author: ROTHENBERG, J.

text:
    SUMMER JAI ALAI PARTNERS, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, Appellee.
    No. 3D13-395.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 9, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 22, 2013.

      Hunton & Williams LLP, and Paul C. Huck, Jr., Coral Gables; John M. Lockwood, P.A., and John M. Lockwood, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    J. Layne Smith, General Counsel, and Garnett W. Chisenhall, Chief Appellate Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, EMAS, and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, J.

Summer Jai Alai Partners (“Summer Partners”) appeals from a final order of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (“Division”), denying Summer Partners’ request to relocate its converted summer jai alai permit. Because the Division’s interpretation of statutes relating to pari-mutuel wagering is entitled to great deference and its interpretation is not clearly erroneous, contrary to legislative intent, or in conflict -with the plain and ordinary meaning of the relevant statutes, we affirm.

A pari-mutuel permit was issued to Miami Beach Kennel Club, Inc., to conduct greyhound racing, which took effect upon approval by a majority of the electors who participated in a ratification election. In March 1980, Summer Partners acquired the greyhound racing permit, and thereafter, on June 26, 1980, the Division granted Summer Partners’ request to convert the greyhound racing permit to a summer jai alai permit pursuant to Chapter 80-88. Summer Partners then leased an existing jai alai facility at Miami Jai Alai, and Summer Partners has operated from that facility for almost thirty-five years.

Beginning in November 2011, Summer Partners began communicating with the Division regarding its intent, pursuant to section 550.0745(2) of the Florida Statutes, to relocate its summer jai alai permit from Miami Jai Alai to Magic City Casino in Miami-Dade County, while continuing to seasonally operate live jai alai performances at Miami Jai Alai. Section 550.0745(2) provides:

Such permittee is entitled to the issuance of a license for the operation of a jai alai fronton during the summer season as fixed in this section. A permittee granted a license under this section may not conduct pari-mutuel pools during the summer season except at a jai alai fron-ton as provided in this section. Such license authorizes the permittee to operate at any jai alai permittee’s plant it may lease or build within such county.

(Emphasis added).

The Division treated Summer Partners’ notification as a request to amend its summer jai alai permit, and the Division denied the request. In denying the request, the Division explained that upon the conversion of a greyhound racing permit to a summer jai alai permit, section 550.0745(2) authorizes the permittee to operate from any jai alai plant the permittee leases or builds in the county without approval by the electorate. However, once the relocation of the summer jai alai permit has occurred and the permit and license has been issued for that location, the permit-holder must comply with section 550.054, Florida Statutes (2012), if it seeks to relocate the converted summer jai alai permit to a subsequent location. Section 550.054 only allows for a change in location if the requested change is approved by the Division and the electorate. At Summer Partners’ request, the Division entered a final order, and this appeal ensued.

Summer Partners asserts that, contrary to the Division’s determination, which was based on the Division’s interpretation of several pari-mutuel statutes, Summer Partners is not required to obtain the Division’s authorization to relocate its summer jai alai permit, which was converted from a greyhound permit to a summer jai alai permit in 1980 pursuant to the predecessor of section 550.0745(1). In other words, Summer Partners disputes the Division’s interpretation of the relevant pari-mutuel statutes. However, Summer Partners’ argument fails to appreciate this Court’s standard of review.

“[A]n agency’s interpretation of a statute is entitled to considerable deference, and ‘[a] reviewing court properly defers on questions of statutory interpretation to the agency to which the Legislature has given the responsibility and authority to administer the statute, unless the interpretation is clearly erroneous.’ ” State Bd. of Admin. v. Huberty, 46 So.3d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Okeechobee Health Care v. Collins, 726 So.2d 775, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (second alteration in original)). However, “a court need not defer to an agency’s construction or application of a statute if special agency expertise is not required, or if the agency’s interpretation conflicts with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.” Fla. Hosp. v. Agency far Health Care Admin., 823 So.2d 844, 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Thus, because the Division is the state agency that is responsible for regulating pari-mutuel wagering in Florida, see § 550.0251, Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that the Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation “shall administer [Chapter 550] and regulate the pari-mutuel industry under this chapter and the rules adopted pursuant thereto”), the Division’s interpretation of statutes- relating to- parimutuel wagering “is entitled to great deference and should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous or in conflict with the legislative intent of the statute,” Donato v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So.2d 1146 (Fla.2000) (quoting Mayo Clinic Jacksonville v. Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, 625 So.2d 918, 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)), or it “conflicts with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.” Fla. Hosp., 823 So.2d at 848.

Pursuant to section 550.054, pari-mutuel wagering permits and licenses are generally fixed to a specific location. See § 550.054(2) (providing that upon approval of a pari-mutuel wagering application by the Division, “a permit shall be issued to the applicant setting forth ... the location of the pari-mutuel facility; however, a permit is ineffectual to authorize any pari-mutuel performances until approved by a majority of the electors participating in a ratification election in the county in which the applicant proposes to conduct pari-mutuel wagering activities.”); § 550.054(9)(a) (“After a permit has been granted by the division and has been ratified and approved by the majority of the electors participating in the election in the county designated in the permit, the [D]i-vision 'shall grant to the lawful permit-holder, subject to the conditions of this chapter, a license to conduct pari-mutuel operations under this chapter, and :.. the [DJivision shall fix annually the time, place, and number of days during which pari-mutuel operations may be conducted by the permitholder at the location fixed in the permit and ratified in the election.”) (emphasis added); see also § 550.0115, Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that after the Division issues a pari-mutu-el wagering permit and after the permit has been approved by the electorate, “the [Division shall issue to the permitholder an annual license to conduct pari-mutuel operations at the location specified in the permit pursuant to the provisions of this chapter”).

Summer Partners asserts that the Division erroneously relied on section 550.054 because that provision, which relates to pari-mutuel permits in general, is in conflict with section 550.0745, which relates specifically to summer jai alai permits. In support of its position, Summer Partners relies on subsection (2) of section 550.0745, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Such permittee is entitled to the issuance of a license for the operation of a jai alai fronton during the summer season.... Such license authorizes the permittee to operate at any jai alai permittee’s plant it may lease or build within such county.” (emphasis added).

The Division determined that section 550.0745(2) does not allow a summer jai alai permitholder to continuously relocate its permit. The Division’s interpretation begins with its recognition of the general provisions regulating pari-mutuel permits. Generally, the location of a pari-mutuel permit is fixed once it has been approved by the Division, ratified and approved by the electorate, and issued by the Division. § 550.054. Section 550.0745, which pertains to the conversion of an underper-forming pari-mutuel permit to a summer jai alai permit, provides an exception to this general rule. Specifically, subsection (1) authorizes the conversion of pari-mutu-el permits to summer jai alai permits. Subsection (2) provides that the issuance of a license to operate at a jai alai fronton during the summer season “authorizes the permittee to operate at any jai alai permit-tee’s plant it may lease or build within such county.” The Division interprets this exception as applying to summer jai alai permits at the time of conversion, but not for subsequent attempts to relocate the operation of a summer jai alai pari-mutuel fronton. Thus, according to the Division’s interpretation of the statutes, at the time of conversion, the permittee is free to choose the location of its operation, and subsection (2) does not authorize a summer jai alai permittee to continuously relocate its operation without approval.

The Division’s interpretation is supported by the language set forth in subsection (1), which provides: “Such permittee ... is bound by all of the rules and provisions of this chapter which apply to the operation of winter jai alai frontons.” § 550.0745(1). Consequently, the Division concluded that section 550.054 also applies to the holder of a summer jai alai permit, and therefore, like a winter jai alai permit, the summer jai alai permit is tied to a specific location. As Summer Partners has already placed its converted summer jai alai permit at the Miami Jai Alai facility, the Division claims that Summer Partners’ request to relocate the summer jai alai permit to the Magic City Casino location was properly denied.

Because we must give great deference to the Division’s interpretation of the relevant statutes it is charged with administering, and we cannot say its interpretation is clearly erroneous, contrary to legislative intent, or in conflict with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutes, we affirm the final order entered by the Division denying Summer Partners’ request to relocate its summer jai alai permit.

Affirmed.

      . Chapter 80-88, § 1, at 284, Laws of Florida, which took effect in mid-June 1980, first appeared in the 1981 version of the Florida Statutes as section 550.074, titled "Conversion of pari-mutuel permit to summer jai alai permit." Section 550.074 is the predecessor to section 550.0745, Florida Statutes (2012), and the changes between section 550.074(1), Florida Statutes (1981), and the current version of section 550.0745(1) are not material to the instant appeal. As did section 550.074(1), section 550.0745(1) allows the owner or operator of certain underperforming pari-mutuel permits to apply to the Division to convert the underperforming pari-mutuel permit to a "permit to conduct a summer jai alai fronton in such county during the summer season." Section 550.0745(1), Florida Statutes (2012), provides as follows:
      (1) The owner or operator of a pari-mu-tuel permit who is authorized by the division to conduct pari-mutuel pools on exhibition sports in any county having five or more such pari-mutuel permits and whose mutuel play from the operation of such pari-mutuel pools for the 2 consecutive years next prior to filing an application under this section has had the smallest play or total pool within the county may apply to the division to convert its permit to a permit to conduct a summer jai alai fronton in such county during the summer season commencing on May 1 and ending on November 30 of each year on such dates as may be selected by such permittee for the same number of days and performances as are allowed and granted to winter jai alai frontons within such county. If a permittee who is eligible under this section to convert a permit declines to convert, a new permit is hereby made available in that permittee’s county to conduct summer jai alai games as provided by this section, notwithstanding mileage and permit ratification requirements. If a permittee converts a quarter horse permit pursuant to this section, nothing in this section prohibits the permittee from obtaining another quarter horse permit. Such permittee shall pay the same taxes as are fixed and required to be paid from the pari-mutuel pools of winter jai alai permittees and is bound by all of the rules and provisions of this chapter which apply to the operation of winter jai alai frontons. Such permittee shall only be permitted to operate a jai alai fronton after its application has been submitted to the division and its license has been issued pursuant to the application. The license is renewable from year to year as provided by law.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    AMERICAN FEDERATED TITLE CORP., as Trustee, Appellant, v. GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A., Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2645.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 9, 2013.
    Arnstein & Lehr LLP, and Franklin L. Zemel, John M. Cooney, and Lori Adelson, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Ross & Girten, and Lauri Waldman Ross, Miami; Coffey Burlington, PL, and Paul J. Schwiep, Miami, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, FERNANDEZ and LOGUE, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Wolfe v. Foreman, 128 So.3d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Latam Invs., LLC v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 88 So.3d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).


author: LEWIS, C.J. BENTON, J., MAKAR, J.,

text:
    ANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, INC. and Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated, Petitioners, v. Christopher STAPLES, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-1038.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 9, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 2013.

      E.T. Fernandez, III and Brian Sebaaly of Fernandez Trial Lawyers, P.A., Jacksonville, for Petitioners.
    Philip S. Kinney of Kinney & Sasso, PL, Jacksonville and Brett Hastings of Brett A. Hastings, P.A., Jacksonville, for Respondent.
   LEWIS, C.J.

Petitioners, Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. and Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated, petition for a writ of certiorari and challenge an Order Disqualifying Law Firm. We conclude that the trial court, based upon the record before it, did not depart from the essential requirements of the law in determining that a conflict of interest existed and in disqualifying the law firm representing both Petitioners, the alleged tortfeasors in a negligence suit brought by Respondent, Christopher Staples, and Respondent’s employer with respect to its workers’ compensation lien claim against any judgment awarded to Respondent as a result of his lawsuit. We, therefore, deny the certiorari petition.

After he was injured while working for his employer, Respondent received workers’ compensation benefits. He subsequently filed a negligence/premises liability action against Petitioners, seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the accident occurring on their premises. The law firm at issue entered an appearance on behalf of Petitioners in the tort action. The firm also filed a Notice of Lien pursuant to section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes, in the tort action on behalf of the employer. Prior to a scheduled mediation, Respondent moved to disqualify the law firm. Both Petitioners and Respondent’s employer filed a Consent to Representation with respect to the law firm. The trial court entered an order disqualifying the firm, finding in part that the interests of the firm’s clients were directly adverse to one another. After determining that Respondent had standing to raise the conflict of interest, the trial court noted that even if Respondent lacked the requisite standing, it would have raised the issue itself and reached the conclusion that disqualification was necessary. It also determined under Rule 4-1.7 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct that the conflict could not be waived because it was unreasonable for the firm to believe that it would be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client and because the representation of Petitioners involved'the assertion of a position adverse to Respondent’s employer.

Petitioners filed a motion for rehearing and claimed for the first time that an indemnity agreement existed between themselves and the employer and that, as a result, the trial court’s conclusion that their interests were fundamentally antagonistic to the employer’s interests was erroneous. The indemnity agreement was not attached to the motion or to an accompanying affidavit. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing, and this proceeding followed.

Certiorari is the appropriate remedy to review an order granting a motion to disqualify counsel. See Transmark, U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Ins., 631 So.2d 1112, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). While it is true, as Petitioners and the dissent point out, that disqualification of a party’s counsel is an extraordinary remedy that should be resorted to sparingly, see Vick v. Bailey, 111 So.2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), we find no departure from the essential requirements of the law in this case. The dissent acknowledges that the law firm’s representation of Petitioners and Respondent’s employer amounted to a conflict of interest under rule 4-1.7(a) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. The dissent then characterizes the issue in this proceeding as being whether the trial court’s legal ruling that Petitioners and Respondent’s employer could not waive the conflict departed from the essential requirements of the law. However, the only issues Petitioners have raised before us are whether Respondent had standing to seek disqualification of the law firm and whether, if Respondent had the requisite standing to do so, the existence of the indemnity agreement that was not brought to the trial court’s attention until the filing of Petitioners’ motion for rehearing established that Petitioners’ interests were not fundamentally antagonistic to Respondent’s employer’s interest.

Contrary to the dissent’s characterization of the issue presented in this case, Petitioners have not argued in this proceeding that the trial court’s analysis under rule 4-1.7(b) was erroneous, that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in concluding that the law firm could not reasonably believe that it was capable of providing competent and diligent representation to each affected client under rule 4-1.7(b)(1), or that mediation does not constitute a “proceeding before a tribunal” for purposes of rule 4-1.7(b)(3). In fact, Petitioners did not cite to rule 4-1.7(b) in their certiorari petition or in their reply to Respondent’s response. Nor was any mention of the rule or the trial court’s analysis as to the rule made at oral argument. Although the dissent correctly notes that Petitioners cited to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So.2d 630 (Fla.1991), and Anderson Trucking Service, Inc. v. Gibson, 884 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), in their certiorari petition, neither of those cases cited to rule 4-1.7(b). Moreover, Petitioners relied upon those two' cases in support of their argument that Respondent lacked standing to seek disqualification of the law firm, not in support of any of the issues raised by the dissent. Furthermore, while Respondent’s response to the certiorari petition contains one citation to rule 4-1.7(b), Petitioners made no mention of the rule or the issue of waiver or consent in them reply to the response.

The dissent obviously finds certain aspects of this case concerning. However, we are not at liberty to address issues that were not raised by the parties. See Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 18.5, at 840-41 (2011 ed.) (noting that an issue on appeal must be one that was raised by a party to the proceeding and citing Lightsee v. First National Bank of Melbourne, 132 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961), for the proposition that an appellate court is “not authorized to pass upon issues other than those properly presented on appeal”); David M. Dresdner, M.D., P.A. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 972 So.2d 275, 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (deeming any potential issue pertaining to the final judgment for attorney’s fees and costs waived or abandoned as no argument regarding the issue was made on appeal).

Accordingly, because Petitioners have failed to establish that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law with respect to the specific issues actually raised in this proceeding, we DENY their certiorari petition on the merits.

BENTON, J., concurs with opinion; MAKAR, J., Dissenting.

BENTON, J.,

concurring.

By petition for writ of certiorari, the defendants in a premises liability case ask us to quash the order disqualifying their trial counsel on conflict-of-interest grounds. They argue here, as they did below, that they have given informed consent in writing to the representation, well aware that the same law firm represents the plaintiffs employer, and that the same law firm has filed a lien asserting the plaintiffs employer is entitled to reimbursement, from any recovery the plaintiff may receive from petitioners, for workers’ compensation benefits that the employer paid the plaintiff.

After reciting the facts in its order disqualifying law firm, the trial court ruled that a conflict existed (and that whether or not plaintiff had standing to raise the conflict was “likely moot,”) and then went on:

The next question to be answered is therefore: Can this conflict be waived by the clients?
An untitled subsection (b) of Rule 4-1.7 (“Conflict of Interest; Current Clients”), Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, states:
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a conflict of interest under subdivision (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1)the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a position adverse to another client when the lawyer represents both clients in the same proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing or clearly stated on the record at a hearing.
Each of these four criteria must be met for a lawyer to proceed with dual representation in the face of a conflict of interest. In the present case, neither criterion (1) nor criterion (8) is met. It is not reasonable for the challenged law firm in this case to conclude that it will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to the divergent interests of each client. Further, the representation requires the firm to assert for one or more clients positions which are adverse to those of one or more of the other clients, and to do so in the same proceeding before the same tribunal.
Because fewer than all the requirements of the rule are met, client consent to continued dual representation by the law firm is insufficient to permit the firm to continue its representations in the face of a conflict. The conflict is thus not one capable of being waived by client consent.

As is clear from the trial court’s order, the trial court had not been told of any indemnity agreement between the owner of the premises and the plaintiffs employer when its order was entered. Petitioners did advert to such an agreement in an affidavit attached to their motion for rehearing in the trial court. But they never favored the trial judge with a copy of the indemnity agreement. That did not surface until it appeared in the appendix to the amended petition for writ of certiorari.

Yet in this proceeding petitioners rely heavily on the indemnity agreement for the proposition that any conflict of interest was waived. (Disputing this contention at oral argument, respondent took the position that the agreement did not apply in any event because petitioners alone were alleged to have been negligent.) The belatedly disclosed indemnity agreement is plainly not something we should address now for the first time, or a proper basis for issuance of the writ. For this reason alone, the petition should be denied.

If the respondent had never filed suit, or if the employer had never filed the lien aligning itself against the defendant in the main action, the conflict might have been waivable. But by the time the trial court entered the order under challenge here, these parties were “adversaries in litigation.” As a comment to the Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers explains:

Conflicts between adversaries in litigation. When clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation, the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client’s position renders the conflict nonconsentable (see § 128, Comment c, & § 129). The rule applies even if the parties themselves believe that the common interests are more significant in the matter than the interests dividing them. While the parties might give informed consent to joint representation for purposes of negotiating their differences (see § 130, Comment d), the joint representation may not continue if the parties become opposed to each other in litigation.

Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 122 cmt. g(iii) (2013). The employer’s lien was filed, not with the mediator, but with the court. Thereafter, the conflict between the employer and the petitioners became, in the terminology of the restatement, “nonconsentable.”

The filing of the lien in this case was “the assertion of a position adverse to another client when the lawyer represents both clients in the same proceeding before a tribunal.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(b)(3). The premises liability claim remained unresolved. Cf. City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So.2d 1196, 1198-1202 (Fla.2000). Counsel filed the employer’s lien in the judicial proceeding, not in the mediation, which was, after all, court-ordered. The employer-by seeking to participate in any recovery with its employee, the plaintiff (respondent)-asserted a position (as a statutory indemnitee) adverse to petitioners, the defending owners of the premises “in the same proceeding before a tribunal,” the Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Court. Id. See generally The Club at Hokuli'a, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., No. 10-00241 JMS-LEK, 2010 WL 3465278, at *5 (D.Haw. Sept.3, 2010) report and recommendation adopted sub nom, 2010 WL 4386741 (D.Haw.2010) (“Oceanside notes that, as a general rule, indemnitors are aligned with their indem-nitees in cases where the principal obligation is in dispute”).

MAKAR, J.,

dissenting.

I.

While at an Anheuser-Busch (A-B) brewing and shipping facility in Jacksonville, Florida, Christopher Staples was involved in an accident connected to his employment with Container Carrier Corporation (Container). Mr. Staples received workers’ compensation benefits from Container, which is self-insured. Mr. Staples then filed suit against A-B, seeking to recover on negligence and premises liability theories.

Fernandez Trial Attorneys, P.A. (Fernandez), which had been A-B’s legal counsel in the past, appeared on behalf of A-B in the lawsuit. Pertinent to this proceeding, Fernandez also filed a notice of lien on behalf of Staples’s employer, Container, against any future judgment in Mr. Staples’s favor to recoup its expenditures in the workers’ compensation proceeding.

Mediation in the matter was scheduled, but cancelled after Mr. Staples’s counsel made an issue of Fernandez representing both A-B and Container at the mediation. Fernandez indicated that it would attend on behalf of A-B and that a non-lawyer claims manager employed by Container would attend on behalf of that company. Upon cancellation of the mediation, Mr. Staples promptly filed a motion alleging that a conflict of interests existed between A-B and Container and that Fernandez should be disqualified from further representing A-B and Container in the case.

Fernandez responded with client waivers demonstrating that both A-B and Container understood and consented to Fernandez representing their interests jointly. Both companies waived “any conflict which may currently or in the future exist because of the law firm’s representation” of them in the litigation. The trial court, after considering legal memoranda and argument of counsel, issued a lengthy order that, distilled to its core, found as a matter of law that a non-waivable conflict existed as to Fernandez’s concurrent representation of A-B and Container. The trial court prohibited Fernandez from representing either A-B or Container, allowing both companies thirty days to get new lawyers to represent them individually. Fernandez seeks certiorari review, asserting the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in denying AB and Container their right to be represented by counsel of their choice. See Yang Enterprises, Inc. v. Georgalis, 988 So.2d 1180, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Certiorari is the appropriate remedy to review orders denying a motion to disqualify counsel.”). As this Court recently noted, “because disqualification of counsel denies a party its counsel of choice, such disqualification constitutes a material injury not remediable on plenary appeal.” Walker v. River City Logistics Inc., 14 So.3d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Thus, the only question is whether the order below departed from the essential requirements of law. Id. .

It

Disqualification of a lawyer is a serious matter, so serious that it is highly disfavored because it operates to deprive a litigant of its chosen attorney, interfering with a relationship having constitutional implications. In re BellSouth Corp., 384 F.3d 941, 955-56 (11th Cir.2003). It follows that disqualification of counsel is an extraordinary step, resorted to only sparingly. Melton v. State, 56 So.3d 868, 872-73 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citing Minakan v. Husted, 27 So.3d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Walker, 14 So.3d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)). Motions for disqualification are “generally viewed with skepticism because ... [they] are often interposed for tactical purposes.” Yang Enterprises, 988 So.2d at 1183 (citations omitted).

No dispute exists that Fernandez’s representation of A-B and Container in fhis litigation amounts to a conflict as defined under the Rules of Professional Responsibility. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a). But that does not end the analysis. Both A-B and Container recognized this conflict, voluntarily agreed they both wanted Fernandez to represent thém, and explicitly waived the conflict in writing. That was their informed choice to make. What constitutes a conflict under subsection (a) of Rule 4-1.7 is not necessarily a non-waivable conflict under subsection (b); if that were the case no conflicts could ever be waived. The question raised here is whether the trial court’s legal ruling, that the conflict between A-B and Container was non-waivable under the circumstances presented, departs from the essential requirements of law. It does for two reasons.

A.

First, the interests of A-B and Container in this routine tort case are not so fundamentally antagonistic that disqualification is compelled. It is not uncommon that clients choose to have one lawyer represent their interests jointly, even if a conflict exists. If clients are fully informed and make voluntary decisions to allow for joint representation (here through written waivers), the basic concerns of the Rules are ameliorated.

To demonstrate that a conflict is one to which a client may consent, four criteria must be met:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a position adverse to another client when the lawyer represents both clients in the same proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing or clearly stated on the record at a hearing.

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(b). The trial court set out these criteria in its order, holding that criteria (1) and (3) were not shown. Though the trial court’s order is lengthy, the totality of its reasoning as to these two criteria is contained in these two sentences:

It is not reasonable for the challenged law firm in this case to conclude that it will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to the divergent interests of each client. Further, the representation requires the firm to assert for one or more clients positions which are adverse to those of one or more of the other clients, and to do so in the same proceeding before the same tribunal.

Addressing the first sentence, it is clear legal error to conclude that a lawyer cannot reasonably represent two sophisticated corporate businesses that have voluntarily and specifically averred that they desire the lawyer to jointly represent them and waive in writing “any conflict which may currently or in the future exist because of the law firm’s representation” in the matter. To the contrary, it is presumptively reasonable for a lawyer representing A-B and Container under the circumstances of this ease at the mediation stage to believe he will be able to “provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client.” Id. Multi-party representation may not be the norm, but it has become commonplace due to its significant benefits (and risks) that the parties may choose to bear. See William E. Wright, Jr., Ethical Considerations In Representing Multiple Parties In Litigation, 79 Tul. L.Rev. 1523, 1526 (2005) (discussing ethical considerations and practical issues arising in multiple-party representation) (noting that “applying economic realities and recognizing strategic alliances, it is often advantageous to limit the number of attorneys involved in litigation”).

Nothing in the record establishes that joint representation was other than reasonable. Fernandez believed it could provide competent and diligent representation to A-B and Container, an assessment in which both companies concurred. Mr. Staples’s counsel could identify no prejudice arising from the joint representation. As such, the trial court’s ruling to the contrary simply disregards the voluntary, fully-informed decisions of A-B and Container, thereby depriving two clients of their chosen lawyer’s services. Harm of this type and magnitude is irremediable once judgment is entered making certiora-ri appropriate. While trial courts should be wary, as the trial court here was, to potential conflicts that run afoul of the Rules, the joint representation of A-B and Container, supported by written waivers, with no countervailing harm to Mr. Staples, provides no legal basis to conclude that criterion (1) was unmet.

B.

Next, the second sentence — which is an almost verbatim statement of the language of criterion (3) — misapprehends the procedural context of the case. The third criterion only applies where “the representation does not involve the assertion of a position adverse to another client when the lawyer represents both clients in the same proceeding before a tribunal.” (Emphasis added). This criterion does not apply in this case at this juncture because mediation is not a “proceeding before a tribunal.” The Florida Bar Rules define “Tribunal” as

a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding, or a legislative body, administrative agency, or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A ... body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular matter.

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4 (preamble). Me-diations do not meet this definition; no neutral official renders a binding legal judgment. Instead, in mediation the “de-cisionmaking authority rests with the parties.” § 44.1011, Fla. Stat. The mediator lacks authority to adjudicate any aspect of a dispute. Fla. R. Med. 10.420(a)(2). Because mediation does not meet the definition of “tribunal,” a mediation cannot be a “proceeding before a tribunal” as specified in Rule 4 — 1.7(b)(3).

Florida Rule 4-1.7 is an analogue of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7, which likewise prohibits representation involving “the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal.” Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.7. The definition of tribunal is also similar. Id. R. 1.0. Notably, the commentary to Model Rule 1.7, discussing paragraph (b)(3), states that “this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer’s multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a “tribunal” under [the terminology rule]).” Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 17. Because mediation is not a proceeding before a tribunal, criterion (3) of Rule 4-1.7(b) is met, and the conflict presented in this case was one to which A-B and Container may consent at the mediation stage.

That mediation is outside of the Rule’s application is consistent with the goal that mediation be a cost-efficient way to resolve disputes. Here, the disqualification order did the opposite; it created a domino effect that multiplied the costs on two companies that did no more than try to reduce their legal expense by using one law firm. Such a result makes little sense in the mediation context.

Beyond that, counsel for Mr. Staples at oral argument was unable to identify any harm to Mr. Staples’s interests that would result from the Fernandez firm’s joint representation; none. Even if A-B and Container were to hire separate counsel, nothing would prevent the new attorneys from collaborating on behalf of their clients. Given the irremediable harm to A-B and Container it causes, and the absence of any harm to Mr. Staples from the joint representation by Fernandez, the disqualification of Fernandez has no utility other than as an impediment to mediation. If allowed to stand, the order may embolden the tactical use of threats of disqualification as a strategy to gain settlement leverage at the mediation stage by potentially raising litigation costs to opponents.

A side issue that has no bearing on the legal issue presented is the trial court’s denial of A-B and Container’s motion for rehearing. Perhaps because they believed their written waivers were sufficient to resolve the conflict issue, or even for their own strategic reasons, A-B and Container did not initially disclose a previously signed indemnity agreement between themselves. The agreement — identified in an affidavit submitted with their motion for rehearing-reflects that Container agreed to indemnify A-B for any liability in this case. The effect of the agreement aligned the interests of A-B and Container because any judgment against A-B would be a liability of Container. The trial court was not made aware of this agreement prior to its initial decision; had it been brought to the trial court’s attention, it would have been helpful in solidifying that the joint representation met applicable legal standards. Even without the indemnity agreement, the record sufficiently shows that disqualification of Fernandez was unwarranted.

III.

Because the trial court’s ruling departs from the essential requirements of law, depriving two clients of the services of their chosen counsel, the disqualification order should be reversed with instructions to allow Fernandez to represent both A-B and Container.

      . Petitioners do not argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for rehearing. See Fitchner v. Lifesouth Cmty. Blood Ctrs., Inc., 88 So.3d 269, 278 (Fla.1st DCA 2012) (noting that trial courts are not required to consider new issues presented for .the first time on rehearing).

      . We note that even if Petitioners had raised the issues addressed by the dissent, we would still deny the certiorari petition. We disagree with the dissent's assertion that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in determining, pursuant to rule 4-1.7(b)(1), that it was unreasonable for the law firm to believe that it could provide competent and diligent representation to both Petitioners and Respondent’s employer. As the trial court reasoned based upon the facts before it, Petitioners' interest would lie in minimizing the damages awarded by a verdict or settlement while the employer’s interest would lie in helping Respondent recover the maximum possible damages against Petitioners so that it could maximize its recovery on its workers’ compensation lien. With respect to rule 4-1.7(b)(3), while the dissent focuses on whether mediation constitutes a "proceeding before a tribunal,” the employer’s Notice of Lien was filed in the underlying tort case. There is no question that the underlying case constitutes a "proceeding before a tribunal.” As such, the dissent's focus on mediation is much too narrow.

      . The trial court set out its fact findings in numbered paragraphs as follows:

        This case arises from the following circumstances:
      1. The Plaintiff, Christopher Staples ("Plaintiff”), was an employee of Container Carrier Corporation ("Employer”).
      2. On January 27, 2003, while working for the Employer, the Plaintiff was injured at the Jacksonville brewing and shipping facility of Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Plaintiff alleges that the accident occurred because of the negligence of two related Anheuser-Busch entities, An-heuser-Busch Companies, Inc., and Anheu-ser-Busch, Inc. ("Defendants”).
      3. The Employer is a corporation separate and distinct from the Defendant corporations.
      4. The Plaintiff received worker's compensation benefits from the Employer as a result of this accident. Because the Employer is self-insured against worker’s compensation claims, there is no Carrier in the worker’s compensation case.
      5. The Plaintiff filed a negligence/premises liability action against the Defendants, seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the January 27, 2003, accident at the Defendants’ brewery.
      6. The law firm of Fernandez Trial Lawyers, P.A. ("the firm”), which has represented the Defendants in past actions, entered an appearance on behalf of both Defendants in this tort action.
      7. The firm also filed a Notice of Lien in this tort action on behalf of the Employer. The lien was filed pursuant to section 440.39(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
      8. When mediation was scheduled for November 1, 2012, in this case, Plaintiff's counsel discussed with the firm his concern about the fact that the firm was representing both the Defendants in the tort action and the Employer in the same action. On behalf of the firm, attorney E.T. Fernandez, III, responded in writing, indicating that the interest of the Employer with regard to the worker’s compensation lien would be addressed at mediation by, and negotiated by, Mr. James Gourley, a non-lawyer claims manager employed by the Employer. Because Plaintiff's counsel still had continuing concerns, the mediation was cancelled.
      9. After learning of the dual representation, Plaintiff’s counsel moved promptly to file the pending disqualification motion.
      10. Both the Defendants in the tort case and the Employer have filed waivers of any conflict which may currently or in the future exist because of the law firm’s representation of all three in the tort case.
      (Footnotes omitted.)

      . The trial court ruled:
      [Ejven if Plaintiff here had no standing, the Court would "raise the question" of disqualification itself and reach the same result required by this order. Consequently, the issue of Plaintiff’s standing to pursue disqualification is likely moot.

      . Fernandez’s petition, though not citing Rule 4-1.7, asserts that its disqualification was improper because the trial court misapplied the legal standard, tracking language from the caselaw interpreting the rule. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So.2d 630 (Fla.1991) (citing Rule 4-1.7); Anderson Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Gibson, 884 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing K.A.W.). Mr. Staples’s response, understanding the nature of Fernandez’s legal challenge, contains citations to the caselaw applying Rule 4-1.7 as well as to both subsections of Rule 4-1.7. Identification of the specific judicial act to be reviewed (the disqualification order) and the legal reasoning for its reversal (it applied the incorrect legal standard under the caselaw applying Rule 4-1.7) enables appellate review. See Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 16:9 (2012 ed.) (citing cases).

      . That A-B and Container have agreed to joint representation by Fernandez does not end Fernandez’s ethical responsibilities, which include continual reevaluation of the joint representation under ethical rules and full, ongoing communications with A-B and Container as circumstances evolve or change.

      . If the case goes beyond meditation and a "proceeding before a tribunal” — such as a trial — is scheduled, the question of whether a conflict then exists can be raised. At that point,' the trial court can assess whether joint representation, if it still exists, will involve the "assertion of a position adverse to another client” that fails to meet 4-1.7(b) — along with the other, criteria of the Rule. Whether a lienor would appear at trial in this type of case is doubtful, but it might occur.

      . Tempering this tactic is that litigants, absent a special relationship to the lawyers sought to be disqualified, ordinarily will lack standing to make formal motions to disqualify. See Zarco Supply Co. v. Bonnell, 658 So.2d 151, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (finding standing only where movant could demonstrate prejudice). Here, the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Staples had standing to seek to disqualify Fernandez because, as admitted at oral argument, Mr. Staples can point to no prejudice arising from the joint representation by Fernandez. The trial court, however, can sua sponte raise conflict issues, making Mr. Staples’s standing a non-issue.


text:
    Christopher HOUSTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-4649.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 10, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 2013.
    Christopher Houston, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

WOLF, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


author: WALLIS, J.

text:
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellant, v. Daniel P. MORCOM and Sharon Morcom, Appellees.
    No. 5D11-4089.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
    Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 20, 2013.
    Michael K. Winston, Dean A. Morande and Donna L. Eng of Carlton Fields, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellant.
    Steven P. Combs, Deborah L. Greene, Robert S. Jeffrey, Shane Herbert and Andrea Combs Jevic of Combs Greene McLester, Jacksonville, for Appellees.
   WALLIS, J.

Appellant appeals the lower court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, in which the trial court held that to have standing to foreclose a mortgage, a party must be the holder and owner of the promissory note. Because the Florida Uniform Commercial Code (“Florida UCC”) and our previous decision in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Lippi, 78 So.3d 81 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), require a party seeking foreclosure to be the holder of the note, we reverse.

Appellant filed a complaint on August 6, 2010, seeking to foreclose a mortgage issued by Appellees. Appellant alleged, inter alia, that “Mortgagee shown on the Mortgage attached as an exhibit is the original Mortgagee” and “Plaintiff is now entitled to enforce Mortgage and Mortgage Note pursuant to Florida Statutes § 673.3011.” Appellant attached to the complaint copies of the mortgage and the promissory note. The note is endorsed “pay to the order of _ without recourse,” with the blank space populated with a stamp of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

On August 9, 2011, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Appellant was not the owner of the note and mortgage. At the hearing on Appel-lees’ motion for summary judgment, Ap-pellees argued that Appellant conceded in its response to request for admissions that Appellant was not the owner of the note or mortgage. However, Appellees agreed that Appellant held the original note. In its order, the lower court indicated that the issue before the lower court was whether “standing in a classic foreclosure case requires evidence that the plaintiff is the owner of the note and mortgage, even though the plaintiff has the right to enforce the note pursuant to the [Florida UCC].” Furthermore, the lower court sustained the objection to any evidence that Appellant was proceeding in a representative capacity because this was not pled in the complaint. The order also found that Appellant is the holder of the note, but that the production of the note provides no evidence of ownership. The lower court denied Appellant’s motion for rehearing.

The standard of review governing the ruling of a trial court on a motion for summary judgment posing a pure question of law is de novo. Delta Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 937 So.2d 695, 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citations omitted). We review findings regarding standing de novo. Fox v. Prof'l Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So.2d 175, 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

The Florida UCC and recent cases from this court stand for the proposition that a plaintiff has standing to bring a foreclosure action if the plaintiff is the holder of a promissory note, endorsed in blank, secured by a mortgage. The controlling law found in the Florida UCC defines the “person entitled to enforce an instrument” as:

(1) The holder of the instrument;
(2) A nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or
(3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to s. 673.3091 or 673.4181(4).
A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.

§ 673.3011, Fla. Stat. (2010).

We have previously held that “[t]he party that holds the note and mortgage in question has standing to bring and maintain a foreclosure action.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Lippi, 78 So.3d 81, 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citing Philogene v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp. Inc., 948 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). “[T]he person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder.” Lippi, 78 So.3d at 84 (quoting Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 44 So.3d 618, 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)). In Lippi, Deutsche Bank’s second amended complaint contained the language that it “is now the holder of the Mortgage Note and Mortgage and/or is entitled to enforce the Mortgage Note and Mortgage.” Lippi, 78 So.3d at 84. The facts in Lippi are almost identical to Appellant’s complaint in the present case, which provides that the “Mortgagee shown on the Mortgage attached as an exhibit is the original Mortgagee” and “Plaintiff is now entitled to enforce Mortgage and Mortgage Note pursuant to Florida Statutes § 673.3011.” The Lippi court held, where the note was endorsed in blank, meaning it was “payable to the bearer and could be transferred simply by possession,” Deutsche Bank’s standing was established because it was the note holder, regardless of any recorded assignments. Lippi, 78 So.3d at 85 (citing Harvey v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 69 So.3d 300, 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)); see also § 673.2051, Fla. Stat. (2010).

In the present case, the original note Appellant attached was endorsed in blank with Appellant’s name stamped in the blank endorsement field, which, paired with section 673.3011(1), established that Appellant was the holder entitled to enforce the instrument.

Applying portions of the Florida UCC, other district courts of appeal have determined that a party that holds a note endorsed in blank has standing to foreclose a mortgage. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Knight, 90 So.3d 824, 825-26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Riggs v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 36 So.3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Mortg. Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So.2d 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Mortg. Elect. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Revoredo, 955 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Appellees cite Florida Supreme Court precedent dating back to the late 1800s to suggest Appellant must both hold and own the note and mortgage to satisfy the standing requirement for a foreclosure action. The cases Appellees cite are not persuasive because the supreme court decided the cases prior to the adoption of the now-instructive and binding Florida UCC.

Based on this court’s precedent in Lippi and the applicability of the Florida UCC, we reverse the lower court’s order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . Subsequently, Appellant filed the original note with the lower court on September 15, 2011.

        . Florida adopted the UCC on January 1, 1967. See Suburbia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bel-Air Conditioning Co., 385 So.2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see also Warren Fin., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.A., 552 So.2d 194, 196 n. 2 (Fla.1989) ("Florida has adopted the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code by statute in chapters 671-680, Florida Statutes.”).

      . Because we hold the holder of a note endorsed in blank has standing to foreclose, it is unnecessary to address any issues regarding deficiencies in Appellant's complaint.


text:
    James E. JORDAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D13-1884.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 2013.
    James E. Jordan, Crawfordville, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Logan v. State, 1 So.3d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“The prosecutor’s alleged failure to have received sworn testimony from witnesses before filing the information in this case ... cannot be raised once a defendant has entered a plea to the merits of the charge. Such a claim is not grounds for postconviction relief.”).

TORPY, C.J., SAWAYA and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Petitioner, v. Wendy HABEGGER, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-2644.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 16, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 2013.

      Pamela E. Langham, Gulf Breeze, for Petitioner.
    Cecile M. Scoon of Peters & Scoon, Panama City; Dennis K. Larry and Jason W. Peterson of Clark, Partington, Hart, Bond, Pensacola; and Larry A. Matthews and Raymond F. Higgins of Matthews & Higgins, LLC, Pensacola, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The defendant/petitioner, University of West Florida (UWF) Board of Trustees, seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court’s order denying its motion for protective order and compelling the deposition of UWF President, Judith Bense, in the lawsuit initiated by the plaintiff/respondent, Wendy Habegger. We grant the petition and quash the portion of the trial court’s order compelling the deposition of President Bense.

The respondent was employed as a professor at UWF. In January 2009, her contract with UWF was terminated. Pursuant to her collective bargaining agreement, she remained employed until January 2010. After her contract was terminated, the respondent filed a several count employment discrimination lawsuit against the petitioner. The complaint also included a claim for tortious interference with business relationship against defendant David Dickey that alleged Dickey had interfered with her business relationship with UWF by communicating disparaging information about her to UWF and to the public.

In conducting discovery of her claim against defendant Dickey, the respondent sought to depose President Bense based upon the allegation that Dickey had communicated disparaging information about her to President Bense. President Bense confirmed that she had had one conversation with Dickey, in May 2009, but asserted that the conversation was not relevant to the respondent’s claim and had no bearing upon the decision to terminate the respondent because that decision had been made four to five months earlier. President Bense also asserted that she was not involved in the decision to terminate the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion for protective order objecting to the deposition of President Bense. The petitioner argued that there were less intrusive alternative discovery methods for the respondent to obtain the same information and that forcing President Bense to testify at a deposition was unnecessary and unduly burdensome. The respondent urged that deposing President Bense was relevant and necessary, and the trial court agreed, denying the motion for protective order and compelling President Bense’s deposition. The trial court found that the respondent was not required to exhaust all alternative discovery mechanisms because President Bense had acknowledged direct contact with defendant Dickey.

In seeking a writ of certiorari, the petitioner is required to demonstrate that the trial court’s order: (1) departs from the essential requirements of law, (2) results in a material injury for the remainder of the case, and (3) cannot be corrected on appeal. See Home v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 901 So.2d 238, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The second and third prongs relating to irreparable injury must be satisfied as a condition precedent to invoking this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction. See Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So.2d 214 (Fla.1998). Here, the petitioner has demonstrated an irreparable injury warranting certiorari relief. Wrongfully compelling the deposition of President Bense would result in a harm that cannot be undone. See Horne, 901 So.2d at 240 (“Orders granting discovery requests have traditionally been reviewed by certiorari because once discovery is wrongfully granted, the complaining party is beyond relief.”). Further, compelling the deposition of President Bense in this context could have future widespread ramifications and subject her to depositions in numerous other employment disputes. Cf. Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Dade Cnty. Police Benev. Ass’n, 103 So.3d 236, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (finding that the Court had jurisdiction over the certiorari petition to review an order directing a mayor to testify that could result in an irremediable injury and have widespread.ramifications that would detrimentally affect the efficient operation of the legislative branch and -government as a whole). Thus, the question becomes whether the trial court’s order departed from the essential requirements of law.

In seeking to depose President Bense, the President and CEO of UWF, the respondent was required to satisfy two requirements: (1) exhaust other discovery tools and' (2) show that the agency head was uniquely able to provide relevant information which could not be obtained from other sources. See Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cnty., 810 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding that an agency head should not be subject to deposition over objection “unless and until the opposing parties have exhausted other discovery and can demonstrate that the agency, head is uniquely able to provide relevant information which cannot be obtained from other sources”); Home, 901 So.2d at 240. As to the first prong, the respondent admits that she did not exhaust other discovery tools prior to seeking to depose President Bense, but argues that .requirement was not necessary as President Bense acknowledged a direct conversation with defendant Dickey and only President Bense had knowledge of the content of their conversation. We disagree that President Bense’s acknowledged direct contact relieved the respondent of her obligation to at least attempt to seek the information via other discovery tools. See Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 810 So.2d at 1058 (finding that an agency head should not be subject to deposition over objection “unless and until the opposing parties have exhausted other discovery ... ”). (Emphasis added.)

Even assuming the respondent was not obligated to exhaust other discovery tools, compelling President Bense’s deposition was in error because the respondent failed to show that President Bense could provide relevant information not available from other sources. Discovery is usually permitted only on matters that are relevant or that are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280. See also City of Gainesville v. Scotty’s, Inc., 489 So.2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“The right of discovery does not extend to matters which are irrelevant or which cannot reasonably be expected to lead to the discovery of relevant matters.”).

The respondent sought President Bense’s deposition only with regard to her tortious interference with business claim against defendant Dickey. To bring a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship, the respondent was required to show:

(1) the existence of a business relationship, not necessarily evidenced by an enforceable contract; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by the defendant; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship.

Se. Integrated Med., P.L. v. N. Fla. Women’s Physicians, P.A., 50 So.3d 21, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton, 463 So.2d 1126, 1127 (Fla.1985)). “Imbedded within these elements is the requirement that the plaintiff establish that the defendant’s conduct caused or induced the breach that resulted in the plaintiffs damages.” Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Alday-Donalson Title Co. of Fla., Inc., 832 So.2d 810, 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Fernberg Geological Srvs., Inc., 784 So.2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)).

It is undisputed that the respondent’s employment relationship was terminated as of January 2009. The evidence also showed that defendant Dickey began contacting UWF regarding the respondent in April or May 2009. The only documented conversation between President Bense and defendant Dickey was in May 2009 — four to five months after the respondent’s contract was terminated. President Bense’s affidavit provided that this was the only conversation she had with defendant Dickey and that she had no input on the decision to terminate the respondent’s contract. The respondent failed to establish that her employment relationship was terminated as a result of any interaction between President Bense and defendant Dickey. See id. at 814 (affirming summary judgment of a tortious interference claim where the evidence showed that the decision to breach the contract had been made prior to any alleged tortious interference of the defendant and there was no evidence that the defendant took any action that caused or induced the breach). Therefore, President Bense’s deposition was unnecessary and irrelevant to the respondent’s claim for tortious interference against defendant Dickey.

The respondent also generally alleges that she was negatively affected after the May 2009 conversation between President Bense and defendant Dickey because her grievance was denied and she was treated negatively by her colleagues. However, this does not change the fact that her employment relationship with UWF had already been terminated. Further, the respondent failed to make any effort to establish a correlation between President Bense’s contact with defendant Dickey and these alleged negative events. As the respondent failed to show that President Bense’s deposition could be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence, the order denying the motion for protective order and compelling the discovery of President Bense departed from the essential requirements of law. Cf. Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Atl. Hospitality of Fla., LLC, 57 So.3d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (granting certiorari and quashing orders compelling the deposition of company president where the respondent failed to show that the president’s deposition would be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence). Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order denying the petitioner’s motion for protective order and compelling the deposition of President Bense.

Petition GRANTED and order compelling deposition QUASHED.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tyrell MOBLEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D-13-2190.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 18, 2013.
    Tyrell Mobley, Crawfordville, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence in Case Nos. 2010-402-CF, 11-271-CF and 11-277-CF, in the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County, Florida. See Fla. RApp. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER, LAWSON and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael BOYINGTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-6131.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 18, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 22, 2013.
    Michael Boyington, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

In this case, Petitioner raises several issues related to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We deny the petition in all respects except as to the issue of the imposition of lump sum fines and costs, for which the State correctly concedes error. While statutorily-mandated costs may be imposed without notice (and thus, need not be individually announced at sentencing), discretionary costs or fines must be orally pronounced at sentencing in order to comport with due process requirements. Sharpe v. State, 115 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Smiley v. State, 704 So.2d 191, 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Here, the fines and costs were assessed as part of a lump sum, which was error. As such, appellate counsel’s failure to file a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct the sentencing error constitutes a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. O’Leary v. State, 2 So.3d 358, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). “The fact that he may ultimately be able to obtain the same relief by way of a different procedural vehicle, such as a rule 3.800(a) motion filed in the circuit court, is irrelevant to the merits of the claims raised in a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Id.

Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated appellate counsel was ineffective on this claim. See Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650, 660 (Fla.2000); Cupon v. State, 833 So.2d 302, 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Consistent with the State’s recommendation, the petition is granted in part and remanded to the lower court to strike the lump sum costs and fines from Petitioner’s sentence. However, we reverse without prejudice to the trial court reimposing the discretionary costs and surcharges after following the appropriate procedures. See Nix v. State, 84 So.3d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding it was error to impose discretionary fine without specifically pronouncing it at sentencing and reversing without prejudice to reimpose the fine following proper procedures); Bright v. State, 689 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (reversing imposition of costs without prejudice for reimposition of statutorily authorized costs after proper notice and hearing); Smiley v. State, 704 So.2d at 195 (reversing imposition of a lump sum of $1,500 in court costs and fines without prejudice to the trial court reimposing authorized sums after following proper procedure). We deny the petition in all other respects.

GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Darryl Maurice YOUNG, Petitioner, v. Chief of INMATE GRIEVANCE APPEAL, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-3922.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 18, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 2013.
    Darryl Maurice Young, pro se, Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus filed August 15, 2013, is denied on the authority of Pettway v. State, 776 So.2d 930 (Fla.2000) (holding that the court will not generally consider the repetitive petitions of persons who have abused the judicial processes of the lower courts such that they have been barred from filing certain actions there).

ROBERTS, SWANSON, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    S.B. and M.B., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-3699.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 18, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 22, 2013.
    S.B. and M. B., pro se, Appellants.
    Drew Parker, General Counsel, Department of Children and Families, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Raysor v. Raysor, 706 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

THOMAS, ROBERTS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dwayne E. ROBERTS, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-3846.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 18, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 22, 2013.
    Dwayne E. Roberts, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lisa Kuhlman Tietig, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. See Gibson v. McDonough, 937 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

LEWIS, C.J., ROWE and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Abderazak ELOFIR, Appellant, v. Wafa HAMANE, Appellee.
    No. 5D13-1686.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 22, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 22, 2013.

      Abderazak Elofir, Orlando, pro se.
    Jeffrey A. Conner, Winter Garden, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.315(a); Applegate v. Barnett Bank, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979).

PALMER, ORFINGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


author: SALTER, J.

text:
    ALFA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Joseph C. THORNTON, III, et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D13-551.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 23, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 2013.

      Scott W. Dutton and Louis Schulman, Tampa, for appellant.
    Richard A. Sherman, Sr. and James W. Sherman, Ft.Lauderdale; Garcia & Smith and Ronald E. Solomon, Key West, for appellees.
    Before LAGOA, SALTER and LOGUE, JJ.
   SALTER, J.

This is an appeal “arising out of’ the interpretation of the term “arising out of,” and other policy terms, in a homeowners and personal liability policy issued by the appellant (Insurer) to the appellees (the Insured). The trial court granted a final summary judgment in favor of the Insured, finding coverage for an unusual accident. The trial court also denied the Insurer’s motion for summary judgment regarding three exclusions in the policy. We reverse, concluding that one of the exclusions was unambiguous and squarely applicable to the accident.

The Undisputed Facts

The pertinent facts relate to an accident in Key West in May 2011. The Insured was walking a dog on a retractable leash on a side road. The dog belonged to a neighbor and friend of the Insured. The Insured stopped to speak to another friend (not the owner of the dog), when a person on a motor scooter (Claimant) came down the road on a path that took her between the Insured and the dog.

The Insured raised the retractable leash in the hopes that neither the Claimant nor the dog would be harmed, but the Claimant ran into the leash, fell from the scooter, and sustained significant injuries. When the Claimant and her husband asserted a claim against the Insured, the Insured notified the Insurer and demanded that the Insurer provide a defense. The Insurer defended them under a reservation of rights, and it brought a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court to establish that the accident was not covered under the policy.

The trial court concluded that the exclusions did not apply, entering final summary declaratory judgments in favor of the Insured and Claimant, and against the Insurer. This appeal followed.

Analysis

The insurance policy was issued to the Insured where they maintain their primary residence — in Alabama. Although we would not reach a different result if we applied Florida law to the exclusion in question, we note that the coverage analysis is governed by the law of Alabama. Rando v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 39 So.3d 244 (Fla.2010) (applying the rule of lex loci contractus). Our review of the summary judgment and the interpretation of the policy terms is de novo.

The insurance policy provided coverage for personal liability as to “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury,” and it also provided a right and duty to defend the Insured against a suit seeking such damages. That coverage was subject to enumerated exclusions, however. One such exclusion applied to “bodily injury or property damage arising out of the care or custody of animals not owned by an insured.” The Insured argued, and the trial court found, that:

The scenario in this case, in which the injured party appears to have driven a motor scooter in a manner so as to collide with a dog leash being held in the air the court finds that the dog had very little to do with this accident at all. It was merely the coincidental and legally remote source of a component, the leash, which was itself harmless until acted upon by [the Insured], holding it up in the air, and [the Claimant], driving into the leash.

Based on that assessment, the trial court concluded that the accident did not involve injury “arising out of’ the Insured’s care or custody of an animal she did not own. The Insured persuaded the trial court that “arising out of’ and “care or custody” were ambiguous, such that the ambiguities would be resolved against the Insurer and in favor of coverage.

Alabama law provides that ambiguity is an issue of law for the court to decide, that a policy term that is undefined in the policy is not necessarily or inherently ambiguous, and that an undefined term should be given the meaning a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably give the term. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Herrera, 912 So.2d 1140 (Ala.2005). Alabama has determined that “arising out of,” as used in an insurance policy, is a term ordinarily understood to mean “originating from,” “having its origin in,” “flowing from,” “incident to,” or “having connection with,” the object or activity which follows it. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Erwin, 393 So.2d 996, 998 (Ala.1981) (quoting Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Ins. Co., 189 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir.1951)).

These meanings are reasonable and consistent. The term “arising out of,” as used in the exclusion (and applied to the facts), is not ambiguous under the cited cases or ordinary usage. The dog extended the leash. No dog, no accident.

Nor do we find any ambiguity in the term “care or custody” of the Insured’s neighbor’s dog. The dog was not in the care of someone other than the Insured at the moment of the accident. Putting the dog on a retractable leash demonstrated the Insured’s care for the animal and established custody. The undisputed facts place the accident within the exclusion.

Conclusion

We may rue the liability that has attended the Insured’s good deed in taking her neighbor’s dog for a walk, but the exclusion addresses a risk that has been reduced to understandable words and phrases. The excluded risk obviously has some basis in the experience of humans, animals, and actuaries.

We reverse the final summary declaratory judgments in favor of the appellees and against the Insured. We remand the case for the entry of a declaratory final judgment in favor of the Insurer on the basis of the “care or custody of animals not owned by an insured” exclusion.

      . The person injured in the accident (Claimant) and her husband also prevailed below and are appellees here.

      . We have not addressed the two additional exclusions advanced by the Insurer. If applicable, those exclusions would only be cumulative.


text:
    Kevin M. McCARTY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, Appellant, v. Robin A. MYERS, A.P., an individual person and Acupuncture Physician, Gregory S. Zwirn, D.C., an individual person and Chiropractic Physician, Sherry L. Smith, L.M.T., an individual person and Licensed Massage Therapist, Carrie C. Damaska, L.M.T., an individual person and Licensed Massage Therapist, “John Doe,” on behalf of all similarly situated health care providers, and “Jane Doe,” on behalf of all those individuals injured by motor vehicle collisions, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-1355.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 23, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 25, 2013.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; C. Timothy Gray, Assistant General Counsel, James Bruce Culpepper, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee; Allen Winsor, Solicitor General; Rachel Nordby, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Luke Charles Lirot, of Luke Charles Lirot, P.A., Clearwater; Adam S. Levine, of Florida Legal Advocacy Group of Tampa Bay, Clearwater, for Appellees.
    Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant: Maria Elena Abate and Matthew C. Scar-fone, of Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlin-sky, Abate & Webb, P.A., Fort Lauderdale for Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, Florida Insurance Council, and American Insurance Association. Kath- ' eriné E. Giddings and Nancy M. Wallace, of Akerman Senterfitt, Tallahassee; Marcy L. Aldrich, of Akerman Senterfitt, Miami, for the Personal Insurance Federation of Florida and the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies.
    Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees: Theodore “Ted” E. Karatinos, of Holliday, Bomhoff & Karatinos, P.L., Lutz, for the Florida Acupuncture Association and the Florida State Oriental Medical Association. Kimberly A. Driggers, of Brooks, LeBoeuf, Bennett, Foster & Gwartney, P.A., Tallahassee; Paul W. Lambert, of Law Office of Paul W. Lambert, Tallahassee, for the Florida Chiropractic Association of America. Mark S. Sussman, Miami, for the Florida State Massage Therapy Association. Jessie L. Harrell and Bryan S. Gow-dy, of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville for the Florida Justice Association.
   PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a non-final order temporarily enjoining Appellant, Kevin M. McCarty, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (“OIR”), from enforcing certain portions of Chapter 2012-197, Laws of Florida (the “2012 PIP Act”), which the trial court determined are inconsistent with the constitutional right of access to courts. Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. Concluding that Appellees lack standing to bring this “access-to-courts” challenge, we reverse the order on appeal.

I. Procedural History

Appellees, who were the plaintiffs below, include Robin A. Myers, A.P. (an acupuncture physician), Gregory S. Zwirn, D.C. (a chiropractic physician), and Sherry L. Smith, L.M.T., and Carrie C. Damaska, L.M.T. (licensed massage therapists). Also listed as a plaintiff is “John Doe,” purportedly representing “all similarly situated citizens of Florida that are actively licensed healthcare providers licensed by Florida pursuant to the Florida Statutes, and/or own businesses providing healthcare services in Florida, and/or provide healthcare services to patients injured as a result of motor vehicle collisions in Florida.” These plaintiffs will be collectively referred to herein as the “Provider Plaintiffs.” An additional plaintiff is “Jane Doe,” who purportedly represents “all those citizens of Florida that are, were, or will be injured as a result of a motor vehicle collision that were also required to purchase $10,000 ... of PIP insurance coverage but may actually only receive no or $2,500 ... in benefits.”

Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against OIR alleging that the 2012 PIP Act violates multiple provisions of the Florida Constitution. Relevant to this appeal, the 2012 PIP Act amended various provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, specifically section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes (2012), relating to personal injury protection (“PIP”) coverage. Ch.2012-197, § 10, Laws of Fla.

To be eligible for PIP medical benefits under the new law, persons injured in a motor vehicle accident must seek initial services and care from specified providers within fourteen days after the motor vehicle accident. § 627.736(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). Medical benefits up to $10,000 are available for “emergency medical conditions” diagnosed by specified providers, and up to $2,500 for non-emergency medical conditions. § 627.736(l)(a)3.-4., Fla. Stat. (2013). In addition, the law specifically excludes licensed massage therapists and licensed acupuncturists from being reimbursed for medical benefits. § 627.736(l)(a)5., Fla. Stat. (2013).. Although chiropractors are authorized to provide treatment to PIP insureds, they cannot make the determination that a patient has suffered an emergency medical condition. § 627.736(l)(a)l.-3., Fla. Stat. (2013). Plaintiffs alleged that the new law significantly limits the type and format of chiropractic treatment of persons covered by PIP insurance.

After filing the complaint, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary injunction, asking the trial court to enjoin OIR “from enforcing, or attempting to enforce the 2012 PIP Act.” The Provider Plaintiffs argued that, without a temporary injunction, they would be irreparably harmed by losing substantial PIP-related business that will either cause them not to be able to work and earn a living (acupuncture physicians and licensed massage therapists) or will severely restrain their ability to provide effective care (chiropractors). The pleading alleged that the “Jane Doe” plaintiff, “although required to purchase $10,000.00 ... in PIP insurance by the Florida Statutes, may receive no benefits if the initial evaluation and treatment does not occur within fourteen (14) days, or may receive only $2,500.00 in benefits if there is no emergency, medical condition diagnosed or if the initial evaluation is by a Chiropractic Physician.”

OIR opposed the motion for an injunction and sought dismissal. As a threshold matter, OIR contended that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the underlying declaratory judgment action, absent any allegations that Plaintiffs have been actually harmed by the legislation. OIR argued that whatever injury Plaintiffs may suffer in the future is purely hypothetical, and the trial court lacked sufficient facts to demonstrate a present, real, and concrete controversy.

After hearing arguments of counsel and receiving testimony from Provider Plaintiff Robin A. Myers, A.P., the trial court granted the motion for temporary injunction based only on the access-to-courts claim. The judge determined that the Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief “as to those sections of the law which require a finding of emergency medical condition as a prerequisite for payment of PIP benefits or that prohibit payment of benefits for services provided by acupuncturists, chiropractors and. massage therapists.”

In so ruling, the court found that the Provider Plaintiffs have standing. The judge characterized these plaintiffs as “seeking to enforce a right vested in members of the public at large,” such that they “must allege and establish some special injury different in kind from the injury suffered by members of the public.” The court found that the Provider Plaintiffs, “as health care providers for automobile accident victims, derive a substantial percentage of their income through PIP insurance payments,” which the 2012 PIP Act prohibits or severely limits, giving them “a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case, as well as an injury that is distinct from the public at large.”

OIR filed a notice of appeal and a notice of automatic $tay pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2). While this appeal was pending, the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ emergency motion to vacate the automatic stay. The court explained that the reason for issuing the injunction is not to address the potential economic harm to the Provider Plaintiffs caused by the 2012 PIP Act, but rather to protect “the constitutional right of citizens to seek redress in the courts if they are wrongfully injured. The medical providers are means to that end.” Prior to full briefing of this appeal on the merits, this Court affirmed the trial court’s order vacating the automatic stay.

II. Standing Analysis

Standing presents “a threshold inquiry” that must be made at the commencement of the case. Olen Props. Corp. v. Moss, 981 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). We have de novo review of the issue of whether Appellees have standing, which is a pure question of law. Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Baker, 84 So.3d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

It is well-established “that a party seeking adjudication of the courts on the constitutionality of statutes is required to show that his constitutional rights have been abrogated or threatened by the provisions of the challenged act.” Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So.2d 448, 453 (1943) (emphasis added). To have the adverse interest necessary for standing on the sole claim presented in this appeal, the Provider Plaintiffs had to assert a violation of their constitutional right of access to courts. See Alachua County v. Scharps, 855 So.2d 195, 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). This burden was not met here, as none of the Provider Plaintiffs claimed a violation of his or her own right of access to courts. Instead, the trial court erroneously conferred standing on the Provider Plaintiffs based on their purported loss of PIP-claim revenue as a result of the 2012 PIP Act.

In support of its claim of legal error, OIR cites analogous case law holding that supervisors of elections lacked any real interest to confer standing to pursue others’ “equal protection” claims against a ballot regulation, even though the supervisors alleged they would suffer the practical harm of disrupted elections. Sancho v. Smith, 830 So.2d 856, 863-64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (stating that “[constitutional rights are personal,” such that generally, “[a] party who is not adversely affected by a statute ... has no standing to argue that the statute is invalid”). In another relevant decision, a hospital lacked standing to bring an “equal protection” challenge against a law making men, but not women, liable for their spouses’ medical bills. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So.2d 644, 646 & n. 1 (Fla.1986). Although the hospital had an economic interest in collecting its debts and therefore sustained a practical harm, it lacked a sufficient interest in whether the law discriminated against men. Id.; Sancho, 830 So.2d at 863-64 & n. 2. Similarly, the alleged economic harm suffered by the Provider Plaintiffs in this case is an insufficient basis to assert others’ potential access-to-courts claims.

Without a showing of an actual denial of access to courts in a specific factual context, the Provider Plaintiffs lack standing to assert this claim. The real parties in interest — injured motorists whose ability to sue tortfeasors has been impermissi-bly limited — are absent from this case. The Provider Plaintiffs’ attempt to bootstrap the standing requirement by joining the fictional “Jane Doe,” purporting to represent all Florida citizens that were, are, or will be injured as a result of a motor vehicle collision, must likewise fail. The instant record does not provide a factual context or legal basis to support this hypothetical claim.

Because Appellees made no colorable showing of standing to proceed on the access-to-courts claim, we reverse the order granting injunctive relief.

REVERSED.

THOMAS, WETHERELL, and RAY, JJ., concur.

      . The complaint alleged violations of the “single subject” rule, due process, separation of powers, equal protection, the right to be rewarded for industry, the right to work regardless of union membership, the prohibition against impairment of contracts, and the right of access to courts.

      . The trial court did not address the standing of the "Jane Doe” plaintiff in its order.

      . We reinstated the automatic stay by separate order issued concurrent with this opinion.

      . The instant case does not invoke the limited exception to the general rule that "a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim for relief on the legal rights and interests of third parties.” Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Shelley, 827 So.2d 936, 941 (Fla.2002) (quoting Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S. 400. 410. 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)). The Provider Plaintiffs did not advance a third-party standing argument below, and there is no apparent reason why Floridians whose access-to-courts rights are infringed by the 2012 PIP Act cannot bring their own constitutional challenge. See Sancho, 830 So.2d at 864.