text:
    STATE ex rel. Shawn CHOPIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2370.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Chopin, Shawn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 99-1106; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-561.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric GRESHAM.
    No. 2013-OK-2379.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Gresham, Eric; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 96-6273; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-650.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren BURNETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2407.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Burnett, Warren; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-CR3-097152; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1048.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gerard ELPHAGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2473.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Elphage, Gerard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 496-506; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1132.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric Charles DAVIS.
    No. 2013-K-2748.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Davis, Eric Charles; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 10-5559; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-313.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wardell Christopher WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-KO-2774.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Williams, Wardell Christopher;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 306,283; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-497.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry GOLDEN, III.
    No. 2013-K-2776.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Golden III, Henry; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 471-194; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0012.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jose G. ALFARO.
    No. 2013-K-2793.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Alfaro, Jose G.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 11-318; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-39.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Antwoene IRVING.
    No. 2013-K-2821.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Irving, Antwoene; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 11345; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0535.

Denied.


text:
    Maureen SREENAN v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re City of New Orleans et al.; New Orleans Aviation Board; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2001-6487; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1433.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana through the DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF LOUISIANA and Aon Risk Services Of Louisiana, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-0267.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana Through the Division of Administration, Office of Risk Management; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C502830; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0375.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    James Norman THOMPSON v. Chrystal Landry THOMPSON.
    No. 2014-C-0391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Thompson, James Norman;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 223,238; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 13-1237.

Denied.


text:
    Darren DUGAS, et al. v. BAYOU TECHE WATER WORKS, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-C-0534.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Bayou Teche Water Works Inc.;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 110321; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-890.

Denied.


text:
    Bradley Ryan AKERS and Eliza Moritz v. The COLUMNS HOTEL, INC., Michael McCormick and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CC-0539.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Akers, Bradley Ryan et al.; Mor-itz, Eliza; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2011-9971; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1683.

Denied.


text:
    Buddy SCARBERRY v. ENTERGY CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0566.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Scarberry, Buddy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2009-07545; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0214.

Denied.


text:
    Buddy SCARBERRY v. ENTERGY CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0599.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014
   In re Entergy Corporation, et al.; En-tergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC; Enter-gy Services, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2009-07545; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0214.

Denied.


text:
    Tammy TODD & Teer Michael Todd v. Robert ANGEL, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0613.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Todd, Tammy; Todd, Teer Michael; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 129,917; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,687-CA.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Bernadette BONNETTE, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Children, Blake Jube and Blade Jube v. The GOLDEN GRYPHON SOCIETY, a/k/a the Krewe of Alla, John Doe, ABC Insurance Company, and DEF Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CC-0648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re The Golden Gryphon Society, a/k/a The Krewe of Alia; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 697-824; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-C-66.

Denied.


text:
    James G. CHOWNS v. C.A. FREDERICKS, Warden, Caldwell Correctional Center, and James LeBlanc, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, and Genie Powers, Director Louisiana Board of Parole, and State of Louisiana, and Renee Streeter, Court Stenographer.
    No. 2014-CC-0694.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections; State of Louisiana; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 26,932; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,126-CW.

Denied.

VICTORY, WEIMER and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Brenna Ash MILLER, et al. v. ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-C-0698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Miller, Brenna Ash; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2012-6808; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 13-1269.

Denied.


text:
    DELTA DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. RAPID RESPONSE RESTORATION, LLC & Betty Jo Dearmon.
    No. 2014-C-0699.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Dearmon, Betty Jo; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2012-0802; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13,1077.

Denied.


text:
    Brenda ROMANO v. JEFFERSON PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE and Anthony Bennett.
    No. 2014-C-0700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Romano, Brenda; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 670-363; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-803.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allison N. WILTZ.
    No. 2014-KK-0702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Wiltz, Allison N.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 12-2463; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-KH-9.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Melanie GARDNER v. Mike CRAFT, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0711.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Gardner, Melanie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 70894; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,861-CA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., would grant in part to address the summary judgment granted in favor of defendant Kellogg, Brown & Root.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of P.G.
    No. 2014-CJ-1020.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re E.G.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2014-JC-322; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. JWC 14-00454.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Juan SMITH.
    No. 2014-KD-1024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 378-343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. PENDING.

Writ granted. The Court of Appeal’s ruling is reversed. Its ruling broadens the Knighten rule, and the ruling itself is premature because (1) the State has not moved to strike a juror, (2) the defendant has not made a Batson challenge, and (3) the State has not offered a prospective juror’s criminal record as reason for striking a juror. Further proceedings shall be conducted consistent with this ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James H. MONTGOMERY, III.
    No. 2014-KK-0902.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 315,087; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-256-KW.

Granted. Considering the factors articulated in La.Code Crim. Proc. arts. 834 and 336.1, we find no abuse of the district court’s discretion in setting and maintaining the defendant’s bail obligation at $500,000.00. Accordingly, the court of appeal’s ruling vacating the district court’s denial of the motion to reduce bail is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.


author: ROBERT A. CHAISSON, Judge.

text:
    Melvin ROBINSON v. ROCKHILL INSURANCE COMPANY, Magnolia Management Corporation, Community Care Center of Destrehan d/b/a Ormond Nursing and Care Center, and Maria Blanchard.
    No. 13-CA-860.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    April 28, 2014.
    Dashawn P. Hayes, Attorney At Law, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Max J. Cohen, Melanie C. Lockett, Attorneys At Law, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, MARC E. JOHNSON, and ROBERT A. CHAISSON.
   ROBERT A. CHAISSON, Judge.

12Melvin Robinson appeals a judgment of the trial court granting Rockhill Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Melvin Robinson filed a petition for damages against Magnolia Management Corporation, Community Care Center of Destrehan d/b/a Ormond Nursing & Care Center, Maria Blanchard, and their insurer, Rockhill Insurance Company. In the petition, Mr. Robinson alleged that on June 7, 2012, while employed at Community Care Center, he was attending to a patient when his supervisor, Maria Blanchard, angrily ordered him out of the room. The petition further alleged that “suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning,” Ms. Blanchard grabbed Mr. Robinson by the arm and dragged him out of the room into the hallway, while she “verbally berated and belittled” him in the presence of his co-workers. Mr. |3Robinson claims that as a result of this incident, he “mentally and physically suffered and required extensive medical treatment.”

Rockhill Insurance Company thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that its policy did not provide any coverage for the claims brought by Mr. Robinson against Magnolia Management Corporation, Community Care Center, and Ms. Blanchard. In particular, Rockhill Insurance Company asserted that the policy excluded coverage for claims by one insured against another insured, Exclusion (0(16) and (C)(20); the policy excluded coverage for willful misconduct and malicious and criminal acts by an insured, Exclusion (C)(1); and the policy excluded coverage for claims involving employment practices, Exclusion (C)(ll). In opposition to the motion, Mr. Robinson argued that the policy was ambiguous and against public policy.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Robinson’s claims against Rockhill Insurance Company. Mr. Robinson now appeals the trial court’s granting of the summary judgment. In particular, Mr. Robinson argues that the trial court erred in finding that the acts alleged in the petition constituted willful and malicious conduct by Ms. Blanchard; that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Blanchard was an employee of Or-mond Nursing & Care Center and, thus, a named insured; and that the trial court erred in finding that the exclusion for employment practices precluded coverage for the actions of Ms. Blanchard. For the reasons that follow, we find no merit to these arguments and affirm the trial court judgment that granted Rockhill’s motion for summary judgment.

\ .DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Bell v. Parry, 10-369 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/23/10), 61 So.3d 1, 2. The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). The motion should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2). Summary judgments are favored in the law and the rules should be liberally applied. Alexander v. Parish of St. John the Baptist, 09-840 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/23/10), 33 So.3d 999, 1003, writ denied, 10-1289 (La.9/17/10), 45 So.3d 1056.

Appellate courts review a judgment granting or denying a motion for summary judgment de novo. Thus, appellate courts ask the same questions the trial court does in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cutsinger v. Redfern, 08-2607 (La.5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945, 949.

The issue of whether an insurance policy, as a matter of law, provides or precludes coverage is a dispute that can be resolved properly within the framework of a motion for summary judgment. Colwart v. Encompass Indemnity Co., 07-79 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/07), 961 So.2d 527, 529, writ denied, 07-1324 (La.9/28/07), 964 So.2d 869. Summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance policy may not be rendered unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion, under which coverage should be afforded. Romano v. Altentaler, 11-0303 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/14/11), 77 So.3d 282, 284. An insurer seeking to avoid coverage through summary judgment bears the burden of proving that some provision or exclusion applies to preclude coverage. Russell v. Eye Associates of Northeast Louisiana, 46,525 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/21/11), 74 So.3d 230, 234.

Having conducted a de novo review, we find that Rockhill Insurance Company met its burden of proving that the policy excluded coverage under the circumstances of this case. At the time of the incident, Rockhill Insurance Company issued a health care general liability policy to Magnolia Management Corporation. By endorsement, Community Care Center, d/b/a Ormond Nursing & Care Center, was an additional insured. The policy provided the following exclusion for claims by one insured against another insured:

C. Exclusions Applicable to All Insuring Agreements
As respects Insuring Agreement ... I.B., OCCURRENCE-BASED GENERAL LIABILITY, this Policy shall not apply to any Claim based on, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from, in consequence of, or in any way involving:
16. Any Claim asserted by or on behalf of an Insured against another Insured; provided, however, that this Exclusion D.16 will not apply to preclude or limit coverage for an otherwise covered Claim based on, arising out of or in any way involving Peer Review;
20. Any Claim made by one Insured against another Insured, unless based on, arising out of or in any way involving Peer Review[J (emphasis in original)

|fiThe policy defines “insured,” in pertinent part, as the named insured as well as “any Employee, but only while acting within the scope of his/her duties as sueh[.]” The policy further states: “Employee means a person who has been hired by the Insured to perform services, and who has an assigned work schedule and appears on the regular payroll of the Insured, with applicable federal, state and local taxes withheld. Employee does not include an Independent Contractor.” (emphasis in original)

In the petition, Mr. Robinson alleged that he was employed by Community Care Center of Destrehan d/b/a Ormond Nursing & Care Center and “was attending to a patient inside his room.” Thus, Mr. Robinson was acting in the scope of his employment duties at the time of the incident and was insured under, the terms of the insurance policy. The policy specifically excludes coverage for any claim by one insured against another insured unless based on or arising out of peer review. There has been no allegation that the claims by Mr. Robinson, in any way, involve peer review. Thus, Mr. Robinson’s claims against Magnolia Management Corporation and Community Care Center are clearly excluded from coverage.

Mr. Robinson’s claims are also excluded with regard to Ms. Blanchard. He alleged in the petition that while he was attending to a patient, Ms. Blanchard, who was his supervisor and also an employee of the nursing home, angrily ordered him out of the room, grabbed him by the arm, dragged him into the hallway, and verbally berated and belittled him in the presence of his co-workers. Thus, Ms. Blanchard is also an insured under the policy, and coverage would be excluded. In his appellate brief, Mr. Robinson asserts that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Blanchard was an employee of Ormond Nursing & Care Center and was acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the incident. 1 ^However, if we were to accept this argument, then Ms. Blanchard would not be an insured under the policy, and there would likewise be no coverage.

Based on our conclusion that Mr. Robinson’s claims are excluded as claims by one insured against another insured, it is unnecessary to determine whether Ms. Blanchard’s actions were willful and/or malicious or whether Ms. Blanchard’s actions were considered employment practices.

DECREE

Having found that Mr. Robinson’s claims are excluded as claims by one insured against another insured, we affirm the judgment of the trial court granting Rockhill’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Robinson’s claims against Rockhill Insurance Company.

AFFIRMED.


author: TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

text:
    David TREGRE v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2013-CA-1365.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    April 30, 2014.

      Raymond C. Burkart, III, Burkart & Associates, L.L.C., Covington, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS).
   TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

11 Officer David Tregre (“Officer Tregre”) appeals his two day suspension from the New Orleans Police Department for violating the Appointing Authority’s internal regulation regarding Instructions from an Authoritative Source. The Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) concluded that the Appointing Authority did not abuse its discretion in finding Officer Tregre violated internal regulations prohibiting acceptance of cash payments for paid details after Officer Tregre accepted a check made payable to cash for a detail at Blaine Kern, Inc. Officer Tregre alleges the Commission erred in affirming the two day suspension because the New Orleans Police Department did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he impaired the efficient operation of the public service. He also argues that the penalty imposed was excessive. Given that Office Tregre knew or should have known about the internal policy and his failure to adhere to it, we agree with the Commission’s conclusion that the Appointing Authority acted properly and within its discretion. Therefore, we affirm.

19FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Officer Tregre is employed by the Department of Police as a.police officer with permanent status. Police Lieutenant Derek Frick, assigned to the Public Integrity Bureau, conducted an administrative investigation into Officer Tregre’s alleged violation of Departmental Rules and/or Procedures regarding New Orleans Police Department Operations Manual; Rule 4: Performance of Duty, paragraph 2-In-structions from an Authoritative Source to wit: Chapter 22.8, paragraph 37, and General Order 828. The internal regulation provides the method by which employees on paid details may accept payment. Specifically, employees are prohibited from soliciting or accepting “a cash payment for any work performed in a paid detail capacity. Further the internal regulation notes that “[c]hecks made payable to “cash” can only be interpreted as a form of cash payment, which is prohibited under policy.” In May 2011, an email from Superintendent of Police, Ronald Serpas (“Superintendent Serpas”) was forwarded to all members authorized to work paid details reminding them of the policy against accepting “cash payments” including checks made payable to cash.

The Public Integrity Bureau determined that in June 2011, at 8:15pm, Officer Tregre worked a paid detail for Blaine Kern, Inc., for which he received as payment a check made payable to cash. During the investigation, Officer Tregre admitted “[he] understood the Departmental Rules and Regulations concerning cash payments or checks made to cash” for paid details. Officer Tregre further ^admitted that he accepted the check from Blaine Kern, Inc., cashed the check made payable to cash, and received payment.

Following the February 2012 hearing, Deputy Superintendent Darryl Albert (“Assistant Superintendent Albert”), of the Field Operations Bureau, recommended finding Officer Tregre in violation of Instructions from an Authoritative Source for failing to adhere to the internal policy prohibiting acceptance of checks made payable to cash for paid details and recommended a two working-day suspension. Thereafter, Superintendent Serpas found Officer Tregre in violation of New Orleans Police Department Operations Manual; Rule 4: Performance of Duty, paragraph 2-Instructions from an Authoritative Source to wit: Chapter 22.8, paragraph 37, and General Order 828 and suspended him for two working-days.

Officer Tregre sought review with the Commission and a hearing was held in August 2012. Although Officer Tregre admitted receiving and negotiating a check issued payable to cash, he alleged that his actions did not interfere with the efficient operation of the department. He further averred that the penalty is not commensurate with the violation. The Commission concluded that the Appointing Authority established by a preponderance of the evidence that it disciplined Officer Tregre for cause, and that Officer Tregre “knew or should have known that the acceptance of a check made payable to cash” violated internal rules. The Commission further noted that the Appointing Authority was justified in “enforcing a legitimate rule that protects the integrity of its detail policy.” Given the violation and the penalty range in this case, the Commission found that the |4Appointing Authority did not abuse its discretion in suspending Officer Tregre for two working-days. Officer Tregre now seeks appellate review from this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commission has the “exclusive power and authority to hear and decide all ... disciplinary cases.” La. Const. art. X, § 12(B). “No person who has gained permanent status in the classified state or city service shall be subjected to disciplinary action except for cause expressed in writing.” La. Const. art. X, § 8(A). It is within the Appointing Authority’s discretion to discipline an employee for sufficient cause. Pope v. New Orleans Police Dep’t, 04-1888, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05), 903 So.2d 1, 4. Sufficient cause to discipline exists when an employee’s conduct “impairs efficiency of the public service in which the employee is engaged.” Id., 04-1888, p. 6, 903 So.2d at 5. The burden rests with the Appointing Authority to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s conduct impaired efficiency of the public service in which the employee is engaged. Allen v. Dep’t of Police, 09-0589, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/12/09), 25 So.3d 966.

On appellate review, we apply a clearly erroneous/manifest error standard of review. Id., 09-0589, p. 3, 25 So.3d 966, 969. If the Commission’s factual findings are reasonable, this Court cannot reverse. Id. Additionally, we will not disturb the Commission’s finding of legal cause and the penalty imposed, “absent evidence of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or characteristics of an abuse of discretion.” Id. The findings of the Commission are arbitrary or capricious when |5there is no rational basis to support its decision. Id. See also Bradford v. New Orleans Police Dep’t., 04-0788, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/23/04), 891 So.2d 9, 14.

LEGAL CAUSE

Officer Tregre avers that the Appointing Authority lacked sufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it had legal cause to suspend him for two working-days. The Appointing Authority found Officer Tregre in violation of New Orleans Police Department Operations Manual; Rule 4: Performance of Duty, paragraph 2-Instruc-tions from an Authoritative Source to wit: Chapter 22.8, paragraph 37, and General Order 828. Rule 4: Performance of Duty, paragraph 2-Instructions from an Authoritative Source states:

An employee shall professionally, promptly, and fully abide by or execute instructions issued from any authoritative source, including any order relayed from a superior by an employee of the same or lesser rank. If the instructions are reasonably believed to be in conflict with the Rules and Procedures of the Department or other issued instructions, this fact shall respectfully be- made known to the issuing authority. If the issuing authority elects to insist upon execution of the instructions which are reasonably believed to be in conflict with Departmental Rules and Procedures, the employee receiving the instructions shall have the right to request and is entitled to receive, IMMEDIATELY, said instructions in writing, except in cases of emergency as determined by the supervisor. The issuing authority shall be held responsible should any conflict materialize; however, no instructions shall be issued or executed which are in violation of law.

(emphasis added).

Chapter 22.8: Paid Details, paragraph 37, and General Order 828 provides:

Employees are responsible for negotiating compensation for details with the detail employer. Under no circumstances shall the employee solicit or accept a cash payment for any work performed in a paid detail capacity.
| fiCheck made payable to ‘cash’ can only be interpreted as a form of cash payment, which is prohibited under policy. To clarify, checks should only be made payable using the legal name of the member working the paid detail,

(emphasis added).

The internal regulation relating to paid details went into effect on August 12, 2010, almost one year prior to the incident giving rise to this appeal. Assistant Superintendent Albert testified that the policy regarding cash payment of paid details was established and later reinforced by email to all members of the department. In May 2011, Superintendent Serpas forwarded an email reminding all members authorized to work paid details of “the prohibition against ‘case [sic] payments.’ ” Likewise, the email cited the policy language and underscored that “[c]hecks made payable to ‘cash’ can only be interpreted as a form of cash payment, which is prohibited under the policy. To clarify, checks should only be made payable using the legal name of the member working the paid detail.” Assistant Superintendent Albert testified that “every member of the department should have been aware of the rule and at all times abide by it.”

In June 2011, Officer Tregre accepted a check made payable to cash for a paid detail with Blaine Kern, Inc. In his administrative statement, Officer Tregre admitted that he cashed the check made payable to cash and received payment. Officer Tregre testified that he was unaware of the policy against accepting a check made payable to cash as payment until after the complaint was filed and someone in the office showed him the May 2011 email.

1 ^Nevertheless, Officer Tregre admitted that he was aware of the policy against accepting cash payment for paid details. In addition, he conceded that he is responsible for checking all his emails. Thus, the Commission found that the Appointing Authority had a rational basis for concluding that Officer Tregre knew or should have known about the internal policy against accepting checks made payable to cash as payment for paid details. Consequently, the Commission concluded that the Appointing Authority had sufficient cause to find that Officer Tregre failed to abide by the Instructions from an Authoritative Source. Specifically, Officer Tregre accepted a check made payable to cash in violation of Chapter 22.8, paragraph 37, General Order 828 and in doing so violated Instructions from an Authoritative Source. We find the Commission’s factual findings reasonable.

In order for the Appointing Authority to have legal cause to discipline, Officer Tregre’s violation must impair the efficiency of the public service in which he is engaged. Pope, 04-1888, p. 6, 903 So.2d at 5. At the August 2012 hearing, Assistant Superintendent Albert testified that cash payments are more difficult to track and link to the officer who performed the detail. Thus, the policy prohibiting cash payments including checks made payable to cash was established to avoid the “look of impropriety” and “to keep a better record of payment that officers receive while working paid details.” The Commission found the Appointing Authority “is justified in enforcing a legitimate rule that protects the integrity of its detail policy. Checks made payable to cash can be cashed by anyone, while a check issued to a ^specific individual is more restrictive.” The Department of Police establishes certain policies and regulations to assure the efficient operation of the public service. Failing to uphold and discipline those in violation of the rules impairs the integrity and operation of the department. Therefore, we agree with the Commission that the Appointing Authority sustained its burden of proof that legal cause existed and discipline was warranted.

PENALTY

Officer Tregre also claims the penalty imposed is not commensurate with the offense. Officer Tregre points to his over twenty years of service to the New Orleans Police Department without prior discipline or incident. Given that this is his first offense, Officer Tregre avers that the penalty imposed is excessive. Assistant Superintendent Albert testified at the August 2012 hearing that penalty guidelines provided a range from “a letter of reprimand to three days” relating to a category one offense. The Appointing Authority imposed a two working-day suspension in this case. Thus, the penalty imposed was within the guidelines. Accordingly, we agree with the Commission that the Appointing Authority did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two working-day suspension.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Commission did not commit manifest error in denying Officer’s Tregre’s appeal and affirm.

AFFIRMED.


author: EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge.

text:
    Lester ROYAL v. SEWERAGE & WATER BOARD.
    No. 2013-CA-1528.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    April 30, 2014.
    Eric J. Hessler, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

      Yolanda Y. Grinstead, Attorney IV, Brian A. Ferrara, Deputy Special Counsel, Nolan P. Lambert, Special Counsel, Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS).
   EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge.

|,The Appellant, Lester Royal, seeks review of the July 2, 2018 decision of the Civil Service Commission upholding his termination by the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. Finding that the Civil Service Commission did not err in upholding the termination, we affirm.

Mr. Royal was a Utilities Maintenance Technician II with permanent status with the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (“the Board”). Between January 9, 2012 to July 9, 2012, he submitted a series of allegedly fraudulent doctor’s slips from a dentist, Dr. Donald D. Yuratich (“Dr. Yuratich”), to the Board stating that he had dentist appointments on the dates given and requesting that his absence be excused for said dates. Noticing that all of Mr. Royal’s doctors slips were issued by the same doctor, his supervisor — Debra Griesardt (“Ms. Griesardt”) — called Dr. Yuratich’s office on July 9, 2012, the date of Mr. Royal’s last submitted doctor’s slip , to verify that he was a patient. Ms. Griesardt learned from Dr. Yuratich’s office recording that the office was closed and on vacation for a week. Ms. Gries-ardt as well as another of Mr. Royal’s supervisors visited Dr. |2Yuratich’s office when it reopened. They were advised by Dr. Yuratich and his staff that Mr. Royal was neither a patient of Dr. Yuratich nor had he ever received dental treatment at his office.

The Board held a pre-termination hearing on August 2, 2012, wherein Mr. Royal’s termination was recommended by Todd Hatheway, the Plant Maintenance and Pumping and Power Superintendent, as a result of Mr. Royal’s attempts to obtain paid sick leave by submitting fraudulent doctors’ slips. Mr. Royal attended the pre-termination hearing. Thereafter, the Board terminated Mr. Royal. The Board issued him a termination letter dated August 14, 2012, notifying him that his record was reviewed because of his presentation “of false doctor notifications and ultimately payroll fraud.” Said correspondence further informed him that his termination was effective on August 17, 2012.

Subsequently, Mr. Royal filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (“the Commission”), and a Hearing Officer was assigned. After the December 5, 2012 Commission hearing, the Commission denied Mr. Royal’s appeal. This timely appeal followed. Mr. Royal raises two assignments of error on appeal:

1. the punishment of termination is not commensurate with any proven violation, and is inconsistent with the Commission’s policies and those of the Board; and
2. the Board did not provide evidence that the alleged dereliction of duty impaired the efficiency of the service of the Board and thus, did not provide legal cause for the discipline.

Appointing authorities are charged with the operation of their departments and it is within their discretion to discipline an employee for sufficient cause. Lapene v. Dep’t of Police, 11-0902, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/25/12), 81 So.3d 998, 1000, citing Joseph v. Department of Health, 389 So.2d 739, 741 (La.App. 4 Cir.1980). “Legal cause exists for disciplinary action of an employee in the classified civil service whenever the employee’s conduct impairs the efficiency of the public service in which the employee is engaged.” Id. [citations omitted].

“The appointing authority has the burden of proving the impairment by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at pp. 3-4, 81 So.3d at 1000 (citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he Civil Service Commission has a duty to decide independently from the facts presented whether the appointing authority has a good or lawful cause for taking disciplinary action and, if so, whether punishment imposed is commensurate with the dereliction.” Id. at p. 4, 81 So.3d at 1000, citing Walters v. Department of Police of New Orleans, 454 So.2d 106 (La.1984).

An appellate court should affirm the Commission’s conclusions as to the existence or cause for dismissal of a permanent employee when the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the Commission’s discretion. Id. [citations omitted]. Furthermore, the standard of review applicable in Civil Service matters is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Ferris v. Dep’t of Police, 13-0202, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/20/13), 129 So.3d 801, 802-03.

In his assignments of error, Mr. Royal argues that the punishment of termination is not commensurate with any proven violation and is inconsistent with the Commission’s policies and those of the Board. He further contends that the Board did not provide evidence that the alleged dereliction of duty impaired the efficiency of the service of the Board; thus, it did not provide legal cause for the discipline. We address Mr. Royal’s assignments of error jointly.

? Royal avers that the Board has promulgated a disciplinary scheme involving progressive discipline as it relates to the use and abuse of an employee’s accrued sick leave. He further argues that the rules of the Board should be used to put into context the proper procedure and disciplinary actions to be taken in similar instances.

Additionally, he argues that termination is too severe a punishment for him as a permanent employee with “an otherwise unblemished disciplinary record”; thus, the discipline is not commensurate with the violations proven or the general principles outlined in the Board’s rules or in the rules of the Civil Service. Lastly, he argues that the record reflects that the Board failed to introduce any evidence demonstrating that the service was prejudiced or otherwise impaired by his actions.

Upon our review of the record, we note Mr. Royal admitted in his testimony before the Hearing Examiner that he submitted fraudulent doctor’s slips at the appeal of his termination, and that he did not treat with Dr. Yuratich on any of the dates listed on the slips he submitted. He further explained that on the dates that he did not appear at work, the dates reflected on the doctor’s slips, he was shopping around for dental services at a certain price-point. He testified that his regular shift for the Board was eight (8) hours. Mr. Royal does not dispute that he used his accrued paid sick leave on the days that he missed work. Furthermore, Mr. Royal does not dispute the Board’s assertion that during the relevant time period he was absent from duty for approximately nine (9) days.

Dr. Yuratich’s office manager, Joycelyn Roussel Smith, testified that she provides estimates to prospective patients regarding the cost of dental work. She testified that she was not familiar with Mr. Royal and that he was not listed in Dr. Yuratich’s computer system as a patient.

^Additionally, the Board’s termination letter to Mr. Royal indicates that he was terminated pursuant to Rule IX of the Rules of Civil Service Section 1, Maintaining Standards of Service, which provides in pertinent part that termination is an acceptable method of discipline:

[w]hen an employee in the classified service is unable or unwilling to perform the duties of his/her position in a satisfactory manner, or has committed any act to the prejudice of the service, or has omitted to perform any act it was his/ her duty to perform, or otherwise has become subject to corrective action, the appointing authority shall take action warranted by the circumstances to maintain the standards of effective service.

While Mr. Royal argues that his termination is inconsistent with the Commission’s policies and those of the Board, we note that said policies are not included within the record for our review. Moreover, Mr. Royal did specify in his brief specifically which policies of the Commission and Board support his position.

Furthermore, both the Board and the Commission determined that Mr. Royal’s explanation for submitting the fraudulent doctors’ slips and thereby committing payroll fraud, to be implausible. The Commission’s findings of fact cannot be manifestly erroneous where there are two permissible views of the evidence. George v. Dep’t of Fire, 637 So.2d 1097, 1101 (La.App. 4th Cir.1994) [citation omitted].

Mr. Royal’s actions evidence not only that he failed to appear for work and collected paid sick leave, but they further reveal his proclivity for sustained duplicity. His actions reflect that he prejudiced the Board by his unwillingness and | f,failure to perform his duties resulting in the Board’s prolonged loss of his labor as well as its remittance of undue paid sick leave. Such fraud and theft of time and resources warrant the imposition of the extreme penalty of termination; thus, we find that there was adequate legal cause to substantiate Mr. Royal’s termination.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination of Lester Royal.

AFFIRMED.

      . This slip purported to excuse Mr. Royal from work for dental treatment from July 9, 2012 to July 12, 2012.

      . Ms. Griesardt testified to these facts contained herein at the Commission hearing of December 5, 2012, before the Hearing Examiner.

      .The Board avers that Mr. Royal obtained paid sick leave as a result of his submission of the forged doctor's slips.

      . Mr. Royal attached the some attendance policies of the Board to his brief; however, these policies were not in the record before the Commission. Therefore, we decline to consider them.

      . Dismissal from permanent employment is the most extreme form of disciplinary action that can be taken against a classified or city employee. Hills v. New Orleans City Council, 98-1101, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/98), 725 So.2d 55, 58, writ not considered, 99-0954 (La.4/30/99), 741 So.2d 6.


author: MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Courtney THOMAS.
    No. 2013-KA-1370.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    April 30, 2014.

      Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, J. Bryant Clark, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Parish of Orleans, New Orleans, LA, for Appellant/State of Louisiana.
    D. Omavi Harshaw, Orleans Public Defenders, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge DANIEL L. DYSART, Judge MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU).
   MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge.

LThe State of Louisiana appeals the trial court’s judgment quashing the bill of information filed against the defendant, Courtney Thomas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Mr. Thomas was charged on July 30, 2004 by bill of information with two counts of access device fraud, violations of La. R.S. 14:70.2. Mr. Thomas was arraigned on August 11, 2004 and entered a plea of not guilty. On December 16, 2004, Mr. Thomas failed to appear for a hearing on motions, and the court issued an alias capias. Mr. Thomas reappeared in court on December-17, 2004, and the alias capias was recalled. Following Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Thomas’ case was reset on the docket. A pre-trial hearing was set for February 2, 2007. Mr. Thomas failed to appear at the February 2, 2007 hearing, and the court issued an alias capias. On May 1, 2013, approximately five and one-half years later, Mr. Thomas was arrested and appeared in court.

|2On June 21, 2013, Mr. Thomas filed a motion to quash the bill of information on the grounds that the two year prescriptive period for prosecuting him had expired. After a hearing, the trial court granted Mr. Thomas’ motion to quash, issuing written reasons on July 23, 2013. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In its sole assignment of error, the State asserts that the trial court erred by granting Mr. Thomas’s motion to quash the bill of information, arguing that the time limitation for commencing the trial had not expired at the time the motion was granted. Under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 578, “no trial shall be commenced ... in other felony cases after two years from the date of institution of the prosecution.” Article 579(A) provides, however, that this two year prescriptive period is interrupted and begins to run anew if the following occurs:

(1)The defendant at any time, with the purpose to avoid detection, apprehension, or prosecution, flees from the state, is outside the state, or is absent from his usual place of abode within the state; or
(2) The defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the control of the state; or
(3) The defendant fails to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual notice, proof of which appears of record.

If the two year prescriptive period expires without having been interrupted, the trial court must dismiss the ease. La.C.Cr.P. art. 581.

The State argues that prescription had not run because Mr. Thomas failed to appear at the February 2, 2007 hearing after having been given sufficient notice of the hearing. Specifically, the State asserts that prescription was interrupted because ^either the defendant failed to update his address, in violation of the bond provision in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 322(A) , which delayed trial in a manner beyond the control of the State; or when the defendant failed to appear despite having been adequately notified.

The State, in challenging Mr. Thomas’ motion to quash, bears the burden of proving that prescription was interrupted. This court recently reiterated the burden in State v. Joseph, 2012-1176, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/20/13), 112 So.3d 363, 365:

Because statutes of limitation are the primary guarantee against inordinate delays and represent the legislative balancing of the interests of the state against the interest of the defendant, “these limitations should be given effect unless the state carries its burden of showing valid grounds to support an interruption or sufficient suspension of these time periods.” (citations omitted)
When, as in this case, a defendant brings an apparent meritorious motion to quash based on prescription, the State bears a heavy burden of demonstrating either an interruption or a suspension of the time limitation “such that prescription will not have tolled.” (citations omitted)

The State’s first argument, that Mr. Thomas was at fault for failing to update his address under the bond provision in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 322(A), is without merit. The record lacks any indication that Mr. Thomas’ |4address on file was incorrect, or that Mr. Thomas moved from the address on file after he entered into the bond contract.

We next turn to the State’s argument that Mr. Thomas received adequate notice and that his failure to appear at the February 7, 2007 hearing interrupted prescription pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 579(A)(3). At the hearing on the motion to quash, the State referenced the service return, which apparently indicated the method of service as “other” and states “left at door” in the comments section, as proof that Mr. Thomas was adequately notified. However, the State failed to introduce into evidence the return slip. In granting the motion to quash, the trial court stated, “[t]he State has not presented any evidence to substantiate its claim that the defendant was properly served with notice of February 2, 2007 hearing.”

We first note that the State failed to introduce into evidence the return slip which it contends supports its argument that Mr. Thomas had notice of the February 2, 2007 hearing. As we are confined to the record, we cannot give consideration to the return slip. State v. McQuirter, 2012-0486, p. 1 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/23/13), 108 So.3d 370, 371.

This court recently faced the same issue in State v. Jordan, 2012-0930 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 118 So.3d 1235; writ denied, 2013-1628 (La.2/7/14), 131 So.3d 854. There, Mr. Jordan was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was released on bond. The trial court granted Mr. Jordan’s motion to quash based on prescription. |fiThe State appealed, arguing that the return slip evidenced that the defendant was adequately notified and that prescription had been interrupted. However, the State failed to introduce that return slip into evidence at the trial court. The State in Jordan attempted to supplement the record with the return slip. In denying the State’s motion to supplement the record and affirming the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to quash, this court stated:

The State’s argument that the prescriptive period of La.C.Cr.P. article 578 was interrupted is based solely on an October 2008 return on service for defendant showing that notice of his arraignment date was left on his door at the address he listed on his bond. However, the State did not attach this document to a response to the defendant’s motion to quash (the State did not file any written response) or introduce the return on service at the motion to quash hearing.... [W]e must deny the State’s motion to supplement the record with this document because it was not presented to the trial court. See State v. McQuirter, 12-486, p. 1 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/23/13), 108 So.3d 370, 371. See also State v. Johnson, 09-259, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/16/09), 22 So.3d 205, 212, (“an appellate court may not consider evidence which is outside the record.”)
Our review of the record shows that the State did not carry its burden of proving an interruption to the time limitation of La. C.Cr.P. article 578 that is applicable in this case. Because the State did not commence trial within two years of the institution of prosecution, and did not prove an interruption of the prescriptive period, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to quash the bill of information.

Jordan, 2012-0930, pp. 4-5; 118 So.3d at 1237-38.

Even if the return slip was in the record, the State’s argument would fail. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 579(A)(3) requires that in order for prescription to be interrupted, the defendant must have received actual notice prior to failing to appear. This court has consistently held that notice “left at door” does Lnot constitute actual notice as it is neither personal nor domiciliary service, and we have previously held that leaving a subpoena on the door of a residence is not proper service. State v. Dillon, 2011-0188, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/24/11); 72 So.3d 473, 476; State v. Hill, 534 So.2d 1296, 1298 (La.App. 4th ir.1988).

In its ruling, the trial court stated, “[l]eaving a notice of hearing in the door of Mr. Thomas’ home is not proper service because Mr. Thomas was not properly served with notice of the hearing. The prescriptive period was not interrupted when he failed to appear for that February 2, 2007 hearing.” The trial court further stated that it was required to determine the date on which the two-year prescriptive period commenced, taking into account the disruption caused by Hurricane Katrina from August 26, 2005 until Orleans Parish Criminal Court reopened on June 5, 2006, which was when the prescriptive period began to run anew. Whether the court closures due to Hurricane Katrina served as an interruption or suspension of prescription, the latest the State could have commenced trial was June 5, 2008, and the State failed to do so.

| /Because the State failed to meet its heavy burden to prove that prescription had been interrupted and had not yet expired, we find that the trial court did not err in granting Mr. Thomas’ motion to quash the bill of information.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment granting Mr. Thomas’s motion to quash the bill of information.

AFFIRMED.

      . A. The defendant and personal surety signing a bail bond shall write the address at which each can be served under their respective signatures and the last four digits of their social security number. The defendant and his counsel may, by joint affidavit filed of record in the proceeding in which the bond was given, appoint his counsel as his agent for service of notice to appear. The appointment shall be conclusively presumed to continue until the defendant files of record an affidavit revoking or changing the appointment. The affidavit shall include the address at which to serve his counsel. A commercial surety shall inscribe its proper mailing address on the face of the power of attorney used to execute the bond. The agent or bondsman posting the bond shall write his proper mailing address under his signature. A bail bond shall not be set aside because of the invalidity of the information required by this Article or for the failure to include the information required by the provisions of this Article.

      . Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 735(A) states:
      Unless otherwise directed by the state or defendant, subpoenas shall be served by domiciliary service, personal service, or United States mail as provided in Paragraph B. Personal service is made when the sheriff tenders the subpoena to the witness. Domiciliary service is made when the sheriff leaves the subpoena at the dwelling house or usual abode of the witness with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein as a member of the domiciliary establishment of the witness, (emphasis added).

      . The court in Hill states:
      La. C. Cr. P. art. 735 allows service of a subpoena by personal or domiciliary service. Proper domiciliary service requires that the sheriff leave the subpoena at the "dwelling house or usual abode of the witness with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein as a member of the domiciliary establishment of the witness.” The article does not allow the sheriff to leave the subpoena on the door of the witness' residence.