text:
    Bipin Jashbhai PATEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D12-1898.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Thomas A. Kennedy, Vero Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Perez v. State, 120 So.3d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Marc COOPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D12-1921, 4D12-2868.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.

      William Mallory Kent, Jacksonville (withdrawn as counsel after filing brief), and Marc Cooper, Miami, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nancy S. Jack, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals the circuit court’s orders: (1) dismissing as untimely his amended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion; and (2) summarily denying his timely original rule 3.850 motion. We reverse the order dismissing the amended rule 3.850 motion, remand for the circuit court to vacate the order denying the original rule 3.850 motion, and direct the circuit court to rule on the amended rule 3.850 motion.

The defendant filed his original rule 3.850 motion within the two-year limitations period of rule 3.850(b). The defendant filed his amended rule 3.850 motion outside of the two-year limitations period, but before the court ruled on the original rule 3.850 motion. In the amended motion, the defendant appears to have merely enlarged the claims he made in the original motion.

The circuit court entered an order dismissing the defendant’s amended rule 3.850 motion as untimely. The defendant appealed that order. The circuit court later entered an order summarily denying the defendant’s original rule 3.850 motion. The defendant filed a separate appeal of that order. We consolidated the appeals.

The state has responded to the consolidated appeals with its concession that the circuit court erred in dismissing as untimely the defendant’s amended rule 3.850 motion. An amended rule 3.850 motion filed before the circuit court has ruled, which merely enlarges or expands on issues raised in a timely-filed original rule 3.850 motion, should not be dismissed as untimely. See Surinach v. State, 110 So.3d 95, 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (“Amended motions for postconviction relief are subject to the two-year time limit for filing rule 3.850 motions unless they merely enlarge an issue or issues raised in the original motion”) (emphasis added; citation omitted); Rincon v. State, 996 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“[T]he trial court could not consider the untimely ... amended motion pursuant to rule 3.850[,] ... except to the extent any grounds of the amended motion constituted mere enlargement of a timely filed claim”) (emphasis added; citation omitted).

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the order dismissing the amended rule 3.850 motion, remand for the circuit court to vacate the order denying the original rule 3.850 motion, and direct the circuit court to rule on the defendant’s amended rule 3.850 motion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

WARNER, GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lisa R. MOYER, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF Jason MOYER, Decedent, and Lisa R. Moyer, Individually and as the Parent and Natural Guardian of minors, Bradley and Brandon Moyer, Appellant, v. DOVER CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida corporation, et al., Appellee.
    No. 4D12-3076.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Margaret M. Bichler of Lytal, Reiter, Smith, Ivey & Fronrath, LLP, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Jennifer S. Carroll of Law Offices of Jennifer S. Carroll, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, and William Price of William W. Price, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Sterling Fin. & Mgmt., Inc. v. Gitenis, 117 So.3d 790, 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Morales v. Weil, 44 So.3d 173, 176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Johnson v. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 985 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

WARNER, GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Peterson LAFORTUNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D12-2866.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Jan P. Weiss, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court’s summary denial of appellant’s Rule 3.850 motion for postconvicton relief and remand for further proceedings. Although we agree that the transcript of the plea colloquy conelu-sively establishes that appellant was aware of the possibility of deportation, this is not alone sufficient as appellant alleges that the plea subjects him to automatic deportation that is clear from the face of the statute. Hernandez v. State, 124 So. 3d 757 (Fla.2012). On remand, in order to be entitled to relief, appellant must establish all the elements set forth in Cano v. State, 112 So.3d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Reversed and Remanded.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., TAYLOR and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.


author: MAY, J.

text:
    Nicholas NELSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 4D13-1111.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Samuel R. Halpern, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   MAY, J.

The defendant petitions for certiorari review of a circuit court order that denied his request to terminate conditional release. We grant the petition in part.

The State charged the defendant with aggravated stalking, and, in a separate case, causing another’s phone to ring repeatedly. On February 7, 2012, he was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity in the stalking case, and the circuit court entered a conditional release order. The following day, the circuit court adjudicated the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity for the phone charge, and entered a conditional release order. The case was transferred to the mental health division for monitoring.

The defendant was ordered to court monitored mental health treatment with a specific treatment provider. His case manager subsequently submitted a letter to the court on November 14, 2012, stating that the defendant no longer needed case management services. The defendant requested an evaluation by a psychologist, who concluded that he did not require further treatment services. A psychiatric evaluation concluded that the defendant was no longer in need of treatment for mental illness and was in full remission.

The defendant requested termination from conditional release in both cases. After a hearing on January 30, 2013, the court denied the request. From this order, the defendant has petitioned this court.

We review challenges to conditional release by a petition for writ of certiorari. See Thomas v. State, 443 So.2d 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

In his petition, the defendant argues the circuit court is required to terminate jurisdiction when it is determined, after a hearing, that a defendant no longer requires supervised followup care. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.219(c); see also § 916.17(3), Fla. Stat. (2013). He argues that he presented the court with substantial, competent, and unrefuted evidence that he no longer needs treatment through the case manager’s letter and testimony, and the evaluations of two doctors. The defendant argues that the order results in irreparable harm because the continued treatment schedule and status conferences result in a loss of income.

The State responds that one of the doctors opined the defendant suffers from bipolar disorder and that he and his wife should be required to obtain further education about the illness. That doctor also recommended that the defendant have an established relationship with a psychiatrist to provide him with medication in the event the symptoms recur. The State argues that because the defendant had not established such a relationship and had not undertaken further education, the motion to terminate was properly denied.

We have reviewed the petition, response, and appendix. We grant the petition in part. Section 916.17(3), Florida Statutes (2012), specifically provides:

If at any time it is determined after a hearing that the defendant who has been conditionally released under subsection (1) no longer requires court-supervised followup care, the court shall terminate its jurisdiction in the cause and discharge the defendant.

While we agree that the doctors and case manager from the treatment program recommended that the originally ordered treatment is no longer necessary, both doctors made recommendations for the defendant’s future. The psychiatrist recommended that both the defendant and his wife receive education on bipolar disorder, and that the defendant establish a relationship with a psychiatrist for followup and to provide medication in the event of early signs and symptoms. The psychologist spoke in terms of reducing or terminating the existing conditions. These recommendations will hopefully provide insight into recognizing any potential red flags or early warning signs to decrease the likelihood of any future episodes.

Here, there is no doubt that the same level of care initially ordered as part of the conditional release is no longer needed. However, judicial supervision is also part of conditional release. The trial court could require the defendant to secure the services of a psychiatrist to whom he can turn as recommended if the symptoms recur and continue status conferences to insure a successful transition from conditional release.

For this reason, we grant the petition in part. The circuit court may continue the conditional release; however, the order must be modified to delete the formerly required treatment and incorporate the recommendations of the experts in the field. The petition is granted in part and the case remanded to the circuit court to modify the requirements of conditional release as recommended.

Petition granted in part.

GROSS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Raimundo GOMEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D13-1036.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Charles Wender, Boca Raton, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the denial of appellant’s untimely motion for postconviction relief. In it, appellant alleged that his attorney mi-sadvised him as to the consequences to his immigration status of his plea and sentence. He pled no contest to sale or delivery of controlled pills (MDMA, known as “ecstasy”) and received a withhold of adjudication with eighteen months of probation. When his green card, allowing him legal residency in this country, came up for renewal six years later, he discovered that, even though his attorney had advised him that a withhold of adjudication might prevent deportation, deportation for the crime was automatic, regardless of the withholding of adjudication. He moved for postconviction relief based upon his attorney’s misadvice, which the trial court denied.

His motion was untimely. See Marshall v. State, 983 So.2d 680, 682-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (time for bringing a postconviction ineffective assistance claim based upon misadvice of counsel commences on the date conviction and sentence becomes final); see also Gusow v. State, 6 So.3d 699, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (same). Those cases apply the rule of State v. Green, 944 So.2d 208 (Fla.2006), which holds that a postconviction claim of an involuntary plea based upon failure to advise of deportation consequences must be brought within two years of the conviction becoming final. In Marshall, we found that the reasoning of Green should also apply in cases of misadvice.

In Marshall, we certified conflict with Rodriguez v. State, 824 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), and State v. Johnson, 615 So.2d 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). This conflict has never been resolved, although Rodriguez and Johnson were both decided prior to Green, which we conclude controls this issue.

Affirmed.

WARNER, MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lorena Vargas HERRERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D13-864.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Robert Sauerheber of Robert Sauerhe-ber, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court’s summary denial of appellant’s rule 3.850 motion without prejudice for her to file a facially sufficient motion if she can do so in good faith. Within sixty (60) days of the mandate for this case, appellant may file an amended motion in the trial court which complies with the pleading requirements set forth in Cano v. State, 112 So.3d 646, 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

WARNER, GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    N.O., the Father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    No. 4D13-2545.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.

      Frank Kreidler, Lake Worth, for appellant.
    Hillary S. Kambour, Sanford, and Stephanie C. Zimmerman, Tampa, for appel-lees.
   PER CURIAM.

The Father appeals from the trial court’s Order Granting Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Permanent Commitment of the Minor Children. The appellees, Department of Children and Families and Guardian ad Litem Program, concede that the requirements of section 39.801(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2012) were not met in this case, and that this failure to comply with the statute warrants reversal. We agree and, therefore, hold that the consent to the termination of parental rights petition was improperly entered with regard to the Father. Accordingly, the consent order shall be vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.

      . The Mother has not filed an appeal of the trial court order.


author: WARNER, J.

text:
    Karletta A. TALTON, Appellant, v. CU MEMBERS MORTGAGE, a Division of Colonial Savings, F.A., Appellee.
    No. 4D13-1653.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Andrea H. Dueñas of Law Office of A. Dueñas, P.A., Lantana, Brian K. Korte and Scott J. Wortman of Korte & Wortman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

In this non-final appeal Karletta Taitón seeks review of the denial of her motion to quash service of process because the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing. Because Taitón filed an affidavit attesting that she did not receive service of process, the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on her motion to quash. We reverse.

Credit Union filed an action to foreclose a mortgage against Taitón. A process server filed the return of service, attesting that he made individual service upon Tai-tón at her front door and describing the person served in the return of process, including her gender, approximate height and weight. Thereafter, Credit Union filed a motion for default and motion for summary judgment. A default was entered against Taitón. The court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. Upon receiving the final judgment, Taitón filed a motion to quash service of process, asserting that she had never been served with process and was not aware of the proceedings. She executed and filed an affidavit in support of her motion to quash service of process, attesting to the lack of service and that at the time of the alleged service she was shorter and weighed noticeably less than the individual described in the return of service. Credit Union did not file a response. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to quash.

Talton appeals the order, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash service of process is a question of law subject to the de novo standard of review. Hernandez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 32 So.3d 695, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). See also Carone v. Millennium Settlements, Inc., 84 So.3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Where the allegations of the motion to quash service of process, if true, would entitle the movant to relief, then the trial court errs in denying the motion without first affording the movant an evidentiary hearing. Montes-Mustira v. Aurora Loan Servs., L.L.C., 98 So.3d 778, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). In Montes-Mustira, as in this case, a final judgment of foreclosure was entered in favor of the lender, Aurora Loan Services. The borrowers filed a sworn motion to vacate, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), alleging that they had never been served with process. The trial court summarily denied the motion. We reversed because the allegations of the motion, if established as true, were sufficient to entitle the borrowers to relief, and they should have been given an evidentiary hearing.

Similarly, in Linville v. Home Savings of America, FSB, 629 So.2d 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), the borrower filed a motion to quash service of process. Home Savings did not offer an affidavit in response. The only evidence presented was Linville’s affidavit denying she had received service. We reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion without an evidentiary hearing. We explained that the unrebutted allegations contained in the motion to quash service and the supporting affidavit, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, would establish the lender’s failure to effect valid service of process as required by section 48.031, Florida Statutes (1991). Thus, Linville was entitled to an evidentia-ry hearing on her motion to quash service of process. Accord, Fern, Ltd. v. Road Legends, Inc., 698 So.2d 364, 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Se. Termite & Pest v. Ones, 792 So.2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. We note that, even though the court denied the motion to quash service, the order states that the final judgment and clerk’s default are both vacated. We remand for an evidentiary-hearing on the motion to quash service of process.

STEVENSON and GERBER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jewel GRIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D13-1247.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Jewel Grier, Okeechobee, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s all writs petition, which attempted to raise an untimely postconviction challenge. The petition was procedurally barred, and the claim raised therein is meritless. Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Fla.2004); Newman v. State, 49 So.3d 843, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

We reverse, however, the portion of the trial court’s order which denied appellant’s May 29, 2012 Amended Motion for Post-conviction Relief. This motion was timely filed within two years of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision denying review of our written opinion in Grier v. State, 27 So.3d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), rev. denied, 46 So.3d 566 (Fla.2010). See Leighty v. State, 87 So.3d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); see also Beaty v. State, 701 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla.1997). Further, the original motion, which the trial court permitted appellant to amend, was timely filed within two years of this court’s mandate on direct appeal.

The postconviction motion was not successive as appellant’s prior motions were filed under rule 3.800(a) and argued that he received an illegal sentence. See Ramirez v. State, 822 So.2d 593, 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Felder v. State, 853 So.2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). His filing of his first rule 3.850 motion was not an abuse of pi-ocedure.

Affirmed in part. Reversed and remanded in part.

WARNER, GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Suzana POPESCU, Petitioner, v. LAGUNA MASTER ASSOCIATION, INC., St. Michael Properties, LLC, Supreme Escrow and Title, Inc., and Fay S. Morrison, Respondents.
    No. 4D13-1203.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 2013.
    Suzana Popescu, Wellington, Pro Se.
    Steven D. Rubin, Boca Raton, for Respondent-Laguna Master Association, Inc.
    Barry Jay Warsch of Fidelity National Law Group, Fort Lauderdale, for Respondent-St. Michael Properties, LLC.
   PER CURIAM.

Suzana Popescu (Popescu) seeks prohibition to bar the Palm Beach Circuit Court from exercising jurisdiction over a motion for rehearing in a post-judgment foreclosure action. We deny the petition for reasons which follow.

Respondent Laguna Master Association, Inc. (Association) sued Fay Morrison (Morrison) for unpaid homeowner’s association dues and obtained a final judgment against her for $8,244.02. At the foreclosure sale of the property, Popescu was the highest bidder. After the certificate of title was recorded, the Association filed a motion to vacate the foreclosure sale and certificate of title, and to refund the purchase price to the purchaser. The motion alleged that the subject property had been sold by Morrison to St. Michael Properties, LLC. (St. Michael) prior to the lien foreclosure sale and that the Association had mistakenly failed to cancel the foreclosure sale. The Association alleged mistake, accident and redemption. St. Michael and Supreme Title & Escrow, Inc. (Supreme Title) moved to intervene, to vacate the foreclosure sale and certificate of title, and to refund the purchase price to the purchaser.

The circuit court heard argument and denied the motions to vacate. The court ruled that Morrison had not retained title to the property when she purportedly sold it to St. Michael. Further, the court ruled that because there had been no redemption, it was without jurisdiction to vacate the foreclosure sale or certifícate of title. The Association, St. Michael, and Supreme Title moved for rehearing of the order denying their motions to vacate. The circuit court granted rehearing in an order which it later clarified, allowing all parties and purchasers requesting rehearing to be heard by another judge due to the original judge’s unavailability.

Popescu filed an emergency motion to reconsider and/or vacate the order granting rehearing, in which she argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to entertain rehearing of an order denying a motion to vacate. The judge then presiding denied the motion, relying essentially on Clearwater Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78 (Fla.1976). There, the Supreme Court of Florida held that a postforeclosure judgment order which was dispositive of a separate issue, entitlement to money paid to a receiver, constituted a “final post decretal order,” from which a motion for rehearing could lie. Id. at 79. The court ruled that the order on entitlement to money paid to a receiver was a distinct adjudication on an issue which had not been addressed in the original mortgage foreclosure final judgment. Id,. As such, it was “so final in nature as to partake of the character of a final decree. A petition for rehearing could properly be addressed to it as one could be addressed to any final decree.” Id. at 80.

In this petition for writ of prohibition, Popescu argues that once the original judge denied the motions to vacate foreclosure sale, the circuit court lost jurisdiction to consider a motion for rehearing. She also argues that the order denying the motions to vacate the foreclosure sale was non-final in nature, such that rehearing could not lie. We disagree. The circuit court’s order denying the motions to vacate the foreclosure sale was a discrete final order, separate from the final lien foreclosure judgment. This order was a final adjudication of the parties’ rights on issues distinct from those before the court prior to the lien foreclosure judgment. As such, it was properly the subject of a motion for rehearing under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530. See Clearwater, 336 So.2d at 79-80; see also Remington v. Remington, 705 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So.2d 1386, 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).

Petition denied,.

WARNER, TAYLOR and MAY, JJ„ concur.


text:
    Jermaine TAYLOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D13-2596.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 2013.

      Jermaine Taylor, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. State v. Sturdivant, 94 So.3d 434 (Fla.2012).


text:
    In re Bruce A. CRAFT.
    No. 2013-OB-2171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 18, 2013.
   ORDER

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into numerous complaints of serious professional misconduct filed against respondent. These matters involve a pattern by respondent of accepting fees from clients, failing to complete the agreed upon legal tasks, and then failing or refusing to refund the unearned fees. Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Bruce A. Craft, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20766, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Bruce A. Craft for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bruce A. Craft shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jefferson D. Hughes III.

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Bruce ASHLEY, II.
    No. 2013-B-1512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 20, 2013.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent neglected a legal matter and failed to adequately communicate with a client. Following the institution of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Bruce Ashley, II, Louisiana Bar Roll number 2577, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to the condition that respondent attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

JOHNSON, C.J., and VICTORY, J., would reject consent discipline.


author: WEIMER, Justice. VICTORY, J., HUGHES, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alexis SARRABEA.
    No. 2013-K-1271.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 2013.

      Department of Justice, State of Louisiana, James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Colin Andrew Clark, Assistant Attorney General, District Attorney’s Office, Fifteenth Judicial District, Michael Harson, District Attorney, Mark Thomas Garber, Assistant District Attorney, for Applicant.
    Public Defender’s Office, Fifteenth Judicial District', Chad Michael Ikerd, for Respondent.
   WEIMER, Justice.

Lin response to the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Louisiana legislature enacted a series of laws under the title “Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways.” 2002 La. Acts, 1st Ex.Sess. 46, § 1. Among other stated aims, the purpose of the enactment was “to make operating a motor vehicle in this state when not lawfully present in the United States a crime.” La. R.S. 14:100.11(B). To that end, La. R.S. 14:100.13 was passed. The statute proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien who does not possess documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States. La. R.S. 14:100.13(A). Violation of the statute is a felony which carries with it a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year, with or without hard labor. La. R.S. 14:100.13(0).

Following a nolo contendere plea to the charge of violating La. R.S. 14:100.13, in which he reserved the right to appeal the claim that the statute is preempted by federal law, the defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Upon review, the appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction and [2sentence, holding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law. We granted certiorari to assess the correctness of that determination.

After review of the relevant law, both statutory and jurisprudential, and despite its laudable goal aimed at preventing acts of terrorism, we are constrained to find, based on the Supreme Court case of Arizona v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012), that La. R.S. 14:100.13 operates in the field of alien registration and is, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 12, 2012, defendant Alexis Sarrabea was charged by bill of information with being an alien student and/or a nonresident alien who, on February 12, 2012, operated a motor vehicle in the parish of Lafayette without documentation demonstrating that he is lawfully present in the United States, a violation of La. R.S. 14:100.13. Defendant, a thirty-year-old non-English speaking male, initially pleaded not guilty. However, after spending more than three months in the parish jail, he entered a nolo contendere plea to the charge and, in accordance with a plea agreement with the State, was sentenced to time served. Although erroneously characterizing defendant’s plea as an “Alford plea,” defense counsel nevertheless expressly reserved the right to appeal the claim that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law, that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause, that it is over-broad and vague, and that it violates the Eighth Amendment. The district court accepted the plea in accordance with the stated conditions and the defendant appealed.

|sOn appeal, a panel of the Third Circuit reversed and set aside defendant’s conviction and sentence. State v. Sarrabea, 12-1013 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/13), — So.3d -, 2013 WL 1810228. Concluding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law, the court found the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona, supra, to be both dispositive and binding, particularly that portion of the decision rejecting the state of Arizona’s attempt to punish failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements. The Third Circuit panel reasoned that, like Arizona, Louisiana has attempted to regulate in a field — alien registration — preempted by federal law where even complementary legislation is not permitted:

We are satisfied that the decision in Arizona is controlling in this case. In Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court clearly held where Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration, even a complementary state regulation is impermissible. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2503. We find La. R.S. 14:100.13 is an impermissible attempt by Louisiana to regulate matters in a field already preempted by federal law.

Sarrabea, 12-1013 at 9, — So.3d -.

The court additionally found that, by enacting laws and administrative provisions in tandem with La. R.S. 14:100.13 that seek to determine what forms of documentation are acceptable proof of lawful presence, Louisiana has undermined and disregarded federal law in an area that is already extensively regulated by a complex scheme requiring the exercise of executive discretion in light of national foreign policy concerns. Id. at 10-11, — So.3d -. Noting that La. R.S. 14:100.13 conflicts even more egregiously with federal law than its counterpart in the Arizona act, further intruding upon the federal scheme, the court explained:

Louisiana’s statute makes actions by an alien present in this country a felony offense while the same action by such an alien visitor is but a misdemeanor offense under federal law.... We note Section 3 of the Arizona statute, rejected by the United States Supreme Court, only made the offense a misdemeanor, but, because it imposed stricter penalties |4than the federal laws, it was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court under the Supremacy Clause. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:100.13, which makes failure to carry proof of lawful presence in the United States while driving in Louisiana a felony offense, impermissibly usurps federal authority.

Id. at 12, — So.3d -.

Finally, the court pointed to uncertainties in the Louisiana law, particularly in identifying what constitutes probable cause for an arrest under La. R.S. 14:100.13, and in the definitions of “alien student,” “nonresident alien,” and “lawfully present in the United States,” explaining that the very existence of such uncertainties underscores the reason states cannot act in this area, which is already occupied by federal law. Id. at 14-15, — So.3d -. “To put it plain and simple,” the court succinctly concluded, “La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law; and the State of Louisiana lacks Constitutional authority to enforce it.” Id. at 17, — So.3d -.

From this adverse ruling, the State applied for supervisory review to this court. We granted the State’s application and consolidated the case for argument with two additional cases emanating from the Third Circuit in which, in unpublished writ decisions, a different panel of the court found no error in district court rulings concluding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is not preempted by federal law, resulting in an intra-circuit split. See, State v. Marquez, 12-1316 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/7/13) (unpub’d), writ granted, 13-0315 (La.5/3/13), 112 So.3d 851; State v. Ramirez, 12-1245 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/7/13) (unpub’d), writ granted, 13-0276 (La.5/3/13), 112 So.3d 851. We granted certiorari to resolve that split and to put to rest the issue of whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law. State v. Sarrabea, 13-1271 (La.6/26/13), 118 So.3d 428.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The statute at issue in this case, La. R.S. 14:100.13, was enacted as part of a series of laws passed by the legislature in 2002 in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Entitled “Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways,” the stated purpose of the laws is to “complement federal efforts to uncover those who seek to use the highways of this state to commit acts of terror” by creating “a comprehensive framework for punishing those who give false information in order to obtain drivers’ licenses or identification cards from the office of motor vehicles ... and to make operating a motor vehicle in this state when not lawfully present in the United States a crime.” La. R.S. 14:100.11(B). Enacted pursuant to this mandate, La. R.S. 14:100.13 provides:

A. No alien student[] or nonresident alien[] shall operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating that the person is lawfully present in the United States.
B. Upon arrest of a person for operating a vehicle without lawful presence in the United States, law enforcement officials shall seize the driver’s license and immediately surrender such license to the office of motor vehicles for cancellation and shall immediately notify the INS of the name and location of that person.
lñC. Whoever commits the crime of driving without lawful presence in the United States shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, imprisoned for not more than one year, with or without hard labor, or both.

The question presented to this court for resolution is whether this provision, which the legislature clearly intended to operate in a counter-terrorism context as a complement to federal law, is instead preempted by federal law.

While the question is one of first impression in this court, it has been the subject of examination in the appellate courts. The Fourth Circuit was the first court to directly address the issue. In State v. Lopez, 05-0685 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06), 948 So.2d 1121, writ denied, 07-0110 (La.12/7/07), 969 So.2d 619, the appellate court concluded that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law. Acknowledging that the “state of Louisiana is vested with the authority to regulate public roads and highways within the state under its police power, provided that the legislation does not ‘prove repugnant to the provisions of the state or national constitutions,’ ” the appellate panel determined that, while on its face La. R.S. 14:100.13 “does not appear to run afoul of any particular federal legislation,” implicit in federal law is a “recognition that states can legally issue driver’s licenses without a person being in a position to establish his legal presence in the United States.” Lopez, 05-0685 at 5-6; 948 So.2d at 1124-1125. The “ultimate problem” presented by La. R.S. 14:100.13, the court reasoned, is that it “places a burden on both legal and non-legal aliens which exceeds any standard contemplated by federal immigration law.” Id.

Less than two years later, the First Circuit expressly declined to follow Lopez.

In two decisions issued the same date, State v. Gonzalez-Perez, 07-1813 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/27/08), 997 So.2d 1, writ denied, 09-0292 (La.12/18/09), 23 So.3d 930, and State v. Reyes, 07-1811 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/27/08), 989 So.2d 770, writ denied, 08-2013 (La.12/18/09), 23 So.3d 929, the appellate panels found that La. R.S. 14:100.13 complements rather than conflicts with the federal scheme and, thus, is not preempted by federal law. In reaching its decision, the First Circuit, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e), which requires every alien eighteen years of age or older to carry and have in his possession at all times any certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card, rejected the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that La. R.S. 14:100.13 places a burden on aliens that is not contemplated by federal immigration law. Gonzalez-Perez, 07-1813 at 9-10, 997 So.2d at 7; Reyes, 07-1811 at 9-10, 989 So.2d at 776-777. Instead, it determined that La. R.S. 14:100.13 simply involves a determination of who may or may not lawfully operate a vehicle in this state. Id. Because the statute is not triggered by mere presence and does not involve a state determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country or the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain, the First Circuit found that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is not an impermissible regulation of immigration. Id. Additionally, the court pointed out that there is a presumption that Congress does not intend to preempt state law unless it speaks with clarity otherwise. Id. Applying the presumption, the court found that Congress had not expressed a clear and manifest intent to effect a complete ouster of state power to regulate requirements for the legal operation of a vehicle on public roads in the state. Id. The appellate court then noted that in the absence of a conflict, dual sovereignty allows complementary state and federal laws to exist. Id. Determining that La. R.S. 14:100.13 does not conflict with any federal laws but rather complements and augments federal law, the First Circuit found no basis to rule that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law. Id.

In a series of decisions that followed Gonzalez-Perez and Reyes, the First Circuit continued to adhere to the conclusion that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is not preempted by federal law; rather, the statute complements and assists the federal scheme. State v. Ramos, 07-1448 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/28/08), 993 So.2d 281, writ denied, 08-2103 (La.12/18/09), 23 So.3d 929; State v. Sanchez, 10-0016 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/11/10), 39 So.3d 834. The court reiterated that it simply did “not find a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to effect a complete ouster of state power to regulate requirements for legal operation of a vehicle on public roads and highways within a state.” Sanchez, 10-0016 at 6, 39 So.3d at 839.

Such was the state of the jurisprudence in 2012: a split had developed among the circuit courts of appeal as to whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law, with the First and Fourth Circuits taking opposite sides of the debate. Then, in that year, the legal landscape against which these competing decisions operated was substantively altered when the Supreme Court chose to revisit this area of the law.

In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to sections of Arizona's “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” which had been enacted to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2497. Specifically, the Court granted certiorari to consider whether federal law preempts four sections of the Arizona Act: Section 3 of the Act made failure to comply with federal alien registration laws a state misdemeanor; Section 5(C) made it a state misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the state; Section 6 authorized state officers to make the warrantless arrest of a person if an officer has probable cause to believe the person |9has committed any public offense that makes him removable from the United States; and, finally, Section 2(B) required that state officers make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of any person they stop, detain or arrest on another legitimate basis if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States. Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2498.

The Court in Arizona began its analysis by reaffirming two long-standing principles which have particular resonance for this case. First, the federal government “has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens,” power that “rests, in part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl.4, and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations.” Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2498. Second, by reason of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, Congress has virtually unfettered power to preempt state law. Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2500. This preemption, the Court explained, may occur in one of three ways: (1) “Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision,” [express preemption]; (2) Congress may determine that conduct in a particular field “must be regulated by its exclusive governance,” a determination that may be inferred “from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,’ ” [field 1 mpreemption]; or (3) state law may conflict with federal law either because “compliance with both state and federal regulations is a physical impossibility” or because the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” [conflict preemption]. Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2500-2501 (citations omitted).

The Court then considered each of the four provisions of the Arizona act in light of these principles. Regarding Section 3, which created a state misdemeanor proscribing the willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document, the Court found that “[t]he framework enacted by Congress leads to the conclusion ... that the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration.” Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2502. Referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1302, 1304-1306, the Court noted:

The federal statutory directives provide a full set of standards governing alien registration, including the punishment for noncompliance. It was designed as a ‘harmonious whole.’ Where Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in this area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.

Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2502 (citations omitted), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).

In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected Arizona’s contention that Section 3 of the act was permissible because it complemented federal law. The Court found this argument “not only ignores the basic premise of field preemption — that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Government has reserved for itself — but also is unpersuasive on its own terms,” because, as the Court pointed out, “[w]ere § 3 to come into force, the State would have the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances where federal officials |T1in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies.” Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2503.

The Court also pointed to the inconsistency between Section 3 of the Arizona Act and federal law with respect to penalties, concluding that the Arizona law, which (unlike its federal counterpart) rules out probation as a possible sentence and also eliminates the possibility of a pardon, creates a conflict with the plan Congress put in place, underscoring the fundamental reason for field preemption. Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2503.

In contrast to Section 3 of the Act, Section 5(C) created a state criminal prohibition that lacked any federal counterpart: Section 5(C) made it a state misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in Arizona. Distinguishing its prior decision in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976), which found that a state had authority to pass its own laws on the subject at a time when there was no comprehensive federal program regulating the employment of unauthorized aliens, the Court noted that federal law at present contains “a comprehensive framework for ‘combating the employment of illegal aliens,’ ” which “does not impose federal criminal sanctions on the employee side,” but rather imposes civil penalties. Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2504 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court found from examining the legislative background that “Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment.” Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2504. Acknowledging the express preemption provision in the federal law is silent as to whether additional penalties may be imposed against employees, the Court ultimately found this section of the | ^Arizona Act preempted because it “would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens” as “it involves a conflict in the method of enforcement.” Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2505.

The Court then turned to Section 6 of the Arizona Act, which provided that a state officer without a warrant may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed any public offense that makes him removable from the United States. The Court noted that under federal law, warrantless arrest of an unauthorized alien by federal officers is permitted only where the alien is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2506. It found that “Section 6 attempts to provide state officers even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given trained federal immigration officers.” Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2506. The Court determined that this was tantamount to Arizona “achiev[ing] its own immigration policy” which “violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.” Id. It rejected the contention that Arizona’s law complemented the federal framework by allowing “cooperation” between state and federal agents: “no coherent understanding of the term [cooperation] would incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government.” Id. at 2507. The Court then summarized its conclusions:

Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may not make war-rantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in specific, limited circumstances. By nonetheless authorizing state and local officers to engage in these enforcement activities as a general matter, § 6 creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

Id.

11sFinally, the Court turned its attention to Section 2(B) of the Arizona Act, which requires state officers to make a “ ‘reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status’ of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if ‘reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.’ ” Id. It also provides that any person who is arrested shall have his immigration status determined by consultation with United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) before he is released. Id. The Court noted that “[Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system” and that ICE operates a 24-hour call center to answer queries from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2508. “The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.” Id. Recognizing that Section 2(B) is susceptible to several interpretations, some permissible and some preempted, the court ultimately declined to determine whether Section 2(B) is preempted by federal law:

There is a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be enforced. At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.

Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2510. The Supreme Court thus held three sections of the Arizona Act, but not Section 2(B), preempted by federal immigration laws.

It was against this jurisprudential backdrop, in the wake of the Arizona decision, that the court of appeal issued its ruling in the instant case. As that court correctly recognized, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, as the most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the Arizona deeision is both binding on the courts of this state and controlling on the issue of federal preemption. As a result, 114both before the appellate court and now in this court, the parties center their arguments for and against preemption on which section of the Arizona Act La. R.S. 14:100.13 most closely resembles.

Not unexpectedly, the State insists that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is most analogous to Section 2(B) of the Arizona Act, the section of the Act the Supreme Court declined to find preempted. That section requires state officials to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is not lawfully present. The State argues that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is distinguishable from the preempted Section '3 of the Arizona Act because criminal consequences under La. R.S. 14:100.13 are triggered by driving without documentation rather than by mere undocumented presence. The State asserts that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is not an “alien registration” statute, nor does it operate in the field of alien registration, because it does not require aliens to register with the State nor does it make an effort to keep track of aliens. Unlike Section 3 of the Arizona Act, La. R.S. 14:100.13 does not merely adopt the federal standard; neither does it exactly mirror federal law, as it does not require aliens to carry registration documents at all times. According to the State, the only way to find La. R.S. 14:100.13 preempted within the field of alien registration is to disregard the element of operating a motor vehicle, which no federal immigration law attempts to regulate. Relying on the well-established presumption against preemption, the State argues that the “field” in which La. R.S. 14:100.13 actually operates is the regulation of roads, a police power traditionally reserved to 11sthe States, and that in the absence of a comprehensive scheme of federal driving regulations, a finding of field preemption is unwarranted.

Quite naturally, the defendant endorses the position adopted by the court of appeal. He argues that, like Section 3 of the Arizona Act, La. * R.S. 14:100.13 is field preempted because, in creating a state law penalty for the failure to carry documents proving one’s lawful presence in the United States, it also invades a field pervasively occupied by the federal government— that of alien registration. Drawing from the Arizona decision, he points out that the field of alien registration occupied by the federal government establishes requirements for registration and for carrying proof of compliance, and sets forth penalties for violation of these requirements:

Federal law now includes a requirement that aliens carry proof of registration. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e).... Aliens who remain in the country for more than 30 days must apply for registration and be fingerprinted.... § 1302(a) ... Detailed information is required, and any change of address has to be reported to the Federal Government.... §§ 1304(a), 1305(a) ... The statute continues to provide penalties for the willful failure to register.... § 1306(a) ...

Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2502. He asserts that, as illustrated, Louisiana’s requirement that proof of lawful presence be carried is one component of the federally occupied field of alien registration.

Moreover, the defendant points out that every document Louisiana accepts as proof of lawful presence is a federally issued alien registration document. The 11ñdefendant discounts the argument that Louisiana’s law is distinguishable from Arizona’s because Arizona criminalized presence without documentation while Louisiana criminalizes driving without documentation. He notes that Arizona’s law is actually broader than Louisiana’s and argues that if the broader regulation is preempted, then the narroiuer regulation acting within the same field is equally vio-lative of federal preemption principles.

In the final analysis, in this post-Arizona era, the debate over whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted centers on whether the fact that Louisiana’s statute only criminalizes the failure to carry documents proving lawful presence in the United States while driving is sufficient to distinguish it from Section 3 of the Arizona Act that made it a state misdemeanor for failure to carry alien registration documents generally.

| )7In an effort to escape principles of field preemption, the State argues that, because criminal liability only arises if a person operates a vehicle, La. R.S. 14:100.13 is merely an effort by the state to regulate driving on its roads and does not operate within the field of alien registration. However, the State’s argument ignores the fact that the statute only applies to aliens’, it requires the carrying of documentation — documentation which is neither directed at nor establishes competency to operate motor vehicles on the roads of this state and which consists, moreover, of documents defined by a state agency as consisting entirely of federal alien registration documents (see, e.g., La. Admin. Code tit. 55 § 147(E)(2007)) — and it punishes the failure to carry such documentation as a felony.

Federal law mandates that, once in the United States, aliens are required to register with the federal government and carry proof of status on their persons at all times (which necessarily includes while driving). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1306. Failure to do so is a federal misdemeanor. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a). The Supreme Court ruled in Arizona that the comprehensive framework in which these provisions appear leads to the conclusion that the federal government has occupied the field of alien registration and that “[w]here Congress occupies an entire field, as 11sit has in the field of alien registration, even complementary state regulation is impermissible.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2502. Arizona thus instructs that states may not criminalize federal registration violations such as the failure to carry proof of alien registration. Id.

In requiring aliens to carry documentation of their lawful presence while driving, La. R.S. 14:100.13 regulates squarely in the field of alien registration. Although no jurisdiction has considered whether a law like La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted, the conclusion is inescapable that if a state cannot criminalize the failure to carry registration generally, neither may it criminalize the failure to carry registration while operating a vehicle. The broader prohibition necessarily includes the narrower one.

Additionally, following the rationale of Arizona, it is clear that the harsh penalty provisions of La. R.S. 14:100.13 impermis-sibly intrude upon the federal [19scheme. Under federal law, the failure to carry registration papers is a misdemeanor, punishable by fíne, imprisonment, or a term of probation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3561. Louisiana R.S. 14:100.13, by contrast, punishes the failure to carry documentation as a felony with the possibility of a hard labor sentence of up to one year. We conclude, consonant with the Supreme Court in Arizona: “This state framework of sanctions creates a conflict with the plan Congress put in place,” and “underscorefe] the reason for field preemption.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2503.

Whereas, previously it may have been a closer question whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted (thus accounting for the in-tra-circuit split among the courts of appeal), after Arizona, it is clear that the federal government has occupied the field of alien registration and that, as a result, even complementary legislation by the states operating in that field is pre-empt-ed. Because La. R.S. 14:100.13 operates in the field of alien registration as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Arizona, by regulating the circumstances under which non-citizens carry documentation establishing proof of lawful status, the statute is preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by controlling federal jurisprudence.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeal is affirmed. AFFIRMED.

VICTORY, Justice, dissents with reasons.

HUGHES, Justice, dissents with reasons.

VICTORY, J.,

dissents.

hi dissent from the majority opinion because in my view, La. R.S. 14:100.13 is not preempted by federal law. Preemption only occurs under Arizona (1) where Congress “withdraws specified powers from the states by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision”; (2) where the states attempt to regulate “conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance”; or (3) where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility. Arizona v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2500-01, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). While it is certain that the first and third preemption doctrines do not apply here, the majority finds the statute at issue preempted because Congress has occupied the field of “alien registration.” However, the driving requirements at issue here have nothing to do with alien “registration,” and I disagree with the broad assumption that anything having to do with alien registration documents is preempted. Further, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the statute.

It is axiomatic that the State is vested with the authority to regulate public roads and highways under its police power. Regulations pertaining to the issuance of motor vehicle drivers’ licenses constitute an exercise of the police power to |2regulate the use of the highways in the interest of the public safety and welfare. Majorie Shields, The Validity of State Statutes, Regulations, or other Identification Requirements Restricting or Denying Driver’s Licenses to Illegal Aliens, 16 A.L.R.6th 131 (2006). This power to license carries with it the power to prescribe reasonable conditions precedent to the issuance of such licenses and to classify drivers for special regulation, provided such classifications are not unreasonable or arbitrary. Id. La. R.S. 14:100.13 is part of a group of statutes requiring alien students and nonresident aliens to have documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States in order to obtain a Louisiana driver’s license and to be lawfully present in the United States in order to operate a motor vehicle. For instance, while one of the requirements for obtaining a license is a social security number, La. R.S. 32:409. 1(A)(2)(d)(vi) provides that an alien residing in Louisiana who is ineligible to obtain a social security number can instead “present a document demonstrating lawful presence in the United States in a status in which the alien individual may be ineligible to obtain a social security number.” As the majority opinion recognizes, “the Supremacy Clause apparently presents no obstacle to Louisiana requiring proof of lawful presence before issuing a driver’s license.” Op. at 465, n. 21 (citing Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 945 F.Supp.2d 1049, (D.Ariz.5/16/13), 2013 WL 2128315). Likewise, there are penalties for providing false information |sto obtain a driver’s license in Louisiana. Generally, the individual’s license or pending application for a license shall be suspended, revoked, or cancelled. La. R.S. 32:409.1(E). Further, “whoever commits the crime of falsifying information required for the purpose of obtaining a driver’s license shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, imprisoned for not less than six months, or both.” La. R.S. 14:100.14(0). In U.S. v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1298-99 (11th Cir.(Ala.) 8/20/12), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2022, 185 L.Ed.2d 905 (2013), the court held that an Alabama statute making it a felony for an unlawfully present alien to attempt to get a driver’s license by providing fraudulent information was not preempted by federal immigration law. La. R.S. 14:100.14(0) criminalizes the same type of behavior criminalized in Alabama which the 11th Circuit found was not preempted. In addition, La. R.S. 14:100.14(0) apparently applies to anyone, not just aliens.

Regarding the particular statute at issue, La. R.S. 14:100.13, the majority reasons that because federal law mandates that aliens are required to carry proof of status on their person at all times (8 U.S.C. 1301-1306), and the failure to do so is a misdemeanor, a state statute which criminalizes failure to carry such proof in a more |4particularized circumstance, even one related to the state’s police power, is preempted. If that were true, then the above statutes are also preempted, even the one that requires presenting proof of lawful presence to obtain a driver’s license, because the alien would have to be “carrying” proof of lawful presence in order to obtain the license. Further, the statute at issue does not appear to criminalize the failure to carry a document proving lawful presence on his person while driving. While La. R.S. 14:100.13(A) provides that “no alien student or nonresident alien shall operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating that the person is lawfully present in the United States,” that is basically just a restatement that documentation demonstrating lawful presence is required to get a driver’s license under La. R.S. 32:409.1(A)(2)(d)(vi). The penalty provision, La. R.S. 14:100.13(0), provides that “whoever commits the crime of driving without lawful presence in the United States shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, imprisoned for not more than one year, with or without hard labor, or both.” Thus, La. R.S. 14:100.13(C), the penalty provision, punishes only “driving without lawful presence,” not driving without carrying documentation proving lawful presence. As the statute does not appear to punish failure to carry registration while operating a vehicle, the majority’s conclusion that “the broader provision,” i.e., “failure to carry registration generally” under Arizona, “necessarily includes the narrower one,” i.e., “failure to cany registration while operating a vehicle,” is incorrect. Op. at 464-65.

In addition to misinterpreting the statute, the majority simply reads Arizona too broadly. As the Supreme Court previously held in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976):

|sPower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power. But the Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power whether latent or exercised ... [T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.

This principle is not altered by the holding in Arizona. This was exemplified by an Eighth Circuit case which considered whether a city ordinance, which limited hiring and providing rental housing to “illegal aliens” and “unauthorized aliens,” was preempted by federal immigration law in light of Arizona. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir.(Nev.) 6/28/13). The rental provisions of the ordinance made it unlawful for any person or business entity to rent to, or permit occupancy by, an “illegal alien.” To implement this restriction, prospective renters were required to obtain an occupancy license, which required proof of citizenship or, if an alien, immigration status. After issuance of the occupancy license, the city police department was required to ask the federal government to verify the immigration status, and if the renter was “unlawfully present,” the occupancy license was revoked and violators were fined $100 per day. Relying on De Canas, the Court rejected the argument that the rental provisions intruded on a federally protected “field,” alien removal, finding that the rental provisions “neither determine ‘who should or should not be admitted into the country,’ nor do they more than marginally affect ‘the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.’ ” 719 F.3d at 941. Further, the court rejection the notion that the ordinance intruded on the federally protected field | r,of alien registration. The court distinguished the ordinance from the law invalidated in Arizona, which imposed state criminal sanctions for an alien’s willful violation of federal alien registration laws, reasoning as follows:

The occupancy license scheme is nothing like the state registration laws invalidated in ... Arizona. The Ordinance requires all renters, including U.S. citizens and nationals, to obtain an occupancy license before renting a dwelling unit in the City. It does not apply to all aliens — it excludes non-renters. Although prospective tenants must disclose some of the same information that aliens must disclose in complying with federal alien registration laws, that does not turn a local property licensing program into a preempted alien registration regime. To hold otherwise would mean that any time a State collects basic information from its residents, including aliens — such as before issuing driver’s licenses — it impermissibly intrudes into the field of alien registration and must be preempted. It defies common sense to think that Congress intended such a result.

Id. at 943.

I agree with the reasoning of Keller and would apply it in this case. Just as the ordinance in Keller, the statute here is distinguishable from the broad statute in Arizona. The licensing and driving provisions require all drivers, including U.S. citizens, to obtain a license from the state in order to drive on state highways. Further, the statute at issue does not apply to all aliens, only drivers. The fact that a prospective driver must disclose some of the same information that aliens must disclose in order to comply with federal alien registration laws does not turn a statewide driver’s license program into a preempted alien registration requirement. It “defies common sense” to think that any time a state collects basic information from aliens before issuing a driver’s license or allowing them to drive on state roads that the state has impermissibly intruded into the field of alien registration.

The court in Alabama also rejected the argument that the anti-harboring provisions in the ordinance were preempted by the federal immigration anti-harboring provisions, even though the ordinance defined “harboring” more expansively and 17imposed penalties not imposed by the federal statute. The court found that “[pjlaintiffs made no showing that Congress intended to preempt States and local governments from imposing different penalties for the violation of different state or local prohibitions simply because the prohibited conduct is labeled ‘harboring.’ ” Id. at 944. Likewise, there is nothing to show that Congress intended to preempt states from punishing an alien who drives without lawful presence, especially given that proof of lawful presence is a requirement for obtaining a driver’s license.

In my view, a state is simply not prevented from asking an alien to provide proof of lawful presence in order to obtain a license, and should certainly not be prevented from punishing an alien with criminal penalties for obtaining a. license with fraudulent proof of lawful presence or for driving when they are not lawfully present. The federal government simply has no interest in a state’s requirements for driving within that state. For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.

HUGHES, J.,

dissenting.

| ¶1 respectfully dissent. Louisiana has passed a law that prohibits non-citizen aliens from driving in Louisiana without documentation showing they are legally present in the United States. The documentation is already required of non-citizen aliens by the federal government. I fail to see how Louisiana’s statute interferes with federal immigration law or involves the status of aliens. Rather, I view it as a legitimate measure to protect the citizens of Louisiana, much the same as requiring drivers to carry liability insurance.

      . Counsel's characterization was a misnomer. Defendant clearly intended to enter a “Crosby plea,” which is a guilty plea conditioned upon review of the denial of designated pre-plea motions. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 588-89 (La.1976). Despite the improper nomenclature, defense counsel made clear that he wished to preserve certain claims, which he expressly delineated. The State has voiced no objection to the improper designation.

      . In addition to its application for supervisory review, the State filed a motion for appeal in the Third Circuit. However, this court has held that, for purposes of our appellate jurisdiction under La. Const, art. 5, § 5(D), a ruling that a state statute is preempted by federal law is not a declaration of unconstitutionality but a matter of statutory interpretation; therefore, review is by application for writ of certiorari rather than by appeal. City of Baton Rouge v. Goings, 95-2542, pp. 2-3 (La.12/13/96), 684 So.2d 396, 397-98. Moreover, although the State does not raise it as a procedural bar in this case, because a finding that a state statute is preempted by federal law is not a declaration of unconstitutionality, the procedural requirements imposed by this court on constitutional challenges to statutes or ordinances (see e.g., State v. Hatton, 07-2377, p. 13 (La.7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, 718) do not apply to challenges based on the doctrine of federal preemption.

      . These cases are resolved in separate opinions issued contemporaneously herewith.

      . 2002 La. Acts, 1st Ex.Sess. 46 § 1.

      . La. R.S. 14:100.12(2) defines an alien student as “any person who is attending an institution of education in the state who is not a citizen of the United States.”

      . La. R.S. 14:100.12(5) defines a nonresident alien as "any person who is not a United States citizen and who is a citizen of any country other than the United States, who is physically present in the United States and who has not acquired INS permanent resident status.”

        . Quoting Kaltenbach v. Breaux, 690 F.Supp. 1551, 1553 (W.D.La.1988)

      . The relevant sections are presented in the order discussed in the Supreme Court's opinion.

      . The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.2, provides, in relevant part:
      This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

      . Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947).

      . Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).

      . Quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002).

      . Quoting Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 11 — 1051(B) (West 2012).

      . Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146 ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”).

      . La. R.S. 14:100.12(3) defines documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States as a document "determined by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections pursuant to R.S. 32:409.l(A)(2)(d)(vi).” In turn, La. R.S. 32:409.1 (A)(2)(d)(vi) permits an alien residing in Louisiana, who lacks a social security number, to obtain a driver’s license after providing, inter alia, "a document demonstrating lawful presence in the United States.” This statute further provides that "[t]he list of acceptable documents demonstrating lawful presence shall be determined by the department.” Id. Finally, at the time the statute was passed, the administrative code defined a "proof of lawful presence document” as "a verifiable document used to establish the identity and lawful presence of an individual who does not have and is ineligible to obtain a Social Security number.” La. Admin. Code tit. 55, § 147(E)(2007).
      The administrative code also provided the following list of "lawful presence documents”:
      a.i. Arrival-Departure Record (1-94) (Class A-l, A-2, A-3, B-l, B-2, C-l, C-2, C-3, E-1, E-2, F-l, F-2, G-l, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, H-4, I, J-2, K-2, L-2, M-l, M-2, NATO 1-7, 0-3, P-4, R-2, S-5, S-6, S-7, TC, TD, Cuban/Haitian Entrant, Parolee);
      ii. the form 1-94 cannot state "Employment Authorized;”
      iii. if a foreign passport and Form 1-94 have been presented as primary or secondary document, that Form 1-94 is also an acceptable § 147.B document, but only if it fits the § 147.B description;
      b. Visa Waiver Arrival-Departure Record (I-94W) (Class WB, WT);
      c. Crewman's Landing Permit (I-95A);
      d. Alien Crewman Landing Permit and Identification Card (1-184);
      e. Nonresident Alien Canadian Border Crossing Card (1-185);
      f. Nonresident Alien Mexican Border Crossing Card (1-186);
      g. Nonresident Alien Border Crossing Card (1-586);
      h. B-l/B-2 Visa/BCC (DSP-150).
      La. Admin. Code tit. 55, § 147(B)(1)(2007).

      . We find the State’s argument that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is most analogous to Section 2(B) of the Arizona Act unconvincing. According to the Supreme Court, Section 2(B), which requires state officers to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of any person they stop, detain or arrest on another legitimate basis if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States, could likely survive a preemption challenge if interpreted by Arizona courts to “only require[] state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released." Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2509. Louisiana's statute goes far beyond this limited communication and sharing of information with ICE, and creates a state felony offense.

      . In an effort to bolster its argument that La. R.S. 14:100.13 does not operate in the field of alien registration, the State argues that La. R.S. 14:100.13 does not legislate upon illegal immigration because it does not require an alien to be in the United States illegally to face prosecution under the statute. The State insists the law applies to any alien, whether lawfully present or not, who fails to carry proof of lawful presence while driving. Thus, according to the State, the alien student or nonresident alien who inadvertently forgets to carry the designated documents while driving is subject to felony prosecution.
      The State's interpretation of the sweep of La. R.S. 14:100.13 is dubious. The penalty provisions of the statute, La. R.S. 14:100.13(B) and (C), clearly indicate that the only persons who could be punished for violating Section (A) are those "without lawful presence.” Furthermore, La. R.S. 14:100.11(B) plainly declares the purpose of the legislation: “to make operating a motor vehicle in this state when not lawfully present in the United States a crime.”
      However, whether the statute’s penalty provisions extend to lawfully present aliens who fail to carry the required documentation while driving or only to those alien students and nonresident aliens "without lawful presence,” Section (A) of the statute nonetheless seeks to regulate the circumstances under which non-citizens carry documentation proving lawful presence, placing it directly within the field of alien registration.

      . The State's argument that La. R.S. 14:100.13 does not criminalize violation of federal laws because La. R.S. 14:100.13 and its federal counterpart, 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e), are not identical and, further, that 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) is not implicated because it applies only to aliens who have registered with the federal government and defendant has not done so, is misplaced. Like the preempted Section 3 of the Arizona Act, La. R.S. 14:100.13 attempts to criminalize activity proscribed by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) and 1306(a) in that it either punishes an individual for failure to carry documents he was issued (§ 1304(e)) or it punishes an individual for failure to register and obtain the necessary documents to carry (§ 1306(a)). In either event, the statute operates in the preempted field of alien registration described in Arizona.

      . It is no obstacle to this conclusion that the legislature intended the Louisiana statute to "complement federal efforts to uncover those who seek to use the highways of this state to commit acts of terror,” La. R.S. 14:100.11(B), as courts must look to the actual impact of a law rather than its stated purpose in defining the field in which it operates. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992), quoting Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432 (1926) (Preemption analysis turns, not on whether federal and state laws “are aimed at distinct and different evils,’’ but whether they “operate upon the same object.”).
      Moreover, it is noteworthy, as the State concedes in brief to this court, that application of the statute has yet to yield the apprehension of anyone identified as a terrorist operating on the roadways of this State.

      . Our independent research confirms that no other state has such a law.

      . Louisiana requires proof of lawful presence before issuing a driver's license. However, the Supremacy Clause apparently presents no obstacle to Louisiana requiring proof of lawful presence before issuing a driver’s license, see, e.g., Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 945 F.Supp.2d 1049 (D.Ariz.5/16/13), 2013 WL 2128315, at *7-8. La. R.S. 32:409.1(A)(2)(d)(vi).

      .Insofar as the requirement that aliens carry documents demonstrating proof of lawful status is concerned, the presumption against preemption on which the State, and earlier decisions of the First Circuit, relied to find no "clear and manifest purpose of Congress to effect a complete ouster of state power to regulate requirements for legal operation of a vehicle on public roads and highways within a state” (see, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 10-0016 at 6, 39 So.3d at 839), has been overcome by the ruling in Arizona; therefore, the presumption is unavailing to the State here.

      . In fact, "[t]hrough the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 231, 313 (codified as note to 49 U.S.C. § 30301), Congress encouraged individual states to require evidence of lawful status as a prerequisite to issuing a driver's license or identification card to an applicant.” U.S. v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1298 (11th Cir.(Ala.) 8/20/12), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2022, 185 L.Ed.2d 905 (2013).
      The REAL ID Act provides that a federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or ID card issued by a state to any person unless the state is meeting the requirements of the Act. Section 202(c)(1) of the Act lists the types of identification information that must be provided before a state may issue a driver’s license or identification card, and Section 202(c)(2) requires verification by valid documentary evidence of an applicant's citizenship or immigration status. However, while a driver's license from a noncomplying state may not be accepted by a federal agency for federal purposes, the Act does not mandate implementation by individual states. In other words, states may issue driver's licenses and identification cards without complying with the Act.

      .The court reasoned as follows:
      The REAL ID Act thus does not purport to comprehensively regulate driver's licenses, ... Rather, it leaves the field essentially open, giving room for the states to adopt different policies concerning this subject. See H.R.Rep. No. 109-72, at 177 (2005) (Conf.Rep.), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 302 (noting that the REAL ID Act "does not directly impose federal standards” and that “states need not comply with the listed standards”). Given the limited scope of the REAL ID Act, we do not see have it forecloses Alabama’s decision to make it a crime for an unlawfully present alien to attempt to get a driver's license or identification card once it has decided that such aliens are ineligible for these documents.
      691 F.3d at 1299.

      . While this provision is in the same part of the revised statutes as the statute at issue, "Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways,” and is entitled "Giving false information regarding lawful presence in the United States in order to obtain a driver’s license,” the penalty provision apparently applies to anyone who gives false information to get a driver’s license.

      . It is well established that criminal statutes are subject to strict scrutiny under the rule of lenity. State v. Oliphant, 12-1176 (La.3/19/13), 113 So.3d 165, 168; State v. Carr, 99-2209 (La.5/26/00), 761 So.2d 1271, 1274.

      . One portion of the ordinance required every business to participate in the “E-Verify Program,” a federal database that allows employers to verify the work-authorization status of prospective employees, and provided that violators could lose their business licenses, permits, contracts, grants or loans from the City. The parties did not appeal the district court ruling that this portion of the ordinance was not preempted because "it was ‘essentially a licensing or similar law’ and thus falls within the savings clause” in the federal immigration law under Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011). 719 F.3d at 938.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Erik TRACZYK.
    No. 2012-KK-1085.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 31, 2012.
   In re Traczyk, Erik; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 473-300; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0585.

Granted. Due to the unique facts and circumstances in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State’s motion to transfer the defendant to parish prison. Therefore, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed, and the ruling of the trial court, denying the State’s motion to transfer the defendant, is reinstated.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Satonia SMALL.
    No. 2011-K-2796.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 31, 2012.
   IN RE Small, Satonia; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 265,488; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,632-KA.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Booker DIGGINS.
    No. 2012-KD-1133.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 322-352; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0759.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    Larry WAGONER, et al. v. CHEVRON USA, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Chevron USA, Inc., et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 22,929; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,119-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., recused.


text:
    Larry WAGONER, et al. v. CHEVRON USA, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2041.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Diamond South Operating, LLC; LSJ Exploration, LLC; Oil & Ale LSJ, LLC; Smith Operating & Management;— Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 22,929; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,119-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., recused.


text:
    Phillip W. RAINES, R.N. v. LOUISIANA STATE NURSING BOARD.
    No. 2013-C-2048.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Raines R.N., Phillip; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. C598207; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1831.

Denied.


text:
    Lorraine T. COBB & Joseph Cobb v. Dr. Horace L. MITCHELL, M.D., the Neuromedical Center & Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-2049.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Cobb, Joseph; Cobb, Lorraine T. et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 530,701; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2012 CA 870, 2012 CA 1082, 2012 CW 0067.

Denied.


text:
    Monica GANGE and Ramir Bioc, Individually, and on Behalf of their Minor Child, Celeste Bioc v. Eslam J. HAMED, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Ray Brandt Infinity of Metairie, LLC, Tokio Marine Insurance Co., Stepping Stones Montessori, Inc., Allstate Insurance Company, and Progressive Insurance Company. Shuichi and Jacqueline Sato, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Child, Kein Sato v. Eslam J. Hamed, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Ray Brandt Infinity of Metairie, LLC, Tokio Marine Insurance Co., Stepping Stones Montessori, Inc., Allstate Insurance Company, and Progressive Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-2050.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Company LTD; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 699-207; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 12-CA-510,12-CA-511.

Denied.


text:
    Orinda ROBERTSON, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Darron Robertson. v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD d/b/a East Baton Rouge Parish School System.
    No. 2013-C-2076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re East Baton Rouge Parish School Board d/b/a East Baton Rouge Parish School System; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 542,151; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 2039.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Dana Washam MARKS v. Stephen R. MARKS.
    No. 2013-CC-2078.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Marks, Stephen R.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2010-14859; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 0723.

Denied.


text:
    Alana STIRGUS Individually and as the Tutrix of A.S. v. ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Larry Dauterive, Ronald Earrilloux, Children’s Hospital, Dr. Carmen Begue and ABC Insurance Companies.
    No. 2013-C-2084.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Barrilloux, Ronald; Dauterive, Larry; St. John the Baptist Parish School Board, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 53,753; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-15.

Denied.


text:
    Larry WAGONER, et al. v. CHEVRON USA, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Chevron USA Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 22,929; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-119-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., recused.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2012-ADMIN-1207.
    No. 2013-OB-2499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Washington, Edward; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 2012-ADMIN-1207.

Denied. Moot. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is conducting a disciplinary investigation.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Trae WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-KK-2690.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 516-133; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1178.

Denied.

VICTORY, WEIMER and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rico WEBB.
    No. 2013-KK-1681.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Webb, Rico; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 514-192; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0759.

Granted.


author: VICTORY, J.,

text:
    In re Danny Wayne SYLVESTER, Jr.
    No. 2013-OB-2202.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Sylvester Jr., Danny Wayne;— Plaintiff; Applying For Petition for Voluntary Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law in Lieu of Discipline.

Petition for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline rejected.

VICTORY, J.,

additionally concurs. Petition for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline rejected. Respondent’s affidavit of consent does not comply with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1(A)(3)(H).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Malcolm ALEXANDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Alexander, Malcolm; — Plaintiff; Applying For Reconsideration of this court’s action dated October 4, 2013, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 80-1260; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-22.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Maurice GIBBS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0998.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Gibbs, Maurice; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated October 11, 2013, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 255-403.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John W. MATHIEU, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Mathieu Sr., John W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 05-4388; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 13-KH-02, 12-KH-919, 13-KK-295, 13-KH-309.

Denied.

WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. DeMarcus W. LAW.
    No. 2013-KO-0978.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Law, DeMarcus W.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C 16173; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1024.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Antonio JACKSON.
    No. 2013-KO-1029.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Jackson, Antonio; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 42,704; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-856-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frederick L. ROSS, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-1079.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Ross Jr., Frederick L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 498-643; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0109.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd A. MUNSON.
    No. 2013-K-1083.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Munson, Lloyd A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 09-5393; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-327.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jessie BELL, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-1140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Bell Jr., Jessie; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 477,549; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA1615.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Samuel WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-KO-1141.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Williams, Samuel; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 443-906; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0252.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenrard D. BROUSSARD.
    No. 2013-KO-1142.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Broussard, Kenrard D.; — -Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 10-1536; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1144.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael PETITTO.
    No. 2013-K-1183.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Petitto, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 703544; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1670.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Auther WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-OK-1195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Williams, Auther; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 396-904; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1092.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A), (D).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jonathan PARKER.
    No. 2013-K-1200.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Parker, Jonathan; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 27572 C/W 27573; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1550.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tam M. TRAN.
    No. 2013-K-1202.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;- — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 509-827; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1219.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dominique DAVIS.
    No. 2013-OK-1205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Davis, Dominique; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 11-2986; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-512.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael E. RICK.
    No. 2013-K-1219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   In re Rick, Michael E.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 490278; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1569.

Denied.