author: LOLLEY, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Graylon Jerrell REYNOLDS, Appellant.
    No. 49,258-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 1, 2014.

      Teresa Culpepper Carroll, Jonesboro, Louisiana Appellate Project, for Appellant.
    Robert W. Levy, District Attorney, Laurie Lee Whitten James, Cary T. Brown, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before DREW, MOORE and LOLLEY, JJ.
   LOLLEY, J.

liThe defendant, Graylon Jerrell Reynolds, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed robbery, and felony theft over $500.00. The plea agreement included a 12-year sentencing cap. The trial court accepted the pleas and sentenced the defendant accordingly. Reynolds now appeals. His appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, together with a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), alleging that there are no nonfrivolous issues upon which to base an appeal. For the reasons stated herein, the motion to withdraw is granted, and Reynolds’ conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Facts

On January 31, 2011, Reynolds was charged by an amended bill of information with the following: possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1; armed robbery by use of a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64 and 14:64.3; and, felony theft over $500.00, in violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(1). Following multiple pretrial hearings and motions and the selection of a jury for his trial, a plea agreement was reached. Reynolds ultimately appeared before the trial court and pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed robbery, and felony theft over $500.00. As part of the agreement, the state agreed to a sentencing cap of 12 years at hard labor and not . to file a habitual offender bill of information.

Specifically, at Reynolds’ guilty’ plea hearing, the state offered evidence of the factual basis for the pleas, and Reynolds admitted that the | ..facts as stated at the plea hearing on the motion to suppress and the preliminary examination were true and correct. The evidence presented at the preliminary examination shows that on May 18, 2010, officers of the Lincoln Parish Narcotics Enforcement Team issued Kenneth Richard, a confidential informant, $500.00 in buy money to purchase an assault rifle and a handgun from Jekevdrick O’Bryan Carter. It was believed the guns had been stolen in recent burglaries. Richard made contact with Carter, who was with the defendant, and arranged to buy the guns from him at a designated location. When Richard arrived at the designated location, he approached Reynolds, who was standing at the rear of a vehicle with the trunk open. Richard saw the guns in the trunk of the car and gave the $500.00 to Reynolds. The defendant then bent over into the trunk as if to retrieve the guns, and instead pulled a handgun out of the waistband of his pants and pointed it at Richard’s head. Richard fled before the transaction was completed.

At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court informed Reynolds of his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and Reynolds stated that he understood and wished to waive his rights. The defendant was advised of the nature of the charges and the applicable sentencing range for each offense. The trial court accepted the pleas and ordered a presen-tence investigation report (the “PSI”).

IsReynolds appeared for sentencing on November 5, 2013. The trial court reviewed the PSI and noted that Reynolds was a fourth-felony offender based on his prior convictions for simple burglary, accessory after the fact to simple burglary, and indecent behavior with a juvenile. The trial court stated that there were numerous aggravating factors, but no mitigating factors. For possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court sentenced Reynolds to 12 years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. For armed robbery, Reynolds was sentenced to 12 years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. For felony theft, the trial court sentenced the defendant to five years at hard labor. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Also, the trial court recommended that Reynolds be housed at a facility where he can receive vocational training and/or substance abuse evaluation and training.

Thereafter, the trial court granted Reynold’s pro se motion for appeal, and the Louisiana Appellate Project was appointed to represent him. Reynolds’ appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, together with an Anders brief, which alleges that she could find no nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal. See Anders, supra; State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La.12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241, 242; State v. Mouton, 95-0981 (La.04/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176; and State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990). The brief outlines the procedural history of the case and the agreement under which the defendant’s guilty plea was entered. The brief also contains “a detailed and reviewable assessment for both the defendant |4and the appellate court of whether the appeal is worth pursuing in the first place.” Jyles, supra. Defense counsel further verified that he mailed copies of the motion to withdraw and his brief to the defendant, in accordance with Anders, Jyles, Mouton, and Benjamin, supra. The state did not file an appellate brief.

On April 14, 2014, this court issued an order holding the motion to withdraw in abeyance, rescinding the pro se briefing deadline, and notifying the defendant that he could file a brief in this appeal within 30 days of the date of the order and file a request to view the appellate record within 10 days of the date of the order. Reynolds was further advised that if no brief was timely filed, the appellate record would be reviewed only for error patent. The defendant did not request the appellate record or file a pro se brief.

Discussion

A review of the record disclosed no nonfrivolous issues and no rulings which arguably support an appeal. The record shows that prior to entering his guilty plea, Reynolds was properly advised of his Boykin rights, understood the plea agreement, and voluntarily pled guilty. Appellate counsel’s brief, containing no assignments of error, conforms with the procedures set forth in Anders, supra, and Jyles, supra. The appellate brief reviewed the procedural history of the case and stated that after a thorough review of all the pleadings filed in the trial court, the court proceedings, and all transcripts contained in the record, no nonfrivolous issues could be advanced for appellate review. Appellate counsel particularly and correctly | .^pointed out that Reynolds was sentenced in accordance with his plea agreement and that under La.C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2), a defendant cannot appeal or seek review of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement which was set forth in the record at the time of the plea. Counsel pointed out that the benefit Reynolds received from his plea bargain coupled with the great discretion of the sentencing court renders meritless any claim of constitutional excessiveness. Counsel also verified sending a copy of the appellate brief and the motion to withdraw to Reynolds.

ERRORS Patent

The error patent review of the appellate record revealed an error patent regarding the defendant’s sentence. For Reynolds’ conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court failed to impose the mandatory fine of not less than $1,000.00, nor more than $5,000.00 as required by La. R.S. 14:95.1(B). Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence is illegally lenient. Louisiana C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) provides that an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review. However, this court is not required to take such action. State v. Jamerson, 43,822 (La.App.2d Cir.01/14/09), 1 So.3d 827; State v. Griffin, 41,946 (La.App.2d Cir.05/02/07), 956 So.2d 199. The state did not object to the error, and Reynolds obviously is not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to impose the mandatory fine. Accordingly, we decline to remand the case for correction of the sentence to include such a fine.

' [4] | (¡Further, the transcript from the Boykin hearing reflects that Reynolds pled guilty to armed robbery without the firearm. Likewise, the sentencing hearing refers only to his conviction for armed robbery. However, the Uniform Commitment Order indicates that Reynolds pled guilty to armed robbery by use of a firearm and the court minutes indicate that he pled guilty “as charged.” When the transcript and court minutes conflict, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732 (La.1983); State v. Wilson, 46,340 (La.App.2d Cir.05/18/11), 69 So.3d 598. Accordingly, we order the trial court to correct the court minutes and commitment order to accurately reflect that Reynolds pled guilty and was convicted of armed robbery (La. R.S. 14:64) rather than with armed robbery by use of a firearm (La. R.S. 14:64.3).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to withdraw is granted and Graylon Jerrell Reynolds’ conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . The trial court did not mention the firearm enhancement provision under La. R.S. 14:64.3 at either the guilty plea or sentencing hearing, and therefore, it appears that Reynolds pled guilty to armed robbery without the firearm enhancement.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MOORE, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Dewey Leroy MOFFETT and Jeanne Rene Moffett, Plaintiff-Appellants v. Clyde Anthony BARNES, III and Maria Lynne Barnes Flaherty, Defendant-Appellees.
    No. 49,280-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 1, 2014.
    Nicholas E. Gasper, Mansfield, for Appellants.
    H. Lyn Lawrence, Jr., Dick “Dave” Knalder, for Appellees.
    Before DREW, MOORE and PITMAN, JJ.
   MOORE, J.

|,Dewey and Jeanne Moffett appeal a judgment rejecting their claims for declaratory judgment that they own a mineral servitude, for an accounting and an award of mineral royalties after February 28, 2010. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

By act of credit sale dated February 28, 2000, the Moffetts bought two tracts of land in DeSoto Parish for $38,900. The sellers were Clyde Barnes and Marla B. Flaherty (collectively, “Barnes”). The act of sale stated, “Vendor retains all oil, gas and other mineral rights in the land herein conveyed for ten (10) years.”

In 2002, Barnes executed a mineral lease affecting one of the tracts; during the term of the lease, the lessee drilled, reaching production in August 2007. In 2009, Barnes executed a separate mineral lease affecting the other tract; during the term of this lease, the lessee drilled, reaching production in March 2010. These wells have been in steady production, and the lessees have continued to pay all royalties to Barnes.

The Moffetts felt that after the expiration of the 10 years stated in the credit sale, they should have begun to receive royalties. They notified the lessees of this, but the lessees responded that in their view, Barnes was “still the owner * * * of the mineral servitude.”

The Moffetts filed this suit in June 2012, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the ownership of the minerals after February 28, 2010, an accounting, and an award of all mineral royalties after February 28, 2010.

|2The matter was set for trial on October 21, 2013, but apparently the district court told counsel in pretrial conference that he had another case presenting the same issue, and research in that case was fatal to the Moffetts’ position. When the parties went on the record, the Moffetts’ counsel stated he wished to call his clients to testify as to their understanding of the reservation, but Barnes’s counsel objected to the parol evidence. The court sustained the objection. The Moffetts’ counsel did not tender their testimony, submitting the case solely on the act of credit sale.

Action of the District Court

Three days later the court released a ruling on the merits. It identified the issue as whether the reservation, which it quoted in full, “creates a fixed, ten-year term, not subject to prescription, or whether it is a reaffirmation of the parties’ adoption of the regular ten-year prescriptive period, making it subject to interruption.” The court found the question was “squarely addressed” in St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne, 2006-984 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06), 945 So.2d 846, writ denied, 2007-0301 (La.4/5/07), 954 So.2d 140. That case held, “The phrase ‘for a period of ten years’ [is] a restatement of the default prescriptive period assumed into all mineral rights created by the State of Louisiana because the parties did not specifically state otherwise.” The instant deed created a mineral servitude in favor of the sellers, with no affirmative intention or statement that the servitude would not be subject to prescription; thus it was subject to prescription, and the drilling activities interrupted prescription. The court therefore rejected |3the Moffetts’ claims.

The Moffetts took this devolutive appeal, raising two assignments of error.

Discussion

By their first assignment of error, the Moffetts urge that the mineral reservation created a term, not a mere restatement of the law of prescription of nonuse. They contend that when a mineral reservation reads, “Vendor retains all oil, gas and other mineral rights in the land herein conveyed for ten (10) years,” mineral ownership reverts to the landowner after those 10 years. They concede that unless stated otherwise, a mineral reservation is a permanent, perpetual right, subject to prescription of 10 years’ nonuse, but argue that the parties may shorten that period under La. R.S. 31:74. They also concede that St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne, supra, appears fatal to their position, but argue that it should be distinguished in that the reservation in Champagne was “for a period of ten years,” while the instant reservation does not use the word “period.” This omission, they submit, takes the case outside the normal prescription rules for mineral ser-vitudes. They also argue that Champagne was simply in error in following the comments to R.S. 31:74 that apply only to reservations of under 10 years. Finally, they urge that the district court’s interpretation flouts the generally prevailing meaning of “for ten years,” expanding the sellers’ servitude indefinitely.

Barnes responds that the court’s ruling was factually and legally correct. He agrees with the Moffetts’ assertion, “Unless stated otherwise, a | ¿mineral reservation is a permanent, perpetual right, subject to a prescriptive period of ten years of nonuse.” He contends that the court correctly analyzed Champagne; the omission of “period” from the instant reservation did not alter its plain meaning; and there is no basis to say Champagne was wrong. He concludes the judgment should be affirmed.

The basic mineral rights that may be created by a landowner are the mineral servitude, the mineral royalty and the mineral lease. La. R.S. 31:16; Wagoner v. Chevron USA Inc., 45,507 (La.App. 2 Cir.8/18/10), 55 So.3d 12, writ denied, 2010-2773 (La.3/2/12), 83 So.3d 1032. When a landowner reserves a part of the mineral interest in the land he sells, he creates a mineral servitude. La. R.S. 31:24; Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 240 La. 198, 121 So.2d 831 (1959); Ford v. Lester, 48,-932 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/14/14), 139 So.3d 22; St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne, supra. A mineral servitude is extinguished by, among other things, prescription resulting from nonuse for 10 years. La. R.S. 31:27(1). Prescription of nonuse is interrupted by good faith operations for the discovery and production of minerals. La. R.S. 31:29; Ford v. Lester, supra; Magee v. Worley, 47,565 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/21/12), 105 So.3d 907, writ denied, 2013-0345 (La.4/1/13), 110 So.3d 586. The parties to an act creating a mineral servitude may alter the applicable legal rules, subject to certain limitations provided in the Mineral Code. La. R.S. 31:72. One such alteration is as follows:

§ 74. Right to fix term or shorten prescriptive period; effect of stipulation for prescriptive period greater than ten years.
|RThe parties may either fix the term of a mineral servitude or shorten the applicable period of prescription of non-use or both. If a period of prescription greater than ten years is stipulated, the period is reduced to ten years.

The comments to this section provide that the parties are “free to specify that the stated number of years is the term of the interest and not a prescriptive period.” Id., comment; Leiter Minerals Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So.2d 845 (1961); St. Mary Operating Co. v. Guidry, 2006-1495 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/07), 954 So.2d 397, writ denied, 2007-0962 (La.6/29/07), 959 So.2d 520.

On close review, we find the district court correctly analyzed the mineral reservation and the law applicable to mineral servitudes and prescription of nonuse. The act of credit sale provided that the vendor would retain all mineral rights in the land “for ten (10) years[,]” thus creating a mineral servitude in favor of the seller, Barnes. La. R.S. 31:24; Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum, supra; Ford v. Lester, supra. As such, the servitude is subject to prescription of nonuse for 10 years, and the prescription is subject to interruption by good faith operations on the servitude. La. R.S. 31:29; Ford v. Lester, supra; Magee v. Worley, supra. During the life of the servitude, Barnes, the owner, granted mineral leases; the parties agree that these leases resulted in operations for the discovery and production of minerals.

These actions were plainly sufficient to interrupt prescription and maintain the servitude in favor of Barnes.

We are unable to agree that the phrasing of the reservation, “Vendor retains all oil, gas and other mineral rights in the land herein conveyed for ten (10) years [,]” somehow converted it to a “term of the interest” instead of |fia servitude subject to the normal rules of prescription. On its face, the reservation merely confirms the normal 10-year limit for a servitude, and does not reject or renounce the normal operation of nonuse and interruption provided by the law. The fact that it applies “for ten (10) years” instead of “for a period of ten years,” as in Champagne, , is insufficient to remove this case from the general provisions of Louisiana law. The reservation did not use words like “regardless of any operations for the discovery and production of minerals,” “the parties hereto establish a term of interest, not a mineral servitude and not subject to the rules of prescription,” or “the vendor expressly renounces his rights to maintain the servitude for any reason after the expiration of 10 years.”

We perceive no error in the district court’s analysis of the reservation. This assignment of error lacks merit.

By their second assignment of error, the Moffetts urge the court should have allowed testimony as to the intent of the parties. They contend that if the reservation was unclear, the court should have admitted extrinsic evidence to interpret it. La. C.C. arts.2046, 2047; St. Mary Operating Co. v. Guidry, supra. They urge that the judgment should be reversed for the admission of their testimony.

Barnes responds that once the court found the reservation clear and unambiguous, there was no need to resort to further interpretation in search of its meaning. La. C.C. art. 2046. He submits the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony.

17A1 though the Moffetts have valiantly urged that the reservation created something other than a mineral servitude subject to the statutory rules of nonuse and interruption, the district court found the reservation was clear and unambiguous. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. C.C. art.2046; Ford v. Lester, supra; Pilkinton v. Ashley Energy LLC, 46,650 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/2/11), 77 So.3d 465, writ denied, 2011-2657 (La.2/10/12), 80 So.3d 484. Testimonial or other evidence may not be admitted to negate or vary the contents of an authentic act or an act under private signature. La. C.C. art. 1848; Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 2012-2292 (La.6/28/13), 144 So.3d 791; Tealwood Props. LLC v. Succession of Graves, 45,975 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/27/11), 64 So.3d 397. In light of the plain reading of the document and the law applicable to parol evidence, we find no abuse of the court’s discretion in excluding the Mof-fetts’ testimony as to their understanding of the reservation. It is no “absurd consequence” that the owner of a mineral servitude may maintain it as long as he conducts operations for the discovery and production of minerals. La. R.S. 31:29. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Conclusion

For the reasons expressed, the judgment is affirmed. All costs are to be paid by the appellants, Dewey and Jeanne Mof-fett.

AFFIRMED.

      . Presumably, that case was Taylor v. Morns, which resulted in a judgment which this court affirms today, 49,425 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/1/14), 150 So.3d 952, 2014 WL 4854188.

      . The deeds in Taylor v. Morris, supra, also reserved mineral rights “for a period of ten (10) years from the date of this Cash Sale Deed.”


author: KITCHENS, Justice, DICKINSON, Presiding Justice,

text:
    Dorothy Ann GLENN v. Andrew POWELL.
    No. 2013-IA-01112-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Oct. 23, 2014.
    Eric Charles Hawkins, Greenville, Willie James Perkins, Sr., attorneys for appellant.
    James D. Bell, Jackson, Paul Caleb Koonce, attorneys for appellee.
   KITCHENS, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Following the May 7, 2013, Democratic primary for the Ward 5 seat on the Greenwood City Council, the Greenwood Municipal Democratic Executive Committee certified Dorothy Ann Glenn as the winner and thus the Democratic nominee for the Ward 5 seat on the City Council. Andrew Powell, the runner-up for the Democratic nomination for the Ward 5 seat, challenged the election results, contending that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5 at the time of the election and that she consequently was ineligible to run for that office. Powell sought a special primary runoff election, without Glenn’s name on the ballot. The Circuit Court of Le-flore County, Special Election Tribunal, found that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5, held that she was not qualified to hold the position of Greenwood City Council Member for Ward 5, set aside the results of the primary election of May 7, 2013, and ordered a special primary runoff election without Glenn’s name on the ballot. Finding no error below, we affirm in part. We reverse in part and vacate the order of the circuit court for a special primary runoff election.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶2. In the May 7, 2013, Democratic primary, Glenn garnered 55.51% of the votes cast; the runner-up, Andrew Powell, garnered 39.73% of the votes cast; and Norman Smith, a third contender, garnered 4.56% of the votes cast. Three days after the primary, on May 10, 2013, Powell filed a “Petition for Certification of the True Results of the Democratic Primary Election for City Council Member, Ward 5,” pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-921 (Rev. 2007), with the Greenwood Municipal Democratic Executive Committee (“Executive Committee”). Powell stated that “Glenn is not currently a resident of the 5th ward of Greenwood, Mississippi] and was not a resident at the time she qualified to run for office, and is therefore ineligible to run for and/or represent the Democratic Party in the general election-” Attached to Powell’s petition were affidavits of relatives and acquaintances of Glenn attesting that Glenn did not reside in Ward 5. According to Powell, Glenn erroneously claimed residence at 116 Longino Street in Greenwood in order to qualify to run for the Ward 5 seat when, in actuality, her residence was 301 East Percy Street in Greenwood, a dwelling not situated within Ward 5. Powell requested that the Executive Committee “declare that the true result of the May 7, 2013 primary is that there are two eligible candidates, namely Andrew Powell and Norman Smith, that shall be in a runoff primary election.”

¶ 3. Having received no response from the Executive Committee as of May 16, 2013, Powell filed a “Petition for Judicial Review of the Democratic Primary Results for the Election of the Position of City-Councilman, Ward 5” in the Circuit Court of Leflore County. That same day, this Court appointed a special judge to preside over the matter. Glenn responded with a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction and that Powell had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Alternatively, Glenn asserted an entitlement to summary judgment “on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact.”

¶ 4. A bench trial was conducted on May 24, 2013. Persons whose affidavits were attached to Powell’s Petition for Certification testified at trial that Glenn did not reside at the 116 Longino Street address, but that she actually resided at 301 East Percy Street, a house not situated within Ward 5. Glenn did testify on her own behalf, denying that she falsely claimed residency at 116 Longino Street in order to meet the residency requirement. Nevertheless, Glenn testified that she had multiple residences, and that she had resided for a time at a business she owned at 601 Broad Street, an address situated in Ward 7. A Registered Voters Report was admitted into evidence showing an address for Glenn (also known as Dorothy Ann Nichols) at 514 East McLaurin Street. But another Voters Report demonstrated that Willie Wayne Gatewood lived at that same address. Gatewood testified that Glenn had never lived at 514 East McLau-rin Street, but that she had asked his permission to use that address as her mailing address.

¶5. The trial court filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 28, 2013, finding that “Glenn has no credibility as a witness” and that “her testimony and the evidence received proves that Ms. Glenn has a propensity to use false addresses to attempt to meet the requirement for candidacy for public office.” Finding further that “[t]he overwhelming preponderance of the evidence received during the trial convinced the Court that Dorothy Ann Glenn is not currently a resident of the 5th Ward of Greenwood, Mississippi and was not a resident at the time that she applied to run for office,” the trial court held that Glenn had been ineligible to represent the Democratic Party in the general election for the office of Greenwood Municipal City Council Member, Ward 5. As a result of Glenn’s disqualification to run as the Democratic nominee, the trial court held further that “the result of the general election for that position is set aside and held for naught,” and that if Glenn “has assumed office by the time this order is made final, then she is by Order of this Court removed from office.” The trial court ordered a special runoff election to take place “on the first Tuesday after two weeks after the entry of this Order.”

¶ 6. Aggrieved, Glenn filed on June 30, 2013, a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal in this Court. A panel of this Court granted Glenn’s petition and stayed execution of the judgment on July 2, 2013. Glenn raises two issues for interlocutory review:

1. Whether the lower court had jurisdiction to decide a contest of qualifications of candidates for primary election under Miss.Code Ann. Section 23-15-927 as opposed to Section 23-15-961.
2. Whether the lower court erred in ordering a special primary runoff election within two weeks between the two losing candidates.

We address each assignment of error in turn.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7. “In an election contest, the standard of review for questions of law is de novo.” Sumner v. City of Como Demo cratic Executive Comm., 972 So.2d 616, 618 (Miss.2008) (quoting Garner v. State Democratic Executive Comm., 956 So.2d 906, 909 (Miss.2007) (citing Ladner v. Necaise, 771 So.2d 353, 355 (Miss.2000))). “When a trial judge sits as a fact finder, his or her findings are reviewed for manifest error, and the verdict will not be disturbed unless it ‘is a result of prejudice, bias, or fraud, or is manifestly against the weight of credible evidence.’” Boyd v. Tishomingo County Democratic Executive Comm., 912 So.2d 124,128-129 (Miss.2005) (quoting Miss. Dep’t of Transp. v. Johnson, 873 So.2d 108, 111 (Miss.2004)).

1. Whether the lower court had jurisdiction to decide a contest of qualifications of candidates for primary election under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-927 as opposed to Section 23-15-961.

¶ 8. Glenn contends that the lower court lacked jurisdiction under Mississippi Code Sections 23-15-921 and 23-15-927. She urges that, because Powell contested Glenn’s qualification as a candidate, his sole remedy consisted of filing a contest under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-961. Mississippi Code Section 23-15-961(1) provides:

Any person desiring to contest the qualifications of another person as a candidate for nomination in a political party primary election shall file a petition specifically setting forth the grounds of the challenge within ten (10) days after the qualifying deadline for the office in question. The petition shall be filed with the executive committee with whom the candidate in question qualified.

Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-961(1) (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added).

¶ 9. Powell admittedly filed, on April 23, 2013, an untimely challenge to Glenn’s qualifications pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-961(1), which he concedes was “properly denied by the Greenwood Municipal Democratic Executive Committee.” The qualifying deadline was March 8, 2013, and thus Powell had until March 18, 2013, to file a timely challenge to Glenn’s qualifications as a candidate for nomination.

¶ 10. But, as Powell and the trial court recognize, our examination of Glenn’s “lawful qualifications to run for or hold office does not end there,” for Powell brought his Petition for Certification and his Petition for Judicial Review after the primary election pursuant to Mississippi Code Sections 23-15-921 and 23-15-927. We must ascertain whether the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 23-15-921 and 23-15-927 was proper. Section 23-15-921 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by Section 23-15-961, a person desiring to contest the election of another person returned as the nominee of the party to any county or county district office, or as the nominee of a legislative district composed of one (1) county or less, may, within twenty (20) days after the primary election, file a petition with the secretary, or any member of the county executive committee in the county in which the election was held, setting forth the grounds upon which the primary election is contested....

Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921 (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added). Likewise, Mississippi Code Section 23-15-927 provides:

When and after any contest has been filed with the county executive committee, or complaint with the State Executive Committee, and the executive committee having jurisdiction fails to promptly meet or, having met, fails or unreasonably delays to fully act upon the contest or complaint or fails to give with reasonable promptness the full relief required by the facts and the law, the contestant shall have the right forthwith to file in the circuit court of the county in which the irregularities are charged to have occurred....

Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 (Supp.2014).

¶ 11. The Democratic primary election was held on May 7, 2013, and Powell filed his Petition for Certification on May 10, 2013, within the twenty-day filing period allowed under Section 23-15-921. Citing Mississippi Code Section 23-15-961(7), which states that “[t]he procedure set forth above shall be the sole and only manner in which the qualifications of a candidate seeking public office as a party may be challenged prior to the time of his nomination or election,” the trial court held that “[ajfter the Primary on May 7, 2013, Dorothy Ann Glenn transformed from a ‘candidate for nomination’ to an apparent or actual ‘nominee.’ ” Thus, the trial court held that Section 23-15-961(1) no longer applied to Glenn, since, after May 7, 2013, she was no longer the “candidate for nomination,” but instead had been certified as the Democratic party nominee.

The trial court ruled that Section 23-15-921 is “a separate statute governing challenges of a party nominee.” We agree. The language of Section 23-15-961 renders it inapplicable to the present case. At the time of Powell’s contest filing, Glenn no longer was the “candidate for nomination in a political party primary” under Section 23-15-961(1), but had been “returned as the nominee of the party” under Section 23-15-921. So Powell’s contest pursuant to Section 23-15-921 was both procedurally timely and substantively meritorious.

¶ 12. Glenn, however, urges that this Court’s holding in Gourlay v. Williams, 874 So.2d 987 (Miss.2004), stands for the proposition that Section 23-15-961 provided Powell an exclusive means of contesting Glenn’s qualifications to run for the Ward 5 office. In that case, Gourlay contested Williams’s qualifications to run as the Democratic nominee for the position of Bolivar County Supervisor, District 1, pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-963 (Rev. 2001). Id. at 988. This Court held that Section 23-15-961 provided, “pri- or to the general election,” “the sole means for contesting the qualifications of a candidate seeking office as a paHy nominee.” Id. at 989 (emphasis added). This Court determined that any suit under Section 23-15-961 was time barred, since Gourlay filed the contest on September 4, 2003, well beyond ten days following the March 1, 2003, qualifying deadline. Highlighting language from Section 23-15-961(7), this Court left “it to Gourlay to determine what other procedures are ‘otherwise provided by law.’ ” Id.

¶ 13. The language employed by this Court in Gourlay renders that case inapposite from the present one. At the outset, the Gourlay Court distinguished Sections 23-15-961 and 23-15-963, a question not before this Court in the present case. Moreover, here, Glenn was a “candidate seeking office as a party nominee” in the primary election. Id. at 989 (emphasis added). But by the time Powell contested Glenn’s election, the primary was complete and Glenn had been “returned as the nominee” of the Democratic party. See Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921 (Rev. 2007). Therefore, Powell, like Gour-lay, was left “to determine what other procedures are ‘otherwise provided by law,’ ” since, according Section 23-15-961(7), he was challenging Glenn’s nomination not “prior to,” but after “the time of [her] nomination-” Gourlay, 874 So.2d at 989. For Powell, those procedures “otherwise provided by law” can be found in Section 23-15-921.

¶ 14. Additionally, Section 23-15-927 vests the circuit court with subject-matter jurisdiction following the filing of an election contest with the executive committee, “in which the irregularities are charged to have occurred,” where that committee “having jurisdiction fails to promptly meet or, having met, fails or unreasonably delays to fully act upon the contest or complaint....” Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 (Supp.2014). Powell filed his Petition for Certification with the Executive Committee on May 10, 2013. According to Powell, as of May 15, 2013, the Executive Committee had not “investigated the grounds for [the] challenge set forth by Andrew Powell’s Petition, had not notified the parties concerned with Andrew Powell’s Petition, and had not taken a vote or declared the true results of the Democratic primary for the position of City Council Member, Ward 5,” pursuant to Section 23-15-921, as of eight days after the primary election. See Barbour v. Gunn, 890 So.2d 843, 847 (Miss.2004) (trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction was considered proper by this Court where “the general election was so near at hand that a revote was needed immediately to preserve the rights of voters.”) Thus, Powell filed his Petition for Judicial Review pursuant to Section 23-15-927 with the Circuit Court of Leflore County on May 16, 2013, with the June 2013 general election looming. A Special Tribunal of the Circuit Court of Leflore County therefore had jurisdiction of Powell’s election contest pursuant to Sections 23-15-921 and 23-15-927.

¶ 15. The dissent finds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, averring that “a plain reading of [Section 23-15-961(1)] leads to the conclusion that it is the only means by which someone may ‘contest the qualifications of another person as a candidate for nomination in a political party primary election.’ ” Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-961(1) (Supp.2014). It is true that Section 23-15-961(7) provides that “[t]he procedure set forth in this section shall be the sole and only manner in which the qualifications of a candidate seeking public office as a party nominee may be challenged ...” Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-961(7) (Supp.2014). But that language, absolute at first blush, is qualified by the following: “prior to the time of his nomination or election.” Id. Once the primary election has occurred, the candidate who sought the party nomination has transformed into the party nominee. This process, which is at issue in the present case, clearly is contemplated by Section 23-15-921, which provides an avenue of relief to an individual desirous of contesting “the election of another person returned as- the nominee of the party to any county or county district office....” Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921 (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added).

¶ 16. Powell was contesting Glenn’s qualifications as a “person returned as” the Democratic nominee for the position of Greenwood City Council Member, Ward 5, under Sections 23-15-921 and 23-15-927, and not her qualifications as “a candidate for nomination” prior to nomination under Section 23-15-961(1). Thus, the trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Mississippi Code Sections 23-15-921 and 23-15-927.

2. Whether the lower court erred in ordering a special primary runoff election within two weeks between the two losing candidates.

¶ 17. Glenn next avers that Mississippi Code Section 23-15-937 mandates that the governor call special elections, and that the trial court here exceeded its authority by so doing. Section 23-15-937 provides:

When no final decision has been made by the time the official ballots are required to be printed, the name of the nominee declared by the party executive committee shall be printed on the official ballots as the party nominee, but the contest or complaint shall not thereby be dismissed but the cause shall nevertheless proceed to final judgment and if the judgment is in favor of the contestant, the election of the contestee shall thereby be vacated and the Governor, or the Lieutenant Governor, in case the Governor is a party to the contest, shall call a special election for the office or offices involved. If the contestee has already entered upon the term he shall vacate the office upon the qualification of the person elected at the special election, and may be removed by quo warranto if he fail so to do.

Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-937 (Supp.2014). Powell, in the absence of any relevant citation, states that, “[bjecause this case was pending when the general election occurred, the Tribunal retained jurisdiction over the parties, over the outcome of the general election and over the right of Ms. Glenn to assume and hold office if elected at the general election.” The trial court here ordered “a special primary runoff election ... to take place on the first Tuesday after two weeks after the entry of this order.”

¶ 18. We agree with Powell that the trial court retained jurisdiction over vacation of Glenn’s election, since Section 23-15-937 states that, despite the party nominee’s name being placed upon the general election ballot, “the cause shall nevertheless proceed to final judgment and if the judgment is in favor of the contestant, the election of the contestee shall thereby be vacated.” The very next phrase provides that “the Governor ... shall call a special election for the office or offices involved.” Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-937 (Supp.2014). While the statute vests the trial court with the authority to render a judgment, and even to vacate the election, the legislature mandated that, in such circumstance, the governor shall call a special election. This Court previously has reversed and rendered the judgment of the trial court in the context of a contest of the results of the Democratic primary election for the position of mayor of Houston, Mississippi. Moore v. Parker, 962 So.2d 558, 561 (Miss.2007). This Court ruled that “[t]he special tribunal erred in ordering a special primary run-off election to be held when it is statutorily mandated that the Governor call such election.” Id. at 568.

¶ 19. To the limited extent the trial court ordered a special primary runoff election, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a judgment that the governor shall call a special primary runoff election for the office of Greenwood City Council Member for Ward 5 to take place between the remaining qualified candidates, Andrew Powell and Norman Smith.

CONCLUSION

¶ 20. The Circuit Court of Leflore County, Special Election Tribunal, correctly found that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5 and that she was not qualified to hold the position as Greenwood City Council Member for Ward 5. To the extent the trial court vacated the results of the May 7, 2013, primary election, we affirm. But the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering a special primary runoff election, which the governor is mandated to do. We therefore reverse and vacate the order of the circuit court for a special primary runoff election.

¶ 21. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND VACATED IN PART.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

DICKINSON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LAMAR, J.

DICKINSON, Presiding Justice,

dissenting:

¶ 22. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Powell’s challenge of Glenn’s qualifications for office, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 23. Both Dorothy Glenn and Andrew Powell sought the Democratic nomination for the Ward 5 city council seat. Glenn prevailed, advanced to an uncontested general election, and assumed office. On May 10, 2013, three days after Glenn took the Democratic primary, but prior to the general election, Powell petitioned the municipal Democratic Executive Committee pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-921 to challenge whether Glenn possessed the minimum qualifications for that office. Then, having received no response, Powell filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-927 in the Circuit Court of Leflore County. The circuit court exercised jurisdiction, found that Glenn lacked the necessary qualifications, removed her from office, and ordered a special election.

¶ 24. As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the circuit court possessed jurisdiction over Powell’s claim. He initiated this circuit court proceeding pursuant to Section 23-15-927, which provides judicial review after a county executive committee fails to promptly respond to a complaint. Powell filed his complaint with the county executive committee pursuant to Section 23-15-921. So the pertinent question is whether Powell properly brought this challenge pursuant to that section, which provides:

Except as otherwise provided by Secticm 23-15-961, a person desiring to contest the election of another person returned as the nominee of the party to any county or county district office, or as the nominee of a legislative district composed of one (1) county or less, may, within twenty (20) days after the primary election, file a petition -with the secretary, or any member of the county executive committee in the county in which the election was held, setting forth the grounds upon which the primary election is contested; and it shall be the duty of the executive committee to assemble by call of the chairman or three (3) members of said committee, notice of which contest shall be served five (5) days before said meeting, and after notifying all parties concerned proceed to investigate the grounds upon which the election is contested and, by majority vote of members present, declare the true results of such primary.

By its terms, Section 23-15-921 provides a procedural avenue “to contest the election of another person returned as the nominee of the party to any county or county district office,” except “as otherwise provided by Section 23-15-961.”

¶ 25. Section 23-15-961(1) provides:

(1) Any person desiring to contest the qualifications of another person as a candidate for nomination in a political party primary election shall file a petition specifically setting forth the grounds of the challenge within ten (10) days after the qualifying deadline for the office in ques- • tion. The petition shall be filed with the executive committee with whom the candidate in question qualified.

Given the all-encompassing language “any person” and the mandatory word “shall,” a plain reading of this statute leads to the conclusion that it is the only means by which someone may “contest the qualifications of another person as a candidate for nomination in a political party primary election.”

¶ 26. But subsection (7) of that statute provides two exceptions and states:

(7) The procedure set forth in this section shall be the sole and only manner in which the qualifications of a candidate seeking public office as a party nominee may be challenged prior to the time of his nomination or election. After a party nominee has been elected to public office, the election may be challenged as otherwise provided by law. After a party nominee assumes an elective office, his qualifications to hold that office may be contested as otherwise provided by law.

So the statute limits its all-inclusive language by permitting challenges to a candidate’s qualifications after the candidate assumes office, if the law otherwise provides for such a challenge. The majority finds that Section 23-15-921 is the “otherwise provided by law.” But that interpretation fails for several reasons.

¶ 27. First, Section 23-15-961⅛ exception states “[ajfter a party nominee assumes an elective office, his qualifications to hold that office may be contested as otherwise provided by law.” Section 23-15-921 provides for a challenge “within twenty (20) days after the primary election,” not after the candidate assumes office. So Section 23-15-921 cannot fit as an alternative avenue within the plain language of Section 23-15-961.

¶ 28. Second, Section 23-15-921 begins by stating “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by Section 23-15-961....” It is simply illogical to find that this statute falls within the “as otherwise provided by law” language of the statute it identifies as an exception to its own rule.

¶ 29. Finally, Section 23-15-921 provides a legal avenue to “contest the election of another person....” But the last two sentences of Section 23-15-961(7) clearly recognize that challenges to the election and challenges to a candidate’s qualifications are distinct things. So the election challenge statute, Section 23-15-921, cannot satisfy the qualification provision’s “as otherwise provided in law.” And it is here that the majority’s response to this opinion fails. The majority focuses on the “nominee” language of Section 23-15-921, but fails to recognize that Section 23-15-921 permits only challenges to the nominee’s election, not their qualifications to be elected.

¶ 30. The plain language of Section 23-15-961 limited Powell’s opportunity to challenge Glenn’s qualifications to the ten days following the qualification deadline, unless some other provision of law provided for challenges after Glenn assumed office. Because Powell brought this challenge after the primary, but before Glenn took office, pursuant to Section 23-15-921, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.

LAMAR, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

      . At present, Glenn is the Greenwood City Council Member for Ward 5, having faced no other contenders for the position in the general election in June 2013, which occurred during the pendency of the present suit.

      . A write-in candidate received a single vote, garnering 0.2% of the votes cast.

      . Section 23-15-921 provides the following: Except as otherwise provided by Section 23-15-961, a person desiring to contest the election of another person returned as the nominee of the party to any county or county district office, or as the nominee of a legislative district composed of one (1) county or less, may, within twenty (20) days after the primary election, file a petition with the secretary, or any member of the county executive committee in the county in which the election was held, setting forth the grounds upon which the primary election is contested....

      .Mississippi Code Section 21 — 8—7 (4)(a) (Supp.2014) provides that "[c]ouncilmen elected to represent wards must be residents of their wards at the time of qualification for election, and any council member who removes the member's residence from the municipality or from the ward from which he was elected shall vacate that office.”

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-171(1) (Rev. 2007) ("At such primary election the municipal executive committee shall perform the same duties as are specified by law and performed by members of the county executive committee with regard to state and county primary elections.”); Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-171(3) (Rev. 2007) ("All primary elections in municipalities shall be held and conducted in the same manner as is provided by law for state and county primary elections.”).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-961(7) (Supp. 2014) provides:
      The procedure set forth in this section shall be the sole and only manner, in which the qualifications of a candidate seeking public office as a party nominee may be challenged prior to the time of his nomination or election. After a party nominee has been elected to public office, the election may be challenged as otherwise provided by law. After a party nominee assumes an elective office, his qualifications to hold that office may be contested as otherwise provided by law.
      (Emphasis added.)

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921 (Rev. 2007).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 (Rev. 2007).

      . Id.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921 (Rev. 2007).

      . Id. (emphasis added).

      . Id.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-961(1) (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added).

        .Id.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-961(7) (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added).

      . Id.

      . Id. (emphasis added).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921 (Rev. 2007).

      . Id.

      . Miss.Code ' Ann. § 23-15-961(7) (Rev. 2007).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921 (Rev. 2007).


author: LAMAR, Justice,

text:
    EDW INVESTMENTS, LLC v. Michelle BARNETT, Spectrum Wireless, LLC, MWB Holdings, LLC and L4, LLC.
    No. 2013-CA-01159-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Oct. 23, 2014.

      Jeffrey D. Rawlings, Jon J. Mims, Madison, attorneys for appellant.
    Dorsey'R. Carson, Jr., Jackson, Julie C. Skipper, Christopher D. Meyer, Jackson, attorneys for appellees.
    Before RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR and KITCHENS, JJ.
   LAMAR, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. EDW Investments, LLC (“EDW”) filed suit against Michelle Barnett and three corporate defendants, claiming that its judgment debtor had fraudulently transferred assets to them. The trial judge granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and EDW appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. EDW Investments, LLC, obtained ■a judgment against Techtronics, Inc. (Techtronics) in 2007. On May 16, 2011, EDW sued Michelle Barnett (“Michelle”), the wife of Techtronics’ president, Kevin Barnett (“Kevin”); Spectrumwireless, LLC; MWB Holdings, LLC; and L4, LLC, claiming that: (1) these limited liability companies “are alter ego entities created solely to conceal the assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. from EDW” and that “Michelle Barnett knowingly participated in these efforts”; (2) “[t]he assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. were fraudulently conveyed to Michelle Barnett and the shell entities to avoid paying EDW”; and (3) “[t]he actions of the [Defendants] were grossly negligent, willful and/or intentional and constitute violation of common law duties under Mississippi law.”

¶ 3. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that the statute of limitations had run on all of EDW’s claims under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, and that EDW did not sufficiently plead its common-law-fraud claim as required by Rule 9(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and EDW timely appeals, raising three issues:

I.The circuit court erroneously found that this action is barred by applicable limitation periods;
II. EDW has pled facts sufficient to entitle EDW to recovery under alternative theories of recovery; and
III. EDW has pled its claims based on fraud with sufficient particularity.

We affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4. This Court employs a de novo standard of review when considering a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. “In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, all of the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint must be taken as true, and the motion should be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim.”

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. The statute of limitations has run on EDW’s statutory fraudulent-transfer claims.

¶ 5. Although EDW did not specifically plead the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in its complaint, its primary contention is that “[t]he assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. -were fraudulently conveyed to Michelle Barnett and the shell entities to avoid paying EDW.” The Act provides that any “transfer made ... by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor ... if the debtor made the transfer ... with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor.” Further, the Act provides that “[a] cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer ... under this article is extinguished unless action is brought: (a) [u]nder Section 15-3-107(1), within three (3) years after the transfer was made ... or, if later, within one (1) year after the transfer ... was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant”

¶ 6. Both the three-year and the one-year time periods elapsed before EDW filed its complaint. In its complaint, EDW suggests that the alleged fraudulent transfers occurred simultaneously with the formation of the three corporate Defendants, more than three years before it filed its complaint, and that it knew of the alleged fraudulent transfers on May 28, 2008, more than one year before it filed its complaint. Therefore, EDW’s statutory fraudulent-transfer claims are time-barred.

¶ 7. EDW relies on Section 15-3-117 of the Act to argue that its fraudulent-transfer claims are subject to Mississippi’s general three-year statute of limitation and its accompanying discovery rule. But Section 15-3-117 states:

Unless displaced by the provisions of this article, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement its provisions.

As discussed above, the Act has its own statute-of-limitation provision, Section 15-3-115. So the Act clearly displaces Mississippi’s general statute of limitation with regard to fraudulent-transfer claims.

II. EDW cannot prevail on its alternate theories of recovery.

¶ 8. EDW also avers that Defendants are a “continuation” of Tech-tronics. EDW presents its continuation argument as two “alternative theories of recovery”: alter ego and continuity-of-enterprise. But EDW failed to plead a continuity-of-enterprise claim in its complaint, and “alter ego” is not a substantive claim but merely a procedural argument that, if successful, allows a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil and recover from a corporation’s shareholders. Alter-ego liability can be extended only to a corporation’s shareholders, and it is undisputed that none of the Defendants was a shareholder of Techtronics. In sum, EDW simply cannot pursue a judgment against these Defendants via an alter-ego theory. This claim is without merit.

III. EDW did not plead its common-law-fraud claim with sufficient particularity.

¶ 9. Finally, EDW argues that it pleaded a common-law-fraud claim. Rule 9(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure requires that: “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” “Fraud will not be inferred or presumed and may not be charged in general terms. The circumstances of the alleged fraud such as the time, place and contents of any false representations or conduct must be stated.”

¶ 10. EDW fails to provide any specific information regarding the alleged fraudulent transfers and instead asks this Court to remand the case “so that [it] can continue its efforts to collect on its Judgment by conducting discovery to determine the dates and full nature and extent of the transfers.” In fact, EDW admitted before the trial court that it “does not know what was transferred, when it was transferred or how it was transferred. Only that something may have been transferred.” As such, EDWs fraud claims do not comply with Rule 9’s pleading requirements.

CONCLUSION

¶ 11. Although EDW may continue its efforts to collect its judgment against Techtronics via any other available avenue, we find that this effort to obtain judgments against these Defendants cannot be maintained for the reasons stated above.

We affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court.

¶ 12. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, ■ CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . EDW previously had sued both Techtronics and its President, Kevin Barnett, in Madison County Circuit Court. But Kevin filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection while the suit was pending, before EDW was able to obtain a judgment against him personally. EDW filed an adversary proceeding in Kevin's bankruptcy, and the parties ultimately entered an agreed judgment in the amount of $70,000.

      . Kevin and Michelle Barnett will be referred to by their first names to avoid confusion.

      . According to the Mississippi Secretary of State website, Techtronics was administratively dissolved on December 7, 2012.

      . Michelle is the purported owner of Spec-trumwireless, MWB, and L4.

      . Burch v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 136 So.3d 1063, 1064-65 (Miss.2014).

      . Lott v. Saulters, 133 So.3d 794, 798 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Miss.2006)).

      . We note that Defendants argue that EDW’s sole remedy arises under the Act, but we are not persuaded. The language of the Act itself states that: “Unless displaced by the provisions of this article, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement its provisions.” Miss.Code Ann. § 15-3-117 (Rev. 2012) (emphasis added).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 15-3-107(1) (Rev. 2012).

      . EDW argues that it "first discovered the fraud and transfer when Kevin Barnett testified on May 28, 2008...." EDW did not file its complaint until May 16, 2011.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 15-3-117 (emphasis added).

      . In its complaint, EDW alleges numerous facts that support a continuity-of enterprise claim but inexplicably failed to plead it, pleading instead: (1) alter ego; (2) fraudulent conveyance, and (3) gross, willful and/or intentional negligence and violation of common law duties.

      . Gray v. Edgewater Landing, Inc., 541 So.2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1989).

      . Id.

      . Miss. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

      . Brabham v. Brabham, 483 So.2d 341, 342 (Miss. 1986).

        .See Brabham, 483 So.2d at 342.


text:
    Mitchell SCRUGGS, Eddie Scruggs, Scruggs Farm & Supplies, LLC f/k/a and a/k/a Scruggs Farm Supply, Inc. and Scruggs Farm Joint Venture v. Greg BOST and Nowell Insurance Agency.
    No. 2013-CA-00374-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Oct. 23, 2014.

      James L. Robertson, William J. Dukes, Jackson, Jim Waide, Rachel Pierce Waide, Tupelo, attorneys for appellants.
    Fred L. Banks, Jr., Jackson, William M. Beasley, Sr., William M. Beasley, Jr., Tu-' pelo, attorneys for appellees.
    Before RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR and KITCHENS, JJ.
   LAMAR, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. When Monsanto Company sued Mitchell Scruggs and his various agricultural entities for patent infringement in federal court, Scruggs made a demand on his commercial general' liability insurer, Farmland Mutual Insurance Company. Farmland denied coverage based on Scruggs’s alleged intentional conduct. Scruggs then sued Farmland, Greg Bost (the insurance agent),- and Nowell Insurance Agency in state court. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment for Bost and Nowell. Scruggs appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that Bost and Nowell negligently failed to advise him that he needed to purchase patent infringement insurance. Because we find that Scruggs’s conduct was uninsurable as a matter of law, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. The Underlying Federal Action

¶ 2. Monsanto Company develops, manufactures, licenses, and sells agricultural chemicals, agricultural biotechnology and other agricultural products. Monsanto Company v. Scruggs, 249 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (N.D.Miss.2001). After much research, Monsanto developed genetically modified seeds that had several favorable traits, such as resistance to herbicides and certain insects/pests. Id. Monsanto markets their genetically modified soybean and cotton seeds under the Roundup Ready® and Bollgard® brands, respectively. The seeds are protected by several U.S. patents, which were issued before Scruggs’s alleged illegal actions took place. Id. Monsanto began marketing the Roundup Ready® seed in time for the 1996 planting season and the Bollgard® seed during the 1998 planting season.. Id. at 750.

¶ 8. Monsanto structured its marketing strategy for its genetically modified seeds carefully. Id. Seed companies and farmers who wished to use Monsanto’s patented seeds were required to enter into a licensing agreement with Monsanto, which limited use of its seeds to one growing season. Id. In other words, farmers could not resell or supply the seeds to any other person, and they could not save any seed to replant the next year. These restrictions were publicized in trade journals and through public meetings with farmers, and they also appeared on the product label. Id.

¶ 4. Monsanto obtained information that Scruggs might have planted saved Roundup Ready® and Bollgard® seeds during the 2000 growing season. Id. After conducting an investigation, Monsanto determined that Scruggs had indeed replanted its seeds, and it filed suit against him in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi on September 7, 2000. Monsanto alleged that Scruggs “knowingly, intentionally and willfully planted unlicensed, saved Roundup Ready® seed without authorization from Monsanto and used such seed in violation of Monsanto’s patent rights.” Scruggs denied Monsanto’s allegations and brought numerous counterclaim? against it. After extensive litigation and trial, the jury found that Scruggs had willfully infringed Monsanto’s patents and awarded it $8.9 million in compensatory damages.

2. The State Action Against Farmland

¶ 5. Beginning in the 1990s, Scruggs did business with insurance agent Greg Bost, and Bost procured insurance coverage for Scruggs’s cotton gin and cotton ginning business. At some point in 1999, Scruggs decided to have Bost (who was by then employed by Nowell Insurance Agency) provide insurance coverage for all of his farming activities. Bost, several other Nowell Agency personnel and Farmland personnel visited Scruggs’s facilities, observed his operations and conducted extensive interviews with him and his employees to determine potential liability and possible coverage options.

¶ 6. Bost presented several coverage options to Scruggs via a written insurance proposal, and Scruggs purchased some options and declined others. Scruggs alleges that he told Bost that he wanted to be protected “in the event that anybody sued us over almost anything.” Scruggs alleges that Bost assured him that he would be protected from all potential liabilities, except for any that might arise out of the quality of seed that Scruggs sold to third parties. '

¶ 7. Scruggs purchased a general liability policy and an umbrella policy, and the policies first went into effect on April 1, 1999. Scruggs subsequently renewed his coverage in 2000. Scruggs testified in his deposition in the state action that he did not mention patent infringement to Bost or ask him about patent-infringement coverage prior to the issuance of the policy in 1999, nor did he mention it before the renewal in 2000.

¶ 8. Sometime in early 2000, Scruggs noticed that some unidentified individuals had bought the lot across from him and had installed surveillance cameras to record his farming activities. Scruggs later learned that they were Monsanto employees after the Sheriffs Department arrested some of them for stalking. Scruggs believed that Monsanto was investigating him because it “didn’t want [him] replanting seed that had their technology in it,” and because it was unhappy with him planting Roundup Ready® seed. Scruggs was aware that Monsanto did not want farmers replanting its patented seed, because he had read ads to that effect in various farm publications.

¶ 9. As mentioned above, Monsanto filed suit against Scruggs on September 7, 2000. Scruggs gave notice of the suit to Bost and Nowell and demanded that Farmland defend him. Farmland denied coverage just before Christmas, and Scruggs (along with his various agricultural entities and partners) then filed suit against Bost, Nowell, and Farmland in the Lee County Circuit Court on March 30, 2001.

¶ 10. In his Complaint, Scruggs alleged that Farmland’s denial of coverage was “outrageous and malicious,” because Bost and Nowell had promised him that the policy would cover the patent-infringement claims. Scruggs sought a declaratory judgment that Defendants were required to both defend and indemnify him. Scruggs also sought actual and punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.

¶ 11. Scruggs and Farmland engaged in discovery and ultimately filed cross-motions for. summary judgment in February and March 2002, respectively. After a hearing, the circuit judge entered an opinion and order granting partial summary judgment for Scruggs. The circuit judge found that Farmland owed Scruggs coverage under the property-damage, personal-injury and advertising-injury sections of the policy. He further found that the intentional-act exclusion did not apply to Scruggs’s conduct, because, while Scruggs may have intentionally saved and replanted Monsanto’s seeds, he did not intentionally infringe Monsanto’s patents, because he had a “reasonable belief’ that he could lawfully replant the seeds.

¶ 12. Finally, the judge found that Farmland had a duty to defend Scruggs going forward in the federal action. The circuit judge issued a preliminary injunction in Scruggs’s favor and ordered Farmland to immediately pay all of the attorneys’ fees that Scruggs had accrued prior to the summary judgment hearing, and to pay all of Scruggs’s attorneys’ fees accrued after that date, within thirty days of receiving an invoice. Farmland filed a motion to vacate the circuit judge’s opinion and order, which the judge denied.

¶ 13. Farmland appealed, and this Court reversed and rendered in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Graves. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scruggs, 886 So.2d 714 (Miss.2004). This Court began its analysis by stating:

Despite the technological complexity of the underlying facts, we only need to address one basic legal issue to resolve this matter: does the Scruggses’ insurance policy cover the torts complained of in Monsanto’s lawsuit? After a review of our jurisprudence and the language of the policy, we answer that question in the negative.

Id. at 717. This Court then closely examined the bodily-injury, property-damage and advertising-injury sections of the policy and determined that, based on the allegations in Monsanto’s complaint, no coverage existed under any of those provisions. Id. at 718-21. This Court also held that Scruggs’s actions were intentional and, as such, uninsurable: “Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, people and businesses cannot purchase insurance coverage for illegal activities.” Id. at 720 (citing Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 697 So.2d 400, 405 (Miss.1997)).

¶ 14. This Court ultimately concluded that there were “three reasons why coverage must be denied; first, the plain face of Monsanto’s complaint does not trigger the policy’s coverage and duty to defend; secondly, the torts complained of were intentional; and last, public policy compels us to refuse coverage for intentional and illegal actions.” Id. at 720. This Court reversed the circuit court’s entry of partial summary judgment for Scruggs, reversed the preliminary injunction requiring Farmland to pay Scruggs’s legal fees, and entered summary judgement on Farmland’s behalf. Id. at 721.

3. The State Action Against Bost and Nowell

¶ 15. As mentioned above, Scruggs filed one Complaint against Farmland, Bost, and Nowell in March 2001, but the case has proceeded in a bifurcated manner. Farmland and Scruggs litigated the action initially, as the pressing issue was Farmland’s duty to defend. Scruggs focused on his claims against Farmland until this Court reversed and rendered in Farmland’s favor. After the federal jury awarded Monsanto $8.9 million in compensatory damages in September 2010, Scruggs pursued his claims against Bost and Nowell, which had remained virtually dormant since 2001.

¶ 16. Following this Court’s decision in Farmland, Scruggs amended his Complaint against Bost and Nowell twice. In his Third Amended Complaint, Scruggs alleged that he was entitled to a declaratory judgment that they had failed in their professional duties as insurance salesmen; that they had failed to use that degree of care that a reasonably prudent insurance agent would exercise; that they had negligently misrepresented to Scruggs that the policy would cover him for anything except the quality of seed sold to third parties and that it provided the broadest possible agricultural liability coverage available at that time; and that they were contractually bound to Scruggs and had breached that contract.

¶ 17. Bost and Nowell filed a motion for summary judgment on February 28, 2011. They argued that Scruggs could not possibly maintain his claims, as his conduct would never have been insurable. So, they argued, because any policy that would have covered Scruggs in spite of his intentional actions would have violated public policy, they could not possibly have been liable for any sort of negligence or negligent misrepresentation.

¶ 18. Scruggs responded and argued, among other things, that Bost and Nowell could be liable for professional negligence given their history with Scruggs, and that the jury verdict against Scruggs was for the strict liability tort of patent infringement only. After a hearing, the circuit judge granted Bost’s and Nowell’s motion for summary judgment. The circuit judge found that:

According to the Mississippi Supreme Court, public policy does not allow parties to purchase insurance coverage for intentional and illegal actions [citing Farmland ]. Here, there is no dispute that the actions Plaintiffs took were intentional. Indeed as the Mississippi Supreme Court pointed out, “it took a preliminary injunction by a federal court to stop the Scruggses from using or selling the seeds.” [citing Farmland ]. Plaintiffs have never denied they acted intentionally; they simply assert their intentional acts were not unlawful. Because it has long been undisputed that Plaintiffs acted intentionally and that public policy does not allow individuals to insure against intentional actions, this Court finds, in accordance with Farmland, that Mississippi law prohibits insurance coverage for the conduct that resulted in Monsanto’s claims. Accordingly, Defendants cannot be liable, contractually or otherwise, for not obtaining and/or failing to offer such insurance to the Plaintiffs.

¶ 19. As for Scruggs’s allegations regarding Bost’s and Nowell’s failure to advise, the circuit judge found that no duty arose, “because neither Defendants nor Plaintiff even mentioned patent infringement coverage.” Finally, the circuit judge found that Bost and Nowell could not be held liable for not realizing the potential for the patent-infringement suit, because “the Mississippi Supreme court has held that request for ‘full coverage’ does not require an insurance agent to provide coverage for all conceivable risks or perils.” The circuit judge dismissed all of Scruggs’s claims with prejudice, and he now appeals to this Court.

¶ 20. Scruggs posits six issues on appeal:

(1) Whether the Circuit Court erred when it granted summary judgment for the professional insurance agent defendants, when there were genuine issues of material fact[ ] regarding the insured’s claims of professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation and failure to warn;
(2) Whether the Circuit Court.erred in holding that public policy, to the extent that it prohibits insurance coverage for intentional and illegal acts, would have prevented Scruggs from acquiring any liability insurance coverage for the strict liability tort of patent infringement;
(3) Whether the insurance agents have professional liability when they procure and sell to the insured a liability insurance policy the terms of which cannot be taken at face value, given the established rules regarding the construction and application of the terms of a liability insurance policy;
(4) Whether the Circuit Court erred in holding that a professional insurance agent who undertakes to advise a potential insured about his coverage needs can escape liability with regard to a particular category of coverage by entirely failing to mention it;
(5) Whether insurance agents have professional liability when they advise and induce an insured to purchase a policy with the representation that such policy will cover all of the insured’s liability coverage needs, if that policy in fact fails to provide coverage for a significant category of the insured’s liability risks; and
(6) Whether an insurance agent with a ten year professional relationship with an insured, who solicits all of the insured’s insurance business, and who joins insurance specialists in an on-site investigation of the insured’s commercial and business activities, has a duty to bring the information thus gleaned to bear in proposing comprehensive coverage to the insured.

We find that Scruggs’s arguments really boil down to one issue. So, despite the rather tedious and lengthy litigation in this case to date, the question before this Court is simple: Did the circuit judge properly grant summary judgment in favor of Bost and Nowell? We find that he did.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶21. The standard of review in a summary judgment case is well known. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) allows summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conrod v. Holder, 825 So.2d 16, 18 (Miss.2002). This Court will review a granted motion for summary judgment de novo. Id. When conducting a de novo review, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Scruggs, but if the evidence shows that Bost and Nowell are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be entered in their favor. Id.

ANALYSIS

¶ 22. After careful consideration, we find that Scruggs’s actions were both intentional and illegal, and therefore uninsurable as a matter of law. As a result, Bost and Nowell simply cannot be liable for any form of negligence. In other words, it would not matter what negligent misrepresentations or omissions Bost and Nowell might have committed if Scruggs’s actions are uninsurable as a matter of law.

¶23. “In general, it is against public policy for an insurance contract to provide coverage for the intentional or willful misconduct of an insured.” Couch On Insurance § 101:22 (3d ed. 2010). This Court had acknowledged that principle prior to its decision in Farmland in Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Home Insurance Company, 697 So.2d 400 (Miss.1997): “Delta Pride cannot purchase insurance coverage for its intentional, illegal activities. ‘[People should not be allowed to insure themselves against acts prohibited by law.’ ” Id. at 405 (citing Graham Resources, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 625 So.2d 716 (La.App.Ct.1993)).

¶ 24. And in Farmland, this Court affirmed that principle unequivocally:

Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, people and businesses cannot purchase insurance coverage for illegal activities. For we do not allow corporations or persons to “insure themselves against "acts prohibited by law.”
There are therefore three reasons why coverage must be denied; first, the plain face of Monsanto’s complaint does not trigger the policy’s coverage and duty to defend; secondly, the torts complained of were intentional; and last, public policy compels us to refuse coverage for intentional and illegal actions.

Farmland, 886 So.2d at 720-21 (citations omitted).

¶ 25. The evidence of Scruggs’s intentional conduct is ample throughout this record and the federal court action. First, Scruggs himself admitted several times in .his deposition that he acted intentionally:

Q: I understand, but it wasn’t no [sic] accident in 1990 — in—in 2000, at planting time, at their [sic] April, May, June beans, it wasn’t by accident that Roundup Ready® technology beans went in the grain drills that ended up being planted on your property was it?
A. No, sir.
Q: That was deliberate actions on your part, deliberately made, a conscious, informed decision to plant Roundup Ready® soybeans?
A: Well, yeah, I — I planted the seed.
Q: You made a conscious, informed decision to plant the seed before actually instructing your laborer to go plant it, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q: And I presume the same would apply as far as your cotton crop that same year to the extent that whatever portion of it involved the Roundup Ready® technology?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you agree with this statement? [referring to the federal court opinion granting Monsanto an injunction] Mr. Scruggs unqualifiedly testified that he has never executed a license for the use of Monsanto’s gene technology; he further — he further admits he was aware of the conditions under which Monsanto licensed its technology to seed companies and farmers.
A: Yeah. I — I’ve never executed a license.
A: No, sir, I’ve never signed one.
Q: What about the next phrase? You were aware of the conditions under which Monsanto licenses technology to seed companies and farmers.
A: Yes, sir, I was aware of that.

Second, District Judge Pepper found that Scruggs had acted intentionally:

In addition to the scientific evidence presented, Mitchell Scruggs admitted during his testimony that much of his soybean and cotton crops were Roundup® “resistant;” he further admitted to the use of Roundup® herbicide on his crops.
There is evidence that defendants have unlicensed Roundup Ready® séed in large quantities. Despite Mr. Scruggs’[s] protestations to the contrary, the plaintiff presented considerable evidence that the defendants have engaged in the sale of reconditioned seeds containing Monsanto’s patented gene technology.
Monsanto is not obligated to afford defendants the opportunity to sell its products. To force it to do so under the present circumstances would be to reward the defendants for their willful infringement of the plaintiffs patented seed technology.

Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F.Supp.2d 746, 751, 760 (N.D.Miss.2001).

¶ 26. Third, as mentioned above, the federal jury found that Scruggs had acted “wilfully.” And finally, and perhaps most important for our discussion here, this Court previously found that Scruggs had acted intentionally:

From, the face of Monsanto’s complaint, only intentional torts are alleged. In addition, the Scruggses’ pattern of conduct has been one of intentional acts. Indeed, it took a preliminary injunction by a federal court to stop the Struggles from using or selling the seeds. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F.Supp.2d 746 (N.D.Miss.2001). The Scruggses never disputed that the conduct was intentional, only that the effects were unintended; in fact, they dispute there was any harm at all. They offer that Monsanto’s claim of patent infringement and damage to trade reputation is “utter nonsense, [since] the farmers saving Roundup Ready soybeans and replanting them in future years is no more harmful to Monsanto’s slogans, brand names and trade reputation th[an] the used car salesman damages Ford Motor Co. by selling used Fords.”
That analogy does not fit the facts at hand. There is nothing illegal about selling used cars, but the cars must not be stolen. The seeds at issue are like a stolen Ford, for at the hearing for the preliminary injunction in federal court “Scruggs also admitted that [he and the other defendants] never entered into a commercial license for authorized use of the plaintiffs’ patented biotechnology.” Scruggs, 249 F.Supp.2d at 751. In the federal court the Scruggses also contended in part that the Monsanto patents were invalid, that there was patent misuse, and that there were antitrust violations. Id. at 752-54. The district court dismissed these claims as “a charade.” Id. at 754.
The Scruggses may not like the consequences of their intentional actions and may dispute the law that protects Monsanto against their actions, but that does not mean their liability insurer must be made a party to such an action. The reasonable and unambiguous insurance contract between the Scruggses and Farmland excludes all intentional acts. Therefore, there is no coverage under the “Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability” section of the policy.

Farmland, 886 So.2d at 719-20 (emphasis added).

¶ 27. There is one federal court opinion written by District Judge Michael Mills where he finds that Scruggs did not act willfully. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 890 F.Supp.2d 729 (N.D.Miss.2012). As expected, Scruggs relies heavily on this opinion. While it is true that Judge Mills did ultimately set aside the jury’s finding of willfulness in the federal action, a close reading of the opinion reveals that he did so only in light of the heightened federal standard under which treble damages can be imposed:

This court finds a certain degree of reprehensibility to Scruggs’[s] actions in this case. At the same time, the court also finds, with regard to each of these factors, mitigating factors which counsel against an award of treble damages. Accordingly, even if the court were to limit its analysis solely to the Read factors, it would still conclude (albeit more narrowly) that treble damages should not be awarded in this case.
The court finds that the unique legal and historical context in which this case arose, in particular the prior lack of legal clarity regarding the patentability of trait-bearing seeds, supports a conclusion that Scruggs did not “act[ ] despite an objectively high likelihood that [his] actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” This court has already discussed at length above its reasons for reaching this conclusion, and this issue is clearly one which a court is in a better position to understand than a jury. Accordingly, while this court is reluctant to overturn the jury’s findings of fact regarding a trial which it did not witness, it concludes, in light of Bard, that the question of willfulness is partially one of law. The court further concludes that Scruggs did not act with objective recklessness in this, case to support a finding of willfulness, since, at the time of the infringement .in the case, the law in this context had not been definitively resolved.

Monsanto, 890 F.Supp.2d at 740, 742 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, 970 F.2d 816 (Fed.Cir.1992), abrogation recognized by Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore and Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171 (Fed.Cir.2012)). In other words, Judge Mills’s opinion is not proof of Scruggs’s lack of willfulness; rather it is only a finding that Scruggs’s conduct did not rise to the level of “objective recklessness” required for treble damages to be imposed.

¶ 28. In sum, we find that Scruggs’s actions were intentional and illegal and therefore uninsurable under Mississippi law. So Bost and Nowell cannot be held liable under any negligence theory, as Scruggs’ actions simply were not insurable. In other words, even if Bost and Nowell did have some duty to recognize Scruggs’s need for patent-infringement insurance and failed to inform him that he needed it, they cannot be liable for that omission, as insurance coverage for Scruggs’s intentional actions simply cannot exist in Mississippi as a matter of law. Thus, the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in Bost and Nowell’s favor was correct, and we affirm.

CONCLUSION

¶ 29. Mississippi caselaw is clear that one’s intentional, illegal actions cannot be insured as a matter of law. We find that Scruggs’s actions were intentional and therefore uninsurable. Because his actions are uninsurable as a matter of law, we find that Bost and Nowell cannot be liable for any alleged negligent misrepresentations or omissions, and we affirm the judgment of the Lee County Circuit Court.

¶ 30. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. CHANDLER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . The Roundup Ready® soybean seeds allow a farmer to apply Roundup® and other herbicides to their entire field without damaging the crop, even after the plants have emerged from the soil. The Bollgard® cotton seeds are resistant to numerous insects and pests that normally prey on cotton crops. Monsanto, 249 F.Supp.2d at 749.

      . Scruggs testified in his deposition that he did not sign a licensing agreement when he purchased the seeds because "nobody ever asked [him] to," but he also testified that he was aware of the conditions under which Monsanto licensed its seed technology to farmers.

      . Monsanto amended its Complaint several times during the litigation. By its Third Amended Complaint, it was alleging that Scruggs had also wrongfully sold its seeds to third parties.

      . See Monsanto v. Scruggs, 249 F.Supp.2d 746 (N.D.Miss.2001) (granting Monsanto's request for preliminary injunction); 342 F.Supp.2d 584 (N.D.Miss.2004) (granting summary judgment for Monsanto on several counts of its complaint); 342 F.Supp.2d 568 (N.D.Miss. 2004) (granting summary judgment for Monsanto on several counts of Scruggs’s counterclaim); 342 F.Supp.2d 602 (N.D.Miss.2004) (granting summary judgment for Monsanto on what appears to be remainder of counts in Scruggs’s counterclaim); 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.2006) (affirming all rulings by the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi); 890 F.Supp.2d 729 (N.D.Miss.2012) (resolving various post-trial motions).

      . From our review of the various district court opinions, it appears that Monsanto was granted summary judgment on all of its patent infringement claims against Scruggs, and that the trial proceeded on damages only (and possibly the common-law claims). See Monsanto v. Scruggs, 342 F.Supp.2d 584 (N.D.Miss.2004).

      . Specifically, the jury found that: (1) Scruggs acted willfully; (2) Scruggs owed Monsanto $2.6 million in damages for his unauthorized planting of its patented soybean and cotton seeds; (3) Scruggs made "brown bag” sales of Monsanto's patented soybean seed; and (4) Scruggs owed Monsanto $6.3 million in damages for his unauthorized sale of its patented soybean seeds.

      . Scruggs stated that Bost approached him and solicited all of his insurance business, while Bost stated that Scruggs was the one who initially requested additional coverage.

      . Interestingly, Scruggs testified in his deposition that he renewed his policy with Farmland for a second time in April 2001, even after Monsanto had sued him and after Farmland had denied coverage. He also testified that he renewed his coverage despite Bost reminding him that Farmland had determined that no patent-infringement coverage existed. Bost testified to this conversation as well.

      . Justice Diaz not participating.

      . Black’s Law Dictionary defines "illegal” as "forbidden by law; unlawful.” See Black's Law Dictionary 815 (9th ed. 2009). Patent infringement is clearly prohibited by federal law. See 35 U.S.C. § 271. We are not convinced by Scruggs’s argument that, because one can be held strictly liable for patent infringement (i.e., because intent is not an element), that somehow saves the act from being “unlawful.”

      . Scruggs does not make any sort of intentional misrepresentation and/or fraud claims against Bost and Nowell.

      . We note that this finding subsequently was set aside by Judge Mills in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 890 F.Supp.2d 729 (N.D.Miss.2012), in which he concluded that Scruggs’s actions did not rise to the level of "objective recklessness” necessary for imposition of treble damages. We discuss Judge Mills's opinion further below.