author: WILLIAMS, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Misty D. WOODS, Appellant.
    No. 48,002-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2013.

      Peggy J. Sullivan, Monroe, LA, for Appellant.
    Misty D. Woods, Pro Se.
    Jerry L. Jones, District Attorney, Ellen R. Eade, George D. Ross, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, LOLLEY and GARRETT, JJ.
   WILLIAMS, J.

| defendant, Misty D. Woods was charged by bill of indictment with second degree murder, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to serve 20 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant appeals, challenging her sentence as constitutionally excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On August 7, 2009, at approximately 2:40 a.m., paramedics and deputies from the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office responded to a call regarding a young child who was found unresponsive at the residence of the defendant, Misty D. Woods. The child was the defendant’s two-year-old daughter, Amity Cantrell. Paramedics transported Amity to Glenwood Regional Medical Center; however, attempts to resuscitate her were unsuccessful.

The defendant initially told the deputies that she believed that her use of pesticides, i. e., roach spray, in the home had contributed to Amity’s death. However, the toxicological testing detected no pesticides, alcohol or drugs in the child’s body; an autopsy revealed that Amity died of “asphyxia with multiple blunt force injuries.” Subsequently, the defendant admitted that she had used cocaine and drank alcohol on the day of Amity’s death and stated that she believed she “rolled over” on the child while they were both asleep on the sofa. The defendant also stated that she later awoke and found Amity unresponsive.

The defendant was not immediately arrested for causing Amity’s 12death. However, at the time of the child’s death, the defendant was on probation for possession of methamphetamine. In January 2010, she was arrested for violating her probation, which was later revoked.

On May 13, 2010, a Ouachita Parish grand jury returned an indictment, charging the defendant with the second degree murder of Amity, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1. On July 5, 2011, the defendant waived her rights and pled guilty to the reduced charge of manslaughter. The state did not present an agreement to a sentence recommendation.

The factual basis for the plea was stated on the record at the guilty plea hearing. During the hearing, the defendant described her conduct on the night of Amity’s death as “negligent.” Counsel for the defendant stated that the defendant believed she “rolled over on [Amity] while they were both asleep on the sofa and that resulted in the asphyxia.” Counsel also stated that the defendant’s use of cocaine, alcohol and prescription medications led “to a situation in which her care of [Amity] was so negligent and so deficient that it caused her death.” Further, defense counsel stated:

The state, I believe, would allege that the multiple blunt force injuries while not the cause of death would be indicative of at the very least simple battery resulting in the death of the child. A number of the injuries were to the child’s face, some to the buttocks and most to the face. There were also sub-galeal contusions and cerebral edema showing injuries to the face and head.

The state agreed to the latter assertions made by defense counsel. Additionally, the state pointed out that in an oral statement to the investigating police officers, the defendant told the officers that she had | ¡¡experienced a “terrible dream,” and thought she was having a fight with her “drug dealer.” She stated that she “awoke to find herself committing batteries on her child.”

The court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea. As part of the plea agreement, a presentence investigation report was ordered.

A sentencing hearing was held on November 21, 2011. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 20 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; the sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to her probation violation, with credit for time served.

Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant argued that the sentence was excessive and the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that she was suffering from an addiction which she had unsuccessfully attempted to address. The defendant also claimed that her actions were not intentional or malicious and that her sentence was disproportionate to the sentences of other similarly situated defendants. Additionally, the defendant urged that if her sentence is to be served consecutively to her probation revocation sentence, then she will not receive credit for time served.

On April 17, 2011, a hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence was held. The trial court granted the motion in part, and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with the defendant’s probation revocation sentence (from May 14, 2010 forward), to ensure that the defendant received appropriate credit for time served. The court took the remaining |4claims in the motion to reconsider sentence under advisement. Subsequently, the court denied the remaining claims.

The defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

The defendant challenges her sentence of 20 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence as constitutionally excessive. She argues that the sentence makes no contribution to justice, is not necessary to protect society, and is nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. The defendant also argues that while the trial court noted several aggravating factors, the court focused on the fact that she had a substance abuse problem and had relapsed.

According to the defendant, she made a mistake, which resulted in the death of her child, and she will pay a price for Amity’s death every day. She notes that she has voluntarily relinquished the rights to her other two children, she is sincerely remorseful, and that she has fought to change her life and deal with her addiction. Moreover, the defendant notes her participation in rehabilitation programs, her periods of sobriety, and the fact that she was married to an abusive man, who also had substance abuse problems. She argues that she is not a “hardened criminal,” but a recovering addict who has made great strides in her recovery and wants to help others. Furthermore, the defendant maintains that it will cost the taxpayers of Louisiana approximately $20,000 per year to house her, and that amount, for a period of 20 years, is grossly disproportionate to this offense. Additionally, the defendant noted four cases in which mothers who caused j Bthe death of their child received a sentence that amounted to them serving 10 years at hard labor.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in LSA-C.O.P. art. 894.1. The trial judge is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so long as the record reflects that he or she adequately considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688 (La.1983); State v. Lathan, 41,855 (La.App.2d Cir.2/28/07), 953 So.2d 890, writ denied, 2007-0805 (La.3/28/08), 978 So.2d 297. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, not rigid or 1 (¡mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with Art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475 (La.1982); State v. Swayzer, 43,350 (La.App.2d Cir.8/13/08), 989 So.2d 267.

The important elements which should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049 (La.1981); State v. Ates, 43,327 (La.App.2d Cir.8/13/08), 989 So.2d 259, writ denied, 2008-2341 (La.5/15/09), 8 So.3d 581. There is no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Shumaker, 41,547 (La.App.2d Cir.12/13/06), 945 So.2d 277, writ denied, 2007-0144 (La.9/28/07), 964 So.2d 351.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. Art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355 (La.1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 2001-0467 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 166; State v. Robinson, 40,983 (La.App.2d Cir.1/24/07), 948 So.2d 379.

|7A trial court has broad discretion to sentence within the statutory limits. State v. Dunn, 30,767 (La.App.2d Cir.6/24/98), 715 So.2d 641; State v. Guzman, 99-1528, 99-1753 (La.5/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion, the appellate court may not set aside a sentence as excessive. State v. Guzman, supra. Where a defendant has pled guilty to an offense which does not adequately describe his or her conduct or has received a significant reduction in potential exposure to confinement through a plea bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing even the maximum sentence possible for the pled offense. State v. Germany, 43,239 (La.App.2d Cir.4/30/08), 981 So.2d 792; State v. Black, 28,100 (La.App.2d Cir.2/28/96), 669 So.2d 667, writ denied, 96-0836 (La.9/20/96), 679 So.2d 430.

LSA-R.S. 14:31(B) provides that a person convicted of manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than 40 years. However, if the victim killed was under the age of 10 years, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, for not less than 10 years, nor more than 40 years. See State v. Jones, 1999-2207 (La.1/29/01), 778 So.2d 1131.

In State v. Jones, supra, the defendant was initially charged with first degree murder for his failure to seek medical attention for his 22-month-old daughter who was repeatedly abused by her mother. He pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to serve 20 years at hard labor. The court of appeal found that the sentence was excessive; however, the Supreme |8Court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court for execution of the sentence. The court stated:

Despite his guilty plea to manslaughter, respondent argued in the court of appeal that[,] for purposes of evaluating the severity of the punishment imposed by the trial court[,] his crime was more appropriately viewed as negligent homicide, a much less serious offense carrying a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:32. However, the legislature has recently added Second Degree Cruelty to Juveniles to the Criminal Code, La. R.S. 14:93.2.3,1999 La. Acts 191, defining the offense as “the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect by anyone over the age of seventeen to any child under the age of seventeen which causes serious bodily injury or neurological impairment to that child.” The crime is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 40 years at hard labor, the same range provided for the crime of manslaughter. This recent addition to the Criminal Code reflects the seriousness with which the legislature requires courts to consider the criminal neglect of children which produces serious bodily injury or significant neurological consequences even when that conduct does not bring about the death of the child.

Id., at 1134. The court pointed out that while the defendant did not inflict the blows that resulted in the child’s death, his decision not to seek medical attention for the child contributed to the crisis which ultimately caused the death.

In State v. Hicks, 42,427 (La.App.2d Cir.10/24/07), 968 So.2d 307, the defendant was initially charged with first degree murder in the death of his seven-week-old daughter, who died as a result of being violently shaken. He pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 40 years at hard labor. This Court upheld the sentence, finding that there was an adequate factual basis for the sentence.

|9In the instant case, at the sentencing hearing, the defendant stated that during the months between Amity’s death and her arrest, she voluntarily participated in an outpatient rehabilitation program and was cooperating with Children’s Services. She also admitted that she had voluntarily terminated her parental rights with regard to her two other children. Further, the defendant admitted that she smoked at least one rock of crack cocaine and drank 8 to 12 beers on the day of Amity’s death.

Prior to imposing the sentence, the trial court considered the circumstances of the offense, the information in the presentence investigation report, the “numerous certificates” submitted on behalf of the defendant, and the factors set forth in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. In reviewing the information in the presentence investigation report, the court noted that the defendant had informed the investigator that she did not really know what happened to Amity because she was too intoxicated from alcohol and drugs at the time. The defendant initially stated that she lay down on the couch with Amity, went to sleep, and when she woke up, Amity was unresponsive. In reference to the injuries noted on the autopsy report, the defendant stated that Amity had fallen off the kitchen table trying to get a kitten. Also, the defendant admitted that she had cocaine in her system when Amity was born and that she occasionally used drugs from the time Amity was born until this incident. The court also stated it gave “little to ho weight” to a statement from Steven Cantrell, Amity’s father, because he |)0provided no support to the defendant or the children, he is incarcerated on drug charges and his parental rights to the other children were involuntarily terminated.

In reviewing the defendant’s criminal history, the court noted that the defendant is a second-felony offender, having been previously convicted of possession of methamphetamine. The court also noted that in 2004, the defendant was eonvicted of driving while intoxicated and child endangerment in the state of Georgia. Referring to the prior convictions, the court stated that the defendant had two opportunities, two “wake up calls,” to do something about her substance abuse before “something happened” to her children.

Further, the trial court reviewed the guidelines set forth in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. The court stated:

Now, under Article 894.1(B) it says— subparagraph one says the offender’s conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim. [I] can’t say based on what I know about the case that you were deliberately manifestly cruel to your daughter, Amity, in terms of when she died. That[,] however[,] does not excuse your conduct on that day leading up to what happened, nor the fact that you ignored a couple of wakeup calls[,] so to speak[,] given to you several years prior to that in terms of do something about your substance abuse problem.
* * *
The offender knew or should have known that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth[J This little girl could not take care of herself. She was dependent on you [t]o take care of her. And you should have known that getting drunk and smoking crack would put her in a | nsituation where she would be particularly vulnerable to being hurt or be — if—if something went wrong she would not be capable of resisting it or to take care of herself.

The court further found that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person because her eight-year-old daughter was also in the house on the day of the incident. The court noted that the defendant was on probation for a drug conviction at the time this incident occurred, which the court concluded was particularly aggravating because her drug and alcohol use “greatly facilitated” Amity’s death. The court went on to state:

[I] am not willing to accept the fact that you did not contemplate that your conduct, your criminal conduct in smoking cocaine, would cause or threaten serious harm. You knew or should have known that and I’m not willing to accept the fact that you didn’t think about it.

The court also noted the defendant’s criminal history and stated, “I cannot say that you have a history of law abiding life [sic] for a substantial period of time before the commission of this offense[.]”

Moreover, the court acknowledged that it had received multiple certificates indicating that the defendant had addressed her substance abuse problem during her incarceration. The court also noted that it had received many letters from various program leaders which addressed the defendant’s participation and performance in glowing terms.

Nevertheless, the court noted that the defendant’s substance abuse caused Amity’s death and that the defendant had other opportunities to address her problem prior to the death of her child. The court stated that the | ^defendant’s incarceration would not cause excessive hardship to her or any of her dependents. As a mitigating factor, the court stated that the defendant had taken her other two children out of harm’s way by relinquishing custody of them, and her parents were in the process of adopting them.

As stated above, the sentencing range for manslaughter is not less than 10 years, nor more than 40 years at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The defendant was sentenced to serve 20 years at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, with credit for time served.

After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find that there is an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed. The defendant, by her own admission, drank 8-12 beers and smoked at least one rock of crack cocaine on the night of Amity’s death. The defendant was the only adult in the house at the time and was, therefore, solely responsible for the care of two of her young children. She continued to express her uncertainty with regard to the events leading up to Amity’s death. In one statement, she stated that she believed that she may have rolled over on Amity while she slept. In another statement, she told police officers that she had a dream that she and her drug dealer were fighting, and she awoke to find herself battering Amity. While there was no evidence to show that the defendant intentionally inflicted the physical injuries, the defendant has admitted that her actions that night resulted in the death of her daughter.

We find that the trial court adequately considered the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. 11sMoreover, the defendant substantially benefitted from the plea agreement and reduced sentence exposure, as she was initially charged with second degree murder, for which the mandatory sentence is life in prison without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. The sentence imposed, 20 years at hard labor, is neither grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense committed nor shocking to the sense of justice. Thus, there is no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing this defendant. Consequently, we cannot say that the defendant’s sentence is constitutionally excessive. The assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

      . The cases cited by the defendant are as follows:
      (1) Jessica Tensley,—State v. Tensley, 41,726 (La.App.2d Cir.4/4/07), 955 So.2d 227. Tensley was convicted of second degree murder for her failure to seek medical help for her child after the child was beaten by her boyfriend. This court reversed her conviction; on remand, she pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor.
      (2) Ashley Johnson — 4th Judicial District Court Docket No. 09-F1034. Johnson delivered a child at home; subsequently, the child died as a result of multiple stab wounds and skull fractures. Johnson was sentenced to 20 years at hard labor, but 10 years was suspended.
      (3) Geneva Mott — 4th Judicial District Court Docket No. 07-F0018. Mott failed to seek medical attention for her child who later died of severe blunt trauma to the skull. Mott was initially charged with second degree murder, but pled guilty to second degree cruelty to a juvenile and was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor.
      (4) Karla Hooper — 4th Judicial District Court Docket No. 06-F2183. Hooper’s child died of brain injuries; there was evidence of past brain trauma, and the father accused Hooper of shaking the baby violently. Hooper was initially charged with second degree murder, but pled guilty to second degree cruelty to a juvenile; she was sentenced to 20 years, but 10 years was suspended.

      . The trial court noted that a drug test administered to the defendant on the morning of Amity’s death showed high levels of cocaine in her system. According to the trial court, this information indicated that the defendant had smoked "significantly more" than one rock of crack cocaine.

      . Steven Cantrell was contacted by telephone by the presentence investigator. Cantrell described the defendant as a drug addict and a liar, and stated that "she should serve the maximum sentence."


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PITMAN, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Rosalind THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jeffrey WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 48,003-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2013.

      Anita T. Mack, Monroe, LA, for Appellant.
    Michael E. Kramer, Winnsboro, LA, for Appellee.
    Before MOORE, LOLLEY & PITMAN, JJ.
   PITMAN, J.

|, Defendant/Plaintiff in rule, Jeffrey Williams, appeals a judgment denying a “Rule to Show Cause Why Judgment of Child Support Should Not Be Amended.” In 2012, Defendant sought to have a 2003 stipulated judgment of child support amended to reflect the allegedly proper intent of the parties. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the written judgment properly reflected the intent of the parties. The trial court also found that it was without authority to substantively amend the judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

In 2002, Rosalind Thomas (“Thomas”) filed a petition against Defendant to establish child support payments. A hearing was held in May 2008. Both parties were represented by counsel. On that date, the parties reached a stipulation, which was evidenced by a transcript of record in the case. The transcript provides a colloquy by which the stipulation was placed on the record settling all disputes for child support obligations, medical insurance costs and child care expenses as it related to the parties’ two children.

The transcript reflects that Thomas’ attorney had prepared an obligations worksheet setting forth the income of the parties, which had been reviewed by both the opposing attorney and the court. The worksheet reflected that Defendant’s total monthly child support obligation was $1,463, which consisted of $1,002 for basic child support and the remainder his obligation for child care payments and health insurance premiums. Defendant agreed to pay the child care separately and directly to the child |acare provider. The transcript further reflects that both parties acknowledged to the court that they understood and agreed to be bound by the stipulated agreement.

Thomas’ attorney stated on the record that the obligations worksheet would be attached to the written judgment reflecting the stipulated agreement of the parties. The worksheet, however, was not attached to the written judgment. The written judgment stated in pertinent part as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that JEFFREY WILLIAMS shall pay child support to ROSALIND THOMAS in the amount of $1,463.00 per month beginning April 1, 2003.
FURTHER ORDERED, that JEFFREY WILLIAMS shall be allowed to pay the above child support obligation beginning in June 2003, as follows:
a) The entire payment for April and May shall be paid directly to ROSALIND THOMAS;
b) JEFFREY WILLIAMS shall pay $1,002.00 directly to ROSALIND THOMAS;
c) JEFFREY WILLIAMS shall pay all costs of medical insurance;
d) JEFFREY WILLIAMS shall pay his portion of day care cost to the childcare provider, Carol’s Kids, 201 Beasley Ave., Monroe, LA;

In 2012, Defendant filed a “Rule to Show Cause Why Judgment of Child Support Should Not Be Amended” to correct the monthly amount to be paid in accordance with the agreement of the parties. A hearing was held on the amendment; and, after the 2003 obligations worksheet used by the parties in confecting the agreement was authenticated, the trial court admitted it into evidence.

|sThe trial court heard the testimony of both parties. Defendant testified his understanding of the ágreement was that he was to pay Thomas the sum of $1,002 per month, as well as his 76 percent share of the child care costs to be paid directly to the child care provider. He further testified that his employer withheld his child support payment of $1,463 from his military income for many years and that it is now withheld from his retirement income. Defendant stated that he paid the children’s day care provider, Carol’s Kids, the sum of $280 per month for an undetermined period of time, but admitted that he had not paid those expenses directly to any other child care provider because he had not been informed of any new providers’ names and/or addresses. Defendant admitted that he had failed to make some child support payments and that, in addition to the $1,463 child support payment, an additional amount was being withheld from his monthly retirement check to repay the arrearage.

Thomas testified that she used the $1,463 she received monthly to pay Defendant’s share of the children’s day care expenses for every provider since the date of the stipulation. She confirmed that she had used several day care providers in the past years and that the cost fluctuated with each provider. She testified that she often did not have a contact address for Defendant and, therefore, was unable to provide him with the name and address of the ever-changing providers she used. Thomas testified that it was her understanding that Defendant was to pay her $1,463 per month in child support, and she chose to pay the children’s total day care expenses out of that sum.

|4The trial court found that the written judgment correctly reflected the intent of the parties as indicated by their oral stipulation and the obligations worksheet and that the judgment did not require an amendment. The trial judge, therefore, denied Defendant’s request to reduce his child support obligation from the sum of $1,463 per month to $1,002. The trial judge also found that to modify the judgment as requested by Defendant would result in a substantive change in the judgment and that, under La. C.C.P. art.1951, he was without authority to grant the relief requested by Defendant. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

Admission of obligations worksheet

Defendant has raised two assignments of error, one of which is a threshold issue to the other and which should be addressed first. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting and considering the copy of the obligations worksheet at the hearing in 2012 when that worksheet was never admitted into the original ease record. Defendant complains that he objected to the introduction of the document, which was undated and only a copy, since it had not been introduced or made a part of the record at any time earlier. Thomas argues that the trial court’s consideration of the worksheet was proper since it conclusively established through a careful analysis of the entire record that the worksheet in question was an authentic copy of the original worksheet.

La. C.E. art. 1003 governs the admissibility of duplicates and states as follows:

IfiA duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless:
(1) A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original;
(2) In the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original; or
(3) The original is a testament offered for probate, a contract on which the claim or defense is based, or is otherwise closely related to a controlling issue.

The transcript of the 2003 hearing showed that Thomas’ attorney prepared the obligations worksheet to calculate the pro rata share of child support to be paid by each party. Before discussing the figures contained in the worksheet, Thomas’ attorney stated that the opposing attorney and the trial judge had reviewed the worksheet and that he would prepare the written judgment and attach the worksheet to it.

At the hearing in 2012, Thomas’ attorney testified that the worksheet was the one he filled out in his own handwriting for this particular case and that he had removed it from his file which had been in storage. He stated that the initials on the bottom of the page were his and that the document was the original filled out in court or shortly thereafter. He attested that he maintained a copy of the document in his file. Defendant’s attorney was allowed to cross-examine Thomas’ attorney regarding the authenticity of the document.

We find no error in the admission and consideration of this document by the trial court in its decision regarding the merits of the motion to amend the child support judgment. There were no real questions as to its | (¡authenticity, and no circumstances which would make its admission unfair. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.

Denial of motion to amend child support judgment

Defendant’s second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to amend the judgment of child support since a judgment may be corrected for alteration of phraseology and calculation errors, as long as the amendments are not substantive. Defendant argues that the colloquy at the 2008 hearing indicates that he was to pay $1,002 in basic child support to Thomas and 76 percent of the child care costs directly to the child care provider. He further argues that the written judgment that was signed requires him to pay $1,463 per month rather than $1,002 per month. In addition, he argues that the judgment on its face is unclear and ambiguous. Therefore, when he filed his rule to modify the judgment, he sought only to correct a calculation error and to have a judgment rendered which would accurately reflect the agreement between the parties.

Thomas opposed the request for amendment of the judgment and argued that none of the conditions necessary for amendment of the judgment under La. C.C.P. art.1951 were present in this case. She argues that Defendant is seeking not to correct calculations or to alter the phraseology, but, instead, is seeking a substantive change in the judgment. She claimed that the evidence presented at the hearing established that there were no errors in the calculation as to the determination of the amount of child support to be paid and that, in fact, there was no conflict between the signed judgment and the oral stipulation entered in 2003.

|7La. C.C.P. art.1951 concerns the amendment of judgments and states in pertinent part as follows:

A final judgment may be amended by the trial court at any time, with or without notice, on its own motion or on motion of any party;
(1) To alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance; or
(2) To correct errors of calculation.

La. C.C.P. art 1951 contemplates the correction of errors of calculation in a judgment, but does not allow the substantive amendment of judgments. Thus, the judgment may be amended by the court where the amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment. Villaume v. Villaume, 363 So.2d 448 (La.1978). The proper recourse for an error of substance within a judgment is a timely application for new trial or a timely appeal. LaBove v. Theriot, 597 So.2d 1007 (La.1992); Hebert v. Hebert, 351 So.2d 1199 (La.1977).

It is well settled under our jurisprudence that a judgment which has been signed cannot be altered, amended or revised by the judge who rendered it, except in the manner provided by law. The trial judge cannot, on his own motion or on the motion of any party, change a judgment which has been so signed, notwithstanding it was signed in error. Villaume, supra.

Without a specific statutory grant of authority, the trial court is limited to the general authorization for amending final judgments provided in La. C.C.P. art.1951. Courts have uniformly held substantive amendments to judgments made without recourse to the proper procedures, i.e. by way of a timely motion for a new trial or by appeal, to be absolute ^nullifies. LaBove, supra; Bourgeois v. Kost, 02-2785 (La.5/20/03), 846 So.2d 692.

Under La. C.C.P. art.1951, the trial court cannot substantively amend a final judgment even to express the court’s actual intent or to conform the judgment to the court’s oral or written reasons for judgment. Stoffer v. Stoffer, 29,458 (La.App.2d Cir.5/7/97), 693 So.2d 1229; Posey v. Singletary, 37,425 (La.App.2d Cir.9/24/03), 855 So.2d 853.

La. C.C. art. 3071 concerns compromise and states that it is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a ‘dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship. A compromise shall be made in writing or recited in open court, in which case the recitation shall be susceptible of being transcribed from the record of the proceedings.

In Reon v. Reon, 07-1277 (La.App. 3d Cir.4/2/08), 982 So.2d 210, the court found the open court recitations, by which the parties in a divorce proceeding agreed to the stipulations offered by their respective attorneys, constituted a binding compromise or agreement on the partition of their community property. The court also found that portions of the judgment dividing community property in the divorce proceeding that did not accurately reflect the intent of the parties as indicated by their oral stipulation to property division had to be removed from the judgment.

The judgment at issue in this case resulted from a stipulated agreement between the parties; therefore, the written judgment should accurately reflect the intention of the parties as to the child support [ ^Defendant was to provide to Thomas. We find that the written judgment does accurately reflect the agreement between the parties and that the trial court correctly found that no amendment was necessary.

At the hearing in 2012, Thomas’ attorney presented evidence in the form of the obligations worksheet prepared in 2003 by which the determination of Defendant’s child support obligation was made. The worksheet showed that Thomas’ monthly adjusted gross income was $1,574 and Defendant’s monthly adjusted gross income was $5,000, which equals a combined monthly adjusted gross income of $6,574. Thomas’ percentage of the income was computed to be 24 percent and Defendant’s 76 percent. Based on these figures, the combined basic child support obligation was calculated to be $1,319.

The sum of $571 for child care costs was added to the basic child support obligation, together with a health care premium of $36, making the parties’ total child support obligation $1,926. Defendant’s 76 percent was thus determined to be $1,468.

Defendant’s attorney correctly confirmed that his client’s monthly payment to Thomas would be 76 percent of the basic child support obligation of $1,319, i.e., $1,002, and that Defendant would separately pay the child care expenses and health insurance premium. Accordingly, Defendant’s child support obligation consisted of the $1,002 basic child support payment to Thomas, 76 percent of the $36 insurance premium |in($27.36) and 76 percent of the child care expense of $571 ($433.96), for a total of $1,463. Based on this reasoning, the oral stipulated agreement entered into by the parties in 2003 is accurately reflected in the written judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court was correct in finding that the written judgment accurately reflected the stipulated agreement of the parties with regard to the payment of all child support obligations and properly denied the motion to amend the child support payments. The total amount of the payment due each month remained consistent with that set forth in the written judgment, notwithstanding the fact that, through the years, it was not entirely implemented by direct payment to child care providers. Any judgment rendered which would have modified the child support judgment would have resulted in a substantive amendment of the judgment and would have been a nullity.

This assignment of error, therefore, is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court denying the motion of Defendant, Jeffrey Williams, to amend the stipulated judgment of child support is affirmed. Costs of appeal are assessed to Jeffrey Williams.

AFFIRMED.

      . Williams has claimed that he is unaware where the $36 figure for health insurance premiums arose because he was in the military and the children were insured through his employment at no cost to him.


author: BROWN, Chief Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Kendranze LEWIS, Appellant.
    No. 48,023-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2013.

      Carey J. Ellis, III, Louisiana Appellate Project, for Appellant.
    J. Schuyler Marvin, District Attorney, John M. Lawrence, Marcus R. Patillo, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before BROWN, WILLIAMS, and MOORE, JJ.
   BROWN, Chief Judge.

11 Defendant, Kendranze Lewis, was charged by bill of information with possession of marijuana-third offense, but pled guilty to the amended charge of possession of marijuana-second offense. On January 11, 2012, officers went to defendant’s residence to arrest him on a probation and parole warrant. A search of the residence incident to arrest revealed a marijuana cigarette. Defendant was on good time release and under the supervision of the Division of Probation and Parole at the time of the instant offense. The offense for which defendant was on probation/parole was a 2006 conviction of possession of Schedule II (crack cocaine) with the intent to distribute. Defendant was sentenced to four years’ hard labor and was recommended for the intensive incarceration substance abuse program. Following the denial of his motion to reconsider sentence, defendant has appealed urging that his sentence is excessive.

Discussion

Review of a sentence for constitutional excessiveness turns upon whether the sentence is illegal, grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or shocking to the sense of justice. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739 (La.1992). A trial court has broad discretion to sentence within the statutory limits. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of.that discretion, the reviewing court may not set aside a sentence as excessive. State v. Guzman, 99-1528, 99-1753 (La.05/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158; State v. June, 38,440 (La.App.2d Cir.05/12/04), 873 So.2d 939.

| gPossession of marijuana-second offense is punishable by a fine of not less than $250, nor more than $2,000, and imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years, or both. La. R.S. 40:966(E)(2)(a).

In the instant case, the trial court expressly stated that it considered the factors of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Specifically, the court noted that defendant was being arrested for violating the terms of his good time release from a conviction for possession of crack cocaine at the time of the instant offense. At the time of sentencing, defendant was still in the violation process for revocation of his parole on that conviction. The trial court recited defendant’s lengthy prior criminal history, including underage DWI, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, simple possession, misdemeanor flight from an officer, simple battery, two previous probation revocations, and one previous parole revocation. The trial court further noted that defendant has two children by different mothers and is in arrears in child support totaling approximately $15,000.

The trial court also considered defendant’s age of 26 years, his personal history, and that he had obtained his GED while at an alternative school in Minden. He recognized defendant’s work history and that defendant admitted to a substance abuse problem, but noted that defendant has done nothing to help himself while incarcerated. The trial court expressly found no mitigating factors.

We do not find the sentence imposed to be constitutionally excessive. Defendant received a substantial benefit from the plea bargain in this case, | .¡reducing his sentencing exposure from twenty years to five. A substantial advantage obtained by means of a plea bargain is a legitimate consideration in sentencing. State v. Ross, 35,552 (La.App.2d Cir.02/27/02), 811 So.2d 176. In addition, defendant has exhibited a pattern of probation and parole violations. Given the circumstances of the case, as provided above, the imposed sentence does not shock the sense of justice.

Conclusion

Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

      . His sentencing exposure on a third offense would have been up to 20 years’ hard labor and a $5,000 fine.


author: GARRETT, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Roosevelt JOHNSON, Appellant.
    No. 48,024-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2013.

      Teresa Culpepper Carroll, Jonesboro, LA, Louisiana Appellate Project, for Appellant.
    J. Schuyler Marvin, District Attorney, John M. Lawrence, Charles Smith, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before BROWN, DREW and GARRETT, JJ.
   GARRETT, J.

|, The defendant, Roosevelt Johnson, pled guilty to one count of possession of cocaine. He was sentenced to serve five years at hard labor, with credit for time served. The defendant now appeals, alleging that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On January 25, 2012, the defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant. During a search, police found in his possession a substance subsequently determined to be cocaine. The defendant was charged by bill of information with possession of cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C). On April 9, 2012, he pled guilty as charged, pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the state agreed not to file a habitual offender bill of information against him. There was no agreement as to the defendant’s sentence, and the trial court ordered a presen-tence investigation (PSI) report.

On June 25, 2012, the trial court sentenced the defendant to five years at hard labor, the maximum sentence for the charge, with credit for time served. The trial court stated that it imposed this sentence due to the defendant’s extensive criminal history, which included three pri- or felony convictions.

The defendant’s motion to reconsider was denied. The defendant now appeals, arguing that his sentence is excessive.

[JAW

The test imposed by the reviewing court in determining the exeessiveness of a sentence is two-pronged. First, the record must show that the trial court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688 (La.1983); State v. Tatum, 47,292 (La.App.2d Cir.8/15/12), 103 So.3d 550. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475 (La.1982); State v. Free, 46,894 (La.App.2d Cir.1/25/12), 86 So.3d 29. The important elements which should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049 (La.1981); State v. Tatum, supra.

Second, a sentence violates La. Const. Art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Smith, 2001-2574 (La.1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1; State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Bell, 47,052 (La.App.2d Cir.5/16/12), 92 So.3d 1087.

A trial court has wide discretion to sentence within the statutory limits. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion, this court will not set aside a sentence as excessive. State v. Williams, 2003-3514 (La.12/13/04), 893 So.2d 7; State v. Free, supra.

Maximum sentences are generally appropriate in cases involving the most serious violation of the offense and the worst type of offender. State v. Russell, 42,479 (La.App.2d Cir.9/26/07), 966 So.2d 154, writ denied, 2007-2069 (La.3/07/08), 977 So.2d 897. Where a defendant has pled guilty to an offense which does not adequately describe his conduct or has received a significant reduction in potential exposure to confinement through a plea bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing even the maximum sentence possible for the pled offense. State v. Gill, 46,784 (La.App.2d Cir.12/14/11), 80 So.3d 719, writ denied, 2012-0164 (La.5/4/12), 88 So.3d 463.

La. R.S. 40:967(C) provides that anyone convicted of possession of cocaine shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, and, in addition, may be sentenced to pay a fíne of not more than $5,000.

LDISCUSSION

The 45-year-old defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. In support of his claim, he points out that his last felony conviction was 14 years ago. He argues that besides his criminal history, there are no other aggravating factors in the record supporting his sentence. He alleges that he would be likely to respond to probation, that he has hit “rock bottom” and is facing his drug addiction, and that he wants to help others similarly situated. The defendant also asserts that his imprisonment would create an excessive hardship on his family insofar as it would negatively impact his ability to pay his child support arrears.

Based upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant. The record indicates that the trial court reviewed the defendant’s PSI report, which detailed his felony convictions, as well as his numerous misdemeanor charges and convictions. The PSI report reflects that the defendant was repeatedly unsuccessful on probation and parole. The trial court explained that the sentence imposed was based upon the defendant’s extensive criminal history.

Additionally, the sentence imposed is not grossly out of proportion to the crime committed. The trial court imposed the maximum sentence in regard to prison time (although the defendant was not fined for his behavior), but the record indicates that he has a substantial criminal history, especially involving violence and illegal substances. Furthermore, he obtained a substantial benefit by pleading guilty because he was able to | savoid exposure as a habitual offender. Therefore, the trial court had discretion to impose the maximum sentence.

This assignment of error has no merit.

CONCLUSION

The defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Darius MENDENHALL, Appellant.
    No. 48,028-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2013.

      Teresa Culpepper Carroll, Jonesboro, LA, for Appellant.
    J. Schuyler Marvin, District Attorney, C. Sherburne Sentell, III, Marcus Ray Patillo, Alexandra Aiello, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before BROWN, DREW, and GARRETT, JJ.
   BROWN, Chief Judge.

| ^Defendant, Darius Mendenhall, pled guilty to distributing a legend drug, Pali-peridone, to a confidential informant, a violation of La. R.S. 40:1238.1, and conspiring to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A). In exchange for defendant’s guilty plea, the state dismissed a third count of distribution of a counterfeit drug and agreed not to file a habitual offender bill. The state also recommended that the sentences run concurrently.

Defendant received concurrent hard labor terms of five years for the distribution of a legend drug, and eight years for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. As a result of these charges, defendant’s probation was revoked on a prior illegal possession of stolen goods conviction (eight years). The trial court ordered that the current sentences would be consecutive to the eight years on the probation revocation. The trial court also recommended defendant for the substance abuse program. His motion to reconsider was denied. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Discussion

Defendant claims that his sentences are excessive. The circumstances of the charges were stated as follows:

On or about October 13, 2011, Menden-hall was observed by a North Webster Narcotics Task Force and was seen distributing six pills of a legend drug, Pali-peridone, to a confidential informant for $20. The transaction was recorded on audio andjjvideo surveillance. The drug was later confirmed by the crime lab as a legend drug.
On or about July 21, 2011, the narcotics task force had a confidential informant call Mendenhall to attempt to purchase from him $40 worth of crack cocaine. Mendenhall later met with the confidential informant and directed the informant to drive them to a location in Webster Parish, where Mendenhall entered to conduct the transaction. Afterward, a second individual brought crack cocaine out to the confidential informant.

Review of a sentence for constitutional excessiveness turns upon whether the sentence is illegal, grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or shocking to the sense of justice. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739 (La.1992). A trial court has broad discretion to sentence within the statutory limits. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion, the reviewing court may not set aside a sentence as excessive. State v. Guzman, 99-1528, 99-1753 (La.05/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158; State v. June, 38,440 (La.App.2d Cir.05/12/04), 873 So.2d 939.

The trial court reviewed the presentence investigation report, which revealed that defendant had two prior felonies. On November 22,1999, defendant had pled guilty to middle grade illegal possession of stolen things and was sentenced to two years at hard labor, suspended, and two years of supervised probation. His probation was revoked on December 11, 2000. Defendant also pled guilty on March 7, 2011, to illegal possession of stolen things and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment at hard labor, suspended, with five years of supervised probation. The presentence | investigation report indicates he was originally charged with simple burglary. He was serving this probation when he was charged with the instant offenses. His probation was revoked prior to sentencing on the present charges.

The trial court noted that defendant’s mother, who was discharged from a mental hospital, Uves with him, as does his girlfriend and their two children. Defendant worked for a landscaping company and was working toward obtaining his G.E.D. A diabetic, defendant also took the medication Paliperidone, the legend drug he was selling, for a condition in which he hears voices.

The trial court also noted that because the instant convictions constitute defendant’s third felony, he was not eligible for probation.

Defendant argues that his concurrent sentences for five and eight years’ imprisonment at hard labor are excessive in light of the fact that they will run consecutively to his other sentence of eight years for his prior conviction for illegal possession of stolen things. He argues that more consideration should be given to the fact that he pled guilty and that the transactions were only six pills for $20 and a small amount of cocaine for $40. Finally, he argues that the sentences imposed would impose a hardship on his family, as he needs to care for his mom and his two children.

A “legend drug” is one in which the label reads “Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without prescription.” La. R.S. 40:1287. Under La. R.S. 40:1238.1, “it is unlawful for any person to sell, deliver, or possess any legend drug, except upon the order or prescription of a physician or licensed Rhealth care practitioner.” Any person who violates La. R.S. 40:1238.1 is subject to imprisonment for not more than five years, with or without hard labor, and an optional maximum fine of $5,000. La. R.S. 40:1238.1(0).

La. R.S. 40:967(A) prohibits the distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. Anyone violating La. R.S. 40:967(A) by distributing cocaine is subject to imprisonment at hard labor for 2-30 years, with the first two years being without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and an optional fine of not more than $50,000. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). For conspiracy to commit distribution of cocaine, the fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half the largest fine or one-half the longest term of imprisonment, or both. La. R.S. 14:26(C). Therefore, for conspiring to distribute cocaine, Mendenhall was subject to a maximum of 15 years’ imprisonment at hard labor.

The sentences in this case are within the statutory guidelines. The trial court considered mitigating factors: that defendant pled guilty and acknowledged his mistake; that he was employed and trying to get his G.E.D.; and that he had obligations in caring for his mother and two children. However, he had a history of probation and parole violations. His crimes are now escalating into sales of controlled substances and he has resorted to selling his own prescription medication.

After benefiting from the plea agreement, in which he was not charged as a third-felony habitual offender and a third charge was dismissed, defendant faced a combined sentence exposure of 20 years (28 years counting the revocation of his prior crime). He was only sentenced to | (five and eight years, respectively, and under the plea agreement, had the benefit of having these sentences run concurrently to one another but consecutively with the eight-year sentence on his prior conviction for which his probation was revoked.

Defendant received a substantial benefit from the plea bargain in this case. A substantial advantage obtained by means of a plea bargain is a legitimate consideration in sentencing. State v. Ross, 35,552 (La.App.2d Cir.02/27/02), 811 So.2d 176. In addition, defendant has exhibited a pattern of probation and parole violations. Given the circumstances of the case, as provided above, the imposed sentences, including the eight-year sentence on the revocation, does not shock the sense of justice. They are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime such as to shock the sense of justice and serve no purpose other than to inflict pain and suffering. State v. Fatheree, 46,686 (La.App.2d Cir.11/02/11), 77 So.3d 1047.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

      . Paliperidone is prescribed in treatment of disorders such as schizophrenia.

      . In a separate matter, Mendenhall was charged with stealing meat from his aunt’s house, pled guilty to criminal mischief and was sentenced to six months in the parish jail.

      .The presentence investigation report indicates another prior offense to which Menden-hall pled guilty and was ordered to serve 60 days’ jail time, suspended, and a one-year probation, which was later revoked.


author: LOLLEY, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Robert Jerome GEORGE, Appellant.
    No. 48,040-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2013.

      Carey J. Ellis, III, Louisiana Appellate Project, for Appellant.
    Charles Rex Scott, District Attorney, Jordan B. Bird, Tommy J. Johnson, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, LOLLEY and GARRETT, JJ.
   LOLLEY, J.

11 This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana. The defendant, Robert Jerome George, was convicted by a unanimous jury of failure to register as a sex offender, a violation of La. R.S. 15:542 et seq. George’s motions for new trial and for post-judgment verdict of acquittal were denied. A timely motion to reconsider sentence was denied without a hearing, and this appeal followed. For the following reasons, George’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Facts

George is a convicted sex offender and, as such, is required to register with local law enforcement authorities pursuant to La. R.S. 15:542 et seq. His underlying felony conviction is forcible rape, for which George received a sentence of 10 years at hard labor. There is no dispute that, after his release from prison, George was fully apprised of the sex offender registration requirements. On release, offenders are presented with a “Notice of Sex Offender and Sexual Violent Predator Registration and Notification Requirements,” which is generally referred to as the “parole contract.” The parole contract provides that offenders, such as George, notify the parish sheriffs office within ten (10) days of a change in residence. On November 19, 2004, and again on June 9, 2006, George signed parole contracts verifying that he received copies of them, and understood the registration requirements and penalties. As a tier three offender, George was required to register quarterly with the Caddo Parish |aSheriffs Office. His notification and registration requirements were for life.

On October 18, 2011, George completed a quarterly registration with the Caddo Parish Sheriffs Office. He registered his residence as 2532 Lillian Street in Shreveport, Louisiana, his grandmother’s home. Lieutenant Greg Winget was the investigator in this case and testified on behalf of the State at the criminal trial. Lieutenant Winget explained the registration procedures and requirements to the jury and further testified that, on or about October 26, 2011, he was made aware that George was not residing at 2532 Lillian Street. He further testified that he went to the residence and spoke with George’s grandmother, Verta Green. According to Lt. Winget, Green was on the front porch when he arrived. He spoke with her on the porch and did not go inside the residence. Green told Lt. Winget that George was her grandson. Lieutenant Winget testified:

She said that at one time he was living there but she hadn’t seen him about eight months. At that point she said she didn’t know his whereabouts ... I asked if he was residing there and she said that he did at one point but he moved out about eight months ago.

Lieutenant Winget stated that Green did not seem confused and that he had. no reason to believe that she did not understand the questions he was asking her. The following day, Lt. Winget obtained an arrest warrant for George, who was subsequently arrested on November 10, 2011, during a traffic stop on 1-20 in Tyler, Texas. During the stop, George produced a driver’s license bearing the address of 2582 Lillian Street.

|sOn cross-examination, Lt. Winget acknowledged that he did not know where George had moved and that, based on the information he had on October 18, 2011, when George completed his quarterly registration, he was in compliance with the law. It was not until eight days later that Lt. Winget was informed that George was not residing at the Lillian Street address. Lieutenant Winget agreed that it was not a violation of the registration law for an offender to travel the Interstate so long as the offender does not change permanent residences. Lieutenant Winget explained that there is no supervision component to the registration requirements; George was free to come and go on a daily basis with the caveat that he give the required notice to the sheriffs office upon a change in residence. Finally, Lt. Winget testified that he tried to call George’s cell phone number before securing the arrest warrant, but there was no answer and he did not leave a message.

Green also testified. She identified George as her grandson and stated that she remembered Lt. Winget coming to her house to ask about the defendant. Green testified that she told Lt. Winget that George “wasn’t there at the time.” When asked about the period of time George had been gone from her residence, Green responded that she did not understand the question. Her testimony was as follows:

Q: Did you tell the Sheriff that came there and questioned you that [the defendant] was gone for a period of time?
A: Well, he was gone for a period of time.
Q: Do you remember how long he was gone for or how long you told the officer that he was gone for?
[4A: No, I don’t, I don’t remember all that.
Q: Do you know how long, do you remember how long he was gone for?
A: No, I don’t.
Q: Did he live there previously?
A: Yes, earlier, yeah.
Q: He lived there earlier?
A: Yeah, lived with me, he lived with me for a while.
Q: Do you know when he moved out?
A: I can’t remember when he moved out.
Q: Was it sometime last year in 2011 during the middle of 2011?
A: Somewhere along in there.
Q: How long had it been since he moved out to when that detective came to talk to you, do you know?
A: No, I don’t.
Q: Do you know if it was months, weeks, something like that, do you have any idea?
A: Something like that.
Q: As far as weeks or months?
A: As far as weeks.

Green further testified that she had not seen her grandson since before the detective visited her and she did not know where he had moved. She was aware that he was a convicted sex offender and that he had listed her address as his residence. Green stated that George kept belongings at her home, though not much, and that she discarded them in the trash after his arrest.

|fiOn cross-examination, Green agreed that she thought George had moved, because he had been gone for a “few days.” She stated that George never told her that he was moving.

Lieutenant Owen McDonnell of the Cad-do Parish Sheriffs Office was qualified and accepted as an expert in fingerprint examination and testified on behalf of the State. He confirmed through fingerprint comparison that George was the same individual convicted of forcible rape in 1997.

George Mize, of the Louisiana Probation and Parole Department (the “Department”), testified that he is the individual assigned to cover all sex offender registrations. Mize explained the registration procedure to the jury. He instructed that, when an offender is released from prison, he or she reports to the Department and receives the parole contract, as earlier mentioned, that contains information detailing the conditions and requirements of parole and the penalties for violations thereof. Regarding changes of residence, Mize explained that, if the offender is still on active probation, he or she must get prior approval before moving residences. Once the probation or parole is complete, however, the offender must simply comply with the post-parole requirement to notify the sheriff’s office within ten (10) days of a change in residence. Mize confirmed that George received the information on registration and signed the requisite documents acknowledging his receipt and understanding of the registration requirements and penalties. Finally, Mize identified the signatures on the 2004 and 2006 registration packets as that of the defendant.

16George testified on his own behalf. He maintained that he lived with his grandmother at the Lillian Street address for over two years. His father lived there with them before he passed away, and George stated that he helped care for his diabetic father prior to his passing. His father had lost all of his limbs to diabetes. George adamantly testified that he “never moved.” He explained that he had been in Tyler, Texas, for two days looking for his birth mother, whom he had never met, and was on his way home to Shreveport when he was stopped and arrested. When asked about his grandmother’s testimony, George testified that she was lying; however, he then stated that she is elderly and confused and “not stable to really just talk.” He further suggested that Lt. Win-get had “tricked” his grandmother into saying that he had moved and had been gone for eight months.

On cross-examination, George agreed that he has a prior failure to register felony conviction in Bossier Parish. He stated that he “did that one but I ain’t do this one.” George further acknowledged having a second offense possession of marijuana conviction.

As previously stated, the jury found George guilty as charged. At sentencing, the trial court described the circumstances of the underlying forcible rape conviction and found the crime to be “shocking.” The trial court emphasized that George had been advised repeatedly of the registration requirements and clearly failed to scrupulously adhere to the law. In addition, the trial court noted the myriad of arrests of George after his release from prison, indicating that he had not lived a law-abiding life. The trial court noted the guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and opined 17that the maximum sentence was appropriate. As previously stated, George was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. This appeal ensued.

Discussion

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first assignment of error, George argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not comply with the registration requirements of La. R.S. 15:542, because it did not prove that he had actually moved residences. The State relies on the testimony of Lt. Winget and Green, arguing that the evidence clearly shows that George moved from Green’s residence sometime (if not eight months) prior to his quarterly registration in October 2011.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La.05/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); State v. Carter, 42,894 (La.App.2d Cir.01/09/08), 974 So.2d 181, writ denied, 2008-0499 (La.11/14/08), 996 So.2d 1086. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.02/22/06), 922 So.2d 517; State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La.App Cir.01/14/09), 1 So.3d 833, writ denied, 2009-0310 (La.11/06/09), 21 So.3d 297.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Eason, 43,788 (La.App.2d Cir.02/25/09), 3 So.3d 685, writ denied, 2009-0725 (La.12/11/09), 23 So.3d 913; State v. Hill, 42,025 (La.App.2d Cir.05/09/07), 956 So.2d 758, writ denied, 2007-1209 (La.12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Speed, 43,786 (La.App.2d Cir.01/14/09), 2 So.3d 582, writ denied, 2009-0372 (La.11/06/09), 21 So.3d 299.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its | ¡¡sufficiency. State v. Speed, supra; State v. Allen, 36,180 (La.App. 2d Cir.09/18/02), 828 So.2d 622, writs denied, 2002-2595 (La.03/28/03), 840 So.2d 566, 2002-2997 (La.06/27/03), 847 So.2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.Ct. 1404, 158 L.Ed.2d 90 (2004).

Louisiana R.S. 15:542(0(2) requires certain offenders, once released, to appear in person within three business days to register with the appropriate law enforcement agencies. In subsection (C)(3) the statute further provides that “[k]nowingly providing false information to any law enforcement officer, office, or agency required to receive registration information ... shall constitute a failure to register pursuant to R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(1).”

An offender convicted of forcible rape, an aggravated offense, shall renew his or her registration every three months (quarterly). La. R.S. 15:542.1.1(A)(1). Louisiana R.S. 15:542.1.2 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. Those persons required to register pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall appear in person at the sheriffs office in the parish of residence, or the police department in the case of a municipality with a population in excess of three hundred thousand, where the offender is currently registered to update information within three business days of establishing a new or additional physical residential address or of changes in information previously provided when any of the following occur:
* * * * ⅜ *
(3) The offender has been absent from Ms current address of registration for more than thirty consecutive days or an aggregate of thirty days or more per calendar year and is physically present at another address during that same time period.
⅜ ⅜: ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
E. ... (2) Any sex offender who fails to provide change of address or other information as provided in this Section shall be subject to criminal prosecution as provided in R.S. 15:542.1.4.
F.(l) The offender shall appear in person at the sheriffs office in the parish of residence at least three days prior to establishing temporary lodging to provide temporary lodging information regarding any place where the offender plans to stay for seven consecutive days or more.
(2) If the location of the temporary lodging is outside of the boundaries of the parish of registration, then the sheriff shall notify the sheriff of the parish of temporary lodging. If the location of the temporary lodging is out of state, then the sheriff shall notify the bureau. (Emphasis added.)

Section 11(C) of the parole contract requires as follows:

C. CHANGE OF ADDRESS REQUIREMENTS (REGISTRATION)
Sex offenders and sexual violent predators and child predators are required to notify Louisiana State Police, the Sheriffs Office in the parish of residence, and if applicable the Chiefs of Police, within ten (10) days of change of address. You must notify the Sheriff in the parish of your initial registration, the Louisiana State Police, and if applicable the Chief of Police. When the address involves a different parish, or different incorporated area that has a police department, then you must notify Sheriff and Chief of Police where you initially registered as well as the Sheriff and Chief of Police if you move to a new incorporated area that has a Police Department. (Emphasis in original.)

It is not disputed that George is a convicted sex offender subject to the registration requirements. Further, there is no dispute that George was provided the notification and registration requirements upon his release. The only question is whether the evidence presented by the State was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that George was absent from the Lillian Street residence for a period of 80 days and failed to | ^notify the sheriffs office of this change in residence as required by the statute. Our review of the trial proceedings leads to the conclusion that the State did a less than stellar job proving its case, especially regarding the amount of time that George had been absent from his grandmother’s home prior to Lt. Winget’s visit there. However, the totality of the evidence, coupled with the discretion afforded the trier of fact, supports a conclusion that sufficient evidence was presented to support the conviction.

Green testified that George previously lived with her, but had moved out before Lt. Winget came to the residence to check on him. While she testified that she could not remember at trial the exact length of George’s absence from her home prior to Lt. Winget’s visit, Green agreed that it was “weeks” that he had been gone and that she did not know his whereabouts at the time. She was worried about her grandson because he had left the residence and she was unable to contact him.

Lieutenant Winget testified that shortly after George’s October 18th quarterly renewal of his registration, at which time he listed 2532 Lillian Street as his residence, he became aware that George did not reside at that address. When Lt. Winget went to the residence, Green advised him that George had been gone from her residence for eight months, and she did not know his whereabouts. The warrant for George’s arrest was issued nine days after his quarterly registration. While somewhat tenuous on the cold record, this evidence reasonably leads a rational trier of fact to conclude that George was absent from the Lillian Street residence for at least 80 days and failed to notify the sheriffs office within 10 days of his relocation. See State v. Cavazos, 2011-0733 (La.App. 4th Cir.05/16/2012), 94 So.3d 870, writ denied, 2012-1372 (La.10/26/12), 99 So.3d 645, where the defendant was ordered out of the house, put on a bus and told never to return, evidence was sufficient to convict him of failure to register as a sex offender.

Notably, a jury saw and heard firsthand the witnesses testify. Significantly, those witnesses included George himself, who testified that he never moved residences and attempted to cast doubt on his grandmother’s veracity and/or competency to advise the jury as to his residency. He also suggested that Lt. Winget had “tricked” his grandmother into agreeing to testify that George had moved. The jury clearly made a credibility determination, electing to credit the testimony of Green and Lt. Winget. After watching and hearing George’s testimony, the jury chose to disregard it, and this determination is within the province and sound discretion of the trier of fact and should not be disturbed on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that this assignment of error is without merit.

Excessive Sentence

In his second assignment of error, George argues that the maximum sentence of 10 years at hard labor is excessive. He submits that the trial court failed to adequately consider the factors of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and did not tailor the sentence to him. George suggests that the trial court improperly focused on the circumstances of the underlying conviction of forcible rape and his prior criminal record. We disagree.

A trial court has wide discretion to sentence within the statutory limits. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion, this Court will not | isset aside a sentence as excessive. State v. Williams, 2003-3514 (La.12/13/04), 893 So.2d 7; State v. McCall, 37,442 (La.App.2d Cir.08/20/03), 852 So.2d 1162, writ denied, 2004-0039 (La.12/17/04), 888 So.2d 858. On review, the appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id.

In reviewing claims of excessive sentence, an appellate court uses a two-step process. First, the record must show that the trial court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the record reveals that he adequately considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688 (La.1983); State v. Dillard, 45,633 (La.App.2d Cir.11/03/10), 55 So.3d 56, writ denied, 2010-2853 (La.11/18/11), 75 So.3d 454.

The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475 (La.1982). The important elements which should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (his age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), pri- or criminal history, seriousness of the offense and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049 (La.1981); State v. Dillard, supra. There is no requirement that specific matters be |Mgiven any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Shumaker, 41,547 (La.App.2d Cir.12/13/06), 945 So.2d 277, writ denied, 2007-0144 (La.09/28/07), 964 So.2d 351.

Second, a sentence violates La. Const. Art. 1, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355 (La.1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 2001-0467 (La.01/15/02), 805 So.2d 166; State v. Bradford, 29,519 (La.App.2d Cir.04/02/97), 691 So.2d 864. A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing offenders. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion, an appellate court may not set aside a sentence as excessive. State v. Kidd, 45,638 (La.App.2d Cir.11/03/10), 55 So.3d 90.

As a general rule, maximum or near maximum sentences are reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 2007-2031 (La.02/15/08), 974 So.2d 665.

Louisiana R.S. 15:542.1.4 provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) A person who fails to register, periodically renew and update registration, provide proof of residence or notification of change of address or other registration information, or provide community notification as required by the provisions of this Chapter, and a person who knowingly provides false information to a law enforcement agency as provided in R.S. 15:542(0(3), shall, upon first conviction, be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned with hard labor for not less than two years nor more than ten years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

| lfiDuring sentencing, the trial court noted the “shocking” facts of the underlying conviction and emphasized that George continued to exhibit a disregard for the law by failing to comply with the sex offender registration requirements once before in Bossier Parish, Louisiana. In addition, the trial court noted that George was arrested numerous times for various offenses including disturbing the peace, failure to register, and possession of marijuana, after his release on the forcible rape conviction. The trial court expressly stated that it had reviewed the factors of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. In so doing, it determined that: there existed an undue risk that George would commit another crime if not incarcerated; George was in need of correctional treatment in a custodial environment; and, any lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. Evidently, the nature of the underlying forcible rape conviction weighed heavily on the trial court, yet it expressly stated that all of the facts and circumstances of the case supported a conclusion that the maximum sentence was warranted. Notably, this charge is in fact George’s second failure to register, and he could have been exposed to a maximum of 20 years had he been charged as a second offender.

The trial court remains vested with great discretion in sentencing within the range and, here, it provided adequate reasons for sentencing George. Therefore, based on this record, the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion in imposing this sentence, and the imposition of the 10-year sentence is not excessive, nor a purposeless and needless infliction of pain |1Rand suffering. It does not shock the sense of justice, and this assignment of error is without merit.

Error Patent

An error patent review indicates that, with regard to the mandatory fine imposed under La. R.S. 15:542.1.4, the sentence imposed is illegally lenient because the trial court faded to impose the $1,000.00 fine. George is not prejudiced in any way by the trial court’s failure to impose the mandatory fíne. Louisiana C. Cr. P. art. 882(A) provides that an illegally lenient sentence may be corrected at any time by an appellate court on review. We, however, are not required to take such action. State v. Griffin, 41,946 (La.App.2d Cir.05/02/07), 956 So.2d 199; State v. Sims, 40,300 (La.App.2d Cir.10/26/05), 914 So.2d 594. Given George’s apparent indigent status, we decline to impose a fine at this juncture.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of the defendant, Robert Jerome George, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . During sentencing, the trial court indicated having reviewed the record in the underlying case and explained that George and one other defendant had been arrested and charged with the aggravated rape of three children (ages 7, 8 and 12), but, "for whatever reason,” the district attorney had allowed this defendant to plead to one count of forcible rape.