text:
    Cortez HATTEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-5504.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 16, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 2014.
    Melissa Joy Ford, Assistant Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Region One, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Angela R. Hensel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC

PER CURIAM.

We grant Appellant’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion, and substitute this opinion in its place in order to clarify our disposition of Appellant’s fourth issue. We deny Appellant’s motion for rehearing en banc.

In this direct appeal, Appellant seeks review of his judgment and sentence for manslaughter (count I), attempted second degree murder (count III), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count V). He raises five issues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on count III; (2) the jury instructions for justifiable use of deadly force were fundamentally erroneous; (8) the statute upon which count V was based is unconstitutionally vague; (4) his 40-year sentence with a 25-year mandatory minimum term for count III is illegal because the 40fyear term exceeds the 30-year statutory maximum for a first-degree felony; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing several costs. The latter two issues were preserved by a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2).

We affirm the first and second issues without comment. We affirm the third issue based upon Weeks v. State, 146 So.3d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), and Kraay v. State, 148 So.3d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

We affirm the fourth issue based upon Kelly v. State, 137 So.3d 2, 6-7 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), wherein this court held that “circuit courts in the First District may, pursuant to [the 10-20-Life statute], impose a sentence in addition to its selected mandatory minimum sentence without regard to whether additional statutory authority for such an additional sentence exists.” And, as we did in Kelly, we certify conflict with Wiley v. State, 125 So.3d 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), to the extent that case held that a trial court may not impose a sentence in excess of the mandatory minimum term imposed under the 10-20-Life statute unless such a sentence is authorized by some other statute. We also certify conflict with decisions from the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts which held that the trial court may not impose a sentence in excess of 30 years for a first-degree felony under the 10-20-Life statute when the court imposes a mandatory minimum term of less than 30 years.

With respect to the fifth issue, we remand for correction of the following minor sentencing errors: imposition of a $230 cost pursuant to section 938.05(l)(a), Florida Statutes, when the statutory maximum is $225; imposition of a $415 cost pursuant to section 775.083(2), Florida Statutes, when the statutory maximum is $50; and imposition of the $100 cost of prosecution without citing the statutory basis for the cost. We recognize that, during the pen-dency of this appeal, the trial court entered a corrected judgment to correct these sentencing errors; however, that judgment is a legal nullity because it was filed more than 60 days after Appellant filed his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B); Ogden v. State, 117 So.3d 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). We see no reason that the trial court could,not simply reenter the corrected judgment on remand. Appellant need not be present.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED with directions; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.

      . The offense charged in Count III, attempted second-degree murder, is a second-degree felony, but it was enhanced to a first-degree felony in this case because Appellant used a firearm during the commission of the offense. See §§ 775.087(l)(b), 777.04(4)(c), 782.04(2), Fla. Stat.

      . Martinez v. State, 114 So.3d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Sheppard v. State, 113 So.3d 148, 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Prater v. State, 113 So.3d 147, 147-48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

      . Levine v. State, - So.3d -, 2014 WL 5149098 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 15, 2014) (reversing 50-year sentence for attempted second-degree murder where trial court only imposed a 25-year minimum mandatory term under the 10-20-Life statute and certifying conflict with Kelly)', see also Antoine v. State, 138 So.3d 1064, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Walden v. State, 121 So.3d 660, 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

        .Wooden v. State, 42 So.3d 837, 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ("[0]nce the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, it could not exceed the thirty year maximum penalty for a first degree felony under section 775.082(3)(b). The twenty-five year to life minimum mandatory range under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) does not create a new statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment.”) (citation omitted); see also Roberts v. State, 2013 WL 6687751 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec.20, 2013); McLeod v. State, 52 So.3d 784, 786 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WARNER, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Rafael Heribe AVILESROSARIO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D12-4269.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and John M. Conway, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allen R. Geesey, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

A bedrock principle of due process is that it is constitutionally impermissible to hold criminal proceedings against a mentally incompetent defendant. Where there is a reasonable question as to a defendant’s competency, the trial court must hold a competency'hearing. In the present case, just prior to the commencement of appellant’s trial, his defense counsel requested such a hearing, noting appellant’s prior mental illness, his recent suicide attempt, and her inability to communicate with appellant. Despite this, the court thought that appellant “looks the same as he has always looked to me.” The court refused to conduct a hearing. We hold that the court abused its discretion and reverse Avilesrosario’s conviction. Moreover, the trial court required appellant to go to trial wearing jail clothes. This too requires a reversal of his conviction.

Appellant Avilesrosario was arrested and subsequently charged with robbery and resisting an officer without violence. Within two months, his attorney moved for, and the court appointed, experts to evaluate him for competency to stand trial. As a result of their examination, appellant was adjudged incompetent to proceed and was committed to the Department of Children and Families. He was reexamined six months later, and the trial court found him competent to proceed based on a stipulation between the parties. '

A jury trial was finally scheduled eight months later. On the day of trial, Aviles-rosario’s attorney filed a motion for continuance and a motion to have him evaluated for competency to proceed. His attorney informed the court that Avilesrosario had cut himself with a razor and almost “bled out.” He had been hospitalized because of this and had only recently been returned to jail. His attorney indicated that she didn’t think he was mentally stable. Counsel indicated that she was not able to communicate with him, and she didn’t believe that he was able to assist in his own defense, nor could he manifest appropriate behavior in court. Avilesrosario had been mumbling to himself when the jury venire was present. The trial court stated, “He looks the same as he has always looked to me.” Co-counsel stated that “Looks are deceiving. He is not the same.” Both of his attorneys told the judge that he had decompensated and one of them stated, “He is not the same Rafael Avilesrosario that I met before. He is not the same. I have had a history with him and he is not the same.”

The trial court denied the motion and ordered jury selection to commence. Avi-lesrosario was in jail garb, and before the jury came in counsel requested that the court wait until her secretary arrived with other clothes for Avilesrosario. Counsel explained that the court had called up the case while she was in trial in another court, so she did not know that the case was called until the afternoon. She emailed her secretary to bring over the clothes. The court refused to wait, and Avilesrosario appeared at voir dire in jail garb. This prompted comments from more than one juror that he obviously was being held in jail and therefore must be guilty of something. Jurors also commented on the fact that Avilesrosario had his eyes closed and was not looking at them. This prompted a rebuke of the jurors by the trial court. Eventually a jury was seated.

The case proceeded, the facts of which are not relevant to the issues we address on appeal. After the state rested, the court asked Avilesrosario if he wished to testify. Avilesrosario stated through a Spanish interpreter:

I am not well. I am really not prepared to speak at this moment because I am under the effects of too much medication. I am just [here] to listen. I am taking — I have taken a bunch of things. I have taken about twenty-one pills for my condition, my mental health condition.

The court asked Avilesrosario if he wanted to wait until the next day to testify and he responded that he took the same pills every day. The defense then rested, and the court denied the defense motion for judgment of acquittal. Avilesrosario was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years for robbery. He appeals.

It is constitutionally impermissible to hold criminal proceedings against a mentally incompetent defendant. Nowitzke v. State, 572 So.2d 1346, 1349 (Fla.1990); Maxwell v. State, 974 So.2d 505, 509 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). In Hill v. State, 473 So.2d 1253, 1257 (Fla.1985), the supreme court explained that the test in determining competency is whether the defendant has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” (Emphasis in original).

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) requires the trial court to order a competency examination and conduct a hearing when it “has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed.” In other words, the question for the trial court is not whether the defendant is incompetent, but whether the defendant may be incompetent. Scott v. State, 420 So.2d 595, 597 (Fla.1982). Even where the defendant has been found competent, the court must be vigilant to reconsider a defendant’s competency if circumstances change. “[A] prior determination of competency does not control when new evidence suggests the defendant is at the current time incompetent.” Nowitzke, 572 So.2d at 1349. When the court has reasonable grounds to believe a criminal defendant may not be competent to proceed, it has no choice but to conduct a competency hearing. Tingle v. State, 536 So.2d 202, 203 (Fla.1988). A failure to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Molina v. State, 946 So.2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (abuse of discretion to refuse to reconsider competency where evidence suggests that defendant is incompetent).

A court should consider all of the circumstances in evaluating whether a competency hearing is necessary. See Calloway v. State, 651 So.2d 752, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). And although there is no single factor which compels a hearing, the representations of defense counsel require special consideration. Id. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) provides that upon motion filed by defense counsel, which is certified to be made in good faith, the court shall conduct a competency hearing.

Culbreath v. State, 903 So.2d 338 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), presents a case similar to this case. There, Culbreath was charged with violation of probation. His attorney filed a motion to determine competency. Two experts testified he was competent to proceed. The trial court found he was malingering and was competent. Over a month and a half later, at the beginning of his violation of probation hearing, defense counsel advised the court that he did not think Culbreath was competent to proceed. Culbreath was unable to communicate with him in jail, and Culbreath had tried to commit suicide the week before. The court denied the motion and proceeded to conduct the hearing. On appeal, the Second District reversed, explaining that even if a defendant has been declared competent at an earlier time, the court must remain receptive to revisiting the issue if circumstances change. If the court is presented with reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant may not have the sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney and aid in the preparation and presentation of his defense, the trial court must order a hearing and examination. The Second District pointed to counsel’s representations to the court, as well as Culbreath’s suicide attempt, as showing reasonable grounds to require a new competency determination.

Similarly, in this case, there was more than ample evidence which reasonably called for a new competency determination. Avilesrosario had attempted suicide and had just been released from the hospital. His counsel could not communicate with him, and based upon the behavior that he had already exhibited, she did not think he could exercise appropriate courtroom demeanor. Counsel pleaded with the trial court, noting that she had dealt with Avilesrosario for some time, and “he’s not the same as he was.” The court rejected all of this, simply based upon Avilesrosario’s appearance.

Avilesrosario’s conduct during the trial only highlighted the questionable nature of appellant’s competence. During voir dire, he kept his eyes closed, prompting jurors to question what was wrong with him. When the trial court asked whether he wanted to testify, he responded that he was unable to speak because of the amount of medication he was taking. All of this should have compelled the trial court to make further examination of his competency to proceed. Not to do so was an abuse of discretion. We must reverse.

Even if we were not reversing because of the lack of a competency hearing, we would also reverse because the trial court forced appellant to appear at trial in his jail clothes. A defendant cannot be compelled to stand trial in identifiable prison clothes, see Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So.2d 403, 409 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901, 109 S.Ct. 250, 102 L.Ed.2d 239 (1988), because it could impair the defendant’s presumption of innocence, which is a basic component of the fundamental right to a fair trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126, reh’g denied, 426 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 3182, 49 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1976).

The trial court erred by requiring Avi-lesrosario to appear in his jail clothing throughout voir dire. The comments of two jurors provide a perfect illustration of the potential harm to the presumption of innocence when a defendant appears in jail clothing. One juror noted that “the man has been arrested, he’s obviously been in jail.” Another juror commented that she was assuming that Avilesrosario was convicted before, stating, “He is wearing something that looks like he comes from jail, so in my mind he committed a crime before.”

The court was obviously anxious to get the trial started — so anxious that the case was called while defense attorneys were in another courtroom and unavailable until shortly before the trial commenced. They had already sent for appropriate attire for Avilesrosario, but the trial court unreasonably refused to wait. In making Avilesro-sario appear in front of the jury in jail clothing, the court violated Avilesrosario right to a fair trial.

Because of our reversal of the foregoing issues, we do not address the remaining issues. We reverse and remand for a new trial, contingent upon a determination that Avilesrosario is competent to stand trial.

LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Curtis HAMPTON and Linda Hampton, his wife, Appellants, v. FLORIDA MUNICIPAL INSURANCE TRUST, Appellee.
    No. 4D13-3659.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.

      Nancy Little Hoffmann of Nancy Little Hoffmann, P.A., and Robert J. McFann of McFann and Beavers, P.A., Fort Lauder-dale, for appellants.
    E. Bruce Johnson and Scott D. Alexander of Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hochman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the final declaratory judgment determining that the Florida Municipal Insurance Trust (“FMIT”) agreement with its member, City of Plantation, provided excess insurance and not primary insurance for automobile accidents. Thus, it was not required to include uninsured motorist protection as part of its provisions. See § 627.727(2), Fla. Stat (2011). The insuring agreement was modified by a “Specific Excess Endorsement Self-Retention Members — Automobile Liability,” which provided for a retention limit of $200,000 by the member. The terms of the endorsement provided that the member would not only cover claims within that limit but would provide for its own defense of such matters, although it could contract with FMIT to provide a defense and reimburse it for its expense. This self-retained limit is not like a deductible but is in fact self-insurance to the extent of the retained limit of $200,000. Thus, it becomes the primary layer of exposure, with the FMIT policy providing excess coverage over the self-retained limit. As an excess policy, FMIT’s obligation under section 627.727(2), Florida Statutes (2011), was to offer UM coverage at the time the trust was initially created, which it did.

Affirmed.

WARNER, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.

      . For this reason, the reference in a footnote in Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 So.3d 734, 735 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), that a self-retained limit is comparable to a deductible, although merely dicta, is not a good comparison and certainly not accurate as applied to the policy in this case.


author: DAMOORGIAN, C.J.

text:
    John VERNETTI and Global Trustee Services, Inc., a Nevada Corporation, Appellants, v. AMERICA-INDIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, Kumar Rajagopalan, Joseph Archiprete, and Raghav L. Seth, Appellees.
    No. 4D14-2360.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.

      Mark F. Booth of Rogers, Morris & Ziegler LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    John F. O’Donnell, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees Kumar Rajagopalan, Joseph Ar-chiprete and American-Indian Enterprises, Inc.
   DAMOORGIAN, C.J.

John Vernetti and Global Trustee Services, Inc. (“Global Trustee”) appeal the trial court’s non-final order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a cross-claim filed by Appellees, America-Indian Enterprises, Inc. (“America-Indian”), Ku-mar Rajagopalan, and Joseph Archiprete. Vernetti and Global Trustee maintain that the cross-claim is arbitrable because it arose out of and is directly related to their agreement with Appellees. We agree and reverse.

By way of background, Global Trustee and America-Indian entered into a Specific Service Agreement (“the Agreement”) in August 2007. Rajagopalan and Arehiprete signed the Agreement as co-owners of America-Indian and Vernetti signed as president of Global Trustee. The Agreement authorized Global Trustee to provide pass-through consulting services to America-Indian and to disburse funds from a Bank of America Client Trust Account to America-Indian at America-Indian’s discretion. The Agreement contains the following arbitration clause:

4. DISPUTE: In the event of any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, the parties agree to resolve such dispute through binding arbitration to be held in the domicile of [Global Trustee], in accordance with the rules of the Arbitration Board in Las Vegas, Nevada. The prevailing party in such arbitration shall be entitled to recover its legal fees and costs, which shall be awarded by the arbitrator, whose award shall be final and binding.

In April 2013, Raghav Seth filed an action for damages against Vernetti, Global Trustee, and Appellees. The complaint alleged that Appellees induced Seth to invest $1,000,000 in a business venture involving the purchase and sale of gold. Seth advanced the funds to America-Indian pursuant to a promissory note. The funds were to be held in trust by Vernetti and Global Trustee. When Seth did not receive payment of the amounts due and owing under the note he initiated the underlying lawsuit, asserting claims for fraud in the inducement, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Florida and Federal RICO statutes. Appellees filed a cross-claim against Vernetti and Global Trustee for fraud, indemnity, and breach of fiduciary duty. Vernetti and Global Trustee moved to compel arbitration of the cross-claim based on the Dispute clause in the Agreement. The trial court denied their motion. This appeal follows.

We review an order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo. Ibis Lakes Homeowners Ass’n v. Ibis Isle Homeowners Ass’n, 102 So.3d 722, 727 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Best v. Educ. Affiliates, Inc., 82 So.3d 143, 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). “[T]here are three elements for courts to consider in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration of a given dispute: (1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived.” Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla.1999). This appeal only concerns the second element-whether the cross-claim is arbitrable.

A claim is arbitrable if, “‘at a minimum, [it] raise[s] some issue the resolution of which requires reference to or construction of some portion of the contract itself and there [is] some nexus between the claim and the contract containing the arbitration clause.” Kolsky v. Jackson Square, LLC, 28 So.3d 965, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (quoting Seifert, 750 So.2d at 638). “ ‘To determine whether a claim falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement, we must look beyond the legal cause of action and examine the factual allegations of the complaint.’ ” Florida Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Rentoumis, 950 So.2d 466, 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Singer v. Gaines, 896 So.2d 851, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)). Any doubt concerning the scope of an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Kolsky, 28 So.3d at 969 (citing Zager Plumbing, Inc. v. JPI Nat’l Constr., Inc., 785 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)).

In this case, the factual allegations in the cross-claim mirror the terms of the Agreement. Without directly referring to the Agreement, the cross-claim asserts that Global Trustee released funds from a Bank of America trust account established in August 2007 without America-Indian’s permission. The Agreement is dated August 6, 2007 and specifically established a Bank of America Client Trust Account for America-Indian’s benefit. Appellees cannot escape their agreement to arbitrate simply because they asserted claims for common law indemnity, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty instead of breach of contract. See Florida Envtl. Servs., Inc., 950 So.2d at 470. The cross-claim cannot be resolved without reference to the Agreement because the Agreement defines the duties Global Trustee owed to America-Indian. See Kolsky, 28 So.3d at 969. For these reasons, we conclude that the cross-claim is arbitrable. We reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an order granting the motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim.

Reversed and Remanded.

GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.

      . Raghav Seth is named as an appellee in the style of this case because he is the plaintiff in the underlying litigation that forms the basis for the cross-claim. However, he is not a party to this appeal and for the purposes of this opinion, the term "Appellees” only refers to America-Indian, Rajagopalan, and Archi-prete.


text:
    Shawn FRIEDMAN, Appellant, v. TEAM CHAMPIONSHIPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 4D13-379.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.
    Marlene S. Reiss of Marlene S. Reiss, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Scott A. Cole of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Kuehner v. Green, 436 So.2d 78 (Fla.1983); Black v. District Bd. of Trustees, 491 So.2d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., MAY and GROSS, JJ., concur.


text:
    RESTORATION I OF the TREASURE COAST, a/a/o Jay Dawley, Petitioner, v. FIRST PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a Frontline Homeowners Insurance, Respondent.
    No. 4D14-2614.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.

      Susan W. Fox of Fox & Loquasto, P.A., Orlando, and Bethany L. Schonsheck of Cohen Battisti, Winter Park, for petitioner.
    Keith E. Hope and Phillip J. Sheehe of Sheehe & Associates, P.A., Miami, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for second-tier certiorari review is granted. In affirming the county court’s dismissal of the action, the circuit court applied the “tipsy coachman” rule and reasoned that the petition should have been dismissed for failure to attach a copy of the insurance policy to the complaint as required under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.130(a). The circuit court’s opinion departs from the essential requirements of law and fails to apply the correct law because it does not provide that the dismissal in this situation should be with leave to amend. Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla.1973). The circuit court “should have remanded the cause with instructions that the complaint be dismissed with leave to amend so as to allow compliance with the rule.” Id. The plaintiff did not waive its right to amend as to this ground for dismissal. Accordingly, the petition is granted, and the circuit court’s opinion is quashed.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.


author: VAN NORTWICK, J.

text:
    Steven Lance CAINE, Appellant, v. Karen Annette CAINE, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-5517.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.

      James M. Levy, Stephens Law Firm, P.A., Destín, for Appellant.
    E. Jane Brehany, Pensacola, for Appel-lee.
   VAN NORTWICK, J.

Steven Lance Caine, the appellant and former husband, challenges several aspects of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage dissolving the union between him and Karen Annette Caine, the appellee and former wife. The appellant raises four issues on appeal. Because the trial court’s order did not reflect that it considered (i) the factors in section 61.077, Florida Statutes (2010) when it denied the appellant’s request for a set off of the amount of the fair rental value of the former marital home and (ii) evidence of the reasonable availability of insurance, the cost thereof, or appellant’s ability to pay before requiring that the husband maintain a $100,000 life insurance policy, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We affirm as to all other issues raised on appeal.

With respect to the granting of credits or setoffs relating to the sale of the marital home, section 61.077, Florida Statutes (2010), provides:

A party is not entitled to any credits or setoffs upon the sale of the marital home unless the parties’ settlement agreement, final judgment of dissolution of marriage, or final judgment equitably distributing assets or debts specifically provides that certain credits or setoffs are allowed or given at the time of the sale. In the absence of a settlement agreement involving the marital home, the court shall consider the following factors before determining the issue of credits or setoffs in its final judgment:
(1) Whether exclusive use and possession of the marital home is being awarded, and the basis for the award;
(2) Whether alimony is being awarded to the party in possession and whether the alimony is being awarded to cover, in part or otherwise, the mortgage and taxes and other expenses of and in connection with the marital home;
(3) Whether child support is being awarded to the party in possession and whether the child support is being awarded to cover, in part or otherwise, the mortgage and taxes and other expenses of and in connection with the marital home;
(4) The value to the party in possession of the use and occupancy of the marital home;
(5) The value of the loss of use and occupancy of the marital home to the party out of possession;
(6) Which party will be entitled to claim the mortgage interest payments, real property tax payments, and related payments in connection with the marital home as tax deductions for federal income tax purposes;
(7) Whether one or both parties will experience a capital gains taxable event as -a result of the sale of the marital home; and
(8) Any other factor necessary to bring about equity and justice between the parties.

The final judgment is silent concerning the former husband’s entitlement to a credit or setoff for half the rental value of the former wife’s exclusive use and possession of the marital home. The final judgment does state that “[a]ll proceeds from the sale of this residence shall be equally divided by the parties after accounting for the expenses allocated to each party as stated above.” (emphasis in original). The trial court also explained at the close of day three of the trial that it was electing not to charge the former wife for the fair rental value of her exclusive use and possession of the marital home because she would be solely responsible for the utilities from July 1, 2013, the other expenses were evenly split between the parties, and she was now paying half the costs associated with the parties’ yacht.

The statute is clear, however, that the eight factors enumerated in section 61.077 “shall be considered before determining the issue of credits or setoffs in [the] final judgment.” The record does not establish that the trial court considered those factors in the context of the credit/setoff issue, requiring remand for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court should specifically address the factors enumerated in section 61.077 and determine whether the former husband is entitled to a credit or setoff regarding the marital home.

Additionally, while section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (2010), authorizes a trial court to “order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy ... [to] secure such alimony award,” in Payton v. Payton, 109 So.3d 280, 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), we reversed and remanded the portion of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that ordered a husband to maintain a $50,000 life insurance policy to secure a support obligation where “no evidence was adduced regarding the reasonable availability of life insurance, the cost thereof, or his ability to pay.” See also Winney v. Winney, 979 So.2d 396, 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“A trial court may not order a party to obtain life insurance without making factual findings regarding the necessity of such coverage. Such findings must reflect consideration of the cost and availability of such insurance.”) (citations omitted).

Here, the record contains no evidence as to the availability, cost, or the former husband’s ability to pay for life insurance. We are constrained by our. precedent to reverse the portion of the final judgment requiring the former husband to maintain life insurance and remand to allow the trial court to make the necessary findings. See Payton, 109 So.3d at 283; see also Winney, 979 So.2d at 400.

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court may reconsider the equitable distribution, as well as the child support and alimony awards, if necessitated by the final disposition of the credit/setoff and life insurance issues.

CLARK and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Edward WILSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-0907.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 18, 2014.
    Edward Wilson, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

LEWIS, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and ROWE, JJ., concur..


text:
    Thomas Larry BOLDS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-5400.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 18, 2014.
    Thomas Larry Bolds, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

LEWIS, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and ROWE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael TOPEL, Appellant, v. Reem TOPEL, Appellee.
    Nos. 5D14-0742, 5D14-0827, 5D14-0829, 5D14-0830.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.
    Sherri K. Dewitt, of Dewitt Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Marcia K. Lippincott, of Marcia K. Lip-pincott, P.A., Lake Mary, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this action for child support and spousal support unconnected with dissolution, the husband timely appeals from four non-final, appealable orders: (1) granting the wife’s motion for temporary alimony and child support and retroactive alimony and child support; (2) finding the husband in contempt; (3) garnishing the husband’s thrift savings plan; and (4) withholding income for support. Although most of the husband’s arguments were not preserved for review, he did preserve one meritorious argument: that the amount of temporary support awarded appears to exceed his ability to pay. This error appears to be attributable, at least in part, to the trial judge’s reliance on an income figure for the husband that was contrary to the husband’s uncontroverted evidence regarding his then-current income. See Breitenbach v. Breitenbach, 838 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that although trial judges have broad discretion in setting temporary alimony awards, any such award must be supported by competent, substantial evidence that demonstrates the need for support and the paying spouse’s ability to pay). The trial judge appears to have compounded the error by using a gross income figure for the husband. See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 116 So.3d 473, 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“The ability to pay alimony should be based on the party’s net income.”). As we did in Clore v. Clore, 115 So.3d 1100, 1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), we “vacate the current temporary relief order and remand for [hjusband to make full and current disclosure of his income and expenses, for the trial court to re-evaluate temporary support in light of better information and to enter a new order.” We also reverse the contempt order and income withholding order, which were entered in reliance on the temporary custody and child support order. We affirm the retroactive alimony and retroactive child support awards in all respects.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.

TORPY, C.J., LAWSON and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.

      . The husband separately appealed each order in case numbers 14-742, 14-827, 14-829, and 14-830. This court has jurisdiction to review non-final orders awarding immediate monetary relief. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii). This court consolidated the four appeals under case number 14-742.


author: WALLIS, J.

text:
    Roy GOINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-1518.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.
    Roy Goins, Lake City, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Marjorie Vincent-Tripp and Pamela J. Roller, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   WALLIS, J.

Appellant appeals the summary denial of his amended motion for postconviction relief after he pleaded guilty to the felony of driving under the influence, fourth or subsequent offense. Appellant argued that his plea agreement for his fourth DUI and resulting sentence of five years’ incarceration should be set aside because his trial counsel failed to investigate and determine that Appellant was not offered counsel for his 1985 DUI conviction. Appellant contends that his 1985 DUI could not be used as a predicate to enhance the charge for his fourth DUI in this case to a felony because the 1985 DUI was uncounseled. The State correctly concedes that under Kelly v. State, 999 So.2d 1029, 1053 n. 20 (Fla.2008), a prior misdemeanor conviction in which a defendant is unrepresented due to a denial of counsel cannot be used as a later statutory enhancer. The State correctly concedes that the order denying the postconviction motion should be reversed and the case remanded for the lower court to (1) attach documents showing Appellant waived a right to counsel in the 1985 DUI conviction, (2) attach documents refuting Appellant’s claim that he did not have counsel, or (3) hold an evidentiary hearing. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED with DIRECTIONS.

EVANDER and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Alfonso ALZAMORA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-1888.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.
    Alfonso Alzamora, Milton, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Alfonso Alzamora appeals the order denying the motion he filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the trial court failed to address the claim regarding jail credit, we reverse that part of the order and remand this case so the trial court may properly consider that claim. We note that the State concedes this error. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.

SAWAYA, PALMER, and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    James ELYSEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-1940.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.
    James Elysee, Milton, pro se.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant .Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

James Elysee appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm the denial of Grounds Two, Three, and Five without further discussion. However, because the allegations contained within Grounds One and Four are not conclusively refuted by the record, we reverse the summary denial of those grounds and remand for attachment of record excerpts conclusively refuting those claims or for an evidentiary hearing. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000) (“[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.”).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

ORFINGER, BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Timothy Leon GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-2438.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.
    Timothy Leon Green, Lake Butler, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Timothy Leon Green (defendant) appeals the order entered by the trial court summarily denying his motion for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We find no error in the trial court’s denial of the grounds raised in the defendant’s original post-conviction motion and its denial, as untimely, of the defendant’s second supplement to that motion. However, the defendant’s first supplement to his original motion was timely filed, but the trial court failed to address the grounds raised therein. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the original motion and the second-supplemental motion, but reverse for the trial court’s consideration of the grounds raised in the defendant’s first-supplemental motion.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

PALMER, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


author: PER CIRIAM.

text:
    Conley Leo EVANS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D14-3262.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.

      Conley Leo Evans, Clermont, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CIRIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from Petitioner’s October 25, 2013 amended judgment and resen-tence in Case No. 05-2010-CF-028025-AX in the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

SAWAYA, WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dennis LEWIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D14-3441.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.
    Dennis Lewis, Wewahitchka, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from Petitioner’s July 30, 2014 judgment and sentence in Case No. 2013-CF-010886-A-OR in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER, ORFINGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael Lashawn CUMMINGS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
    No. 5D14-4198.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.
    A. Michael Bross, of Bross, Bross, Thomas, & Savy, LLC, West Melbourne, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence, in Case No. 05-2012-CF-56994-A-X, in the Circuit Court in and for Bre-vard County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

TORPY, C.J., BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Brandon X. STARLING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-3900.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 23, 2014.
    Jeffrey E. Lewis, General Counsel, and Melissa Joy Ford, Assistant Regional Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kristen Lynn Bonjour, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Branden Starling appeals his conviction for robbery with a weapon on the basis of a'legally inconsistent guilty verdict. We agree and conclude that his conviction must be reduced to simple robbery.

There is little question that the jury’s verdict in this case was inconsistent on its face. The jury found Appellant guilty of robbery with a firearm, but made a separate finding that Appellant did not “actually possess a firearm” during the commission of the offense. Recognizing the verdict’s inconsistency, the trial court reduced Appellant’s conviction to the lesser included offense of robbery with a weapon. This inclination to reduce the offense was correct. The problem is, however, that the only weapon referenced in the record as being involved in the crime was the firearm allegedly wielded by Appellant, which the jury affirmatively concluded Appellant did not possess. We cannot reconcile Appellant’s reduced conviction for robbery with a weapon with the jury’s specific finding that he did not possess the only weapon referenced in the record.

Circumstances like this one raise a “true” inconsistent verdict which may not be excused under the general rule permitting inconsistent verdicts. See Gerald v. State, 132 So.3d 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Nettles v. State, 112 So.3d 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Thus, we remand this case to the trial court to reduce Appellant’s conviction from robbery with a weapon to simple robbery and for resentencing.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

WOLF, ROWE, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gary NALEPA, Appellant, v. CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE, et. al., Appellee.
    No. 3D12-2810.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 31, 2014.
    Schuler, Halvorson, Weisser & Zoeller, P.A., Jason D. Weisser and David M. Ker-ner (West Palm Beach); Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., Andrew A. Harris and Bard D. Rockenbach (West Palm Beach), for appellant.
    Weiss Serota Helfman Cole Bierman & Popok, P.L., Edward G. Guedes, Laura K. Wendell, Kelly'Rains Jesson, Michael Po-pok and Samuel I. Zeskind, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LOGUE, JJ.
   ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

PER CURIAM.

Based upon appellee’s confession of error, and in light of Masone v. City of Aventura, 147 So.3d 192 (Fla.2014), we reverse the final judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sherrod BRUMFIELD.
    No. 2013-KP-2390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

| (Writ granted in part; denied in part. The state seeks review of the Fourth Circuit’s order upholding the trial court’s denial of its procedural objections to the application for post-conviction relief filed by respondent in 2012 collaterally attacking six convictions by way of guilty pleas entered on the same day in 1999. State v. Brumfield, 13-K-0765 (La.App. 4 Cir.9/17/13) (Lombard, McKay, JJ., Bonin, J., dissenting).

Following this Court’s decision in State v. Brumfield, 09-1084 (La.9/2/09), 16 So.3d 1161, which held that respondent’s window of opportunity for attacking his 1999 guilty plea on one count of armed robbery, supporting his habitual offender sentence, on a conflict-of-interest claim had closed by virtue of the time limits imposed by La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A), the trial court granted a motion by respondent in 2011 and imposed sentence for the first time on the five remaining convictions dating from the 1999 plea proceeding. The court ran all of the sentencing concurrently with the habitual offender sentence on the remaining count of armed robbery, with the net effect that respondent’s overall term of imprisonment did not change. 12The state did not seek review at that time. In 2012, the trial court then resentenced respondent on the remaining armed robbery count by expressly vacating the original sentence imposed on that count and re-imposing the same habitual offender sentence. Respondent thereafter filed another application for post-conviction relief challenging all six of his convictions on the basis of his conflict-of-interest claim. The state filed procedural objections on grounds that the application was time-barred as to all counts and repetitive. The trial court denied the objections on grounds that sentencing in 2011 on five of the six counts, and resen-tencing in 2012 on the remaining count, provided respondent with new two-year time periods for collaterally attacking all of his convictions. The court found that the 2012 application was therefore timely, but refrained from reaching the merits to give the state the opportunity to seek review.

The court of appeal denied relief. Finding that it was “undisputed that the defendant’s post-conviction time period has not prescribed with regard to five of the six counts,” and that it was “faced with the potential disconcerting situation where it finds that the defendant’s constitutional procedural due process rights were egregiously violated but, even though the same constitutionally infirm process underlies all counts (and, concomitantly, sentences), relief can be granted only as to five of the six counts,” a majority on the panel found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the state’s procedural objections as to all six counts. Judge Bonin dissented from that order on grounds that our prior decision in Brumfield foreclosed the issue of timeliness altogether.

The court of appeal erred to the extent that it upheld the trial court’s denial of the state’s procedural objections as to the count of armed robbery | scarrying respondent’s habitual offender sentence. Pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 and State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189, respondent is barred from seeking post-conviction relief as to that conviction and sentence. The post-conviction time limitations period did not begin to run anew when the district court vacated the habitual offender sentence originally imposed in 1999 and resentenced respondent in 2012 to the same term. See e.g., State ex rel. Rushing v. Whitley, 93-2722 (La.11/13/95), 662 So.2d 464 (“Resen-tencing alone does not restart the ... time period for applying for post-conviction relief.”). As noted in our prior decision, respondent’s window of opportunity for collaterally attacking the one armed robbery conviction supporting the habitual offender sentence had fully closed by the time respondent filed his first application in 2008 asserting a conflict-of-interest “based on facts known to him at the time he entered his guilty pleas,” and not “otherwise falling] within any of the exceptions to the time limit enumerated in art. 930.8.” Brumfield, 09-1084 at 2, 16 So.3d at 1162. That window did not reopen when the trial court corrected its error in 1999 by finally imposing sentence on the remaining counts in 2011, without objection by the state, and thereby gave respondent an opportunity to collaterally attack those convictions. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) (no application for post-conviction relief may be considered if filed more than two years “after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final”) (emphasis added). One consequence of the time limits imposed by the legislature in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A), as underscored by our prior decision, Brumfield, 09-1084 at 2, 16 So.3d at 1162, is that constitutional claims on the merits may be foreclosed simply by the passage of time.

|4The trial court’s denial of the state’s procedural objections to respondent’s application for post-conviction relief as it relates to the conviction for armed robbery supporting the habitual offender adjudication and sentence is therefore reversed. The claim as to that conviction is time-barred. In all other respects, however, the state’s application in this Court is denied.


text:
    Melinda Gregoire RODRIGUEZ v. DOLGENCORP, LLC, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

|, Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging she was injured when she “attempted to thread her way through a maze” of shopping carts, and her left foot came in contact with a shopping cart wheel, which caused her to step back and fall. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff was unable to establish presence of the shopping cart in the parking area presented an unreasonably dangerous condition. In support, defendant relied on plaintiffs deposition in which she admitted to seeing the shopping cart which caused her fall.

The district court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeal denied supervisory review. This application followed.

Courts have recognized that the mere presence of obstacles in a store, such as shopping carts, does not create an unreasonable risk of harm when the condition is' open and obvious. See Russell v. Morgan’s Bestway of Louisiana, LLC, 47,914 at p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/10/18), 113 So.3d 448, 453 (holding “[ejven though there were multiple stocking carts involved, we find this situation so open and obvious that [the plaintiff] was able to observe the carts and easily avoid any risk of harm”). In the instant case, defendant established plaintiff was aware of the presence of the shopping cart and could have avoided any harm through the exercise of ordinary care. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence (by affidavit, deposition, discovery response, or other form sanctioned by La.Code Civ. P. arts. 966 and 967) to demonstrate that she would be able to meet her burden at trial to show a 12duty on the part of defendant. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence showing she could meet her burden at trial. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of defendant is mandated. See Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 14-0288 (La.10/15/14), — So.3d-.

Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant.


text:
    Audrey ALLEMORE, Wife of/and Floyd Allemore, Jr. v. CAMELLIA HOSPICE OF LOUISIANA, L.L.C., Home Health Care of Bogalusa, Inc., d/b/a Camellia Home Health & Hospice, and Vincent H. Mancuso, Jr.
    No. 2014-C-1789.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Allemore Jr., Floyd; Allemore, Audrey et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2008-15960; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2018 CA 1600.

11Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant and assigns reasons.

KNOLL, J., would grant for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice JOHNSON.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant the writ application.

hi find this tort action against a physical therapist is not governed by the Medical Malpractice Act. I would allow Plaintiffs’ expert physical.therapist to testify. Finding genuine issues of material fact remain, I would grant the writ application and reverse the rulings of the lower courts and deny the motion for summary judgment.


text:
    In re Gilbert E. STAMPLEY.
    No. 2014-B-2314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY ' PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

liOn December 6, 2013, we accepted a petition for consent discipline and suspended respondent; Gilbert E. Stampley, for a period of eighteen months, with all but one year deferred, subject to his successful completion of a one-year period of unsupervised probation. In re: Stampley, 13-2604 (La.12/6/13), 129 So.3d 527 (“Stampley I”). In the instant matter, respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) jointly seek to make the deferred portion of the Stampley I suspension exec-utory, based upon new violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by respondent. Specifically, after the effective date of respondent’s suspension, he acknowledges that he appeared in open court on behalf of a client, prepared and filed legal pleadings on the client’s behalf, notarized documents for the client, and gave her legal advice.

We agree that these facts reflect new violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by respondent which would support the imposition of the deferred portion of the eighteen-month suspension we imposed on December 6, 2013. Accordingly, we will make the previously deferred portion of respondent’s suspension immediately executory.

IgDECREE

For the reasons assigned, the previously deferred portion of the eighteen-month suspension imposed in In re: Stampley, 13-2604 (La.12/6/13), 129 So.3d 527, is hereby made immediately executory. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent, Gilbert E. Stampley, Louisiana Bar Roll number 12392, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid,

      . The record in Stampley I reflected that respondent was the subject of multiple complaints involving allegations that he neglected his clients' legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to timely account for fees, and improperly attempted to settle his liability for malpractice.

      . Respondent acknowledges in the petition that “this submission does not reflect final discipline in the matter.”


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frederick JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Frederick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 32-564.

Denied. See State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, cert. denied, Tate v. Louisiana, — U.S.—, 134 S.Ct. 2663, 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014).

JOHNSON, C.J., JOHNSON, C.J. would grant.

In State v. Tate, 2012-2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, this court held that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), does not retroactively apply to juvenile offenders whose life sentences were handed down before the Supreme Court issued its opinion. In my view, Miller announced a new rule of criminal procedure that is substantive, and consequently should apply retroactively.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Fard A. DICKERSON.
    No. 2014-KO-0908.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 4, 2014.
   In re Dickerson, Fard A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 505-789; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0209.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kendall SMITH.
    No. 2014-CP-1766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 7, 2014.
   In re Smith, Kendall; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 127272 & 120554; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00313.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.

HUGHES, J., would consider the merits.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmie Darnell DIXON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Dixon, Jimmie Darnell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 09-06-1058; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1679.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Scott LAURENT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0552.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Laurent, Scott; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 382629; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1837.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terrance KNOX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0555.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Knox, Terrance; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 374-563; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0149.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin KYLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Kyle, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 148,551; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 14-00159.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Felton D. LAGARDE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0560.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Lagarde, Felton D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 04-7083; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-1012.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick PIERRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Pierre, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Civ. H, No. 06-97-0846; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW1802.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Almer RANDLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0573.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Randle, Aimer; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 21,606.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Errol FALCON, Jr.
    No. 2014-KO-0769.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Falcon Jr., Errol; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 09-722; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-849.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bernard W. NOBLE.
    No. 2014-K-0795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Noble, Bernard; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 501-594; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-1109.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of R.B.
    No. 2014-CK-0806.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2013-316-05-DQ-F; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0045.

Denied.

KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tanislla THOMAS.
    No. 2014-K-0807.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 481-576; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0816.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Errol FARRAR.
    No. 2014-KO-0868.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Farrar, Errol; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 474320; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1635.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, v. Norman LIGHTFOOT.
    No. 2014-KO-0873.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Lightfoot, Norman; — Defendant; Applying For Writ .of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 05-10-0868; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1408.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Martha A. OLIVIA.
    No. 2014-K-0884.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Olivia, Martha A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 464-740; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0496.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Francis X. ROSS, Jr.
    No. 2014-K-0886.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 512-141; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0500.

Denied.


text:
    Hazel Richard SAVOIE, et al. v. Alice T. RICHARD, et al.
    No. 2014-C-1283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Savoie, Hazel Richard et al.; Sa-voie, Kevin Troy; Savoie, Richard Michael; — Plaintiff (s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-18078; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CA 13-1370, CW 13-1422.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would grant and docket.


text:
    Hazel Richard SAVOIE, et al. v. Alice T. RICHARD, et al.
    No. 2014-C-1287.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Shell Oil Company; SWEPI LP;— Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-18078; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CA 13-1370, CW 13-1422.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rodricus CRAWFORD.
    No. 2014-OK-1454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Crawford, Rodricus; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 304048.

Denied.


text:
    Peggy EDWARDS v. PLANT WORKS, et al.
    No. 2014-C-1776.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; Plant Works; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 4, No. 13-02553; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1112.

Denied.


text:
    Robert J. NOLAN, II v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-C-1795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Nolan II, Robert J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. C614070; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 2140.

Denied.


text:
    Kelly B. STEELE and Stephen J. Williams v. FERRY HOLDINGS, LLC, Ferry Holding Corporation, Platinum Equity Advisors, LLC, International Offshore Services, LLC, International Marine, LLC, International Construction Group, LLC, International Pipeliner, LLC, and Richard Currence, Jr.
    No. 2014-C-1798.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Currence Jr., Richard; Ferry Holding, LLC,; International Construction Group, LLC; International Marine, LLC; International Offshore Services, LLC; International Pipeliner, LLC; Platinum Equipment, LLC; Platinum Equity Advis-ors, LLC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 621597; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CA 0081.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Kelly B. STEELE and Stephen J. Williams v. FERRY HOLDINGS, LLC, Ferry Holding Corporation, Platinum Equity Advisors, LLC, Platinum Equipment, LLC, International Offshore Services, LLC, International Marine, LLC, International Construction Group, LLC, International Pipeliner, LLC, and Richard Currence, Jr.
    No. 2014-C-1799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Currence Jr., Richard; Ferry Holding Corporation; Ferry Holdings LLC; International Construction Group LLC; International Marine LLC; International Offshore Services LLC; International Pipeliner LLC; Platinum Equipment LLC; Platinum Equity Advisors LLC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 621597; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1933.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Linda Atkins GRAY v. James GRAY.
    No. 2014-C-1804.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Nelson Sr., Otha Curtis; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Helena, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 19121; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1953.

Denied.


text:
    Sallye B. STEWART v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1808.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Stewart, Sallye B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 141358; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit,.No. 2014 CW 0297.

Denied.


text:
    Marilyn CLARK v. STATE of Louisiana, et al. Elwood Sonnier v. The Unopened Succession of Lacy N. Johnson, et al. Gaynelwyn Sonnier v. State of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1841.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C-2007-188 C/W C-2007-186 C/W C-2007-190; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00546.

Denied.


text:
    Barry MUSEMECHE v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL SYSTEM, Nichole Bourgeois, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Principal of Parkway High School and Bossier City, Louisiana, d/b/a the Bossier City Police Department.
    No. 2014-CC-1842.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Bossier Parish School Board; Bossier Parish School System; Nichole Bourgeois, individually and in her official capacity as Principal of Parkway High School;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 617210; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0666.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Phyllis B. CREEL v. UNITED FIRE & INDEMNITY COMPANY and the Haydel Chiropractic Clinic.
    No. 2014-CC-1846.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Creel, Phyllis B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 165740; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0837.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darcallis D. COLLINS.
    No. 2014-KK-1847.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Collins, Darcallis D.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 519-222; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0732.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leon JACKSON.
    No. 2014-KK-1848.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Jackson, Leon; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 13-1959; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-K-363.

Denied.


text:
    Rosemalia ROBERTINEAU v. WINN-DIXIE MONTGOMERY, L.L.C.
    No. 2014-CC-1871.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Winn-Dixie Montgomery L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2013-4155; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0561.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Robert C. ESTELLE v. Curt EYSINKI, Executive Director, Louisiana Workforce Commission.
    No. 2014-C-1879.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Estelle, Robert C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District •Court Div. D, No. 12-8630; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-CA-0108.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Reuben WILLIAMS v. The THREE GIRLS, L.L.C., Humphrey Manlift Company, Inc., and R & R Rig Service, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-1881.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Hyman-Moses Properties L.L.C.; Kornfeld Properties L.L.C.; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2011-3750; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1589.

Denied.


text:
    Mary Ann HOLMES v. LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF NURSING.
    No. 2014-C-1886.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Holmes, Mary Ann; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Board of Nursing, No. RN 131267; 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No.. 616,984; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 2154.

Denied.


text:
    In re MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL on behalf of Dorothy RACHAL.
    No. 2014-C-1887.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Rachal, Dorothy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 561,974A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-984-CA.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    SIMMONS, MORRIS & CARROLL, LLC v. CAPITAL ONE, N.A. and Tonya Lambert.
    No. 2014-C-1900.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Simmons, Morris & Carroll, L.L.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 557,134; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,005-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., recused.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Linda WILLIAMS v. Joey WILLIAMS. State of Louisiana v. Lester Joseph Williams, II.
    No. 2014-CC-2146.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Williams II, Lester Joseph; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 2007-1107 C/W 2010-6765; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00886.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Anthony JONES, Sr. v. MAC-RE, LLC, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-2195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re MAC-RE, L.L.C. d/b/a Plantation Place Apartments; Scottsdale Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2013-9125-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00782.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael HEINE.
    No. 2014-KP-2297.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   In re Michael Heine; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 10-2269; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-KH-629.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    Lloyd J. DANIEL v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2014-CC-2403.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2014.
   In re Lloyd J. Daniel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 731-371; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-C-876.

Stay denied; writ denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Damien Eric CLARK.
    No. 2014-K-2313.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 20, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 198,253, 198,254; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,167-KA C/W 49,168-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Danny KELLY v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY.
    No. 2014-CQ-1921.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; — Other; Applying For Certified Question United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 12-31064.

Certification granted.


text:
    Rhonda DANOS, et al. v. BOH BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO., LLC, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Rhonda Danos as curatrix for the interdict, Ronald Martin: — Plaintiff; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated February 7, 2014; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C; Nos. 2010-03184, 2010-03451; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1356.

Rehearing denied.

JOHNSON. C.J., and KNOLL. J., would grant.


text:
    Rhonda DANOS, et al. v. BOH BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO., LLC, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Brandy Martin o/b/o Ronald Martin, III and Damon Martin; — Plaintiffs; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated February 7, 2014; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C; Nos. 2010-03184, 2010-03451; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1356.

Rehearing denied.

JOHNSON. C.J., and KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnny R. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2014-KP-0019.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 06-F-2694; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-023-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thaddeus K. FRITH.
    No. 2014-KP-0026.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Frith, Thaddeus K.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 479-737; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No.- 2013-KH-1225.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stephen Ross PROCTOR.
    No. 2014-KP-0057.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Proctor, Stephen Ross; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 41124; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 13-00935.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lee M. BROWN.
    No. 2014-KP-0108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Brown, Lee M.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 7013119; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1458.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael Wayne COLLINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Collins, Michael Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 295345; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-01281.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Fate Vincent WINSLOW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0509.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Winslow, Fate Vincent; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 271,588; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 49,-154-KH, 49,222-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lamont LYLES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0510.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Lyles, Lamont; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 145919, 11-186242; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1599.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clarence SMITH Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0525.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Smith, Jr., Clarence; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 09-F-0979; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,106-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert GRAHAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0530.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Graham, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 22,984.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leslie Kyle ADAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0531.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Adams, Leslie Kyle; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 12191-79.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Louis PRESTON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Preston Jr., Louis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 366755; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1751.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2014.
   In re Jackson, Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 162069; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-01125.

Denied.


text:
    Kimberly SPILLMAN v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA and City of Baker School Board.
    No. 2014-CC-2444.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2014.
   In re Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 620,614; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 1474.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    Robert E. RUEL, III, et al. v. Sally Pulver Ruel DALESANDRO, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-2065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Miles, Mary Kilp; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 727-836; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-C-518.

Granted in part. The exception of no cause of action is granted. The case is remanded to the district court to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their petition. See Owen v. Owen, 336 So.2d 782, 786-87 (La.1976); Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-0612 (La.3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211. In all other respects, the application is denied.


text:
    Joycelyn M. WILLIAMS, et al. v. The ADMINISTRATORS OF the TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-2137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Ahmed M.D., Raziuddin; Mikulla M.D., Brian Joseph; Ragland M.D., Patrick; The Administrators of The Tulane Educational Fund, Inc., d/b/a Tulane University School of Medicine; Vansant M.D., Janine Tracy; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or ■ Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 13-1952; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0860.

Granted. The judgment of the district court granting plaintiffs’ motion for new trial is reversed.. The judgment granting relators’ exception of prescription is reinstated. See La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis A. KEIL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0572.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Keil, Curtis A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 101008; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1976.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    Ronnie M. LYLES v. PHELPS CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al.
    No. 2014-CP-2076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Lyles, Ronnie M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C-2009-0661; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00744.

Not considered; not timely filed. See State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La.3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; Morris v. Stueben, 01-0137 (La.3/16/01), 781 So.2d 1220.

HUGHES, J., would grant to consider the merits.


text:
    Jessi DALE v. STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT; State of Louisiana, through its Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police; Sid Gautreaux, III, as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish and Greg Phares, as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish.
    No. 2014-CC-2119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Dale, Jessi; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 595,598; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 1280.

Not considered; not timely filed. Although Columbus Day is a legal holiday pursuant to La. R.S. 1:55(A)(1), it is not one of the specific enumerated holidays which are listed as legal holidays in La. R.S. 1:55(E)(3) for purposes of the calculation of time delays under La.Code Civ. P. art. 5059. See Hooper v. Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 13-2433 (La.1/27/14), 130 So.3d 954.

HUGHES, J., would consider the merits.


text:
    Gene and Mary WILKERSON as the Natural Parents of the Deceased, Katie Scarlette Wilkerson v. Eric Joseph BURAS and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CP-2138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Buras, et al., Eric Joseph; — Defendant; Applying .For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2006-15699; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1328.

Not considered; not timely filed. Although Columbus Day is a legal holiday pursuant to La. R.S. 1:55(A)(1), it is not one of the specific enumerated holidays which are listed as legal holidays in La. R.S. 1:55(E)(3) for purposes of the calculation of time delays under La. Code Civ. P. art. 5059. See Hooper v. Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 13-2433 (La.1/27/14), 130 So.3d 954.

HUGHES, J., would consider the merits.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF McKinley HOUSTON.
    No. 2014-CC-2144.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Houston, Michael; Houston, Steve; — Other(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of De-soto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 74746; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49651-CW.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).

HUGHES, J., would consider the merits.


text:
    Kenneth Wayne HUGES v. Teresa Lynn TALTON.
    No. 2014-CJ-2402.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Teresa Lynn Taitón; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 574-394; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-CA-17.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Quroy JOHNSON.
    No. 2014-KO-0254.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Quroy; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 1003073; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0372.

Denied.'


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Willis PITTMAN, Jr.
    No. 2014-KP-0266.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Pittman, Jr., John Willis; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 1999-157363; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW1886.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry L. CHILDS.
    No. 2014-K-0312.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 514-568; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0948.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Curtis A. KEIL.
    No. 2014-K-0353.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Keil, Curtis A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 101008; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1976.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leonardo R. GERMAN.
    No. 2014-KO-0396.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re German, Leonardo R.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 09-2202-1; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1293.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nakeith C. SPARKMAN.
    No. 2014-KO-0477.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Sparkman, Nakeith C.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 11-5998; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-640.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy L. ESTEP.
    No. 2014-KO-0579.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Estep, Roy L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 465865; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0627.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dwayne M. JONES, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0589.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Jones Sr., Dwayne M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal .Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, Nos. 10-1821, 11-827; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-01309.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0594.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Wilson, David; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 114926;- to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1794.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art., 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P.art. 351.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joshua Ford REED v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0602.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Reed, Joshua Ford; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 460214-2; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 1539.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would transfer the application to the district court for post-conviction relief consideration.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vidale G. TASBY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0608.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Tasby, Vidale G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 156,720; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-114-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

VICTORY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Maurice J. ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Anderson, Maurice J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court, Nos. 1202751, 103644; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1363.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie POGUE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0623.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Pogue, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 991610; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1878.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Calvin R. AUTHIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0624.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Authier, Calvin R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-CR-020183; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,206-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terrance Wayne Luke v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0629.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Luke, Terrance Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Winn, 8th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 39016; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,112-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(D); La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry G. DAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0641.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Day, Terry G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th' Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 154,963; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-01293.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Letrakus TYLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Tyler, Letrakus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 124350; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-01314.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James W. MARTIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Martin, James W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 478933; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1814.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard McGee v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0770.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re McGee, Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 04-364; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-KH-187.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eugene LAW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0774.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Law, Eugene; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 270,965; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,268-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shannon Lamar DENNIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0775.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Dennis, Shannon Lamar; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 273,475; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-231-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Glen Dale NELSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0776.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Nelson, Glen Dale; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-F-3081; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-193-KH.

Denied.

CLARK, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Reginald W. PAYNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0777.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Payne, Reginald W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 514-148; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0224.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sherman D. SHARP.
    No. 2014-K-0925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Sharp, Sherman D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 96665; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 13-1123.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Wesley BILLIOT.
    No. 2014-K-0935.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Billiot, John Wesley; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 35370-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1189.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Wesley BILLIOT.
    No. 2014-K-0936.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Billiot, John Wesley; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 07619-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1188.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Wesley BILLIOT.
    No. 2014-K-0937.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Billiot, John Wesley; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 07597-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1187.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Wesley BILLIOT.
    No. 2014-K-0948.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Billiot, John Wesley; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 35370-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1189.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Wesley BILLIOT.
    No. 2014-KO-0949.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Billiot, John Wesley; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 07619-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1188.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Wesley BILLIOT.
    No. 2014-KO-0950.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Billiot, John Wesley; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 07597-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1189.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marlon Jermaine WELLS.
    No. 2014-KO-0951.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Wells, Marlon Jermaine; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 513343; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1418.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Norman DEAN.
    No. 2014-KO-0961.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 2014.
   In re Dean, Norman; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 11-3710; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-885.

Denied.