author: CLARK, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the INTEREST of J.M. State of Louisiana in the Interest of J.M.
    Nos. 2013-CK-1717, 2013-KA-1772.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 2014.

      Public Defender’s Office, 19th Judicial District, Mark David Plaisance, Baker, LA, Michael Anthony Mitchell, Jack Pascal Harrison, for Applicant (No. 2013-CK-1717).
    Department of Justice, State of Louisiana, James D. Caldwell, Attorney, Colin Andrew Clark, Jessica Thornhill, Assistant Attorneys General, District Attorney’s Office, East Baton Rouge Parish, Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney, April N. Williams, Assistant District Attorney, for Respondent (No. 2013-CK-1717).
    Department of Justice, State of Louisiana, James D. Caldwell, Attorney, Colin Andrew Clark, Jessica Thornhill, Assistant Attorneys General, District Attorney’s Office, East Baton Rouge Parish, Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney, April N. Williams, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellant (No. 2013-CK-1772).

      Public Defender’s Office, 19th Judicial District, Mark David Plaisance, Baker, LA, Michael Anthony Mitchell, Jack Pascal Harrison, for Appellee (No. 2013-CK-1772).
   CLARK, Justice.

|tA juvenile in a delinquency proceeding argued the criminal statutes regarding the intentional concealment of a weapon, La. R.S. 14:95(A), and the possession of a handgun by a juvenile, La. R.S. 14:95.8, fail to meet the requirement of strict scrutiny under the state constitutional provision securing the right to keep and bear arms. The juvenile court declared La. R.S. 14:95(A) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, and found a portion of La. R.S. 14:95.8 should be severed from the statute. Upon review, we find the juvenile court was wrong in both of its rulings. For the reasons that follow, we hold both criminal statutes are constitutional and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Before its recent amendment, La. Const, art. I, § 11 provided: “The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person.” Pursuant to Acts 2012, No. 874, § 1, a proposal to amend this |2provision of the state constitution was submitted to the electors of the state of Louisiana, and was ratified by them in a statewide election held on November 6, 2012. Effective December 10, 2012, La. Const, art. I, § 11 now provides: “The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction of this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny.” See State v. Draughter, 2013-0914, p. 7-8 (La.12/10/13), 130 So.3d 855, 2013 WL 6474419.

According to the state, six days after the effective date of this new state constitutional provision, on December 16, 2012, the juvenile, J.M., knowingly possessed a handgun on his person, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.8, and intentionally concealed a weapon on his person, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95(A). Based on these alleged delinquent acts, the state sought to have J.M. adjudged delinquent and filed a petition for the adjudication of delinquency in the juvenile court for East Baton Rouge Parish.

La. R.S. 14:95.8 prohibits the possession of a handgun by a juvenile except under certain exceptions. Subsection A of the statute provides: “It is unlawful for any person who has not attained the age of seventeen years knowingly to possess any handgun on his person. Any person possessing any handgun in violation of this Section commits the offense of illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile.” Subsection B of the statute describes the penalties for a first, second, third or subsequent conviction, and the enhanced penalties for a juvenile offender previously adjudged delinquent for a crime of violence. Subsection C describes seven exceptions under which circumstances the prohibition of possessing a handgun will not apply to a juvenile, as follows:

(1) Attending a hunter’s safety course or a firearms safety course;
(2) Engaging in practice in the use of a firearm or target shooting at an established range;
(3) Hunting or trapping pursuant to a valid license issued to him pursuant to the laws of this state;
h(4) Traveling to or from any activity described in Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this Subsection while in possession of an unloaded gun;
(5) On real property with the permission of his parent or legal guardian and with the permission of the owner or lessee of the property;
(6) At' such person’s residence and who, with the permission of such person’s parent or legal guardian, possesses a handgun; and
(7) Possessing a handgun with the written permission of such person’s parent or legal guardian; provided that such person carries on his person a copy of such written permission.

Subsection D defines what is meant by the term “handgun.”

La. R.S. 14:95(A) prohibits the illegal carrying of a weapon. Considering the state’s allegations, the only provision of that statute applicable in this case is La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1), which prohibits: “The intentional concealment of any firearm, or other instrumentality customarily used or intended for probable use as a dangerous weapon, on one’s person.”

Counsel for J.M. filed motions to declare both statutes unconstitutional under the new provisions of La. Const, art. I, § 11, arguing the statutes did not pass strict judicial scrutiny. Additionally, counsel argued the effect of the amendment of the constitution invalidated any prohibition restricting the carrying of concealed weapons.

The Office of the Louisiana Attorney General exercised its discretionary right to respond to the constitutional challenge to the statutes and joined with the East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney in opposing J.M.’s motions (hereinafter preferred to as “the state”). The state responded to the motions, arguing J.M. did not have a right to assert under the state constitution, and, even if he did, the statutes at issue pass strict scrutiny review.

After a hearing and briefing, the juvenile court issued a written opinion. The juvenile court first subjected La. R.S. 14:95.8 to the strict scrutiny required by La. Const, art. I, § 11 and found the state showed a compelling government interest for prohibiting the possession of handguns by a juvenile. The juvenile court explained: “... it is clear that this statute attempts to address a well known [and] studied fact in our society, that the cognitive brain development of minors is not the same as an adult.” Based on this inherent difference between adults and children, the juvenile court found a compelling state interest not only in restricting the possession of handguns from those who lack the maturity to handle them, and for the benefit of the safety of society at large, but also to provide a method of punishment separate from those sanctions imposed on adult criminal offenders. .

After finding a compelling state interest in prohibiting the possession of handguns by juveniles, the juvenile court turned to the second part of the strict scrutiny analysis. The juvenile court considered the factors described in In re: Warner, 2005-1303, p. (La.4/17/09); 21 So.3d 218, 253, to determine whether a statute is narrowly drawn to achieve the compelling government interest and found:

La. R.S. 14:95.8 is neither over-inclusive as to be too broad, nor under-inclusive so as to be too vague, because the statute refers to a specific group, individuals under the age of seventeen. Further, La. R.S. 14:95.8 does not prohibit juveniles from total use and possession of firearms. The statute only places a prohibition on handguns. As previously mentioned, the majority of shootings committed by juveniles are committed with handguns. Therefore, this statute clearly |fiadvances the interest asserted, safety of society.

Despite these findings, the juvenile court nevertheless ruled four of the exceptions found in Subsection C should be severed from the statute, even though J.M. failed to assert any examples of less restrictive means of enforcement. The juvenile court first examined all seven exceptions to the handgun restriction found in Subsection C. The first three circumstances described in the exceptions were approved by the juvenile court, which found juveniles could possess handguns for attending a hunter’s or firearms safety course, engaging in practice in the use of a firearm or target shooting at an established range, or hunting or trapping pursuant to a valid state license. See La. R.S. 14:95.8(0(1-3). As for the remaining four circumstances, without further analysis the juvenile court indicated “... the court does not have the same feeling towards the remaining exceptions: C(4), (5), (6) and (7)” and ordered them severed from the statute. After the four exceptions were severed, the juvenile court found La. R.S. 14:95.8 was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, explaining: “The statute only prohibits a particular. type of firearms (handguns) by a particular group of individuals and further strikes a fine line between the right to bear arms and the protection of individuals in our society.”

As to the prohibition against carrying concealed weapons found in La. R.S. 14:95(A), the juvenile court again found a compelling state interest for the statute “in protecting society from any and all types of violence.” However, the juvenile court did not believe the statute was narrowly tailored. Specifically, the juvenile court found La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) was “... unconstitutional as it relates to juveniles because there already existfs] a law that restricts juveniles[’] possession of guns, i.e. La. R.S. 14:95.8 ... La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) as it relates to juveniles is duplicitous in nature.” The juvenile court explained “La. R.S. 14:95.8 is a narrowly tailored statute which passes the strict scrutiny analysis [presumably after taking into | (¡consideration the severance of the four exceptions in Subsection (C)(4 — 7) ] and therefore, there is no need for any additional restrictions on juveniles to possess guns to be found in any other statutes.”

The state sought direct review of the juvenile court’s declaration of the unconstitutionality of La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) as applied to juveniles pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D). The state also asserts in brief that it is directly appealing the juvenile court’s ruling insofar as it found La. R.S. 14:95.8(C)(4-7) unconstitutional and severed those portions of the statute from La. R.S. 14:95.8. J.M. applied for writs directly to this court to consider the underlying constitutionality of La.' R.S. 14:95.8 with the state’s appeal. This court granted J.M.’s writ application and consolidated the two matters for the court’s docket. The court has received amicus curiae briefs from the Louisiana District Attorneys Association and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of two criminal statutes. Such questions of law are reviewed by this court de novo. City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 2012-0078, p. 2 (La. 10/16/12); 100 So.3d 301, 303.

' Nature of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms

Before we address the constitutionality of the statutes at issue, we must discuss the nature of the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms. After its 2012 amendment, La. Const, art. I, § 11 provides: “The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction on this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny.”

Unlike the provisions of the federal constitution, the constitutional ^provisions in our state constitution “are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its legislature.” Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 1993-0962 (La.1/14/94); 630 So.2d 694, 697. This court’s function in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the people who adopted the provision. See State v. Bazile, 2012-2243, p. 4 (La.5/7/13); 144 So.3d 719, 2013 WL 1880395; State v. Chinn, 2011-2043, p. 6-7 (La.2/10/12); 92 So.3d 324, 328; Radiofone, 630 So.2d at 698. Before ratification by the voters, the proposed amendment “was a mere proposal, without force or effect. The political act that made the [constitutional amendment] binding was the vote of the people; it is the understanding that can be reasonably ascribed to that voting population as a whole that controls.” Radiofone, 630 So.2d at 698. The proper analysis to determine the understanding of the voters is described as follows:

In general, in seeking to discover that constitutional intent, this court is guided by the same rules it follows in interpreting laws and written instruments.... When a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it must be applied as 'written without further interpretation in search of its intent. Every provision must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the provision and the interests it furthers and resolves. When the provision is susceptible of different meanings, it is interpreted by examining the context and the text in which it occurs as a whole and by giving it the meaning that best conforms to its purpose.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

As we stated in State v. Amos, 343 So.2d 166, 168 (La.1977), “[t]he right to keep and bear arms, like other rights guaranteed by our state constitution, is not absolute.” That limits may be imposed on the right was evidenced in the language of the official ballot proposition presented to the voters. The proposition asked:

Do you support an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Louisiana to provide that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right and any restriction of that right requires the highest standard of review by a court? (Amends Article I, Section 11)

IsSee Acts 2012, No. 874, § 3.

The voters of Louisiana did not ratify this constitutional amendment in a vacuum. In our opinion, the reference to restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms in the proposition reflects an expectation of sensible firearm regulation held by the voters, and comports with historical restrictions with respect to the acquisition, possession or use of firearms for lawful purposes found in Louisiana law. The Supreme Court has described a similar understanding of the nature and limitations of the right to bear arms in the analogous Second Amendment. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 128 5.Ct. 2783, 2816, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (“From Blackstone through the 19th-cen-tury cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”).

We also conclude the voters’ ratification of strict scrutiny as a review standard of alleged infringements on the right to keep and bear arms was not meant to invalidate every restriction on firearms, whether in existence at the time the amendment was ratified or yet to be enacted. Rather, the strict scrutiny standard adopted by the voters “is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker” for firearm regulation within the context of the fundamental right to keep and bear arms. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327,123 S.Ct. 2325, 2338, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003). In Draughter, decided in our last opinion cycle, we concluded the right to bear arms has always been a fundamental right and the amendment to the constitutional provision merely sought to ensure that the review standard of an alleged infringement of this fundamental right was consistent with 19developing standards of constitutional analysis. Id., 130 So.3d at 855, slip op. at 10. Strict scrutiny requires a careful examination by our courts, keeping in mind that the fundamental right at issue is one where some degree of regulation is likely to be necessary to protect the public safety. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327, 123 S.Ct. at 2338 (in a strict scrutiny analysis, “context matters.”).

Strict Scrutiny Analysis

La. Const, art. I, § 11 states any restriction on the right to keep and bear arms must meet strict scrutiny review. Where strict judicial scrutiny is required, a state “is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, the state rather than the complainant must carry a heavy burden of justification, the state must demonstrate its [legislation] has been structured with precision, and is tailored narrowly to serve legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the less drastic means for effectuating its objectives.” Southland Corp. v. Collector of Revenue for Louisiana, 321 So.2d 501, 505 (La.1975); see also State v. Brenan, 1999-2291, p. 6 (La.5/16/00); 772 So.2d 64, 69; Warner, 2005-1303, p. 37; 21 So.3d at 246. In meeting this heavy burden of justification, the state’s role is to present evidence of the compelling nature of the government’s interest served by the regulation and to demonstrate the restrictions are narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted interest.

In this case, the state based its argument on “logic, case law, and statistics.” At issue are two long-standing limitations on the right to keep and bear arms — the prohibition against the carrying of concealed weapons, and the possession of firearms by children — for which there exists an extensive history of law and jurisprudence. Under such circumstances, we find “a long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense” to be sufficient evidence for even a strict scrutiny review. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 1858, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992).

| V)La. R.S. U:95.8

To demonstrate a compelling government interest, the state must establish “the need to address a perceived problem, protect a group from harm, or cure some ill in society.’ ” Warner, 2005-1303, p. 44; 21 So.3d at 250. The state asserts the compelling interest of the government in enacting this legislation is the safety of the general public and juveniles in particular. The juvenile court agreed, and referred to a “well known [and] studied fact in our society, that the cognitive brain development of minors is not the same as an adult.”

We agree public safety is a compelling state interest for restricting the possession of handguns by juveniles. Common sense, science and social science agree that juveniles exhibit a sometimes transient lack of maturity, impetuosity, suggestibility and vulnerability which would make the possession of a handgun by a juvenile a danger for the public and the juveniles themselves. See Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464-2465, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). We | nalso note this prohibition on the juvenile possession of a handgun is the type of long-standing limitation on the right to keep and bear arms with which voters were familiar. As early as in 1890, the Louisiana legislature made it a misdemeanor offense “for any person to sell, or lease or give through himself or any other person, any pistol, dirk, bowie-knife or any other dangerous weapon, which may be carried concealed to any person under the age of twenty-one years.” See 1890 La. Acts, No. 46.

Courts have found “the clandestine acquisition of firearms by juveniles and minors is a most serious problem facing law enforcement and the citizens of this country.” National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 199 (5th Cir.2012), petition for cert, filed July 29, 2013, quoting S.Rep. No. 90-1097, at 79 (1968), 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2167. The statistics obtained through a congressional investigation and referred to in the case law confirmed a “causal relationship between the easy availability of firearms other than a rifle or shotgun and ... youthful criminal behavior.” Id., 700 F.3d at 199, quoting Pub.L. No. 90-351, § 901(a)(6); 82 Stat. at 225, 26. Based on these considerations, we agree with the finding of the juvenile court in this respect and hold there is a compelling government interest supporting the enactment of La. R.S. 14:95.8.

Based on the historical tradition restricting the possession of weapons by | ^juveniles in Louisiana, the legislature could have instituted a total ban on a juvenile’s possession of a handgun. Instead, and in order to structure this legislation with precision, the legislature narrowly tailored the statute to provide exceptions for circumstances consistent with the possession or use of a handgun by a juvenile for a lawful purpose. A statute is narrowly tailored where, as here, it “actually advance[s] the interest asserted,” “is reasonably necessary to serve the state interest,” is not under- or over-inclusive, and no less “restrictive alternatives ... would serve the compelling state interest at least as well.” Warner, 2005-1303, pp. 48-49; 21 So.3d at 253-254.

The statute restricts only the possession of a certain type of weapon, a handgun, which according to statistics and case law considered by the juvenile court is the most readily accessible type of weapon to juveniles, and is most often used in committing crimes. The prohibition targets only individuals aged 16 years and younger, consistent with the studies and case law showing this as the most vulnerable age group. We find the first four exceptions to the statute, La. R.S. 14:95.8(0(1-4), describe situations in which a juvenile would possess a handgun for the lawful purposes of engaging in, or traveling to and from, activities consistent with hunting, trapping, target shooting and firearms safety. In La. R.S. 14:95.8(0(5-7), we find the legislature acknowledged the special relationship which parents or legal guardians of children possess. Where a parent or legal guardian believes a juvenile has shown sufficient maturity and skill to possess a handgun in certain specified locations or otherwise with written permission, the legislature has crafted an exception to encompass those circumstances.

|islt is clear the legislature was focused on solving a particular problem — that of preventing persons sixteen years of age or younger, who might be immature and impulsive, from easily accessing handguns, in order to reduce the incidence of accidents or violent crime. We find La. R.S. 14:95.8 is narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate purposes of the government’s interest in enacting this legislation. Considering the compelling government interest in enacting La. R.S. 14:95.8, and our finding the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve this legitimate purpose, we hold La. R.S. 14:95.8 withstands strict scrutiny analysis. The juvenile court’s ruling which severed Section C(4-7) from La. R.S. 14:95.8 is reversed.

La. R.S. 1⅛:9 5(A)(1)

J.M. initially argues the changes in the language from the former version of La. Const, art. I, § 11 to its current version eliminated the legislature’s authority to place any restrictions on the carrying of a concealed weapon. Specifically, J.M. asserts the removal of the phrase: “... but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person” invalidates any enforcement of La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) whatsoever.

Generally, a change to the language of an existing law, particularly the | udeletion of a phrase authorizing an action, indicates the legislature was aware of the original language and its interpretation and signals a change in the law. State v. Johnson, 2003-2993, p. 15-16 (La.10/19/04); 884 So.2d 568, 577. Clearly, this is the basis for J.M.’s argument that in doing away with the constitutional authorization for legislation restricting the carrying of concealed weapons, the voters intended to restrict the legislature’s ability to make any laws on that subject. Under this interpretation, J.M. argues La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) is unconstitutional and cannot serve as a basis for an adjudication of delinquency.

We disagree with J.M.’s interpretation of the effect of the constitutional amendment. In our opinion, the drafters and ratifiers did not intend to invalidate the existing law restricting the carrying of concealed weapons, or to restrict the legislature’s authority to pass laws on that subject. The clear and unambiguous language of the second sentence of the amended provision ensures that any restriction on the right to keep and bear arms, including those laws regarding the carrying of concealed weapons, must pass the requirements of strict scrutiny. There is no limitation on the phrase “any restriction.” To read the constitutional provision as J.M. urges would be inconsistent with the clear terms of the second sentence of La. Const, art. I, § 11. We hold the 2012 amendment to La. Const, art. I, § 11 did not invalidate La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) and does not prohibit the legislature from enacting laws regarding the carrying of concealed weapons.

The juvenile court found the prohibition against intentionally carrying a concealed weapon, as applied to juveniles, overlapped the restriction on a juvenile’s possession of a handgun. In dismissing similar arguments, this court has held “even assuming the two offenses totally overlapped, we are not aware of how this statutory arrangement conflicts with any constitutional principle.” State v. Smith, 1999-0606, p. 16-17 (La.7/6/00); 766 So.2d 501, 514, quoting State v. Neal, 500 So.2d 374, 378 (La.1987). The court has explained “the policy of our | lficriminal code recognizes that there will be overlapping in the code sections and other statutes and expressly provides that in such cases prosecution may proceed under either provision.” Id. Our statutory policy intends that an offender “will be protected from unwarranted multiple prosecutions by the law concerning double jeopardy.” Neal, 500 So.2d at 378. We are not called upon to determine whether La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1), as applied to a juvenile, would violate double jeopardy principles when considered with La. R.S. 14:95.8 as delinquent acts. We express no opinion whether the facts at issue here, once developed from this pre-trial posture, would satisfy either the Bloclcburger test or the “same evidence” test used in Louisiana to answer a double jeopardy challenge. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 591; State v. Magee, 2011-0574, p. 6-7 (La.9/28/12); 103 So.3d 285, 334, cert, denied, -U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 56,187 L.Ed.2d 49 (2013).

J.M. argues the prohibition against carrying concealed weapons does not pass strict scrutiny review, as there is no compelling reason for the legislation, as applied to juveniles, and the statute is not narrowly tailored. The state again asserts the compelling interest of the government in this legislation is the safety of the general public. The juvenile court found the state carried its burden of sufficient justification for the enactment of La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1). As with the prohibition against the possession of handguns by juveniles, we are again presented with a long-standing limitation on the right to keep and bear arms in Louisiana.

In State v. Flicker, 311 So.2d 863, 865 (La.1975), this court presented “an historical exegesis of the concealed weapons law in Louisiana.” Flicker noted “[t]he first statute to proscribe the concealment of weapons was enacted in 1813,” the year after Louisiana became a state. Id., 311 So.2d at 865. The preamble to La. Acts 1813, p. 172, § 1 provided:

11fiWhereas assassination and attempt to commit the same, have of late been of such frequent occurrence as to become a subject of serious alarm to the peaceable and. well disposed inhabitants of this state; and whereas the same is in a great measure to be attributed to the dangerous and wicked practice of carrying about in public places concealed and deadly weapons, or going to the same armed in an unnecessary manner....

In applying this statute, the court found “[t]his law became absolutely necessary to counteract a vicious state of society, growing out of the habit of carrying concealed weapons, and to prevent bloodshed and assassinations committed upon unsuspecting persons.” State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489^190 (1850). In upholding this statute against a Second Amendment challenge, the court found:

[t]his was never intended to prevent the individual States from adopting such measures of police as might be necessary, in order to protect the orderly and well disposed citizens from the treacherous use of weapons not even designed for any purpose of public defence, and used most frequently by evil-disposed men who seek an advantage over then-antagonists, in the disturbances and breaches of the peace which they are prone to provoke. ■

State v. Smith, 11 La.Ann. 633 (1856). Against another Second Amendment challenge, the court explained: “[t]he statute in question does not infringe the right of the people to keep or bear arms. It is a measure .of police, prohibiting only a particular mode of bearing arms which' is found dangerous to the peace of society.” State v. Jumel, 13 LaAnn. 399, 399-400 (1858).

Other than the elimination of language requiring the weapon to be in full open view, and the addition of a requirement of intentional concealment, the amendments to the statute have not changed the definition of illegally carrying a weapon to the present day. Fluker, 311 So.2d at 865. This type of long-standing limitation on the right to keep and bear arms is the kind of historical restriction of which the voters of Louisiana were aware when they voted for the constitutional amendment. Just as concealed weapons presented a danger to the public order in 1813, they continue to do so, particularly when those weapons are in the hands of impulsive, immature juveniles. Protecting the juvenile population from itself and ^protecting society-at-large from increased gun violence is now, more than ever, a compelling interest of the government; We find the state has a compelling interest in prohibiting juveniles from carrying concealed weapons.

Likewise, we find this statute is narrowly drawn to achieve the state’s legitimate interest in public safety. First, La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) is not over-inclusive because it does not prohibit more conduct than necessary. The statute prohibits individuals from carrying a concealed firearm (or other dangerous weapon) in public without a permit. Under La. R.S. 40:1379.3, Louisiana residents over the age of 21 may obtain a permit to carry concealed weapons for up to five years. See La. R.S. 40:1379.3(H)(2). There is even a provision for a lifetime permit. See La. R.S. 40:1379.3(V). The statute at issue is not a complete ban on the carrying of concealed weapons; the statute merely places restrictions on the carrying of concealed weapons in order to protect the public. The statute is not under-inclusive, as it includes firearms and all other instruments “customarily used or intended for probable use as a dangerous weapon.” La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1).

J.M. asserts the ease with which a permit to carry a concealed weapon may be obtained negates the state’s compelling interest in enacting the prohibition in the first place. We disagree. The very fact that an individual submits his identifying information and likeness to the state, and meets the qualifications for obtaining a permit (including a demonstration of competence and training with a handgun), is at least some indicia that the individual intends to carry a concealed weapon for a lawful purpose, i.e. the defense of self or property.

Finally, J.M. contends there is no need for La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) because the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and La. Const, art. I, § 11 are themselves public safety measures. We find the legislature, in the exercise of its police power, has the authority to enact a statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons. See Fruge v. Board of Trustees of Louisiana State Employees’ 1 ¶^Retirement System, 2008-1270, p. 5 (La.12/2/08); 6 So.3d 124, 128 (“Because the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people, exercised through the legislature, the legislature may enact any legislation that the constitution does not prohibit.”).

Considering the compelling government interest in enacting La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1), and our finding the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve this legitimate purpose, we hold La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) withstands strict scrutiny analysis. The juvenile court’s ruling which held La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles is reversed.

CONCLUSION

We hold the 2012 amendment to La. Const, art. I, § 11, which deleted the specific constitutional language authorizing the passage of laws regarding the carrying of concealed weapons, did not invalidate La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) or restrict the legislature’s ability to pass laws on this subject. We further hold La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) and La. R.S. 14:95.8 pass the strict scrutiny analysis required by the constitutional provision. The juvenile court ruling which severed Sections C(4-7) from La. R.S. 14:95.8 and held La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) to be unconstitutional is reversed. This matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Retired Judge MARION EDWARDS, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for HUGHES, J., recused.

       Retired Judge Marion Edwards, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Hughes, J., recused.

      . La. R.S. 14:95.8(D) provides: "For the purposes of this Section "handgun” means a firearm as defined in R.S. 14:37.2, provided however, that the barrel length shall not exceed twelve inches.” La. R.S. 14:37.2(B) defines a "firearm” as "an instrument used in the propulsion of shot, shell, or bullets by the action of gunpowder exploded within it.”

      . Other provisions of the statute additionally define the illegal carrying of a weapon by an enemy alien; the ownership, possession, custody or use of any tools or explosives with the intent to commit a crime; the manufacture, ownership, possession, custody or use of certain types of knives; and the intentional possession of a dangerous weapon on a school campus or on a school bus. La. R.S. 14;95(A)(2 — 5).

      .La. R.S. 49:257(C) provides: "Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the attorney general, at his discretion, shall represent or supervise the representation of the interests of the state in any action or proceeding in which the constitutionality of a state statute or of a resolution of the legislature is challenged or assailed.” See also La.C.Cr.P. art. 62(B), which provides: "The attorney general has authority to institute and prosecute, or to intervene in any proceeding, as he may deem necessary for the assertion or protection of the rights and interests of the state.”

      . La. Const, art. V, § 5(D) provides in pertinent part: "(D) Appellate Jurisdiction. In addition to other appeals provided by this constitution, a case shall be áppealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional....”

      . See La. Const, art. V, § 5(A), which provides in pertinent part: "The supreme court has general supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts."

      . The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

      . Although the state referred to several studies, and such information was apparently considered by the juvenile court, none of this information was admitted in evidence.

      . In Miller, the Supreme Court referenced Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1195, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) and noted:
        Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2464-2465 (footnote omitted). Miller noted the science and social science supporting the conclusions made by the Supreme Court in Roper and Graham had become even stronger. Id., 132 S.Ct. 2464 n. 5. Compelling statistical support for these differences between juveniles and adults may also be found in National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding the federal statute prohibiting federally licensed firearms dealers from selling handguns to persons under age 21 does not violate the Second Amendment) and United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 1133, 130 S.Ct. 1109, 175 L.Ed.2d 921 (2010) (Juvenile Delinquency Act ban of juvenile possession of handguns did not violate the Second Amendment).

        Those cases [Roper and Graham] relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a " ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,' ” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Second, children "are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited "contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character is not as "well formed” as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions less likely to be "evidence of irretrievable] deprav[ity].” Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183.
      Our decisions rested not only on common sense — on what "any parent knows" — but on science and social science as well. Id., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. In Roper, we cited studies showing that " '[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents' " who engage in illegal activity " 'develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior.’ ” Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (quoting Stein-berg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003)). And in Graham, we. noted that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” — for example, in "parts of the brain involved in behavior control.” 560 U.S., at [68], 130 S.Ct., at 2026. We reasoned that those findings — of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences — both lessened a child’s "moral culpability” and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his " 'deficiencies will be reformed.’ ” Id., at [68], 130 S.Ct. at 2027 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183).

      . We note the Louisiana Constitution declares for the people of Louisiana the freedom to hunt, fish and trap, subject to the laws enacted by the legislature. La. Const, art. I, § 27 provides in pertinent part: "The freedom to hunt, fish, and trap wildlife, including all aquatic life, traditionally taken by hunters, trappers and anglers, is a valued natural heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people.”

      . The Preamble to the Louisiana Children’s Code likewise recognizes the special relationship between parent or guardian and child, and the role of the state:
      The people of Louisiana recognize the family as the most fundamental unit of human society; that preserving families is essential to a free society; that the relationship between parent and child is preeminent in establishing and maintaining the well-being of the child; that parents have the responsibility for providing the basic necessities of life as well as love and affection to their children; that parents have the paramount right to raise their children in accordance with their own values and traditions; that parents should make the decisions regarding where and with whom the child shall reside, the educational, moral, ethical, and religious training of the child, the medical, psychiatric, surgical, and preventive health care of the child, and the discipline of the child; that children owe to their parents respect, obedience, and affection; that the role of the state in the family is limited and should only be asserted when there is a serious threat to the family, the parents, or the child; and that extraordinary procedures established by law are meant to be used only when required by necessity and then with due respect for the rights of the parents, the children, and the institution of the family.

      .The juvenile court did not invalidate La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) on this ground. However, J.M. raised this as an additional argument in his challenge to the statute and we will address the contention in our de novo review.

      . Our discussion of strict scrutiny encom- passes only Subsection (1) of Section (A) of La. R.S. 14:95, the only provision of the statute applicable here.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: VICTORY, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Micah SMITH.
    No. 2013-KA-2318.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 2014.

      Department of Justice, State of Louisiana, James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Colin Andrew Clark, Ellison Carruth Travis, Assistant Attorneys General, District
    Attorney’s Office, East Baton Rouge Parish, Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney, for Appellant.
    Hymel Davis & Petersen, Glen Richard Petersen, Baton Rouge, LA, for Appellee.
   VICTORY, J.

| ,This case comes to us on direct appeal pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(D)(1) after a district court found La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3), pertaining to the unauthorized participation in medical assistance programs, facially unconstitutional. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the district court and uphold the constitutionality of La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 23, 2012, Micah Smith was charged in the 19th JDC with a violation of La. R.S. 14:126.3.1, which provides:

A. A person commits the crime of unauthorized participation in a medical assistance program when the person has been excluded by any state or federal agency under the authority of 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7, LAC 50:4165, or LAC 50:4167, and knowingly:
(1) Seeks, obtains, or maintains employment with a provider.
(2) Seeks, obtains, or maintains employment as a provider.
(3) Seeks, obtains, or retains any monies or payments derived in whole or in part from any state or federal medical assistance funds while excluded from participation in any state or federal medical assistance program.
(4) Seeks, obtains, or maintains a contract with a provider.
|2(5) Shares in the proceeds from a provider or participates in the ownership or management of a provider.
B. The following definitions apply to the terms in this Section:
(1) “Exclusion” means that a state or federal oversight agency has determined that the person or provider can no longer be employed by, contract with, or have an ownership or management interest in any entity that provides services which will be billed directly or indirectly to any medical assistance program.
(2) “Medical assistance program” means any state or federally funded program paid for directly or indirectly with federal or state funds.
(8) “Oversight agency” means the state or federal agency responsible for the administration of the medical assistance program, including but not limited to Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals or the United States Department of Health and Human Services, office of the inspector general.
(4) “Participation” means employment for a provider in any capacity, employment as a provider in any capacity, or obtaining any monies derived in whole or part from any medical assistance programs.
(5) “Payment” includes a payment, any portion of which is paid out of any medical assistance program funds, including but not limited to the Louisiana Medicaid Program. “Payment” also includes a payment by a contractor, subcontractor, or agent for the Louisiana Medicaid Program, or any other state or federally funded medical assistance program pursuant to a managed care program, which is operated, funded, or reimbursed by the Louisiana Medicaid Program, or any other state or federally funded medical assistance program.
(6) “Provider” means an actual provider of medical assistance or other service, including any managed care organization providing services pursuant to a managed care program operated, funded, or reimbursed by any state or federally funded medical assistance program, including but not limited to the Louisiana Medicaid Program.
C. Whoever commits the crime of unauthorized participation in medical assistance programs shall be:
(1) Imprisoned for not more than six months or fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both, when the state or federal exclusion is based on an underlying criminal conviction defined by Louisiana law as a misdemeanor, or when the exclusion is based on any reason other than a criminal conviction.
(2) Imprisoned for not more than five years with or without hard labor, or fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more thanjjtwenty thousand dollars, or both, when the exclusion is based on an underlying criminal conviction defined by Louisiana law as a felony.

Added by 2009 La. Acts. 337, eff. July 1, 2009.

Specifically, the state alleged:
On or about March 10, 2010, through and including the present, 2012, Micah Smith, defendant herein, committed the crime of Unauthorized Participation in a Medical Assistance Program in that he, after being excluded by any state or federal agency, he knowingly: Seeks, obtain, or maintains employment as a provider; Seeks, obtains, or retains any monies or payments derived in whole or in part from any state or federal medical assistance funds while excluded from participation in any state or federal medical assistance program; and Seeks, or maintains a contract with a provider in violation of La. R.S. 14:126.3.1.

The state alleges in its brief that it expects to prove at trial that Micah Smith was excluded from participating in medical assistance programs through the administrative process by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”) for various allegations of fraud and misconduct. Among other things, DHH administers the Louisiana Medicaid Program. After that exclusion, Smith continued to serve as the billing agent for Medicaid providers, despite his exclusion.

On February 4, 2013, defendant filed a motion to quash in which he challenged La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(4) (“Seeks, obtains, or maintains a contract with a provider”) as overbroad because it would “prohibit a substantial amount of free speech and actions which would be protected under the First Amendment.” It is apparent that this provision was intended to prevent a person who is excluded from being employed by, contracting with, or having an ownership or management interest in, any entity that provides services which will be billed to any medical assistance program, from contracting with a provider of such services in order to continue to profit thereby. However, defendant argues that it goes too far in | ^prohibiting any contractual arrangement between an excluded person and a Medicaid provider, which “can run the gamut from cutting a provider’s grass, to cleaning their home or office, to cutting their hair, or selling them insur-anee.” Therefore, defendant contended that the enactment prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech and the freedom to associate and is thus overbroad. In opposition, the state argued that contractual freedom is not constitutionally protected speech as contemplated by the overbreadth doctrine.

On April 9, 2013, defendant filed a second motion to quash in which he challenged La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) (“Seeks, obtains, or retains any monies or payments derived in whole or in part from any state or federal medical assistance funds while excluded from participation in any state or federal medical assistance program”) as overbroad. Defendant argued that this provision “is so sweeping in its proscription that it denies a wide range of protected benefits to which a majority of Americans are entitled.” For example, defendant argued that “[a]n excluded provider would not be able to live in government subsidized housing and would not be able to obtain a home loan which was subsidized by the federal government in any way.” In opposition, the state argued that the statute is not unconstitutional because it does not affect recipients of the government benefits as those payments are not “state or federal medical assistance funds” due to the fact that they are made directly to healthcare providers.

|,At a hearing on July 2, 2013, the district court denied defendant’s first motion to quash but granted his second motion. Because the district court ruled that La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) is unconstitutional, the matter is directly before us pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(D), under which a case is appealable to this Court if a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional.

DISCUSSION

The state argues that the trial court erred in finding La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) unconstitutional on its face on the basis of overbreadth because the statute does not prohibit protected speech, The state contends that La. R.S.' 14:126.3.1 (A)(3) prohibits conduct rather than any form of expression. The state 16also contends that defendant’s construction of the statute, under which he claims a person could be denied federal benefits, is unreasonable and, regardless, even if that interpretation were proper, there is no First Amendment right (or other fundamental right) to receive government benefits. In addition, the state argues that the statute may not be invalidated because defendant’s unsupported allegations are insufficient to show his hypothesized unconstitutional applications are “real” and “substantial” in accordance with overbreadth jurisprudence. Thus, the state argues that defendant failed to show any realistic danger that a person excluded from participation in Medicaid or Medicare would not be eligible to receive benefits from those programs.

“As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (citing Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002)). The overbreadth doctrine applies to constitutional challenges made under the First Amendment:

| ./‘Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 839 (1973).
A limited exception to this principle of constitutional adjudication has been carved out in the area of First Amendment concerns. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611, 93 S.Ct. at 2915. Even though a statute may be constitutionally applied to the activities of a particular defendant, that defendant may challenge it on the basis of overbreadth if it is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit protected speech or expression of other persons not before the court. State v. Franzone, 384 So.2d 409, 412 (La.1980). “Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612, 93 S.Ct. at 2916. The doctrine of overbreadth is a creature unique to the First Amendment, in particular free speech. State v. Schirmer, 93-2631, pp. 17-18 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 890, 900-901. Thus, overbreadth invalidation of statutes is generally inappropriate when the allegedly impermissible applications of the challenged statute affect conduct rather than speech, State v. Neal, 500 So.2d 374, „ 377 (La.1987), and especially where the conduct at issue is harmful and controlled by criminal laws. State v. Brown, 94-1290, pp. 10-11 (La.1/17/95), 648 So.2d 872, 878.

State v. Sandifer, 95-2226 (La.9/5/96), 679 So.2d 1324,1332.

The overbreadth doctrine has been described as “strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly,” and “only as a last resort.” See Broadrick, supra, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908. “In short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.” Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2126, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). Thus, “[t]he overbreadth claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, ‘from the text of [the law] and from actual fact,’ that substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 2198, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (quoting New York [ ¡¡State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 2234, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988)). .

“In a facial challenge to the over-breadth ... of a law, a court’s first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). Although some academic commentators have advocated for the use of the overbreadth doctrine outside the context of the First Amendment, see, e.g., John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L.Rev. 53 (2004), Justice Scalia recently reiterated that “ ‘[t]he fact that [a law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since [the Stipreme Court has] not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment’ Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.-,-, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2515, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)) (emphasis added). See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S, 263, 268 n. 18,104 S.Ct. 2403, 2412, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 | ¡,(1984) (“[0]utside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad”); Nevada Com’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2343, 2347, 180 L.Ed.2d 150 (2011) (“The First Amendment has no application when what is restricted is not protected speech”). Finally, the United States Supreme Court has held that “[r]arely if ever will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating).” Virginia v. Hicks, supra, 539 U.S. at 124,123 S.Ct. 2191.

With that background, and as stated above in Sandifer, this Court has found that overbreadth invalidation of statutes is generally inappropriate where statutes prohibit conduct rather than speech, especially where the conduct at issue is harmful or criminal. See also State v. Neal, 500 So.2d 374 (La.1987) (statutes prohibiting solicitation of prostitution and solicitation of crime against nature not unconstitutionally overbroad as they affect conduct rather than speech); State v. Brown, 94-1290 (La.1/17/95), 648 So.2d 872 (statute which enhances penalties for persons convicted of distributing narcotics within 1,000 feet of school property not unconstitutionally overbroad as the statute affects conduct rather than speech and the conduct is illegal); State v. Greco, 583 So.2d 825 (La.1991) (statute prohibiting commercial purchase of fish from a person who does not possess a valid fishing license not subject to overbreadth analysis). Defendant points to State v. Muschkat, 96-2922 (La.3/4/98), 706 So.2d 429, wherein this Court found a statute criminalizing certain conduct to be overbroad. The statute in Muschkat was a drug-traffic loitering statute, La. R.S. 40:981.4, under which a person could be arrested for merely being in a high-crime neighborhood. In Muschkat, we recognized that “the First Amendment protects more than just speech, such as the right of association,” 706 So.2d at 435, citing to Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971), where the United States Supreme | inCourt had struck down a statute which prohibited people from loitering on a sidewalk as overbroad. We found the statute to be overbroad because it criminalized a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activities, such as: being in an area known for unlawful drug use; being on premises that have been reported as places suspected of unlawful drug activity; being within six feet of a vehicle registered to a known unlawful drug user; repeatedly beckoning to, stopping, or attempting to stop passersby or engaging passersby in conversation; repeatedly stopping or attempting to stop vehicle operators by hailing, waving of arms, or any other bodily gesture; and circling an area in a car and repeatedly beckoning to, contacting, or attempting to stop pedestrians. 706 So.2d at 436. Contrary to the statute at issue in Muschkat, the statute at issue here does not criminalize any constitutionally protected activities, and has nothing to do with the right to assemble. We find the Muschkat case to be clearly distinguishable.

Pursuant to the above line of cases, prohibiting defendant from serving 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000)), and legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment {City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-535, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624(1997)). Id. as the billing agent for Medicaid providers, after being excluded from doing so because of allegations of past fraud and misconduct, is not the type of conduct that the United States Supreme Court, or this Court, has ever recognized as conduct protected by the First Amendment. Further, assuming for the sake of argument that district court’s interpretation of the statute is correct and defendant could be prevented from obtaining Medicaid or Medicare benefits, the overbreadth argument still fails because the First Amendment is not implicated in the receipt of those types of government benefits. Although, as noted above, there has been some slight extension of the overbreadth doctrine into areas implicating other fundamental constitutionally-protected rights, “[t]he receipt of Medicare benefits has never been held to be a fundamental right.” Arruejo v. Thompson, 2001 WL 1563699 *16 (E.D.N.Y.2001). See also Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 1010, 1015, 47 L.Ed.2d 249 (1976) (“Welfare benefits are not a | T1 fundamental right, and neither the State nor Federal Government is under any sort of constitutional obligation to guarantee minimum levels of support”); Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 1144, 1157-58 (5th Cir.1982) (“This complaint of a violation of Rivers’ right to substantive due process is cognizable only if this claim for social security benefits involves an assertion of a fundamental right.... Rivers points to no authority which would support application of this theory of substantive due process to her claim.”). This conclusion is consistent with the only reported appellate decision to consider whether a state Medicaid fraud statute should be voided for overbreadth. In State v. Vogel-song, 82 Ohio App.3d 354, 612 N.E.2d 462 (1992), a pharmacist appealed his conviction of Medicaid fraud in violation of R.C. 2913.40(B). The intermediate appellate court quickly rejected defendant’s contention that the statute, which provided that “No person shall knowingly make or cause to be made a false or misleading statement or representation for use in obtaining reimbursement from the medical assistance program,” is overbroad:

[T]he overbreadth doctrine applies only to First Amendment and other fundamental right issues and has no application to statutes such as the one in question prohibiting Medicaid fraud. See paragraph three of the syllabus of Cincinnati v. Hoffman (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 163, 60 0.0.2d 117, 285 N.E.2d 714. In other words, even though application of the statute might be unconstitutional with respect to persons making innocent false or misleading statements in connection with Medicaid reimbursement without intent to gain any advantage thereby, defendants are not entitled to rely upon that issue so long as the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to them. See, .also, State v. Van Dyne (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 95, 26 OBR 270, 498 N.E.2d 221; and State v. Loless (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 5, 31 OBR 19, 507 N.E.2d 1140.

Vogelsang, 82 Ohio App.3d at 362, 612 N.E.2d at 467-68.

CONCLUSION

The overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” to be used “sparingly” and “only as a last resort.” The overbreath argument fails here no matter how La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) is interpreted because the statute does not reach “a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” The First Amendment does not 112protect the conduct the statute clearly intends to prohibit, i.e., prohibiting defendant from serving as a billing agent for Medicaid providers after being excluded from doing so because of past fraud or misconduct. Nor is the First Amendment implicated in the receipt of Medicaid or Medicare benefits.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court ruling which found La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) unconstitutional and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The state alleges that it has also charged defendant separately with seven counts of Medicaid fraud in violation of La. R.S. 14:70.1 and one count of filing or maintaining false records in violation of La. R.S. 14:133.

      . The state’s response was brief and is reproduced entirely as follows:
      The defendant has filed this motion alleging that subpart (3) of 14:126.3.1 will prohibit deserving recipients of Medicaid and social security benefits from receiving those benefits. Subpart (3) punishes one who "seeks, obtains, or retains any monies or payments derived in whole or in part from any state or federal medical assistance funds while excluded from participation in any state or federal medical assistance program.” The defendant is inaccurate in his assertions.
      Medicaid and Medicare recipients do not receive payments. Payments for their health benefits are made directly to providers. This statute will not affect the Medicaid or Medicare benefits of excluded persons.
      Social Security benefits are not "medical assistance funds”. "Medical assistance funds” are a subset of the social security program. Banning one from those funds does not ban them from Social Security benefits. A review of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations show that the different programs are in different chapters.

      . The state alleges that writ review of the denial of defendant's first motion to quash is pending in the court of appeal.

      . We note that the district court granted defendant’s motion to quash and that motion was based solely on overbreadth; however, the state never technically argued to the district court that overbreadth doctrine did not apply because the conduct prohibited by La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) was not protected speech under the First Amendment. In opposing defendant's second motion to quash, the state only disputed the factual accuracy of defendant’s allegation that La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) might prohibit someone from receiving Medicaid or Medicare benefits. Specifically, the state contended that Medicaid or Medicare providers receive the payments directly rather than through the beneficiary and therefore that beneficiary would not seek, obtain, or retain any monies or payments under the language of the statute. However, the state alleges that the opposition to the second motion to quash was intended to supplement and incorporate the arguments presented in opposition to the first motion to quash, in which the state did make this argument. The state concedes that it "neglected to bring all the relevant constitutional defenses to the trial court’s attention,” but claims that new legal arguments in defense of the constitutionality of a statute may be made on appeal.
      While it is settled that a new basis for an objection may not be urged for the first time on appeal, Louisiana High School Athletics Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 12-1471 (La. 1/29/13), 107 So.3d 583, 596, Segura v. Frank, 93-1271 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 725, State v. Stoltz, 358 So.2d 1249, 1250 (La. 1978), we have never refused to consider an argument made by a party defending the constitutionality of a statute after a district court has found the statute to be unconstitutional. In addition, while this Court has repeatedly cautioned the district courts against declaring a statute unconstitutional on grounds not advanced by the litigants, see, e.g., State v. Over-street, 12-1854 (La.3/19/13), 111 So.3d 308; State v. Duheart, 12-0085 (La.10/26/12), 125 So.3d 1054; State v. Camese, 11-2534 (La.9/12/12), 99 So.3d 636; State v. Bazile, 11-2201 (La. 1/24/12), 85 So.3d 1; State v. Hatton, 07-2377 (La.7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, these decisions rest on the principle that "a judge's sua sponte declaration of unconstitutionality is a derogation of the strong presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative enactments.” Istre v. Meche, 00-1316 (La. 10/17/00), 770 So.2d 776, 779 (cites omitted). Further, though we have long held that the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim particularized, these procedural rules exist to afford interested parties sufficient time to brief and prepare arguments defending the constitutionality of the challenged statute. Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc., 94-1238 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859, 865. This opportunity to fully brief and argue the issue provides the trial court with thoughtful and complete arguments relative to the issue of constitutionality and furnishes reviewing courts with an adequate record upon which to adjudge the constitutionality of the statute. Id. However, that principle is not implicated when the state wishes to advance additional arguments in support of the constitutionality of an enactment. This is especially true, in this case, where the defendant’s argument to the district court was that the statute was unconstitutional based on overbreadth; thus, the district court necessarily found that the conduct prohibited by La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) was protected speech under the First Amendment. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the state did not technically present this argument in the district court, in considering the correctness of the district court’s ruling, we must consider whether the conduct prohibited by La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) is subject to an overbreadth analysis. See La. C.C.P. art. 2164 ("the appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal”).

      . The state refers the Court to information provided online by the U.S. Dept, of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General, indicating that ”[a]n exclusion affects only the ability to claim payment from these programs for items or services rendered; it does not affect the ability to receive benefits under the programs.” The state also contends that there has been no evidence presented showing that Louisiana has ever prosecuted excluded persons for merely receiving federal benefits or that a substantial number of excluded persons have not applied for federal benefits because of fear of prosecution.

      . In United States v. Stevens, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized several ways to mount a successful overbreadth challenge: (1) “that no set of circumstances exist under which [the statute] could be valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); (2) that the statute lacks “any plainly legitimate sweep,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740, n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments); or (3) that a “substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n. 6, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008). United States v. Stevens, supra, 559 U.S. at 472, 130 S.Ct. 1577.

      . In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed disdain for facial overbreadth challenges as they "call for relaxing familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination that the law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those at hand.” Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004). However, despite the previous clear statements from the Court that the overbreadth doctrine only applied in the First Amendment context, the Court in Sabri noted that the Court had "recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth (though not necessarily using that term) in relatively few settings,” citing cases dealing with the right to travel (Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)), abortion (Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938-946, 120 S.Ct.