author: KNOLL, J. WEIMER, J., GUIDRY, Justice,

text:
    Paul MASSEY v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-C-2789.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 2014.

      Overton Thomas Harrington, Jr., for Applicant.
    James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Jonathan R. Vining, Debra A. Rutledge, William Lester Kline, Baton Rouge, LA, for Respondent.
   KNOLL, J.

| ¶ This case concerns whether defendant, Paul Massey, is eligible to receive “good time” credits when the law changed after the offenses were committed, eliminating Massey’s eligibility to earn early release.

In 2006, the Legislature amended the statute that gave inmates the capacity to earn early release from their prison sentence — “good time” credits — in exchange for good behavior and the performance of work or self-improvement activities. This amendment significantly narrowed the class of inmates qualified to receive good time credits, excluding from eligibility, as pertinent here, those convicted of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile or molestation of a juvenile. Massey committed both felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and attempted molestation of a juvenile on August 9, 1994, in Sabine Parish. His victims, however, did not report his crimes to the authorities until 2004, and a jury did not convict Massey of these offenses until February 7, 2007. We are asked to decide which version of the good time statute applies to Massey — the law in effect at the time he committed his ^crimes, under which Massey unequivocally is eligible for, and indeed has earned, good time credits, or the law in effect at the time of his conviction, which denies him early release regardless of his demonstrated good behavior. Because the rescission of good time eligibility creates a significant risk of prolonging his incarceration and increases the severity of Massey’s sentence by altering the terms and conditions under which he must serve his penalty, we find application of the amended law would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Applying the law in effect at the time the offenses were committed, we find Massey is eligible to receive good time credits and is entitled to have his time recomputed under the statute before it was amended.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the time Massey committed his crimes, La.Rev.Stat. § 15:571.3, as then enacted, provided for good time eligibility to “[e]very inmate in the custody of the department who has been convicted of a felony and sentenced to imprisonment for a stated number of years or months.” 1991 La. Acts No. 138; La.Rev.Stat. § 15:571.3(B)(1) (1991). For ease of reference, we will refer to this earlier enacted version of § 15:571.3 as “Act 138.” 'In 2006, the Legislature amended § 15:571.3 with its enactment of La. Acts No. 572. .We will refer to this later version of § 15:571.3 as “Act 572.” This later act narrowed the availability of good time credits by excluding from eligibility, among others, those convicted of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, in violation of La.Rev.Stat. § 14:80, or of molestation of a juvenile, in violation of La.Rev.Stat. § 14:81.2. La.Rev.Stat. § 15:571.3(B)(2)(b) (2006). Act 572 specified that its provisions “shall apply only to persons convicted of offenses on or after August 15, 2006.” Although Massey committed the offenses on August 9, 1994, during the effective period of Act 138, he was convicted of his crimes on February 7, 2007 — after Act 572 by its own terms had become effective. Ultimately, Massey was sentenced to six years at hard | ¡¡labor for each of the two counts, with both terms to be served consecutively.

The record reflects Massey sought to take advantage of the good time provisions available to him under § 15:571.3 as it was enacted at the time of his offenses. Every iteration of Massey's master prison record that is before us indicates a full term release date of October 3, 2018. Likewise, each version of Massey’s master prison record prior to July 20, 2011, shows Massey’s good behavior earned him a release date which was consistently drawing nearer and nearer. Indeed, the master prison record dated June 14, 2007, reflects a diminution of sentence — or early release — date of April 4, 2012. Massey’s master prison record from January 29, 2011, reveals an adjusted early release date of September 6, 2011, reflecting 221 days of good time credit Massey earned. This early release date reflects, among other things, 180 days of educational credits Massey earned for taking a welding class which ran from January 11, 2008 to May 10, 2010, and 18 days for educational credits he garnered for participating in “Personal Development Module 1” which he completed on May 21, 2010.

In July 2011, two months before he was scheduled for early release, Massey received an amended master prison record indicating that all of his good time credit had been revoked and that he would not be eligible for release until October 3, 2018. Massey filed a formal request for administrative relief as required by La.Rev.Stat. § 15:1172. Having exhausted the administrative process with the Department of Public Safety and Corrections affirming its amended computation of his sentence at each stage, Massey filed a petition for judicial review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court according to La.Rev.Stat. § 15:1177. Citing State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 00-0172 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, the ^commissioner assigned to review Massey’s request also affirmed the Department’s decision to apply Act 572, the law in effect at the time of his conviction in 2007. The District Court, adopting the commissioner’s reasons, likewise affirmed the Department’s decision. Massey then appealed this judgment to the First Circuit Court of Appeal under La.Rev.Stat. § 15:1177(A)(10). Also citing this Court’s decision in Olivieri, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Department’s computation of Massey’s time, finding application of Act 572 did not violate the ex post facto clause because this post-offense change in the law did not “increase the penalty by which his crimes were punishable.” Massey v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, 13-0241 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 11/1/13), 2013 WL 5915742. We granted Massey’s writ application to address both the lower court’s interpretation of Olivieri and the ex post facto implications of the Department’s decision to apply a statute which denies an inmate eligibility to earn good time credit when the inmate was eligible to earn good time credit under the law in effect at the time he committed his crimes. Massey v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, 13-2789 (La.6/30/14), 148 So.3d 184.

DISCUSSION

We review the judgment of the Court of Appeal as provided by La.Rev.Stat. § 15:1177. Section 15:1177(A)(9) lays out the exclusive grounds upon which this Court could reverse or modify the Department’s decision. As relevant to Massey’s petition for review, to rule in his favor, we must find his “substantial rights ... have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are ... [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions.” La.Rev. Stat. § 15:1177(A)(9)(a).

This court has consistently held that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty which the convicted accused must suffer. State v. Hyde, 07-1314, p. 1 (La.11/21/07), 968 So.2d 726; | State v. Sugasti, 01-3407, p. 4 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, 520; State v. Wright, 384 So.2d 399, 401 (La.1980); State v. Gros, 205 La. 935, 18 So.2d 507 (1944). This strong jurisprudential presumption has significant constitutional underpinnings. Both Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 23 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the enactment of any ex post facto law. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995); Olivieri, 00-0172 at p. 14, 779 So.2d at 743 (bringing Louisiana ex post facto law in line with federal jurisprudence). In accordance with the Framer’s original understanding of the Ex Post Fac-to Clause, the United States Supreme Court has held that “the Clause is aimed at laws that ‘retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.’ ” Morales, 514 U.S. at 504, 115 S.Ct. at 1601; (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 391-92 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68-69, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). Massey argues that application of Act 572 denies him good time credit eligibility which was available to him under Act 138 violating this critical constitutional protection.

In order to weigh the merits of Masse/s petition, we first must determine whether the Department seeks to apply a law “to events occurring before its enactment.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 438, 441, 117 S.Ct. 891, 896, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997). Here, Massey committed his crimes on August 9, 1994. The Department applied a law to his sentence that the Legislature did not pass until over a decade after these offenses occurred. Thus, the retroactive nature of the Department’s application of Act 572 is unquestioned.

Under both federal and state law, our next task is to determine whether or not this retroactive application of the law violates the ex post facto prohibition by asking whether the change in the law alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the punishment for the crime. Id.; Morales, 514 U.S. at 504, 115 S.Ct. at 61601; Olivieri, 00-0172 at pp. 15-16, 779 So.2d at 744. Our review is “limited to the issues presented in the petition for review and the administrative remedy request filed at the agency level.” La.Rev.Stat. § 15:1177(A)(5). Because Massey’s petition alleges exclusively that application of Act 572 increases the penalty to which he is subject, we address only this narrow issue — that is, whether application of Act 572 increases Massey’s punishment when it denies him eligibility for good time credits previously available to him under the law in effect at the time he committed his offenses.

In determining whether retroactive application of a law increases the punishment to which an inmate would be subject, the relevant inquiry is whether the change in the law “creates a significant risk of prolonging [the inmate’s] incarceration.” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 251, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1368, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000); Peugh v. United States, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2082, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013) (citing Gamer for the proposition that “[t]he touchstone of this Court’s inquiry is whether a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes’ ”). As we have stated it another way, retroactive application of a law increases a defendant’s punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause when it “increase[s] the severity of the sentence by altering the terms and conditions under which defendant must serve the penalty.” Hyde, 07-1314 at p. 2, 968 So.2d at 726 (finding that application of a sentencing law enacted post-offense runs afoul of the ex post facto prohibition).

Regardless of the test we employ,' the Department’s retroactive application of Act 572 to Massey’s sentence cannot withstand ex post facto scrutiny. Indeed, Massey has unequivocally endured a longer sentence because the Department chose to apply a law that was not enacted at the time he committed his crimes. As the record clearly reflects, Massey could have been released as early as 2011 if the 17Pepartment had not revoked the credits he had earned. Therefore, in Massey’s case, application of the later enacted Act 572 has not created merely a hypothetical “significant risk” of prolonging his incarceration. The Department’s application of Act 572 has actually prolonged his incarceration by a number of years. Additionally, by denying Massey good time credit that would have been available to him at the time he committed his offense, the Department has certainly increased Massey’s penalty by altering the “the terms and conditions under which [he] must serve the penalty.” Hyde, 07-1814 at p. 2, 968 So.2d at 726. Thus, we find retroactive application of Act 572 increases Massey’s punishment and, accordingly, violates the prohibition against the application of ex post facto enactments.

Moreover, as Massey has highlighted in his arguments before every tribunal that considered his petition for review, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have held retroactive application of a law denying an inmate eligibility to earn credits for good conduct unquestionably increases the punishment to which an inmate would be subject and, therefore, violates the prohibition against ex post facto enactments. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 35-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 968, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (statute retroactively reducing the number of good time credits an inmate was eligible to receive changed the “quantum of punishment” and, therefore, violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws); State v. Singleton, 96-2380 (2/7/97), 688 So.2d 486 (retroactive application of statute eliminating eligibility for good time credit violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); State ex rel. Bickman v. Dees, 367 So.2d 283, 289 (La.1978) (retroactive application of change in formula for computing good time credits and reducing the prate of accrual violated the Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Curtis, 363 So.2d 1375, 1378-83 (La.1978). The lower courts erred in failing to follow this jurisprudence.

Although the United States Supreme Court, in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), tightened the focus of the ex post facto inquiry, neither Collins nor its progeny has called into question the conclusion reached in Weaver v. Graham that retroactive application of a law reducing the number of good time credits an inmate is eligible to receive violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 35-36, 101 S.Ct. at 968. While prior to Collins, the ex post facto inquiry centered on whether retroactive application of a -law “disadvantaged the offender affected by it,” the Collins Court refined this analysis, focusing on two important brands of “disadvantage.” As the post-Collins Supreme Court explained in Lynce,

To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective — that is, “it must apply to events occurring before its enactment” — and it “must disadvantage the offender affected by it,” [Weaver, 450 U.S.] at 29, 101 S.Ct., at 964, by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime, see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 50,110 S.Ct. 2715, 2723, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990).

519 U.S. at 441,117 S.Ct. at 896.

Although the Supreme Court decided Collins decades after Weaver, the Court reexamined Weaver in California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1602, five years after its decision in Collins. Discussing its pre-Collins decisions, the Court noted that several decisions, including Weaver, contained language indicating a law which operates to the “disadvantage” of covered offenders by changing the measure of criminal punishment fell within the ex post facto prohibition. According to the Morales Court, this language was “unnecessary to the results in those cases and is inconsistent with the framework developed in Collins [ ].” Although the Morales Court was clear that the focus of the analysis had narrowed, it was also clear the ^problematic language in Weaver was “unnecessary” to the result in that case. Indeed, nothing in Morales called into question the holding of Weaver “that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids the States to enhance the measure of punishment by altering the substantive ‘formula’ used to calculate the applicable sentencing range.” Morales, 514 U.S. at 505,115 S.Ct. at 1601.

The United States Supreme Court examined Weaver again in Lynce, another post-Collins decision, addressing whether a law retroactively eliminating for certain classes of offenders overcrowding credits — that is, credits which the Court recognized were similar to the good time credits at issue in Weaver because both credits were dependent on an inmate’s good conduct — violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 519 U.S. at 441-47, 117 S.Ct. at 896-98. Applying Weaver and Morales, the Court determined the California law did, indeed, run afoul of the ex post facto prohibition. Id. at 519 U.S. at 447, 117 S.Ct. at 898.

The Court of Appeal erred in finding Olivieri supported its decision to deny Massey relief. In State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, this Court made the Louisiana ex post facto prohibition found in Article I, section 28 of the Louisiana Constitution coextensive with the federal prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws provided in Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution. 00-0172 at pp. 15-16, 779 So.2d at 744. Therefore, if federal jurisprudence condemning the retroactive application of a law denying an inmate eligibility for good time credits remained unchanged post-Collins, then Louisiana jurisprudence similarly remained unchanged as well post-Olivieri. Thus, our holdings in Singleton, Bickman, and Curtis similarly support Massey’s position that the Department’s retroactive application of Act 572 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Both based on the precedents of this Court and of the United States Supreme Court, as well as on our assessment that the retroactive application of Act 572 increases the measure of punishment for Massey’s crimes, we find Massey’s substantial rights have beenjj^violated by the Department’s application of Act 572 in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and we reverse the Department’s computation of Massey’s time.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand this case to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections with instructions to recompute Massey’s sentence in accordance with Act 138, the law that was in effect at the time he committed his crimes.

REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.

VICTORY, Justice, concurs.

WEIMER, Justice, concurs and assigns reasons.

GUIDRY, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J.,

concurring.

|,I agree with the result and respectfully concur. I believe this case can be resolved by applying the holdings of State v. Singleton, 96-2380 (La.2/7/97), 688 So.2d 486, State ex rel. Bickman v. Dees, 367 So.2d 283, 289 (La.1978), and State v. Curtis, 363 So.2d 1375, 1379-83 (La.1978), as recognized by the majority. Because these cases are dispositive in applying the ex post facto law of Louisiana, an analysis of relevant United States Supreme Court jurisprudence is unnecessary.

Furthermore, State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 00-0172 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, is distinguishable from the instant matter since it did not involve retroactive changes in criminal punishment; rather, it addressed whether the application of the remedial provisions of Louisiana’s sex offender registration and notification laws to crimes occurring before the enactment of these provisions violate ex post facto principles. See Id., 00-0172 at 19-21, 779 So.2d at 747-48.

It is worth noting that since 1981, release of an inmate due to credit for good time has been “as if he were released on parole,” and the former inmate remains under state supervision for “the remainder of the original full term of sentence.” See La. hR.S. 15:571.5(B)(2). Thus, although released from incarceration, the former inmate will remain under state supervision for the full term of his original sentence.

For these reason, I respectfully concur.

GUIDRY, Justice,

dissents and assigns reasons.

hi respectfully dissent from the majority opinion today because this case is not in the proper posture for this court’s review. The attorney general was neither served nor notified of the plaintiffs challenge attacking the constitutionality of La.Rev. Stat. 15:571.3, amended by Acts 2006, No. 572, as required by La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1880, so that the attorney general could elect whether or not to exercise his statutory right to represent the state’s interests in the proceedings prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality. See La.Rev.Stat. 49:257(B); Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc., 94-1238 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859, 865.

      . Massey argues attempted molestation is not an enumerated offense under La.Rev.Stat. § 15:571.3, even as it was enacted in 2006. Because we find the 2006 act does not apply to Massey, we do not reach this issue.

      . The record reflects Massey was originally sentenced on March 2, 2007. On appeal, the First Circuit remanded Massey for resentenc-ing which then took place on March 14, 2008.

      . As Massey's master prison records and the July 28, 2011 letter he received from the Records Office indicate, Massey’s sentence was computed under Act 572 from the first day of his sentence because he was "convicted on 02/07/07 and offenders were not being sentenced under Act 138 after 8/15/06 (effective date of Act 572).” According to the Records Office, Massey accrued good time credits due to an oversight, as he "should actually be under Act 572F (designated name of the Act by the Department of Corrections) which differs from Act 572 (which allows good time) in that Act 572F does not allow good time.”

      . We are unable to determine from the record exactly when Massey should have been released. As we explain infra, see note 3, the Department has computed Massey's good time under some portion of Act 572 throughout his entire incarceration. Prior to revoking entirely his eligibility to earn good time, the Department computed Massey’s good time credits under a portion of Act 572 which allowed him to receive thirty-five days of good time credit for every thirty days of good behavior. If the Department had properly computed his good time credits under Act 138, Massey should have received thirty days of good time credits for every thirty days of good behavior in custody.

      . See La. Const, art. I, § 23.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur Lee TAYLOR, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0145.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Taylor Jr., Arthur Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99,630.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur MORRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0148.

    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Morris, Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 03-60; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-959.

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text:
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    No. 2014-KH-0154.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Williams, Eddie L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 236149; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 00931.

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text:
    STATE ex rel. JerXavier LANE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0155.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Lane, JerXavier; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 272,091; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-951-KH.

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text:
    STATE ex rel. Karsten Keelen a/k/a Karston KEELEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0175.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Karsten Keelen a/k/a Karston Keelen; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 72,230; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1662.

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text:
    STATE ex rel. Henry PHILLIPS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0177.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Phillips, Henry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal. District Court Div. E, No. 486,174; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1603.

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text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie R. PITTS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Pitts, Willie R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 49767; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00915.

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text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick PIERRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0179.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Pierre, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, Nos. 06-97-0846, 06-98-0961; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1583.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

i


text:
    STATE ex rel. Graley ROBERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0181.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Roberson, Graley; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 257,824; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-949-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raymond MITCHELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0215.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Mitchell, Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 479-036; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1657.

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text:
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    No. 2014-KH-0219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re James, Murlin Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 601,199; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1845.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0223.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Thomas, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 401111; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1517.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WE1MER, J., recused.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nathaniel GRIFFIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0224.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Griffin, Nathaniel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. F-2011-44; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-990-KH.

Denied.


text:
    Tanya WHITEHEAD v. Jim ROGERS, Warden, and Secretary James LeBlanc, Department of Corrections.
    No. 2014-CI-0227.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Whitehead, Tanya; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or'Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 610806; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0657.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky GRYDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0228.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Gryder, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 69,906; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-084-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcellus GAY, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0229.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Gay, Jr., Marcellus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 294,795; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-070-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Moses Maine JACOBS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Jacobs, Moses Maine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 288098; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00804.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


author: HUGHES, J.,

text:
    Antonio SCOGGINS v. CALCASIEU PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE.
    No. 2014-CI-0236.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Scoggins, Antonio; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00894.

Denied.

HUGHES, J.,

I concur. Relator must file his petition for judicial review in the 19th Judicial District pursuant to CARP, R.S. 15:1171 et seq.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Benjamin T. WEBB.
    No. 2014-K-0436.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Webb, Benjamin T.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 504-028; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0146.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick Randall DAVIS.
    No. 2014-K-0483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 176,200; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-777-KA.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Felipe Garcia FUENTES.
    No. 2014-KO-0501.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Fuentes, Felipe Garcia; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 519497; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0957.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tyrone A. MURRAY.
    No. 2014-KO-0503.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Murray, Tyrone A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 155,971; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-880 C/W 13-881.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Billy Joseph FAYE.
    No. 2014-KO-0505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Faye, Billy Joseph; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 620769 C/W 627669; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2013 KA 1295, 2013 KA 1296.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wesley James MONROE.
    No. 2014-KO-0517.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Monroe, Wesley James; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. CR-132762; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-717.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wesley James MONROE.
    No. 2014-KO-0523.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Monroe, Wesley James; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. CR-138470; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-754.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Fermichael HARRISON.
    No. 2014-KO-0529.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Harrison, Fermichael; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 52373 & 54154; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 13-981 C/W KA 13-982.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Albert L. HUEY.
    No. 2014-KO-0535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Huey, Albert L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 1-11-0038; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1227.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sharonda Alfrednette OBEY.
    No. 2014-KO-0537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Obey, Sharonda Alfrednette; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 34316-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-924.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Keith James BOYD.
    No. 2014-K-0540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Boyd, Keith James; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 502336; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0238.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Aaron TAYLOR.
    No. 2014-KO-0557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Taylor, Aaron; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07-11-0377; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1069.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larondric JOHNSON.
    No. 2014-KO-0563.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Larondric; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 12-09-0749; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1032.

Denied.


text:
    Timothy MARTIN v. NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE CO.
    No. 2014-CC-1362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re National City Mortgage Co.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs,. Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 516,431; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,348-CW.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS in the Matter of Bryan KRANTZ and Family Racing Venture, LLC.
    No. 2014-C-1363.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In' re Family Racing Venture LLC; Krantz, Bryan et ah; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Ethics Adjudicatory Board, No. 2012-8686-ETHICS-A; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1732.

Denied.


text:
    Lauren E. ROBERTS v. Lauren RUDZIS, Richard Fischer, and Louisiana Farm Bureau Insurance Agency, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-1369.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Roberts, Lauren E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 581,523; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0538.

Denied.

VICTORY, KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ, would grant.


text:
    GUY HOPKINS CONSTRUCTION CO. & Luba Workers Compensation v. Charles POOLE.
    No. 2014-C-1371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Poole, Charles; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District #5, No. 13-02048; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 2072.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Kenneth Eugene CARROLL.
    No. 2014-CC-1382.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Carroll, Jason; Carroll, Kenneth; Carroll, Steven; Urráte, Kelly Carroll;— Other(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 645-592; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-C-280.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    LIVE OAK MANOR SUBDIVISION PHASE II, L.P. by and through GOZONE, L.L.C. its General Partner v. AMTAX HOLDING 430, LLC. Live Oak Manor Limited Partnership, a Louisiana Partnership in Commendam, by and through Gozone, L.L.C. its General Partner v. Amtax Holding 303, LLC.
    No. 2014-CC-1383.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Amtax Holdings 303, LLC; Amtax Holdings 430, LLC, et ah; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Divs. H, C, Nos. 730744, 730746; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-C-247.

Denied.


text:
    Al HARNEY, et al. v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION.
    No. 2014-CC-1384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 702-066; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-1007.

Denied.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    Rashika DOTSON v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2014-CC-1386.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Dotson, Rashika; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C612658; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0273.

Denied.


text:
    Ben William MEAUX v. Leonard GUIDRY.
    No. 2014-C-1389.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Meaux, Ben William; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. C-2013-4400 F2; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-155.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Paul KNATT, III.
    No. 2014-KK-1391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Knatt III, Paul; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. ll-CR-1790; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 14-00427.

Denied.


text:
    Evelyn ANDERSON et al. v. MORENO’S AIR CONDITIONING, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-C-1392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Anderson, Evelyn et al.; Estate of Elsie Mae Savant Moreno; Estate of Fred M. Moreno; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2012-386; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-27.

Denied.


text:
    Jonathan LEFEAUX v. Andrea CRAVEN, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, and Southern Farm Bureau Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-1395.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Lefeaux, Jonathan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 596,162; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1970.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Mabel DAIGLE, Widow of Lawrence Lejeune v. John C. STECK, M.D. and West Jefferson Medical Center.
    No. 2014-C-1408.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Lejeune, Mabel Daigle; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 681-655; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-1017.

Denied.


text:
    Joshua GODCHAUX, et ux. v. PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2014-C-1411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Campbell, Brian; Moody Price, LLC; Peerless Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. ll-C-1647; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1083.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Nicholas WILLIAMS, et al. v. USAGENCIES CASUALTY INS. CO.
    No. 2014-C-1412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Giroir, Bobby; Nicholas Williams, et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 73991-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-185.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Mark PILIE v. SHAW ENVIRONMENTAL & INFRASTRUCTURE, INC.
    No. 2014-C-1414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Shaw Environmental & Infrastructure Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 618758; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA1105.

Denied.

KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James BROWN.
    No. 2014-KK-1425.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Brown, James; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 498181; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 KW 0479.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Darlene VITAL v. LANDMARK OF LAKE CHARLES.
    No. 2014-C-1430.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Landmark of Lake Charles; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District # 3, No. 13-04570; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-96.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Lola J. COLEMAN v. Stephanie P. STEPHENS, Stephens Fish, Inc., and Farm Bureau Insurance Company. Vincent Coleman and Sue Ann Coleman v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, et al. Kaline Bennett, on behalf of the Minor Child, Damion Bennett v. Stephanie P. Stephens, Stephens Fish, Inc., and Farm Bureau Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-1439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Coleman, Lola J.; Illinois National Insurance Company; — Other(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Franklin, 5th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 41,5790, 41,582A, AND 41,-583B; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,993-CA, 48-994-CA, 48-995-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Steven E. CRAWFORD, et al. v. RAPIDES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Crawford, F. Kathleen; Steven E. Crawford, et al.; Steven E. Crawford, on behalf of Jonathan Crawford; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 247,445; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00091.

Denied.


text:
    J. Robert WOOLEY, as Acting Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Louisiana v. AMCARE HEALTH PLANS OF LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 2014-CC-1666.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re James J. Donelon Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Louisiana as Liquidator of AmCare Health Plans of Louisiana Inc. In Liquidation; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 499,737; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0726.

Denied.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ., would ■ grant.


text:
    Joseph SEGURA v. Erika Kristen SEGURA.
    No. 2014-CJ-1805.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
   In re Segura, Erika Kristen; — Defen- ' dant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2012-12221;, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CU 0254.

Denied.

HUGHES, J.,

would grant. The involvement of Dr. Clark and Dr. Thompson in this case was court-ordered. Their input is not to help one side or the other to “win the case,” but rather to assist in determining the best interests of the child. The trial court is always free to accept or reject expert testimony, but failure to even consider these court-appointed experts undercuts confidence in the result.


author: WILLIAMS, J.

text:
    Nyle Anthony POLITZ, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Alice Catherine Bordelon POLITZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 49,242-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 10, 2014.

      Alice Catherine Bordelon Politz, In Proper Person.
    Gary A. Bowers, for Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, DREW and MOORE, JJ.
   WILLIAMS, J.

|,In this community property partition litigation, Alice Catherine Bordelon Politz appeals a trial court judgment in favor of her former husband, Nyle Anthony Politz. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to schedule a hearing to determine whether Ms. Politz is entitled to permanent spousal support and the amount to which she is entitled.

FACTS

Nyle Anthony Politz and Alice Catherine Bordelon Politz were married on May 28, 1977. Mr. Politz left the matrimonial domicile on September 18, 2002, and filed a petition for divorce on October 18, 2002. A judgment of divorce was rendered on May 21, 2003. However, the parties have been embroiled in litigation with regard to various ancillary issues for more than 10 years.

On March 16, 2004, Mr. Politz filed a petition of rule nisi, seeking partition of the parties’ community property. He also filed a sworn detailed descriptive list of the assets and debts of the community and made numerous claims for reimbursement. On July 19, 2004, Ms. Politz filed a detailed descriptive list; she also made claims for reimbursement and for “mismanagement” and “unauthorized alienation” of community property. 1 ¿Thereafter, Mr. Politz filed two amended detailed descriptive lists.

Subsequently, Ms. Politz filed a rule for contempt, alleging that Mr. Politz had violated an injunction which barred both parties from alienating community property. More specifically, she alleged that he had liquidated certain retirement accounts which belonged to the community. On February 28, 2005, the trial court entered a judgment awarding to Ms. Politz “the balance in the Vanguard accounts in the names of either or both of the parties herein as an allocation of an asset of the community[.]”

The partition trial finally commenced in 2010. After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the trial court determined that the total assets of the community were $128,132.35. The court allocated one-half interest in the property to each party ($64,066.17 each). Further, the court made the following findings:

3. Mrs. Politz has assets in her possession in the amount of $22,000.00.
[¾4. Mr. Politz has assets in his possession in the amount of $55.54.
5. Mr. Politz’s reimbursement claims total $171,692.75, which divided by [two] entitle[s] him to $85,846.37 from Mrs. Politz’s side. To this figure is added the separate property claim of $1,197.00 plus the rental claim of $6,294.50, for a total reimbursement/rental total of $93,337.87.
6. Mr. Politz’s reimbursement/rental claim of $93,337.87 is well over Mrs. Politz’s fifty (50%) percent interest in the remaining assets ($64,066.17).
7. Mr. Politz would be entitled to receive his fifty (50%) percent of the net community in addition to Mrs. Politz’s fifty (50%) percent of the net community against his reimbursement claims to the extent of the measure of the community property.
8. There are insufficient community assets to resolve the measure of the reimbursement claims.

Because the amount allocated to Ms. Politz was insufficient to resolve the reimbursement claims asserted by Mr. Politz, the court allocated all remaining community assets to Mr. Politz, including an undivided interest in 2124 Fairfield Avenue, LLC; an undivided interest in Jones, Odom, Davis & Politz, LLP; an undivided interest in Nyle A. Politz, LLC; the sum of $81,176.81 in the client trust account of Gary A. Bowers (held in escrow from the sale of the matrimonial domicile); and the ownership of two retirement accounts and two life insurance policies. To further offset Mr. Politz’s reimbursement claims, the court also allocated to Mr. Politz royalties due to Ms. Politz from mineral leases for the years 2003-2012.

|4Ms. Politz appeals.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Politz contends the court erred in allocating the following community assets to Mr. Politz: (1) two Vanguard retirement accounts which had been allocated to her in a previous judgment; (2) two Trans-America life insurance policies; (3) reimbursement for cash advances Mr. Politz made on credit cards he obtained after the termination of the community; and (4) a reimbursement claim in the amount of $2,500.

LSA-R.S. 9:2801 provides, in pertinent part:

A. When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the matrimonial regime, or from the co-ownership of former community property following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime |5or upon termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a proceeding, which shall be conducted in accordance with the following rules:
* * *
(4) The court shall then partition the community in accordance with the following rules:
(a) The court shall value the assets as of the time of trial on the merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the parties.
(b) The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so .that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.
(e) The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of the community assets and liabilities. In allocating assets and liabilities, the court may divide a particular asset or liability equally or unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of the spouses. The court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that the court deems relevant. As between the spouses, the allocation of a liability to a spouse obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability. The allocation in no way affects the rights of creditors.
(d) In the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall direct. The court may order the execution of notes, mortgages, or other documents as it deems necessary, or may impose a mortgage or lien on either community or separate property, movable or immovable, as security.
⅜ * *

Generally, the property of married persons domiciled in Louisiana is either community or separate. LSA-C.C. art. 2335. The community property comprisés: property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property acquired with community things or with community and separate things, |fiunless classified as separate property under Article 2341; property donated to the spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits of community property; damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the community; and all other property not classified by law as separate property. LSA-C.C. art. 2338. Wages are the premier community asset acquired through the effort, skill or industry of either spouse. Ross v. Ross, 2002-2984 (La.10/21/03), 857 So.2d 384; Gill v. Gill, 39,406 (La.App.2d Cir.3/9/05), 895 So.2d 807.

It is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion in adjudicating issues raised by divorce and partition of the community. Clemons v. Clemons, 42,129 (La.App.2d Cir.5/9/07), 960 So.2d 1068, writ denied, 2007-1652 (La.10/26/07), 966 So,2d 583; Mason v. Mason, 40,804 (La.App.2d Cir.4/19/06), 927 So.2d 1235, writ denied, 2006-1524 (La.10/13/06), 939 So.2d 366. A trial judge is afforded a great deal of latitude in arriving at an equitable distribution of the assets between the spouses. Id. Factual findings and credibility determinations made by the trial court in the course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities in the partition of community property may not be set aside absent manifest error. Clemons, supra. However, the trial court’s allocation or assigning of assets and liabilities in the partition of community property is reviewed by this Court under the abuse of discretion standard. Benoit v. Benoit, 2011-0376 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/8/12), 91 So.3d 1015; Legaux-Barrow v. Barrow, 2008-530 (La.App.5th Cir.1/27/09), 8 So.3d 87, writ not cons., 2009-0447 (La.4/13/09), 5 So.3d 152.

| ^Retirement Accounts

Ms. Politz contends the trial court erred in allocating to Mr. Politz two Vanguard retirement accounts. She argues that the same retirement accounts were awarded to her in a judgment dated February 28, 2005.

As stated above, Ms. Politz filed a rule for contempt against Mr. Politz in a prior proceeding. She alleged that he had violated an injunction by removing funds from a Vanguard account ending in 4945. She sought a judgment compelling Mr. Politz “to provide a full accounting for all monies withdrawn from the community account[.]” Following a hearing, the trial court rendered a judgment, signed April 26, 2005, awarding to Ms. Politz “the balance in the Vanguard accounts in the names of either or both of the parties herein as an allocation of an asset of the community[.]”

We have reviewed the detailed descriptive lists introduced by both parties. The Vanguard account, ending in 4945, which was addressed by the court in the prior proceedings, was not listed on either party’s detailed descriptive ¡list in this partition proceeding. By the time of the trial herein, the accounts previously awarded to Ms. Politz were her separate property. During the trial, Mr. Politz testified with regard to the Vanguard accounts at issue and was cross-examined repeatedly by Ms. Politz regarding those accounts. Mr. Politz unequivocally testified that he had turned over to Ms. Politz the Vanguard accounts that were at issue in the 2005 judgment. Ms. Politz did not refute his testimony. Thus, the testimony, and the varying account numbers of the retirement accounts introduced into the record, indicate that the accounts awarded to Ms. Politz in the prior judgment were 18not the same accounts as those listed on the parties’ detailed descriptive lists. Consequently, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the two Vanguard retirement accounts to Mr. Politz.

TransAmerica Life Insurance Policies

Ms. Politz contends the trial court erred in allocating both life insurance polices to Mr. Politz. She argues at least one of the polices should have been awarded to her because Mr. Politz “kept sole control and possession of both ... policies, never affording [her] the opportunity to control and possess the one listing [her] as beneficiary.”

Under Louisiana law, life insurance policies are treated as unique contracts governed by their own rules rather than by the Civil Code. Talbot v. Talbot, 2003-0814 (La.12/12/03), 864 So.2d 590, citing Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Matrimonial Regimes § 3.32, at 122 (2nd ed.1997). According to the rules of privity of contract, the contracting spouse is the sole manager of the contractual rights that are provided under the policy. Id. In principle, contracts produce effects as between the contracting parties only. Talbot, supra, citing LSA-C.C. art. 2346, cmt. (B) (2003).

Upon termination of the community, a life insurance policy purchased with community funds during the community is “a co-owned asset subject to partition ' by the co-owners.” Talbot, supra, citing Spaht & Hargrave, supra, § 3.32, at 125; LSA-C.C. art. 2336. Under the privity principle, the policy should be awarded to the owner of the policy, with the other spouse receiving property of an equal value. Id.

|9In the instant case, it is undisputed that Mr. Politz is the owner of the policies and that the life insurance polices are community property. However, contrary to Ms. Politz’s assertion, the law does not mandate that she be awarded the policy on Mr. Politz’s life merely because she was listed as the beneficiary. Thus, in accordance with the privity principle, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment allowing Mr. Politz to retain ownership of the policies.

Reimbursement Claims

A spouse may have a claim against the other spouse for reimbursement. LSA-C.C. art. 2358. The right of reimbursement is a claim by one spouse against the other which may be satisfied during the judicial partition from the obli-gor’s net share of the community property and, in certain instances, from his or her separate property. LSA-C.C. art. 2365; Dupree v. Dupree, 41,572 (La.App.2d Cir.12/20/06), 948 So.2d 254.

In the instant case, the court allowed certain reimbursement claims made by Mr. Politz and disallowed others. Among those allowed was a claim for payments he had made on one or more Discover Cards in the amount of $7,350. During the trial, Mr. Politz testified that the community had incurred a large amount of credit card debt at high interest rates. Therefore, he applied for, and received, .Discover Cards with zero-percent interest rates, and used those cards to eliminate the community credit card debt. Ms. Politz did not introduce any evidence to refute this testimony. Therefore, we find that the trial court was not clearly wrong in accepting Mr. Politz’s testimony regarding his reimbursement claim for the Discover | Klcredit cards.

Ms. Politz also argues that the trial court erred in allowing a reimbursement claim by Mr. Politz in the amount of $2,500. According to Ms. Politz, this amount is attributable to the liquidation of an insurance policy, of which Mr. Politz gave her $2,500, and kept the remaining $2,500.

We have reviewed the judgment with regard to Mr. Politz’s reimbursement claims. The judgment does not contain a $2,500 allocation denoting proceeds from any life insurance policy. Thus, this assignment lacks merit.

Ms. Politz further contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for a continuance after the trial court granted her former attorney’s motion to withdraw on February 25, 2010. She argues that when the trial court allowed her attorney to withdraw, the trial had already been scheduled for April 16, 2010. According to Ms. Politz, the trial court’s denial of her motion to continue prevented her from obtaining new counsel. She alleges that all of the attorneys she approached declined to represent her in this matter because they did not have sufficient time to prepare for the trial.

A continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1601. The trial court’s discretion in granting or denying a continuance under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1601 must be based upon consideration of the facts of each case and factors such as diligence, good faith, and reasonable grounds. English v. English, 47,331 (La.App.2d Cir.12/5/13),11 105 So.3d 994, writ denied, 2013-0326 (La.4/1/13), 110 So.3d 585; Connor v. Scroggs, 35,521 (La.App.2d Cir.6/12/02), 821 So.2d 542. Equally important is the exceptor’s corollary right to have his case heard as soon as practicable. English v. English, supra; Stett v. Greve, 35,140 (La.App.2d Cir.2/27/02), 810 So.2d 1203. The trial judge may also weigh the condition of the court docket, fairness to both parties and other litigants before the court, and the need for orderly and prompt administration of justice. English v. English, supra; Connor v. Scroggs, supra.

In the instant case, on April 13, 2010, Ms. Politz filed an ex parte motion to continue the trial which was scheduled to commence on April 16, 2010. On the morning of trial, Ms. Politz offered a number of reasons to support her contention that a continuance was needed. She argued that she had not yet obtained counsel and, although she is an attorney, she did not have any trial experience and was unprepared to proceed to trial.

After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court found that “good ground” did not exist for a continuance under art. 1601. Rather, the court noted that Ms. Politz had several attorneys to represent her over the course of the proceedings. The court also noted that Ms. Politz had weeks to obtain counsel after her attorney withdrew; however, she had not done so.

We agree. Our review of the record reveals that Ms. Politz took every opportunity to remind the court of her inexperience and her need for a continuance. However, whenever she was advised to retain counsel, Ms. Politz failed to do so. Additionally, her prior counsel had provided Ms. Politz with the exhibits she needed for the trial; however, on the morning of 112the trial, she admitted that she had not downloaded any of them and did not have any of the documents with her in court. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that none of the grounds urged by Ms. Politz constituted “good grounds” for a continuance under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1601.

Furthermore, trial courts are vested with great discretion in determining the manner in which they handle their dockets. Appellate courts interfere in trial court matters such as control of a docket, case management, and determination of whether a continuance should be granted, only with reluctance and in extreme cases. Daigle v. City of Shreveport, 46,429 (La.App.2d Cir.10/5/11), 78 So.3d 758, writ denied, 2011-2472 (La.2/3/12), 79 So.3d 1027, citing Thinkstream, Inc. v. Rubin, 2006-1595 (La.App.lst Cir.9/26/07), 971 So.2d 1092, writ denied, 2007-2113 (La.1/7/08), 973 So.2d 730. After reviewing the transcript from the hearing and the supporting documents, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance. If granted, a continuance would have delayed a matter— that had been pending several years — indefinitely, while Ms. Politz sought counsel. Considering the facts of this case, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in moving forward with the trial. This assignment lacks merit.

Ms. Politz also contends the trial court erred in proceeding with the trial in her absence on June 23, 2010. She argues that she overslept and missed court that day because she was ill; she attempted to notify the court as soon as she could. When she returned to court for the next scheduled trial date, she objected to the court’s decision to proceed with the trial in her [ ^absence.

As stated above, LSA-C.C.P. art 1601 provides that a trial court may elect to grant a continuance “if there is good ground therefor.” LSA-C.C.P. art. 1602 mandates a continuance when “the party applying for the continuance shows that he has been unable, with the exercise of due diligence, to obtain evidence material to his case; or that a material witness has absented himself without the contrivance of the party applying for the continuance.”

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Ms. Politz was aware of the June 23, 2010 trial date. The transcript from that date provides, in pertinent part:

THE COURT: [I]t is now 9:30 and we have checked with the judge’s office and there has been no communication from Ms. Politz to the judge’s office that she has been delayed or unable to be here.
Mr. Bowers, I’m going to turn to you now and ask you, do you want to go ahead with the presentation of your evidence or if you have some reservation about that with going ahead knowing the nature [of] that case. It’s whatever your pleasure, sir.
MR. BOWERS: Well, what I’d like to do with the Court’s permission, if you’d like, I’d like to first call my office to see perhaps since she doesn’t know you don’t have a regular office here and just to avoid the possibility that perhaps she called the office, would you mind if I do that, sir?
THE COURT: No, sir. I would welcome that.
MR. POLITZ: Could I step out and call my office as |uwell, Judge, she may have called there?
THE COURT: Certainly, Mr. Politz.
THE SHERIFF: Would you like me to check the other courtrooms?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
(Pause in Proceedings)
MR. BOWERS: No call, no fax.
THE COURT: Have an entry made that Mr. Bowers contacted his office and spoke with his staff there, that there have been no voicemails or voice messages left, no fax messages, no emails, no communication at his office by Ms. Politz concerning her not being present at the designated time for ■ a hearing.
. MR. POLITZ: No contact with my office, Judge. Checking on Fairfield to see if she may have called there and my secretary was going to send me a text message if they got any message at all. So the answer to this point is no.
THE SHERIFF: I checked all the courtrooms, Your Honor, and the fourth floor and nobody is there.
MR. BOWERS: Now directly to the question that you posed about what my preference was as far as what to do, Your Honor, I understand the likelihood that if we proceed this morning that Ms. Politz in her absence, Ms. Politz may, you know, make an issue out of that from an appellate standpoint.
:|: * *
[I] would just as soon prefer to go ahead and move forward. If under 11Bother circumstances perhaps, you know, it may be different, and without belaboring the point, it’s been my sense that Ms. Politz has a history in this case obstructing the forward progress on the partition for years. And that’s my thoughts about it and my preference would be to proceed with all due respect.
THE COURT: Proceed.

The trial proceeded, during which Mr. Politz completed his testimony on direct examination and introduced multiple exhibits into the record.

We first note that Ms. Politz did not object on the record when the trial reconvened on September 24, 2010. Rather, she re-urged her objection regarding the trial court’s denial of her motion to continue the trial which she had previously filed.' Additionally, our review of the record convinces us that the court made a diligent effort to ascertain the whereabouts of Ms. Politz. It is clear from the record that neither the court nor the other parties had any information concerning the reason Ms. Politz was absent. For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in proceeding with the trial on June 23, 2010. This assignment lacks merit.

Next, Ms. Politz contends the trial court erred in failing to designate her appeal as suspensive, rather than devolutive. She argues that she timely filed the appeal and paid “all court costs”; therefore, the appeal should have been designated as sus-pensive.

LSA-C.C.P. art. 2123 provides, in pertinent part:

|lfiA. Except as otherwise provided by law, an appeal that suspends the effect or the execution of an appealable order or judgment may be taken, and the security therefor furnished, only within thirty days of any of the following:
(1) The expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as provided by Article 1974 and Article 1811, if no application has been filed timely.
(2) The date of the mailing of notice of the court’s refusal to grant a timely application for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as provided under Article 1914.
* * *

No security is required for de-volutive appeals; for a suspensive appeal of a judgment for the payment of a sum of money, with specified exceptions, security equal to the amount of the judgment plus interest is required. When the judgment distributes a fund in custodia legis, only security sufficient to secure the payment of costs is required. In all other cases, the security shall be fixed by the trial court at an amount sufficient to assure the satisfaction of the judgment, together with damages for the delay resulting from the suspension of the execution. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2124.

In a suspensive appeal, the appellant must both file a petition for appeal and furnish the security within the delay allowed in LSA-C.C.P. art. 2123. Wright v. Jefferson Roofing, Inc., 97-1217 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 773. Where the appellant has failed to file the required bond, the suspensive appeal should be converted to a devolutive appeal, as long as the appellant has met those requirements. R.G. Claitor’s Realty v. Rigell, 2006-2336 (La.App.lst Cir.5/4/07), 961 So.2d 458, unit denied, 2007-1214 (La.9/21/07), 964 So.2d 340; Clement v. Graves, 2004-1831 (La.App.lst Cir.9/28/05),17 924 So.2d 196.

Herein, Ms. Politz filed a motion for an appeal and a notice of intent to file appeal within 30 days of the signing of the judgment. However, the record reveals that she did not pay the costs of the appeal, nor did she file the required bond within the delay set forth in LSA-C.C.P. art. 2123. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in designating the appeal as a devolutive appeal, rather than a suspensive appeal. This assignment lacks merit.

Ms. Politz further contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to amend her detailed descriptive list during the trial. She argues that the court “disregarded” the language of LSA-R.S. 9:2801, which requires a trial court allow a party to amend his or her detailed descriptive list.

As stated above, LSA-R.S. 9:2801 sets forth the procedure for judicial partition of community property and settlement of claims after the dissolution of a marriage. The statute provides for specific time periods for filing detailed descriptive lists and traversals. Although LSA-R.S. 9:2801 provides that the court “shall” allow amendments to the detailed descriptive list, a trial court, nonetheless, has discretion in setting and 11senforcing time limits. See, LSA-R.S. 9:2801(A)(2); Mathews v. Mathews, 457 So.2d 746 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1984). In Mathews, supra, the trial court refused to permit the husband to introduce into evidence his sworn list, which was filed six days prior to trial, but after the time limit for filing.

In the instant case, Ms. Politz filed her original detailed descriptive list on July 19, 2004; the trial commenced April 16, 2010; the motion to amend the detailed descriptive list was not filed until November 10, 2010. By this time, Mr. Politz had concluded his testimony on direct examination.

In her argument to the trial court, Ms. Politz offered a myriad of reasons for her delay in filing the motion to amend her detailed descriptive list. After hearing arguments with regard to the motion, the trial court “disallow[ed] the amendment of the detailed descriptive list” stating that they were “well into the trial of this matter.” Nevertheless, the court allowed Ms. Politz to introduce the document into the record as an offer of proof.

After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Politz’s motion to amend her detailed descriptive list. Contrary to Ms. Politz’s assertion, LSA-R.S. 9:2801 does not require courts to allow litigants to amend detailed descriptive lists at any time. As stated above, this matter has been pending since 2002, and has been subjected to numerous delays. The trial finally commenced on April 16, 2010, several months before Ms. Politz sought to amend her detailed 119descriptive list. The trial court has great interest in controlling all aspects of a trial and has discretionary authority with regard to evidentiary matters (the trial court has great discretion in controlling the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence). Bickham v. Riverwood Int’l. Corp., 42,122 (La.App.2d Cir.10/8/07), 966 So.2d 820. Therefore, under the facts of this ease, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling disallowing Ms. Politz’s motion to amend her detailed descriptive list after the trial commenced. This assignment lacks merit.

Additionally, Ms. Politz argues that the trial court erred in denying her request to introduce into evidence correspondence and a copy of a cancelled check from New York Life Insurance Company. She argues that the documents would have proven that Mr. Politz forged her name on a check from New York life insurance company in 2001. Mr. Politz objected, arguing that the documents were irrelevant. The court allowed Ms. Politz to proffer the documents into the record.

LSA-C.E. art. 103(A) provides, “Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected.” The trial court is granted broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings, which will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Simmons v. Christus Schumpert Medical Ctr., 45,908 (La.App.2d Cir.6/15/11), 71 So.3d 407, writs denied, 2011-1592 (La.10/7/11), 71 So.2d 317, and 2011-1591 (La.10/7/11), 71 So.2d 318; Graves v. Riverwood Int’l. Corp., 41,-810 (La.App.2d Cir.1/31/07), 949 So.2d 576, writ denied, 2007-0630 (La.5/4/07), 956 So.2d 621.

LpOn appeal, this Court is required to consider whether the complained-of ruling was erroneous and whether the error affected a substantial right of the complaining party. If a party’s substantial right was not affected by an evidentiary ruling, a reversal is not warranted. Simmons, supra, citing LSA-C.E. art. 103(A). The determination is whether the error, when compared to the record in its totality, had a substantial effect on the outcome of the case, and it is the complainant’s burden to so prove. Id.

We find no error in the trial court’s denial of Ms. Politz’s request to introduce the correspondence and cancelled check into evidence. The check from the insurance company was dated April 12, 2001, prior to the dissolution of the marriage. Additionally, the check was not listed on any of the detailed descriptive lists as an asset or liability of the community. Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that it was irrelevant evidence with regard to the partition proceeding. This assignment lacks merit.

Next, Ms. Politz contends the trial court erred in accepting Mr. Politz’s testimony regarding the amount of funds that remained in the community property bank accounts. She argues that although Mr. Politz testified at the trial that $1,421 remained in the accounts, he had testified that the accounts contained a significantly higher amount in an earlier proceeding.

It is the duty of the trier of fact to weigh credibility and to accept or reject all or part of a witness’s testimony. Badke v. USA Speedway, LLC, 49,060 (La.App.2d Cir.5/14/14), 139 So.3d 1117; Corder v. Lively, 39,780 (La.App.2d Cir.6/29/05), 907 So.2d 824. Reasonable evaluations of |⅞1 credibility should not be disturbed on appeal. See, Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).

Ms. Politz failed to offer any evidence to refute Mr. Politz’s testimony regarding the amount of funds in the community property bank accounts. The trial court had the discretion to accept or reject any part of Mr. Politz’s testimony. The court elected to accept the testimony; we find no manifest error.

Further, Ms. Politz contends the trial court erred in accepting the judgment prepared by Mr. Politz. She argues that the proposed judgment “circumvented” the partition judgment regarding the allocation of and reimbursement for the oil royalty interests.

We first note that Mr. Politz filed a “Motion to Address Form and Content of Judgment,” alleging that he had mailed the proposed judgment to Ms. Politz, and she had failed to return it to him with her signature affixed. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing to address any objections Ms. Politz may have had to the form of the proposed judgment. During the hearing, Ms. Politz attempted to raise multiple objections as to the content of the judgment. With regard to the form of the judgment, Ms. Politz objected to the fact that the judgment failed to state that the “oil and gas royalties should revert back to the date the community regime ended[.]” After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial judge signed the judgment, stating, “[I]t is my finding that the judgment accurately tracks the language that I used in my ruling on the partition suit[.]”

We agree. This Court has reviewed the judgment and compared it to 12athe transcript of the trial court’s ruling. We do not find anything in either document to support Ms. Politz’s contention that the judgment “circumvented” the court’s ruling. This assignment lacks merit.

Ms. Politz also contends the trial court erred in “refusing to hear” her rule for permanent spousal support. She argues that the court has denied all of her requests for a hearing on her rule for spousal support.

We have not found anything in the record to support Ms. Politz’s contention that the trial court “denied” her requests for spousal support. In fact, on several occasions during the trial, Ms. Politz attempted to assert her claim for spousal support. On September 24, 2010, the court stated, “I cannot determine whether you’re entitled to alimony until I am able to decide if, to determine if you are entitled to any funds out of this, because if you have funds out of this, you’re not entitled to alimony.” Based on the trial court’s ruling with regard to the partition of the community, Ms. Politz’s rule for spousal support remains viable. Accordingly, we shall remand this matter to the trial court to determine whether Ms. Politz is entitled to permanent spousal support and the amount to which she is entitled.

Finally, Ms. Politz contends the trial court erred in “ignoring” a rule nisi that Mr. Politz filed on January 16, 2013. According to her, the rule was in reference to matters which would have benefited both her and Mr. Politz with regard to the partition proceeding.

The rule in question was filed well after the conclusion of the trial, but prior to the date of the trial court’s judgment. However, Ms. Politz did l^not file any response to the Rule Nisi, nor did she object to the trial court’s failure to set the rule for hearing. Thus, Ms. Politz did not properly raise the issue in the lower court. This Court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Segura v. Frank, 93-1271, 93-1401 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714; Cooper v. Southern Hunting Products, Ltd., 39,166 (La.App.2d Cir.12/22/04), 891 So.2d 91.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of partition rendered by the trial court is hereby affirmed. We remand this matter to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether Ms. Politz is entitled to permanent spousal support and the amount to which she is entitled. Costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to defendant, Alice Catherine Bordelon Politz, and one-half to plaintiff, Nyle Anthony Politz.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED.

      . Three children were bom of the marriage. The children had reached the age of majority when the petition for divorce was filed.

      . See, Politz v. Politz, 2005-2568 (La.App. 1st Cir.8/1/07), 2007 WL 2193547 (not reported), writ denied, 2007-2137 (La. 1/7/08), 973 So.2d 728 and Politz v. Politz, 44,885 (La.App.2d Cir.1/27/10), 31 So.3d 552.

      . On December 21, 2004, the parties entered into a consent judgment whereby Ms. Politz agreed that Mr. Politz’s interim spousal support obligation was satisfied by virtue of the expenses he had paid on her behalf. In the same document, Mr. Politz agreed to (1) waive certain claims for reimbursement, including payment of the mortgage homeowner's insurance and property taxes on the family home; (2) waive his rental claim for Ms. Politz's use of the family home from the time the community was terminated until November 30, 2003; and (3) continue to pay, until exhausted, the debt Ms. Politz incurred for the purchase of a vehicle post-termination of the community.

      . The court also ordered Mr. Politz to pay Ms. Politz final periodic spousal support in the amount of $658 per month "until the mortgage debt on the house and lot previously owned by the community in which Alice Catherine Politz resides in is paid in full." However, in Politz v. Politz, 2005-2568 (La.App.lst Cir.8/1/07), 2007 WL 2193547 (not reported), writ denied, 2007-2137 (La.1/7/08), 973 So.2d 728, the court of appeal amended the award, increasing the periodic spousal support to $1,300 per month.

      . Due to scheduling difficulties, several court hearings were held on April 16, 2010, June 23, 2010, September 24, 2010, November 12, 2010, January 14, 2011, April 29, 2011, and October 14, 2011.

      . Additionally, the court ordered Ms. Politz to return to Mr. Politz the following items: (1) Mr. Politz’s birth certificate; (2) Mr. Politz's baptismal certificate; and (3) the silver certificate ($1.00) given to Mr. Politz by his godfather.

      .Rule 2-12.4 of the Louisiana Uniform Rules-Court of Appeal requires an appellant’s brief to comply with certain requirements. The brief must include, among other things, "a concise statement of the case, the action of the trial court thereon, a specification or assignment of the alleged errors relied upon, the issues presented for review, an argument confined strictly to the issues of the case, free from unnecessary repetition, giving accurate citations of the pages of the record and the authorities cited, and a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.” Rule 2-12.4 further provides that "[a]U specifications or assignments of error must be briefed.” If they are not briefed, "[t]he court may consider as abandoned any specification or assignment of error which has not been briefed.” Additionally, rule 2-12.4 provides that the appellant's argument "shall contain: (a) appellant’s contentions, with reference to the specific page numbers of the record and citations to the authorities on which the appellant relies, (b) for each assignment of error and issue for review, a concise statement of the applicable standard of review, which may appear in the discussion or under a separate heading placed before the discussion, and (c) for each assignment of error and issue for review which required an objection or proffer to preserve, a statement that the objection or proffer was made, with reference to the specific page numbers of the recordf.]”
      Ms. Politz appears in this appeal pro se and she has filed a brief which does not fully comply with the requirements of Rule 2-12.4. Recognizing Ms. Politz’s pro se status, as well as her limited experience in practicing law, this Court has attempted to ascertain the substance of her arguments and treat them as properly raised.

      . David C. Hesser, Ms. Politz's former counsel, filed the motion to withdraw, alleging that Ms. Politz "does not wish to sign a fee agreement in order to continue counsel representing her in this matter. ”

      . On the next day of trial, September 24, 2010, the trial court stated on the record that Ms. Politz had called his office on June 23, 2010, at 10:30 a.m. (court was scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m.). She had advised the trial court’s office that she had "overslept because of some medication that [she] had taken the night before.”

      . LSA-R.S. 9:2801(A) provides, in pertinent part:
      (l)(a) Within forty-five days of service of a motion by either party, each party shall file a sworn detailed descriptive list of all community property, the fair market value and location of each asset, and all community liabilities^]

      (b) Each party shall affirm under oath that the detailed descriptive list filed by that party contains all of the community assets and liabilities then known to that party. Amendments to the descriptive lists shall be permitted. No inventory shall be required.

      . Ms. Politz argued that she "was under the impression from [her] former attorney that he had already submitted [the amended detailed descriptive list] before [they] began the community partition back in December 2009."


text:
    David PATTRIDGE, and Gary Gardner, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Jimmy A. STARKS, Billy J. Edwards, Gregory G. Edwards, Vector Energy Solutions Company and Endurall, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
    No. 49,239-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 24, 2014.

      James C. McMichael, Jr., Shreveport, for Appellants.
    Geoffrey D. Westmorland, Charles E. Tabor, for Appellees, David Pattridge and Gary Gardner.
    Joe M. Enis, In Proper Person, Interve-nor/Appellee.
    Before BROWN, WILLIAMS and LOLLEY, JJ.
   WILLIAMS, J.

iiThe defendants, Jimmy Starks and Billy Edwards, appeal a trial court order dismissing the dissolution proceedings as to Endurall, Inc., and the denial of their motion for an order dissolving the corporation. The district court found that the reason for dissolution no longer existed as a result of the sale of corporate stock. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

Beginning in the 1980s, Billy Edwards (“Edwards”) and Jimmy Starks (“Starks”) owned and operated Down Hole Enterprises, Inc., which manufactured and sold rod guides that are used in the oil and gas industry to prevent well tubing leaks. In 2004, David Pattridge and Gary Gardner became partners with Edwards and Starks to form Endurall, Inc. (“Endurall”). The Endurall shareholders were Edwards, Starks, and Pattridge, who each owned 33% of corporate stock, and Gardner, who owned 1% of the stock. Pattridge was Endurall’s President/CEO, Edwards and Starks were Vice Presidents and Gardner was the Secretary-Treasurer. Endurall then purchased the assets, including proprietary information, of Down Hole Enterprises, which was dissolved. Each shareholder also signed an agreement not to compete with Endurall or disclose its proprietary information.

For a number of years, Endurall operated at a profit without significant disagreement among the corporate officers. Then, in August 2012, Starks, Edwards and his son, Greg Edwards, joined with others to form Vector Energy Solutions Company (“Vector”). Billy Edwards was hired as Vector’s Vice President of Development. Pattridge, Gardner and |2Endurall were not informed of the formation of Vector. After learning that Edwards and Starks had apparently used Endurall’s proprietary information in marketing Vector to a potential client, Pattridge and Gardner terminated Edwards and Starks from their positions with Endurall.

In September 2012, Pattridge and Gardner filed a lawsuit alleging that the defendants, Edwards and Starks, had breached their fiduciary duties to Endurall by using its proprietary information for the benefit of Vector. Subsequently, defendants filed a petition for liquidation seeking the dissolution of Endurall based on an irreconcilable deadlock of the board of directors and shareholders. In May 2013, the district court rendered judgment ordering the involuntary dissolution of Endurall under court supervision pursuant to LSA-R.S. 12:143 and appointing H.E. Richard, Jr., LLC, as the liquidator of Endurall.

The liquidator then submitted to the court a liquidation plan proposing the auction of either the assets or the stock of Endurall. In July 2013, the district court ordered the dissolution of Endurall by auction of 100% of the corporation’s stock. Participation in the auction was limited to the existing shareholders under an agreement signed by the parties. At the auction, Pattridge and Gardner were the successful bidders. Edwards and Starks were each paid $1,122,000 for their shares of stock. After the auction of stock, Endu-rall and the liquidator filed a joint motion to dismiss the dissolution proceedings on the grounds that the sale of stock had removed the deadlock and the cause for dissolution no longer existed.

On August 12, 2013, the district court rendered judgment dismissing | ¡¡the dissolution proceedings. On the same day, defendants filed an objection to the dismissal of the proceeding and a motion for a rule to show cause why an order declaring that Endurall had been dissolved should not be issued. After a hearing, the district court denied the rule for an order dissolving the corporation. Defendants appeal the judgment.

DISCUSSION

The defendants contend the district court erred in ordering the sale of corporate stock by private auction as the method of dissolution of Endurall. Defendants argue that the stock sale did not comply with the dissolution statute because they were effectively forced to sell their shares.

A corporation may be dissolved and liquidated either voluntarily or involuntarily. Proceedings that are involuntary shall be subject to court supervision. The dissolution proceeding takes effect when the court has appointed a judicial liquidator. At such time, all of the rights and duties of the officers and board of directors shall be vested in the court-appointed liquidator. LSA-R.S. 12:141.

The judicial liquidator shall proceed with the liquidation of the corporation’s affairs under court supervision. LSA-R.S. 12:146(B). In pertinent part, LSA-R.S. 12:146(C) provides:

A judicial liquidator in dissolution proceedings shall have full authority to retain counsel and auditors, and to prosecute and defend actions; shall have authority to compromise, compound and settle claims by or against the corporation upon such terms as he deems best, subject to supervision by the court; and shall have such other powers as the court may in its discretion grant, which, without limiting the scope of the court’s discretion, may include any or all powers enumerated in R.S. 12:145(C).

| ¿The liquidator shall have authority to sell and convey the property of the corporation at public or private sale on such terms as seem best, to vote shares of stock and to “do any and all things which may be necessary, proper or convenient for the purpose of liquidating the corporation.” LSA-R.S. 12:145(C). Since officers and directors are deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its shareholders and must discharge their duties in good faith, the liquidator, who is vested with the duties of the officers and directors during dissolution, owes the same fiduciary duty to each shareholder. Levy v. Billeaud, 443 So.2d 539 (La.1983).

In the present case, the liquidator submitted to the trial court a plan for dissolution through a sale of either the corporation’s assets or stock. The liquidator opined that, based on a comparison of the alternatives by a CPA, the stock sale would result in the highest value for all of the shareholders by preserving the non-compete agreements and by realizing substantial tax savings. After considering the liquidator’s recommendation, the trial court found that the stock sale would be in the best interest of all shareholders. The defendants then signed an agreement regarding the procedure for the auction sale of stock.

In their brief, defendants contend the dissolution statute does not allow the district court to order the sale of stock. We note that although Section 145 does not specifically list selling stock among the liquidator’s powers, Section 146(C) expressly provides that the district court’s discretion in granting authority to the liquidator is not limited to those enumerated powers. Further, the statute provides that the liquidator shall | shave such powers as the court may in its discretion grant, including the authority to take any actions which may be necessary, proper or convenient for dissolution. The statute gives the district court broad discretion in the supervision of dissolution proceedings. Thus, the statutory language does not support the defendants’ contention that the stock sale fails to comply with the law. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in approving the sale of stock by the liquidator. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Dismissal of Dissolution Proceedings

The defendants contend the trial court erred in dismissing the dissolution proceeding. Defendants argue that the court should have declared Endurall dissolved following the stock sale because the effect of the stock auction was liquidation of the corporation.

When a corporation has been “liquidated completely” and the proceeding is subject to court supervision, the court shall make an order declaring the corporation to be dissolved. LSA-R.S. 12:148(A)(1). The court may dismiss a dissolution proceeding under its supervision at any time before the corporate existence ceases, upon a showing that cause for dissolution no longer exists. LSA-R.S. 12:149. Courts are required to give effect to all parts of a statute and should not interpret a statute to make any part superfluous or meaningless if that result can be avoided. Pepper v. Triplet, 2003-0619 (La.1/21/04), 864 So.2d 181.

In the present case, defendants sought involuntary dissolution on the grounds that the Endurall board of directors was irreconcilably deadlocked. | ,¡The trial court then ordered a sale of stock among the existing shareholders to maintain the corporation as a going concern and thereby obtain the highest value for those shareholders. This purpose was expressed to the defendants in the liquidator’s plan. Plaintiffs were the winning bidders and paid defendants $1,122,000 each for their shares of stock. There is no showing that defendants received less than fair market value for their shares. As a result of the stock sale, Pattridge and Gardner remained as the only shareholders and directors of Endurall.

The defendants argue that because the court ordered a stock salé as the méthod of dissolution, the court could not then validly determine that the result of the sale had eliminated the cause for dissolution. However, the statutory language does not preclude such an outcome. Contrary to the defendants’ argument, Section 148 is not applicable in this situation because Endurall was not completely liquidated by a sale of all corporate assets. Further, Section 149 expressly provides that the court may dismiss a dissolution proceeding any time before the corporate existence ceases upon a showing that the cause for dissolution no longer exists. The statute does not require some “natural resolution of the corporate deadlock” as asserted by defendants in their brief.

Additionally, defendants have not shown that the law requires that once an action for dissolution has been filed the corporation must inevitably be dissolved. Such an interpretation would make Section 149 superfluous and ignores the statutory language providing that involuntary dissolution proceedings are subject to court supervision. The court’s role includes 17monitoring the proceeding and assessing, as in this case, whether the cause which prompted the action for involuntary dissolution continues to exist.

The record shows that Endurall and the liquidator demonstrated to the court that cause for dissolution no longer existed upon the plaintiffs’ purchase of 100% of the corporate stock. Pursuant to Section 149, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing the dissolution proceeding based upon this showing. Thus, the assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment dismissing the involuntary dissolution proceeding is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellants, Jimmy Starks and Billy Edwards.

AFFIRMED.