text:
    K-C ELECTRIC CO. and Bridgefield Employers Ins. Co. c/o Summit, Appellants, v. Selinda WALDEN, as Plenary Guardian o/b/o Kenneth Keller, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-1145.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 7, 2013.

      Tim Jesaitis of the Law Office of Tim Jesaitis, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellants.
    Susan W. Fox of Fox & Loquasto, P.A., Orlando, and Lawrence H. Samaha, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) adjusting Claimant’s average weekly wage (AWW) to include the pro rata portion of the corporate profits to which he was entitled as a shareholder, on the authority of Pishotta v. Piskotta Tile & Mar ble, Inc., 613 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The E/C argues that a 1994 amendment to Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law’s statutory definition of “wages” precludes this ruling and renders Pishotta distinguishable. We affirm the order, and write on this issue of first impression to clarify that the plain language of the as-amended statutory definition of “wages” does not permit the E/C’s proposed reading or trump Pishotta.

As background, the amount of indemnity benefits payable under the Workers’ Compensation Law is calculated based on a claimant’s AWW, and the appropriate AWW is calculated under section 440.14, Florida Statutes, which sets forth its formulas in terms of “wages.” “Wages” is defined elsewhere in the Workers’ Compensation Law:

The money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of injury and includes only the wages earned and reported for federal income tax purposes on the job where the employee is injured and any other concurrent employment ... together with the reasonable value of housing furnished to the employee by the employer ... and gratuities reported to the employer....

§ 440.02(28), Fla. Stat. (2011). The phrase “and reported for federal income tax purposes” was added by amendment effective January 1, 1994. Ch. 93-415, § 2, at 72, Laws of Fla.

The E/C argues the amendment to the above definition of “wages” means the term is limited to “wages” as defined under the federal tax code. The plain language of section 440.02(28), however, does not rely on the federal tax code’s definition; instead, it defines wages differently as “the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of injury.” From this statutory definition, a subset is created that excludes any portion of that rate not “earned” on that job or concurrent employment (and including any portion earned but not yet paid, see Witzky v. West Coast Duplicating, 503 So.2d 1327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding definition of wages as “earned” rather than “paid” indicates that AWW is not limited to money actually paid to claimant)). The 1994 amendment also uses the initial definition of “wages” to create a subset of itself, this time excluding any portion of that rate not “reported for federal income tax purposes.” Although this new language excludes “wages” not reported, it does not limit the manner of reporting or otherwise exclude from “the money rate ... earned” monies not defined by the federal tax code as “wages.” See generally Lombardi v. S. Wine & Spirits, 890 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review). Based on this language and structure, we cannot conclude that the Workers’ Compensation Law’s definition of “wages” should match the federal tax code’s definition of “wages”; indeed, if the Legislature had such an intent, it could have chosen a more clear manner of expressing as much.

Because the 1994 statutory amendment did not alter the definition of “wages” in the manner suggested by the E/C, the precedent set forth in Pishotta remains in force: a claimant’s AWW includes his or her pro rata portion of corporate profits where the profits were “almost entirely the direct result of personal management and endeavor” (and therefore were “earned” as required by the definition of “wages” in the Workers’ Compensation Law). 613 So.2d at 1376 (quoting MDM Marble Co. v. Jackson, 512 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)). Here, the E/C concedes the profits given to Claimant “were the results of his active income, not the result of passive income or return on investment,” and thus were earned. It is undisputed that the “money rate” Claimant is contractually due is $250.00 per week plus sixty percent of the profits per year. Because it is likewise undisputed that Claimant’s portion of the profit was reported to the IRS, although not necessarily as “wages” as defined by the federal tax code, the plain language of the statute as applied to this case does not prohibit the inclusion of Claimant’s pro rata profits as “wages” under the Workers’ Compensation Law. Further, Pishotta requires the inclusion of such pro rata profits as “wages” (to the extent such profits were “reported for federal income tax purposes,” as the 1994 amendment requires). Accordingly, the JCC here was correct to include Claimant’s earned and reported pro rata profits when calculating Claimant’s AWW.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, C.J., WOLF, and MAKAR, JJ„ concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: SWANSON, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Ray JONES, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-1964.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 9, 2013.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brittany Ann Rhodaback, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   SWANSON, J.

The state appeals the trial court’s decision to impose a downward departure sentence after appellee entered an unconditional nolo contendere plea to child abuse and possession of a controlled substance. We agree with the state that the trial court’s reason for departure was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

The trial court imposed a downward departure sentence pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2012), upon finding the offenses were committed in an unsophisticated manner and were isolated incidents for which appellee had shown remorse. Under the plain language of section 921.0026(2) (j), all three elements — lack of sophistication, isolated incident, and remorse — must be established to permit a departure sentence. State v. Geoghagan, 27 So.3d 111, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); State v. Jerry, 19 So.3d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The state argued below that a downward departure was not warranted because appellee’s offenses were not isolated and appellee had not shown sufficient remorse. We agree there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that appellee’s current offenses were isolated incidents.

Appellee’s criminal history included a prior felony conviction for manslaughter, for which appellee was returned to prison after violating his probation; a prior felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance; and two prior misdemeanor convictions, one of which was for resisting an officer without violence. In light of this prior record, appellee failed to show that his current offenses of child abuse and possession of a controlled substance (the latter committed while appellee was on pretrial release for the former) were isolated incidents. See State v. Leverett, 44 So.3d 634, 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (holding that home invasion robbery was not an isolated incident where defendant had a prior record that included a felony conviction for possession of cocaine and misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and trespass); State v. Tice, 898 So.2d 268, 269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (holding that defendant’s latest felonies of burglary of a dwelling and resisting an officer without violence were not isolated incidents where defendant was previously convicted of resisting an officer without violence, two violations of probation, aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer).

Although the trial court noted a significant temporal break between appellee’s current offenses and his prior convictions, this was due to the fact appellee served considerable time in prison on his prior manslaughter conviction. We conclude ap-pellee’s criminal record was significant enough to preclude a downward departure sentence under section 921.0026(2)(j). Accordingly, we reverse appellee’s sentence and remand for resentencing. See Jackson v. State, 64 So.3d 90 (Fla.2011).

REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing.

WETHERELL and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Charles BUGGS, Deceased, by and Through Lita RENGIFO, Personal Representative, Appellant.
    No. 1D12-3836.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 9, 2013.
    Scott Distasio of Distasio Law Firm, Tampa; Celene H. Humphries and Sarah C. Pellenbarg of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa, for Appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition for approval of an attorney’s fees contract. Because the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of the applicable rule, we reverse.

Appellant chose the Distasio Law Firm to represent her in a medical malpractice action. Due to the nature of her claim, the firm would only represent her if she agreed to a straight 40% contingency fee. Pursuant to Rule 4 — 1.5(f)(4)(B)(ii) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Appellant signed the approved waiver of rights form and petitioned the circuit court for approval of the fee contract. Without holding a hearing and without making any factual findings, the circuit court denied the petition. This was error.

The rule provides that the trial court “shall” approve a petition “if the court determines the client has a complete understanding of the client’s rights and the terms of the proposed contract.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4 — 1.5(f)(4)(B)(ii). The comment to the rule also states that a trial court “must” approve the petition if the client understands the rights that are being waived and the contents of the contract. Comment to R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5. “[T]he court must give unambiguous language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless it leads to a result that is either unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent.” R.T.G. Furniture Corp. v. Coates, 93 So.3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “Shall” is normally interpreted as a mandatory term that creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. City of St. Petersburg v. Remia, 41 So.3d 322, 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Psychiatric Inst. of Delray, Inc. v. Keel, 717 So.2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Consequently, the plain language of the rule required the trial court to approve the petition as long as it found that Appellant understood the rights that she was waiving and the terms of the fee contract. We, therefore, reverse the order on appeal and remand with directions for the trial court to make a determination as to whether Appellant’s waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.

VAN NORTWICK, ROWE, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


author: LAGOA, J.

text:
    MAUNA LOA INVESTMENTS, LLC, Appellant, v. Anamaria SANTIAGO, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-1825.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 2013.
    Opinion on Rehearing Oct. 16, 2013.

      Easley Appellate Practice, PLLC, and Dorothy F. Easley, Miami; Austin Carr, Coral Gables, for appellant.
    Gregory A. Moore; Carlos Cruanes, Miami; Brannock & Humphries and Cel-ene H. Humphries, Riverview, Tracy S. Carlin and Sarah C. Pellenbarg, Tampa, for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ, LAGOA and SALTER, JJ.
   ON MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED

LAGOA, J.

We grant Anamaria Santiago’s Motion for Rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion filed on March 20, 2013, and substitute the following in its place.

Mauna Loa Investments, LLC (“Mau-na”), appeals from a final judgment entered in favor of Anamaria Santiago (“Santiago”) after a default was entered against it and a jury trial conducted on damages. Because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Mauna, we reverse.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Santiago leased space for her business in a commercial warehouse property located at 9325 Okeechobee Road, Hialeah Gardens (the “property”). In February 2010, Santiago filed suit against Mauna, alleging that she was injured on July 2, 2008, when she tripped and fell on the property “due to the walkway surface being in an unsafe condition; specifically that the concrete walkway was allowed to be in a condition of disrepair wherein holes and uneven areas where [sic] created and caused the Plaintiff to lose her footing and fall.” Santiago alleged that Mauna owned, maintained and/or controlled the property on the date of her injury. The complaint was served on Mauna’s registered agent, Ma-wanphy Gil (“Gil”). Although Gil gave the complaint to Mauna’s attorney, Mauna’s attorney never filed an answer or response. Santiago filed a motion for entry of default on May 5, 2010, and the trial court entered a default against Mauna on May 13, 2010.

Mauna subsequently filed no fewer than five motions seeking to have the default set aside; we address only one — Mauna’s Amended Motion to Set Aside Default filed on November 11, 2011 (the “Amended Motion”). In the Amended Motion, Mau-na argued that the default should be set aside because on the date of Santiago’s injury Mauna did not own the property. Mauna asserted that on the date of the injury the property was actually owned by Iberia, NV, LLC (“Iberia”). In support of its argument, Mauna argued that in June of 2011, Santiago filed a lawsuit against Iberia (the “Iberia Complaint”) seeking damages for the same injury. Indeed, on September 20, 2011, the trial court consolidated the Iberia Case with the instant case. In the Iberia Complaint, Santiago alleged that:

11. At the time of the accident, IBERIA and MARMOL [] were owners of the commercial property and they were responsible to maintain and control the commercial property located at 9325 Okeechobee Road, Hialeah Gardens, Florida.
12. At all times material hereto, IBERIA and MARMOL were responsible for the operation, maintenance and safety of the premises, and had a duty to maintain said premises in a safe condition.
41. On October 6, 2008 IBERIA conveyed the real property to MAUNA LOA by Special Warranty Deed recorded in Official Records Book 26610 at page 1133 of the public records of Miami-Dade County. (Attached as Exhibit “B”).

Mauna attached the Iberia Complaint to the Amended Motion. The Iberia Complaint, in turn, attached a special warranty deed showing the transfer of the property by Iberia to Mauna on October 6, 2008, three months after the date of Santiago’s injury. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the Amended Motion.,

The matter proceeded to a jury trial on Santiago’s damages. The trial court subsequently entered final judgment against Mauna in the amount of $1,077,390.48. Mauna filed several timely post-trial motions, including a motion to vacate the judgment as void because Mauna did not own or control the property on the date of Santiago’s injury and therefore it was a judgment against the incorrect party. The motion was denied. This appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

“[T]he law is well-settled that a default judgment may not be entered against a defendant on a complaint which wholly fails to state a cause of action against the said defendant.” Sunshine Sec. & Detective Agency v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp., 496 So.2d 246, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); accord Moynet v. Courtois, 8 So.3d 377, 378-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Morales v. All Right Miami, Inc., 755 So.2d 198, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc., 645 So.2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Becerra v. Equity Imports, Inc., 551 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). A default judgment must be set aside where the complaint fails to state a cause of action because “[fjailure to state a cause of action, unlike formal or technical deficiencies, is a fatal pleading deficiency not curable by a default judgment.” Becerra, 551 So.2d at 488. Moreover, “a motion to set aside a default judgment requires no allegations or showing of excusable neglect where the basis for the motion is that the allegations in the complaint do not entitle the plaintiff to relief,” id. at 488-89; the trial court has no discretion, but is obligated to vacate the default judgment. See Horton v. Rodriguez Espaillat Y Asociados, 926 So.2d 436, 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

At the time Mauna filed the Amended Motion, the trial court had before it the special warranty deed, which was attached to the consolidated Iberia Complaint. The special warranty deed established that Mauna did not own the property on the date of Santiago’s injury. Santiago also admitted that Iberia owned, controlled and maintained the property at that time. These facts precluded a claim for relief against Mauna relating to the property based on the alleged injury on that date. As the record before the trial court established that Santiago failed to state a claim for relief against Mauna, the trial court had no discretion but to grant the Amended Motion and set aside the default as void. Accordingly, because the final judgment was based upon the prior invalid default, the trial court erred in failing to grant Mauna’s motion to vacate the judgment as void. See Juan v. Fame Int’l Bay, Inc., 845 So.2d 338, 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (where final judgment was based upon invalid default, trial court erred in denying motion to set aside default and default final judgment); Morales v. All Right Miami, Inc., 755 So.2d 198, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing final default judgment where trial court erred in denying motion to set aside default).

For the reasons stated, we reverse the order denying Mauna’s motion to vacate the judgment as void, and remand with directions to vacate the default and the final judgment and to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

      . Marmol was the son of the owner who passed away in February of 2008.

      . Because the trial court’s order denied a motion to set aside a “simple default” on liability rather than a final default judgment, the order was a non-final, interlocutory ruling, which was not subject to appellate review until Mauna’s appeal from the final judgment. See Westwood One, Inc. v. Flight Express, Inc., 940 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Bruno v. A.E. Handy & Assocs., Inc., 787 So.2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Tieche v. Fla. Physicians Ins. Reciprocal, 431 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).

      . We note that the Amended Motion was denied by a prior, now-retired judge, and not by the current trial judge.

      . The fact that Santiago dismissed the Iberia Complaint pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) (2011) immediately pri- or to the hearing on Mauna's Amended Motion does not affect our analysis.


author: PER CURIAM. VICTORY, J.,

text:
    Misty HERNANDEZ v. Brandon JENKINS.
    No. 2012-CJ-2756.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 21, 2013.
    Mark David Plaisance, Baker, LA, for Applicant.
    The Miles Law Firm, LLC, Keelus Re-nardo Miles, for Respondent.

      .La. R.S. 9:355.12(A) provides:
      A. In reaching its decision regarding a proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors:
      (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the child's relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and with the nonrelocating parent, siblings, and other significant persons in the child's life.
      (2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into consideration any special needs of the child.
      (3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between the nonrelocating parent and the child through suitable visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.
      (4) The child's preference, taking into consideration the age and maturity of the child.
      (5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of the parent seeking the relocation, either to promote or thwart the relationship of tire child and the nonrelocating party.
      (6) Whether the relocation of the child will enhance the general quality of life for both the custodial parent seeking the relocation and the child, including but not limited to financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

        (7) The reasons of each parent for seeking or opposing the relocation.
      (8) The current employment and economic circumstances of each parent and whether or not the proposed relocation is necessary to improve the circumstances of the parent seeking relocation of the child.
      (9) The extent to which the objecting parent has fulfilled his or her financial obligations to the parent seeking relocation, including child support, spousal support, and community property obligations.
      (10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting parent.
      (11) Any history of substance abuse or violence by either parent, including a consideration of the severity of such conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation.
      (12)Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

   PER CURIAM.

|¾⅛ this child custody matter, we are called upon to determine whether the family court abused its discretion in denying a mother’s motion to relocate to another state with her minor child. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the record supports the finding that the family court failed to properly apply the relocation factors and therefore abused its discretion in denying the mother’s motion to relocate.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Misty Hernandez (“mother”) and Brandon Jenkins (“father”) are the parents of M.H., a minor child born in 2004. Although the parties were never married, the father executed an affidavit acknowledging paternity. Both parties resided in East Baton Rouge Parish.

Shortly after M.H.’s birth, the mother petitioned for paternity, custody and child support. In October 2004, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment which designated the mother as the domiciliary parent and granted the father custody every other weekend, with extended custody during holidays and summers. Additionally, the father agreed to pay $386 per month in child support, and forty-eight percent of the child’s insurance premiums and uncovered medical expenses.

|2In March 2011, the father petitioned to have child support reduced, alleging the parties entered into an extrajudicial custody agreement that included a reduction in support. In response, the mother asserted the father failed to fully pay child support during 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011, accumulating arrears of $1,424.00. The mother further claimed the father owed $5,445.20 as his share of child care costs. The mother also sought an increase in child support, based upon the father’s increase in income since the 2004 consent judgment, and her termination from employment because of a reduction in staff.

Before the court conducted a hearing on these motions, the mother filed a “Motion for Court Authorization to Relocate Child’s Residence,” seeking to relocate her residence and the residence of the child to Enterprise, Alabama. In her petition, the mother asserted she was engaged to be married to Gary Ray, who served in the Air National Guard and resided in Alabama. The mother indicated she recently had been laid off from her full-time employment as a mortgage processor in Louisiana and was presently working in a part-time capacity. She alleged the job opportunities in Alabama were more plentiful, and the relocation was “necessary to improve the circumstances of the Plaintiff/custodial parent and enhance the general quality of life for both the custodial parent/Plaintiff and the child.... ” Finally, she alleged the father has not paid the child support he owed and indicated she filed a motion for arrearages.

The matter proceeded to a hearing before the family court. At the hearing, the family court heard testimony from the mother, Mr. Ray, the father and the child’s paternal grandparents.

|sThe mother testified she .was M.H.’s primary caretaker since his birth. She indicated she had recently married Mr. Ray, who was employed as an aircraft mechanic at the Fort Rucker Army Base, which was approximately six miles away from Enterprise, Alabama. Mr. Ray has two children of his own. According to the mother, M.H. got along well with Mr. Ray’s children.

The mother testified she wished to move to Enterprise, Alabama, which was approximately five hours away from Baton Rouge. She asserted the move would not affect the father’s custody rights under the October 2004 stipulated judgment and proposed the parties could exchange custody by meeting at a halfway point near Mobile, Alabama.

Regarding her employment, the mother testified she worked in the mortgage industry but had been laid off. She was unable to find employment in the Baton Rouge area and had been working part-time at a shoe store, but that job ended. She described herself as “struggling” and noted both her mortgage and car note were behind. She had a job opportunity as a mortgage processing assistant in Alabama, which would allow her to work from home. As a result, she would not be required to place M.H. in child care after school.

The mother testified that if she was allowed to relocate, she could place M.H. in an elementary school which had a smaller class size than M.H.’s current school, Shenandoah Elementary. According to the mother, M.H. did “okay” at Shenandoah, but the classes there were big and there were complaints about M.H.’s first grade teacher.

The mother testified her relocation would not affect the father’s custody rights as set forth in the October 2004 stipulated judgment. She proposed that the parties maintain the every other weekend schedule, along with the agreed-upon holiday and bsummer schedule. Additionally, she pointed out she offered the father an additional week of custody during the spring break/Easter holiday, even though the October 2004 stipulated judgment provided only for Easter Sunday. She also indicated she would make every effort to allow the father to visit M.H. in the event the father was traveling near Alabama. She cited examples in the past where she allowed the father to see M.H. outside of the ordinary custody schedule and stated, “I’ve never told him no.”

The mother testified the father owed her past due child support in the amount of approximately $7,000. Although the court rendered a judgment for this amount in May 2011, the father had not paid any portion of this judgment at the time of the August 2011 hearing. The mother testified the father continued to pay his current child support, but has been paying it later than the 1st and 15th of the month. As evidence of late payment, she produced an envelope for the June 15 payment which was postmarked June 27.

Upon relocation, M.H. would have medical, dental and vision insurance coverage through Mr. Ray’s employer. Mr. Ray worked from 5:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and would be able to assist in taking care of M.H. The mother testified M.H. got along very well with Mr. Ray.

Mr. Ray testified that he has lived in Alabama for over ten years. He was under a six-year contract with the National Guard of Alabama, and had four years remaining on his contract. He looked for work in Louisiana, but was unable to find any positions. Mr. Ray testified he was willing to help the mother care for M.H. Mr. Ray noted M.H. referred to him as “Dad,” but testified he did not request that M.H. refer to him in that manner.

UM.H.’s paternal grandmother, Donna Jenkins, testified she frequently saw M.H. or talked with him on the phone. Mrs. Jenkins, a retired teacher, helped M.H. with homework, and encouraged M.H. to read books. She testified her son (M.H.’s father) had a “good salary” and was able to provide a “nice permanent home” for M.H. She indicated her family was involved in many clubs and organizations in the Baton Rouge area, and felt these family activities added a lot to M.H.’s life. She considered M.H. to be a “very important part of our family,” and she “would love for him to be a part of it.”

M.H.’s paternal grandfather, Kenneth Jenkins, testified he engaged in several activities with M.H., including fishing and hunting, and going to LSU games. Mr. Jenkins considered M.H.’s father to be a good provider for M.H., and believed he had a stable work history. Mr. Jenkins felt that if M.H. moved to Alabama, he probably would have no contact with M.H. during the time he was in Alabama unless he initiated a phone call, and would “miss out on a relationship.”

The father testified that he opposed the relocation of M.H. to Alabama. He felt it was in M.H.’s best interest to remain in Louisiana.

The father indicated he actively participated in M.H.’s education. According to the father, the school M.H. attended, Shenandoah Elementary, was a blue ribbon school and “probably the best elementary public [school] in our area.” M.H. had some problems with reading skills, and the father worked with a teacher to address those weaknesses. However, on cross-examination, the father admitted he did not enroll M.H. with a reading coach until the summer, despite the fact M.H. was struggling during the school year.

The father testified that over the past three or four years, he and the mother had an informal agreement to exercise custody on an alternating fourteen-day basis, where Reach party had M.H. for seven days. He assumed that if the mother and M.H. relocated to Alabama, they would return to the original arrangement under the 2004 agreement under which he had custody every other weekend and on alternating holidays.

The father testified M.H. interacted with his family “all the time,” and enjoyed activities such as hunting or fishing. His mother and father, as well as his sister and brother-in-law were nearby, in addition to friends and neighbors. The father described his support network as “gigantic.”

The father admitted he owed approximately $7,000 in past child care and child support, which had been unpaid for nearly three months. However, he testified he was timely in paying his current child support obligations.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court denied the mother’s motion to relocate. In lengthy oral reasons for judgment, the family court acknowledged the mother’s request to relocate was made in good faith, and recognized the relocation would have benefits for both the mother and the child. Nonetheless, the family court emphasized the negative impact of the relocation on M.H.’s relationship with his father and relatives in Louisiana:

The challenge is I do find that this custodial arrangement that is proposed in this case by Ms. Hernandez does have a negative impact on the child’s relationship and the child’s time with his father. That is [M.H.’s] time with his father. I find it problematic because Mr. Jenkins’ visitation would in fact be limited by the distance 2½ hours for travel for the father to pick up the child, as well as the mother to meet him twice in a weekend, twice a month. And for the child that is 5 hours of travel on a Friday and 5 hours of travel on a Sunday. So 10 hours within that 3 day period.' I also find that the distance would restrict the weekday interactions between the father and the child, and contact between the child and the extended family; particularly the grandparents which [illegible] seems to be consistent and significant. And I make a distinction because [the mother’s counsel] continuously made great points with the witnesses 17to distinguish the weekend time which while limited by.the travel, Mr. Jenkins and his family members will still get to enjoy, like I don’t think he’s going to miss like an LSU game and think he’ll still get to go hunting and fishing, although there will be some limitations with the time. It is for that reason that I was very concerned about what [M.H.] had been enjoying in terms of a custodial arrangement with his parents prior to the time that this litigation started.

The mother appealed. A five-judge panel of the court of appeal affirmed the family court’s judgment in a split decision. Hernandez v. Jenkins, 12-0097 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/30/12) (not designated for publication). Two judges dissented, explaining that as a result of the family court’s decision, “M.H. and his mother are sentenced to remain in financial difficulties because of limited employment opportunities, and she is unable to join with her husband in providing emotional and financial support for M.H. as a member of their family.”

Upon the mother’s application, we granted writs to consider the correctness of the family court’s judgment denying the mother’s motion for relocation. Hernandez v. Jenkins, 12-2756 (La.3/15/13), 109 So.3d 370. The sole issue presented for our consideration is whether the family court abused its discretion in denying the motion to relocate.

DISCUSSION

A parent seeking to relocate the principal residence of the child is required to show: (1) the request for relocation is made in good faith; and (2) the move is in the | Rchild’s best interest. La. R.S. 9:355.13; Curole v. Curole, 02-1891 (La.10/15/02), 828 So.2d 1094, 1097. La. R.S. 9:355.12(A) sets forth twelve factors which the court must consider in determining whether the proposed relocation is in the best interest of the child. However, there is no requirement that the court give ^preferential consideration to any factor. Gray v. Gray, 11-0548 at p. 18 (La.7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1247,1255. Where the trial court has considered the factors listed under La. R.S. 9:355.12 in determining whether relocation is in the best interest of the child or children, the court’s determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gathen v. Gathen, 10-2312 at p. 1 (La.5/10/11), 66 So.3d 1, 2.

In the instant case, the family court determined the mother satisfied the first part of her burden under La. R.S. 9:355.13 by establishing the request for relocation is made in good faith. We agree. The mother’s testimony indicates the request for relocation was based on her recent marriage to her new husband, who lived and worked in Alabama. Additionally, she testified she was unable to find employment in her field in Louisiana, but had found a position in Alabama. This testimony supports the conclusion that the mother’s request to relocate was made in good faith.

We now turn to the question of whether the mother proved the relocation is in the child’s best interest. In this regard, the family court recognized the relocation would have tangible benefits for the child. This determination is supported by uncon-troverted evidence in the record establishing that the child would derive a financial benefit from the mother’s employment in Alabama, as well as Mr. Ray’s |inincome and insurance coverage. Additionally, the family court found the child would receive intangible benefits in the form of emotional support from being in a family unit with the mother, Mr. Ray, and his children.

However, in denying the relocation, the family court emphasized the negative impacts on the child’s relationship with his father, explaining that the father’s visitation would be “be limited by the 2½ hours for travel for the father to pick up the child.... ” Additionally, the court found the distance would restrict interactions between the father, his extended family and the child.

La. R.S. 9:355.12(A)(1) directs the court to consider “[t]he nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the relationship of the child with the person proposing relocation and with the non-relocating person, siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life” [emphasis added]. From the family court’s reasons for judgment, it appears the court focused on the potential negative impacts which might result to the non-relocating parties, such as increased travel time for the father. However, we believe the focus of this provision is on the impact of the relocation on the child, as opposed to the impact on the non-relocating persons.

From the evidence in the record, we conclude the relocation would not significantly impact the child’s relationship with his non-relocating family members. To be sure, there will be some level of inconvenience for the father. Nonetheless, the mother has committed to maintain the current custody schedule set forth in the October 2004 stipulated judgment, providing the father with custody every other weekend, over the summer and during specified holidays. Additionally, the mother’s Intestimony indicates she is willing to do everything possible to foster a good relationship between the child and his father, as shown by her willingness to give the father an extra week of custody over the Easter holidays. Considering the entirety of this evidence, we believe any impact of the relocation on the child’s ability to maintain a close relationship with his non-relocating relatives is likely to be minimal.

Additionally, we do not believe the family court gave proper weight to La. R.S. 9:355.12(A)(9), which directs the court to consider “[t]he extent to which the objecting person has fulfilled his financial obligations to the person seeking relocation, including child support, spousal support, and community property, and alimentary obligations.” The undisputed evidence in the record reveals the father owed approximately $7,000 in past due child support and child care costs. Despite testimony in the record indicating the father had stable employment and received a good salary, he had made no effort to pay any of the arrearages at the time of the August 2011 hearing. Although the mother testified he continued to pay his current child support obligation, she pointed out he was consistently late in his payments.

In reasons for judgment, the family court stated, “I cannot emphasize enough how the timely payment of child support and paying off those arrears is important and will become even more important now.” Nonetheless, as observed by the dissenting judge in the court of appeal, the family court did not acknowledge that the father’s failure to comply with his support obligation exacerbated the mother’s financial difficulties resulting from her inability to find work in her chosen field. The father’s failure to fully comply with his support obligations, while at the same time opposing the mother’s request for relocation, exposes the child to an uncertain and untenable financial future. This factor, when considered together with the financial benefit to |i2the mother and child resulting from the move, weighs in support of the proposed relocation.

In summary, we conclude the record supports the determination that the relocation will have positive benefits for the child. We further find the record establishes the relocation will not significantly affect the current custody schedule, nor will it adversely affect the child’s relationship with his Louisiana relatives. Under these circumstances, we find the family court abused its great discretion in denying the mother’s motion to relocate.

In reaching this conclusion, we do not intend to repudiate the well-settled principle that the trial court is afforded great discretion in relocation matters. Rather, our decision today stands only for the proposition that under the specific facts presented in this case, the family court failed to properly weigh and apply the relevant factors. An analysis of the relevant facts in light of undisputed evidence in the record leads to the inescapable conclusion that the family court clearly abused its discretion in denying the relocation.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and hereby render judgment in favor of plaintiff, Misty Hernandez, granting her motion to relocate her residence and the residence of the child to Enterprise, Alabama.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff, Misty Hernandez, granting her motion to relocate her residence and the residence of the child to Enterprise, Alabama.

VICTORY, Justice, dissents.

VICTORY, J.,

dissents.

_JjI dissent and find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

      . On May 10, 2011, the family court rendered judgment in favor of the mother and against the father, finding that as of the date of the judgment, the father owed child support ar-rearages of $1,424.40 and child care costs of $5,445.20.. The family court also declined to find the father in contempt and continued without date the mother’s motion for modification of child support.

      . Despite a request by this court, the father declined to file an opposition to the mother's writ application. After the case was docketed and a formal briefing order issued to the parties, the father failed to file a brief or participate in oral argument.

      . At the time of the hearing of this case in 2011, the burden of proof in relocation cases was set forth in La. R.S. 9:355.13. By 2012 Act No. 627, the legislature amended and renumbered the statute as La. R.S. 9:355.10. In amending the statute, the legislature removed language from the prior version providing that in determining the child's best interest, "the court shall consider the benefits which the child will derive either directly or indirectly from an enhancement in the relocating parent’s general quality of life.” Section 4 of the act provides "[t]his Act shall not apply to any litigation pending on the effective date of this Act regarding the relocation of the principal residence of a child, but shall apply to any subsequent relocation after final disposition of that litigation.” Because this litigation was commenced prior to the August 1, 2012 effective date of Act 627, the 2012 amendments are not applicable to the instant case.

      . In 2012, La. R.S. 9:355.12 was amended and renumbered as La. R.S. 9:355.14. As discussed in footnote 3, supra, that amendment is not applicable to the instant case.

      . As discussed in footnote 3, supra, the version of La. R.S. 9:355.13 in effect at the time of the hearing in this case mandates the court to “consider the benefits which the child will derive either directly or indirectly from an enhancement in the relocating parent’s general quality of life.” Unquestionably, the evidence in this case establishes the relocation to Alabama will enhance the mother’s general quality of life, and this enhancement will have both direct and indirect benefits for the child.

      . In reaching this conclusion, we do not depart from our holding in Gathen v. Gathen, 10-2312 at p. 17 (La.5/10/11), 66 So.3d 1, 12, in which we found a father’s failure to pay child support weighed against him, but "does not mandate that relocation be approved.” As in Gathen, the father’s fáilure to pay past due child support in this case is not by itself grounds for approving relocation, but is a factor to be considered along with the overall financial difficulties the child might encounter if relocation is denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin GRAY.
    No. 2013-KK-1326.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 28, 2013.
   PER CURIAM.

| jWrit granted. The State seeks supervisory relief’from the Trial Court’s ruling suppressing evidence found in the defendant’s possession. In reviewing whether the Trial Court erred in suppressing the evidence, we find error in the Trial Court ruling, reverse, and remand for trial.

Officers received an anonymous tip that defendant, who was selling various items from a table on Canal Street in front of a restaurant, was also selling drugs. The tipster gave a detailed description of the defendant and his location. On the way to that location, the officer called the informant who stated, more particularly, she had observed the defendant reach behind the table, retrieve an unknown item, and hand it to another individual for money. Upon arriving at the scene, officers observed an individual, who matched the description, selling items as described. Officers approached the defendant and informed him that they were investigating a call regarding an individual fitting the defendant’s description suspected of selling drugs. Defendant responded, “You are just doing your job, then do your job.” One of the officers then went to the right side of the table and saw a black backpack behind the table. The officer bent down and detected the smell of marijuana emanating from the backpack. The officers then read the defendant his Miranda | ¡.rights and asked the defendant if the backpack belonged to him, to which the defendant responded affirmatively. The officers looked in the bag and observed a handgun and a clump of loose marijuana.

As an initial matter, “law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, or by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen.... ” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)(White, J.); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)(“[T]he proposition that police officers can approach individuals as to whom they have no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially incriminating questions .... is by no means novel; it has been endorsed by the Court any number of times.”) (citations omitted). Thus, an encounter between a police officer and a citizen “will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. at 2386. Police officers remain free to approach any citizen to ask him a few questions “as long as [they] do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435, 111 S.Ct. at 2386. State v. Richardson, 09-0638 (La.10/20/09), 23 So.3d 254.

The plain view doctrine renders a warrantless search reasonable: (1) if the police officer is lawfully in the place from which he views the object; (2) where the object’s incriminating character is immediately apparent; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); State v. Willis, 36,759 (La.App. 2 Cir.4/9/03), 843 So.2d 592, writ denied, 04-1219 (La.4/1/05), 897 So.2d 593. The plain smell |sexception is an extension of the plain view exception. State v. Allen, 10-1016 (La.5/7/10); 55 So.3d 756.

In this case, the defendant was in a public place when officers arrived. Although the Trial Court was concerned with the sufficiency of the anonymous tip, that analysis was not relevant because the officers were in a place where they were legally entitled to be. Upon informing the defendant of their interest, the defendant told the officers, “You are just doing your job, then do your job.” This was nothing more than a consensual encounter. Officer Collins then went to the side of the table and, observing the bag, bent over and smelled marijuana coming from the backpack. At that point, based on the plain smell doctrine, and being where the officers lawfully had a right to be, the officers were well within their constitutional bounds to search the backpack and its contents. Accordingly, the evidence discovered pursuant to the search should not have been suppressed.

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Trial Court, granting defendant’s motion to suppress, is hereby reversed. Defendant’s motion to suppress is denied and the case is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings.

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT REVERSED; MOTION DENIED; REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT.


author: GUIDRY, Justice.

text:
    Derek Alan POCIASK v. Kera MOSELEY.
    No. 2013-C-0262.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 28, 2013.

      Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, LLP, Kermit Louis Roux, III, Isaac Harrington Ryan, for applicant.
    Lila Molaison Samuel, for respondent.
   GUIDRY, Justice.

hln this disavowal action, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Derek Alan Pociask, and allowed him to disavow paternity of the minor child, J.M. The appellate court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, Kere Moseley, finding the plaintiffs action was prescribed under Article 189 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, and dismissing the action with prejudice. We granted the plaintiffs application for supervisory writs, and for the reasons set forth below, we reverse the court of appeal’s decision and reinstate the judgment of the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kera Moseley and Derek Pociask were married on October 11, 1997, in New Orleans. One child, E.P., was born of the marriage on April 4, 1999. The parties physically separated on April 30, 2006. On March 15, 2007, Ms. Moseley gave birth to another child, J.M. Following a hearing on Ms. Moseley’s rule to show cause on May 14, 2007, the district court rendered a judgment of divorce. On July 15, 2008, Mr. Pociask was notified by the State of Louisiana that Ms. Moseley had asserted he is the father of J.M.

| ¡.Thereafter, on August 19, 2008, Mr. Pociask, hereinafter “the plaintiff,” filed a petition to disavow paternity of J.M. Ms. Moseley, hereinafter “the defendant,” responded by filing a peremptory exception of prescription. In her exception, the defendant asserted that, pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 189, the plaintiff did not file his petition to disavow paternity within one year of J.M.’s birth. Following a hearing, the district court signed a judgment overruling the exception of prescription. On January 20, 2011, the parties entered into a consent judgment, whereby the district court ordered that J.M. submit to a DNA test within ten days. The results of the DNA test revealed that the plaintiff was not the biological father of J.M.

On July 21, 2011, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment under La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 966, asserting that, because he is not the biological father of J.M., he is entitled to summary judgment granting his petition and formally finding that he is not the father of J.M. The defendant countered with her own motion for summary judgment alleging the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the exception to the time limitation set forth in the second paragraph of La. Civ.Code art. 189. She claimed the parties did not live separately and apart continuously during the three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of J.M. The defendant alleged the plaintiff had admitted to returning to the matrimonial domicile in New Orleans on the weekend of May 25, 2006, spending at least one night at the domicile while the |,.¡defendant was present, and that the defendant visited the plaintiff and E.P. in Pennsylvania, at the plaintiffs residence, in June of 2006.

At the hearing on the exception of prescription conducted on October 18, 2010, it was stipulated that the plaintiff, who resided in Pennsylvania, made a visit to New Orleans on or about May 25, 2006, to attend the wedding of his brother. While there, he stayed at the former matrimonial domicile for one night, possibly two; the defendant was present in the home for one night. It was also stipulated that the defendant in June 2006 made a “journey” to Pennsylvania, where the plaintiff lived, to pick up or drop off E.P. It was disputed whether she stayed at the plaintiffs residence in Pennsylvania.

A hearing on the parties’ motions for summary judgment was conducted on October 17, 2011. The defendant conceded the plaintiff was not the biological father of J.M., given the results of the DNA test, and admitted the plaintiff had had a vasectomy prior to the pregnancy at issue. The defendant asserted that Louisiana recognizes dual paternity; that the impossibility of the child not being the plaintiffs biological child is not a relevant inquiry; that the plaintiff knew about the birth of the child and that it was not his, but failed to file his petition within one year of the child’s birth; and that the plaintiff could not avail himself of the suspension exception to the time limitation in Article 189 because he had only lived separate and apart from the defendant continuously for 292 days, given the one night they were present together in the matrimonial domicile in May 2006.

Following the hearing, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the former husband. In its oral reasons given at the hearing, the district court found that the one night stay at the matrimonial domicile in May 2006 did not interrupt the requisite period of time for the parties to be living separate and apart | continuously. The district court reasoned that the “living separate and apart continuously” language in the article on bringing the disavowal action should be read in pari materia with similar language found in the articles on divorce, La. Civ.Code arts. 102 and 103. The court noted that, under the jurisprudence interpreting the divorce articles, short visits did not interrupt the time period in order to obtain a final divorce. On May 14, 2012, pursuant to a remand order from the court of appeal, the district court signed an amended judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the former husband and ordering that he shall be allowed to disavow paternity of the minor child, J.M.

The court of appeal reversed the district court’s ruling and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, finding the plaintiffs disavowal action was prescribed. Pociask v. Moseley, 12-0440 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/12), 2012 WL 6738168 (unpublished). Citing our decision in Gallo v. Gallo, 03-794, pp. 7-8 (La.12/3/03), 861 So.2d 168, 173-74, the court reasoned it must strictly apply the articles governing disavowal actions. The court of appeal, strictly construing the phrase “living separate and apart continuously” for three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child, reasoned that the two visits between the parties resulted in the parties not living separate and apart continuously for the three hundred days immediately preceding the |Bbirth of the minor child. Therefore, the court found, the plaintiffs claim did not fall within the exception to the general one-year time limitation for commencing the disavowal action, that is, within one year of the actual or constructive knowledge of the birth of the child.

We granted the plaintiffs writ application to review the correctness of the court of appeal’s ruling. Pociask v. Moseley, 13-0262 (La.4/1/13), 110 So.3d 590.

DISCUSSION

The parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The defendant properly raised in her motion the defense of prescription, and thus bears the burden of proof at trial on the peremptory exception. Wells v. Zadeck, 11-1232, p. 7 (La.3/30/12), 89 So.3d 1145, 1149; Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632, p. 6 (La.7/6/10), 45 So.3d 991, 997. However, if prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the action has not prescribed. Wells v. Zadeck, p. 7, 89 So.3d at 1149. A summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate; i.e. whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc., 11-1566, p. 7 (La.7/2/12), 94 So.3d 750, 755; Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726, pp. 3-4 (La.2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 882-83.

The burden of proof remains with the movant; however, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mov-ant’s burden on the motion does not require | fihim to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 966(C)(2). Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

The motions for summary judgment at issue here arise in the context of a petition for disavowal of paternity. The defendant has asserted a defense of prescription, asserting the plaintiffs disavowal action was not filed within one year of the birth of the child, nor did the parties live separate and apart continuously for three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child, such that the suspensive exception to the one-year limitation in La. Civ.Code art. 189 is similarly unavailing to the plaintiff. The issue thus presented in the instant case is whether the former husband timely filed his petition for disavowal of paternity.

“The sources of law are legislation and custom.” La. Civ.Code art. 1. In Louisiana, legislation is the superior source of law. La. Civ.Code art. 1, cmts. (a) and (c). Legislation cannot be abrogated by custom. La. Civ.Code art. 3. Therefore, the starting point of our analysis is with the codal articles to determine the status of the parties and their reciprocal rights and obligations. Gallo, 03-794, p. 6, 861 So.2d at 173.

It is a longstanding principle of our civil law tradition that the husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a child born either during the marriage or within three hundred days from the date of the termination of the marriage. La. Civ.Code art. 185. However, the husband may disavow paternity of the child by clear and convincing evidence that he is not the father, though the testimony of the |7father must be corroborated by other evidence. La. Civ.Code art. 187. The petition for disavowal of paternity must be brought within the time limitations set forth in La. Civ.Code art. 189, which provides as follows:

The action for disavowal of paternity is subject to a liberative prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the day the husband learns or should have learned of the birth of the child.

There is an exception suspending this time limitation contained in the second paragraph of La. Civ.Code art. 189:

Nevertheless, if the husband lived separate and apart from the mother continuously during the three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child, this prescription does not commence to run until the husband is notified in writing that a party in interest has asserted that the husband is the father of the child.

In Gallo, we explained that the policy embodied in the restrictive provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with the action to disavow is “to protect innocent children, born during marriage, against scandalous attacks upon their paternity by the husband of the mother, who may be seeking to avoid paternal obligations to the child.” Gallo, p. 7, 861 So.2d at 173 (citing Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 7-8, 87 So.2d 707, 709 (1956)). Thus, “the traditional and historical position of Louisiana jurisprudence was to zealously guard and enforce the presumption of paternity” created by the Civil Code. Id. (citing Pounds v. Schori, 377 So.2d 1195, 1200 (La.1979)). “The fundamental ends achieved by such court action were preservation of the family unit, avoidance of the stigma of illegitimacy, and aversion to the disinheritance that resulted from a successful disavowal action.” Id. Accordingly, we found the public interest in dispelling doubts as to legitimacy demanded the establishment of a relatively short time limitation for bringing challenges, a consideration which had contributed to the |sfinding in Pounds v. Schori, that the period of time in which a husband must file a suit for disavowal to defeat the presumption of his paternity is peremptive. Id., p. 8, 861 So.2d at 174.

In 1999, twenty years after Pounds v. Schori, this court noted that once the bonds of matrimony are dissolved by divorce, the state’s interest in preserving the marital family wanes. See T.D. v. M.M.M., 98-0167, p. 4 (Knoll, Justice, concurring) (La.3/2/99), 730 So.2d 873, 878-879. We observed in Gallo that, “Although some rights spring from the dissolution of a lawful marriage, today’s realities are that illegitimacy and ‘broken homes’ are neither rarities nor stigmas as in the past.” Id. In Gallo, we pointed to then-recent changes in this area of the law, which included legislation making the presumption regarding paternity rebuttable instead of conclusive; Louisiana’s recognition of dual paternity; and the acceptance of DNA testing as conclusive scientific evidence of biological paternity. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). Since our 2003 decision in Gallo, these legislative changes have continued, as following a fourteen-year project of the Louisiana Law Institute culminating in the 2005 amendments to the law of filiation, the legislature inter alia changed the time limitation for instituting a disavowal action from the more rigorous peremptive term recognized in Pounds v. Schorl to an explicitly prescriptive one. Acts 2005, No. 192, Sect. 1, eff. June 29, 2005; La. Civ.Code art. 189, cmt. (a); see also Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who’s Your Momma, Who are Your Daddies?: Louisiana’s New Law of Filiation, 67 La. L.Rev. 307 (2007); Rachel L. Kovach, Comment, Sorry Daddy — Your Time Is Up: Rebutting the Presumption of Paternity in Louisiana, 56 Loy. L.Rev. 651(2010).

A similarly liberalizing legislative change was effected in the second paragraph of La. Civ.Code art. 189, to suspend the time period for filing the |9disavowal action if the husband continuously lived separate and apart from the mother during the three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child. See Acts 1999, No. 790, Sect. 1; Spaht, 67 La. L.Rev. at 314. No such suspension of prescription was provided for until the 1999 amendment, which incorporated the living separate and apart language long used in the codal articles governing divorce. See La. Civ.Code arts. 102 and 103. This suspension for filing the disavowal action was incorporated into the Law Institute’s revision of Article 189 and has been continued in the 2005 legislation. See Spaht, 67 La. L.Rev. at 314. The professed intent behind these changes in the law of filiation is to bring legal and biological paternity into closer association. Id.

With this history in mind, we turn to the issue at hand: whether the overnight visit between the parties in this ease interrupted the three-hundred day requirement for the parties to live separate and apart continuously. The plaintiff argues the | mphrase “living separate and apart continuously” is a term of art within the family law context which has a long and settled interpretation for obtaining a “no fault” divorce under La. Civ.Code arts. 102 or 103, that is, no longer living openly as husband and wife. See Hava v. Chavigny, 147 La. 330, 84 So. 892 (1920) (recognizing that couples could live under the same roof for weeks or months and yet still be deemed “living separate and apart”). The plaintiff argues that in applying this requirement, Louisiana courts have recognized impermanent or intermittent visits, or even sexual intercourse, between separated spouses will not serve to interrupt the continuity of a legal separation. See Lemoine v. Lemoine, 97-1626 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/1/98), 715 So.2d 1244 (evidence that husband and wife went on several trips together and had intermittent sexual relations during the time period after filing for divorce was insufficient to establish the parties had reconciled, where husband rented separate residence, never moved back into the marital home, never stayed in the marital home for more than a few days, and stated that he had no intent to resume the marriage). The plaintiff argues the jurisprudence establishes that, to prove reconciliation interrupting the continuity of separation, the overall circumstances must show a mutual intention by the parties to voluntarily resume their marital relationship. See Millon v. Millon, 352 So.2d 325 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977). Here, the plaintiff argues, there was no evidence in the record that the parties had reconciled or even had attempted to reconcile. Moreover, to obtain the divorce, the defendant attested that the parties had lived separately and apart continuously from the plaintiff from April 30, 2006, through May 14, 2007, the day of the hearing on the rule to show cause. Thus, the plaintiff argues, the exception in Art. 189 applies, and his petition was timely filed within one year of being given notice in writing by the State that a party in interest had asserted that he is the father of the child.

|nThe defendant on the other hand argues there remains a strong public policy in Louisiana to favor the legitimacy of children, citing Gallo and Drew. Thus, she contends the court of appeal properly applied a strict construction of the prescription article on disavowing paternity. She further contends the appellate court properly declined to read the prescription article, La. Civ.Code art. 189, in pari materia with the articles on divorce, La. Civ.Code arts. 102 and 103, because the purposes and public policy considerations behind disavowal actions and divorce actions are vastly different. The defendant contends the provisions on paternity and divorce do not pertain to the same subject matter and the language therein should be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law, citing La. Civ. Code art. 10.

The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent and the ascertainment of the reason or reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law. In re: Succession of Boyter, 99-0761, p. 9 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature. Id.; Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044, p. 5 (La.7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, 766. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will, and therefore, interpretation of a law involves primarily a search for the legislature’s intent. La.Rev.Stat. § 1:4 (2004); La. Civ.Code art. 2; Lockett v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Development, 03-1767, p. 3 (La.2/25/04), 869 So.2d 87, 90. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La.Civ.Code art. 9; Lockett, 03-1767 at p. 3, 869 So.2d at 90-91; Conerly v. State, 97-0871, p. 3-4 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 709, 710-11.

1 i2The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and placing a construction on the provision in question that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting it. Boyter, 99-0761 at p. 9, 756 So.2d at 1129; Stogner, 98-3044 at p. 5, 739 So.2d at 766. The statute must, therefore, be applied and interpreted in a manner that is consistent with logic and the presumed fair purpose and intention of the legislature in passing it. Boyter, 99-0761 at p. 9, 756 So.2d at 1129. This is because the rules of statutory construction require that the general intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting the law must, if possible, be given effect. Id.; Backhus v. Transit Cas. Co., 549 So.2d 283, 289 (La.1989). It is presumed the intent of the legislature is to achieve a consistent body of law. Stogner, 98-3044 at p. 5, 739 So.2d at 766.

La. Civ.Code art. 13 provides that, where two statutes deal with the same subject matter, they should be harmonized if possible. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 96-0732, 96-0741, p. 2 (La.11/25/96), 699 So.2d 351, 358 (on rehearing). It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that all laws dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia. La. Civ. Code art. 17; Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury, 518 So.2d 1044, 1047 (La.1988). Statutes are in pari materia— pertain to the same subject matter — when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. 2B Sutherland Stat. Const. § 51:3, p. 222 (7th ed.2012).

We' hold that the phrase “living separate and apart continuously” in the divorce articles and the disavowal action article found in our Civil Code should be read in pari materia. The codal articles on divorce and those on filiation and disavowal of paternity are found in Book 1 of our Civil Code, entitled “Of 11?,Persons,” and clearly relate or pertain to the same class of persons, that is, families in some state of flux, and to the same or strikingly similar objects, that is, the dissolution of marital and filial relationships. Compare State in Interest of Johnson, 465 So.2d 134 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985) (termination and abandonment statutes are similar because they both deal with the termination of parental rights, though for different reasons), aff'd, 475 So.2d 340 (La.1985). Although Articles 102 and 103 apply the subject language in setting forth grounds for divorce without fault, and Article 189 applies the subject language in delineating a time limitation for liberative prescription of the disavowal action, they both involve the husband and wife living separate and apart continuously in the context of a dissolving marital or filial relationship. Further, as in this case, a disavowal action is most often precipitated by a divorce between the mother and the presumed legal father. Simply stated, but for the marriage, there would be no disavowal action under Art. 189. Therefore, it is logical to interpret a provision or language in the disavowal article similarly to the same provision or language in the divorce articles.

Finally, the legislature, when it amended Art. 189 in 1999 and reenacted it in 2005, was certainly aware of the phrase “living separate and apart continuously” as used in the divorce articles, which language had been long and consistently interpreted and applied by the courts of this state such that the phrase has acquired a “peculiar and appropriate meaning” in the area of family law. “Technical words 114and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” La.Rev.Stat. 1:3. There is no indication, and the parties have not directed us to any legislative history, that, when the legislature adopted the subject phrase found in the divorce articles for use in the disavowal action article — first in 1999 and then again in 2005, it intended a different meaning to apply. While we continue to adhere to our policy of strictly construing the codal provisions dealing with filiation, we cannot ignore either the context of the known terms and phrases employed by the legislature in creating an exception to the running of the time limitation for a disavowal action or the trend of the legislative changes in this area of the law.

Accordingly, reading La. Civ.Code art. 189 in pan materia with La. Civ.Code arts. 102 and 103, we find the district court correctly concluded that one overnight visit in the former matrimonial domicile when both parties were present did not interrupt the three-hundred-day time period required for the former husband to live separate and apart continuously from the mother to avail himself of the exception to the running of prescription set forth in Art. 189. There is no dispute the parties maintained separate residences in different states commencing from their separation on April 30, 2006, when the plaintiff moved to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, through the date of the birth of the child on March 15, 2007, 319 days later. The mother, in obtaining the "divorce, attested she had lived separate and apart from the plaintiff from April 30, 2006, through the date of the divorce on May 14, 2007. Aside from the one night visit on or about May 25, 2006, in which the parties were present in the former matrimonial domicile, there is no evidence the parties did not hold themselves out to the community as living separate and apart. There are no allegations of cohabitation, sexual relations or reconciliation 11fithat might serve to defeat or interrupt the requirement of living separate and apart for three hundred days. Thus, we find no error in the district court’s determination that the parties had lived separate and apart continuously for the three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child.

Accordingly, the district court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, allowing him to disavow paternity of the minor child J.M. The plaintiff established that he had lived separate and apart continuously from the mother for the three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child on March 15, 2007. He was first given notice on July 15, 2008, that the mother had asserted he was the father of J.M. and that the mother was seeking child support. The plaintiff timely filed his disavowal petition on August 19, 2008, well within the one-year time limitation provided for in Art. 189. Because there is no dispute that the plaintiff is not the biological father of the child, summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was warranted.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing the law and jurisprudence, we hold the court of appeal erred in not reading La. Civ.Code art. 189 in pari materia with La. Civ.Code arts. 102 and 103 before determining whether the husband and mother had lived separate and apart continuously for the three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child. The district court correctly found that one overnight visit, absent any allegation of cohabitation, sexual relations, or reconciliation, did not serve to interrupt the three-hundred day period. Thus, the district court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Derek Alan Pociask, and allowed him to disavow paternity of [1fithe minor child, J.M. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the court of appeal’s decision and reinstate the judgment of the district court.

REVERSED; DISTRICT COURT’S JUDGMENT REINSTATED

      . La. Civ.Code art. 189 provides as follows:
      The action for disavowal of paternity is subject to a liberative prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the day the husband learns or should have learned of the birth of the child.
      Nevertheless, if the husband lived separate and apart from the mother continuously during the three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child, this prescription does not commence to run until the husband is notified in writing that a party in interest has asserted that the husband is the father of the child.

      . La. Civ.Code art. 102 provides as follows:
      Except in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted upon motion of a spouse when either spouse has filed a petition for divorce and upon proof that the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, has elapsed from the service of the petition, or from the execution of written waiver of the service, and that the spouses have lived separate and apart continuously for at least the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, prior to the filing of the rule to show cause.
      The motion shall be a rule to show cause filed after all such delays have elapsed.
      La. Civ.Code art. 103 provides in pertinent part as follows:
      Except in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted on the petition of a spouse upon proof that:
      (1) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously for the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, or more on the date the petition is filed....

      . As previously stated, a complete revision of the law concerning filiation was enacted in 2005. See State, Dept. of Social Services, Office of Family Support ex rel. K.B.D. v. Drew, 46,337 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/29/11), 70 So.3d 1011, 1013. The Chair and Reporter of the Persons committee of the Louisiana Law Institute commented on the revision in 2005 and 2006 of the articles governing proof of filiation:
      One clearly stated objective of the revision of the law of filiation: to more closely align biological and legal paternity. Yet, the series of articles devoted to the mother’s contestation action recognizes that this alignment must pose the least possibility of potential harm to the child and the family. The objective of aligning biological and legal paternity principally reflects dissatisfaction with the historical application of the presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of the child conceived or born during marriage. The presumption had become virtually irrebuttable. Even before the Law Institute revision passed in 2005, legislative changes to the time period for instituting a disavowal action markedly liberalized the rebuttal of the presumption of the husband's paternity. The liberalizing legislative change that suspended the time period if the child was born more than three hundred days after a continuous physical separation of the mother and her husband was incorporated into the Law Institute's revision. In addition, the revision took an additipnal liberalizing step by converting what was arguably a peremptive time period for instituting the action into an explicitly prescriptive period, subject to both suspension and interruption. Thus, the potential for more closely aligning legal and biological paternity exists by virtue of the continued liberalization of the rules regulating the disavowal action by the husband and, for the first time, extending an action of contestation to the mother of the child.

        Spaht, 67 La. L.Rev. at 314.

      . "Living separate and apart” for purposes of obtaining a final divorce means , the parties live apart in such a manner that those in the community are aware of the separation. Lemoine v. Lemoine, 97-1626 p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/1/98), 715 So.2d 1244, 1248 (citing Billac v. Billac, 464 So.2d 819- (La.App. 5 Cir.1985); Quinn v. Brown, 159 La. 570, 105 So. 624 (1925); Arnoult v. Letten, 155 La. 275, 99 So. 218 (1924); Hava v. Chavigny, 147 La. 330, 84 So. 892 (1920)). Reconciliation is a defense that may be asserted to extinguish a cause of action for divorce pursuant to La. Civ.Code art. 102. La. Civ.Code art. 104; Lemoine, pp. 9-10, 715 So.2d at 1248. Reconciliation occurs when there is a mutual intent to reestablish the marital relationship on a permanent basis. Woods v. Woods, 27,199 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/23/95), 660 So.2d at 135. The motives and intentions of the parties to reestablish the marital relationship are questions of fact determined by the trial court from the totality of the circumstances. Id.


text:
    EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the CITY OF BATON ROUGE, and Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Randy P. ZINNA d/b/a Law Offices of Randy P. Zinna, and Continental Casualty Company.
    No. 2013-CC-0937.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 28, 2013.
   PER CURIAM.

11 Considering the unique facts of this case, we find the district court did not err in denying the exception of peremption. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the district court is reinstated. Case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy SHELTON.
    No. 2013-KK-1791.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 25, 2013.
   ORDER

| (Writ granted. Probable cause was present for a search warrant. The defendant made voluntary statements cooperating with police then consented in writing to a search of his residence, stating that there had been no coercion.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jefferson D. Hughes III Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Robert Lawrence KURT.
    No. 2013-OB-2119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 27, 2013.
   ORDER

| Considering the Petition for Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by petitioner, Robert Lawrence Kurt,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Robert Lawrence Kurt, Louisiana Bar Roll number 2252, seeking to voluntarily resign from the practice of law in the State of Louisiana pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVIII, § 5 be and is hereby granted.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jefferson D. Hughes III Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    Staci BAKER v. Jock Nalty BAKER.
    No. 2013-C-1218.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Baker, Jock Nalty; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 122,047; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0911.

Denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 10-DB-077.
    No. 2013-OB-1729.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Wiley, Christopher George;— Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 10-DB-077.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring this matter to the disciplinary board for its consideration.


text:
    Clodie BRUMFIELD v. ALLSTATE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2266.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 2, 2013.
   In re Fluor Enterprises Inc.; TRS Staffing Solutions Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2007-02610; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1046.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RURAL DEVELOPMENT (formerly Farmers Home Administration), United States Department of Agriculture v. Azzett Johnson MATTHEWS and Unopened Succession Of Evelyn Matthews Bradford.
    No. 2013-CC-2297.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 2, 2013.
   In re Bradford, Charles Henry; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2010-11; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. CW 13-48720.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD v. LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, AON Risk Services, Inc. of Louisiana, James Lawler, ABC Insurance Company, Clarendon America Insurance Company, Essex Insurance Company, Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company (an Ace USA Company) and RSUI Indemnity Company.
    No. 2013-C-2205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 2, 2013.
   In re RSUI Indemnity Company; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2006-7342; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0095.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Barry EDGE.
    No. 2013-KK-2343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 2, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. W-04-3-77; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1689.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Shenan Smith PURVIS v. GRANT PARISH SCHOOL BOARD and Jana Lashley.
    No. 2013-C-1424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Grant Parish School Board; Lash-ley, Jana; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Grant, 35th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 17427 C/W 17850 C/W 18053; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1325.

Granted.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-022.
    No. 2013-OB-1572.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Shelton, Dehlice; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-022.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-PDB-141.
    No. 2013-OB-1622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Gibson, Philip; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-PDB-141. •

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-001.
    No. 2013-OB-1656.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Goshkarian, Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-001.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-034.
    No. 2013-OB-1889.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Tyson, Sharon Diamond; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-034.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-040.
    No. 2013-OB-1974.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Crystal Kinler, et al.; Kinler, Gerard; — Other(s); Applying For Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board No. 13-PDB-040 Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-040.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-045.
    No. 2013-OB-2009.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Allen, Kenan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-045.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lanford Anthony PAYNE.
    No. 2013-KO-0065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Payne, Lanford Anthony; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated June 14, 2013, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 10-F-1704; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,481-KA.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James Anthony COFFMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0361.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Coffman, James Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated July 31, 2013, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 148,794, 148,795; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,095-KH.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael FRANCOIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Francois, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated July 31, 2013. Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 2012-188485, 2012-119978; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 2083.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vernon GOODLOW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1800.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Goodlow, Vernon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 9870; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 0700.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rocaldo Raynard WEITERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1904.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Weiters, Rocaldo Raynard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 486455; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 1920.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vernon GOODLOW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2115.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Goodlow, Vernon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 9870; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1155.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darrell ROBINSON.
    No. 2012-KP-2294.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Robinson, Darrell; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 243-583.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ryan Preston PRATT.
    No. 2012-KP-2424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Pratt, Ryan Preston; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 124353; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 11-01500.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ernest CHENEVERT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-OK-0267.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Chenevert, Ernest; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 369081, 369138; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW1659.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joe Lee GRADY, Jr.
    No. 2013-K-0294.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Grady Jr., Joe Lee; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 245,612; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-622-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy D. SMITH.
    No. 2013-K-0472.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Smith, Timothy D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 491-266; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0664.

Denied.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ., would grant to remand to the court of appeal for reconsideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Lee BURKS, III.
    No. 2013-KO-0504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Burks III, James Lee; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 15911-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 12-567.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jason Lamounte MORGAN.
    No. 2013-KO-0505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Morgan, Jason Lamounte; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 22538-10; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 12-778.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Malcolm ALEXANDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Alexander, Malcolm; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 80-1260; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-22.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony Wayne DENNIS, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-0515.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Dennis Jr., Anthony Wayne;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 30011-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-866.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne Kevin JONES.
    No. 2013-KO-0516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Jones, Wayne Kevin; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 20609-10; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-864.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne Kevin JONES.
    No. 2013-KO-0530.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   In re Jones, Wayne Kevin; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 20609-10; to the Court of Appeal Third Circuit, No. 12-863.

Denied.