author: LEWIS, J.

text:
    George JACKSON, et al., Petitioners, v. The SHAKESPEARE FOUNDATION, INC., et al., Respondents.
    No. SC11-1196.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 31, 2013.

      Jean Marie Downing of Downing Law Offices, P.A., Panama City Beach, FL, for Petitioners.
    Leonard E. Ireland, Jr. of Clayton-Johnston, P.A., Gainesville, FL, for Respondents.
   LEWIS, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Shakespeare Foundation, Inc. v. Jackson, 61 So.3d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), and concerns whether an action for fraud is within the scope of an arbitration provision in a contract for the purchase and sale of real property. The First District certified.that its decision is in conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Maguire v. King, 917 So.2d 263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

FACTS

In 2006, George Jackson, Kerry Jackson, and the Jackson Realty Team, Inc. (“the Jacksons”) decided to sell the real property that is the subject of the contract which forms the basis of this dispute. They posted the following advertisement in the Bay County Multiple Listing Service:

This is a Great affordable housing project. Estimate from North Bay Engineering is $17,500 to get you to Dev order stage. Topography and boundary survey completed recently by Dragon Surveying to be included in price. Property is 165' on Everitt Avenue and 396' deep, totally cleared and filled except for 10' around fence line. Zoning per City of PC is MU2, Mixed Use 2, Multi Family duplex, triplex or quadra-plex be built on the property. Recently tapped into Panama City Water and Sewer, with new commercial grade pump/lift station on site. Local Engineering company has platted 10 duplexes could fit 6 4 plexes. Zoned 20 units per acre or 30 units total. Wetlands study verifies No Wetlands. One of Sellers is Licensed Fl. Realtor.

(Emphasis added.) When the Jacksons posted this advertisement, they had in their possession a Property Report Land Use Planning Analysis, which established, contrary to the advertisement, that 25% of the subject property constituted wetlands.

The Jacksons and the Respondents — the Shakespeare Foundation, Inc., and the Herd Community Development Corp. (collectively the “Shakespeare Foundation” or the “Foundation”) — entered into negotiations for the purchase of the real property. During the negotiations, the Shakespeare Foundation advised the Jacksons that they intended to develop the property into a twenty-seven unit low-income housing development. The Shakespeare Foundation relied on the representations set forth in the advertisement and entered into a contract with the Jacksons for the purchase of the real property.

In July 2007, after the Shakespeare Foundation tendered full payment to the Jacksons for the property, the Foundation held an onsite meeting with a builder and engineer. The builder reported that the property might contain wetlands. The Shakespeare Foundation hired an engineering firm to perform a wetlands delineation on the property. The firm provided the Shakespeare Foundation with a report that established that 0.39 acres of the 1.5 acre property was wetlands rendering it unbuildable. The wetlands constituted 26% of the entire tract which was equal to nine of the twenty-seven units that the Shakespeare Foundation had intended to develop.

The Shakespeare Foundation thereafter filed an action against the Jacksons for fraudulent misrepresentation. In the complaint, it was alleged that in the advertisement for the sale of the property, the Jacksons knowingly and falsely misrepresented that the property had no wetlands and that the property was suitable for the construction of thirty units, and the Shakespeare Foundation relied on these misrepresentations when entering into the contract. The Shakespeare Foundation contended that if it had been known that 26% of the property constituted wetlands, the property would have never been purchased because that percentage of wetlands made use of the property “economically unfeasible.” The Shakespeare Foundation also asserted that the existence of the wetlands led to a delay in project development. It was alleged that this delay of time caused the Foundation to miss a favorable real estate market in which the subject property could have been sold, and placed them in one of the worst real estate markets in the modern era.

The Jacksons moved to dismiss the Shakespeare Foundation’s action. They asserted that the fraud claim arose out of, and was related to, the contract and, therefore, fell within the arbitration provision of the contract. The arbitration provision in the contract, titled “Default and Dispute Resolution,” states:

14. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: This Contract will be construed under Florida law. All controversies, claims, and other matters in question arising out of or relating to this transaction or this Contract or its breach will be settled as follows:
(a) Disputes concerning entitlement to deposits made and agreed to be made: Buyer and Seller will have 30 days from the date conflicting demands are made to attempt to resolve the dispute through mediation. If that fails, Escrow Agent will submit the dispute, if so required by Florida law, to Escrow Agent’s choice of arbitration, a Florida court or the Florida Real Estate Commission. Buyer and Seller will be bound by any resulting award, judgment, or order.
(b) All other disputes: Buyer and Seller will have 30 days from the date a dispute arises between them to attempt to resolve the matter through mediation, failing which the parties will resolve the dispute through neutral binding arbitration in the county where the Property is located. The arbitrator may not alter the Contract terms or award any remedy not provided for in this Contract. ... This clause will survive closing.

(Emphasis added.) The Jacksons contended that the contractual provisions required the Shakespeare Foundation to submit the fraud claim to binding arbitration. It was asserted that this provision required binding arbitration of the fraud claim because the scope of the contractual provision included all claims “arising out of or relating to this transaction or this Contract.” (Emphasis added.)

The trial court subsequently granted the Jacksons’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the arbitration provision in the contract required that the parties submit the fraud claim to arbitration. The Shakespeare Foundation appealed the judgment of dismissal to the First District Court of Appeal. See Shakespeare Found., 61 So.3d at 1196.

Decision of the First District

On appeal, the First District examined whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action. See id. at 1197-98. The crux of the appellate court’s review was whether the fraud claim of the Shakespeare Foundation was within the scope of the arbitration provision of the contract. See id. at 1198.

The district court below concluded that the arbitration provision of the subject contract was broad in scope because its terms were to apply to all claims or controversies “arising out of or relating to” the contract. See id. (concluding that the “or relating to” language rendered the arbitration provision broad in scope). The district court then held that a claim falls within a broad arbitration provision if a “significant relationship” — i.e., a “contractual nexus” — exists between the contract and the claim. See id.

The district court, however, determined that the fraud claim here did not come within the broad scope of the arbitration provision because the fraud claim arose from a general duty established under the common law; not from an obligation arising under the contract. See id. at 1199. More specifically, the district court concluded that the fraud claim did not significantly relate to the contract because determination of this claim required neither reference to nor construction of the contract. See id. Rather, the district court held that the claim rested on the alleged false statements in the published advertisement and the general common law duty not to make fraudulent misrepresentations. See id. The court further determined that the fraud claim was not within the scope of the arbitration provision because the contract was only incidental to the dispute since the Shakespeare Foundation had the ability, as well as the right, to assert a fraud claim before the parties executed the contract. See id. The district court also concluded that the express language of the contract evinced an intent that a fraud claim would not be litigated under the contract and its arbitration provision. See id. Specifically, the district court held that the express language of the contract only contemplates remedies for a breach of contract action, and prohibits an arbitrator from providing a remedy not specifically provided for in the provisions of the contract, such as a remedy in the event of a tort or fraud action. See id.

The First District ultimately held that the action based on fraud was not a dispute subject to arbitration under the contract, reversed the trial court’s order, and certified conflict with the decision of the Fifth District in Maguire. See id. at 1201.

Conflict Case

In Maguire, a buyer entered into a contract to purchase real property from the sellers. See 917 So.2d at 264. The sellers represented that the real property would include two acres of drainage rights. See id. The parties articulated and reduced those rights into written form in an addendum to the purchase contract. See id. After the parties closed on the contract, the buyer discovered that the sellers had previously transferred one acre of the agreed upon two acres of drainage rights in a previous sale of a different parcel. See id. The buyer filed an action against the sellers for specific performance, breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. See id. at 265. Pursuant to an arbitration provision in the contract that is identical to the provision at issue in this case, the sellers moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. See id. The trial court granted the motion .with regard to the specific performance and contract claims, but denied the motion to compel arbitration with regard to the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. See id. The trial court held that the arbitration provision did not apply to those claims because the claims were founded in tort law. See id.

On appeal, the Fifth District reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to compel arbitration of the fraud and misrepresentation claims. See id. at 268. The appellate court held that a contractual nexus existed between the misrepresentation claims and the contract because the contract contained a broad arbitration provision, and the buyer based the misrepresentation claims on duties created by the contractual relationship between the parties. See id. at 266 (“[T]he tort claims are nonsensical when divorced from the contractual obligation to deliver approximately two acres of drainage rights.”). According to the appellate court, the fraudulent misrepresentation and fraud in the inducement claims arose from conduct pertaining to the agreement — i.e., the misrepresentation regarding the drainage rights which had been specifically incorporated into the written contract. See id. at 267.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co. Ltd., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000). This Court’s review of an order dismissing an action and compelling arbitration is limited to the four corners of the complaint and its incorporated attachments. See Minor v. Brunetti, 43 So.3d 178, 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). The purpose of the review is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint; not to determine factual issues. See id. All well pled allegations in the complaint are taken as true, with all reasonable inferences to be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. The issue in this case also concerns ,a matter of contract interpretation, which is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Chandler v. Geico Indem. Co., 78 So.3d 1293, 1296 (Fla.2011).

Applicable Rules of Law

Generally, the three fundamental elements that must be considered when determining whether a dispute is required to proceed to arbitration are: (1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived. See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla.1999). Arbitration provisions are contractual in nature and remain a matter of contractual interpretation. See id. The intent of the parties to a contract, as manifested in the plain language of the arbitration provision and contract itself, determines whether a dispute is subject to arbitration. See id. Courts generally favor such provisions, and will try to resolve an ambiguity in an arbitration provision in favor of arbitration. See id.; see also Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So.2d 952, 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

Two basic types of arbitration provisions have emerged: (1) provisions with language and application narrow in scope, and (2) provisions with language and application broad in scope. See Seifert, 750 So.2d at 636-37. An arbitration provision that is considered to be narrow in scope typically requires arbitration for claims or controversies “arising out of’ the subject contract. See id. at 636. This type of provision limits arbitration to those claims that have a direct relationship to a contract’s terms and provisions. See id. In contrast, an arbitration provision that is considered to be broad in scope typically requires arbitration for claims or controversies “arising out of or relating to ” the subject contract. See id. at 637 (emphasis added). The addition of the words “relating to” broadens the scope of an arbitration provision to include those claims that are described as having a “significant relationship” to the contract — regardless of whether the claim is founded in tort or contract law. See id. at 637-38.

A “significant relationship” between a claim and an arbitration provision does not necessarily exist merely because the parties in the dispute have a contractual relationship. See id. Rather, a significant relationship is described to exist between an arbitration provision and a claim if there is a “contractual nexus” between the claim and the contract. See id. at 638. A contractual nexus exists between a claim and a contract if the claim presents circumstances in which the resolution of the disputed issue requires either reference to, or construction of, a portion of the contract. See id. More specifically, a claim has a nexus to a contract and arises from the terms of the contract if it emanates from an inimitable duty created by the parties’ unique contractual relationship. See id. at 639. In contrast, a claim does not have a nexus to a contract if it pertains to the breach of a duty otherwise imposed by law or in recognition of public policy, such as a duty under the general common law owed not only to the contracting parties but also to third parties and the public. See id.

For example, in Seifert, this Court examined whether a negligence claim in a wrongful death action was within the scope of a broad arbitration provision in a contract for the sale and purchase of real property. See 750 So.2d at 635. The Court held that a significant relationship did not exist between the negligence claim and the contract, and, as a result, the claim did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision. See id. at 642.

The wrongful death action in that case arose after a wife and husband purchased a home. See id. at 635. After the couple moved into the home, the husband died inside the home due to the inhalation of carbon monoxide. See id. at 635. This death occurred because an air conditioner located in the garage area captured carbon monoxide emissions from a running car engine in the garage and transmitted the toxic emissions into the living area of the home. See id. The wife, as personal representative of her husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death action against the sellers of the home for strict liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. See id. The sellers moved to compel arbitration with regard to the negligence-type claims, arguing that although the claims were founded in tort law, all of the claims were within the scope of the arbitration provision in the purchase contract:

13. ARBITRATION. Any controversy or claim arising under or related to this Agreement or to the Property (with the exception of “consumer products” as defined by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 et seq., and the regulations promulgated under the Act) or with respect to any claim arising by virtue of any representations alleged to have been made by the Seller or Seller’s representative, shall be settled and finally determined by mediation or binding arbitration as provided by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Section 1 — 14) and similar state statutes and not by a court of law.

Id. (emphasis added).

This Court disagreed with the sellers. See id. at 640-42. We held that the negligence-type claims did not have a significant relationship to the contract because they were founded in the tort of common law negligence and were unrelated to any unique legal duties imposed under the contract, i.e., the actions were predicated on the sellers’ breach of general common law duties of care owed to the injured parties; not on a breach of a unique duty imposed under the contract. See id. The holding was supported by reference to the total absence of any mention of rights regarding personal injury or negligence actions in the contract. See id. We concluded that the absence of such language further signified that the parties did not intend for the arbitration provision to apply to the negligence-type claims. See id. at 641-42.

Instant Case

We hold that the action here based on fraud is within the scope of the arbitration provision because it has a clear contractual nexus with, and thus a significant relationship to, the contract. This relationship exists because: (1) the fraud claim is inextricably intertwined with both the circumstances that surrounded the transaction from which the contract emanated and the contract itself; and (2) resolution of the fraud claim requires the construction and consideration of duties arising under the contract.

In this case, as in Seifert, the contract at issue has a broad arbitration provision because it subjects “[a]ll controversies, claims, and other matters in question arising out of or relating to this transaction or this Contract or its breach” to binding arbitration. (Emphasis added.) See Seifert, 750 So.2d at 637 (holding that an arbitration provision which contains the phrase “arising from or relating to” is considered a broad arbitration provision because of the addition of the “or relating to” language). However, in Seifert, this Court concluded that the negligence-type claims at issue did not have a significant relationship to a contract that had a broad arbitration provision because a contractual nexus did not exist between the claims and the contract. See id. at 640 — 42. We held that this was because the claims did not require some reference to or construction of the contract, and pertained to the duty of care imposed by general common law in recognition of public policy. See id. at 637, 640-41.

In contrast to Seifert, here, although the fraud claim is based on common law fraud, it is inextricably intertwined with both the circumstances that surrounded the transaction from which the contract emanated and the contract itself. As alleged in the complaint as a basis for the action, the genesis of the fraud claim is that the Jacksons knowingly misrepresented facts in the published advertisement that the subject property did not contain wetlands when, in fact, the Jacksons knew of the wetlands’ existence through their own previous study which established that wetlands constituted 25% of the property. The Shakespeare Foundation allegedly relied on the misrepresentations in the published advertisement and entered into the contract. The subsequent damages the Shakespeare Foundation allegedly incurred arose from the contract itself, i.e., by entering into the contract, the Foundation suffered the economic damage of owning property it was unable to develop or sell.

Therefore, unlike the negligence-type claims in Seifert, the fraud claim at issue here is inextricably intertwined with both the transaction from which the contract arose and the contract itself — the reliance element of the claim emanates from the transaction from which the contract arose, and the damages element of the claim arises from the execution and existence of the contract itself. Accordingly, the fraud claim has a significant relationship to the contract and is within the scope of the contract’s broad arbitration provision.

Furthermore, the resolution of the fraud claim requires reference to and construction of both the contract’s arbitration provision and its “as is” provision. In particular, the arbitration provision of the contract limits the remedies for disputes arising from the contractual relationship to those provided in the contract, stating that the “arbitrator may not alter the Contract terms or award any remedy not provided for in this Contract.” The express remedies in the contract are limited to the parties’ rights in the event of a default, and the contract does not mention the parties’ remedial rights in the event of a fraud or tort action.

This limitation of remedies in the arbitration provision may have an impact on the contract and the arbitration provision. See Hialeah Auto., LLC v. Basulto, 22 So.3d 586, 590-91 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding as unconscionable an arbitration provision that resulted in the waiver of common law and statutory remedies). However, we do not resolve such questions here as they were not presented for review nor addressed by the district court below. These are issues that remain for consideration below as we address only the initial question concerning whether the arbitration clause may apply.

The adjudication of the fraud action may also require reference to and the construction of the “as is” provision of the contract. More specifically, the resolution of the fraud claim may require a determination as to whether that claim is negated due to an election of the “Feasibility Study” option under the “as is” provision of the contract. By electing this option, the Shakespeare Foundation may have accepted the property “as is” for the intended use and waived any claims. See Gilman v. Butzloff, 155 Fla. 888, 22 So.2d 263, 265 (1945) (“A party may waive any right to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred by statute, or guaranteed by the Constitution.”). Although the Shakespeare Foundation’s election of the option may not result in a waiver of the fraud claim, whether this argument is viable will require reference to, and the construction of, the contract and all other facts. See, e.g., D & M Jupiter Inc. v. Friedopfer, 853 So.2d 485, 488-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Oceanic Villas Inc. v. Godson, 148 Fla. 454, 4 So.2d 689, 690 (1941)) (concluding that although a claim for fraudulent inducement of a contract may vitiate an “as is” provision, such a determination requires an examination of the contract and the circumstances surrounding its execution, and a resolution of whether a fraudulent representation occurred).

The decision in Maguire is also consistent with our holding. There, the parties entered into a contract for the sale of real property that contained an arbitration provision identical to the provision we consider in this case. There, as here, the aggrieved party filed an action for fraud. In relying on Seifert, the Fifth District in Maguire held that a contractual nexus existed between the fraud claims and the contract because the contract contained a broad arbitration provision, and the buyer based the fraud claims on misrepresentations regarding the property that was the subject of the contract, which were relied upon by the buyer in executing the contract. See Maguire, 917 So.2d at 266. Similarly, in this case, a contractual nexus exists between the fraud claim and the contract because the Jacksons allegedly misrepresented facts in the published advertisement concerning the property that was the subject of the contract, and the Shakespeare Foundation allegedly relied on those misrepresentations in entering into the contract. Therefore, in both Ma-guire and this case, the fraud claims at issue had a significant relationship to the contracts and were within the scope of the respective contracts’ arbitration provisions.

Lastly, decisions from the United States Supreme Court and other state courts support the conclusion that the fraud claim here is within the scope of the broad language of the arbitration provision at issue. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 397-403, 406, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967) (holding that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was within the scope of a contract that required arbitration for “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof’); Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 817 A.2d 149, 155 (Del.2002) (holding that a fraud claim was within the scope of a broad arbitration provision that required the contracting parties to arbitrate “any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or in connection with” the contract); Green Tree Agency, Inc. v. White, 719 So.2d 1179, 1180 (Ala.1998) (holding that a claim of fraud in the inducement was within an arbitration clause that required arbitration for “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract”); Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 379 Mass. 762, 400 N.E.2d 858, 860-61 (1980) (holding that a claim for fraud in the inducement was within the scope of an arbitration provision that required arbitration for all claims and disputes “arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof’); Flower World of Am., Inc. v. Wenzel 122 Ariz. 319, 594 P.2d 1015, 1016-17, 1019 (App.1978) (holding that a fraud claim was within the scope of an arbitration provision that required arbitration for “any controversy, dispute, claim or question arising out of, in connection with, or in relation to this Agreement or its interpretation, performance, or any breach thereof’).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we conclude that the fraud action here filed by the Shakespeare Foundation has a contractual nexus with, and a significant relationship to, the contract between the Shakespeare Foundation and the Jacksons and is, as a general principle, within the scope of the contract’s broad arbitration provision. We do not determine nor do we address any other issue beyond this threshold determination. We, therefore, quash the decision below, remand for further consideration, and approve the decision in Maguire to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

POLSTON, C.J., and CANADY, J., concur in result.

      . A "wetlands delineation” is "the act of establishing the boundary between wetlands and uplands (or non-wetlands).” The Wetlands Regulation Center, Wetlands Delineation Under the Clean Water Act, http://www. wetlands.com/regs/tlpge02h.htm (last visited January 15, 2013).

      . An aggrieved party proves common law fraud by establishing that: (1) the opposing party made a misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) the opposing party knew or should have known the falsity of the statement, (3) the opposing party intended to induce the aggrieved party to rely on the false statement and act on it, and (4) the aggrieved party relied on that statement to his or her detriment. See, e.g., Butler v. Yusem, 44 So.3d 102, 105 (Fla.2010) (listing the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation).

      . In the contract, the Shakespeare Foundation elected the following provision:
      (1) Feasibility Study: Buyer will, at Buyer's expense and within 30 days from Effective Date ("Feasibility Study Period”) determine whether the Property is suitable, in Buyer’s sole and absolute discretion, for use. Buyer will deliver written notice to Seller prior to the expiration of the Feasibility Study Period of Buyer’s determination of whether or not the Property is acceptable. Buyer’s failure to comply with this notice requirement will constitute acceptance of the Property as suitable for Buyer’s intended use in its "as is " condition.

      (Emphasis added.)


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PARIENTE, J. LABARGA, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Bob GRAHAM, et al., Petitioners, v. Mike HARIDOPOLOS, etc., et al., Respondents.
    No. SC11-2453.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 31, 2013.

      Robin Gibson of Gibson Law Firm, Lake Wales, FL, for Petitioners.

      Daniel Cramer Brown and Christine Davis Graves of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents.
   PARIENTE, J.

The issue presented to the Court in this case is one of constitutional construction: whether the Legislature or the constitutionally created Board of Governors has the power to control the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees for the Florida university system under article IX, section 7(d), of the Florida Constitution. In 2007, the Legislature passed several statutes and included a provision in the 2007-2008 General Appropriations Act that exerted control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees. The Petitioners challenge these statutes as unconstitutional, contending that the 2002 constitutional amendment creating the Board of Governors transferred the authority over tuition and fees to the Board, divesting the Legislature of any power over these funds.

Although the question in this case is whether the challenged statutes are constitutional, the answer hinges on our interpretation of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, we address whether the 2002 amendment to the Florida Constitution creating the Board of Governors and transferring to the Board the power to “operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system,” art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const., carried with it the power to control tuition and fees and thereby divested the Legislature of that authority. The First District Court of Appeal held that this constitutional amendment did not transfer to the Board the authority to set and appropriate for the expenditure of tuition and fees and, therefore, that the challenged statutes were valid. Graham v. Haridopolos, 75 So.3d 315, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Because the district court expressly declared a state statute valid, this Court has jurisdiction.

For the reasons more fully explained below, we hold that the constitutional source of the Legislature’s control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees derives from its power under article VII, sections 1(c) and (d), of the Florida Constitution to raise revenue and appropriate for the expenditure of state funds. The language of the 2002 amendment, now contained in article IX, section 7, is devoid of any indication of an intent to transfer this power to the Board of Governors. Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature has exercised control over these funds are facially constitutional and approve the First District’s decision.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

Prior to 2001, the Board of Regents, a statutorily created entity, managed the state university system under the control and supervision of the State Board of Education. The Board of Regents was abolished as of July 1, 2001, by the Legislature and its powers were transferred to a new entity known as the Florida Board of Education.

In apparent response to the Legislature’s actions, a constitutional amendment was proposed by citizen initiative that “sought to amend the Florida Constitution to create a system of governance for the state university system.” In re Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. ex rel. Local Trustees, 819 So.2d 725, 727 (Fla.2002). In November 2002, the voters approved the proposed amendment to article IX of the Florida Constitution, establishing “a system of governance for the state university system of Florida” and creating the Board of Governors to “operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” See art. IX, § 7(a), (d), Fla. Const. The amendment, which had been proposed by a citizen initiative petition and is now contained in article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution, provided in pertinent part as follows:

SECTION 7. State University System.—
(a) PURPOSES. In order to achieve excellence through teaching students, advancing research and providing public service for the benefit of Florida’s citizens, their communities and economies, the people hereby establish a system of governance for the state university system of Florida.
(b) STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM. There shall be a single state university system comprised of all public universities. A board of trustees shall administer each public university and a board of governors shall govern the state university system.
(d) STATEWIDE BOARD OF GOVERNORS. The board of governors shall be a body corporate consisting of seventeen members. The board shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system. These responsibilities shall include, but not be limited to, defining the distinctive mission of each constituent university and its articulation with free public schools and community colleges, ensuring the well-planned coordination and operation of the system, and avoiding wasteful duplication of facilities or programs. The board’s management shall be subject to the powers of the legislature to appropriate for the expenditure of funds, and the board shall account for such expenditures as provided by law....

Art. IX, § 7, Fla. Const.

In 2007, the Legislature enacted the challenged statutory provisions involving tuition and fees. See § 1011.41, Fla. Stat. (2007) (stating that funds provided to state universities in the General Appropriations Act were contingent upon each university complying with tuition and fee policies established by the Legislature); § 1011.4106, Fla. Stat. (2007) (stating that any appropriations provided in the General Appropriations Act from the Education/General Student and Other Fees Trust Fund are the only budget authority for the universities to expend tuition and out-of-state fees and that the expenditure of tuition and fee revenues from local accounts by each university shall not exceed the authority provided in the General Appropriations Act unless otherwise approved); § 1011.91, Fla. Stat. (2007) (stating that except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, all monies received by universities from, among other things, student fees authorized in section 1009.24 are appropriated to the use of the universities collecting the same, to be expended by the university board of trustees pursuant to detailed budgets filed with the Board of Governors). In addition, the Legislature included similar language in the 2007-2008 General Appropriations Act.

Shortly thereafter, the Petitioners in this case, as individually named plaintiffs in their capacity as citizens and taxpayers, sought a declaratory judgment that the above-referenced statutes were unconstitutional because they violated article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution. The Board of Governors itself is not a party to this case. The Petitioners do not allege that any of the specific tuition and fee policies set by the Legislature are unconstitutional as applied, but rather broadly assert that the Legislature no longer has the power to control tuition and fees. In other words, the Petitioners contend that while the Legislature retains appropriations authority over the portion of university funding derived from general revenue, the Legislature was divested of authority over the funding stream generated by tuition and fees.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Legislature, ruling that the statutes in question were constitutional because article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution “does not reveal an intent to remove the Legislature’s historic revenue-raising and appropriations authority over tuition and fees at public universities granted in Article VII, Section 1, and Article IX, Section 1, of the Constitution.”

On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statutes were constitutional. The First District rejected the Petitioners’ attempt to “draw a distinction between general revenue funds, which they concede still fall within the Legislature’s constitutional appropriation power, and tuition and fees, which they categorize as ‘agency’ funds within the Board’s exclusive control.’ ” Graham, 75 So.3d at 317. The First District reasoned that “[t]he legislative power to raise funds is not limited to the imposition of taxes; it includes the power to impose fees necessary to offset the costs of using state government services. Likewise, the power of appropriation is not limited to certain types of funds; it extends to all funds in the State Treasury from whatever source.” Id. at 318. With respect to university tuition and fees, the First District held that they “are unquestionably state funds; they are collected by state universities for the use of their services and the monies collected are deposited into the State Treasury.” Id.

The First District therefore framed the issue as whether the constitutional amendment establishing the Board divested the Legislature of its “power of the purse” over state tuition and fees by vesting that authority in the Board. Id. at 319. Addressing this question, the First District held:

[W]e see nothing in the language of [the amendment] or its history that would suggest that such a fundamental change in the Legislature’s power was intended or effectuated.
Article IX, section 7(d) provides that the Board is “fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” But this provision also makes clear that the Board’s management of the university system is “subject to the powers of the legislature to appropriate for the expenditure of funds.” Id. This express subrogation of the Board’s management authority to the Legislature’s appropriation power, coupled with the absence of any language in article IX, section 7 referring to tuition and fee setting, undermines Appellants’ argument that the intent of this provision was to grant the Board such authority.
Not only is there no reference to tuition or fees in the language of article IX, section 7(d), there was no indication in the ballot title or summary for [the amendment] that the Legislature’s exclusive and plenary appropriations power was being in any way limited with respect to the state university system.
We are unaware of any entity other than the Legislature in the history of our state that has been authorized by the Florida Constitution to exercise the quintessential legislative power of raising and appropriating state funds. Thus, if as [Petitioners] contend, such authority was vested in the Board by [the amendment], it would be an unprecedented change in our state’s government.
The fact that such a fundamental change in the Legislature’s powers was in no way described in the ballot title or summary is a strong indication that it was not an intended result. Indeed, had that been the intent of the amendment, the Florida Supreme Court likely would have found the ballot summary to violate the single-subject requirement for initiative petitions.

Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the First District concluded that article IX, section 7(d), did “not grant the Board authority to set and appropriate tuition and fees; rather, as it was prior to the adoption of [the amendment], that power is vested exclusively in the Legislature” under the Legislature’s appropriations power. Id. at 321.

ANALYSIS

In analyzing the issue presented in this case, it is important to be clear at the outset as to what this case is not about. This case is not about an as-applied challenge to a specific tuition and fee policy or a contingency attached to an appropriation that would encroach on the Board’s constitutional responsibility to manage the state university system. Although the attorney for the Legislature stated in oral argument that the appropriations power includes the authority to attach contingencies to the appropriation of funds, relying on Florida Department of Education v. Glasser, 622 So.2d 944, 948 (Fla.1993), we emphasize that such authority is not without limits. The question of determining the limits on attaching contingencies with respect to the Board, however, is not before the Court in this case. Nor is this case about which entity has control over monies from federal grants or private donations to universities.

The sole issue presented in this case is whether the 2002 constitutional amendment creating the Board of Governors transferred authority over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees from the Legislature to the Board, and whether the challenged statutes exercising control over tuition and fees are therefore facially unconstitutional. “Because the issue before the Court involves the determination of a statute’s constitutionality and the interpretation of a provision of the Florida Constitution, it is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc. (FACDL), 978 So.2d 134, 189 (Fla.2008). Although the Court’s review is de novo, “statutes come clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and must be construed whenever possible to effect a constitutional outcome.” Id.

“When reviewing constitutional provisions, this Court follows principles parallel to those of statutory interpretation. First and foremost, this Court must examine the actual language used in the Constitution. If that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written.” Id. at 139-40 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When interpreting constitutional provisions, this Court endeavors to ascertain the will of the people in passing the amendment.” In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597, 599 (Fla.2012). “In accord with those tenets of constitutional construction, this Court ‘endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters.’ ” Id. at 614 (quoting Zingale v. Powell, 885 So.2d 277, 282 (Fla.2004)). “Moreover, in construing multiple constitutional provisions addressing a similar subject, the provisions ‘must be read in pari materia to ensure a consistent and logical meaning that gives effect to each provision.’” Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 838 So.2d 492, 501 (Fla.2003) (quoting Advisory Op. to the Gov.-1996 Amend. 5 (Everglades), 706 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1997)).

Both parties agree that the amendment at issue did not alter the Legislature’s article VII, section 1, appropriations power. “Appropriation” is defined as a “legal authorization to make expenditures for specific purposes within the amounts authorized by law.” § 216.011, Fla. Stat. (2007). The Florida Constitution in article VII, section 1, vests in the Legislature the constitutional duty and power to raise and appropriate state funds:

(c) No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriation made by law.
(d) Provision shall be made by law for raising sufficient revenue to defray the expenses of the state for each fiscal period.

Art. VII, § 1, Fla. Const.; see also Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla.1991) (stating that based on article VII, sections 1(c) and 1(d), “this Court has long held that the power to appropriate state funds is legislative and is to be exercised only through duly enacted statutes”). Article VII, section 1(c), of the Florida Constitution gives the Legislature “the exclusive power of deciding how, when, and for what purpose the public funds shall be applied in carrying on the government.” Republican Party of Fla. v. Smith, 638 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.1994) (quoting State ex rel. Kurz v. Lee, 121 Fla. 360, 384, 163 So. 859, 868 (1935)).

The legislative authority over public funds has been referred to as the “power of the purse.” Children A B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d at 267. As this Court has explained:

Under any working system of government, one of the branches must be able to exercise the power of the purse, and in our system it is the legislature, as representative of the people and maker of laws, including laws pertaining to appropriations, to whom that power is constitutionally assigned....
The constitution specifically provides for the legislature alone to have the power to appropriate state funds. More importantly, only the legislature, as the voice of the people, may determine and weigh the multitude of needs and fiscal priorities of the State of Florida. The legislature must carry out its constitutional duty to establish fiscal priorities in light of the financial resources it has provided.

Id.

The Legislature has been given further responsibility and authority with respect to funding universities in article IX, section 1(a), of the Florida Constitution, which provides that the Legislature must make adequate provision for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of Florida’s universities. See art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const. (“Adequate provision shall be made by law ... for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.”). Unquestionably, this legislative obligation was not altered by the amendment.

Because the issue presented in this case involves constitutional construction, we begin with the actual language of the constitutional provision. Caribbean Conservation Corp., 838 So.2d at 501 (“[Ajny inquiry into the proper interpretation of a constitutional provision must begin with an examination of that provision’s explicit language.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution states that its purpose is to “establish a system of governance for the state university system of Florida.” Art. IX, § 7(a), Fla. Const. It provides for the Board of Governors, which “shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. The provision then lists examples: “These responsibilities shall include, but not be limited to, defining the distinctive mission of each constituent university and its articulation with free public schools and community colleges, ensuring the well-planned coordination and operation of the system, and avoiding wasteful duplication of facilities or programs.” Id. The provision also expressly states that the Board’s “management shall be subject to the powers of the legislature to appropriate for the expenditure of funds, and the board shall account for such expenditures as provided by law.” Id.

The Petitioners contend that the language of the amendment constituted an “all-inclusive” transfer of power to the Board, transferring control over every aspect of universities, with the exception of the Legislature’s power of appropriations over the general revenue portion of university funding. However, contrary to the Petitioners’ position, the language of article IX, section 7, does not plainly transfer to the Board the Legislature’s control over tuition and fees, but instead grants to the Board the responsibility to “operate,” “regulate,” “control,” and “be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. Nothing within the language of article IX, section 7, indicates that it was intended to transfer power over tuition and fees to the Board. Simply put, the language' of article IX, section 7, is not “clear” or “unambiguous” and does not expressly “address[ ] the matter in issue.” FACDL, 978 So.2d at 140. We therefore turn to principles of construction, always endeavoring to construe the constitutional provision “in a manner consistent with the intent of the framers and voters.” W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So.3d 1, 9 (Fla.2012); FACDL, 978 So.2d at 140.

The canon of construction known as ejusdem generis is instructive in construing the meaning of “operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. Under this canon, “when a general phrase follows a list of specifics, the general phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed.” State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 219 (Fla.2007). Employing this canon of constitutional construction, the Board’s responsibilities in operating, regulating, controlling, and being responsible for the management of the university system include responsibilities that are executive and administrative in nature, such as “defining the distinctive mission of each constituent university” and “avoiding wasteful duplication of facilities or programs.” Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. The ability to set and appropriate for the expenditure of tuition and fees is of a wholly different nature than the executive and administrative functions delineated in the constitutional provision and therefore is not included in the meaning of “operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const.

We also review the ballot summary, because it is indicative of voter intent. See Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 998 So.2d 566, 570 n. 3 (Fla.2008) (“[B]allot materials are one source from which the voters’ intent and the purpose of the amendment can be ascertained.”). Here, the ballot summary that accompanied the amendment and appeared on the ballot also indicated a grant of power that appears to be executive and administrative in nature. The ballot title and summary provided as follows:

Ballot title: Local trustees and statewide governing board to manage Florida’s university system
Ballot summary: A local board of trustees shall administer each state university. Each board shall have thirteen members dedicated to excellence in teaching, research, and service to community. A statewide governing board of seventeen members shall be responsible for the coordinated and accountable operation of the whole university system. Wasteful duplication of facilities or programs is to be avoided. Provides procedures for selection and confirmation of board members, including one student and one faculty representative per board.

In re Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. ex rel. Local Trs., 819 So.2d at 727-28 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the ballot title or ballot summary does it indicate that the voters or framers intended for the Board of Governors to have authority over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees.

When this Court approved the amendment for placement on the ballot, we concluded that

the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to create a governance of the state university system. The enumeration of the duties and responsibilities of the statewide board of governors and the local university boards of trustees is a necessary component of a single dominant plan that complies with the single-subject requirement. While the proposed amendment may affect more than one branch of government, we cannot say it substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple branches of government....

Id. at 730. This Court also concluded that the amendment did not “substantially affect or change” article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution, id., which provides that the Legislature must make adequate provision for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of Florida’s universities. See art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const. (“Adequate provision shall be made by law ... for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.”). Accordingly, this Court concluded that the amendment did not violate the single-subject requirement. See In re Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. ex rel. Local Trs., 819 So.2d at 730 (“Even though the proposed amendment interacts with [article IX, sections 1 and 3] by providing a two-tier governing system specifically for the state university system, it does not substantially affect or change either one_We therefore conclude that the only subject embraced in the proposed amendment is the two-tier system of governance of the state university system”). If the framers intended that the Board would have expansive authority over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees, neither the ballot summary nor the title indicated such an intent.

The Petitioners contend, however, that university funding has a dual nature: (1) tuition and fees from article III revenue paid by the recipients of education services; and (2) the state subsidy from article VII general revenue paid by taxpayers. The Petitioners therefore argue that the Legislature’s prior authority to control tuition and fees emanated solely from its article III authority to legislate and when voters passed the constitutional amendment creating the Board, this article III authority was necessarily transferred to the Board as a part of its power to “operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const.

In support, the Petitioners point to article III, section 1, of the Florida Constitution as having been the prior source of the legislative authority to control the setting and expenditure of university tuition and fees, rather than article VII. However, article III, section 1, entitled “Composition,” states only that the “legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislature.” Moreover, article VII, sections 1(c) and 1(d), do not limit the Legislature’s power to raise revenue and make appropriations to monies raised by taxes, nor does the constitution indicate that fees for use of a state service fall outside of the Legislature’s power to raise revenue and appropriate funds. Further, this Court’s decisions regarding revenue and appropriations do not include this distinction. See, e.g., Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d at 265 (stating that based on article VII, sections 1(c) and 1(d), “this Court has long held that the power to appropriate state funds is legislative and is to be exercised only through duly enacted statutes” (emphasis added)).

Rather, it has been long-established that the Florida Constitution “requires legislative appropriation or authorization for the use of any funds from whatever source by a public agency or official for a public purpose.” Advisory Op. to the Governor, 200 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla.1967). Although that statement was made with respect to provisions in the 1885 Florida Constitution, similar provisions, including an identical appropriations provision, appear in the current 1968 Florida Constitution. Id. (citing art. IV, § 24 and art. IX, § 4, Fla. Const. (1885), now art. IV, § 4(c), and art. VII, § 1(c), Fla. Const. (1968)). As cogently-explained by the First District, “[u]niver-sity tuition and fees are unquestionably state funds; they are collected by state universities for the use of their services and the monies collected are deposited into the State Treasury.” Graham, 75 So.3d at 318 (citing § 215.31, Fla. Stat. (2007)).

The Petitioners rely in part upon the fact that tuition and fees were deposited in a trust fund, stating that the “Legislature correctly ‘segregated’ the Article III funds from the Article VII funds throughout the legislative process,” including requiring the monies in the Education and General Student and Other Fees Trust Fund to be “segregated for a purpose authorized by law.” This distinction has no bearing on the nature of the funds or the Legislature’s constitutional authority over them, because, as explained by the First District below, “a trust fund is, at its essence, nothing more than an accounting tool used to segregate monies within the State Treasury.” Graham, 75 So.3d at 318-19 (citing § 215.32, Fla. Stat. (2007); Sec’y of State v. Milligan, 704 So.2d 152, 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)). We therefore conclude that the Legislature’s pre-amendment control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees derived from its article VII, section 1, revenue-raising and appropriations power.

Finally, we reject the Petitioners’ reliance on the constitutional systems of governance of universities established in other states, particularly Michigan, Minnesota, and California, as evidence of what the amendment at issue was intended to accomplish. The constitutional systems of university governance in Michigan, Minnesota, and California are clearly different than that in Florida.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the constitutional source of the Legislature’s authority to set and appropriate for the expenditure of tuition and fees derives from its power to raise revenue and appropriate for the expenditure of state funds. Nothing within the language of article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution indicates an intent to transfer this quintessentially legislative power to the Board of Governors. Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature has exercised control over these funds are facially constitutional and approve the First District’s decision.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

LABARGA, J., concurs with an opinion.

POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

LABARGA, J.,

concurring.

I concur with the majority that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature has exercised control over the setting of and appropriation of tuition and fees are facially constitutional. I write, however, to re-emphasize that our opinion does not address an as-applied challenge to a specific tuition and fee policy. Furthermore, our opinion does not address the question of the legality of any contingency attached to an appropriation that would encroach on the Board’s constitutional responsibility for management of the university system. The power to attach contingencies to funds appropriated to the university system may not be employed to impair the constitutional authority of the Board to operate and manage the university system. Article IX, section 7(d), makes clear that it is the Board of Governors that “shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” This constitutional grant of power is not insignificant. As aptly noted by the majority, the appropriations authority of the Legislature to attach contingencies to the appropriation of funds is not without limits. Majority op. at 602.1 note that this same caution would apply equally to other budgetary functions historically assigned to the Legislature. With these caveats, I concur.

      . See §§ 1011.41, 1011.4106, and 1011.91, Fla. Stat. (2007); ch.2007-72, § 2, subsection 156, Laws of Fla.

      . See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

      . See ch.2002-387, § 3(5)(a), Laws of Fla. (“Effective July 1, 2001: 1. The Board of Regents is abolished. 2. All of the powers, duties, functions, records, personnel, and property; unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds; administrative authority; administrative rules; pending issues; and existing contracts of the Board of Regents are transferred by a type two transfer, pursuant to s. 20.06(2), to the Florida Board of Education.”).

        .See ch.2007-72, § 2, subsection 156, Laws of Fla. ("The appropriations provided in Specific Appropriations 156, 158, 159, and 160 from the Education and General Student and Other Fees Trust Fund are the only budget authority provided in this act for the 2007-2008 fiscal year to the named universities to expend tuition and fees that are collected during the 2007-2008 fiscal year and carried forward from the prior fiscal year and that are appropriated into local accounts pursuant to section 1011.4106, Florida Statutes. The expenditure of tuition and fee revenues from local accounts by each university shall not exceed the authority provided by these specific appropriations, unless approved pursuant to the provisions of chapter 216, Florida Statutes .... General revenue funds provided in Specific Appropriations 156 through 162 to each of the named universities are contingent upon each university complying with the tuition and fee policies established in the proviso language attached to Specific Appropriation 156, and with the tuition and fee policies for state universities included in Part II of chapter 1009, Florida Statutes.”).

      . The Petitioners in this case are Bob Graham, Talbot “Sandy” D'Alemberte, Joan Ruffier, Bruce W. Hauptli, James P. Jones, Howard B. Rock, Eric H. Shaw, and Frederick R. Strobel.

      . Although the Board was added as a party to the lawsuit in the trial court, it later filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in March 2010.

      . Art. IV, § 24, Fla. Const. (1885) ("The Treasurer shall receive and keep all funds, bonds, and other securities, in such manner as may be prescribed by law, and shall disburse no funds, nor issue bonds, or other securities, except upon the order of the Comptroller countersigned by the Governor, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.")

      . Art. IX, § 4, Fla. Const. (1885) (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”).

      . Art. IV, § 4(c), Fla. Const. (1968) ("The chief financial officer shall serve as the chief fiscal officer of the state, and shall settle and approve accounts against the state, and shall keep all state funds and securities.”).

      . Art. VII, § 1(c), Fla. Const. (1968) (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriation made by law.”).

      . See Mich. Const, art. VIII, § 5 (expressly giving each board of regents "general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds").

      . See Minn. Const, art. XIII, § 3 (providing that "[a]ll the rights, immunities, franchises and endowments heretofore granted or conferred upon the University of Minnesota are perpetuated unto the university”); Minnesota v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951, 954 (1928) (explaining that under this provision, "the University, in respect to its corporate status and government, was put beyond the power of the Legislature by paramount law, the right to amend or repeal which exists only in the people themselves” (emphasis added)).

      . See Cal. Const, art. 9, § 9(a) (providing that the University of California "shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing corporation known as 'The Regents of the University of California,' with full powers of organization and government, subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security of its funds and compliance with the terms of the endowments of the university and such competitive bidding procedures as may be made applicable to the university by statute for the letting of construction contracts, sales of real property, and purchasing of materials, goods, and services” (emphasis added)).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Ronald W. HENDRICKS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC10-1275.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 31, 2013.
    William J. Sheppard, Daniel Gray Thomas, Matthew R. Kachergus and Bryan Everett Demaggio of Sheppard, White, Thomas & Kachergus, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, and Thomas Howland Duffy, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted review of the decision in Hendricks v. State, 34 So.3d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), based on express and direct conflict. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Upon further consideration, we conclude that jurisdiction was improvidently granted. Accordingly, we hereby discharge jurisdiction and dismiss the review proceeding.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE and LABARGA, JJ., recused.