author: ALTENBERND, Judge. DAVIS, Chief Judge,

text:
    In re petition for ORDER DIRECTING PAYMENT OF $13,857.69 in unclaimed money deposited in accordance with section 43.19, Florida Statutes, William Crescenzo, Appellant, v. Jeffrey Atwater, in his official capacity as Chief Financial Officer, and Interest Recovery, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 2D12-3092.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2014.

      Ann M. Allison of Allison Law Group, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Samuel Dean Bunton, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee, Jeffrey Atwater.
    No appearance for Interest Recovery, Inc.
   ALTENBERND, Judge.

William Crescenzo appeals an order denying his “Motion to Direct Chief Financial Officer to Return Funds to Court.” Although this court concludes that the circuit court properly denied this motion, we do so for reasons other than those contained in the order on appeal. This case involves the first step in the confusing process of obtaining unclaimed funds from the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) under chapter 717, Florida Statutes (2011), after those funds have been deposited with the CFO by a court pursuant to section 43.19, Florida Statutes (2011). By statute, the circuit courts play a role in this process, but once the judicial branch has deposited such funds with the executive branch, separation of powers affects the role of both the court and the CFO.

In the style of this opinion, we describe the order on appeal as an order denying a “petition for order directing payment of $13,857.69 in unclaimed money deposited in accordance with section 43.19, Florida Statutes.” Mr. Crescenzo’s pro se motion is intended to accomplish this general result but in fact sought an order from the trial court compelling the CFO to perform certain actions when the CFO was not a party to the proceeding. The CFO, who from this record has received other similar claims from Mr. Crescenzo, intervened in the trial court action to protect his interests and to establish precedent.

Procedurally, this case is very unusual. If the CFO had not chosen to intervene in the trial court, we doubt that any active party would be listed as an appellee. There are apparently no judicial rules of procedure to assist in the filing of a claim under section 43.19. It is likely that the legislature intends the local state attorney to perform a function as if the state attorney were a party to the action. The state attorney is not a party, and it is doubtful that state attorneys are actually performing the intended function. The CFO has promulgated regulations that are useful within the context of the administrative proceeding to obtain payment under chapter 717, but those regulations should have little, if any, impact on the proceedings within the court itself.

In this opinion, we first provide a description of the lawsuit from which this proceeding arises, a lawsuit in which none of the original parties are remaining parties to this proceeding. Second, we provide a description of the proceeding commenced by Mr. Crescenzo. Third, we provide a description of section 43.19 and of chapter 717. Fourth, we provide a legal analysis of the many issues presented by the parties. Finally, in the fifth section, we provide a summary of the procedure that we conclude should be used to process claims under section 43.19 and to seek payment from the CFO.

I. THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

In 1999, Willie Consuegra sued certain underwriters at Lloyd’s of London to resolve a dispute arising from the repair of his large truck, which was insured by Lloyd’s. The dispute, identified as case number 99-CA-003537, was referred to an umpire who apparently determined that Tampa Spring Company was entitled to be paid a storage fee on the truck of $11,375.00. As a result, Judge Edward H. Ward entered an order in July 2000 that contained a provision stating “[t]hat the Defendants shall also pay as agreed the storage charges claimed by Tampa Spring Company for the Plaintiffs vehicle in the amount of $11,375.00 into the court registry as above representing the interests of such storage facility within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.”

Tampa Spring Company was not a party in the action, but the order indicates that it was served on John Messina in care of Tampa Spring Company. It is undisputed that Lloyd’s deposited these funds into the registry of the court on August 24, 2000. For reasons not explained in the record, Tampa Spring Company never obtained these funds from the court’s registry.

The lawsuit between Mr. Consuegra and Lloyd’s continued primarily as a dispute over the payment of attorneys’ fees. That issue resulted in an opinion by this court. See Consuegra v. Lloyd’s Underwriters at London, 801 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA2001). The issue of storage, however, was fully resolved by the order in 2000. Eventually, the lawsuit was resolved and the parties dismissed the action in March 2003. Thus, since 2003 the circuit court has not had personal jurisdiction over the original parties to this action.

Because no one ever claimed the $11,375.00 from the registry of the court, in 2007 the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Clerk of Circuit Court included this case among those in an application to the chief judge of the circuit seeking authorization to transfer the funds to the CFO. That proceeding was styled as “In the Matter of Unclaimed Court Registry Funds, Case No: 07-AF-000007.” By the time the clerk commenced this proceeding, the amount held by the clerk that was properly to be deposited with the CFO had grown to $13,857.69 with interest. On November 16, 2007, Chief Judge Manuel Menendez signed an order stating,

[T]he Clerk of this Court is hereby authorized and directed to deposit with the Chief Financial Officer of Florida to the credit of the State School Fund, the moneys described upon the attached schedule, which have been deposited in the Registry of this Court for five years or more, unclaimed by the person, firm, or corporation entitled thereto, in the described causes set forth in the Exhibit attached to the Petition.
[T]he deposit of such funds as herein ordered, shall be without prejudice to the rights of any interested party as provided by law.

As a result, the funds from this case and a long list of other cases were transferred to the CFO.

II. THE PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED BY MR. CRESCENZO

About four years later, in September 2011, John Messina as “Director of Tampa Spring Co. a/k/a Tampa Spring Company” executed an “assignment of case, lien and interests.” By the assignment, for a payment of only $10, Interest Recovery, Inc., obtained whatever rights Tampa Spring might have to the $13,857.69 that had previously been placed in the registry of the court. Interest Recovery, Inc., is a company controlled by William Crescenzo. Interest Recovery, Inc., subsequently assigned its claim to itself and William Cres-cenzo, in exchange for $10. Thus, the corporation and Mr. Crescenzo apparently hold joint ownership of the claim to the $13,857.69.

Mr. Crescenzo is not an attorney, but he filed the pro se motion that sought to have the circuit court order the CFO to return the funds to the registry of the court. Initially, he attempted to file the motion on behalf of himself and Interest Recovery, Inc. Eventually, the court required that an attorney appear on behalf of the corporation, but Mr. Crescenzo continued to represent himself pro se.

Mr. Cescenzo and his corporation did not commence a new proceeding but rather filed this motion in case number 99-CA-003537. Of course, that case had been closed for years and neither Mr. Crescenzo nor Tampa Spring had ever been a party to that lawsuit. The CFO had never been a party. Mr. Crescenzo served copies of this motion on the attorneys for Mr. Con-suegra and Lloyd’s. Mr. Consuegra and his attorney actually appeared at one or more hearings even though they had no legal interest in the proceedings and the court had ceased to have jurisdiction over them years earlier.

In the motion, Mr. Crescenzo made two claims. First, he argued that Judge Men-endez had erred in ordering a transfer of the funds because the lawsuit had not been closed for five years when the order transferring the funds was entered in 2007. Second, he explained his claim to the funds by virtue of the assignment and sought an order from the court requiring the clerk to pay Interest Recovery, Inc., once the funds were returned by the CFO.

The motion was heard by Judge Bernard C. Silver. The CFO filed a notice of appearance with a motion to intervene, arguing that Mr. Crescenzo’s motion should be denied and raising many issues. The CFO was permitted to intervene. In the order resolving the competing motions, the court determined that Mr. Crescenzo had properly filed his motion in the old, closed circuit court file because subject matter jurisdiction and venue remained with the court under the procedure provided for in section 43.19. It also determined that the funds were ripe for deposit with the CFO in 2007 because the funds had remained deposited and unclaimed since 2000, a period that was more than five years. It then determined that the claim was invalid because it did not comply with various requirements of section 717.1351, Florida Statutes (2011). Thus, the court denied the motion for an order under section 43.19 only because the claim did not comply with section 717.1351. Mr. Cres-cenzo appealed. Oddly, his corporation, Interest Recovery, Inc., did not appeal and has not participated in these proceedings. Accordingly, the corporation is properly an appellee. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(g)(2).

III. A DESCRIPTION OF SECTION 43.19 AND CHAPTER 717

A. Section 43.19, Florida Statutes.

Section 43.19 is a relatively short statute, dating back to the 1930s when the state treasurer performed the functions that the CFO now performs. It provides a mechanism to manage unclaimed funds that arise from judicial proceedings. In its entirety, it states:

(1) In every case in which the right to withdraw money deposited as hereinbe-fore provided has been adjudicated or is not in dispute and the money has remained so deposited for 5 years or more unclaimed by the person, firm, or corporation entitled thereto, on or before December 1 of each year the judge, or one of the judges, of the court shall direct that the money be deposited with the Chief Financial Officer to the credit of the State School Fund, to become a part of that fund, subject to the right of the person, firm, or corporation entitled thereto to receive the money as provided in subsection (3).
(2) The direction that the money be deposited as provided in subsection (1) shall be by written order. A copy of the order shall be filed in the action in which the money was originally deposited. The order shall also be noted in the progress docket in the action, if a docket is maintained by the court.
(3) Any person, firm or corporation entitled to any of the money may obtain an order directing the payment of the money to the claimant on written petition to the court from which the money was deposited or its successor, and written notice to the state attorney of the circuit wherein the court is situate, whether or not the court is a circuit court, and proof of right thereto, and the money deposited shall constitute and be a permanent appropriation for payments by the Chief Financial Officer of the state in obedience of such orders.
(4) All interest and income that accrue from the money while on deposit with the Chief Financial Officer to the credit of the State School Fund belong to that fund.

(1) Discussion of Subsection 43.19(1).

Subsection (1) of the statute contains four concepts worth emphasizing. First, this law applies only to “every case in which the right to withdraw money deposited as hereinbefore provided has been adjudicated or is not in dispute.” Thus, in the normal case to which this statute applies, there will be an order or stipulation that specifies a quantity of money that is placed with the clerk of court for the benefit of an identified party. This case, for example, contains an order granting Lloyd’s motion to deposit this amount of money into the registry of the court for the benefit of Tampa Spring Company. As a result of this limitation, any subsequent petition to retrieve the money should normally have a single primary issue — the identity of the claimant.

Second, the transfer to the CFO occurs only after “the money has remained so deposited for 5 years or more unclaimed.” Thus, the time period is measured from the point when the money could be claimed from the registry, not from the close of the lawsuit.

Third, the statute contemplates that a “judge” shall direct that the money be deposited. From the examples that we have seen, in actual practice the clerk of court submits a periodic application to the chief judge containing a list of all cases that currently have deposits more than five years old. The judge signs an order authorizing the transfer. It does not appear that any type of evidentiary hearing occurs in the process. Essentially, the matter is an administrative duty in which the judge reasonably relies on the clerk of court to identify the appropriate cases.

Fourth, the funds are “deposited” with the CFO to the “credit” of the State School Fund. While we would not wish to put too fíne a point on this, the court does not transfer ownership of this asset to the CFO; the court is placing the money on deposit with the ■ CFO while apparently retaining the right to protect the interests of the lawful owner and to determine the ultimate beneficiary of the funds.

(2) Discussion of Subsection 43.19(2).

Subsection (2) requires that the deposit order be a written order, a copy of which is maintained in the original court file. This lends credence to the argument that any petition to recover the funds, at least in the absence of a rule, should be filed in the original court file even if that file has been closed for years.

(3) Discussion of Subsection 43.19(3).

Subsection (3) contains six concepts worth noting. First, “[a]ny person, firm or corporation entitled to any of the money” may petition for a payment. The statute does not limit a claim to the specific person identified in the earlier court order.

Second, the person submits a “written petition.” Neither the statute nor any court rule explains the content of the petition, but presumably it must allege the basic facts establishing the person’s entitlement to the funds.

Third, the petition is “to the court from which the money was deposited.” Again, this is a clear indication that, although the funds are deposited with the CFO, the court retains authority to determine the person to whom the funds should be released.

Fourth, the claimant must provide “written notice to the state attorney.” The statute does not require that the state attorney be served as a party or that the state attorney answer or respond to the petition. Nevertheless, the state attorney is the only officer identified in the statute to protect the interests of the state.

Fifth, the statute contemplates that the claimant must provide “proof’ to obtain an order. Whether this can be accomplished by affidavit or whether it requires an evi-dentiary hearing is unclear. But in any event the mere filing of an unsworn petition is insufficient under the statute to obtain an order of payment.

Finally, subsection (3) describes the money deposited with the CFO as a “permanent appropriation for payments” by the CFO. The reason for this is unstated in the statute. However, Florida’s Constitution states that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriation made by law.” Art. VII, § 1(c), Fla. Const. Section 215.965, Florida Statutes (2011), generally requires that money in the state treasury be disbursed by a state warrant, drawn by the CFO, and payable to the “ultimate beneficiary.” Presumably, the “permanent appropriation,” see § 43.19(3), permits the CFO to write a warrant to the person identified as the ultimate beneficiary by the court without first obtaining a special appropriation in the annual budget from the legislature.

B. Chapter 717.

Although Florida had earlier laws addressing the escheat of property to the state, chapter 717 was a major addition, enacted in 1987 as the “Florida Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.” Ch. 87-105, § 1, at 916, Laws of Fla. It is based on the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (1954). Unlike section 43.19, it is not intended to address a narrow subset of unclaimed property but rather to provide broader substantive and administrative law addressing all varieties of unclaimed property. Thus, for example, it has procedures for unclaimed bank accounts, utility deposits, and life insurance proceeds. §§ 717.106-.07, 108. Similar to funds deposited under section 43.19, the funds deposited under chapter 717 often end up in the State School Fund. See § 717.123. The fact that the funds end up in the same account, however, does not mean that they must only be removed from that fund using the same procedures.

Section 717.113 provides that property held by courts is typically “presumed unclaimed” after one year even though it is not transferred under section 43.19 for five years. The legal effect of this presumption is unclear to this court.

Section 717.124, contains an explanation of how a person makes a claim for unclaimed property under this chapter. Apparently concerned about potential abuses of this process, the statute also contains regulation of powers of attorney to recover property for others and contracts to acquire ownership of unclaimed property. §§ 717.135, .1351. These regulations apply to property reported by persons under section 717.117. Given that the judiciary is a separate branch of the government and that the funds in question here were reported under section 43.19, it is reasonable to question the application of these regulations in this case. We do not, however, reach that issue because we conclude that these provisions are not statutes that create issues to be decided by the court when a petition is filed to obtain payment of deposited funds under section 43.19.

Regulations have been promulgated to assist in filing claims under chapter 717 emanating from section 43.19 proceedings. See Fla. Admin. Code. R. 691-44.021. The portion of the regulation applicable to section 43.19 states:

(1) Petitions for funds held pursuant to Section 43.19, 732.107, 733.816 or 744.534, F.S., are to be filed initially with the court that directed the deposit of the funds with the Chief Financial Officer.
(a) Petitions proving the claimant’s right to funds held pursuant to Section 43.19, F.S., must include written notice to the state attorney of the circuit where the court is situated.
(2) If the court that directed the deposit of the funds with the Chief Financial Officer grants the petition, each claimant or claimant’s representative must file a Claim for Funds Deposited Pursuant to Section 43.19 ... Form (DFS-A4-1988), effective 11-22-09, incorporated herein by reference and available from the Florida Department of Financial Services, Bureau of Unclaimed Property, 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0358.
(a) The claim form must be accompanied by a certified copy of the final order or judgment awarding the funds to each claimant, supporting documentation establishing each claimant’s right to the funds, and a government-issued photographic identification issued to each claimant.
(b) Payment for funds reported pursuant to Sections 43.19 ... will be made to the ultimate beneficiary, as provided by Section 215.965, F.S.

No copy of a Form (DFS-A4-1988) exists in this record. Oddly, we have been unable to locate such a form by searching Florida internet public records.

IV. A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES

Section 717.1401 expressly states that chapter 717 does not repeal section 43.19 but that it is “additional and supplemental.” Unfortunately, it is not obvious how to make chapter 717 supplemental to section 43.19. In this analysis, we attempt to honor both statutes to the fullest extent possible. But we admit that it is difficult to give full application to both statutes in light of the conflict between them. On appeal, the parties raise many issues. We will address the issues that merit discussion.

A. The Five-Year Period For Deposit With The CFO Is Measured From The Date The Funds Were Placed In The Registry.

As to Mr. Crescenzo’s claim that the monies were prematurely deposited with the CFO, we agree with the circuit court that the five-year period in subsection 48.19(1) is measured from the date the funds were placed in the registry of the court and not from some later date when the relevant lawsuit was dismissed or concluded. This appears to be a plain reading of subsection 43.19(1).

B. The Circuit Court Has Discretion To Allow The CFO To Intervene In A Section 43.19 Proceeding.

Mr. Crescenzo argues that the CFO lacked standing to intervene because the CFO does not own the funds at issue and will not be adversely affected by the court’s ruling. Although we disagree with Mr. Crescenzo’s argument, it is significant that the statute does not require that the claimant make the CFO a party to the proceeding. Instead, the local state attorney must be provided with notice. Under subsection 27.02(1), Florida Statutes (2011), the state attorney is authorized to defend the state in civil matters.

We conclude that the legislature prudently concluded that the interests of the state would be more cost-effectively addressed if these proceedings were monitored by a local constitutional officer. A claimant in a section 43.19 proceeding is not even required to give the CFO notice of the proceeding. The CFO should not be forced to send a separate attorney from Tallahassee to perform this rather straightforward function.

Nevertheless, the state attorney is not required to be a party in these proceedings. If the state attorney is not adequately performing this function, it is the CFO who “keeps” all state funds, including the State School Fund. Art. IV, § 4(c), Fla. Const. The CFO clearly has an interest that may permit intervention. Cf. Atwater v. City of Cape Coral, 120 So.3d 595, 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (discussing the CFO’s responsibilities as to claims). This is a matter in the sound discretion of the trial court and may depend upon the position taken by the state attorney. We note that, unless some representative of the state is made a party to section 43.19 proceedings, there may be no party in the trial court who is adversely affected by the ruling and has the right to file a notice of appeal on behalf of the state.

C.A Section 43.19 Claim May Be Assigned In Accordance With Contract Law.

The CFO argues that Mr. Crescen-zo lacks standing and cannot file the petition in the circuit court or in this appeal. We disagree. The CFO’s argument is two-fold. First, it argues that neither Interest Recovery, Inc., nor Mr. Crescenzo has an enforceable claim by way of assignment. The CFO maintains that a claim to funds placed into the registry of the court is essentially unassignable. Second, it argues that Interest Recovery, Inc., did not appeal and that Mr. Crescenzo cannot appeal the order in the absence of this corporation. As to this second argument, the CFO cites no authority for the proposition that a co-owner of an assigned right cannot appeal an adverse ruling unless both owners appeal.

As to its argument that the claim could not be assigned by Tampa Spring Company, we note that section 43.19 does not address the issue of assignment. Under the general rules of contract law, economic causes of action, contracts, and judgments have all been rather freely assignable with the parties to determine their fair value within the open market. See Kohl v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 988 So.2d 654, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“All contractual rights are assignable unless the contract prohibits assignment, the contract involves obligations of a personal nature, or public policy dictates against assignment.”); Wachovia Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Toomey, 994 So.2d 980, 987 (Fla.2008) (permitting assignment of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. McNulty, 229 So.2d 585, 586-87 (Fla.1969) (determining judgment from a claim not based on personal tort to be assignable where assignment was not contrary to public policy); W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Webb, 699 So.2d 859, 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (concluding that party could not bring an action on a claim that it had assigned). Most recent mortgage foreclosures seem to have been filed by plaintiffs who obtained an assignment of the mortgage, often after the loan was in default. See, e.g., Correa v. U.S. Bank N.A., 118 So.3d 952, 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). In the absence of any express statutory prohibition of such assignments in section 43.19, we see no reason why this court should announce a blanket, common law rule that assignments of claims arising from funds placed into the registry of the court are contrary to public policy.

D. Chapter 717 Substantive And Procedural Requirements Do Not Apply In A Section 43.19 Proceeding.

Mr. Crescenzo argues that the trial court erred by holding that his petition should be denied for failure to comply with certain provisions of chapter 717. We agree with Mr. Crescenzo that the trial court erred in this regard but not for the reasons argued in his brief. On appeal, the CFO argues that the trial court could not compel the CFO to disburse funds or return funds, but in the trial court the CFO asked that court to enforce provisions of chapter 717 that may be applicable to administrative claims made under that chapter. We conclude that the CFO cannot have it both ways.

Nothing in section 43.19 requires the CFO to be a party to such a proceeding. The fact that section 43.19 compels the court to deposit funds with the CFO after five years does not give every such court personal jurisdiction over the CFO or subject matter jurisdiction over chapter 717 issues that may arise subsequent to the order directing the payment of the money to the claimant. We conclude that the issues to be presented on a section 43.19 petition are merely the narrow issues relating to the identity of the claimant and its entitlement to the funds. There is no reason for that court to concern itself with the requirements of chapter 717.

E. Because, In This Context, A Section 43.19 Judicial Proceeding Is A Condition Precedent To A Chapter 717 Administrative Proceeding, The Circuit Court Should Rarely, If Ever, Need To Obtain Jurisdiction Over The CFO.

Finally, the CFO argues that Mr. Crescenzo’s motion should have been denied on the additional grounds that the circuit court had no authority to order the CFO either to return these funds to the circuit court or to compel the CFO to pay the claim. We do not hold today that the circuit court could never have authority to order a return of funds. But Mr. Cres-cenzo did not attempt to make the CFO a party to the section 43.19 proceeding. He did not allege any extraordinary legal basis that might require the funds to be returned to the court’s registry. Even after the CFO chose to intervene in this matter, there was no legal reason for the court to order a transfer.

The case law clearly establishes a general rule that the circuit courts should not exercise jurisdiction over the CFO, at least until the CFO has determined the claimant’s entitlement to the funds. See Atwater v. Citibank, F.S.B., Inc., 96 So.3d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); City of Cape Coral, 120 So.3d at 600 (“Because the CFO has the exclusive power to distribute the surplus funds, the courts acted in excess of their authority and jurisdiction when they directed the release of the funds, issued orders to show cause, and attempted to hold the CFO in contempt.”). We note that the CFO voluntarily appeared in this action. The trial court had jurisdiction over his person. Even with such jurisdiction, under the basic principles recognizing the separation of powers, the circuit court has limited authority to order the CFO to perform his statutory or constitutional duties. In this case, we are merely required to hold that the trial court correctly declined to order the CFO to return funds from the State School Fund to the registry of the court when no legal justification for that action existed.

We conclude that chapter 717 is “supplemental” to section 43.19 in the sense that it provides an adequate mechanism for a person who receives an order in a section 43.19proceeding to submit a claim and receive a warrant from the CFO. Accordingly, there should rarely, if ever, be a time when a court conducting a section 43.19proceeding should need to obtain jurisdiction over the CFO in an effort to order a transfer of properly deposited funds back to the registry of the court. If a claimant has difficulty convincing the CFO to honor a court order from a section 43.19proceeding as a claim under chapter 717, it seems to us that the solution rests in either an administrative proceeding under section 717.126 or in a separate lawsuit between the aggrieved claimant and the CFO. See, e.g., Nat’l Equity Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 127 So.3d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (addressing an appeal from an administrative order). Thus, while we conclude that, at least under normal circumstances, the circuit court in the section 43.19 proceeding should not attempt to compel the CFO to obey its order, it may be entirely possible that a circuit court in a lawsuit between the claimant and the CFO could enter such an order after the CFO declined to issue a warrant on a chapter 717 claim.

Y. A SUMMARY OF THE APPROPRIATE PROCESS TO OBTAIN PAYMENT OF UNCLAIMED FUNDS FROM THE CFO AFTER DEPOSIT OF THOSE FUNDS UNDER SECTION 43.19

Section 43.19 requires a circuit court to deposit certain unclaimed funds with the CFO if they remain unclaimed for five years. The statute applies only to monies where the right to the funds has been adjudicated or is not in dispute.

We conclude that after unclaimed funds are transferred to the CFO pursuant to this section, the circuit court retains jurisdiction to enter an order directing payment of the money to a proper claimant under subsection 43.19(3). To invoke this jurisdiction, the claimant must file a petition seeking an order directing payment of the unclaimed funds that have been deposited in accordance with section 43.19. Once the petition has been filed and the claimant has given notice to the local state attorney, the state attorney, although not a party, represents the interests of the State. If the state attorney wishes to challenge the petition, it would seem reasonable for the state attorney to move to intervene in the proceeding. The CFO should not be expected to discover the existence of and intervene in each of these proceedings to perform a function that the legislature has assigned to the state attorney. But the CFO has standing to intervene to protect the corpus of the State School Fund if the state attorney is not performing his or her intended role.

We further conclude that the circuit court has the discretion to accept a valid assignment of a claim for such unclaimed funds under the standard rules of contract law governing assignment. Thus, upon proper proof, the court may enter an order directing payment of the money to the claimant’s assignee. Upon proper assignment, the original claimant ceases to be the “ultimate beneficiary” under section 215.965, and the assignee assumes that role.

Thus, the circuit court has both the power and the duty to enter an order directing payment of a specific amount of money to a specific claimant, or the claimant’s as-signee, under subsection 43.19(3). We decline in this opinion to decide whether the circuit court order establishes factual determinations binding on the CFO. Obviously, there is an argument that the issues resolved by the court should be binding on the State during the administrative process seeking payment from the CFO on the court order.

The circuit court, however, does not obtain personal jurisdiction over the CFO merely because it transferred the unclaimed funds to the CFO. Even if the circuit court obtains jurisdiction over the CFO by intervention, it should not direct that funds properly transferred to the CFO be returned to the clerk of court. It should allow the CFO to issue a warrant pursuant to statute to the ultimate beneficiary.

Because the legislature intends chapter 717 to supplement section 43.19, we conclude that, after a claimant has obtained an order of payment from the circuit court at the hearing where the State’s interests are protected by the state attorney, the claimant must still make a proper claim for the issuance of a warrant from the CFO pursuant to section 717.124, and in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 691-44.021.

Any issue concerning the application of any portion of chapter 717 to the unclaimed funds deposited by the court is not a matter to be resolved by the circuit court in the section 43.19 proceeding. The requirements of chapter 717 simply are not relevant issues in the section 43.19 proceeding. Instead, if the CFO imposes substantive or procedural requirements on the claimant that the claimant believes to be unenforceable, those issues should be resolved either in an administrative proceeding under section 717.126, or by a separate lawsuit between the aggrieved claimant and the CFO. See, e.g., Nat’l Equity Recovery Servs., 127 So.3d 1291 (addressing an appeal from an administrative order).

VI. CONCLUSION

In closing, we would comment that Mr. Crescenzo’s decision to file this action in the original court proceeding appears at least permissible under section 43.19. It is, however, an odd procedure. It created great confusion both in the circuit court and in this court as to the proper parties to the proceeding. It is not within our power, but we would suggest that the circuit courts and the supreme court consider an alternative procedure for the filing of these petitions.

We also comment that this opinion addresses many issues that might ultimately warrant consideration by the supreme court. We have intentionally decided not to certify any questions because our mandate permits further proceedings that may better distill the issues for consideration by that court.

We are affirming the order of dismissal because the circuit court could not order the funds returned to Hillsborough County and, thus, could not order the clerk to pay Mr. Crescenzo under the motion that he filed. Given that this was not the reasoning of the circuit court and Mr. Crescenzo may have been able to amend his motion to state a proper petition for an order directing payment, on remand, Mr. Cres-cenzo shall be given the option to file a second petition under section 43.19. If successful in that petition, he then can seek payment from the CFO under chapter 717.

Affirmed.

CRENSHAW, J., Concurs.

DAVIS, Chief Judge, Concurs specially with opinion.

DAVIS, Chief Judge,

Specially concurring.

I fully concur with the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I write to express my disagreement with some of the observations made regarding the interaction between chapter 717 and section 43.19.

I agree with the majority that on the circumstances presented in this case, the trial court did not have the authority to order the CFO to return the funds to the clerk of the circuit court and that the trial court was correct to allow the CFO to intervene in this action. And I agree with the majority’s observation that once the trial court has determined the claimant’s entitlement to the funds, “chapter 717 is ‘supplemental’ to section 43.19 in the sense that it provides an adequate mechanism for a person who receives an order in a section 43.19 proceeding to submit a claim and receive a warrant from the CFO.”

However, the majority suggests that if the CFO fails to comply with the trial court’s order, the claimant’s remedy is to address the issue in an administrative proceeding or by separate lawsuit. I disagree with this premise.

Section 43.19(3) clearly contemplates the trial court ordering the payment:

Any person, firm or corporation entitled to any of the money may obtain an order directing the payment of the money to the claimant ... and the money deposited shall constitute and be a permanent appropriation for payments by the Chief Financial Officer of the state in obedience of such orders.

(Emphasis added.) According to this language the payment is in response to the trial court’s order, and I do not agree that the enforcement of that order is to be handled by an administrative proceeding or that a claimant needs to file a separate lawsuit to enforce a prior court’s order. Unlike the funds at issue in National Equity Recovery Services, 127 So.3d 1291, the funds at issue here were not surplus funds from a mortgage foreclosure and are not deposited with the CFO “pursuant to chapter 717.” See § 45.032(4). Chapter 717 does provide for administrative review of decisions of the CFO in administering funds received pursuant to that chapter, and chapter 45 does specify that surplus funds from a mortgage foreclosure are paid pursuant to those provisions. However, the legislature chose not to include this proviso in chapter 43, stating instead that the provisions of chapter 717 shall “supplement” chapter 43. Because section 43.19 specifies that the CFO is to pay in “obedience” to the trial court’s order, it remains within the trial court’s purview to review the CFO’s denial of payment pursuant to the court’s order and to determine interaction of the provisions of these two chapters if that is the basis of the denial of payment. See Spencer v. Spencer, 898 So.2d 225, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“We recognize that a court always has the inherent jurisdiction to enforce its previously entered orders, even in the absence of an express reservation of jurisdiction in a final judgment.”). Although I disagree with the majority to this extent, this is not necessary to our holding in this case. Accordingly, I concur with the result reached by the majority.

      . The Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida is the agency head of the State of Florida Department of Financial Services. In this case, the attorneys for this intervener/ap-pellee have not consistently described their client as either the CFO or the agency. By using the CFO as the named appellee we are essentially treating the CFO and the agency as equivalents without deciding which should be the proper named intervener in the trial court and an appellee in this court.

      . The parties to this appeal listed some of the original parties as parties to this appeal. We conclude that these listed parties are not parties over whom this court has jurisdiction. We have reconstructed the style of this case to comport with our understanding of the actual parties and their positions within the appeal.

      . The umpire's report or decision is not in our record.

      . The trial court never determined the validity of this assignment, and we have no reason to question its authenticity for the purposes of this appeal. Whether the language of the assignment or the limited consideration paid for the assignment affect the claim are not issues that have been addressed by the circuit court. Tampa Spring Company was not involved in the proceedings on Mr. Crescenzo’s motion or in this appeal.

      . So long as a claimant sought to recover the funds more than five years from the deposit of the funds in the registry of the court, it is not obvious that a premature transfer to the CFO would affect the claimant, except perhaps for a small quantity of interest.

      . This case involves a petition filed in a circuit court. The statute appears to contemplate petitions filed in a county court, as well as those filed in a circuit court. We do not address such a case in this opinion.

      . In Crescenzo v. Interest Recovery, Inc., No. 2D12-312, 136 So.3d 1261, 2014 WL 1613403 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 23, 2014), for example, a case released on the same day as this case, the facts appear to involve funds that were improperly transferred to the CFO. Funds that were erroneously transferred from the judiciary to the executive branch of government arguably might be an exceptional situation.

      . There is no standard form to use in this situation, and we do not attempt to suggest the content of such a petition.

      . We express no opinion as to whether Interest Recovery, Inc., has any remaining right to file a new petition in light of its decision to forego an appeal of the order challenged in this case.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ALTENBERND, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re petition for ORDER DIRECTING PAYMENT OF $11,800.25 in unclaimed money deposited in accordance with section 43.19, Florida Statutes, William Crescenzo, Appellant, v. Interest Recovery, Inc., Appellee.
    No. 2D12-312.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2014.
    See also 2014 WL 1613401.

      Ann M. Allison of Allison Law Group, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Lori L. Jobe of Department of Financial Services, Division of Legal Services, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae Department of Financial Services.
    No appearance for Appellee Interest Recovery, Inc.
   ALTENBERND, Judge.

William Crescenzo appeals an order denying his “Motion to Direct Chief Financial Officer to Return Funds to Court.” This case is similar to Crescenzo v. Atwater, No. 2D12-3092 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 23, 2014), which we issue on this same date. Again, this court concludes that the motion was properly denied but for reasons other than those contained in the order on appeal. Procedurally, this case is even more complex than the case involving the claim in case number 2D12-3092. Our holding in this case is the same as in the other case. We recite many of the details of this case to demonstrate the problems connected with such claims and to provide notice to two parties in the circuit court whose attorneys have never been notified as to these new proceedings.

In 2004, the Department of Transportation filed an eminent domain proceeding to take a parcel of land owned by Ethel Howard in order to widen Interstate 275 near downtown Tampa. The Department deposited $100,000 with the clerk of the court in April 2005. The Department and Ms. Howard reached a settlement by which Ms. Howard would receive $109,750 for the property. Judge Gregory Holder entered a stipulated judgment in the case on May 12, 2005. That judgment required the Department to deposit another $9750 into the court’s registry.

At the time of the stipulated judgment, Ms. Howard apparently owed $11,800.25 on a promissory note that was secured by a mortgage on the property. A dispute existed as to whether this obligation was owed to Elliptical, Inc., or CitiFinancial Mortgage Company, Inc. As a result, the stipulated judgment ordered that this amount would be held in the registry and should not be released until further order of the court. The order recites: “A satisfaction of mortgage or disclaimer of interest shall be filed by Defendants Elliptical and CitiFinancial within ninety (90) days from the date of this Order.”

In June 2005, the Department deposited the final $9750. From the record, we assume that all moneys were withdrawn from the registry except for the $11,800.25. The Department filed a “notice of dropping parties” on June 8, 2005, that purported to drop Ms. Howard, Elliptical, CitiFinancial, and others from this proceeding.

In September 2005, an attorney appeared for Elliptical and filed a “motion for surplus funds.” The motion claimed that Elliptical had a superior right to the funds because CitiFinancial’s assignment of the mortgage and note contained a forged signature. Elliptical filed a second comparable motion for surplus funds in November 2005. An attorney filed a notice of appearance for CitiFinancial in January 2006. Thus, in January 2006, the two parties appeared ready to resolve their respective rights to the money in the registry of the court. From the record, it does not appear that the two parties ever obeyed the court order requiring them to file a joint satisfaction of mortgage. Perhaps such a document was recorded in the public records but not placed in the court file.

Oddly, the next entry in the docket, on November 2, 2010, is a copy of an “Order Directing Deposit of Unclaimed Court Registry Funds with the Chief Financial Officer.” This order was executed by Chief Judge Manuel Menendez, Jr., in a case styled: “In the Matter of Unclaimed Court Registry Funds [Case Number] 10-AF-000037.” Thus, the disputed funds were in the court’s registry from June 2005 until November 2010 without a resolution of the disputed ownership of the funds.

Our record contains no portion of the record in case number 10-AF-000037, except for the copy of this order. We do not know who may have been served or notified of that proceeding. But from our record, when the clerk filed the new proceeding to deposit funds with the Chief Financial Officer, there were two active parties represented by attorneys in this case. They simply had never resolved the disputed issue of ownership of the funds in the registry of the court. The clerk of court apparently filed the application to deposit these funds with the Chief Financial Officer pursuant to section 43.19, Florida Statutes (2011), which allows for an order to deposit funds with the Chief Financial Officer if the money has been deposited with the clerk for five years or more. Section 43.19, however, applies to money deposited with the clerk where the right to withdraw the money “has been adjudicated or is not in dispute.” See § 43.19(1). No one involved with this appeal has argued the point, but it would appear that this fund of money was never actually eligible for deposit with the Chief Financial Officer. We take no position on how that circumstance may affect this case because the order denying the motion can be affirmed without regard to the correctness of the deposit with the Chief Financial Officer.

In August 2011, an amended motion for surplus funds was filed in this case. It was not filed by Elliptical but rather by William Crescenzo and Interest Recovery, Inc. In the motion, they claim to have purchased the “note, mortgage and interest” from Elliptical. The motion states that it was served on a group of parties that all appear to be the parties dropped by the Department of Transportation in 2005. The motion does not appear to have been served on the two attorneys who were actually of record for Elliptical and CitiFinancial.

The amended motion has several supporting documents attached, including two assignments of the “mortgage and interest,” first to Interest Recovery, Inc., and then from that corporation to Mr. Crescen-zo and Interest Recovery, Inc. The assignments are odd documents. They do not expressly assign or deliver a promissory note to Mr. Crescenzo or his corporation. They do not expressly assign rights to funds held in the registry of the court or by the Chief Financial Officer. For the ten dollars Mr. Crescenzo paid to receive this assignment, he and his corporation received rights under a mortgage that was ordered satisfied in 2005. In the unlikely event that the mortgage is still enforceable, it would be a lien against an interstate highway that is currently under construction.

It does not appear that the circuit court entered any order disposing of the amended motion. Instead, in October 2011, Mr. Crescenzo and Interest Recovery, Inc., filed a motion to direct the Chief Financial Officer to return the funds to the court registry of Hillsborough County. This motion is very similar to the one in Cres-cenzo, No. 2D12-3092. It recites that a copy of the motion has been sent to a list of people, but it does not certify that it has been served on the two lawyers of record.

The motion recites that a copy was sent to the Chief Financial Officer. It does not recite that a copy was provided to the state attorney. Nothing in the record at the time of oral argument demonstrated that the state attorney had been notified. Following oral argument, Mr. Crescenzo supplemented the record with original, non-record documents showing that he sent a copy of the claim to the state attorney by certified mail about the same time that he filed his motion.

The Chief Financial Officer did not move to intervene in the circuit court. As a result, no one objected to Interest Recovery, Inc., being a party unrepresented by counsel. In November 2011, Judge James D. Arnold entered an order denying the motion. The order contains reasoning comparable to that in the order in Cres-cenzo, No. 2D12-3092. Thus, the order denies the motion based on perceived deficiencies under chapter 717, Florida Statutes (2011). Following the entry of this order, Mr. Crescenzo sought to disqualify Judge Arnold. Judge Arnold disqualified himself and eventually Judge Sam Pendino entered an order comparable to the order entered by Judge Arnold. Mr. Crescenzo appealed that order pro se. Interest Recovery did not appeal.

Because Mr. Crescenzo filed his motion in the original eminent domain action, the style on his notice of appeal is “Department of Transportation v. Ethel Howard, et al.” Neither the Department of Transportation nor Ethel Howard has been a party in the circuit court for many years. This court has identified Interest Recovery as an appellee for the same reasons that the court identified it as an appellee in Crescenzo, No. 2D12-3092. No one appeared on its behalf in this appeal.

Technically, CitiFinancial Mortgage Company, Inc., and Elliptical, Inc., may be appellees to this appeal. But given that (1) no one provided their attorneys with any notice of the renewed proceedings in the trial court, (2) they showed no interest in the circuit court proceeding between early 2006 and 2012, (3) they have been given no notice of this appeal, and (4) the outcome of this appeal is not adverse to them, we decline to treat them as appel-lees. A copy of the opinion, however, will be sent to their attorneys of record in the circuit court. The only entity that has wished to advocate against Mr. Crescenzo in this appeal has been the Department of Financial Services, which appeared as an “amicus curiae.” At oral argument, this court allowed the Department to argue the case as if it were the appellee. We are confident that Mr. Crescenzo has timely appealed an order that is final and adverse to him, but we have little confidence as to what party, if any party, should actually be the primary appellee.

Our holding in this case is comparable to the one in Crescenzo, No. 2D12-3092. The trial court properly denied the motion because the trial court had no legal basis to direct the Chief Financial Officer to return funds to the court’s registry when the circuit court had no personal jurisdiction over the Chief Financial Officer and the motion contained no legal basis to require a return of such funds.

Affirmed.

DAVIS, C.J., and CRENSHAW, J, Concur.

      . The progress docket indicates notices of hearing and cancellations of hearings in 2006 but nothing that actually resolved the issue of entitlement to the funds in the registry.

      . This record, as explained earlier, does not have a copy of the clerk’s application. We are assuming it was comparable to the application filed in case number 2D 12-3092.

      . This chain of assignments is similar to the assignments in Crescezno, No. 2D 12-3092.

      . The assignment from Elliptical to Interest Recovery, Inc., is executed by Jo Catlin Valen-ciano, "as President of Elliptical, Inc., merger to Oceanside Mortgage, Inc.” The date of the assignment is August 11, 2011. One of the other attachments to the amended motion is an affidavit from Jo Catlin Valenciano, explaining that the corporation has been a dissolved corporation since 2007 or 2008.

      . The unresolved dispute between these parties was not disclosed in the briefing. This court first appreciated that the two parties were represented by counsel in the trial court well after the case had been perfected for oral argument.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Sergio LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 2D12-3971.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2014.
    Opinion filed April 23, 2014.
    Sergio Lopez, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,' for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Sergio Lopez, in his petition filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d), alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the then-standard jury instruction for manslaughter by act that was given to the jury in his trial for second-degree murder was fundamental error. In a supplemental response to Lopez’s petition, the State concedes that in light of the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Daniels v. State, 121 So.3d 409 (Fla.2018), Lopez’s petition should be granted. We agree, and for the same reasons articulated in Horne v. State, 128 So.3d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), we grant the petition, reverse Lopez’s second-degree murder conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for a new trial.

Jimy Pedroza died after Lopez stabbed him. Lopez was charged with second-degree murder and was tried by jury. The evidence at trial showed that Lopez admitted throwing the knife at Pedroza but claimed he acted in self-defense during a fight with Pedroza, who was intoxicated and outweighed him by seventy pounds. The State contended that Lopez stabbed Pedroza in anger because he believed Pe-droza was having an affair with his wife.

The jury was instructed on second-degree murder, manslaughter by intentional act, manslaughter by culpable negligence, justifiable homicide, and excusable homicide. The instruction for manslaughter by act corresponded with the then-standard jury instruction as amended in 2008. Lopez did not object to the instruction. The jury found Lopez guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. This court affirmed Lopez’s conviction and sentence. Lopez v. State, 88 So.3d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Lopez’s appellate attorney filed his initial brief on February 22, 2011, more than four months after the First District Court of Appeal issued its opinion in Riesel v. State, 48 So.3d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), holding that the manslaughter by act instruction as amended in 2008 was fundamentally erroneous. Twenty-three days before this court affirmed Lopez’s conviction and sentence, this court certified conflict with the First District’s Riesel decision in Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227, 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The Florida Supreme Court ultimately overruled our decision, holding that the amended instruction still erroneously required proof of an intent to kill. Daniels, 121 So.3d at 419.

Lopez is entitled to relief because his intent was pertinent and material to what the jury had to consider in order to reach its verdict. See Horne, 128 So.3d at 957. Lopez admitted that he threw the knife at Pedroza but argued that he did not intend to kill Pedroza. If the jury found that the State did not prove Lopez acted with evil intent but that his acts were not justifiable or excusable under the law, manslaughter would have been the appropriate verdict. But the faulty instruction on manslaughter by act deprived the jury of the ability to decide whether Lopez’s lack of intent to kill, when considered with all the other evidence, fit within the elements of the offense of manslaughter. See Haygood v. State, 109 So.3d 735, 742-13 (Fla.2013) (holding that the jury instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence does not cure the fundamental error in giving an erroneous manslaughter by act instruction where the defendant is convicted of second-degree murder and the evidence supports a finding of manslaughter by act, but it does not reasonably support a finding that the death occurred due to the culpable negligence of the defendant). The only non-intentional homicide offense remaining for the jury’s consideration was second-degree murder; therefore the jury was deprived of all the tools it needed to reach a proper verdict. Id. at 743.

Accordingly, we grant the petition. Because Lopez is entitled to have his conviction set aside, a new appeal would be redundant in this instance. Therefore we reverse Lopez’s second-degree murder conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand for a new trial.

Petition granted.

SILBERMAN, BLACK, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


author: SILBERMAN, Judge.

text:
    DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, Trustee Formerly Known as Banker’s Trust Company, as Trustee and Custodian, Appellant, v. Gary Wayne NASH and Beverly J. Nash, Husband and Wife; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as Nominee for Accredited Home Lenders, Inc.; David H.E. Hoffman; Thomas K. Sandwick; NCO Portfolio Management, Inc.; Premium Asset Recovery Corporation; Unknown Parties In Possession # 1; Unknown Parties in Possession # 2; If Living, and all Unknown Parties Claiming by, through, Under and Against the Above Named Appellants who are not Known to be Dead or Alive, Whether Said Unknown Parties May Claim an Interest as Spouse, heirs, Devisees, Grantees, or Other Claimants, Appellees.
    No. 2D12-5318.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2014.

      Jeremy W. Harris of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, CHTD, Wichita, KS, and Kahri E. Taustin of Morris, La-ing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, Chtd., Wellington, for Appellant.
    Richard T. Avis, St. Petersburg, for Ap-pellees Gary Wayne Nash and Beverly J. Nash.
    No appearance for remaining Appellees.
   SILBERMAN, Judge.

After entry of a final judgment of foreclosure, Gary Wayne Nash and Beverly J. Nash filed a motion for relief from judgment and sale. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, Trustee (Deutsche Bank), appeals the trial court’s order that grants the motion, cancels the foreclosure sale, and dismisses the case based on a discharge in bankruptcy. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the final judgment of foreclosure.

Deutsche Bank filed its foreclosure action against the Nashes on December 21, 2007. After engaging in discovery, the Nashes and Deutsche Bank entered into a stipulation to the entry of judgment that was filed on January 24, 2011. The stipulation provided that the plaintiff owned and held the note and mortgage and related security instruments. The stipulation further provided that the defendants: withdrew any affirmative defenses and counterclaims and acknowledged that they had no defenses; admitted the validity of the allegations of the complaint; acknowledged the validity of the debt; and consented to the entry of a judgment of foreclosure, waiving any rights to object to the foreclosure sale or to otherwise delay the issuance of a certificate of title. On January 24, 2011, the trial court rendered a final judgment of foreclosure.

Subsequently in bankruptcy court, the Nashes received a discharge in bankruptcy dated June 18, 2012. The Nashes then filed in the foreclosure proceedings a “Notice of Discharge in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and Motion for Relief from Judgment and Sale.” The Nashes filed the motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(5), which provides that a trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment when that judgment “has been satisfied, released, or discharged.”

After a hearing, the trial court rendered an order granting the motion for relief from judgment and sale. The trial court determined that as a result of the bankruptcy discharge, the promissory note had been fully discharged and that no amounts were due on it. As a result of no amount being due under the note, the court discharged the attendant mortgage and released the property from the lien. The court canceled the scheduled foreclosure sale and dismissed the case.

On appeal, we conclude that the final judgment must be reinstated. The Nashes argue that the note was separated from the mortgage and thus the lien was not valid. But the Nashes stipulated that the plaintiff held the note and mortgage and that they had no defenses to the foreclosure. The Nashes stipulated to entry of the final judgment of foreclosure and waived any right to object to the foreclosure sale or to impede issuance of a certificate of title to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale. Stipulations are to be enforced if they are “entered into with good faith and not obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, and not against public policy.” Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 179, 182 (Fla.1994); see also Jiminez v. Faccone, 98 So.3d 621, 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). The trial court must strictly enforce the parties’ agreement unless a party demonstrates grounds for withdrawal or rescission of the stipulation. See Johnson v. Johnson, 663 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Here, the stipulation was not withdrawn, and there was no order rescinding or vacating the stipulation.

A review of the bankruptcy documents shows that Deutsche Bank was listed on Schedule F as an unsecured creditor. On the explanation page of the discharge order it states that the collection of a discharged debt is prohibited; “[h]owever, a creditor may have the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against the debtors’ property after the bankruptcy, if that lien was not avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case.” Nothing indicates that Deutsche Bank’s mortgage lien was avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case.

Under these circumstances, we agree with Deutsche Bank that the bankruptcy discharge did not affect the mortgage lien on the property. Rather, as Deutsche Bank recognizes, the bankruptcy discharged the Nashes as to personal liability for a deficiency judgment. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (2012) (providing that discharge voids a judgment to the extent that the judgment is a determination of personal liability). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for reinstatement of the final judgment of foreclosure.

Reversed and remanded.

WALLACE and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.

      . We note that the Nashes would have been prohibited from filing a motion for relief from judgment alleging mistake, fraud, or misrepresentation because a motion on those grounds must be filed not more than one year after the judgment. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).


author: ESSRIG, KATHERINE G„ Associate Judge.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Tommy Lee JONES, Appellee.
    No. 2D13-1849.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2014.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Christina Zuccaro, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Lawrence Shearer of McDonald & Shearer, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellee.
   ESSRIG, KATHERINE G„ Associate Judge.

The State appeals a final order granting Tommy Lee Jones’s motion for postconviction relief in connection with his negotiated admission of violations of probation in a 1993 and a 1994 case and negotiated plea to new law offenses of driving with a suspended license and leaving the scene of an accident with property damage in a 2010 case. As Jones concedes on appeal, at the evidentiary hearing below he failed to establish that any deficient performance by trial counsel prejudiced him as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Grosvenor v. State, 874 So.2d 1176, 1179 (Fla.2004) (recognizing that in the context of a guilty plea the defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have entered the guilty plea but would have insisted on going to trial). Therefore, we reverse the order granting post-conviction relief and remand for reinstatement of Jones’s judgments and sentences. Reversed and remanded.

WALLACE and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.


author: NORTHCUTT, Judge.

text:
    Matthew THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D13-4518.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2014.
    Matthew Thompson, pro se.
   NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Matthew Thompson appeals the postcon-viction court’s dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 as untimely. We reverse.

The postconviction court’s order rendered on February 6, 2013, granted Mr. Thompson a forty-five-day extension of time to file his rule 3.850 motion. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.050. The forty-fifth day following this order was Saturday, March 23, 2013, so Mr. Thompson had until Monday, March 25, 2013, to file his rule 3.850 motion. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.040; Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)(1)(C). Although Mr. Thompson’s motion does not contain a certificate of service, the summary record shows that his rule 3.850 motion was timely filed since the correctional institution’s date-stamp on the face of the motion demonstrates that he placed the motion in the hands of prison officials for mailing on March 25, 2013. See Haag v. State, 591 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla.1992) (holding that a pro se inmate’s rule 3.850 motion is deemed filed under the “mailbox rule” when the inmate places the motion in the hands of prison officials for mailing); Westley v. State, 903 So.2d 312, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“[Wlhen a document lacks a certificate of service, as in this case, then the date on the face of the motion is controlling.” (citing Haag, 591 So.2d at 617 n. 3)). Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Mr. Thompson’s motion as untimely and remand for consideration of the motion as timely filed.

Reversed and remanded.

VILLANTI and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


author: BLACK, Judge.

text:
    In the Interest of S.M. and G.M., children. J.M. and D.B., Petitioners, v. Department of Children and Family Services, and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Respondents.
    No. 2D13-5345.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 23, 2014.
    Ama N. Appiah of Law Office of Ama N. Appiah, St. Petersburg, for Petitioners.
    Jennifer S. Paullin, Sanford, for Respondent Guardian ad Litem Program.
    No appearance for Respondent Department of Children and Family Services.
   BLACK, Judge.

J.M., the Father, and D.B., the Mother, petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari to quash the disposition order that accepted the case plan requiring each to submit to a psychiatric evaluation and a substance abuse evaluation. The trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law because nothing in the record indicates that a substance abuse evaluation is relevant to the dependency or that it would meaningfully address the facts and circumstances which resulted in the children’s removal from the home. See, e.g., §§ 39.6011(2)(a), .6012(l)(a), .603(l)(f), Fla. Stat. (2013); C.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 84 So.3d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). As such, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari in part, quashing the disposition order to the extent that it requires the Father and the Mother to submit to substance abuse evaluations as part of the case plan. We note that the case plan may of course be amended pursuant to section 39.6013 and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.420 should the need arise.

Petition granted in part; order quashed in part.

DAVIS, C.J., and CRENSHAW, J., Concur.

      . Since the Father and the Mother did not object to the psychiatric evaluations at the hearing, this issue has not been preserved. We also note that after the petition was filed, the Father and the Mother underwent psychiatric evaluations.


text:
    James KASER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-4978.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 24, 2014.
    James Kaser, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is dismissed as untimely. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(A).

ROBERTS, WETHERELL, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


author: PALMER, J.

text:
    HANCOCK BANK as Successor in Interest, etc., Appellant, v. D.S.C. OF NEWARK ENTERPRISES, etc., et al., Appellee.
    No. 5D13-2305.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 25, 2014.
    Scott A. Livingston and Robert J. Sto-vash, of Stovash, Case, Tingley, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

      Peter B. Heebner and J. Steven Garthe, of Heebner, Baggett, Upchurch & Garthe, P.L., Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PALMER, J.

In this mortgage foreclosure action, Hancock Bank appeals the partial final declaratory judgment entered by the trial court, holding that D.S.C. of Newark Enterprises possesses a vendor’s lien which is superior in priority to Hancock’s purchase-money mortgage. Determining that D.S.C.’s contractual right to recover liquidated damages does not provide a basis for the imposition of a vendor’s lien, we reverse.

Master Development of Central Florida, Inc. entered into a sale/purchase agreement with D.S.C. relating to real property located in Volusia County. Master financed the purchase through a purchase-money mortgage from Peoples First Community Bank. The cash portion of the purchase price was $9,625,000. As additional consideration for the contract, a contract addendum required Master to complete various infrastructure projects. The cost of the projects exceeded $5,000,000.

After closing, Master entered into a post-closing agreement with D.S.C. That agreement stated that the sale/purchase agreement and the addendum imposed certain obligations on Master as part of the consideration for the purchase of the subject property. The agreement then listed numerous obligations including, as additional consideration, the construction of roads and utilities. The agreement also stated that Master’s infrastructure obligations were covenants that ran with the land. The agreement also contained a liquidated damages clause providing for a payout of $15,000 per month in delay damages in the event Master did not timely perform its contractual obligations.

Peoples First filed suit against Master and several other defendants, including D.S.C. The complaint alleged that Master breached the terms of its note and mortgage by failing to make timely payments. Peoples First was thereafter closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was appointed receiver. Hancock acquired certain assets of Peoples First, including the instant note and mortgage. Hancock was substituted as the plaintiff in this action.

Hancock filed an amended complaint. The complaint named D.S.C. as a party defendant, and stated that D.S.C. “may have right, title, interest or claim in or to the subject property”, but that any such interest was “junior, inferior and subordinate in every way” to Hancock’s interest.

Hancock filed a motion for partial summary judgment against D.S.C. The motion asserted that D.S.C.’s interests arising from its post-closing agreement with Master were inferior to Hancock’s interests because Hancock was in possession of a purchase-money mortgage, citing BancFlorida v. Hayward, 689 So.2d 1052 (Fla.1997). D.S.C. filed a competing motion for declaratory relief, seeking a determination of whether it was entitled to obtain a vendor’s lien in the amount of the unpaid portion of the purchase price (i.e., the cost of the infrastructure requirements), and whether said lien was superior to Hancock’s purchase-money mortgage.

After a hearing, the trial court issued a written order holding that D.S.C. acquired a vendor’s lien in the amount of its yet to be determined liquidated damages against Master for its failure to timely complete its infrastructure obligations, and that under the equities of the case said lien had priority over Hancock’s purchase-money mortgage. This appeal timely followed.

When reviewing a declaratory judgment, appellate courts “defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by competent, substantial evidence.” Village of N. Palm Beach v. S & H Foster’s, Inc., 80 So.3d 433, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing to Lawyers Title Ins. Co., Inc. v. Novastar Mortg., Inc., 862 So.2d 793, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

Hancock argues the trial court erred in concluding that D.S.C. is entitled to receive a court-imposed vendor’s lien in the amount of its yet to be determined liquidated damages judgment against Master. We agree.

A vendor’s lien is a creature of equity, a lien implied to belong to a vendor for the unpaid purchase price of land, where he has not taken any other lien or security beyond the personal obligation of the purchaser. Rewis v. Williamson, 51 Fla. 529, 41 So. 449; Bowen v. Grace, 64 Fla. 28, 59 So. 563; De Long v. Marshall, 66 Fla. 410, 63 So. 723; Johns v. Seeley, 94 Fla. 851, 114 So. 452.

Special Tax Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Orange Cnty. v. Hillman, 131 Fla. 725, 179 So. 805, 809 (1938). See Golden v. Woodward, 15 So.3d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Lake Placid Holding Co. v. Paparone, 508 So.2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

Any liquidated damages award which D.S.C. recovers against Master will not represent the unpaid purchase price for thé land. Rather, the liquidated damages award will relate to delay damages for Master’s breach of its infrastructure obligations. As such, the trial court erred in ruling that D.S.C. was entitled to receive a vendor’s lien in the amount of its liquidated damages. Accordingly, the trial court’s partial final declaratory judgment order is reversed.

REVERSED.

ORFINGER and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . Appellate jurisdiction is proper pursuant to rule 9.110(k) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

      . D.S.C. would not have been entitled to obtain a vendor's lien in any amount, since a vendor’s lien is only available when the vendor has not taken any other lien or security beyond the personal obligation of the purchaser, and the post-closing agreement required Masters to provide security, including an escrow deposit of $250,000, to guaranty the completion of its contractual obligations. See Hillman, 179 So. at 809.


text:
    Mowaffak ATFEH and Rydanah Atfeh, Appellants, v. Lillian GICHIMU, Appellee.
    No. 5D13-2070.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 25, 2014.
    Anthony ■ J. Russo and Jared M. Krukar of Butler Pappas Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, and Emory Wood of J. Emory Wood, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellants.
    Laura H. Howard and Michael C. Addison of Addison & Howard, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellants challenge the order awarding attorney’s fees based on a proposal for settlement. Because the proposal failed to comply with the rule in effect at the time it was served, we reverse.

On August 12, 2010, Appellee served a $150,000 proposal for settlement on Appellants. The proposal did not state the amount and terms attributable to each Appellant. At the time of the proposal, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) (2010), required that a proposal state the amount and terms attributable to each party but did not yet provide an exception to such rule with respect to a party that is alleged to be solely vicariously liable. Appellants did not accept Appellee’s settlement proposal, and after a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee in the amount of $281,296.23. Appellee then moved for attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2010). Appellants objected, arguing that, as a result of Appellee’s failure to comply with rule 1.442(c)(3), the proposal for settlement was invalid. The trial court rejected Appellants’ argument and awarded Appellee attorney’s fees in the amount of $162,400. Appellants appeal this attorney’s fee award.

We reverse. See D.A.B. Constructors, Inc. v. Oliver, 914 So.2d 462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

REVERSED.

TORPY, C.J., GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Darryl Maurice YOUNG, Appellant, v. Michael D. CREWS, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-5104.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 25, 2014.
    Darryl Maurice Young, pro se, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jamie M. Braun, Assistant Attorney General, and Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Young v. Crews, 128 So.3d 984, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (barring Appellant from appearing pro sé and directing him to secure counsel for other pending cases or face dismissal).

CLARK, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Edwardo CHAPALET, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-1369.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 25, 2014.

      Edwardo Chapalet, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Because the Court’s jurisdiction was not invoked in a timely fashion, the appeal is dismissed. However, the dismissal is without prejudice to appellant filing a petition for belated appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c).

WOLF, CLARK, and SWANSON, JJ„ concur.


text:
    Raymond CLAUDIO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-5417.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 30, 2014.
    Raymond Claudio, pro se, Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied without prejudice to petitioner seeking an order from the lower tribunal directing the clerk to reassign the case. See Fla. R. Jud. P. 2.330(j).

WOLF, CLARK, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


author: SWANSON, J.

text:
    Alan B. BOOKMAN, as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of Deborah E. Irby, Deceased, Appellant, v. Dale DAVIDSON, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-3086.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 5, 2014.

      John H. Adams, P. Michael Patterson, and Cecily M. Welsh of Emmanuel, Sheppard, and Condon, Pensacola, for Appellant.
    W. David Jester and Jonathan B. Min-chin of Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, Pensacola, for Appellee.
   SWANSON, J.

Appellant, Alan B. Bookman, as successor personal representative of the estate of Deborah E. Irby, appeals the trial court’s “Summary Final Judgment as to Count II and Order Dismissing Count III.” In it, the court found, as a matter of law, that appellant does not have standing to bring a legal malpractice action against appellee, Dale Davidson, the attorney who was hired by the initial personal representative to aid her in the administration of the estate. The court also granted appellee’s motion to dismiss appellant’s claim for disgorgement of attorney’s fees paid by the estate to appellee on the basis they were excessive. It concluded that while appellant had a right to pursue that claim, it would be more appropriately heard in the estate proceedings, which were still pending. We reverse the trial court’s summary final judgment based on a plain reading of section 733.614, Florida Statutes. We affirm on principle, however, the trial court’s dismissal of the claim for disgorgement, but hold the court may, in its discretion on remand, exercise its subject matter jurisdiction to hear that issue along with the other counts of the civil case.

According to the undisputed facts, on January 4, 2007, Dana Ford, through ap-pellee, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Deborah Irby in the Walton County circuit court. On January 24, 2007, Ford was appointed personal representative of the estate and Letters of Administration were issued. Ford engaged the legal services of appellee to advise her concerning her administrative duties until shortly before she resigned as personal representative on February 12, 2010. During the course of his representation of Ford, appellee was paid from estate funds the sum of $195,000.

On February 17, 2010, appellant was appointed successor personal representative of the estate. After his appointment, appellant filed a civil suit against Ford and appellee. In his Second Amended Complaint, appellant alleged that Ford, through appellee’s guidance, improperly disclaimed or transferred out of the estate certain assets belonging to the estate that could have been used to pay its creditors. Appellant sought damages based on allegations that appellee had improperly advised Ford in regards to her responsibilities as personal representative, as well as damages from Ford, personally, for breach of fiduciary duty, defalcation, malfeasance, and devastavit, and also sought disgorgement of personal representative fees paid to her. Ford, in turn, filed an answer raising affirmative defenses, including the defense that her actions were done in good faith and in reliance on the advice of legal counsel. She also filed a cross-claim against appellee for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and contribution.

Appellee moved for summary judgment against appellant, in part claiming the undisputed facts established a lack of any attorney-client relationship between appel-lee and appellant such that appellant, as successor personal representative, could not file a suit against him for malpractice. Primarily, appellee argued a successor personal representative is not in privity with the original personal representative’s attorney, a necessary prerequisite to maintaining a malpractice claim under Florida law. He also moved to dismiss appellant’s count for disgorgement of the portion of attorney’s fees paid to him, urging the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction, or, at least, was the proper court, to review the compensation of professionals involved with the administration of the estate.

The trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment, finding appellant lacked standing to sue appellee because he was not in privity with appellee. It also dismissed the claim for disgorgement, concluding that while appellant might have a right to pursue a claim for disgorgement of excessive attorney’s fees, it was more appropriate that such claim be made in the then-pending estate proceedings. Appellant now challenges these findings and conclusions.

This case presents a question of first impression in Florida, that being whether a successor personal representative of an estate may bring a cause of action for legal malpractice against an attorney hired by her or his predecessor to provide services necessary to the administration of the estate. In reaching our decision to reverse the summary final judgment, we conclude we need not address the privity issue. Instead, our decision is informed by the plain meaning of the language of the relevant statutes in the Florida Probate Code, sections 733.601-733.620, Florida Statutes. See Petty v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 80 So.3d 313, 316 n. 2 (Fla.2012); Srygley v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 82 So.3d 1211, 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); In re A.G., 40 So.3d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding where the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction).

Sections 733.601 through 733.620 set forth the powers, duties, and obligations of the personal representative as regards not only the estate, but an assemblage of other individuals related to the estate’s administration, including its beneficiaries, creditors, contractors, accountants, and attorneys. Section 733.602(1), Florida Statutes, prescribes the general duties of the personal representative by providing that the personal representative

is a fiduciary who shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees ... [and] is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the decedent’s will and [the Florida Probate Code] as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.

To accommodate the personal representative’s exercise of her or his duties, section 733.612, Florida Statutes, governs the transactions authorized by the personal representative, including the employment of an attorney. See § 733.612(19), Fla. Stat. Most significantly, section 733.614 addresses the “[p]owers and duties” of a successor personal representative:

A successor personal representative has the same power and duty as the original personal representative to complete the administration and distribution of the estate as expeditiously as possible, but shall not exercise any power made personal to the personal representative named in the will without court approval.

Therefore, the powers granted to the original personal representative flow to the successor personal representative.

Within this context, the Florida Probate Code expressly granted to Dana Ford, as personal representative of the estate of Deborah E. Irby, the power to engage appellee to represent her and to pay appellee from estate funds. See §§ 733.612(19) & 733.6171(1), Florida Statutes. The Code also grants to the personal representative the power to prosecute lawsuits or proceedings for the protection of the estate and the benefit of interested parties. See § 733.612(20), Fla. Stat. Furthermore, Ford, as personal representative, had the duty to act within “the best interests of the estate” and in “the best interests of all interested parties, including creditors.” §§ 733.602 & 733.603, Fla. Stat. This means the personal representative is required by law to pursue assets and claims of the estate, with value, including those assets which are in the hands of a former personal representative or her or his agents. See Sessions v. Willard, 172 So. 242, 245-46 (Fla.1937).

Thus, there is no dispute that Ford, as the estate’s personal representative, had standing to bring suit against appellee for legal malpractice. Yet, by virtue of the plain language of section 738.614, we hold all of the power and rights Ford possessed, including the right to bring suit against appellee on behalf of the estate, likewise transferred to appellant as the successor personal representative. In essence, appellant stepped into the shoes of Dana Ford when he became the successor personal representative. Consequently, the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of appellee, claiming appellant lacked standing. Appellant, as successor personal representative, has every right and duty under the Florida Probate Code to pursue legal action for malpractice against appellee on behalf of the estate. Cf. Onofrio v. Johnston & Sasser, P.A., 782 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The cause is therefore remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant’s remaining point concerns the trial court’s decision to dismiss his count for disgorgement of attorney’s fees against appellee. The court ruled: “While [appellant] may have the right to pursue a claim for disgorgement of excessive fees allegedly charged by [appellee], it is more appropriate that such claim be made in the estate proceedings, which currently remain pending.” Section 733.6175(2), Florida Statutes, provides that “[c]ourt proceedings to determine the reasonable compensation of the personal representative or any person employed by the personal representative, if required, are a part of the estate administrative proceedings .... ” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it has been held that “the Florida probate court has exclusive jurisdiction [over the matter of compensation] and is obligated to review estate fees upon the petition of a proper party.” In re Winston, 610 So.2d 1323, 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The trial court, then, did not abuse its discretion in holding it was “more appropriate” for the disgorgement claim to be heard in the probate proceedings. Nonetheless, the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim for disgorgement. The “court” for purposes of the Florida Probate Code is defined generally as “the circuit court.” § 731.201, Fla. Stat. Any circuit court has “exclusive original jurisdiction” over “proceedings relating to the settlement of the estates of decedents and minors, the granting of letters testamentary ..., and other jurisdiction usually pertaining to courts of probate.” § 26.012(2)(b), Fla. Stat. In this respect, “every judge of the circuit court possesses the full jurisdiction of that court in his or her circuit and [ ] the various divisions of that court operate in multi-judge circuits for the convenience of the litigants and for the efficiency of the administration of the circuits’ judicial business.” Maugeri v. Plourde, 396 So.2d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding, however, in the case before it, the clear language of section 744.387(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), mandated that “the only court having jurisdiction to approve the settlement of a minor’s claim in a pending action is the court in which the action is pending”). See also Fort v. Fort, 951 So.2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Maugeri, and also citing In the Interest of Peterson, 364 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), for the holding: “All circuit court judges have the same jurisdiction within their respective circuits.... The internal operation of the court system and the assignment of judges to various divisions does not limit a particular judge’s jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted). Accord, Weaver v. Hotchkiss, 972 So.2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Unlike the statutory language addressed in Maugeri, we do not read section 738.6175(2) as precluding a circuit court of general jurisdiction from hearing, in a related civil suit, the issue of compensation of a person who was employed by the personal representative of an estate as a part of the estate’s administration. On remand, the trial court, in its discretion and for the convenience of the court and the parties, may hold a joint trial of all the claims if it is shown that a joint trial will not prejudice a party or cause inconvenience. See Yost v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 570 So.2d 350, 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BENTON and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mark Allen DONALDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D13-5262.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 7, 2014.

      Mark Allen Donaldson, pro se.
   ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

ALTENBERND, Judge.

Mark Allen Donaldson appeals the post-conviction court’s order summarily denying his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The court denied the motion as untimely. Although that ruling appears correct, we dismiss this appeal because Mr. Donaldson, who is not entitled to the mailbox rule, filed his notice of appeal late.

The postconviction court filed the order denying Mr. Donaldson’s motion in July 2013. It denied his motion for rehearing in an order that was filed on Thursday, September 19, 2013. Accordingly, the notice of appeal was required to be filed on or before Monday, October 21, 2013. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(1), 9.110(b), 9.020(h), 9.420(e); Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514(a). If, as in this case, a pro se appellant is not an inmate in custody, the notice of appeal is considered filed as of the date the clerk of the circuit court receives the notice. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.420(a); Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.516(e). Therefore, the appellant’s notice of appeal, which was filed on Tuesday, October 22, 2013, was untimely.

The Florida Supreme Court in Millinger v. Broward County Mental Health Division & Risk Management, 672 So.2d 24, 26 (Fla.1996), clearly stated: “It is a settled rule of law that mailing, as opposed to filing, a notice within the thirty-day filing period is insufficient to preserve appellate rights.” Only prisoners who are confined on the date that the notice of appeal must be filed may take advantage of the “mailbox rule,” which provides that a notice of appeal submitted by the prisoner is deemed filed at the moment the inmate loses control over the document by entrusting its further delivery or processing to agents of the state, usually prison officials. See Haag v. State, 591 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla.1992); Ray v. State, 89 So.3d 304, 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Raysor v. Raysor, 706 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). And in no case is the deadline for filing a notice of appeal extended for five days even though the order to be appealed was mailed to the recipient. Since 2012, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.420(e) has explained that the computation of time in appeals is governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514(b). That rule provides that the automatic five-day extension applies only when some act is required to be done after service of a document by mail, not when the act is required to be done after rendition or filing of an order, even if the rendered order is mailed to the parties. See Bouchard v. State, Dep’t of Bus. Reg., 448 So.2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Turner v. State, 557 So.2d 939 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

Mr. Donaldson asserts that United States Supreme Court Rule 29 requires his notice of appeal to be considered filed as of the date of the postmark placed by the United States Postal Service on a first-class mail envelope. But rule 29 is applicable to “[a]ny document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice.” This rule of procedure governs proceedings in the United States Supreme Court only, not in Florida state courts.

Mr. Donaldson filed his notice of appeal a day late. There is no legal justification that gives this court the authority to extend his time to file the notice of appeal even for a day. See Tillett v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Comm’n, 115 So.3d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ„ Concur.