author: STUART, Justice. SHAW, Justice

text:
    The WATER WORKS and SEWER BOARD of the CITY of PRICHARD v. The BOARD of WATER and SEWER COMMISSIONERS of the CITY of MOBILE d/b/a Mobile Area Water and Sewer Service System.
    1120630.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
    K. Mark Parnell and Mary H. Thompson of Waldrep, Stewart & Kendrick, LLC, Birmingham; and Jay M. Ross and Randall Scott Hetrick of Adams & Reese, LLP, Mobile, for appellant.
    James E. Atchison and Frank G. Taylor of The Atchison Firm, P.C., Mobile, for appellee.
   STUART, Justice.

The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard (“the Prichard Water Board”) appeals the summary judgment entered against it by the Mobile Circuit Court in its action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile d/b/a Mobile Area Water and Sewer Service System (“the Mobile Water Board”) with regard to the Mobile Water Board’s planned takeover of the water and sewer systems currently being operated by the Prichard Water Board. We reverse and remand.

I.

On June 9, 2011, during its 2011 Regular Session, the Alabama Legislature (“the legislature”) approved and adopted Act No. 2011-543, which provides as follows:

“Section 1. The following amendment to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as amended, is proposed and shall become valid as a part thereof when approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon and in accordance with Sections 284, 285, and 287 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as amended:
“PROPOSED AMENDMENT
“(a) Within 90 days after the ratification of this amendment, the assets and liabilities of the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard shall be transferred to the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile, presently known as the Mobile Area Water and Sewer System. The transfer shall include all assets of the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard and shall be conditioned upon the assumption or discharge by the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile, presently known as the Mobile Area Water and Sewer System, of all liabilities of the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard, including, without limitation, all indebtedness, contracts, and retirement obligations. Any assumption of obligations by the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile, presently known as the Mobile Area Water and Sewer System, shall be evidenced by resolution of that board.
“(b) Upon transfer of its assets and liabilities pursuant to subsection (a), the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard shall be dissolved.
“(c) The rates for water and sewer service to existing customers of Mobile Area Water and Sewer System shall not be increased at any time for reasons related to the acquisition or maintenance of the assets, liabilities, or infrastructure of the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard.
“(d) Notwithstanding ratification of this amendment in accordance with applicable state law, this amendment shall not be effective and the actions, including, but not limited to, the transfer of assets and liabilities in subsections (a) and (b), shall not take place unless both of the following have occurred:
“(1) A favorable vote by the majority of those persons who reside and voted in precincts any part of which are serviced by the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile (Mobile Area Water and Sewer System).
“(2) A favorable vote by the majority of those persons who reside and voted in precincts any part of which are serviced by the Water and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard. The votes cast on this amendment in precincts any part of which are serviced by the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile (Mobile Area Water and Sewer System) and the votes cast on this amendment in precincts any part of which are serviced by the Water and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard shall be tabulated separately to determine whether a majority of those who voted in each area approved the amendment.
“Section 2. An election upon the proposed amendment shall be held in accordance with Sections 284 and 285 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, now appearing as Sections 284 and 285 of the Official Recompilation of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as amended, and the election laws of this state.
“Section 8. The appropriate election official shall assign a ballot number for the proposed constitutional amendment on the 'election ballot and shall set forth the following description of the substance or subject matter of the proposed constitutional amendment:
“ ‘Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, to provide for the transfer of the assets and liabilities of the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard to the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile, presently known as the Mobile Area Water and Sewer System.
“ ‘Proposed by Act-’
“This description shall be followed by the following language:
“ ‘Yes () No ().’ ”

The proposed amendment was included on the ballot for the general election held November 6, 2012, as amendment 5. A majority of voters statewide, a majority of voters served by the Prichard Water Board, and a majority of voters served by the Mobile Water Board all voted in favor of the proposed amendment, and it was apparently subsequently renumbered Amendment No. 863. On January 28, 2013, the Mobile Water Board adopted a resolution authorizing the assumption of all assets and liabilities belonging to the Prichard Water Board.

On November 29, 2012, the Prichard Water Board sued the Mobile Water Board, seeking a judgment declaring Amendment No. 863 invalid and void, as well as an injunction enjoining the Mobile Water Board from taking any action to take over the Prichard Water Board’s water and sewer systems or to dissolve the Prichard Water Board. The Mobile Water Board moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court subsequently ordered both parties to submit summary-judgment motions outlining their positions. The parties filed the requested summary-judgment motions on January 25, 2013. In its motion, the Prichard Water Board argued, among other things, that Amendment No. 863 was invalid because the proper procedure for proposing an amendment to the Constitution was not followed; specifically, the Prichard Water Board argued that the legislature had erred by following the procedure set forth in Ala. Const.1901, Art. XVIII, § 284, which outlines the general procedure for proposing an amendment to the Constitution and provides:

“Amendments may be proposed to this Constitution by the legislature in the manner following: The proposed amendments shall be read in the house in which they originate on three several days, and, if upon the third reading three-fifths of all the members elected to that house shall vote in favor thereof, the proposed amendments shall be sent to the other house, in which they shall likewise be read on three several days, and if upon the third reading three-fifths of all of the members elected to that house shall vote in favor of the proposed amendments, the legislature shall order an election by the qualified electors of the state upon such proposed amendments, to be held either at the general election next succeeding the session of the legislature at which the amendments are proposed or upon another day appointed by the legislature, not less than three months after the final adjournment of the session of the legislature at which the amendments were proposed. Notice of such election, together with the proposed amendments, shall be given by proclamation of the governor, which shall be published in every county in such manner as the legislature shall direct, for at least four successive weeks next preceding the day appointed for such election. On the day so appointed an election shall be held for the vote of the qualified electors of the state upon the proposed amendments. If such election be held on the day of the general election, the officers of such general election shall open a poll for the vote of the qualified electors upon the proposed amendments; if it be held on a day other than that of the general election, officers for such election shall be appointed; and the election shall be held in all things in accordance with the law governing general elections. In all elections upon such proposed amendments, the votes cast thereat shall be canvassed, tabulated and returns thereof be made to the secretary of state, and counted, in the same manner as in elections for representatives in the legislature; and if it shall thereupon appear that a majority of the qualified electors who voted at such election upon the proposed amendments voted in favor of the same, such amendments shall be valid to all intents and purposes as parts of this Constitution. The result of such election shall be made known by proclamation of the governor. Representation in the legislature shall be based upon population, and such basis of representation shall not be changed by constitutional amendments.”

The Prichard Water Board argued that the legislature should instead have followed the procedure set forth in Ala. Const. 1901, Art. XVIII, § 284.01, which relates to constitutional amendments affecting only one county and provides as follows:

“(a) Any proposed constitutional amendment which affects or applies to only one county shall be adopted as a valid part of the constitution by a favorable vote of a majority of the qualified electors of the affected county who vote on the amendment. Any proposed constitutional amendment which affects or applies to only one political subdivision within a county or counties shall be adopted as a valid part of the constitution by a favorable vote of a majority of the qualified electors of both the county and the political subdivision affected by the amendment who vote on the amendment. The proposed amendment may provide for a separate referendum in a political subdivision of less than a county if a simultaneous referendum is not possible because of conflicting voting precincts.
“(b) The proposed amendment shall first be approved by at least a three-fifths vote of the elected members of each house of the Legislature with no dissenting vote east and approved by a majority vote of the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission. The commission shall be composed of the Governor, Presiding Officer of the Senate, Attorney General, Secretary of State, and Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Legislature may by general act specify procedures for the Local Constitution Amendment Commission, but may not expand its role beyond deciding whether the amendment affects more than one county or more than one political subdivision in one or more counties.
“(c) Notice of the election, together with the proposed amendment, shall be given by proclamation of the Governor, which proclamation shall be published once a week for four successive weeks next preceding the day appointed for the election in each newspaper qualified to run legal notices in the county or counties affected.
“(d) In the event any constitutional amendment proposed for adoption pursuant to this amendment is approved by at least a three-fifths vote of the elected members of each house of the Legislature but with one or more dissenting votes cast, the amendment shall be treated as a statewide amendment as described in subsection (e).
“(e) If after having been approved by at least a three-fifths vote of the elected members of each house of the Legislature without a dissenting vote cast the proposed amendment is not approved by a majority vote the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission, it shall automatically be submitted in a statewide referendum in accordance with the procedures for proposed statewide constitutional amendments under Sections 284 and 285 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. If the proposed amendment is submitted in a statewide referendum, it shall not become effective unless approved at a referendum by a majority of the qualified voters of the affected county voting on the proposition and the affected political subdivision voting on the proposition, if it affects less than the whole county. The referendum in a political subdivision may be held at the same time as the election for the ratification of the proposed amendment, or at another time if provided by the proposed amendment.
“(f) Notwithstanding any provision of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, to the contrary, all constitutional amendments which have been adopted by a majority vote of the appropriate electorate pursuant to [this section as added by] Amendment No. 425 to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, are hereby ratified and confirmed.”

The Prichard Water Board argued that Amendment No. 863 affected only Mobile County and that the legislature accordingly should have followed the procedure in § 284.01. In its motion, the Mobile Water Board acknowledged that Amendment No. 863 affected only Mobile County, but it argued that the legislature was nevertheless free to follow the procedure in either § 284 or in § 284.01.

On February 19, 2013, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Mobile Water Board and against the Prichard Water Board, holding that Amendment No. 863 was properly enacted and dissolving the Prichard Water Board and transferring its assets and obligations to the Mobile Water Board. On February 27, 2013, the Prichard Water Board filed its notice of appeal to this Court.

II.

The Prichard Water Board argues that the trial court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of the Mobile Water Board. We review this argument pursuant to the following standard:

“This Court’s review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala.2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce ‘substantial evidence’ as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12.”

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala.2004).

III.

The Prichard Water Board argues that the summary judgment in favor of the Mobile Water Board should be reversed for a variety of reasons; we first consider its argument that Amendment No. 863 is invalid because, it says, the proper procedure for proposing an amendment to the Constitution was not followed. In Hunt v. Decatur City Board of Education, 628 So.2d 393, 396-97 (Ala.1993), this Court stated:

“Our constitution contains two procedures, other than the convention procedure, Ala. Const.1901, Art. XVIII, §§ 286, 287, for amending the document. [Section 284] gives the general procedure for amending the constitution, and [§ 284.01] provides a limited procedure for proposing and adopting an amendment that applies to only one county.[] These provisions are the exclusive means for amending the document, for the power to alter the constitution must be explicitly conferred in the instrument itself. State v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864 (Ala.1983); Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 87 So. 375 (1921); Hooper v. State ex rel. Fox, 206 Ala. 371, 89 So. 593 (1921); Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100 (1854). For example, in Johnson and Hooper the legislature proposed amendments to the constitution that purported to confer upon the Governor the power to call statewide elections for the amendments. Although there was no express provision in the constitution prohibiting the legislature from delegating this power to the Governor, this Court held that the purported amendments were invalid because § 284 provided that only the legislature has the power to order the statewide elections. This Court refused to recognize an implied or supplementary power on the part of the Governor in the amendment process.
“An important corollary to the rule that any power in the amendment process must be expressly conferred is that the prescribed amendment procedures must be strictly followed and that any deviation from the procedure renders the proposed amendment a nullity. This rule applies notwithstanding a vote by the electorate in favor of the amendment. Johnson, Collier, supra. The fundamental law must necessarily be immune to unauthorized change by any of the coordinate branches of government. In Collier, supra, this Court stated:
“ ‘The constitution is the supreme and paramount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it is clearly defined. It has been said, that certain acts are to be done— certain requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to what purpose are these acts required, or these requisitions enjoined, if the Legislature or any other department of the government, can dispense with them. To do so, would be to violate the instrument which they are sworn to support.... ’
24 Ala. at 109.”

Thus, Hunt makes it clear that “the prescribed amendment procedures must be strictly followed and ... any deviation from the procedure renders the proposed amendment a nullity.” 628 So.2d at 396. We must accordingly determine whether the legislature erred by proposing Amendment No. 863 pursuant to § 284 instead of § 284.01.

Section 284.01(b) provides that a proposed amendment affecting only one county “shall first be approved by at least a three-fifths vote of the elected members of each house of the Legislature with no dissenting vote cast and approved by a majority vote of the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission.” (Emphasis added.) We have previously stated that “[t]he word ‘shall’ is clear and unambiguous and is imperative and mandatory.” Ex parte Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 721 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Ala.1998). In the instant case, we may take judicial notice of the fact that Act No. 2011-543, proposing Amendment No. 863, was approved by the Senate 23-0 and by the House 66-0. Nevertheless, Amendment No. 863 was never submitted to the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission for approval, despite the clear indication in § 284.01 that such a submission is necessary when the legislature unanimously approves a proposed amendment affecting only one county by the prescribed margin. Thus, it is clear that the procedure for proposing Amendment No. 863 provided by § 284.01 was not followed. Indeed, the Mobile Water Board does not even take the contrary position; rather, it argues that § 284.01 merely provides an alternative path for proposing an amendment affecting only one county and that the legislature is free to follow the procedure set forth in § 284 instead should it desire to do so when proposing a constitutional amendment affecting only one county. We disagree.

In Opinion of the Justices No. 329, 568 So.2d 1216 (Ala.1989), this Court considered a question posed by the House of Representatives regarding whether the provisions of § 284 or § 284.01 (then Amendment No. 425) applied to a proposed amendment affecting only Calhoun County. We stated that § 284.01 “changed the method of approving or disapproving an amendment to the Constitution where only one county is affected by the amendment,” 568 So.2d at 1219 (emphasis added), and that § 284.01 “controls the election where a proposed Constitutional amendment affects only one county,” 568 So.2d at 1218 (emphasis added). The use of the term “changed” indicates that the prior method for approving an amendment affecting only one county was no longer available, and the use of the term “controls” further indicates that § 284.01 is, post-adoption, the exclusive avenue for proposing such an amendment. The Mobile Water Board rightly notes that advisory opinions issued by this Court are not binding precedent, see, e.g., Opinion of the Justices No. 384, 49 So.3d 1181, 1186 (Ala.2010); however, in light of the previously noted mandatory language in § 284.01, we agree with the conclusion reached in this Court’s 1989 advisory opinion that the procedure set forth in § 284.01 must be followed in proposing amendments affecting only one county.

We recognize that our holding today is in conflict with two advisory opinions issued by the Alabama Attorney General and cited by the Mobile Water Board in support of its arguments. Although this Court is not bound by opinions of the attorney general, it has recognized that such opinions often constitute persuasive authority; accordingly, we think it wise to explain further our rationale for rejecting in this case the reasoning expressed in those opinions. See Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 694 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Ala.1997) (“While an opinion of the attorney general is not binding, it can constitute persuasive authority.”). In Op. Att’y Gen. No. 84-00098 (Dec. 15, 1983), the attorney general issued an advisory opinion to the probate judge of Randolph County regarding an amendment affecting only Randolph County that the legislature had approved pursuant to § 284 as opposed to § 284.01, which at that time required proposed amendments affecting only one county to be unanimously approved by the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission and did not contain current subsections (d) and (e). In concluding that the legislature could elect to follow either the procedures of § 284 or § 284.01 when proposing a constitutional amendment affecting only-one county, the attorney general stated:

“It is obvious that the constitutional amendment proposed by Act 83^54 is a local amendment and therefore would not be required to be voted on statewide absent the specific language contained therein excepting it from the provisions of [§ 284.01]. Therefore, the question to be determined becomes whether [§ 284.01] was intended by the Legislature to be the exclusive method by which a proposed constitutional amendment affecting only one county may be adopted. If it is the exclusive method, then the language contained in Act No. 83-454 that attempts to exclude it from the operation of [§ 284.01] is invalid, inasmuch as it would in that case constitute a statutory provision which conflicts with a constitutional provision. Although a constitutional amendment normally may exclude itself from other constitutional provisions, it cannot exclude itself from the provisions regarding the steps necessary for it to become a valid constitutional amendment. A constitutional provision validly enacted under the procedures presently required by the constitution and containing language changing said procedures would be necessary in order to change the procedures by which amendments may be adopted for subsequently proposed amendments.
“It is highly unlikely that the Legislature intended to give the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, and Speaker of the House of Representatives, individually, veto power over any proposed local constitutional amendment. If [§ 284.01] is read to be the exclusive method by which to adopt local amendments to the Constitution, such a veto power would appear to vest in each of the above-named officials. The more reasonable interpretation would be that [§ 284.01] was intended as a non-exclusive method of avoiding a state-wide vote on purely local matters, but that if a local amendment for some reason is not approved pursuant to [§ 284.01], it may still be approved and adopted in the manner followed previous to the adoption of [§ 284.01],
“It is therefore the opinion of this office that the Legislature did not intend [§ 284.01] to be the exclusive means by which a proposed constitutional amendment affecting only one county may be adopted.”

In a later opinion, Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-00196 (Aug. 11, 1998), the attorney general responded to a similar inquiry regarding a proposed constitutional amendment affecting only Bibb County and again concluded, based on its previous advisory opinion, that the legislature could elect to follow the procedure of either § 284 or § 284.01 when proposing a constitutional amendment affecting only one county. The only rationale offered in either advisory opinion in support of the conclusion that either § 284 or § 284.01 could be employed to propose an amendment to the constitution that affected only one county was the fact that the contrary conclusion would essentially give the individual members of the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission veto power over the proposed amendment.

However, on November 8, 1994, Amendment No. 555 was ratified, amending § 284.01 to its current form, which requires only a majority of the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission to approve a proposed amendment, and further providing, in subsections (d) and (e), procedures by which a proposed amendment could still be submitted to the voters for approval even if approval by the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission or a unanimous vote in either chamber of the legislature is not obtained. Thus, the only rationale offered in the two cited advisory opinions issued by the attorney general for the conclusion that the legislature could proceed in such a case under § 284 or § 284.01 no longer holds, and we are left with only the mandatory language of § 284.01 setting forth the proper procedure to follow when “[a]ny proposed constitutional amendment ... affects or applies to only one county.” § 284.01(a). It is notable, furthermore, that the legislature, in proposing Amendment No. 555 to amend § 284.01 after this Court’s decision in Hunt, did not include language indicating that § 284.01 was merely an alternative path it could elect to follow to propose a constitutional amendment affecting only one county. Rather, the legislature amended the language to remove the apparent veto power that had been given to the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission and to further provide a specific avenue for passing a proposed amendment even when commission approval or unanimous legislature approval was not obtained. However, the mandatory language, i.e., the use of the mandate “shall,” remained.

IV.

The Prichard Water Board appeals the summary judgment entered against it by the trial court holding that Amendment No. 868 was properly proposed and ratified pursuant to § 284. That judgment is now reversed. Because Amendment No. 863 affects only Mobile County, the legislature should have followed the procedure in § 284.01 instead of the procedure in § 284, and that noncompliance with § 284.01 invalidates Amendment No. 863 in spite of any compliance with § 284. See Hunt, 628 So.2d at 396 (“[T]he prescribed amendment procedures must be strictly followed and ... any deviation from the procedure renders the proposed amendment a nullity.”). We accordingly preter-mit discussion of all other arguments raised by the parties, and we remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MOORE, C.J., and BOLIN, PARKER, and MAIN, JJ., concur.

SHAW, J., concurs specially.

MURDOCK, J., concurs in the result.

WISE and BRYAN, JJ., dissent.

SHAW, Justice

(concurring specially).

I concur in the main opinion. I write specially to note the following.

Article XVIII, § 284.01, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, applies when a proposed constitutional amendment “affects or applies to only one county.” That language is strikingly broad, and nothing in the text of Amendment No. 863 explicitly “affects or applies to” any one particular county. However, there is no challenge raised or any discussion broached that Amendment No. 863 can have any effect or application outside Mobile County, where the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard and the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile operate. Thus, there appears to be no dispute that Amendment No. 863 “affects or applies to only one county” as contemplated by § 284.01; I therefore agree with the majority that § 284.01 controls.

      . Following die trial court’s entry of a summary judgment in favor of the Mobile Water Board, the Prichard Water Board moved for a temporary injunction pending appeal. The Mobile Water Board opposed the motion, and, on February 22, 2013, the trial court granted the motion in part, allowing the Mobile Water Board to take over the day-to-day operations of the Prichard Water Board but allowing the Prichard Water Board to retain its corporate existence in order to facilitate an appeal and prohibiting the Mobile Water Board from making any permanent or irreversible interconnections between the two water and sewer systems until the anticipated appeal was resolved

      . In Hunt, this Court at times referred to § 284 and § 284.01 as Amendment No. 24 and Amendment No. 425, respectively. When the Code was recompiled, they were renumbered as § 284 and § 284.01. For consistency, we re^er 1:0 them solely as § 284 and § 284.01 throughout this opinion.

      . See, e.g., Johnson v. Hall, 10 So.3d 1031, 1034 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (stating that "court may take judicial notice of public records"), and Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 41 N.M. 474, 71 P.2d 140, 141 (1937) (stating that "we take judicial notice, that by chapter 117 of the Laws of 1937, the Legislature by unanimous vote of each house thereof, 22 senators voting in the affirmative, nays none, 2 senators being absent, and 34 members of the House voting in the affirmative, none in the negative, the others being absent, called a special election to be held throughout the state” to approve or reject proposed amendments to the New Mexico Constitution).

      . In the event a proposed amendment is approved by the legislature in a three-fifths vote that is not unanimous, or if the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission fails to approve the amendment by a majority vote, § 284.01(d) and (e) provide that the proposed amendment "shall automatically be submitted in a statewide referendum in accordance with the procedures for proposed statewide constitutional amendments under Sections 284 and 285 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.” § 284.01(e). However, nothing indicates that the legislature may elect simply to bypass the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission entirely.

      . Section 284.01 at that time read as follows:
      "Any proposed constitutional amendment which affects or applies to only one county shall be adopted as a valid part of the constitution by a majority vote of the people of the county and in any political subdivision thereof so affected, provided that such proposed amendment has first been unanimously approved by at least a three-fifths vote of the elected members of each house and unanimously approved by a local constitutional amendment commission composed of the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state and speaker of the house of representatives and notice of such election, together with the proposed amendment shall be given by proclamation of the governor, which proclamation shall be published once a week for four successive weeks next preceding the day appointed for the election in each newspaper qualified to run legal notices in the county affected. The proposed local constitutional amendment shall then be approved by a majority vote of the qualified electors of the county and in any political subdivision thereof affected by such proposed amendment voting in a referendum election held for the purpose of determining if such proposed amendment shall become adopted as a valid part of the Constitution.”

      . We further note that this Court in Hunt previously rejected the rationale put forth by the attorney general in his 1983 advisory opinion, holding that the plain language of § 284.01 controlled:
      "The [Local Constitutional Amendment] Commission also argues that the effect of a failure by it to unanimously approve a proposed amendment for submission to a vote in a single county is that the amendment will be submitted to a vote of the entire state. It seizes upon the language in the attorney general's opinion questioning whether the legislature intended to give a single member of the Commission veto power over proposed local amendments. However, [§ 284.01] clearly compels exactly this result.”
      628 So.2d at 397.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MAIN, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    BALDWIN COUNTY, by and through the BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSION v. BALDWIN COUNTY CATTLE & FAIR ASSOCIATION, INC.
    1120599.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Sept. 20, 2013.

      Daniel G. Blackburn, David J. Conner, and Rebecca A. Gaines of Blackburn, Conner & Taupeka, P.C., Bay Minette, for appellant.
    William G. Baxley and Joel E. Dillard of Baxley, Dillard, McKnight & James, Birmingham; and Julian B. Brackin, Jr., of Braekin McGriff Johnson, Foley, for appel-lee.
   MAIN, Justice.

Baldwin County (“the County”) appeals from a judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of Baldwin County Cattle & Fair Association, Inc. (“the Fair Association”). We reverse and remand.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On or about June 14, 2004, the Baldwin County Commission passed a resolution recognizing the Fair Association’s planned construction of a multimillion dollar coliseum at the Fair Association’s new fairgrounds site in Baldwin County. The Fair Association is a nonprofit corporation that operates the Baldwin County Fair. In the resolution, the Commission resolved to provide long-term funding for the Fan-Association in the amount of $75,000 annually for a period of 10 years, beginning in the County’s 2005 fiscal year.

On October 18, 2005, the County and the Fair Association entered into a memorandum of understanding, pursuant to which the parties agreed that the Fair Association would construct the new coliseum to standards suitable for the County to use as a hurricane-evacuation shelter. The parties further agreed that, upon the completion of construction, the coliseum property would be conveyed to the County, which would then lease the property back to the Fair Association. The memorandum of understanding additionally provided that, once the property was conveyed to the County, the County would be relieved from its commitment to make the annual $75,000 payment to the Fair Association.

On September 10, 2008, the County and the Fair Association entered into a real-estate sale and purchase agreement for the conveyance of the coliseum property to the County. The purchase agreement provided that the County would be “released and relieved from paying [the Fair Association] the Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), annual payment....” Following conveyance of the coliseum property, on September 29, 2008, the parties entered into a lease agreement for the property. The lease was for a term of 75 years, and the agreement provided that the Fair Association would pay annual rent to the County in the amount $15,000 plus 15 percent of the Fair Association’s net revenues.

Despite the parties’ agreement to discontinue the annual $75,000 payment to the Fair Association, the County made two additional payments — one in 2009 and another in 2010. Each additional payment was presented to the County Commission as part of the “County Commission Accounts Payable Payments” and was approved by the Commission along with payments to other vendors. The County now asserts that the two $75,000 payments were made by mistake and were the result of failure of the County’s clerk/treasurer to discontinue the automatic transfers and payments set up following adoption of the June 2004 resolution. The County also contends that the Fair Association owes it $32,762 in past-due rent and other financial obligations under the lease agreement.

On July 3, 2012, the County, by and through the County Commission, filed this lawsuit against the Fair Association in the Baldwin Circuit Court. The complaint alleged that the two $75,000 payments to the Fair Association were made in error; that the Fair Association knew or should have known that the payments were in error; and that the Fair Association has retained the funds rather than return the moneys to the County. Counts one, two, and three of the complaint assert claims for money had and received, money paid by mistake, and unjust enrichment, respectively. Each count seeks damages in the amount of $150,000. Count four of the complaint asserts a claim of breach of the lease agreement and alleges that the Fair Association has failed to pay rents and other financial obligations it incurred under the lease agreement. The County seeks damages in the amount of $32,762 as a result of the Fair Association’s alleged breach and also demands rescission of the lease agreement.

On August 20, 2012, the Fair Association filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. The motion asserted two grounds. First, the Fair Association argued the County’s claims for money had and received, money paid by mistake, and unjust enrichment were each barred by the separation-of-powers doctrine. According to the Fair Association, the judiciary may not interfere with what the Fair Association contends was a valid appropriation of funds by the County. In support of its argument, the Fair Association attached excerpts of published minutes of the two County Commission meetings at which the Commission approved the two additional $75,000 payments to the Fair Association as part of an “Accounts Payable Payment.” Second, the Fair Association argued that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim alleging breach of the lease agreement. The Fair Association contends that an action seeking compensatory damages for breach of a lease or rescission of a lease must be brought as an unlawful-detainer action originating in the Baldwin District Court. The County filed a brief in opposition to the motion.

A hearing on the motion was held on November 29, 2012. On January 11, 2013, the circuit court granted the Fair Association’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings. The County appealed.

II. Standard of Review

The motion filed by the Fair Association and granted by the circuit court was styled as a Rule 12(c), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Although the motion may have been more appropriately styled as a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion to dismiss, the Fair Association supported the motion with evidence outside the pleadings, requiring the conversion of the motion to a motion for a summary judgment.

“When matters outside the pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss, the motion is converted into a motion for summary judgment, Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; this is the case regardless of what the motion has been called or how it was treated by the trial court, Papastefan v. B & L Constr. Co., 356 So.2d 158 (Ala.1978); Thome v. Odom, 349 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1977). ‘Once matters outside the pleadings are considered, the requirements of Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., become operable and the “moving party’s burden changes and he is obliged to demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil, 1366 at 681 (1969).’ Boles v. Blackstock, 484 So.2d 1077, 1079 (Ala.1986). The effect of converting the defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment was to impose upon the defendants the burden of meeting the two-part summary judgment standard, that is, the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.”

Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So.2d 932, 937-38 (Ala.1997). We have recently described the standard of review applicable to a summary judgment:

‘“This Court’s review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala.2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce “substantial evidence” as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12.’ ”

Patterson v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 101 So.3d 743, 746 (Ala.2012)(quoting Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala.2004)).

III. Analysis

The Fair Association argues that application of the separation-of-powers doctrine compels us to affirm the judgment of the circuit court with respect to Count one (money had and received), Count two (money paid by mistake), and Count three (unjust enrichment) of the County’s complaint. Each of those counts seeks recovery of the two $75,000 payments made by the County to the Fair Association after the execution of the purchase agreement. According to the Fair Association, each payment represents a valid legislative appropriation that was duly approved by the County Commission. The County, on the other hand, which is suing by and through the County Commission, asserts that the payments were approved and paid by mistake, that it has a right to bring this action in its name for the recovery of the funds, and that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not apply-

The Constitution of Alabama expressly adopts the separation-of-powers doctrine. Birmingham-J efferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So.2d 204 (Ala.2005). Section 42, Ala. Const.1901, divides the power of state government into three distinct departments: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. We have stated that “the core judicial power is the power to declare finally the rights of parties, in a particular case or controversy, based on the law at the time the judgment becomes final.” Ex parte Jenkins, 723 So.2d 649, 656 (Ala.1998). Under § 48, Ala. Const.1901, however, the judicial branch “shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them.” We have interpreted Section 43 to mean that “this Court will not decide ‘political questions,’ even if submitted to it.” City of Birmingham, 912 So.2d at 214. In determining what constitutes a nonjusticiable political question, this Court has adopted the formulation set forth by the United State Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962):

“ ‘It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.’”

City of Birmingham, 912 So.2d at 214-15 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).

Particular examples of our application of the separation-of-powers doctrine include our holdings in City of Birmingham, supra, in which we held that the question as to whether a statute had passed the Alabama House of Representatives with a proper quorum was a nonjusticiable political question, and Ex parte James, 836 So.2d 813 (Ala.2002), in which we concluded that any remedy that we could impose with regard to the question of the constitutionality of the State’s method for funding the public-school system would necessarily usurp the power of the legislature. We have held that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not apply to local municipal governments. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Lane, 181 Ala. 646, 658, 62 So. 31, 34 (1913). Moreover, it should be noted that we have long recognized the ability of a public body to recover funds mistakenly or illegally paid out. See, e.g., City of De- mopolis v. Marengo Cnty., 195 Ala. 214, 70 So. 275 (1915); Mobile Cnty. v. Williams, 180 Ala. 639, 61 So. 963 (1913); and Ledger Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 170 Ala. 437, 54 So. 52 (1910).

The present case does not present a political question sufficient to invoke the separation-of-powers doctrine. Here the County, by and through the County Commission, asserts that it mistakenly approved continued payments toward an old funding obligation to the Fair Association. The County, which is permitted by the laws of Alabama to sue and be sued, asserts various equitable claims seeking recovery of the money it claims was mistakenly paid to the Fair Association. Deciding whether the County is entitled to recover under any of its asserted theories will not risk improper judicial intrusion into the province of a coordinate branch of government. Accordingly, judicial review of the County’s action is not barred by the separation-of-powers doctrine.

Next, we must determine whether the circuit court properly entered a judgment in favor of the Fair Association as to the County’s claims of breach of the lease agreement and rescission. Citing Darby v. Schley, 8 So.3d 1011 (Ala.Civ.App.2008), the Fair Association argues that the County’s lease claims are in the nature of an unlawful-detainer action and, therefore, that original jurisdiction for the County’s claims lies exclusively with the Baldwin District Court. In contrast, the County argues that its breach-of-lease and rescission claims do not seek possession of the premises and therefore are not claims for unlawful detainer. The County’s argument is well taken.

Count four of the County’s complaint seeks monetary damages from the Fair Association in the amount of alleged unpaid rent and other financial obligations due under the lease agreement. Count four further demands rescission of the lease agreement. There appears to be no dispute that the Fair Association remains in lawful possession of the leased premises under the lease agreement.

The Fair Association principally relies on the Court of Civil Appeals’ statement in Darby v. Schley, 8 So.3d 1011 (Ala.Civ.App.2008):

“By statute, original jurisdiction over unlawful-detainer actions lies in the district courts. 6-6-330, Ala.Code 1975 (‘The forcible entry upon and detainer, or the unlawful detainer, of lands, tenements and hereditaments is cognizable before the district court of the county in which the offense is committed.’). A circuit court may not exercise jurisdiction over an unlawful-detainer action until the district court has adjudicated the unlawful-detainer action and one of the párties has appealed to the circuit court.”

8 So.3d at 1013. Section 6-6-310 of the Alabama Code defines “unlawful detainer”:

“UNLAWFUL DETAINER. Where one who has lawfully entered into possession of lands as tenant fails or refuses, after the termination of the pos-sessory interest of the tenant, to deliver possession of the premises to anyone lawfully entitled or his or her agent or attorney.”

§ 6-6-310, Ala.Code 1975. See also Ex parte McKinney, 87 So.3d 502, 507 n. 6 (Ala.2011) (“ ‘Unlawful detainer is a penal action, summary in character, specifically designed to oust a hold-over tenant.’”)(quoting Lane v. Henderson, 232 Ala. 122, 124, 167 So. 270, 271 (1936)).

The County’s action is not an action to oust the Fair Association from possession of the leased premises, and the Fair Association’s possessory interest in the premises has not been terminated. Accordingly, the action cannot be characterized as an unlawful-detainer action. Rather, the action seeks damages for the Fair Association’s alleged failure to make rental payments due under the lease agreement. The County also seeks rescission of the lease agreement. The County was not required to bring its breach-of-lease and rescission claims in the district court. Instead, these claims fall within the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See § 142, Ala. Const.1901; Ex parte Dennis, 681 So.2d 157, 160 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (“ ‘[Tjhere is a presumption against divestiture of jurisdiction from a court to a lower court.’ ”)(quoting Thomas v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 368 So.2d 254, 257 (Ala.1979)).

IV. Conclusion

We reverse the circuit court’s judgment entered in favor of the Fair Association and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MOORE, C.J., and BOLIN and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

MURDOCK, J., concurs in the result.

      . The record indicates that the Fair Association did not file an answer before filing its motion, rendering a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings premature. See Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So.2d 557, 562 (Ala.2005)(" ‘Motions brought under Rule 12(c) cannot be filed until "[ajfter the pleadings are closed” (i.e., after filing its answer).' "Xquoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.net Corp., 269 F.Supp.2d 942, 947 (S.D.Ohio 2003)). The substance of a motion, however, and not what a party styles it, determines the nature of the motion. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So.2d 784, 792 (Ala.2007). For a discussion on the differences between a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss and a Rule 12(c) motion for a judgment on the pleadings, see Pontius, 915 So.2d at 561-62. Regardless of whether the motion was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c), when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment....” Rules 12(b) and (c), Ala. R. Civ. P.

      . We note that the Fair Association, for the first time on appeal, makes several new arguments in favor of affirming the judgment of the circuit court. " '[Tjhis Court will affirm a judgment for any reason supported by the record that satisfies the requirements of due process, Taylor v. Stevenson, 820 So.2d 810, 814 (Ala.2001), even where the ground upon which we affirm was not argued before the trial court or this Court. Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So.2d 188, 191 (Ala.2000).’ ” CitiFinancial Corp. v. Peoples, 973 So.2d 332, 340 (Ala.2007) (quoting Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So.2d 375, 380 (Ala.2006)).
      Several of the Fair Association's arguments challenge the validity of the purchase agreement, including the provision relieving the County of the annual $75,000 payment to the Fair Association. For example, the Fair Association argues that the merger clause contained in the subsequently signed lease agreement invalidates the purchase agreement. We have reviewed these additional arguments and, in light of the record before us, do not find that they form a basis for affirming the judgment of the circuit court.


author: WISE, Justice.

text:
    John Robert LANIER v. McMATH CONSTRUCTION, INC.
    1120413.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Sept. 20, 2013.

      Thomas B. Albritton of Albrittons, Clifton & Moody, P.C., Andalusia, for appellant.

      Thomas P. Ollinger, Jr., Mobile, for ap-pellee.
   WISE, Justice.

One of the defendants below, John Robert Lanier, appeals from the denial of his motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., and for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60, Ala. R. Civ. P. Lanier’s motion was filed after the plaintiff, McMath Construction, Inc., filed a “Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment” pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“the UEFJA”), § 6-9-230 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

McMath filed an action in the district court of the Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana (“the Louisiana court”), against Lanier, Michael Veazey, and LT & C, Inc., a company in which Lanier was a part owner (“the Louisiana litigation”). Service of the Louisiana litigation was attempted by certified mail addressed to Lanier at “7801 Hwy. 59 South, Foley, AL 36535.” Lanier’s mother, Sharon Lanier, signed the return receipt for the mail on March 21, 2007.

In their briefs to this Court, the parties state that, on September 5, 2007, the Louisiana court entered a preliminary default judgment in favor of McMath and against Lanier, Veazey, and LT & C (“the preliminary default judgment”). The record indicates that, on February 8, 2011, the Louisiana court entered an order in which it confirmed the preliminary default judgment (“the Louisiana judgment”). On October 4, 2011, McMath filed in the Mobile Circuit Court a “Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment” pursuant to the UEFJA, to which it attached a certified copy of the Louisiana judgment.

On November 28, 2011, Lanier and LT & C (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the defendants”) filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate pursuant to Rule 59 and for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60 (“motion for relief from judgment”), in which they alleged, among other things, that the Louisiana judgment was void. The defendants based their contention, in part, on their assertion that Lanier had not been properly served before the Louisiana court entered the preliminary default judgment. McMath filed an opposition to the defendants’ motion for relief from judgment, and Lanier filed a reply to McMath’s opposition. On November 26, 2012, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for relief from judgment. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

“The review applicable to a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is de novo. When the grant or denial of relief turns on the validity of the judgment, as under Rule 60(b)(4), discretion has no place. Satterfield v. Winston Indus., Inc., 553 So.2d 61, 64 (Ala.1989); Smith v. Clark, 468 So.2d 138, 141 (Ala.1985); Seventh Wonder v. Southbound Records, Inc., 364 So.2d 1173, 1174 (Ala.1978). The only question before us is whether the judgment is void. Satterfield, 553 So.2d at 64; Smith, 468 So.2d at 141; Seventh Wonder, 364 So.2d at 1174. A judgment is void only if the court rendering it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Satterfield, 553 So.2d at 64; Smith, 468 So.2d at 141; Seventh Wonder, 364 So.2d at 1174.
“The Constitution of the United States, Article IV, Section 1, requires that ‘full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.’ A judgment, therefore, entered by the court of another state having jurisdiction over the subject matter and persons is entitled to full faith and credit in Alabama courts. Teng v. Diplomat National Bank, 481 So.2d 1202 (Ala.1983); Morse v. Morse, 894 So.2d 950 (Ala.1981).
“The validity and effect of a foreign judgment are determined by the law of the state in which it was rendered. Teng, 431 So.2d at 1203; Morse, 394 So.2d at 951; Forbes v. Davis, 187 Ala. 71, 65 So. 516 (1914). If a judgment of a sister state is properly authenticated and filed with the circuit court, [as provided for in the UEFJA, Ala.Code 1975,] §§ 6-9-232, 6-9-233, a presumption arises that the court rendering that judgment had jurisdiction to do so. See Teng, 431 So.2d at 1203. Therefore, the party challenging the judgment has the burden of asserting lack of jurisdiction and producing evidence to overcome the presumption. Id.”

Greene v. Connelly, 628 So.2d 346, 351 (Ala.1993), abrogated on other grounds by Ex parte Full Circle Distribution, L.L.C., 883 So.2d 638 (Ala.2003).

“The nature of our review of the legal conclusions of a trial court is de novo. City of Russellville Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Vernon, 842 So.2d 627 (Ala.2002). However, ... the scope of our review in this case is limited to examining whether the issue of personal jurisdiction was ‘fully and fairly litigated and finally decided’ in Virginia.”

Omega Leasing Corp. v. Movie Gallery, Inc., 859 So.2d 421, 422 (Ala.2003).

“ ‘Before enforcing a foreign judgment, Alabama courts may inquire into the jurisdiction of the foreign court. “The scope of the inquiry is limited to ‘(1) whether the issue of jurisdiction was fully and fairly litigated by the foreign court, and (2) whether the issue of jurisdiction was finally decided by the foreign court.’ ” ’
“McGouryk [v. McGouryk], 672 So.2d [1300,] 1302 [ (Ala.Civ.App.1995) ] (quoting Feore v. Feore, 627 So.2d 411, 413 (Ala.Civ.App.1993), quoting in turn Alston Elec. Supply Co. v. Alabama Elec. Wholesalers, Inc., 586 So.2d 10, 11 (Ala.Civ.App.1991)). ‘The burden is on a party challenging the validity of the foreign judgment to assert and demonstrate the rendering court’s lack of jurisdiction.’ Menendez [v. COLSA Inc.], 852 So.2d [768,] 771 [ (Ala.Civ.App.2002)] (citing Greene v. Connelly, 628 So.2d 346, 351 (Ala.1993)).”

Bartlett v. Unistar Leasing, 931 So.2d 717, 720 (Ala.Civ.App.2005).

“The special writing in Ex parte Lanier Worldwide, [Inc., 922 So.2d 115 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) ], indicates that where, as here, res judicata principles do not bind an Alabama court to any particular conclusion regarding the existence of a foreign court’s jurisdiction, ‘the courts of this state may and should inquire into the jurisdiction of a foreign court whose judgment is sought to be enforced in this state and that, in so doing, the courts of this state are to make their own determination on the merits as to whether that foreign judgment is void.’ 922 So.2d at 120-21. We are, however, bound by a duty to afford full faith and credit to judicial proceedings of our sister states, a duty that partakes of both constitutional and statutory dimensions. See U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see also [Package Express Center, Inc. v.] Maund, 957 So.2d [1137,] 1140 [(Ala.Civ.App.2006)]. We must, therefore, analyze the validity of the judgment that Lanier sought to register under the law of the state whose courts rendered it.... E.g., Morse v. Morse, 394 So.2d 950, 951 (Ala.1981).”

Lanier Worldwide, Inc. v. Crum, 976 So.2d 451, 454 (Ala.Civ.App.2007).

Based on the record before this Court, it does not appear that the Louisiana court litigated the issue whether Lanier was properly served in the Louisiana case before entering the preliminary default judgment. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata does not bind this Court to any particular conclusion regarding the existence of the jurisdiction of the Louisiana court. See Lanier Worldwide, supra. Therefore, this Court is to make its own determination on the merits as to whether the Louisiana judgment is void. Id. However, we must analyze the validity of the Louisiana judgment against Lanier under Louisiana law. See Greene, supra; Lanier Worldwide, supra.

Discussion

Lanier argues that the Louisiana judgment cannot be enforced against him in Alabama because, he says, that judgment is void. Specifically, he contends that the Louisiana judgment is void because, he says, he was not properly served pursuant to the Louisiana Long Arm Statute, § 13:3204, La.Rev.Stat. Ann.

Article 6, La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann., provides:

"(a) Contrary to the assertion of Lanier counsel within ¶ 9 of 'Defendants' Reply To Opposition To Motions Filed Pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 ("Reply”),' filed in the Within Civil Action on March 29, 2012, to the effect that 'Defendants are filing a pro se action in Louisiana to nullify the judgment against them,' no such 'pro se action’ has been filed to date in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana. In addition, contrary to the 'Certificate of Service’ signed by Lanier and dated March 29, 2012, upon Exhibit 'H' annexed unto said Defendants' Reply, such a Petition to Annul has not been delivered to my law office as such indicates, nor has same been received by my senior partner, John S. Lawrence, Jr., or David P. Curlin, co-counsel, with whom I am associated.”
“A. Jurisdiction over the person is the legal power and authority of a court to render a personal judgment against a party to an action or proceeding. The exercise of this jurisdiction requires:
“(1) The service of process on the defendant, or on his agent for the service of process, or the express waiver of citation and service under Article 1201.
“(2) The service of process on the attorney at law appointed by the court to defend an action or proceeding brought against an absent or incompetent defendant who is domiciled in this state.
“(3) The submission of the party to the jurisdiction of the court by commencing an action or by the waiver of objection to jurisdiction by failure to timely file the declinatory exception.
“B. In addition to the provisions of Paragraph A, a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and with the Constitution of the United States.”

Article 1201, La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann., provides, in pertinent part:

“A. Citation and service thereof are essential in all civil actions except summary and executory proceedings, divorce actions under Civil Code Article 102, and proceedings under the Children’s Code. Without them all proceedings are absolutely null.”

Section 13:3204, La.Rev.Stat. Ann., provides, in pertinent part:

“A. In a suit under R.S. 13:3201,[] a certified copy of the citation or the notice in a divorce under Civil Code Article 102 and of the petition or a certified copy of a contradictory motion, rule to show cause, or other pleading filed by the plaintiff in a summary proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure Article 2592 shall be sent by counsel for the plaintiff, or by the plaintiff if not represented by counsel, to the defendant by registered or certified mail, or actually delivered to the defendant by commercial courier, when the person to be served is located outside of this state or by an individual designated by the court in which the suit is filed, or by one authorized by the law of the place where the service is made to serve the process of any of its courts of general, limited, or small claims jurisdiction.
“C. Service of process so made has the same legal force and validity as personal service on the defendant in this state.”

With regard to default judgments, § 13:3205, La.Rev.Stat. Ann., provides:

“No default judgment can be rendered against the defendant and no hearing may be held on a contradictory motion, rule to show cause, or other summary proceeding, except for actions pursuant to R.S. 46:2131 et seq., until thirty days after the filing in the record of the affidavit of the individual who either:
“(1) Mailed the process to the defendant, showing that it was enclosed in an envelope properly addressed to the defendant, with sufficient postage affixed, and the date it was deposited in the United States mail, to which shall be attached the return receipt of the defendant; or
“(2) Utilized the services of a commercial courier to make delivery of the process to the defendant, showing the name of the commercial courier, the date, and address at which the process was delivered to the defendant, to which shall be attached the commercial courier’s confirmation of delivery; or
“(3) Actually delivered the process to the defendant, showing the date, place, and manner of delivery.”

In Corte v. Cash Technologies, Inc., 843 So.2d 1162 (La.Ct.App.2003), the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated:

“Jurisdiction over a person who has not submitted or waived objection is based upon service of process on the defendant. La. C.C.P. [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 6. Citation and service thereof are essential in all civil actions except summary and executory proceedings and certain divorce actions. La. C.C.P. art. 1201. Without them, all proceedings are absolutely null. Id.
“Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1701, addressing judgment by default, provides, that if a defendant in the principal or incidental demand fails to answer within the time prescribed by law, judgment by default may be entered against him. A default judgment may not be taken against a person who has not received citation and service thereof. Clay v. Clay, 389 So.2d 31, 35-36 (La.1979)....
“Service of process on non-residents such as the defendant corporations involved in this suit must be effected by complying with the Long Arm Statute, a statute that permits our courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent allowed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Clay v. Clay, 389 So.2d at 37. La. R.S. 13:3204 A sets forth the mandatory manner in which service of process must be made under the Long Arm Statute:
“ ‘A certified copy of the citation and of the petition in a suit under R.S. 13:3201 shall be sent by counsel for the plaintiff, or by the plaintiff if not represented by counsel, to the defendant by registered or certified mail, or actually delivered to the defendant by commercial courier, when the person to be served is located outside of this state or by an individual designated by the court in which the suit is filed, or by one authorized by the law of the place where the service is made to serve the process of any of its courts of general, limited, or small claims jurisdiction.’
“La. R.S. 13:3205 provides that no default judgment can be rendered against the defendant until thirty days after the filing in the record of an affidavit showing compliance with Section 3204. Section 3205 reads as follows:
“ ‘No default judgment can be rendered against the defendant until thirty days after the filing in the record of the affidavit of the individual who either:
“ ‘(a) mailed the process to the defendant, showing that it was enclosed in an envelope properly addressed to the defendant, with sufficient postage affixed, and the date it was deposited in the United States mails, to which shall be attached the return receipt of the defendant; or
“ ‘(b) actually delivered the process to the defendant, showing the date, place and manner of delivery.’
“The words ‘default judgment’ used in this section l’efer to the preliminary default judgment rather than the confirmation of default. Howard v. A & M Const. Co., 93-1013, p. 9 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/29/94), 637 So.2d 575, 580.
“The provisions of La. R.S. 13:3205 are mandatory. Clay v. Clay, 389 So.2d at 37. A preliminary default judgment obtained without strict compliance with the procedural requirements of La. R.S. 13:3205 is an absolute nullity.... A judgment confirming a default judgment that is obtained on the basis of an invalid preliminary default is, likewise, a nullity. Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Patterson, 589 So.2d 9, 10 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991); Davis v. Tele-Total, Inc., 465 So.2d 948, 949 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985).”

834 So.2d at 1165-67.

In this case, McMath submitted evidence indicating that process in the Louisiana litigation was delivered by certified mail on March 21, 2007, and that the certified mail was addressed to Lanier at “7801 Hwy. 59 South, Foley, Alabama 36535.” McMath also submitted evidence showing that that was the address listed for Lanier with the Alabama Home Builder’s Licen-sure Board for 2007. Additionally, McMath submitted evidence indicating that, in September 2007, Lanier and his wife executed a mortgage and that the borrower’s address listed on that mortgage was “7801 Hwy 59, Unit_, Foley, AL 36535.”

In the motion for relief from judgment, the defendants asserted that Lanier was being sued personally. In his affidavit, Lanier asserted that he was not properly served with the initial petition in the Louisiana litigation; that the address to which the certified mail was sent was not the office of LT & C; that the address to which the certified mail was sent was not his residence; that the address to which the certified mail was sent was the location of his wife’s former dental practice; that, although the office of LT & C was located in the same building complex as his wife’s former dental practice, it was not in the office matching the address included on the certified mail; and that, at the time the process was delivered, he had moved from Baldwin County to Covington County. Lanier also asserted that the certified mail was accepted by his mother, who had been the bookkeeper for his wife’s former dental practice; that his mother was not an agent, servant, or employee of LT & C; that his mother did not work for him; and that his mother did not have any authority to accept mail on his behalf or to accept service of process either for him personally or for LT & C.

In Drago v. Drago, 477 So.2d 786, 788 (La.Ct.App.1985), the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:

“In Louisiana service of process can be effected on a defendant either personally or at his domicile by leaving the papers with a competent person at the defendant’s domicile. In Roper v. Dai-ley, 393 So.2d 85 (La.l981)[,] the Supreme Court concluded ‘a party can be validly served at his place of business only by citation served on him personally.’ In other words, service of process cannot be effected on a defendant by leaving the papers to be served at his place of business.”

(Emphasis added.)

Further, in Dukov v. 701 Corp., 668 So.2d 379 (La.Ct.App.1996), the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed a summary judgment entered in favor of Mitchel R. Dukov in his suit seeking to annul a default judgment entered in favor of 701 Corporation. The issue on appeal was whether the service of process that led to the default judgment complied with the applicable provisions of Louisiana’s Long Arm Statute. That case involved an escrow agreement for legal services the law firm of Breazeale, Sachse, and Wilson (“Breazeale”) provided to Ronald Goux and Nutritional Rehabilitation Limited Partnership. The escrow agreement indicated that Nutritional Rehabilitation was a Delaware Corporation and that Dukov Corporation, an Ohio Corporation, was the managing general partner for Nutritional Rehabilitation. Dukov signed the escrow agreement as the president of the Dukov Corporation and gave the corporation address as “1991 Crocker Road, Cleveland, Ohio, Attention: Mitchel R. Du-kov.” Dukov, 668 So.2d at 380. The underlying petition sought a judgment against Dukov individually as well against Nutritional Rehabilitation and Goux. Service of process for Dukov was effected by certified mail at the address listed for Du-kov Corporation. The return receipt for the process was signed by J. Huszai on December 24,1991.

In December 1991, 701 Corporation, the collection agency for Breazeale, took a default judgment against Dukov. Subsequently, Dukov filed a petition to annul 701 Corporation’s judgment. Dukov submitted an affidavit giving the address for his residence; stating that he had not ever resided at the Crocker Road address; stating that that was the address for Du-kov Corporation; stating that Huszai had resigned her employment on December 28, 1991; stating that Huszai was not authorized to accept mail or sign receipts either for the corporation or for Dukov personally; and stating that he had not ever received any of the documents supposedly received by Huszai.

On appeal, 701 Corporation argued that service under the Long Arm Statute was proper because the mail was delivered to the address given by Dukov in the escrow agreement. The Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed this issue as follows:

“The Long Arm Statute provides that a certified copy of the petition and citation shall be sent to the defendant by registered or certified mail. § 3204. The statute further provides that no default judgment can be taken against the defendant without an affidavit of the individual who mailed the process to the defendant, showing that it was enclosed in an envelope properly addressed to the defendant ‘to which [affidavit] shall be attached the return receipt of the defendant.’ § 3205.
“In the affidavit of 701’s attorney, John F. Whitney, verifying Long Arm Service, he stated that he sent a copy of the petition and citation to Mitchel R. Dukov at 1991 Crocker Road in Cleveland and he attached the return receipt signed by J. Huszai at that address.
“The first question is whether the envelope containing the petition and citation was properly addressed. 701 Corporation was suing Dukov personally. The Crocker Road address was that of the corporation of which he was the president. His involvement in this affair with Breazeale and 701 Corporation had been in his representative capacity, not in his personal capacity. Breazeale had sought to get Dukov personally involved when it asked him to guarantee the note of the corporation but he declined to do so.
“In any event, even if the envelope was properly addressed pursuant to § 3204 by mailing it to Dukov’s place of business a problem remains with the requirement of § 3205 that a return receipt of the defendant must be filed in the record before a default is taken. In this case the receipt was signed by one J. Huszai, not by Dukov. Since the address to which it was sent was Du-kov’s place of business and not his residence we cannot regard the receipt of this third party as a receipt of the defendant Dukov. Thus, we conclude that 701 Corporation took its default without complying with § 3205.
“This conclusion is entirely consistent with The Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund v. Ortego, 475 So.2d 764 (La.1985). In that case where Tulane was suing Ortego to collect a delinquent student loan and mailed the copy of the petition and citation to the school library in California where he worked the court held that service of process was not valid under the Long Arm Statute. The court held that a notice mailed pursuant to R.S. 13:3204 ‘must be received by defendant or by a person authorized to receive mail on his behalf.’ The court noted that the librarian who received Ortego’s notice was not designated by him to receive his mail, but merely sorted it out for the school and that the defendant apparently did not receive the letter and was not even in California when the letter was received.
“In the present case Dukov stated in his affidavit that he never authorized J. Huszai to receive his mail, he was not at the Crocker Road address when the notice was received and he never received the letter or knew anything about it until long after 701 Corporation took the judgment against him.
“In the Tulane case the court cites for comparison Howard Avenue Realty Corporation v. McIntosh, 352 So.2d 348 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978). In that case the receipt for the papers mailed pursuant to the Long Arm Statute was signed by an employee at McIntosh’s ranch who had been designated to pick up mail at the distant post office. He was employed full-time as a member of McIntosh’s household staff and business. Shortly after service was made McIntosh’s attorney sent a request to the plaintiff for an extension of time to file responsive pleadings. Under these circumstances the court held that the service of process was valid under the Long Arm Statute.
“The McIntosh case is clearly distinguishable from the present case. There service was made at a ranch where McIntosh resided upon a member of his household staff, McIntosh had authorized this individual to receive his mail, and McIntosh did indeed receive the notice. None of these factors exists in the present case.”

Dukov, 668 So.2d at 380-81 (emphasis other than first emphasis added).

In this case, Lanier stated that the address on the certified mail was not his residence. McMath has not presented any evidence to dispute that assertion. At most, McMath presented evidence indicating that the address on the certified mail was the address Lanier had listed with the Alabama Home Builder’s Licensure Board. Also, Lanier asserted that the certified mail was not actually delivered to LT & C’s office in the business complex. Rather, he asserted that it was delivered to the office of his wife’s former dental practice. Regardless, the evidence before the trial court establishes that the process in the Louisiana litigation was not served at La-nier’s domicile. Therefore, under Louisiana law, process should have been served on Lanier personally.

McMath does not dispute that the process was not personally served on Lanier. In fact, the undisputed evidence established that it was Lanier’s mother who signed for the certified mail. However, in his affidavit, Lanier stated that his mother did not work for him, that she was not an employee or agent for LT & C, and that she was not authorized to accept mail or service of process for him or for LT & C. McMath did not present any evidence to refute Lanier’s assertions in this regard. Thus, the facts in this case are substantially similar to the facts that were presented in Dukov. Accordingly, even if McMath had properly addressed the process in the Louisiana litigation and even if that process had been delivered to the proper address, the service of process still did not strictly comply with Louisiana’s Long Arm Statute because it was not personally served on Lanier.

McMath also argues that, in his affidavit, Lanier never denied that he was advised of the Louisiana litigation and/or that he was a named individual defendant in the Louisiana litigation. Therefore, McMath argues:

“[I]n order for Lanier to prevail in setting aside default judgment we would have to believe that his mother, Sharon Lanier, never gave him the envelope for which she signed on May 21, 2007, nor did she ever advise him that she had so signed. Obviously, Lanier’s carefully crafted language asserting only that his mother ‘had no authority to accept mail on’ his behalf is suspect.”

(McMath’s brief, at p. 11.) However, in Naquin v. Titan Indemnity Co., 779 So.2d 704 (La.2001), the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed an argument that the fact that the defendants had actual knowledge of the pending suit obviated the need for service of citation as follows:

“[I]t is well-accepted that even a defendant’s actual knowledge of a legal action cannot supply the want of citation because proper citation is the foundation of all actions. See, e.g., Peschier v. Peschier, 419 So.2d 923 (La.1982); Strong’s Plumbing, Inc. v. All Seasons Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 32-783 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00), 754 So.2d 336, 338; Kimball v. Kimball, 93-1364 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 779; Scullin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 421 So.2d 470 (La.App. 4 Cir.1982). The argument that the defendants’ knowledge of Na-quin’s suit can somehow fill the role of service of citation lacks merit.”

Naquin, 779 So.2d at 710. Thus, whether Lanier had actual knowledge of the Louisiana litigation is not relevant to the question whether Lanier was properly served in that case.

The above facts establish that, under Louisiana law, McMath did not properly serve Lanier in the Louisiana litigation. See Dukov, supra, and Drago, supra. Therefore, the preliminary default judgment and the Louisiana judgment are void. See Corte, supra. Because the Louisiana judgment is void, the trial court erred when it denied Lanier’s motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MOORE, C.J., and STUART, PARKER, and SHAW, JJ., concur.

      . In their reply to McMath’s opposition to the motion for relief from judgment, the defendants asserted that they were filing a pro se action in Louisiana to nullify the Louisiana judgment. The defendants attached a copy of a "Petition to Annul Judgment." However, that copy does not indicate that it was filed in the Louisiana court. Additionally, in its evi-dentiary submissions in opposition to the defendants’ motion for relief from judgment, McMath attached an affidavit from Matthew L. Devereaux, the attorney who represented McMath in the Louisiana litigation. In his affidavit, Devereaux stated:

      . Section 13:3201, La.Rev.Stat. Ann., provides for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.

      . Lanier asserts that his wife's former dental office was in a different suite than the office for LT & C. McMath attached a copy of the return receipt as an exhibit to Matthew Devereaux’s affidavit. See supra note 1. That return receipt indicated that it was addressed to “7801 Hwy 59 South, Foley, AL 36535.” The return receipt did not include any specific suite or office designation.

      . Based on our holding, we pretermit discussion of Lanier’s remaining arguments as to why service in the Louisiana litigation was improper.