author: McDonald, j. KUHN, J.,

text:
    Dan S. COLLINS and Dan S. Collins, CPL & Associates, Inc. v. STATE of Louisiana, through DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Robert Benoit, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Assistant Director Atchafalaya Basin Program, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources.
    No. 2012 CA 1031.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 30, 2013.

      Jill L. Craft, Crystal G. LaFleur, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellants Dan S. Collins and Dan S. Collins, CPL & Associates.
    James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, Attorney General, and Robin L. Jones, Stephen J. Oats, George O. Luce, Special Assistant Attorneys General, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Natural Resources.
    Before KUHN, PETTIGREW, and McDonald, jj.
   McDonald, j.

12From 1997 to 2010 Dan S. Collins (a certified professional landman) and Dan S. Collins, CPL & Associates, Inc. (collectively plaintiffs or Collins) provided consulting services for land, title, and environmental research, for the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR), particularly the Atchafalaya Basin Program and the Coastal Protection and Restoration Program. Robert Benoit served as Assistant Director of the Atchafalaya Basin Program.

Starting in 2007, Mr. Collins discovered what he believed to be violations of environmental laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the dredged water quality project known as the Bayou Pastillion Water Quality Project and the Big Bayou Pigeon Water Quality Project. Mr. Collins reported his findings to DNR, Mr. Benoit, and Scott Angelle, Secretary of DNR. Both projects were conducted by the Atchafala-ya Basin Program within the basin to improve water quality for fishermen and crawfishermen. Mr. Collins believed that he discovered the real purpose of the projects was oil and gas exploration for the use and benefit of adjacent landowners.

Collins’ contract with DNR for 2009 ended, and it was not renewed for 2010. Collins filed suit on June 29, 2010, naming as defendants the State of Louisiana, through DNR, and Mr. Benoit, individually and in his capacity as Assistant Director of the Atchafalaya Basin Program at DNR, asserting that “defendants have refused to employ Petitioners and denied Petitioners the ability to continue employment with defendant DNR on account of their whistle-blowing activities regarding the violations of Federal and State laws, rules, and regulations.” Collins asserted that DNR violated La. R.S. 30:2027 (the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute) and La. R.S. 23:967 (the Louisiana Whistle-blower Statute) and that DNR and Mr. Benoit violated La. R.S. 42:1169 (the Louisiana Code of Governmental Ethics Whis-tleblower Statute). Collins | sprayed for judgment in their favor including punitive damages, triple damages as allowed by law, and attorney fees, as well as all other relief to which they were entitled, including declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendants filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action as to the claims raised pursuant to La. R.S. 23:967, La. R.S. 30:2027, and La. R.S. 42:1169, which were sustained by the district court. Defendants also filed a dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity as to the claims raised pursuant to La. R.S. 42:1169, which was denied as moot. The district court gave plaintiffs thirty days to amend their petition to state a cause of action.

After plaintiffs timely amended their petition, defendants again filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action as to claims under La. R.S. 23:967, La. R.S. 30:2027, and La. R.S. 42:1169, which were subsequently sustained by the district court, and the plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to those statutes were dismissed. The plaintiffs are appealing that judgment, and assert three assignments of error.

1) The Trial Court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ [sic] did not state a cause of action in their original and supplemental petitions pursuant to La. R.S. 42:1169 et seq., the Code of Governmental Ethics.
2) The Trial Court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ [sic] did not state a cause of action in their original and supplemental petitions pursuant to La. R.S. 30:2027, the Environmental Whistleblower Statute, when the law does not require that plaintiffs assert a specific violation or prove an actual violation of state law.
3) The Trial Court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ [sic] did not state a cause of action in their original and supplemental petitions pursuant to La. R.S. 23:967, et seq., the Louisiana Whistleblower |4Statute, or that La, R.S, 23:967 is superseded by La. R.S. [30:2027], the Environmental Whistle-blower Statute.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling sustaining an exception raising the objection of no cause of action, the court of appeal should subject the case to de novo review because the exception raises a question of law and the lower court’s decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. In appraising the sufficiency of the petition we follow the accepted rule that a petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief. The question therefore is whether in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. City of New Orleans v. Board of Com’rs. of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-0690 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 253.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In this assignment of error, plaintiffs maintain that the district court erred in concluding that their original and supplemental petitions did not state a cause of action pursuant to La. R.S. 42:1169 et. seq., the Code of Governmental Ethics. Defendants maintained that there is no provision in the Code of Governmental Ethics that provides a private right of action. Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:1169 provides in pertinent part:

A.Any public employee who reports to a person or entity of competent authority or jurisdiction information which he reasonably believes indicates a violation of any law or of any order, rule, or regulation issued in accordance with law or any other alleged acts of impropriety related to the scope or duties of public employment or public office within any branch of state government or any political subdivision shall be free from discipline, reprisal, or threats of discipline or reprisal by the public employer for reporting such acts of alleged impropriety. No employee with authority to hire, fire, or discipline employees, supervisor, agency head, nor any elected official shall subject to reprisal or threaten to subject to reprisal any | ¡¡such public employee because of the employee’s efforts to disclose such acts of alleged impropriety.
B. (1) If any public employee is suspended, demoted, dismissed, or threatened with such suspension, demotion, or dismissal as an act of reprisal for reporting an alleged act of impropriety in violation of this Section, such employee shall report such action to the [Board of Ethics].
(2) An employee who is wrongfully suspended, demoted, or dismissed shall be entitled to reinstatement of his employment and entitled to receive any lost income and benefits for the period of any suspension, demotion, or dismissal.
C. The board shall provide written notice of the commencement of an investigation of a report of a violation of this Section to the agency head of the employee, or if the agency head is the defendant, then to an agency head of the governmental entity that supervises the agency, or if none, then to the governing authority of the governmental entity not less than ten days prior to the date set for the investigation. If the board determines, following an investigation, that it shall offer a consent opinion or conduct a public or private hearing to receive evidence and determine whether any violation of this Section has occurred, the board shall provide written notice of the hearing or consent opinion to the agency head of the employee, or if the agency head is the defendant, then to an agency head of the governmental entity that supervises the agency, or if none, then to the governing authority of the governmental entity not less than sixty days prior to the date set for the action by the board. The employee’s agency shall cooperate in every possible manner in connection with any investigation conducted by the board. The agency shall be considered to be an indispensable party to any investigation, hearing, or consent opinion and may have legal counsel, cross-examine witnesses, call witnesses, and present evidence on its behalf.
D. Any employee with the authority to hire, fire, or discipline employees, supervisor, agency head, or elected official who violates this Section shall be subject to the same fines and penalties provided for other violations of this Chapter. In addition, if the board, following a public hearing, finds there is probable cause to believe that a person has violated a criminal law of this state, pursuant to R.S. 42:1156, the board shall forward a copy of its findings to the district attorney of the parish in which the violation occurred for appropriate action. Thereafter, notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, such district attorney shall have access to all records of the board relative to such findings.
E. Upon notification by the employee, the employee’s agency, the defendant, or the defendant’s agency that the employee has commenced a civil action in a district or federal court or with a federal agency with adjudicatory authority over employment complaints against his agency pursuant to R.S. 23:967(B) or other relevant state or federal statutes at any time prior to the board’s final determination Ras to whether a violation of this Section has occurred, the board shall stay any action pending before the board until a final order in the civil or adjudicatory action is issued, and the prescriptive period provided for in R.S. 42:1163 for action shall be suspended while such civil or adjudicatory action is pending and shall resume when such final order is issued. The final order of the court in the civil action or agency in an adjudicatory action, except if the action is dismissed by the plaintiff, shall resolve all matters the employee has pending before the board regarding this Section. (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs contend that the last sentence of La. R.S. 42:1169(E) provides for a private right of action. In support of their contention, the plaintiffs maintain that the language used in Goldsby v. State, Dept. of Corr., 2003-0343 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/7/03), 861 So.2d 236, writs denied, 2004-0328, 2004-0330 (La.4/8/04), 870 So.2d 271, implies that there is a right of action under both La. R.S. 23:967 and La. R.S. 42:1169.

In Goldsby, this court found there was no cause of action under La. R.S. 42:1169 because the whistleblower statute pertained to violations, or alleged violations, of the Code of Governmental Ethics, and the plaintiff did not report the matter to the Ethics Commission. Goldsby, 861 So.2d at 238. The plaintiffs in the present case contend that because they did report the matter to the Ethics Commission, they have a cause of action. We find that their reliance upon Goldsby is misplaced.

An employee’s remedy under the Code of Governmental Ethics is through the Board of Ethics. See Nolan v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Service Dist. No. 2, 01-175 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/27/01), 790 So.2d 725, 732. Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:1169(E) merely provides that the final order of the court in a civil action “shall resolve all matters the employee has pending before the board regarding this Section.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:1169(E) refers to civil actions brought | ./‘pursuant to R.S. 23:967(B) or other relevant state or federal statutes.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:1169(E) does not provide an independent right of action, rather, it relies upon other statutes to provide a right of action.

After a de novo review, we find that the plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action pursuant to La. R.S. 42:1169.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

In this assignment of error, plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in concluding they did not state a cause of action in their original and supplemental petitions pursuant to La. R.S. 30:2027, the Environmental Whistleblower Statute, when the law does not require that plaintiffs assert a specific violation or prove an actual violation of state law.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:2027 provides:

A. No firm, business, private or public corporation, partnership, individual employer, or federal, state, or local governmental agency shall act in a retaliatory manner against an employee, acting in good faith, who does any of the following:
(1) Discloses, or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy, practice of the employer, or another employer with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.
(2) Provides information to, or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into any environmental violation by the employer, or another employer with whom there is a business relationship, of an environmental law, rule, or regulation. B. (1) Any employee against whom any action is taken as a result of acting under Subsection A of this Section may commence a civil action in a district court of the employee’s parish of domicile, and shall recover from his employer triple damages resulting from the action taken against him and all costs of preparing, filing, prosecuting, appealing, or otherwise conducting a law suit, including attorney’s fees, if the court finds that Subsection A of this Section has been violated. In addition, the employee shall be entitled to all other civil and criminal remedies available under any other state, federal, or local law.
|s(2)(a) The term “action is taken” shall include firing, layoff, lockout, loss of promotion, loss of raise, loss of present position, loss of job duties or responsibilities, imposition of onerous duties or responsibilities, or any other action or inaction the court finds was taken as a result of a report of an environmental violation.
(b) “Damages” to be tripled pursuant to Paragraph B (l) of this Section shall be for the period of the damage, but not to exceed three years, and shall include but not be limited to lost wages, lost anticipated wages due to a wage increase, or loss of anticipated wages which would have resulted from a lost promotion, and if the period of the damage exceeds three years, the employee shall thereafter be entitled to actual damages. In addition to the above, “damages” shall also include any property lost as a result of lost wages, lost benefits, and any physical or emotional damages resulting therefrom.
C. This Section shall have no application to any employee who, acting without direction from his employer or his agent, deliberately violates any provision of this Subtitle or of the regulations, or permit or license terms and conditions in pursuance thereof.

Plaintiffs filed an unlawful retaliation claim under La. R.S. 30:2027. Defendants maintain that the plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under La. R.S. 30:2027 for three reasons: 1) plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of a specific environmental law; 2) plaintiffs did not suffer an adverse action covered under the purview of La. R.S. 30:2027; and 3) plaintiffs are not employees that are covered under the purview of La. R.S. 30:2027. We consider each of these arguments in turn.

1) Plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of a specific environmental law.

First, defendants contend that the plaintiffs have failed to allege a violation of a specific environmental law. The language of La. R.S. 30:2027(A)(1) supports five requirements for a cause of action: 1) employee acts in good faith; 2) employee reports, or threatens to report, a violation; 3) employee reasonably believes the activity, policy, or practice undertaken by his employer, or another employer with whom there is a business relationship with his employer, is a violation of an environmental law; 4) employee reports, or threatens to report, the violation to a supervisor or to a public body of the employer; and 5) employer acts |9in retaliatory manner because the employee reported, or threatened to report, a violation.

To require a plaintiff to know specifically what law is being violated would seem to render the “good faith” and “reasonably believe” portions of the law superfluous. These two requirements would serve no purpose if the employee had to know exactly what provision of the law was being violated.

The purpose of the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute, La. R.S. 30:2027, is to protect employees from retaliatory action or other adverse employment action by employers for reporting possible environmental violations. Chiro v. Harmony Corp., 99-0453 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/5/99), 745 So.2d 1198, 1200, writ denied, 99-3346 (La.1/28/00), 753 So.2d 840 (emphasis added). It would frustrate the purpose of the Jaw to require the specificity that the defendant asks for.

In their petitions, the plaintiffs asserted in part:

8.
Indeed, Petitioners submit that defendant DNR allowed the Bayou Postillion dredge project to proceed knowing that the information submitted for the Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) Permit was incorrect. Specifically, the permit listed the name of “Sandra Thompson Deco-teau”, individually, instead of DNR, and intentionally listed the incorrect Parish of “St. Martin” instead of “Iberia”, meaning that the public and opponents that had submitted complaints that the Bayou Postillion Project was, in reality, the creation of an oil and gas access canal, to the State Land Office prior to dredging, were deliberately mislead and the ACOE permit was issued on a false and incomplete basis.
9.
Petitioners submit that defendant DNR intentionally withheld the fact that the Bayou Postillion Project’s primary purpose was to facilitate oil and gas exploration activities within the Atchafa-laya Basin — and not water quality — and on the adjacent lands, including the Kyle-Peterman Management tracts.
14.
Defendant DNR failed to follow the law and regulations, specifically leading to mitigation violations, loss of wetland ecologies, and inappropriate and insufficient compensatory mitigation creating | mhundreds of thousands to millions of dollars in mitigation costs within the Atchafalaya Basin, all constituting serious violations of State and Federal environmental laws, rules, and regulations.
35.
Petitioners contend that the Defendants violated Federal and State law, rules, and regulations, based on the allegations contained herein, including, but not limited to, the following:
1. The Clean Water Act: 40 CFR 230 et seq. (33 USC § 403-404);
2. The False Claims Act;
3. La. R.S. 30:61, et seq. and 30:2071, et seq., Louisiana Water Control Law;
4. La. R.S. 30:123.1, 30:126, 30:128, and 30:148.4 regarding registration of prospective leaseholders, advertisements for lease, application for fee, inspection, quantity of land, and transfers or assignments of interest;
5. Louisiana Administrative Code 43:1, Subchapter B, Sections 701, 707, 709, 711, 717, and 719 regarding various coastal use guidelines;
6. Louisiana Administrative Code 43:1, Subchapter A, Sections 901-903 regarding nomination, bidding, and assignments and other transfers of interest;
7. Louisiana Administrative Code 43:1, Subchapter C, Sections 723-724 regarding Coastal Use Permits and Mitigation; and
8. La. Const. Art. DC, Sec. 4(A).

We find that the petitions adequately specified possible environmental law violations.

2) Plaintiffs have not suffered an adverse action under the purview of La. R.S 30:2027

In their second argument, defendants contend that the plaintiffs have not suffered an adverse action under the purview of La. R.S. 30:2027. The defendants cite Chiro v. Harmony Corp., 745 So.2d 1198, as authority that the non-renewal of an employment contract is not an adverse action. However, we find that Chiro is distinguishable. In Chiro, the plaintiff voluntarily quit his job as a means of | nprotest, and then sued after the company did not rehire him until six months later. This court in Chiro found that the plaintiff was not an employee whenever the alleged wrong occurred (failure to rehire for reporting violations to OSHA). Further, this court stated that “even if we were to conclude that Chiro remained an employee under the statute after he resigned his employment, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Harmony refused to hire him.” Chiro, 745 So.2d at 1201, n. 5

In the present case, plaintiffs did not quit as a means of protest; their contract simply lapsed. They also sought to have their contract renewed immediately, not months later. Finally, and most importantly, the present plaintiffs’ contract was term-based and was not renewed, while in Chiro it did not matter if the plaintiffs contract was term-based, because he quit.

Under the plain language of La. R.S. 30:2027(2)(a), the defendants do not have to perform an affirmative act to be liable. If the plaintiffs can prove that their contract was not renewed (an inaction on the part of the defendants) because of their reporting of an environmental violation, then they would have a cause of action, assuming they meet the rest of the statutory requirements.

3) Plaintiffs are not employees that are covered under the purview of La. R.S. 30:2027

Defendants contend that the plaintiffs are not employees that are covered under the purview of La. R.S. 30:2027. The term “employee” is not defined in La. R.S. 30:2027. In their petition plaintiffs state that “from 1997 through the present, Petitioners acted in the capacities as public employees (contracting parties) of defendant DNR providing consulting land related research and duties.”

|1gTaking this assertion in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and with every doubt resolved on their behalf, we cannot say that the plaintiffs do not state a cause of action under the purview of La. R.S. 30:3027.

Therefore, after a de novo review, we find that the district court erred in finding that the petition failed to state a cause of action pursuant to La. R.S. 30:2027. This assignment of error has merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in finding that they had no cause of action under La. R.S. 23:967, the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute. Plaintiffs maintain that La. R.S. 23:967 is not superseded by La. R.S. 30:2027.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:967 states in pertinent part:

A. An employer shall not take reprisal against an employee who in good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation of law:
(1) Discloses or threatens to disclose a workplace act or practice that is in violation of state law.
(2) Provides information to or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into any violation of law.
(3) Objects to or refuses to participate in an employment act or practice that is in violation of law.
IB. An employee may commence a civil action in a district court where the violation occurred against any employer who engages in a practice prohibited by Subsection A of this Section. If the court finds the provisions of Subsection A of this. Section have been violated, the plaintiff may recover from the employer damages, reasonable attorney fees, and court costs.
C. For the purposes of this Section, the following terms shall have the definitions ascribed below:
(1) “Reprisal” includes firing, layoff, loss of benefits, or any discriminatory action the court finds was taken as a result of an action by the employee that is protected under Subsection A of this Section; however, nothing in this Section shall prohibit an employer from enforcing an established employment policy, procedure, or practice or exempt an employee from compliance with such.
b(2) “Damages” include compensatory damages, back pay, benefits, reinstatement, reasonable attorney fees, and court costs resulting from the reprisal.
D. If suit or complaint is brought in bad faith or if it should be determined by a court that the employer’s act or practice was not in violation of the law, the employer may be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and court costs from the employee.

The scope of La. R.S. 23:967 is broad. It protects employees who disclose, or threaten to disclose, acts in violation of law, employees who testify or provide information about acts in violation of law, or employees who refuse to participate in an act which violates the law.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:2027 states in pertinent part:

A. No firm, business, private or public corporation, partnership, individual employer, or federal, state, or local governmental agency shall act in a retaliatory manner against an employee, acting in good faith, who does any of the following:
(1) Discloses, or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy, practice of the employer, or another employer with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.
(2) Provides information to, or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into any environmental violation by the employer, or another employer with whom there is a business relationship, of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.

The scope of La. R.S. 30:2027 is more specific. It only protects employees who disclose, or threaten to disclose, acts in violation of an environmental law or employees who testify or provide information about acts in violation of an environmental law.

As stated under well-established principles of statutory construction, where there is a general statute and a specific statute addressing the same subject matter, such as La. R.S. 30:2027 and La. R.S. 23:967, the more specific statute should govern. Barber v. Marine Drilling Management, Inc., 01-1986 (E.D.La.2/15/02), 2002 WL 237848 (unpublished). Thus, we find that La. R.S. 30:2027 supersedes La. R.S. 23:967 in regard to this claim.

Therefore, after a de novo review, we find that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under La. R.S. 23:967. This assignment of error has no merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, that portion of the district court judgment ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action pursuant to La. R.S. 42:1169 is affirmed; that portion of the judgment ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action pursuant to La. R.S. 30:2027 is reversed; and that portion of the judgment ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action pursuant to La. R.S. 23:967 is affirmed.

Thus, the district court judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court. Costs are assessed against plaintiffs.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

KUHN, J., concurs in the result.

KUHN, J.,

concurring.

hi agree that because defendants have asserted a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, we are bound to review the allegations of the petition in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and, therefore, their barebones claim of a public employee capacity must be accepted as true. Nevertheless, in their appellate brief, plaintiffs have conceded that their claims arise out of a contractual relationship rather than that of employer-employee. Thus, I believe that plaintiffs will be unable to recover any relief against defendants. Accordingly, I must concur.

      . Plaintiffs also asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Mr. Benoit, asserting that he "violated their clearly established rights pursuant to the 1st Amendment, to report and oppose unlawful conduct, and pursuant to the 14th Amendment,’ to due process of laws and to one's good name and reputation.” DNR and Mr. Benoit later filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss all of plaintiffs' remaining claims in the suit. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed an appeal. That matter is pending in a separate appeal, 2013 CA 0284.

      . DNR also filed a dilatory exception of insufficiency of service of process, which was denied as moot.

      . In Nolan, the court concluded that ‘‘[w]e find no provision for any private right of action under the Code of Governmental Ethics; the employee’s remedy is to complain to the Board of Ethics, which then investigates and takes action to protect the employee, if appropriate.” Nolan, 790 So.2d at 732.

      . In Chiro, the plaintiff was eventually rehired, albeit for less money then he was previ-ouslypaid. Chiro, 745 So.2d at 1199.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PETTIGREW, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Leonard J. CAROLLO III v. Trish E. CAROLLO.
    No. 2013 CU 0010.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 31, 2013.

      Stephanie A. Fratello, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant, Leonard J. Carollo, III.
    James E. Moorman, III, Covington, LA, for Defendant-Appellee, Trish E. Carollo.
    Before KUHN, PETTIGREW, and McDonald, jj.
   PETTIGREW, J.

|2This appeal challenges numerous aspects of a trial court’s judgment, including the finding that plaintiff was in contempt of court for failing to pay private school tuition for the minor child, the ruling concerning plaintiffs motion to annul and/or amend a previous consent judgment, and the dismissal of plaintiffs petition for change in custody. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record reflects that plaintiff, Leonard J. Carollo, III, and defendant, Trish E. Carollo, were divorced by a Texas judgment dated December 22, 2005, which judgment was made executory in Louisiana by order dated August 22, 2007. One child, Leonard J. Carollo, IV, was born of the marriage. All ancillary matters, including child support, custody, and visitation were addressed in the original Texas divorce judgment. Thereafter, in September 2007, Leonard filed a motion to modify the terms of the 2005 divorce agreement, in particular, visitation and his child support obligation. Numerous continuances were filed by Leonard, and ultimately a rule date before the hearing officer was scheduled for June 29, 2009, with a hearing before the trial court scheduled for July 21, 2009. Prior to the hearing officer conference, Trish filed a rule requesting an increase in child support, which was also set for hearing before the trial court on July 21, 2009.

Following the hearing officer conference on June 29, 2009, the parties entered into a “Joint Stipulation And Consent Judgment” whereby the parties retained joint custody of the child, with Trish named as the domiciliary parent. Moreover, Leonard’s child support obligation was reduced, and a procedure was put in place for the parents to pay their share of the child’s expenses. This judgment was signed by the trial court on July 10, 2009.

In November 2010, Trish filed a rule for contempt against Leonard arguing that he was in violation of the July 10, 2009 judgment because he had an “overnight guest of a romantic nature while exercising overnight visitation with the minor child.” Leonard responded to the rule for contempt with various exceptions, including | svagueness/ambiguity, no cause of action, and res judicata. Leonard also filed his own rule for contempt against Trish, arguing that she had not been sharing information with him about the child as she was ordered to do in the July 10, 2009 judgment. Leonard also moved for a change in custody, increased visitation, decrease in child support, and an amendment to the consent judgment. Thereafter, Trish filed a supplemental rule for contempt and a rule to increase child support. These matters were considered at a hearing officer conference on April 27, 2011, at which time the hearing officer recommended that custody remain the same with the exception that Leonard was to have an additional week of visitation during the summer. With regard to child support, the hearing officer denied both Leonard’s request for a decrease and Trish’s request for an increase for failure to show a change in circumstances. The hearing officer found both Leonard and Trish in contempt of court and ordered them both to pay attorney fees in connection with the finding of contempt. The recommendations of the hearing officer were made temporary orders of the trial court by order dated May 17, 2011, pending a hearing before the trial court on July 14, 2011.

After a continuance by Leonard’s counsel, the matter was heard on October 18, 2011. Judgment was rendered in open court on October 18, 2011, as follows: The parties were awarded joint custody with Trish remaining as the domiciliary parent. The trial court took judicial notice of Leonard’s admission that he knowingly violated the prior consent judgment dated July 10, 2009, by having an overnight guest of a romantic nature while the child was present. The trial court deferred adjudication on the contempt issue, but ordered Leonard to pay Trish’s court costs associated with filing the rule for contempt. The trial court again reiterated the overnight guest prohibition from the July 10, 2009 consent judgment, but included an exclusion for Leonard’s girlfriend, Eriana Antoun. The trial court ordered that the child continue to be enrolled in private school and that all expenses attributable to his education be split between the parties equally, commencing with the 2011/2012 school year. A parenting coordinator, Dr. Stephen W. Thompson, was appointed by the trial court to make recommendations regarding the child. Trish’s rule for contempt and rule to increase child support were dismissed, with prejudice. |4Leonard was awarded one extra week of visitation in the summer, and his rules for contempt, to modify custody, and to decrease child support were dismissed, with prejudice. It was further ordered that all other provisions of the July 10, 2009 consent judgment not expressly modified would remain in full force and effect. Written judgment to this effect was not signed by the trial court until April 23, 2012.

On March 30, 2012, Leonard filed another petition for change in custody and/or increased visitation. In said petition, Leonard also sought removal of Trish as domiciliary parent and requested that the child be enrolled in a school that could accommodate his special needs as a gifted student. Attached to Leonard’s petition was a letter from the parenting coordinator Dr. Thompson to counsel for both parties, in which Dr. Thompson outlined his suggestion with regard to the child’s education. On May 24, 2012, Trish again filed a rule for contempt against Leonard, this time arguing that Leonard had willfully violated the April 23, 2012 consent judgment by refusing to pay his share of the child’s school tuition for the 2011/2012 school year. On May 30, 2012, Leonard filed a motion to annul and/or amend and/or vacate the April 23, 2012 consent judgment and a motion for sanctions. These matters proceeded to a hearing officer conference on June 6, 2012, at which time the hearing officer made the following recommendations:

The father’s motion for modification of legal custody is denied.
The father’s physical custody is modified as follows:
On the father’s custodial week-ends, the child shall be returned Monday morning to school[.]
All other physical custody as provided in Consent Judgments of 7/10/2009 and 4/23/2012 remain in effect.
Leonard ... is hereby found to be in contempt of the prior order of this Court for failure to pay private school tuition timely.
He is hereby sentenced to serve 3 days in the parish jail, and fined $300.00 payable to the Judicial Expense Fund.
The fíne and sentence are suspended, on the following condition(s):
|sThe father paying his 50% share of the private school tuition by 7/31/2012. The father not being found in contempt of court in any further proceedings.

Leonard filed an objection to the hearing officer’s recommendations, and, therefore, the recommendations were never made the final judgment of the trial court. Rather, they became a temporary order of the trial court (with the exception of the recommendations on contempt, which remained recommendations only) pending the hearing before the trial court.

The matter proceeded to hearing before the trial court on July 31, 2012, at which time the court heard testimony from both Leonard and. Trish and considered documentary evidence. With regard to Leonard’s motion to annul and/or amend and/or vacate the April 23, 2012 consent judgment and motion for sanctions, the trial court denied the motion to annul the consent judgment in whole, but granted the request to amend the judgment in part as it related to Leonard’s summer visitation. The trial court amended the judgment to remove all language from the summer visitation clause, except to state that Leonard was afforded an extra week of visitation in the summer. In all other respects, the motion was denied, and the April 23, 2012 consent judgment remained in effect as written.

The next matter taken up was Leonard’s rule on custody, visitation, change in domiciliary status, and choice of school for the child. At the conclusion of Leonard’s testimony on these issues, counsel for Trish moved for an involuntary dismissal on the grounds that Leonard did not carry his burden of proof. The trial court granted the request for involuntary dismissal, finding that Leonard had not met his burden of proving that there was a material change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child since the last judgment was entered into the record on October 18, 2011.

Finally, the trial court considered the contempt issue. Trish testified regarding Leonard’s refusal to pay the child’s tuition for the 2011/2012 school year. According to the record, by April 12, 2012, Leonard was aware of what his share of the tuition was and | Bthat it was due to the school on May 1. Leonard sent Trish an email on April 30, 2012, advising as follows with regard to the tuition payment: “In light of Dr. Thompson’s written recommendation that Lenny be re-enrolled in a gifted program ... end due to the pending court dates in June and July regarding Dr. Thompson’s recommendation, I will not pay Lenny’s tuition until the court makes a ruling concerning Lenny’s education.”

When Trish was tendered for cross examination, counsel for Leonard urged exceptions raising the objections of prematurity and no cause of action. The following colloquy occurred:

[Counsel for Leonard:]
Your Honor, I would like to move for exception of prematurity in this action. To give you a little procedural history, the rule for contempt was filed on May 24th, 2012. However, the payment wasn’t due until May 1st of 2012. In the 2009 judgment, it gives [Leonard] two months time to pay any fees that have been incurred by [Trish] including — any fees, any monetary fees that would be involved. Also, we had a Hearing Officer Conference. And the hearing officer gave [Leonard] until July 31st to pay this, of which I have a check here today for her,
[Counsel for Trish:]
A, that’s a recommendation of the hearing officer. B, an exception of prematurity is a declinatory or dilatory — I am not sure — exception which must be raised prior to filing an answer. While an answer wasn’t due, we are now at the end of a trial. It’s too late to object to prematurity.
[Counsel for Leonard:]
Exception of no cause of action, Your Honor.
[Counsel for Trish:]
It’s been — they’ve got to file that before we start the trial, Your Honor.
[Counsel for Leonard:]
I can do that on the day of trial.
[Counsel for Trish:]
But we’ve started.
THE COURT:
But why would you do that? Why would you do that and waste my time on this ... ?
17[CounseI for Leonard:]
Well, Your Honor, I didn’t have a choice.
THE COURT:
Well, the Court is going to deny the oral motion for the exceptions. There’s several reasons. The main one would be it’s moot. You know, she’s just testified your client sent her an e-mail or a text saying he wasn’t going to pay it. She had to file the contempt. He didn’t say I have two months to pay it, correct?
[Counsel for Leonard:]
No, Your Honor. That’s not what the e-mail says. It actually says—
THE COURT:
What did the e-mail say?
[Counsel for Leonard:]
It actually says, “I will not pay Lenny’s tuition until the Court makes a ruling.” He isn’t denying that he owes tuition.
THE COURT:
That’s not what the judgment says. [Counsel for Leonard:]
Your Honor, he only — he has — the 2009 judgment does say that.
THE COURT:
Until the Court makes a ruling he doesn’t have to pay?
[Counsel for Leonard:]
The Court — it’s July 31st [sic]. Payment wasn’t due until June 31st. If the receipt wasn’t given until April, and the hearing officer — in the Hearing Officer Conference it was brought up. It said that he said he would pay it.
THE COURT:
That’s a recommendation only....
[Counsel for Leonard:]
I understand that, Your Honor. But I am telling you that we already had this pending before the Court. He would not have owed this tuition had he not— had LJ, Little Lenny, not gone to school next year.
|STHE COURT:
That’s not the law_ He pays according to a court order until the Court changes it. Then, if he is entitled to credit or reimbursement, we give it to him. But you are not correct on the law....
[Y]ou have had months to file an exception. You have not. Today you wait until the end of this hearing and you bring forth this exception of prematurity. You didn’t file it in the record. You don’t have a written exception today. It’s moot because your client has already — written evidence has been offered that he wasn’t going to pay until the Court ruled. That’s not the law. And he would be in contempt of court if that’s what he is telling this lady after he agreed in a judgment to pay it, in the consent judgment of October. He doesn’t get to file something, keep a child from being able to go to school or a child to be supported while he’s waiting on a court to see if I am going to go along with what he wants to change in the last judgment. He doesn’t get to do that.... And if you can show me any law or any case that says that, I will look at it. But I’ve been doing this quite some time, and I think I’m safe on this one.
So the bottom line is the exception is denied. The exception, were it to be filed, would be moot. It is clear that he told her he wasn’t going to pay it until the Court said whether or not he got to decide did the child go to another school.
So the exception is denied. It was untimely filed. And even had I had it to consider, it would have been moot.

Following the trial court’s ruling on the exception, testimony on the contempt issue continued. Thereafter, the trial court found Leonard in contempt of the October 18, 2011 consent judgment, noting as follows:

Today it has been successfully proven to the Court that he is in contempt of the court’s orders of October 18th, 2011, which was a Consent Judgment that is very clear. In the judgment he is ordered to pay — I want to cite exactly the
paragraph — Page 2, the middle of the page, “It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the minor child shall continue to be enrolled in private school.” It is not limited to any school term.
This was a long day. We had many conversations with counsel and with the parties. The transcript is extensive of the stipulation being placed on the record. It is absolutely clear this was not limited to any school year.
It says, “The tuition and registration fees attributable to the minor child’s enrollment in private school shall be split between the parties, with each party being responsible for 50 percent of the same, commencing” — “commencing”— “with the 2011/2012 school year.” We wouldn’t have said “commencing” if it only meant that school year, in the Court’s opinion.
The judgment is clear. [Trish] has proven, by the appropriate burden of proof, that [Leonard] is in contempt of those orders of this |9court. The Court finds this was done intentionally, knowingly and purposefully, without justifiable excuse. This constitutes willful disobedience of a judgment of this court. He continues to show a lack of respect for the court’s orders. He’s jeopardized this child’s enrollment in the school in which he agreed the child was to be enrolled. It has required the mother to spend her funds to pay the entire amount and wait until today when he finally gives her a check today in the amount of $2,847.50.
In addition to that amount, he is to pay the sum of $1400 attorney’s fees and court costs to Mr. Jim Moorman and his client within seven days hereof. I don’t know what the court costs are. You can find that out from the Clerk’s Office.
The Court is going to sentence [Leonard] to serve — this being the second rule for contempt that’s before the Court — is going to sentence him ... to serve a sentence of 30 days in the St. Tammany Parish jail. The sentence is suspended upon him paying the $1400 plus court costs within seven days hereof.
In addition, he will be on probation for a period of one year. This will be unsupervised probation through the 22nd Judicial District Court. As a term of his probation, the sentence will be suspended but subject to being served if he does not continue to pay his obligations as court ordered for child support — that includes the tuition — timely.
The former requirement, if there is one from a judgment in 2009 that, in your interpretation, Ms. Fratello [counsel for Leonard], would allow him to wait two months after the tuition is due to pay [Trish], that is going to be amended. The tuition is to be paid immediately as she sends it to him, within seven days thereof, and certainly before it is due to the school as incurred.
In addition, if he was allowed 90 days before, that is going to be reduced, on any other expenses, to 30 days.... Those are to be paid within 30 days. No longer are we having 90 days to pay anything. I am not expecting this mother to have to put out all of this money and wait 90 days to get reimbursed by your client.

A judgment in accordance with these findings was signed by the trial court on August 27, 2012. It is from this judgment that Leonard has appealed, assigning the following specifications of error:

1. The trial court erred in failing to allow the parenting coordinator to testify at trial and by failing to allow the parenting coordinator’s correspondence to be admitted at trial pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1636.
2. The trial court erred in granting Defendant/Appellee’s motion for involuntary dismissal of all of Plaintiff/Appellant’s claims without hearing all evidence.
| m3. The trial court abused its discretion in amending the April 23, 2012 consent judgment as it pertains to dismissal with prejudice and amending the July 10, 2009 consent judgment on its own motion with respect to decreasing the timeline for reimbursement of expenses.
4. The trial court erred/abused its discretion in denying PlaintiffAppellant’s request for increased visitation pursuant to La.R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b), when there was no evidence that increase in visitation was not warranted and the April 23, 2012 consent judgment reserved the right for PlaintiffAppellant to reassert modification of custody/change in visitation as a result in his change, of residence from Texas to Louisiana.
5. The trial court erred/abused its discretion in holding PlaintiffAppellant in contempt of court for failing to timely pay tuition for private school.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Parenting Coordinator

In his first assignment of error, Leonard argues that in making its ruling, the trial court should have considered the correspondence submitted by the parenting coordinator. Leonard maintains that the “correspondence, arguably a report, was submitted and was merely presented for the court’s referenced.” He further notes that the parenting coordinator’s input was crucial and relevant to the matter at trial.

It is well settled that the trial court is not required to allow the parenting coordinator to be called as a witness. Moreover, the parenting coordinator shall not be called as a witness without prior approval of the trial court. La. R.S. O^SA. As correctly pointed out by Trish in brief, Leonard has not alleged that he requested or received prior approval of the trial court to call Dr. Thompson as a witness or that this approval was erroneously denied. In fact, this very issue was discussed by the trial court below during the hearing:

Dr. Thompson is the parenting coordinator. No one filed to have the parenting coordinator testify. Even if they had filed to have him testify, it is in my discretion. Most times we don’t allow the parenting coordinators to testify because the law discourages that. We want them to continue to be objective and be your parenting coordinator. So I am not going to fallow into evidence by your testimony what Dr. Thompson has said to either one of you.

Based on our review of the record and applicable Jaw, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling on this issue.

Involuntary Dismissal

In assignment of error number two, Leonard challenges the trial court’s ruling on Trish’s motion for involuntary dismissal of Leonard’s rule on custody, visitation, change in domiciliary status, and choice of school for the child. He argues that premature dismissal of all of his claims prior to testimony by Trish resulted in the trial court’s inability to consider all factors that were in the best interest of the child.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1672(B) provides for a motion for involuntary dismissal of a plaintiffs action in the course of a bench trial:

In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of the action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.

Unlike a motion for directed verdict in a jury trial, Article 1672(B) requires the trial court to evaluate all the evidence and render a decision based upon a preponderance of the evidence without any special inferences in favor of the opponent to the motion. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence simply means that taking the evidence as a whole, such proof shows that the fact or cause sought to be proved is more probable than not. Connelly v. Connelly, 94-0527, p. 14 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94), 644 So.2d 789, 798.

An involuntary dismissal should not be reversed by an appellate court in the absence of manifest error. Cosman v. Cabrera, 2009-0265, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/23/09), 28 So.3d 1075, 1081. Accordingly, in order to reverse the trial court’s grant of involuntary dismissal, we must find, after reviewing the record, that there is no factual basis for its finding or that the finding is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). The issue is not whether the trial court was right or wrong, but whether its conclusion was reasonable. Id.

When a custody decree is, as herein, a stipulated or consensual judgment, a party seeking modification of custody must prove that there has been 3 material change in circumstances (also referred to as a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child) since the original decree, as well as prove that the proposed modification is in the best interest of the child. Cedotal v. Cedotal, 2005-1524, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/4/05), 927 So.2d 433, 436. If the first prong of the test is not met and a material change in circumstances is not shown, the inquiry ends, and there is no basis for altering the physical custody decree. Lunney v. Lunney, 2011-1891, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/10/12), 91 So.3d 350, 353, writ denied, 2012-0610 (La.4/4/12), 85 So.3d 130.

After Leonard presented his evidence on the rule on custody, visitation, change in domiciliary status, and choice of school for the child, Trish moved for an involuntary dismissal arguing that Leonard had failed to carry his burden of proving a prima facie case “that her decision to place the child in private school adversely affected the child ... that a modification in physical custody since last October is adversely affecting the child or that she’s abused her position as domiciliary parent.”

The trial court, after hearing argument from respective counsel, ruled as follows on Trish’s motion:

[T]he first issue ... for the Court to consider, there was a motion or rule for the Court to consider whether or not the decision of the primary domiciliary parent should be overturned in deciding that the child remain enrolled in the private school that the parties agreed to back in October of last year.
[Leonard] would have had to have met his burden of proof. By law he has not done so. The Court is going to grant the request for involuntary dismissal of his rule to overturn the decision of the domiciliary parent as far as the choice of school for the child.
On the second matter that was heard today, there is a request by [Leonard] to, for the Court to change custody of the child and the arrangement to a shared custody arrangement or an arrangement in which there would be no domiciliary parent or that the mother would be ... removed from at least the primary decision and role of primary domiciliary-parent’s authority on certain issues.
| lsThe burden of proof is that [Leonard] would have to have proven that, since October of last year when the last stipulated judgment was entered in this matter, October — it came to court October 18th, 2011 — in which they reached certain agreements that, after that, because there was at that time various rules between the parties including rules to modify custody, they were all settled. Everything was done, They were done with prejudice at that point in time, and they are reurging many of the same issues that were before the Court back in October when everyone agreed to settle this matter.
But it’s the decision of the Court that [Leonard] has not met his burden of proving that there is a material change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of this child since the last judgment was entered in this record of October 18th, 2011, and, therefore, the Court is going to grant the motion to dismiss, involuntarily dismiss on Irish’s behalf. ...

Mindful that it was Leonard’s burden to prove a material change in circumstances since the original decree and that the proposed modifications were in the best interest of the child, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s grant of Irish’s motion for involuntary dismissal of Leonard’s rule on custody, visitation, change in domiciliary status, and choice of school for the child.

Alleged Amendments of Consent Judgments

Leonard next argues that the trial court erred in amending the April 23, 2012 consent judgment as it pertains to dismissal with prejudice and amending the July 10, 2009 consent judgment on its own motion with respect to decreasing the time-line for reimbursement of expenses. We find no merit to these arguments on appeal.

With regard to the alleged amendment of the April 23, 2012 consent judgment, we find no such language in the August 27, 2012 judgment that is before us for review. Rather, the trial court simply noted during the July 31, 2012 hearing that when the matter came before it on October 18, 2011, the parties had reached certain agreements and all matters were settled “with prejudice at that point in time.” In fact, the April 23, 2012 consent judgment that appears in the record before us contains the following pertinent language:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Mother’s Rule for Contempt and to Increase Child Support is hereby dismissed, with prejudice.
|14IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Father’s Rules for Contempt, to Modify Custody, and to Decrease Child Supportive, hereby dismissed, with prejudice.

Thus, no amendment by the trial court was necessary as the pertinent dismissals in the April 23, 2012 judgment were already with prejudice.

With regard to the trial court’s amendment of the July 10, 2009 consent judgment with respect to the timeline for reimbursement of expenses, we find no error in this as Leonard was held in contempt for his failure to pay the child’s private school tuition. The trial court found that it was done “intentionally, knowingly and purposefully, without justifiable case” and wanted to insure that Trish would be timely reimbursed for all expenses related to the child’s tuition and extracurricular activities in the future. Based on the facts and circumstances herein, we find this action by the trial court to be reasonable and without error.

Denial of Increased Visitation

In assignment of error number four, Leonard asserts the trial court erred in denying his request for increased visitation pursuant to La. R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b). Leonard maintains that he wants to be an integral part of his son’s life and that he has the financial means, the capability, love, and affection to spend as much time as possible with his son. Citing Harang v. Ponder, 2009-2182 (La.App. 1 cir. 3/26/10), 36 So.3d 954, writ denied, 2010-0926 (La.5/19/10), 36 So.3d 219, as support for his position, Leonard argues that he should be awarded increased visitation with the child and that a new implementation plan should be instituted. Leonard further contends 115that he should be successful in his bid for increased visitation because Trish did not present any evidence to contradict his evidence. We find no merit to Leonard’s arguments in this regard.

As previously indicated, Leonard, as the parent seeking modification of a consensual custody decree, bore the burden of establishing the occurrence of a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of his child and that his proposed modification of the existing custody arrangement would be in the best interest of his child. Cedotal, 2005-1524 at 5-6, 927 So.2d at 436. Leonard failed in his burden, thus Trish was not required to submit evidence to rebut insufficient evidence. See Soignet v. Soignet, 546 So.2d 541, 544 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989). Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of his request for increased visitation.

Contempt

In his final assignment of error, Leonard argues the trial court abused its discretion in holding him in contempt for failing to timely pay the child’s private school tuition. Leonard asserts that he believed he only had to pay for private school tuition for the 2011-2012 school year, as there was no court order in place ordering payment of private school tuition for the 2012-2013 school year. Based on the applicable law and the record before us, we find no support for Leonard’s argument.

A constructive civil contempt of court includes the “[w]illful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court.” La.Code Civ. P. art. 224(2). A finding that a person willfully disobeyed a court order in violation of Article 224(2) must be based on a finding that the person violated an order of the court intentionally, knowingly, and purposefully, without justifiable excuse. Boyd v. Boyd, 2010-1369, p. 15 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/11/11), 57 So.3d 1169, 1178-1179.

As discussed by the trial court below, the language in the April 23, 2012 consent judgment is very clear with respect to the private school tuition. It states as follows:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the minor child shall continue to be enrolled in private school. The tuition and registration fees attributable to the minor child’s enrollment in private school shall be split between the parties, with each party being | ^responsible for fifty percent (50%) of the same, commencing with the 2011/2012 school year.

In finding Leonard guilty of contempt, the trial court pointed out the use of the word “commencing,” noting that in the court’s opinion, “we wouldn’t have said ‘commencing1 if it only meant that school year.” The trial court continued, finding that Trish had shown Leonard’s intentional, knowing, and purposeful contempt of the court’s order that he pay the child’s private school tuition. The trial court concluded that Leonard’s actions constituted “willful disobedience of a judgment of this court” and that he continued “to show a lack of respect for the court’s orders.”

As this was the second rule for contempt that was before the court, Leonard was sentenced to serve 30 days in St. Tammany Parish Jail, which was suspended upon his payment of $1,400.00 in attorney fees and court costs. He was also placed on unsupervised probation for one year. Based on a thorough review of the record and the facts and circumstances before us in this case, we are unable to find any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding of contempt or the resulting sentence imposed on Leonard.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s August 27, 2012 judgment. We assess all costs associated with this appeal against plaintiff, Leonard J. Carollo, III.

AFFIRMED.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:358.5 provides as follows:
      A. The parenting coordinator shall not be called as a witness in the child custody proceeding without prior court approval.
      B. The parenting coordinator shall distribute all reports to the court, the parties, and their attorneys.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
      A. (1) In a proceeding in which joint custody is decreed, the court shall render a joint custody implementation order except for good cause shown.
      (2)(a) The implementation order shall allocate the time periods during which each parent shall have physical custody of the child so that the child is assured of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.
      (b) To the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody of the children should be shared equally.
      (3) The implementation order shall allocate the legal authority and responsibility of the parents.