author: WEIMER, Justice.

text:
    LIVINGSTON PARISH COUNCIL ON AGING v. Willie GRAVES, Sheriff of Livingston Parish.
    No. 2012-C-0232.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 4, 2012.

      Jill L. Craft, for applicant.
    Pittman Law Firm, APLC, Eric L. Pittman, Brian C. Dufour, for respondent.
   WEIMER, Justice.

|,The issue in this matter is whether a sheriff acted within statutory authority in deducting a commission in connection with the collection of a two-millage assessment that was initially approved by voters in 2003. The resolution of this issue requires inquiry into the differences in the manner in which sheriffs’ offices were funded prior to and after the passage of 1976 La. Acts 689. Harmonizing and reconciling the various provisions of the legislation in question, we conclude that the change in the method of funding eliminated the prior percentage commission-based funding of the sheriffs office from ad valorem taxes under former La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) and replaced it with revenue generated by the newly-created special taxing districts known as law enforcement districts. Thus, sheriffs are no longer authorized to deduct a commission on ad valorem taxes collected by them on behalf of other taxing authorities, as the costs associated with the collection of those |2taxes is now satisfied by the millage levied by the law enforcement districts. For the reasons that follow, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2003, the Livingston Parish Council on Aging (Council), a non-profit corporation serving the needs of the elderly in Livingston Parish, adopted a resolution authorizing an election to establish a two-millage property tax for a 10-year period. These taxes were to be used by the Council to pay the costs of programs for the elderly. The millage proposition was passed by a majority vote of the parish’s electorate. In 2004, the Sheriff of Livingston Parish (Sheriff) began collecting the property tax on the Council’s behalf, deducting a commission equal to 12 percent of the ad valorem taxes collected.

In 2010, the Council filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Sheriff, seeking a judgment declaring the Sheriffs deduction of a commission from the property tax collected on the Council’s behalf to be improper and ordering the Sheriff to remit the commissions that had been withheld by him. Finding the Sheriffs deduction of a commission to be improper, the trial court ordered all commissions or fees collected by the Sheriff since December 2004 in connection with the Council’s two-millage assessment be returned to the Council. The court further prohibited the Sheriff from deducting or collecting commissions or fees on future millage assessments to which the Council is entitled.

After reviewing the statutory provisions related to the financing of the office of the sheriff and the sheriffs general fund, the appellate court reversed the trial | acourt’s judgment. Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Willie Graves, Sheriff of Livingston Parish, 11-0787 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/21/11) (unpublished). The reversal was based on a finding that former La. R.S. 33:9008 (now La. R.S. 13:5903) is inapplicable to the Council’s assessment that was approved by the voters after the Sheriffs initial millage was fixed in 1977. Accordingly, the appellate court found that the Sheriff was acting within the authority vested in him by former La. R.S. 33:1423(0 (now La. R.S. 13:5523(0) m deducting a commission from the ad valo-rem taxes imposed for the Council’s benefit beginning in 2004.

The Council’s writ application to this court was granted for consideration of whether the Sheriff had acted within his statutory authority in deducting a commission fee in connection with the Council’s two-millage assessment. See Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Willie Graves, Sheriff of Livingston Parish, 12-0232 (La.4/20/12), 85 So.3d 1279.

DISCUSSION

In 1976, legislation was passed that modified the method in which the office of the sheriff was funded. See 1976 La. Acts, 689 (Act 689). That legislation amended former La. R.S. 33:1421 and 1423 (now La. R.S. 13:5521 and 5523 respectively) and added former La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008 (now La. R.S. 13:5901 through 5911).

The function of statutory interpretation and the construction to be given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government. Red Stick Studio Development, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Dept, of Economic Development, 10-0193 (La.1/19/11), 56 So.3d 181, 187-88, quoting M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 27. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature. Id. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent, as well as the reason or reasons which prompted the legislature to enact the law. See Id.

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water Dist., 02-0439 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 20. Words and phrases shall be read in their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. La. R.S. 1:3. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. Id. When the wording of a section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. La. R.S. 1:4. Unless otherwise specifically provided therein, all laws or parts of laws in conflict with a provision of a law subsequently enacted by the legislature are repealed by the law subsequently enacted. La. R.S. 24:176(A).

When the meaning of a statute cannot be ascertained by the application of the provisions of La. R.S. 1:3, et seq., the court shall consider the intent of the legislature as best evidenced by the text of a law. See La. R.S. 24:177(A) and (B)(1). The occasion and necessity for the law, the circumstances under which it was enacted, concepts of reasonableness, and eontempo-raneous legislative history may also be considered in determining legislative intent. La. R.S. 24:177(B)(2)(a). The legislature is presumed to have enacted an article or statute in light of the preceding law involving the same subject matter and court decisions construing those articles or statutes, and where the new article or statute is worded differently from the | ¡¡preceding law, the legislature is presumed to have intended to change the law. La. R.S. 24:177(C).

To fully understand the impact of the 1976 legislation on the funding of sheriffs’ offices, we examine the applicable laws in this area as they existed prior to and after the 1976 changes. At the time the legislature considered the proposed legislation, sheriffs’ offices were funded based on the number of state representatives serving a parish (the representative allowance) and by commissions deducted on taxes collected on behalf of taxing authorities as provided in La. R.S. 33:1423. After the enactment of subsection E in 1966, La. R.S. 33:1423 provided:

A.All fees in civil, criminal and other matters allowed by law for the performance of any duty of the sheriff and ex-officio tax collector shall include not less than $1000.00 per annum. In parishes having more than two representatives in the Legislature, the sheriff shall receive $500.00 for each additional representative. These sums shall be deducted by the sheriff pro rata from the amounts due the recipients of taxes in addition to the percentages hereinafter provided for, before settlement with them, and shall be collected by him, and deposited by him in a special account, to be accounted for by the sheriff under the head of “Sheriff s salary fund.”[]
B. The tax collector shall deduct a commission which he is to turn over to the sheriffs salary fund from the following: all state, parish, school, levee, and other taxes and licenses, including all special taxes except the confederate veterans tax, including hunting and fishing licenses collected by him and actually paid by him into the state and parish treasury or the authority designated by law to receive same.
C. In the following parishes, the tax collectors shall deduct as commissions not more than the following percentages of the aggregate amount of such taxes shown to be collectible by the tax rolls:
| (j(32) Livingston . Twelve per cent[]
D. The sheriff and ex-officio tax collector shall draw his salary monthly on his own check or warrant and shall monthly issue to employees and deputies, checks or warrants for the amount due them, which shall be drawn against and paid out of the sheriffs salary fund. For claims within the allowance above fixed, and to be charged to the allowance, he shall issue his own checks or warrants, which shall be drawn against and paid out of the sheriffs salary fund. The special account representing the sheriffs salary fund shall show the total receipts of the office of the sheriff and ex-officio tax collector in civil and criminal matters and other fees, allowances, charges and commissions, and the disbursement to the sheriff and ex-officio tax collector, including the salary and all other expenses of the office, and also including the reimbursement of actual expenses paid out as hereinafter allowed. In any case where the sheriff can, with reasonable certainty, estimate what will be the amount of the sheriffs salary fund, as herein provided, he may, at his discretion, anticipate not exceeding seventy-five per cent of the same, exclusive of interest, according to the needs of his office and may negotiate his own warrants against the fund from month to month. In that case, the warrants and the interest thereon shall be paid from the sheriffs salary and expense fund as the money accrues therein in the order of issuance of the warrants. The fund is pledged for the payment of any warrant issued under the authority of this proviso, but the warrants shall not exceed the salary and allowance provided above.
E. The percentage allocations set forth in Paragraph C of this section shall not be changed by amendment to this section, or by other act regardless of whether it amends this section, unless notice of intent to do so shall have been sent by the sheriff to the school board and governing authority in each parish to be affected by such change. Such notice in each parish affected shall state the percentage change to be applied for and shall be sent by certified mail.
The mailing of this notice of intent to change percentage allocations in paragraph C of this section shall be made by the sheriff at least ten days prior to the convening of the legislative session in which such change is to be made. The evidence of such notice having been mailed shall be exhibited in the legislature before such act shall be passed, and every such act shall contain a recital that such notice has been given.

17Thus, when the legislature began considering possible changes to the method sheriffs’ offices were being funded, the services for sheriffs’ offices were paid by the “representative allowance” provided for in La. R.S. 33:1423(A) and by the percentage commission as set forth in La. R.S. 33:1423(C) relative to collection of the taxes and licenses referenced in La. R.S. 33:1423(B). Payment of the representative allowance and commissions by taxing authorities enabled sheriffs to pay the expenses related to the services provided. See La. R.S. 33:1423(D). If, as can be expected, there were fluctuations in taxes collected for the various taxing authorities, the revenue generated by sheriffs’ offices in terms of commissions from collected taxes varied from year to year. See La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C).

In 1969, the legislature amended the list of taxes and licenses set forth in La. R.S. 33:1423(B), deleting the reference to “special taxes,” and added a second paragraph to provide for the collection of sales taxes by the sheriffs in Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes. As amended, La. R.S. 33:1423(B) provided:

The tax collector shall deduct a commission which he is to turn over to the Sheriffs Salary Fund from the following: all state, parish, school, levee and other taxes and licenses, including hunting and fishing licenses collected by him and actually paid by him to the state and parish treasury or the authority designated by law to receive same.
In addition, the sheriff of the parish of Jefferson shall collect any sales tax levied by the Jefferson Parish School Board for which collection he shall receive as compensation the percentage specified in Subsection C of this Section, and the sheriff of the parish of St. Bernard shall collect all sales taxes levied by the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury and/or the St. Bernard Parish School Board, for which collection he shall receive as compensation the percentage specified in Subsection C hereof.

This amendment clearly shows the historical interplay between subsections B and C of La. R.S. 38:1428.

|sFor the purpose of calculating the deductions authorized by subsection B from “all state, parish, school, levee and other taxes and licenses, including hunting and fishing licenses,” a sheriff would use the percentage specified for his parish in subsection C. Parish ad valorem taxes were just one of the many categories of taxes to which the percentages set forth in subsection C applied.

The funds derived pursuant to La. R.S. 33:1423(A), (B), and (C) were placed into the sheriffs salary fund and expended in accordance with La. R.S. 33:1423(D). When the funds from those sources were insufficient to meet the needs of a sheriffs office, the sheriff would seek to have the legislature increase the percentage rate set forth in La. R.S. 33:1423(0) relative to the sheriffs parish. As a result, the legislature was bombarded with legislation regarding the percentage rates set forth in La. R.S. 33:1423(0), which placed the legislature in the position of acting as a mediator of rate disputes between the sheriff and the taxing authorities.

To eliminate the repeated requests for percentage rate increases and to bring more stability to the sheriffs funding, the legislature in 1976 provided for the creation of special law enforcement districts by enacting La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008. See 1976 La. Acts 689, § 1. The expressed purpose for the creation of such districts was for financing the office of the sheriff. La. R.S. 33:9001. To accomplish that purpose, each law enforcement district was given the authority to tax within the limits of La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008. See La. R.S. 33:9002. The method of taxation was provided for in La. R.S. 33:9003, which read:

|flEach district hereby created shall levy a tax on the assessed valuation of all property appearing on the 1977 and subsequent tax rolls, without a vote of the people, in an amount that will produce for the district in the initial year the same revenue as that estimated to be produced by the sheriffs commission on ad valorem taxes for the Fiscal Year 1976-1977. The amount of millage to be assessed shall be certified by the legislative auditor and this millage adopted shall remain in effect in subsequent years unless changed as provided by law. The sheriffs shall provide such information to the legislative auditor as he shall require to fulfill the duties imposed upon him by this section.
In addition to the taxes authorized herein the district or a subdistrict created by the district may impose additional millages in any district or subdistrict when approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon in an election held for that purpose. This election may be called by the sheriff and ex officio executive officer of the district. The cost of the election is to be borne by the sheriffs salary fund unless the election is concurrent with other elections in which event the district or subdistrict will bear a proportionate share of the cost.

Thus, beginning with the 1977 tax year, law enforcement districts were entitled to levy their own ad valorem taxes (without the need for voter approval) for the express purpose of funding sheriffs’ offices. See La. R.S. 33:9003.

The initial levy would be equal to “an amount that will produce for the district in the initial year the same revenue as that estimated to be produced by the sheriffs commission on ad valorem taxes for the Fiscal Year 1976-1977.” La. R.S. 33:9003. The initial millage to be levied by law enforcement districts had to take into account “the actual cost of collection of taxes for the other tax recipient bodies” such that “[a] pro rata share of the cost of collection shall continue to be paid to the sheriff of the parish by each tax recipient body.” See La. R.S. 33:9004 (1976). The cost-sharing 1 ^provided in La. R.S. 33:9004 (1976) was be accomplished by a mandatory rollback of ad valorem taxes by tax recipient bodies so as not to impose an additional tax burden on payers of ad valo-rem taxes. See La. R.S. 33:9005 (1976).

In connection with the use of the funds from the sheriffs salary fund, a sheriff was required to file an annual budget disclosing his estimated expenditures. See La. R.S. 33:9006 (1976). Placement of and disbursements from funds in the sheriffs salary fund were governed by La. R.S. 33:9007 (1976). The newly enacted statutory scheme concluded with La. R.S. 33:9008 (1976), which addressed the powers of the sheriff and provided:

It is the purpose of this Chapter to create special district for the financing of the sheriffs office. Nothing contained herein shall be interpreted as diminishing any of the authority of the sheriff as delegated to him in the constitution and laws of this state.

|nSince the legislature directed that the sheriffs initial millage be based solely on the sheriffs estimated revenue from “commission[s] on ad valorem taxes for the Fiscal Year 1976-1977,” the Sheriff in this case urges that the levy authorized by La. R.S. 33:9003 served only as compensation for services performed by his office in connection with the ad valorem taxes that were in effect for the 1976-77 fiscal year. As to subsequently levied ad valorem taxes, the Sheriff, citing La. R.S. 33:9008, argues that he is still entitled to deduct a commission pursuant to La. R.S. 33:1423.

The laws of statutory construction require that laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other. Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inci, 06-0582 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037, 1045, quoting Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04-0227 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 836-37. The legislature is presumed to have acted with deliberation and to have enacted a statute in light of the statutes involving the same subject matter. Id. Under our long-standing rules of statutory construction, where it is possible, courts have a duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject matter. Id.

In analyzing the Sheriffs argument pertaining to the applicability of La. R.S. 33:9003 to subsequently imposed ad valo-rem taxes, we must examine the corresponding amendments made by Act 689 to La. R.S. 33:1423. In connection with the creation of law enforcement districts for the purpose of financing sheriffs’ offices, the legislature initially proposed a repeal of subsections A, B, and C of La. R.S. 33:1423, which then governed the financing of sheriffs’ offices. See H.B. 1285, 1976 Reg. Sess., original, § 2. Pursuant to amendments by the Louisiana House of Representative Committee on Municipal and Parochial Affairs, the engrossed version of House Bill 1285 envisioned the repeal of only subsections C and E of La. R.S. 11233:1423, with subsections A, B, and D of La. R.S. 33:1423 being amended. The proposed repeal of all or part of La. R.S. 33:1423 was obviously tied to the legislature’s desire to eliminate the sheriffs authority to collect a commission in light of the new method of financing sheriffs’ offices authorized by La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008.

Pursuant to the proposed amendments, La. R.S. 33:1423(A) and (B) provided:

[A.] All fees in civil, criminal and other matters allowed by law for the performance of any duty of the Sheriff and ex-officio tax collector shall include not less than $1,000.00 per annum. In parishes having more than two representatives in the legislature, the sheriff shall receive $500.00 for each additional ■representative. These sums shall be deducted by the sheriff pro rata from the amounts due the recipients of taxes before a settlement with them, and shall be collected by him, and deposited by him in a special account, to be accounted for by the sheriff under the head of “Sheriff’s salary fund.”
[B.] The tax collector shall deduct a 15 per cent commission which he is to turn over to the sheriffs salary fund from the following: all state taxes and licenses, including hunting- and fishing licenses and parish licenses collected by him and actually paid by him to the state and parish treasury or the authority designated by law to receive same.
In addition, the sheriff of the Parish of Jefferson shall collect all sales tax levied by the Jefferson Parish Council and/or Jefferson Parish School Board, for which collection he shall receive as compensation, 11% of the aggregate amount of sales taxes collected by the sheriff and levied by the Jefferson Parish Council, and 9½% of the aggregate amount of sales taxes collected by the sheriff and levied by the Jefferson Parish School Board. The Sheriff of the Parish of St. Bernard shall collect all sales taxes levied by the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury and/or the St. Bernard Parish School Board, for which collection he shall receive as compensation 12% of the aggregate amount of sales taxes collected by the Sheriff and levied by the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury and/or the St. Bernard Parish School Board Parish School Board.

In connection with the proposed repeal of subsection C, the references in subsections A and B to the percentages specified in subsection C were eliminated | isby the 1976 legislation. Furthermore, to allow for the calculation of the commission deductions authorized by subsection B, specific percentages were inserted into subsection B. Nonetheless, in light of changes proposed on the floor of the Louisiana Senate (Senate) and then by the Legislative Conference Committee, the enrolled version of the bill provided only for the repeal of subsection E and for the amendment and reenactment of subsections A, B, and D of La. R.S. 33:1423. The 1976 legislation left La. R.S. 33:1423(C) intact, without further amendment of subsection B.

By leaving subsection C intact, the Sheriff urges that the legislature did not impact his right to deduct a commission from the ad valorem taxes that were not in effect in the 1976-77 fiscal year and were not part of the formula used in calculating the initial millage tax rate authorized by Act 689. In making this argument, the Sheriff fails to mention the historical interplay between La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C), nor did he address the changes made to La. R.S. 33:1423(B), which had previously been the source of the Sheriffs authority to deduct a commission in connection with ad valo-rem taxes collected by him.

Based on its decision not to repeal subsection C as originally proposed, the legislature obviously believed that subsection C was needed to protect the sheriffs right to “collect all fees, charges, commissions and other funds payable to the sheriffs salary fund as provided by law.” See 1976 La. Acts 689, § 6. A review of the changes made to the list of taxes found in La. R.S. 33:1423(B) sheds light on the fees, charges, and commissions referred to in section 6 of Act 689.

In amending subsection B, the legislature substantially reduced the number of taxes formerly listed in subsection B such that subsection B now only authorized the deduction of a commission in connection with “all state taxes and licenses, including | ^hunting and fishing licenses and parish licenses,” all at a rate of 15 percent. Based on its inclusion of specific percentage rates in subsection B, the legislature seemingly eliminated the historical interplay between subsections B and C. Notably missing from the list in subsection B of taxes and licenses from which the sheriff historically could deduct a commission are “all ... parish, school, levee and other taxes” and “all school, levee and other licenses.” Had the legislature repealed subsection C as originally proposed, Act 689 would have taken away the sheriffs authority to deduct a commission in connection with “all ... parish, school, levee and other taxes,” “all school, levee and other licenses,” and any other “taxes [historically] shown to be collectible by the tax rolls,” an effect that the legislature was cautious to guard against. See 1976 La. Acts 689, § 6. By its enactment of La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008 and amendment of La. R.S. 33:1423 the legislature clearly did not intend to “[diminish] any of the authority of the sheriff as delegated to him in the constitution and laws of this state.” See La. R.S. 33:9008.

Among the taxes no longer included in the list of taxes found in subsection B are ad valorem taxes. Thus, a question arises as to whether the sheriffs’ right to deduct a commission from ad valorem taxes was still “provided by law” after the passage of Act 689. Although the legislature did not expressly state that its vesting of taxing authority on law enforcement districts superseded the sheriffs authority to deduct a commission from ad valorem taxes, that effect of the legislation is understood. The parties do not dispute that the legislature, by its enactment of La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008, intended that the funds received by a law enforcement district’s levy of ad valorem taxes in 1977 replace the prior commission-based funding relative to ad valorem taxes as formerly provided in La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and 115(C). That conclusion is logical when considering the reason for the enactment of La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008, which was to provide a new method for financing sheriffs’ offices by the creation of law enforcement districts. See La. R.S. 33:9001 and 9002. The legislature evidenced no intent to confine the effect of this legislation to ad valorem taxes that were being levied at the time of the fixing of the initial millage. Instead, La. R.S. 33:9003 provided that once certified by the legislative auditor, the initial millage adopted would “remain in effect in subsequent years unless changed as provided by law.” Clearly, the levy authorized by La. R.S. 33:9002 was not confined to the 1977 tax year. The sheriffs right to levy an ad valorem tax at the initial millage rate would continue indefinitely unless changed in the manner provided by law. The fact that the 1976 legislation did not provide for an automatic upward adjustment of the initial millage rate for subsequently imposed property tax millages by other taxing authorities is not determinative of the merits of the Sheriff’s argument in this case. The legislature similarly did not provide for an automatic downward adjustment of the initial millage for those millages that would expire after the 1976-77 fiscal year based on the passage of a set term. Instead, the legislature gave the sheriff the right to seek additional millages to ensure adequate funding for his office. See La. R.S. 33:9008.

| ^Interpreting La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008 in a way which harmonizes and reconciles it with La. R.S. 33:1423, as amended, we conclude that the grant of authority to law enforcement districts, combined with the 1976 changes to La. R.S. 33:1423, evidence the legislature’s intent to replace the ad valorem tax commission-based funding with the revenue source to be provided by the ad valorem tax collected by the law enforcement districts. Stated differently, the sheriffs’ right to deduct a commission from ad valorem taxes as formerly authorized by La. R.S. 33:1423, being in conflict with newly enacted La. R.S. 33:9001 through 9008, was repealed by the legislature by the passage of Act 689; therefore, that right is no longer “provided by law.” The application of these statutory provisions in this manner does not lead to absurd consequences and accomplishes the legislature’s intent. A new way of funding sheriffs’ offices was created by the legislature to alleviate the problems presented by the commission-based funding relative to ad valorem taxes collected by sheriffs on behalf of other taxing authorities. Having resolved those problems by giving sheriffs (through law enforcement districts) the power to levy their own ad valorem taxes, it would be illogical to conclude that the legislature intended to allow sheriffs to continue to deduct a commission relative to ad valorem taxes that were not in effect at the time the initial millage was determined. A contrary finding would defeat the purpose of the 1976 enactment, in that the sheriffs and the taxing authorities would continue to be subject to the former, | ^problematic commission-based funding with regard to ad valorem taxes imposed after the 1976-77 fiscal year.

In summary, we find that by way of compromise between the sheriffs and the taxing authorities for which they collect ad valorem taxes, Act 689 established a new procedure for the funding of sheriffs’ offices. The 1976 change in the method of funding did away with the prior percentage commission-based funding relative to ad valorem taxes under La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) and replaced it with the source of revenue generated by the newly-created special taxing districts known as law enforcement districts. Thus, sheriffs are no longer authorized to deduct a commission on ad valorem taxes collected by them on behalf of other taxing authorities, as the costs associated with the collection of those taxes is now covered by the millage levied by the law enforcement districts. If the funds available to the sheriffs’ offices through La. R.S. 33:9003(B) and (C) and La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) are insufficient to satisfy the expenses of their offices, sheriffs have been given the authority to call an election and have a vote by the citizens to levy additional taxes. See La. R.S. 33:9003(B). Notably, such an interpretation is consistent with the pronouncement made in Atchafalaya Basin Levee District v. N.F. Pecquet, Jr., Assessor of West Baton Rouge Parish, 364 So.2d 610 (La.App. 1 Cir.1978).

|1SDECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The sheriff of Livingston Parish is the only sheriff in the state who deducts a commission on an ad valorem tax collected by him.

      . Prior to the passage of 1977 La. Acts 591, § 3, the sheriff’s general fund was called the sheriff's salary fund.

      . La. R.S. 33:1421 through 1450.1 were re-designated as La. R.S. 13:5521 through 5560 by 2011 La. Acts 248, § 3.

      . In light of the chronological approach taken in this examination, the former statutory designations will be used in this opinion.

      . See 1963 La. Acts 50, § 1; 1966 La. Acts 268, § 1 (added subsection E).

      . This provision was repealed by 1978 La. Acts 339, § 2, effective June 30, 1978.

        .See 1968 La. Acts 444, § 1 (amended commission percentages in subsection C, increasing Livingston Parish’s percentage from 12 percent to 15 percent); 1976 La. Acts 602, § 1 (amended commission percentages in subsection C, increasing Livingston Parish’s percentage from 15 percent to 17 percent).

      . See 1969 La. Acts 129, § 1.

      . See, for example, and by way of illustration, the three legislative changes involving the sheriff of Livingston Parish listed in footnote 7. Notably, since the passage of Act 689 in 1976, no legislative changes have been made to La. R.S. 33:1423(C). See 1977 La. Acts 591, § 1; 1984 La. Acts 261, § 1, effective June 30, 1984; 1985 La. Acts 881, § 1, effective October 1, 1985; 1986 La. Acts 1066, § 1; 1992 La. Acts 536, § 1; 1998 La. Acts, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 164, § 1, effective September 21, 1998; 2000 La. Acts, 2nd Ex.Sess., No. 1, § 1, effective June 26, 2000.

      . La. R.S. 33:9004 (1976) provided:
      In calculating the amount of tax which the district is entitled to levy there shall be deducted therefrom an amount equal to the actual cost of collection of taxes for the other tax recipient bodies in the parish. A pro rata share of the cost of collection shall continue to be paid to the sheriff of the parish by each tax recipient body. The amount due to the sheriff under this Section may be reviewed by the legislative auditor upon the written request of the parish governing authority and/or the school board within the parish. The sheriff shall provide such information to the legislative auditor as he shall require to perform the duties imposed upon him by this section.
      This provision was repealed by 1977 La. Acts 411, § 2, effective April 30, 1977.

      . La. R.S. 33:9005 (1976) provided:
      The total amount of ad valorem taxes received by other taxing authorities in the parish shall not be increased because of the provisions of Sections 9001 through 9008. To accomplish this result, it shall be mandatoiy for each affected taxing authority in the year in which the special district provided for herein is created to adjust millages so that taxes are not increased as a result of the creation of the special district provided for herein. Thereafter such millages shall remain in effect unless changed or increased in a manner provided by law. In the event a taxing authority increases the taxes authorized under this Section without a public referendum, such taxing authority shall have deducted from its share of state revenue sharing funds an amount equal to such taxes increased without a public referendum plus a penalty of fifteen percent of such amount. Provided however, that nothing herein shall prohibit a taxing authority from collecting, in the year in which the special district is created or in any subsequent year a larger dollar amount of ad valorem taxes by:
      (a) levying additional or increased millages as provided by law;
      (b) putting additional property on the tax rolls; or
      (c) increases in the fair market or use value of the property.
      This Section shall not apply to millages required to be levied for the payment of general obligation bonds.

      . In 1982, the legislature also repealed La. R.S. 33:9006 relative to the filing of an annual budget by the sheriff. See 1982 La. Acts 591, § 1.

      . See H.B. 1285, 1976 Reg. Sess., engrossed, § 3.

      . See 1963 La. Acts 50, § 1.

      . See 1969 La. Acts 129, § 1.

      . See 1976 La. Acts 689, § 6.

      .As a means of authorizing an additional financing, the legislature in 1982 added subsection C to former La. R.S. 33:9003, which read:
      In addition to the taxes authorized by this Section, the district or subdistrict may levy and collect any other taxes authorized by the Constitution of Louisiana to political subdivisions, including a tax upon the sale at retail, the use, lease or rental, the consumption, and the storage for use or consumption of tangible personal property, and on sales of services as defined by law. The tax herein authorized shall be levied and collected only after the question of its imposition has been submitted to and approved by a majority of the qualified voters has been submitted to and approved by a majority of the qualified voters of the district voting in at a regularly scheduled primary or general election to be conducted in accordance with the Louisiana Election Code. This election may be called by the sheriff and ex officio executive officer of the district.

        See 1982 La. Act 840, § 1.

      . See Holly & Smith Architects, Inc., 943 So.2d at 1045.

      . See La. R.S. 24:176(A).

      . See 1976 La. Acts 689, § 6.

      . According to the court in Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, prior to the passage of Act 689, the sheriffs, as tax collectors for each parish, were authorized to deduct a commission of a certain percentage as provided by La. R.S. 33:1423(C) from various taxes (including “levee” taxes) collected by them and actually paid into the treasury or to the appropriate authority. Act 689 removed the sheriffs’ authority to deduct a percentage commission (except in instances which are not pertinent to that suit) and substituted a direct ad valorem tax for the percentage commission as the method of funding sheriffs' offices. Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 364 So.2d at 611.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KIMBALL, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. $144,320.00 Tina Beers, 132 Woody Lane, Silver City, NC 27344, et al.
    No. 2012-K-0466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 4, 2012.

      James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, St. Martin Parish District Attorney’s Office, J. Phil Haney, District Attorney, Walter J. Senette, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Kim Michael Kidd, Assistant District Attorney, for applicant.
    The Doran Law Firm, PLLC, Pride Justin Doran, Quincy L. Cawthorne, for respondent.
   KIMBALL, C.J.

| ,We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in ordering the return of $144,320 to Tina Beers after finding the State did not establish probable cause for forfeiture of the currency under the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989 (the Act), La. R.S. 40:2601 et seq. For the reasons stated herein, we find the State proved there was probable cause for the forfeiture. We also find the court of appeal erred by reversing the decision of the district court to strike Tina Beers’ claim to the money. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeal and reinstate the decision of the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 10, 2009, State Trooper Du-puis was patrolling the west-bound lanes of Interstate 10 in St. Martin Parish when he stopped Tina Beers (“Beers”) for an unknown traffic violation. Beers was driving a 1995 Plymouth Voyager (a minivan) with a North Carolina license plate. She was accompanied by her three children, who were between ages two and seven. Upon being stopped, Beers appeared nervous. Trooper Dupuis requested permission to search Beers’ vehicle, and she consented. During the search, Trooper Dupuis discovered several bundles of United States currency stored in a floor compartment of the vehicle.

| ¡After discovering the large amount of currency, Trooper Dupuis transported Beers to the State Police regional office in Lafayette, Louisiana. State Trooper Jackson, a regional narcotics agent, took custody of Beers’ vehicle and assisted Trooper Dupuis in removing nine plastic shrink-wrapped bundles of money from the floor compartment. Trooper Jackson placed the bundles in what he called a “neutral room.” He then brought in a trained drug-detecting police dog to sniff the room, and the dog alerted to the bundles of currency, which according to Trooper Mire indicates the presence of “illegal narcotics.” No further testing was performed on the money. The currency was counted and valued at $144,320, consisting of 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100-dollar bills. In subsequent requests for admissions, the State admitted no narcotics were found in Beers’ vehicle and the State did not charge her with a crime related to this incident.

State Trooper Mire interviewed Beers in a separate room of the regional office after she was advised of her Miranda rights and waived them. Beers explained she and her children were traveling from North Carolina to Houston, Texas, to visit her mother-in-law, who was recently hospitalized. Beers, however, could not recall the name of the hospital. Beers stated the money was not hers and she was unaware of how it became placed in her vehicle. She explained she had no means of accumulating such funds and had never received any inheritance or other large sum of money. Beers claimed to have been working at a television repair shop for approximately eighteen months, earning $800 per week in cash, which she said she did not disclose on her tax documents. She then signed a Notice of Disclaimer of Ownership, again stating she did not own the money and did not know how it became placed in her vehicle. The Notice of Disclaimer of Ownership also states Beers waived “any right to notice of seizure or intention to seek forfeiture” of the money. Before Beers was released, Trooper Mire served her with a Notice of Pending Forfeiture.

lüThree days later, on January 13, the State filed an application for Warrant of Seizure for Forfeiture pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2606. The State included a Letter of Designation authorizing Louisiana State Police to seize and hold the money and the Notice of Pending Forfeiture that Trooper Mire previously served upon Tina Beers. The State also submitted the affidavit of Trooper Mire, which set forth the aforementioned facts relating to the stop and interview of Tina Beers on January 10, 2009. The affidavit shows Trooper Mire became a Louisiana State Trooper in 2001 and was assigned to the West District Narcotics Section in January 2005, after receiving instruction on investigating illegal narcotic trafficking. He noted his experience and training taught him drug traffickers frequently carry large amounts of cash and the cash they carry often contains narcotics residue. Trooper Mire testified trained drug-detection dogs like the one used here generally alert to the scent of narcotic residue on currency derived from drug trafficking. He also testified Interstate 10 is a known corridor for drug trafficking. According to Trooper Mire, narcotics are typically transported from areas west of St. Martin Parish eastward and currency derived from drug transactions is typically transported from areas east of St. Martin Parish westward. Judge Paul deMahy of the 16th Judicial District Court signed the warrant on January 15, 2009.

On April 2, 2009, Tina Beers and Brittany Beers, Tina’s sister (collectively, “the claimants”), filed a “Motion for Probable Cause Hearing Regarding Pending Notice of Forfeiture and for Release of Seized Property” pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2611. In the motion, the claimants argue they were not served with the district | attorney’s notice of intent to seize the currency for forfeiture. The claimants also contend the property is not subject to forfeiture and alternatively, they “specifically urge each of the factors necessary to assert an exemption per La. R.S. 40:2605.” They do not, however, allege any facts supporting those assertions. They claim the money is accumulated savings as evidenced by the attached affidavits, which are “styled as a Request for Stipulations of Exemption.”

The claimants filed identical affidavits, each stating the affiant owns an undivided 100% interest in the money. Both contend the money comprised |Baccumulated savings, partially earned from the proceeds of vehicle sales “as evidenced by the attached documentation.” Brittany attached no supporting documentation to her affidavit. Tina attached a 2007 tax return, showing earned wages of $4,314.50 for the previous year. Tina also attached tax receipts from the Chatham County Tax Department in North Carolina. The tax receipts show a total assessed value on six vehicles of $18,530.

In response, the State filed a “Motion to Strike Claim,” alleging the claim of Tina Beers fails to satisfy the requirements of La. R.S. 40:2610, which governs the filing of claims against property pending forfeiture. The motion requested the court to strike the claim of Tina Beers and to subsequently allow the State to proceed with application for forfeiture because no claims were timely filed.

All of the motions were scheduled to be heard on April 8, 2009, before Judge Co-meaux of the 16th Judicial District Court. After taking the matter under advisement, the district court ruled the service of the Notice of Pending Forfeiture |fion Tina Beers was ineffective because Trooper Mire was not authorized to effectuate service on January 10, 2009, when he personally served Tina Beers. Although Trooper Mire signed the Notice of Pending Forfeiture as a member of the designated seizing agency, the State had not filed its letter of designation with the trial court until January 13, 2009, three days after service was made. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, finding Tina Beers waived her right to notice of forfeiture by signing the Notice of Disclaimer of Ownership, which provides, “[I] am waiving any right to notice of seizure or intention to seek forfeiture of this currency or property,” and further showed she had notice and knowledge of the forfeiture proceedings by filing a claim of ownership. State v. $144,320.00, 09-954 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 29 So.3d 1266 (Beers I). This Court denied writs. 10-0821 (La.6/18/10), 38 So.3d 324.

On remand, the district court denied the claimants’ Motion for Probable Cause Hearing, finding the hearing was unavailable because there had been a “previous judicial determination of probable cause” when Judge deMahy granted the State’s Application for Warrant of Seizure for Forfeiture. See La. R.S. 40:2611(C). In its judgment dated January 6, 2011, the district court found probable cause existed for the seizure and forfeiture of the $144,320.

The district court also granted the State’s Motion to Strike Claim, striking the claims made by both claimants for failing to satisfy La. R.S. 40:2610(B). The court found Brittany provided no evidence to support her allegation that the money |7was her accumulated savings. Although Tina attached some supporting documentation to her affidavit, the court noted the total amount of savings Tina claimed would not amount to even one-quarter of the money seized from her vehicle. In summary, the district court stated:

[The affidavit] doesn’t set forth the date, identity of the transfer, or the circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property in either documentation attached to it or in the affidavit itself. It just says ... I’ve accumulated it through savings. It doesn’t give any specificity that’s required by the statute. Therefore, I’m going to grant the Motion to Strike.

The claimants appealed, raising three assignments of error. They argued (1) the district court erred in finding probable cause existed for the seizure, (2) the district court erred by striking Brittany’s claim to the money, and (3) the district court erred in not granting Brittany’s exceptions for lack of notice.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the ruling of the district court and found no probable cause for forfeiture existed in this case. The court reasoned the State bears the initial burden of showing probable cause for forfeiture in a forfeiture proceeding. State v. Gauthier, 02-1227, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/17/03), 854 So.2d 910, 912. While the court noted there were “facts which provide a suspicion that the cash could be of less than honest origins,” it found “no credible evidence whatsoever that the currency was related in any way to any drug transaction or activity.” The court noted Tina Beers was never charged for a crime relating to the January 10, 2009, stop and no narcotics-related evidence was found in her vehicle. In addition, the State did not provide any evidence showing Tina Beers had a history associated with drug activity. The court of appeal found probable cause was not established by the drug dog alerting to the scent of narcotics on the currency because of “the prevalence of currency in circulation which would contain such a strike.”

|sThe court of appeal further ruled the money must be returned to Tina Beers. While the court of appeal found the district court did not err in striking Brittany Beers’ claim because she provided no evidence to show any connection to the money, the court of appeal reversed the district court’s ruling striking Tina Beers’ claim. The court of appeal explained Tina Beers’ affidavit showed income equal to approximately one quarter of the seized money, which was much larger than the showing Brittany made and, moreover, the money was taken directly from Tina Beers’ possession. Therefore, the court of appeal found all of the money should be returned to Tina Beers.

Judge Genovese concurred, agreeing there was no probable cause for the forfeiture. However, Judge Genovese did not think the money should be returned to Tina Beers because she had not established she was the rightful owner.

The State filed an application for certio-rari with this Court, asserting the court of appeal erred in finding no probable cause for the forfeiture, and further asserting the court of appeal erred in reviewing the district court’s decision to strike the claim of Tina Beers because the claimants did not appeal that issue. The State additionally argues the district court was correct in striking Tina Beers’ claim and, if it was not, the State should be given the opportunity to present evidence at a full forfeiture hearing to show the money was subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence. See La. R.S. 40:2612(G). We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeal. 12-0466 (La.06/29/12); 92 So.3d 843.

I «DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Forfeiture proceedings under the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989 (the Act), La. R.S. 40:2601 et seq., are civil proceedings, generally governed by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. La. R.S. 40:2611(K). We review factual determinations in civil cases under the manifest error standard of review. See, e.g., Detraz v. Lee, 05-1263, p. 7 (La.1/17/07), 950 So.2d 557, 561 (a tort case). Thus, the Louisiana courts of appeal have applied the manifest error standard of review to a trial court’s factual determinations made when considering whether probable cause for forfeiture exists, even though the issue of probable cause is ultimately a legal question. See State v. Bordelon, 11-0413, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11), 74 So.3d 1263, 1265; State v. Bell, 10-0583, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/10), 48 So.3d 1253,1255 (citing Lirette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 563 So.2d 850, 852 (La.1990)); State v. $107,156 U.S. Currency Seized from Marlin Morton, 41,-090, p. 15 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/30/06), 935 So.2d 827, 836. In Detraz, this Court explained the standard as follows:

Under the manifest error standard, a factual finding cannot be set aside unless the appellate court finds that the trier of fact’s determination is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. In order to reverse a fact finder’s determination of fact, an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.
The appellate court must not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its own factual findings because it would have decided the case differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong, even if the reviewing court would have decided the case differently.

Detraz, 05-1263 at 7, 950 So.2d at 561. We review questions of law de novo. See, e.g., Badeaux v. Sw. Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-0612, p. 7 (La.3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211,1217 (reviewing exception of no cause of action de novo because it h «raised a legal question).

Here, we must determine whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the district court’s finding of probable cause for forfeiture. However, because the evidence to be considered in that determination is affected by whether or not we consider the claims of Tina and Brittany Beers, we first review whether the district court erred in striking their claims.

II. Motion to Strike

According to La. C.C.P. art. 964, “The court on motion of a party or on its own motion may at any time and after a hearing order stricken from any pleading any insufficient demand.... ” If an owner or interest holder wishes to file a stipulation of exemption to forfeiture under La. R.S. 40:2609 or a claim against the property under La. R.S. 40:2610, the claimant must submit an affidavit that complies with the requirements of La. R.S. 40:2610. This Court has previously held, “The failure to fulfill any of these requirements ... precludes the owner or interest holder from further participation in the forfeiture proceedings.” State v. 2003 Infiniti G35 VIN NO. JNKCV51E93MO24167, 09-1193, p. 14 (La.1/20/10), 27 So.3d 824, 834. According to La. R.S. 40:2610(B), the affidavits must set forth all of the following:

(1) The caption of the proceedings as set forth on the Notice of Pending Forfeiture or petition and the name of the claimant.
(2) The address where the claimant will accept mail.
(3) The nature and extent of the claimant’s interest in the property.
(4) The date, identity of the transferor, and the circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property.
(5) The specific provision of this Chapter relied on in asserting that the property is not subject to forfeiture.
(6) All essential facts supporting each assertion.
(7) The specific relief sought.

In its brief to this Court, the State argues Tina Beers did not appeal the district court’s decision to strike her claim. However, the State contends neither of the claimants’ affidavits satisfies the requirements of La. R.S. 40:2610(B) or shows |nthe money was not related to drug activity. The State avers the affidavits do not satisfy La. R.S. 40:2610(B)(4) or B(6) because they do not specify how the money was acquired, nor do they provide facts supporting the assertion that the money was derived from vehicle sales.

In opposition, the claimants argue Brittany Beers adequately asserted a claim for return of the money sufficient to justify a full forfeiture proceeding. The claimants aver the documents attached to Tina’s affidavit indicate the claimants were gainfully employed and engaged in the business of selling vehicles. They contend the district court erred in requiring them to specify the source of each dollar that was seized.

As did the district court, we find both affidavits fail to comply with the requirements of La. R.S. 40:2610. Particularly, we agree the affidavits do not satisfy La. R.S. 40:2610(B)(4), which requires a claimant to specify “[t]he date, identity of the transferor, and the circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property.” Both affidavits claim the money was accumulated savings, earned in part from the sale of automobiles, as evidenced by attached documentation. However, the affidavits do not provide any details regarding how the claimants acquired the alleged savings.

Brittany did not attach any documentation to her affidavit, despite the reference to documentation made in her affidavit. Tina attached a 2007 W2 form showing earnings of $4,314.50 for the previous year. She also attached tax receipts for six automobiles having a total assessed value of $18,530. We find even if Tina alleged sufficient facts to show the tax receipts were based upon automobile sales yielding 100% profit and her earnings from those sales and other occupation went directly to savings, her explanation for the money would amount to roughly $23,000, despite her claiming 100% ownership of the $144,320 seized from her vehicle. Thus, we find the claims fail to satisfy La. R.S. 40:2610(B)(4). |12We also find the affidavits do not specify “all essential facts supporting each assertion” that the money was exempt from forfeiture as required by La. R.S. 40:2610(B)(6).

Tina Beers did not appeal the district court’s decision to strike her claim and she does not contest that decision before this Court. Accordingly, we find the court of appeal erred in reversing the district court’s decision to strike the claim of Tina Beers. We also find, as did the court of appeal, Brittany Beers failed to show any connection between herself and the money and thus, her claim was properly stricken by the district court.

III. Probable Cause for Forfeiture

We now consider whether the court of appeal was correct in reversing the district court, which found there was probable cause for forfeiture in this case. Although the Act does not explicitly define “probable cause,” the phrase is well defined in the jurisprudence regarding searches and seizures in criminal cases and, for the sake of consistency, that definition should apply here. See La. R.S. 1:3 (“[Words that] have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”). Furthermore, La. R.S. 40:2606 states, “The sufficiency of the warrant of seizure and affidavit under oath shall be determined in accordance with the law on search warrants.” Therefore, in seeking to define probable cause for forfeiture, we look to the definition of probable cause established by the criminal law jurisprudence.

Whether probable cause exists in a given case is determined by examining the totality of facts and circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Green, 02-1022, p. 8 (La.12/4/02), 831 So.2d 962, 969 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). This Court recently stated probable cause exists sufficient to issue a search warrant “when the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he | ishas reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that evidence or contraband may be found at the place tu be searched.” State v. Lee, 05-2098, p. 14 (La.1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 122. In the context of warrantless searches and seizures, the Court has defined probable cause as “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” State v. Warren, 2005-2248, p. 10 (La.2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1224 (citing United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391-92 (6th Cir.1993)). In the context of an arrest, we have noted, “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonable and trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify a person of average caution in the belief that the accused has committed an offense.” State v. Wells, 08-2262, p. 8 (La.7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577, 582-83 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines probable cause as “[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime.” Black’s Law DictionaRY (9th ed.2009).

Here, the State is not seeking to show probable cause for a search or arrest, but probable cause for forfeiture of suspected drug-related property under the Act. The Act specifies the conduct that gives rise to forfeiture in La. R.S. 40:2608 and describes the categories of property subject to forfeiture in La. R.S. 40:2604. 1uThis Court in State v. 2003 Infiniti G35 succinctly summarized the conduct and property detailed in La. R.S. 40:2603 and 2604 as “property that is related to, is a proceed from, facilitates, or is itself a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, La. R.S. 40:961-995.” 09-1198 at 5, 27 So.3d at 828. Thus, borrowing from the criminal law definition of probable cause, we hold probable cause for forfeiture is satisfied when the totality of the facts and circumstances provides reasonable ground for believing the property in question is connected to illegal drug trafficking.

The affidavit of State Trooper Mire establishes several facts that, when |ir,viewed together, support a finding of probable cause for forfeiture in this case. One such fact is the manner in which the money was packaged and stored. See, e.g., State v. Small, 00-0564 (La.3/24/00), 762 So.2d 1071 (police officer’s experience showed cellophane packaging was peculiar to drug trafficking and this fact led to finding of probable cause to arrest defendant and seize cellophane bag); State v. Jackson, 263 La. 849, 269 So.2d 465 (1972) (same); see also State v. Isaac, 31,277, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/9/98), 722 So.2d 353, 358 (even though no narcotics or drug paraphernalia were found in defendant’s vehicle, fact that cash stored in vehicle was wrapped in duct tape was a fact considered in finding probable cause to forfeit money). In his affidavit, Trooper Mire testified the money was bundled with rubber bands, sealed in plastic shrink wrapping, and hidden in the vehicle’s floor compartment. He stated based on his experience, such packaging indicates a “substantial connection between the questionable currency and narcotics transactions.” The claimants presented no evidence to contradict these statements made by Trooper Mire in his affidavit.

The drug dog’s alert to the money is also a significant factor in determining whether probable cause for forfeiture exists. We have previously found an alert by a trained drug dog establishes probable cause to search for evidence of drug contraband. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 00-0562, p. 4 (La.10/30/00), 772 So.2d 90, 93 (citing United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (5th Cir.1993)); State v. Cowan, 99-2888, p. 1 (La.6/16/00), 763 So.2d 583, 584; State v. Gant, 93-2895 (La.5/20/94), 637 So.2d 396, 397. In this case, Trooper Mire testified a trained drug dog alerted to the money. He further testified in his experience, such an alert indicates narcotic residue was present on the money.

Relying on the reasoning of the court of appeal, the claimants contend the dog’s alert is not reliable evidence of criminal activity because 96% of currency in circulation may contain trace amounts of narcotic residue. United States v. $80,760.00 in U.S. Currency, 781 F.Supp. 462, 475 (N.D.Tex.1991), aff'd 978 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.1992). The claimants, however, did not raise this argument before the district court, and they presented no evidence to support their theory. “The general rule is that appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” Segura v. Frank, 93-1271, 93-1401 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 725 (citing Fried v. Bradley, 219 La. 59, 87, 52 So.2d 247, 257 (1950)). Even if the claimants had shown a large percentage of currency in circulation contains trace amounts of narcotic residue, they did not show these trace amounts of narcotics would cause a trained police dog to alert.

Trooper Mire’s affidavit also implies Tina Beers was traveling on a route commonly used to transport drug money. He testified she was driving on Interstate 10 from an area east of St. Martin Parish (North Carolina) to an area west of St. Martin Parish (Houston, Texas), which in his experience is a route typically used to transport money derived from illegal drug transactions. Other factors to consider are Tina Beers’ nervousness upon being stopped and her initial denial of ownership of the money. The claimants contend these facts do not prove the money was drug-related. While these facts alone do not prove the money is drug-related, they may be considered under the totality of circumstances to determine if there was probable cause for forfeiture. The claimants also allege Tina Beers’ initial denial of ownership was due to fear or coercion, but they presented no evidence supporting those allegations before the district court.

In finding no probable cause for forfeiture, the court of appeal relied upon the fact that narcotics were not discovered in Tina Beers’ vehicle and that she was not charged with any crime. The claimants similarly argue there can be no finding |17of probable cause for forfeiture in this case because the State has not shown any specific criminal activity related to the money. However, the Act does not require the State to prove the person from whom the money was seized committed a drug-trafficking crime; it requires proof the seized property was related to drug trafficking. See La. R.S. 40:2608, 2604. As previously stated, we find the State established reasonable ground to believe the money seized in this case is related to drug trafficking, and the claimants failed to establish an exemption under La. R.S. 40:2605. Further, the Act does not require proof of a specific drug transaction. See, e.g., State v. $2,540.00 U.S. Currency Seized from Foster, 47,127, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/16/12), 92 So.3d 1153, 1155 (“It is unnecessary for the State to trace the property to a particular drug transaction— it is the totality of the circumstances that leads to a finding of probable cause”).

Considered individually, the facts set forth in Trooper Mire’s affidavit might not amount to probable cause for forfeiture. However, when viewed together, the totality of circumstances establishes reasonable ground to believe the money is connected to drug trafficking and, therefore, subject to forfeiture under the Act. We consequently find the court of appeal erred in reversing the district court and in finding no probable cause for forfeiture.

CONCLUSION

We find the district court properly struck the claims of Tina and Brittany Beers for failing to satisfy the requirements of La. R.S. 40:2610. In addition, we find the district court did not err in finding probable cause for forfeiture based upon the totality of circumstances established by the state trooper’s affidavit. Because the court of appeal found there was no probable cause for forfeiture and reversed the district court’s ruling that struck Tina Beers’ claim, we reverse the decision of the court of appeal and reinstate the ruling of the district court.

Reversed, Ruling of District Court Reinstated.

      . La. R.S. 40:2606(A) states, "Within seventy-two hours, exclusive of holidays or weekends, after actual or constructive seizure, the seizing agency shall apply to the court for a warrant of seizure to hold the property pending forfeiture...."

      . La. R.S. 40:2611(C) provides:
      If property is seized for forfeiture or a forfeiture lien is filed without a previous judicial determination of probable cause or order of forfeiture or a hearing under the provisions of Section 2613 of this Chapter, the court, on an application filed by an owner of or interest holder in the property, within ten days after notice of its seizure for forfeiture or lien, or actual knowledge of it, whichever is earlier, and after complying with the requirements for claims in Section 2610 of this Chapter, after five days notice to the district attorney, may issue an order to show cause to the seizing agency, for a hearing on the sole issue of whether probable cause for forfeiture of the property then exists. The hearing shall be held within thirty days of the order to show cause unless continued for good cause on motion of either party. If the court finds that there is no probable cause for forfeiture of the property, the property shall be released to the custody of the applicant or from the lien pending the outcome of a judicial proceeding pursuant to this Section.

      .La. R.S. 40:2605 provides:
      A property interest is exempt from forfeiture under this Chapter if its owner or holder establishes all of the following:
      (1) That he is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur.
      (2) That he had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture other than as an interest holder in bona fide commercial transaction.
      (3) That with respect to conveyances for transportation only, he did not hold the property jointly, in common, or in community with a person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture.
      (4) That he does not hold the property for the benefit of or as an agent for any person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired his interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value not knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction.
      (5) That no person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture had the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct.
      (6) That the owner or interest holder acquired the interest after the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture and that the owner or interest holder acquired the interest under all of the following conditions:
      (a) As a bona fide purchaser for value who was not knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction.
      (b) Before the filing of a forfeiture lien on it and before the effective date of a Notice of Pending Forfeiture relating to it, and without notice of its seizure for forfeiture under this Chapter.
      (c) At the time the interest was acquired, there was no reasonable cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture or likely to become subject to forfeiture under this Chapter.

      . Five of the receipts bear the same date, April 9, 2008. The other receipt is dated January 16, 2009. Two of the receipts have "sold” handwritten on them — one for $10,000 where the typewritten assessed value of the car was $6,610, and another for $4,000 where the assessed value was $2,260. The receipts do not indicate the type of tax being levied (property or sales) and no other documentation relating to the vehicles was introduced into evidence.

      . Specifically, La. R.S. 40:2610(B) provides:
      B. The claim shall be in affidavit form, signed by the claimant under oath, and sworn to by the affiant before one who has authority to administer the oath, under penalty of perjury or false swearing and shall set forth all of the following:

        (1) The caption of the proceedings as set forth on the Notice of Pending Forfeiture or petition and the name of the claimant.
      (2) The address where the claimant will accept mail.
      (3) The nature and extent of the claimant’s interest in the property.
      (4) The date, identity of the transferor, and the circumstances of the claimant's acquisition of the interest in the property.
      (5) The specific provision of this Chapter relied on in asserting that the property is not subject to forfeiture.
      (6) All essential facts supporting each assertion.
      (7) The specific relief sought.
      Affidavits that are styled as stipulations for exemption must also meet the requirements of claims filed under Section 2610 of the Act. See La. R.S. 40:2609.

      .According to La. R.S. 40:2615, if no claims are timely filed in an in rem action, the district attorney may apply for an order of forfeiture. "Upon a determination by the court that the district attorney's written application establishes the court’s jurisdiction, the giving of proper notice, and facts sufficient to show probable cause for forfeiture, the court shall order the property forfeited to the state.” La. R.S. 40:2615(A).

      . The district court did not otherwise rule on the motions at that time.

      . In their brief to this Court, claimants argue the substance of the Notice of Pending Forfeiture was deficient for failing to specify the criminal activity giving rise to forfeiture as required by La. R.S. 40:2608(4). However, that issue was also raised before the court of appeal in Beers I, 09-954 at 3, 29 So.3d at 1267. The court found the issue to be moot because it found "proper notice ... was given to Tina Beers.” 09-954 at 5, 29 So.3d at 1269. Because this Court denied writs on the issue (10-0821, 38 So.3d 324), the arguments concerning the sufficiency of the Notice of Pending Forfeiture are not now before the Court. La. C.C.P. art. 2166(E).

      . Before the court of appeal ruled in Beers I, the State filed a Petition for Forfeiture in Rem pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2612. The claimants answered, raising several exceptions and making claims identical to the claims made in their Motion for Probable Cause Hearing. However, at this time, the district court has not considered that petition or the claimants' response to it.

      . In a footnote, the court of appeal stated, "recent studies have found that a majority of the currency in circulation contains drug residue.” However, no study was cited, nor did the court indicate a police dog would alert to every trace quantity of drug residue.

      . La. R.S. 40:2612(G) provides in pertinent part:
      In a forfeiture case wherein no claim is timely filed pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter, the burden of proof to forfeit shall be probable cause. In a forfeiture case, wherein a claim is timely filed pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter, the burden of proof required to forfeit the defendant’s property shall be a preponderance of the evidence.

      . La. R.S. 40:2603 provides:
      Any of the following conduct gives rise to forfeiture:
      (1) An act or omission punishable by confinement for more than one year under R.S. 40:961 et seq. whether or not there is a prosecution or conviction related to the act or omission.
      (2) An act or omission occurring outside this state, which would be subject to prosecution in the place of occurrence and would be described in Paragraph (1) of this Section if the act or omission occurred in this state, whether or not it is prosecuted in any state.
      (3) Any act or omission committed in furtherance of any violation of R.S. 40:961 et seq. which is punishable by confinement with or without hard labor, including any inchoate or preparatory offense, regardless of whether there is a prosecution or conviction related to the act or omission.
      La. R.S. 40:2604 provides:
      The following property is subject to seizure and forfeiture as contraband, derivative contraband, or property related to contraband under the provision of Section 4 of Article I of the Constitution of Louisiana:
      (1) All controlled substances, raw materials, or controlled substance analogues that have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, possessed, or acquired in violation of R.S. 40:961 et seq.
      (2) All property that is either:
      (a) Furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of R.S. 40:961 et seq.
      (b) Used or intended to be used in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture, provided that a conveyance subject to forfeiture solely in connection with conduct in violation of R.S. 40:961 et seq. may be forfeited only pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter.
      (3) Proceeds of any conduct giving rise to forfeiture.
      (4) All weapons possessed, used, or available for use in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture.
      (5) Any interest or security in, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of control over any enterprise that a person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of through conduct giving rise to forfeiture.

      . This definition of probable cause for forfeiture is similar to the definition the courts of appeal have adopted from federal jurisprudence. For example, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal has defined probable cause in the forfeiture context as follows:
      [Probable cause is defined as] a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. It may be established by demonstrating ‘by some credible evidence, the probability that the money was in fact drug related. Probable cause can be established by circumstantial evidence or evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, so long as the evidence is reliable.... the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal has recognized that as to the issue of the con-nexity of the property to the crime, the government’s burden requires "probable cause for belief that a substantial connection exists.

        State v. $2,540.00 U.S. Currency Seized from Foster, 47,127, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/16/12), 92 So.3d 1153, 1155 (citing State v. Giles, 26,695 (La.App. 2 Cir. 06/18/97), 697 So.2d 699); United States v. One 1987 Mercedes 560 SEL, 919 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.1990); see also, e.g.. State v. Bordelon, 11-0413 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11), 74 So.3d 1263; State v. Bell, 10-0583 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/10), 48 So.3d 1253.

      . Courts in some jurisdictions have found police dog alerts to be reliable evidence, even if a high percentage of currency is tainted with narcotic residue. See, e.g., United States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars ($30,670.00), 403 F.3d 448 (7th Cir.2005) (based upon evidence presented, finding police dogs do not alert to cocaine on currency, but a byproduct of cocaine, methyl benzoate, which evaporates rapidly); see also United States v. $141,700.00 in U.S. Currency, 157 F.3d 600, 606 (8th Cir.1998).

      . Although not authoritative for our determination of probable cause, we find persuasive several federal cases that likewise resulted in a finding of probable cause for forfeiture. See, e.g., United States v. Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Dollars ($369,980) in United States Cwrency, 214 Fed.Appx. 432 (5th Cir.2007) (finding probable cause based upon the route of travel, the large sum of money, the unique packaging of the money, a drug dog alerting to the money, and inconsistent stories used to explain the source of the money); United States v. Mondragon, 313 F.3d 862 (4th Cir.2002) (government’s petition sufficiently plead probable cause for forfeiture because of a dog alert to a large sum of money that was unusually packaged and stored in a hidden compartment); United States v. U.S. $42,500.00, 283 F.3d 977 (9th Cir.2002) (finding probable cause based upon large amount of cash that was wrapped in cellophane to which drug dog alerted); United States v. $141,770.00 in U.S. Currency, 157 F.3d 600 (8th Cir.1998) (finding probable cause based upon a large amount of cash that was stored in a hidden compartment with fabric softener sheets to dispel the smell of narcotics and a drug dog alerting to the evidence); but see United States v. $5,000 in U.S. Currency, 40 F.3d 846 (6th Cir.1994) (reversing summary judgment because appellate court found large amount of money upon which drug dog alerted was not sufficient to establish probable cause).


author: GUIDRY, Justice.

text:
    In re JUSTICE OF the PEACE LUANN LANDRY, St. Bernard Parish, Ward E, State of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-O-1946.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 4, 2012.
    Office of Special Counsel, Michael D. Brewers, for applicant.
    Lauren Landry, in Proper Person, for respondent.
    Clare Dolores Fiasconaro, Interim Commission Counsel.
   GUIDRY, Justice.

| TThis matter arises from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Luann Landry, St. Bernard Parish, Ward E, to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. For the reasons set forth below, we find the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Landry failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement of Rule XXXIX, thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. We further find that her failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirement was willful and knowing. After considering the facts, circumstances, and applicable law, Justice of the Peace Landry is ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00, plus costs of $554.00.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Supreme Court Rule XXXIX requires the filing of annual financial disclosure statements by judges and justices of the peace. See In re: Thomas, 11-0572, p. 2 (La.7/1/11), 66 So.3d 466, 467; In re: Sanborn, 10-2051, p. 2 (La.11/30/10), 50 So.3d 1279. Pursuant to Section 3 of the rule, each elected justice of the peace must file his or her financial statement by May 15th of each year, using a form prescribed by the Judicial Administrator’s Office (“JAO”) for that purpose. Rule XXXIX, §§ 3(A) and (B). We have discussed this rule and its requirements pertaining to justices of the peace in a number of cases. See, e.g., In re: Hoffman, |¾11 — 0417 (La.7/01/11), 66 So.3d 455. The instant case is one of three cases decided this date involving a justice of the peace who has been charged with failing to file timely the personal financial disclosure statement required by Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. See In re: Myers, 12-1500 (La.12/04/12), 105 So.3d 679; In re: Threet, 12-1501 (La.12/04/12), 105 So.3d 676.

Justice of the Peace Landry’s 2010 financial statement was due on May 15, 2011; however, it is undisputed that it was not received by that date. Accordingly, on May 27, 2011, the JAO sent Justice of the Peace Landry (hereinafter, “Respondent”) a notice of delinquency by certified mail advising her that the 2010 Statement “must be filed no later than fourteen (14) business days after receipt of this notice of delinquency, or by June 21, 2011.” The notice of delinquency also stated that failure to file the 2010 Statement by the deadline “shall result in referral to the Judiciary Commission and the imposition of penalties as provided in Section 4 of Rule XXXIX.” The certified mail containing the delinquency notice was signed for by Respondent’s husband, and she acknowledges that she received it from him.

On June 30, 2011, the JAO referred the matter to the Commission, based upon Respondent’s failure to file the 2010 Statement timely. Respondent eventually filed the 2010 Statement on February 23, 2012, after the Commission filed a Formal Charge against her. In her answer to the Formal Charge, Respondent indicated that she believed she had mailed her 2010 Statement shortly after the initial due date, having retained for her records a copy of a report dated May 28, 2011. She did not have proof of mailing, however, and the May 28th report was not received by the JAO. Additionally, the May 28th |sreport was not properly completed because it failed to disclose Respondent’s judicial salary or the amount of filing fees she had received in connection with her office. Respondent acknowledged that she made a “huge mistake” by not responding to the delinquency notice or a July 2011 inquiry letter from the Office of Special Counsel, but she maintained that her conduct was merely negligent rather than willful and knowing.

This matter was set for a hearing before a hearing officer on March 28, 2012. During the hearing, Respondent testified she was dealing with personal issues (caring for her father, who was gravely ill), which prevented her from filing her 2010 Statement in a correct format and on time. She apologized for her conduct, stating she knew “this is a big mess and it’s all my fault. And I’m just so sorry about that.”

Following the hearing, the hearing officer filed findings of fact and conclusions of law with the Commission. In his report, the hearing officer found that Respondent failed to timely file her 2010 Statement, and that her failure was willful and knowing, as that term is defined in Rule XXXIX, because she continued to ignore her obligation to file even after she was put on notice of her non-compliance. The Commissioners then invited, but did not order or require, Respondent to appear before them on May 18, 2012, to make a statement concerning the hearing officer’s report and the penalty issue. Respondent did not attend the May 2012 meeting, but she filed a brief in the matter, again asserting that her non-compliance was not willful and knowing.

|4On September 4, 2012, the Commission filed its recommendation in this court. In its report, the Commission generally adopted the hearing officer’s proposed conclusions of fact and law, and found the allegations of the Formal Charge were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Commission observed that, although Respondent is apologetic and remorseful for failing to timely file her 2010 Statement, under the circumstances, her actions were nonetheless willful and knowing:

The Commission agrees with the hearing officer’s conclusions that JP Landry, though apologetic and remorseful, committed a willful and knowing violation of the Reporting Rule by not taking the time, trouble, and effort to complete the form with the knowledge that it was to be filed by a certain date, and by making a purposeful choice to ignore the two notices of non-compliance she received rather than contacting the OJA or the OSC to find out what she needed to do to bring herself in compliance with the rule. Although the Commission was sympathetic to the demands placed upon JP Landry by her father’s illness and death, she continued to treat her obligations under the Reporting Rule as a matter of little or no importance even after her father’s death. Notably, she was familiar with the financial disclosure form, having filed her 2009 report in a timely manner.

For her willful and knowing conduct, balanced by the mitigating circumstances, the Commission recommended Respondent be ordered to pay a penalty of $3,705.00, or $15 per day for the 247 days that elapsed between June 21, 2011 (the deadline set forth in the delinquency notice) to February 23, 2012 (the date Respondent submitted her financial disclosure statement). The Commission also recommended that she be cast with $554.00 in costs. See La. Sup.Ct. Rule XXXIX, § 4(F)(7).

J^DISCUSSION

After our review of the facts and applicable law, we find the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not timely file her financial disclosure statement. See In re: Myers, 11-0874, pp. 7-8 (La.10/25/11), 74 So.3d 672, 677-78; In re: Sanborn, p. 4, 50 So.3d at 1281. We further find that Respondent’s violation of the reporting rule was “willful and knowing” under Rule XXXIX, Section 4(F)(8), as both the hearing officer and the Commission concluded. Respondent knew or should have known of the need to file her 2010 Statement in a timely manner because she had previously filed timely her 2009 Statement. As we have elsewhere pointed out, the financial disclosure form required of justices of the peace by Rule XXXIX is quite short and simple, and would have taken a minimal amount of time to complete. Accordingly, we conclude Respondent’s failure to file her 2010 Statement timely was a willful and knowing violation of Rule XXXIX.

We next decide the appropriate penalty for Respondent’s failure to file timely her financial disclosure statement under Rule XXXIX for 2010. Each violation of Rule XXXIX is decided on a case by case basis; therefore, our penalty assessments in prior cases should not be construed as absolutes for violations of Rule XXXIX. However, because this is Respondent’s first violation of the financial disclosure rule, we find that a civil penalty of $500 is appropriate. We further find that Respondent should be cast with costs in the amount of $554.00. See La. Sup.Ct. Rule XXXIX, § 4(F)(7).

CONCLUSION

We find the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Landry failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement of Rule XXXIX, thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. We further find that her failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirement was willful and | nknowing. Accordingly, it is ordered that Justice of the Peace Landry pay a civil penalty to the State of Louisiana, Judicial Branch, in the amount of $500.00, plus costs in the amount of $554.00, no later than thirty days from the finality of this judgment.

      . The first financial statements required of justices of the peace were due for calendar year 2009, to be filed no later than May 15, 2010. Justice of the Peace Landry timely filed her 2009 Statement.

      . The hearing officer rejected as not credible Respondent's belief that she may have filed her 2010 Statement on May 28, 2011, as there is no evidence (such as a cover letter) to indicate she had in fact sent the report at that time. Furthermore, even if Respondent’s belief were reasonable, the May 27, 2011 delinquency notice and a July 22, 2011 inquiry letter from the Office of Special Counsel should have put her on notice that her attempt to file was unsuccessful.

      . The Commission adopted all of the hearing officer's findings and conclusions, with the exception of his conclusion that Respondent acted in bad faith by not taking the time, trouble, and effort to file her 2010 Statement in a timely fashion. The Commission disagreed with the "bad faith” portion of this finding.

      . The Commission took into consideration the following factors: (1) this is Respondent’s first violation of the financial disclosure rule; (2) she eventually filed her 2010 Statement, albeit only after being formally charged with violating the rule; (3) she participated in the proceedings before the Commission by filing an answer to the Formal Charge and answers to interrogatories, testifying at the hearing, and filing a brief with the Commission; and (4) she sincerely apologized for her conduct and assured the Commission she will take steps to prevent a recurrence of the problem.


text:
    Keisha DESSELLE, et al. v. ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.
    No. 2013-CC-0012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Acadian Ambulance Services, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2010-5885; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01244.

Stay denied. Writ Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Trevor T. JOHNSON.
    No. 2012-KO-1597.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Johnson, Trevor T.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C. No. 470,776; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 2240.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Taft WILSON.
    No. 2012-KO-1621.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In i'e Wilson, Taft; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 479-284; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1166.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David STAPLETON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Stapleton, David; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Grant, 35th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 07-169; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-01161.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael Bradford BASS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1819.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Bass, Michael Bradford; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 07F-1592; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,544-KH.

Denied.

CLARK, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frank WALGAMOTTE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1943.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In Re Walgamotte, Frank; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 12-WCR-036; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 0854.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph V. FOSTER, Jr. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2012-CI-1962.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Foster Jr., Joseph V.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 5595,-019; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 2194.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Burnell COLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1963.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Coleman, Burnell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 277-721.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dwayne DEMOUCHET v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2022.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Demouchet, Dwayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 04-1512; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00780.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren SINCENO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Sinceno, Warren; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 09-2789; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-118.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rutherford JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2025.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Jones, Rutherford; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 08-178,207; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1036.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shamichael Toro TILLMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Tillman, Shamichael Toro; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 281,318; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-386-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Johnson, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 281,054; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-313-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert L. WYMORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Wymore, Robert L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 79-065, 78-215; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-599.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Telly Tyrone WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2038.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Williams, Telly Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 500109; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1083.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; State v. Thomas, 08-2912, (La.10/16/09), 19 So.3d 466.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Walter ESCOBAR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2048.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Escobar, Walter; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 27,896; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 0977.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John C. WARNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2049.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Warner, John C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 354-118; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-llll.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Everett G. THORNTON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2050.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Thornton Jr., Everett G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 18646; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1139.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Fredrick WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2051.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Wilson, Fredrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 06-07-0280; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1086.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emanuel BARRETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2062.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Barrett, Emanuel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 295,293; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-334-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Damon CAMEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Camel, Damon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 08-03-0714; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 0998.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Byron JOSEPH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Joseph, Byron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 03-2299; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-575.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rickey GIPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2110.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
   In re Gipson, Rickey; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 145,576; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-768-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.