author: PER CURIAM. VICTORY, J.,

text:
    In re Trent Anthony GARRETT, Sr.
    No. 2013-B-0491.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 2013.

      Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Charles Bennett Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Eric Reiley McClendon, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, for Applicant.
    Trent Anthony Garrett, Sr., Schiff, Scheckman & White, Julie Brown White, for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS ■

PER CURIAM.

| ¶This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Trent Anthony Garrett, Sr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Count I — The Honoré Matter

Lori Honoré retained respondent to represent her in a personal injury matter arising out of an August 22, 2007 automobile accident. Respondent believed that he had timely filed the petition for damages by fax prior to midnight on Friday, August 22, 2008, the last day of the one-year prescriptive period. However, the fax confirmation from the clerk of court’s office indicates the pleading was not sent until 12:20 a.m. on Saturday, August 23, 2008. In June 2009, the trial court granted the defendant’s exception of prescription and dismissed the suit with prejudice. Respondent then filed a motion for , new trial on Ms. Honoré’s behalf, but he failed to appear for the hearing and the motion was denied.

In February 2010, Ms. Honoré filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The ODC alleges that respondent did not cooperate in its investigation of the complaint and did not update his primary registration address with the Louisiana State Bar Association (“LSBA”). The ODC also alleges that respondent Rfailed to properly withdraw from Ms. Honoré’s representation and failed to promptly return a complete copy of her file.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c).(failure to timely notify the LSBA of changes of address), 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.15(a) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16(c)(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation), 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation), and 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct).

Count II — The Failure to Cooperate Matter

Respondent failed to respond in writing to a disciplinary complaint filed against him, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena for his sworn statement on April 6, 2011. The ODC’s investigator was unable to serve respondent with the subpoena despite several attempts to do so.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.1(b), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).

Count III — The Child Support Matter

By way of background, respondent and his wife, Mary Walker, were divorced prior to his attending law school. In June 1999, as part of the divorce proceeding, respondent was ordered to pay $150 per month in child support to Ms. Walker.

Respondent enrolled in law school in 2001 and graduated in 2004. In January 2004, respondent submitted a Request for Preparation of Character Report |3to the National Conference of Bar Examiners (“NCBE”) in conjunction with his application for admission to the Louisiana bar. Respondent disclosed continuing child support obligations on his NCBE application, but he did not specifically disclose that his child support obligation to Ms. Walker was in arrears in the amount of $8,400 at that time.

In December 2010, Ms. Walker filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent’s primary and secondary registration addresses via certified mail, but the notices were returned marked “unclaimed” and “attempted not known,” respectively. The ODC’s staff investigator ultimately served respondent with the complaint on April 12, 2011.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c), 8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter or bar admission matter or application), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In September 2011, the ODC filed three counts of formal charges against respondent as set forth above. Respondent answered the formal charges, admitting to specific background facts but denying any misconduct. This matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made factual findings, including the following:

I/The Honoré Matter — Respondent did not timely file Ms. Honoré’s petition for damages, as the fax confirmation from the clerk of court’s office indicates the pleading was sent at 12:20 a.m. on the day after prescription ran. Respondent explained that he had been in negotiations with the insurance adjuster to settle Ms. Honoré’s claim, but when he was unable to confirm that a settlement agreement was in place, he filed suit. Respondent testified that he started trying to fax the petition to the clerk of court at 11:30 p.m. on the last day of the prescriptive period and that he had a fax confirmation sheet indicating a 12:02 a.m. time stamp on it. He also stated that the clerk’s office acknowledged that their fax machine had not been calibrated recently and that the time stamp may have been off by several minutes. However, there is no documentary evidence to support these claims. Respondent did not produce any record of fax attempts made from his machine or the fax confirmation sheet or any information from the clerk of court to call into question the time or date Ms. Honoré’s petition was filed.

With regard to the issue of respondent’s address and his alleged failure to cooperate, the committee noted that for a period of time, respondent used the address of his former mother-in-law’s residence, which is located next door to his home in Lafayette, as his primary registration address. Although he was unable to live in his home and did not have the means or a system in place to obtain his mail from that location, respondent indicated that this address was the best or only home address he had available. According to the committee, this “was not a good decision.” However, the record indicates that respondent updated his secondary registration address at least five times with various work addresses as his employment and physical office addresses changed. The ODC’s staff investigator testified that the ODC did have respondent’s work information and that respondent | sdid receive some of the information that was sent to his work addresses. Respondent testified about having problems with his office staffing and/or receiving his mail, but the committee determined that those issues cannot completely explain the numerous problems the ODC had in serving him at the addresses he provided. The committee also pointed out that when respondent did receive notices, he did not always respond timely and within applicable delays.

The Failure to Cooperate Matter — This count of the formal charges encompasses only respondent’s failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation; the underlying complaint is not at issue. The committee agreed that the ODC’s allegations regarding its difficulty in serving respondent and his resulting failure to cooperate are supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.

The Child Support Matter — The committee found that respondent was not making his child support payments and that he was in arrears dating back to the 1990’s. Respondent stated that he was unaware he was in arrears when he signed his application to the Louisiana bar in 2004, but the committee found this testimony not to be credible in light of respondent’s admission that his wages and a tax refund had been garnished to satisfy a child support order. The committee noted that a garnishment proceeding means a debt is owed, and respondent failed to acknowledge this debt on his bar application. The evidence presented also confirms the ODC’s unsuccessful attempts to contact and serve respondent at his primary and secondary addresses.

Based on these factual findings, the committee determined that respondent violated Rules 1.1(c), 1.3, 1.15(a), 1.16(c)(d), 8.2, 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The committee did not discuss in its report the duties violated by respondent, his mental state, or the injury caused. The committee made no findings with respect to aggravating factors, but did find the absence of a prior disciplinary | (¡record in mitigation. The committee also noted as a mitigating factor “respondent’s continuing effort to ' keep his current work address updated, the apparent lack of a better home address than the Lafayette address he listed with the Bar, his testimony regarding the tree and water darhage to his home, [and] the difficulties with a permanent living situation.”

Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, as well as the jurisprudence cited by the ODC, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, with all but.one year and one day deferred, followed by a period of probation with conditions.

Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the record and are not manifestly erroneous. The board also agreed that the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct, except that the board found respondent’s failure to promptly return Ms. Honoré’s file is not a violation of Rule 1.15(a) but is more appropriately addressed under Rule 1.16(d).

The board determined that respondent violated duties owed to his client, the legal system, and the legal profession. His actions were negligent in some respects and knowing in other respects, resulting in actual injury to his client. Respondent failed to abide by the legal rules of substance and procedure that affect the administration of justice and failed to uphold the high standards of conduct |7expected of members of the bar. Citing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

The board stated that the record does not support the finding of any aggravating factors, but noted that respondent did enT gage in a pattern of misconduct. The board found the following mitigating factors are present: absence of a prior disciplinary record and personal or emotional problems.

Based on these findings, and considering the compelling mitigating factors present, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, with all but one year and one day deferred. The board also recommended that respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s report and recommendation. Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

We have carefully reviewed the record of this matter and find clear and convincing evidence that respondent neglected Ms. Honoré’s personal injury case and failed to promptly return a complete copy of her file, failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation, and failed to specifically disclose his child support ar-rearages on his bar application. This misconduct amounts to violations of the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.16(d), 8.1(a), and 8.1(c).

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent violated duties owed to his client, the legal system, and the legal profession. The record supports a finding that although respondent’s conduct was negligent, actual harm resulted, at least in the case of Ms. Honoré, whose personal injury suit was dismissed with prejudice based upon the defendant’s exception of prescription. The baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is suspension. The record supports the mitigating factors found by the board, and furthermore that respondent was inexperienced in the practice of law at the time of the misconduct (admitted 2006). There are no aggravating factors present.

| flTurning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find that the sanction requested by the ODC, and recommended by the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, is overly harsh. There is no evidence that respondent acted intentionally, and the mitigating circumstances present here are compelling. Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year, with all but six months deferred, subject to a one-year period of supervised probation with the requirement that he attend and successfully complete the LSBA’s Ethics School program. We caution respondent that any violation of the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Trent Anthony Garrett, Sr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 30247, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year. It is further ordered that all but six months of the suspension shall be deferred. Following the active portion of the suspension, respondent shall be placed on supervised probation for one year. As a condition of probation, respondent is ordered to attend and successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with | inSupreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty-days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

VICTORY, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

VICTORY, J.,

dissents.

| ]I dissent from the per curiam opinion because I would impose a harsher sanction for respondent’s conduct.

      . On April 13, 2006, when respondent was admitted to the Louisiana bar, his child support obligation to Ms. Walker was in arrears in the amount of $12,300. The arrearage was subsequently satisfied through garnishment proceedings.

      . The ODC did not charge respondent with violating a court order relating to child support.

      . Respondent testified that a tree damaged his home, resulting in water and mold damage to the residence and rendering it uninhabitable. After he lost his home, respondent slept at his office and lived out of his car because he had nowhere else to go.

      . The board also found that respondent neglected the underlying legal matter in the Failure to Cooperate count; however, the ODC specifically did not charge respondent with any misconduct other than failing to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation.

      . The board rejected the committee's recommendation of probation with conditions, recognizing that the court has typically declined to impose probationary periods or conditions in cases in which the sanction will require application for and reinstatement to the practice of law. See In re: Welcome, 02-2662 (La.1/24/03), 840 So.2d 519 (imposing an eighteen-month suspension from the practice of law, but declining to impose a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions because “such issues, along with any other relevant factors, may be addressed if and when respondent applies for reinstatement”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. Mike ALVAREZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Alvarez, Mike;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 07-2136; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-227.

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    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of T.S.
    No. 2013-CK-2426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 16, 2013.
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    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank RAINEY.
    No. 2013-KK-2329.
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    STATE of Louisiana v. Marlon D. WASHINGTON.
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    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
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    Bobbie Christine MURPHY v. 1ST LAKE PROPERTIES, INC. & Favrot and Shane Properties.
    No. 2013-C-1728.
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   In re Murphy, Bobbie Christine;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 623-713; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-649.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).


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    No. 2013-KH-329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
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    No. 2013-OK-0512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Miller, Dale;—Plaintiff; Applying For Reconsideration of this court’s action dated July 31, 2013, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2001 CR 92141.

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    No. 2013-CC-2276.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
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    STATE ex rel. Deborah McANULTY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re McAnulty, Deborah;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 05-CR-60255; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00096.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky CUSKY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1772.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Cusky, Ricky;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 60255; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 1/18/2011.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nathan WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Wilson, Nathan;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 02-4244; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-720.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Enoch KINARD.
    No. 2012-KO-2745.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Kinard, Enoch;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div C, No. 2011-CR-179; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-446.

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text:
    STATE ex rel. TUAN TRAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0130.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Tran, Tuan;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 08-97-0389; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1607.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kikyator JONES.
    No. 2013-K-0373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Jones, Kikyator;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 481-144; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0408.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert S. KRODINGER and Michael L. Marshall.
    No. 2013-K-0608.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Marshall, Michael L.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 487-956; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0134.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dewayne Lakeith JOSEPH.
    No. 2013-KO-0658.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Joseph, Dewayne Lakeith;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 09-236232; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-466.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, v. Dexter HOLDER.
    No. 2013-KO-0659.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Holder, Dexter;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 07-1124; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-258.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donovan James SPRINGER.
    No. 2013-KO-0660.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Springer, Donovan James; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 03-09-0836; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1002.

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text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie J. GROSS, Jr. State of Louisiana v. Willie Gross, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-0661.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Gross Jr., Willie J.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 11-690; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-73 C/W 12-KK-826.

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text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dion LEWIS.
    No. 2013-KO-0672.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Lewis, Dion;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 287,129; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,853-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph Christopher AUSTIN.
    No. 2013-KO-0673.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Austin, Joseph Christopher;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 10-25; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-629.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert S. KRODINGER.
    No. 2013-KO-0674.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Krodinger, Robert S.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish or Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 487-956; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0134.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ramon TRAVIS.
    No. 2013-K-0681.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 471-522; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0836.

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text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary BREAUX.
    No. 2013-KO-0699.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Breaux, Gary;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 496-685; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0555.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony Dewayne TILLMAN.
    No. 2013-KO-0700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Tillman, Anthony Dewayne;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 186,063; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,921-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Barry D. McCRAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0961.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re McCray, Barry D.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 67,659; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-252-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Theodore MATHIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0999.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Mathis, Theodore;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 90-2174; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-187.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carl BARRAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Barras, Carl;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 188319; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0275.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/35), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Harold Joe BLACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1070.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Black, Harold Joe;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 194,296; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-237-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gerald BROUSSARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Broussard, Gerald;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 284-106; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0445.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Deyton MARTINEZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Martinez, Deyton;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 06-1663; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-224.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph V. FOSTER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Foster Jr., Joseph V.;-Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory end/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 123,292; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-397.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Regal MINOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1092.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Minor, Regal;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06K5760; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00504.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lonnie LAURENT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1093.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Laurent, Lonnie;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Fetish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 384255-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KK 0417.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.p. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney HAMILTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1094.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Hamilton, Rodney;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 75-351.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard RAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1115.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Ray, Richard;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 11-1183; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-684.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James MORRISON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Morrison, James;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 233-762.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Hubert Delane WALKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Walker, Hubert Delane;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 83,444, 83,446; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,352-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David D. JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1143.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Jones, David D.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 44,417, 44418; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,346-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren HOLMES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1144.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Holmes, Warren;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 313-293; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0458.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles Wayne SNEED v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1146.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Sneed, Charles Wayne;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A. No. 17,360.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. John B. DOUCET v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1149.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Doucet, John B.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 96032; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00613.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 9S-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard EVERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Every, Leonard;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 82nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 247,396 C/W 262,809; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0338.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas BEAMON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1151.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Beamon, Thomas;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. R-125379; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00336.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. James O. FRANCIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1152.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Francis, James O.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 91-216; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-213.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cedric SCOTT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1155.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Scott, Cedric;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. O, No. 09-06-0670; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0347.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcel DUGAR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1157.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Dugar, Marcel;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99-191; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-120.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jazz GILDS.
    No. 2013-KP-1449.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Gilds, Jazz;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 11-2649; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-374.

Denied.


text:
    Clarence J. BURTON v. SALSBURY’S DODGE CITY, INC. and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-1629.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Burton, Clarence J.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. C539197; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA1999.

Denied.


text:
    Catina Louise STEFANIK v. Bruce Woodford BEAM.
    No. 2013-C-1645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Stefanik, Catina Louise;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2009-17379; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 2076.

Denied.


text:
    Oliver HOWARD v. Edward A. DUFRESNE, Jr., et al.
    No. 2013-CP-1647.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Howard, Oliver;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 675-382; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 13-32.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    Spyridon C. CONTOGOURIS, et al. v. OCEAN THERAPY SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-1679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Continental Casualty Company;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2011-6489; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0255.

Denied.


text:
    Daniel A. CAMPBELL v. NEW ORLEANS SAINTS and Berkley Specialty.
    No. 2013-C-1727.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Campbell, Daniel A.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 07, No. 10-01151; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-886.

Denied.


text:
    Angela LIVINGS v. ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICES, INC.
    No. 2013-CC-1730.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Acadian Ambulance Service Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2012-1524; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00150.

Denied.


text:
    Larry WILLIS v. Matthew M. BROOKS, Avenue D Development, LLC, Magazine Street Interests, Stan Carpenter, Autozone Stores, Inc., Autozone Development Corporation, and Autozoners, LLC.
    No. 2013-C-1670.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re Willis, Larry;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2010-00373; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1674.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Travis HOLMES.
    No. 2013-KK-2508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 514-341; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1453.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


author: HUGHES, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph WIGGINTON.
    No. 2013-KK-2445.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 28, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 512-237; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1395.

Denied.

HUGHES, J.,

would grant in part with respect to the prior crimes involving a cash register in which the defendant was identified as the perpetrator.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Conell GALLE and Allen Scott.
    No. 2013-K-0752.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 30, 2013.
   In re Galle, Conell; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 489-028; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0930.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Mohammad AGHIGHI v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS INSURANCE CORPORATION.
    No. 2013-C-1737.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 30, 2013.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2009-09104; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1096.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cary PORTER.
    No. 2013-KK-2567.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 510-112; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1479.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Emmitt GATES.
    No. 2013-KK-1422.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana: — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 191261; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-894-KW.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David LEFEVRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0905.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Lefevre, David; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 9ÍM225; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-108.

Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. On direct review, the court of appeal found relator’s consecutive sentences, for an aggregate total of 209 years, constitutionally excessive, amended his sentences to run concurrently, and affirmed as amended. State v. Lefeure, 02-592 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/29/02), 831 So.2d 398, 402. If it has not already done so, the district court is ordered to provide the Louisiana Department of Corrections with a new commitment order reflecting that relator’s sentences run concurrently. In all other respects, the application is denied.

CLARK, J., would deny.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick DOBAN.
    No. 2013-KK-1739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. 1, No. 514-661; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0836.

WRIT GRANTED. The ruling of the trial court is reversed. For the reasons assigned by Judge McKay in dissent, we find the search was legal and the defense Motion to Suppress was erroneously granted. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would deny.


text:
    Shirley LaMonthe SCHNYDER, Wife of/and Calvin Schnyder v. BARONNE DEVELOPMENT, LLC and City of New Orleans.
    No. 2013-CC-1684.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Colony National Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 10-00746; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0167.

Not considered; not timely filed. See State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La.3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; Morris v. Stueben, 01-0137 (La.1/26/01), 781 So.2d 1220.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jose Luis Arellanes MIRANDA.
    No. 2013-KK-1752.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Miranda, Jose Luis Arellanes;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 27170; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0531.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    Vester JOHNSON v. T. Taylor TOWNSEND and Donald G. Kelly.
    No. 2013-CP-1760.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Johnson, Vester; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 84,884; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00405.

Not considered; not timely filed. See State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La.3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; Morns v. Stueben, 01-0137 (La.1/26/01), 781 So.2d 1220.


text:
    Randall G. ENGELS, Jr. v. SHELTER GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2013-CC-1860.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Engels, Jr., Randall G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 603137; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1506.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(d).

HUGHES, J., would grant to consider the merits.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-026.
    No. 2013-OB-2035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Whittig, Janet; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-026.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 30(C).


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-030.
    No. 2013-OB-2125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Cuccia, Jack; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-030.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-068.
    No. 2013-OB-2138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Scoggins, Antonio; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board No. 13-PDB-068 Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-068.

Leave to appeal denied


text:
    Julia CLOUD v. Jo Ann Boggs BARNES, Michael Delesdernier, Attorney at Law and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-1304.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   IN RE Cloud, Julia et al.; Swift, Rickey K.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated September 27, 2013; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 547750; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-764-CA.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-676.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Brown, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated September 13, 2013; Parish of Jefferson, 24th District Court Div. G, No. 97-365; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1123.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jody BUTLER.
    No. 2012-K-2359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Jody Butler; — Defendant; Applying For Rehearing of this Court’s order dated May 17, 2013, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 498-885; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0985.

Rehearing denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    In re Robert LIPTAK.
    No. 2013-OB-2131.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; — Other; Applying For Findings and Recommendations (Reinstatement) Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-DB-103.

Petition for reinstatement denied. Petitioner may not reapply for reinstatement until he has' fully complied with all conditions set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Section 24, including, but not limited to, the requirement that he demonstrate one year of sobriety, and in no event less than one year from the date of this judgment. Supreme Court Rule XIX, Section 24(1).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert W. BELL.
    No. 2013-K-0347.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Bell, Robert W.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 8208-08; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-720.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jessie JOHNSON, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-0554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Johnson Jr., Jessie; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 492-870; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1213.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Conell GALLE and Allen Scott.
    No. 2013-K-0561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Scott, Allen; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 489-028; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0930.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest D’Wayne DERRYBERRY.
    No. 2013-KO-0553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
   In re Ernest D’Wayne; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 211195; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 12-788.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeffrey STEWART v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2526.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 4, 2013.
   In re Stewart, Jeffrey; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 281-875; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit.

The application is transferred to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s motion to vacate an invalid guilty plea, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 872; and correct an illegal sentence pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 882 and La. Const, of 1974, Art. 1319, Art. 1822 as relator shows by Inmate’s Request for Legal/Indigent Mail receipt that the application was submitted on or about February 26, 2013. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the application is attached.


author: TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas HENRY.
    No. 2012-KA-1093.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Sept. 4, 2013.

      Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Matthew R. Payne, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Appel-lee/State of Louisiana.
    Mary Constance Hanes, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge JAMES F. McKAY III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge TERRI F. LOVE).
   TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

11This appeal arises from the defendant’s convictions for possession in violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C). Following a multiple bill hearing, the trial court found the defendant a three-time multiple offender. The trial court vacated his original sentence of five years and was sentenced to eight years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. In his appeal, the defendant alleges the trial court abused its discretion in limiting questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire regarding their views on police testimony. The defendant also alleges the' State’s evidence submitted at the multiple bill hearing was insufficient to find him as a three-time multiple offender. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the questioning of potential jurors as the record indicates that defense counsel was able to question extensively about the veracity of police testimony. Furthermore, we find that the evidence of the defendant’s 1996 conviction for cocaine possession was sufficient and the defendant failed to demonstrate with any affirmative evidence that the 1996 guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Therefore, we affirm the convictions and remand the present matter for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

| ^PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State of Louisiana charged Thomas Henry (“Mr. Henry”) with one count of possession with intent to distribute eariso-prodol (“Soma”) and one count of possession with intent to distribute alprazolam (“Xanax”), both violations of La. R.S. 40:969(A)(1). At trial, a twelve-member jury returned responsive verdicts of possession in both counts in violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C). Subsequently, the State filed a multiple bill charging Mr. Henry as a triple offender, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. The trial court originally sentenced Mr. Henry to five years, which was immediately vacated following the trial court’s finding of Mr. Henry as a triple offender. Accordingly, Mr. Henry was sentenced to eight years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Mr. Henry’s appeal follows.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The, facts from the instant case arise from an incident involving Mr. Henry and Narcotics Detectives Joseph Jefferson, Marc Vasquez, Ronald Bouet, and Travis Ward, who were working in plain clothes in the French Quarter around Bourbon Street. The following testimony and facts were contested and contradicted at trial.

Mr. Henry’s Testimony

At trial, Mr. Henry testified. He stated that prior to the incident, while working in the French Market, he was giving a tourist directions when Detective Vasquez and “a couple more guys.... [t]hrew [him] against the wall ... and told [him] that [he] fit the description of a suspect.” Mr. Henry testified that he was searched, and the detective ran his name, but nothing was discovered. ^Subsequently, Mr. Henry recalled Detective Vasquez saying that he did not want to see Mr. Henry on Bourbon Street ever again.

In his testimony, Mr. Henry denied dealing drugs. Mr. Henry stated that on the night of his arrest, he was scared to go on Bourbon Street because of Detective Vasquez’s warning.

Mr. Henry admitted that when Detectives Vasquez and Jefferson approached him, he was holding his girlfriend Tara Forest’s (“Ms. Forest”) Chanel purse. He also stated that Detective Vasquez said, “I thought I told you I didn’t want to see you out here again,” to which he replied, “it is a free country. I can go wherever I want.” Detective Vasquez responded, “Well, you know something, I told you I didn’t want to see you no more.” At that point, Detective Vasquez noticed the purse and snatched it from Mr. Henry. Mr. Henry protested that the purse was his girlfriend’s, but was quickly taken to the police station. He also testified that the police took the bag and his money from him. Mr. Henry said that he had $400 when he was arrested, but signed a receipt for only $229 because one of the arresting officers told him part of the money would be placed in' evidence. On cross-examination, Mr. Henry admitted having possession of Ms. Forest’s purse containing her prescription drugs when he was arrested.

Tara Forest’s Testimony

At trial, Ms. Forest testified that she worked both a day and evening shift the day Mr. Henry was arrested. She left her purse at home because a purse had been stolen from her work place the day before. When Mr. Henry picked Ms. Forest up from her second shift, he brought her purse with him, and they went to a casino. According to Ms. Forest, she won $400 and Mr. Henry won $600 that night. After they left the casino, Ms. Forest and Mr. Henry walked to Bourbon Street, went to a|4club, and ended up at a daiquiri shop so Ms. Forest could use the restroom. Mr. Henry stood outside, while Ms. Forest went to the restroom. Ms. Forest recalled taking her wallet out to purchase a drink and giving Mr. Henry her purse while she used the restroom. She also stated that when she returned from the restroom, Mr. Henry was gone.

After hours of searching for Mr. Henry, Ms. Forest called local hospitals and finally Central Lockup, where she found Mr. Henry. Subsequently, Ms. Forest picked up her purse from Central Lockup, but her medications were gone.

Ms. Forest testified that she keeps Soma, Combivent, Xanax, Lyrica, Topa-max, tramadol and promethazine in her purse. She takes Soma as a muscle relaxant for a hip and thigh injury she suffered in 2000. Combivent is an inhaler for asthma. She takes Xanax for anxiety. She testified she takes Lyrica for neuropathy, specifically for a nerve condition in her legs and feet. She takes Topamax for epilepsy and the tramadol for migraines. The promethazine is for cold, sinus symptoms and cold-induced asthma. She also takes Cipro for sinus, and Advair for asthma. Ms. Forest also testified that as long as she had known Mr. Henry, she knew of no drug related activities.

Detective Vasquez’s Testimony

Detective Vasquez testified at trial that he was on Conti Street, near the intersection of Bourbon Street, when Mr. Henry walked by, stopped and said, “I got what you white boys like.” Detective Vasquez replied by asking what Mr. | ¡¡Henry had. Mr. Henry informed Detective Vasquez that he had “coke[], Xanax, an Somas.” Detective Vasquez recalled Mr. Henry said it would cost $100 for a bag of coke and retrieved a bag of pills from his right pocket. At that point, Detective Vasquez signaled to the other detectives that contact and an offer to purchase drugs was made. When Detective Vasquez stepped into a doorway under a hotel overhang with Mr. Henry, the other detectives converged on Mr. Henry and Detective Vasquez. Mr. Henry was placed under arrest and advised of his rights.

Detective Jefferson’s Testimony

Mr. Henry was taken to the police station where Detective Jefferson asked Mr. Henry if he had anything else on his person that he needed to know about. Detective Jefferson testified that Mr. Henry then produced two bags of crushed Lyrica that he kept in his posterior. Additionally, as a result of the search incident to arrest, $229, twelve Somas, and thirteen Xanax were found on Mr. Henry. Both Detectives Jefferson and Vasquez denied knowing or seeing Mr. Henry before this incident.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record reveals two errors patent. First, when the trial court issued its original sentence, it failed to specify a sentence for each count of possession in violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C). The trial court issued only one sentence when Mr. Henry was convicted of two counts of possession. Second, the trial court issued a sentence without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence pursuant to Mr. Henry’s status as a multiple offender. Notably, the trial court failed to indicate which count the multiple offender sentence was based. Further, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) mandates that multiple offender sentences “shall be |fiat hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” The statute does not prohibit parole. Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art 882(A), “an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review.” We vacate Mr. Henry’s sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

VOIR DIRE CHALLENGE

■ Mr. Henry asserts that he was not afforded his constitutional right to examine potential jurors during voir dire due to the trial court’s curtailment of defense counsel’s questions. He contends that the trial court prevented him from questioning potential jurors about their “attitudes on -the testimony of police officers as eyewitnesses.”

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Holmes, 2006-2988, p. 55 (La.12/2/08), 5 So.3d 42, 79-80, set forth the standard of review for claims that voir dire was unlawfully limited:

La. Const, art. I, § 17 guarantees a defendant full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and the right to challenge jurors peremptorily. The purpose of voir dire is to determine qualifications of prospective jurors by testing their competency and impartiality in order to discover bases for challenges for cause and for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. State v. Hall, 616 So.2d 664, 668 (La.1993). Nonetheless, the scope of examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent clear abuse. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 786; Hall, 616 So.2d at 669. In determining whether the trial court afforded a sufficiently wide latitude to the defendant, the entire voir dire examination must be considered.

Mr. Henry alleges that the trial court erred in sustaining two of the State’s objections to the defense’s questioning of prospective jurors regarding police testimony. First, Mr. Henry points to the trial court’s sustaining of the State’s objection during the first panel of prospective jurors wherein defense counsel |7asked whether they could think of any reasons why a police officer might lie. The State objected and an off-the-record bench conference was . held. Thereafter, defense counsel changed the subject to police officers as professional witnesses and asked the panel members to rate the New Orleans Police Department based on their opinion of the department’s overall performance. Mr. Henry’s defense counsel did not return to the topic of police officers lying.

Secondly, the State asked the second voir dire panel members if they could render a verdict on police testimony alone. One panel member responded that she did not trust the police “because [she knew] too many people who [were] wrongfully prosecuted.” When defense counsel conducted voir dire of the second voir dire panel, she returned to the panel member who previously expressed concerns of police officer credibility. Defense counsel asked the panel member whether police officers “played a part” in the wrongful prosecution of people she knew. The State then objected and an off-the-record bench conference was held.

Additionally, a third objection occurred during the second round of voir dire when Mr; Henry’s defense counsel referenced the widely publicized “Danziger Bridge case” noting:

Now, I think, you know, we have all seen cases, like, I think, right now the Dan-ziger Bridge case is actually in session. So we have heard kind of about big cases, right, where maybe somebody is killed or whatever and the officers may not tell the truth in cases like that.

This Court has previously found that a trial court may not curtail the defendant’s right to ask non-repetitious voir dire questions that “reasonably explore the juror’s potential prejudices, predispositions or misunderstandings relevant to the central issues of the particular case.” State v. Anear, 508 So.2d 943, 948 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/3/1987). This Court also noted that, a trial court may | Jimit voir dire “as long as the limitation is not so restrictive as to deprive defense counsel of a reasonable opportunity to probe to determine a basis for challenge for cause and for the intelligent exercise of a peremptory challenges.” Id.

Mr. Henry asserts that his case is analogous to State v. Dyer, 95-2368, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/2/96), 682 So.2d 278, 280, wherein the trial court committed reversible error by prohibiting any inquiry into the relations between prospective jurors and police officers. We find Mr. Henry’s case to be distinguishable. In the instant matter, Mr. Henry had the opportunity to question and did question potential jurors about the veracity of police testimony.

During the first voir dire panel, defense counsel noted that some panel members expressed they would hold police officérs to a higher standard in response to the prosecutor’s questions regarding the credibility of police witnesses. She then asked whether any panel members believed police officers were more likely to tell the truth than others and whether previous hypothetical showing why. others might lie also applied to police officers. After the State’s objection to whether the panel could think of more reasons why police officers would lie, defense counsel asked whether panel members would evaluate the testimony of professional witnesses, such as police officers, differently from lay witness testimony. She also asked panel members to rate the New Orleans Police Department on a scale of one to ten.

After the objection to defense counsel’s reference to the Danziger Bridge case was sustained, defense counsel asked the panel if police officers were more or less likely to tell the truth in “run of the mill” cases, as opposed to “large[r]” cases. In addition to the previously mentioned questions, many of the questions were oriented to witness credibility. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the |9trial court allowed extensive questions dealing with the credibility of police officers throughout voir dire. Therefore, Mr. Henry’s case is distinguishable from the situation in Dyer.

Moreover, we find the sustained objections were properly made. The objection to defense counsel’s question about other instances where police officer might lie was proper because it asked the panel members for speculation, and it was cumulative. See Ancar, 508 So.2d 943 at 948 (The trial court may prohibit repetitive questions); See also Dyer, 95-2368 at p. 4, 682 So.2d at 280 (The trial court may prohibit hypothetical questions which call for prejudgment of the supposed facts). Likewise, the objection to the question concerning the Danziger Bridge case and other cases concerning police improprieties was properly sustained. See State v. Scott, 307 So.2d 291 (La.1/20/1975) (prohibiting questioning aimed at determining potential racial bias was proper because the question was irrelevant, inflammatory, and misleading). Finally, defense counsel’s attempt to question a potential juror about her previously mentioned bias against police officers was also properly prohibited, as it was aimed at eliciting irrelevant and inflammatory material. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

TRIPLE OFFENDER CHALLENGE

Mr. Henry asserts that the evidence of one of his previous convictions was insufficient to sustain his conviction as a three-time felony offender. He contends that the evidence of his 1996 conviction for cocaine possession, case no. 386-815, was insufficient because the State did not introduce a perfect transcript of the plea colloquy.

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) provides:

| inExcept as. otherwise provided in this Subsection, the district attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. The presumption of regularity of judgment .shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. If the person claims that any conviction alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response to the information. A copy of the response shall be served upon the prosecutor. A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the constitutions of Louisiana or of the United States shall set forth .his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The person shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by the response. Any challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

The Louisiana Supreme Court established the following analysis to determine whether the State has sufficiently proven prior guilty pleas in multiple offender proceedings:

If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information, the burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that defendant was represented by counsel when they were taken. If the State meets this burden, the defendant has the burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. If the defendant is able to do this, then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the plea shifts to the State. The State will meet its burden of proof if it introduces a “perfect” transcript of the taking of the guilty plea, one which reflects a colloquy between judge and defendant wherein the defendant was informed of and specifically waived his right to trial by jury, his privilege against self-incrimination, and his right to confront his accusers. If the State introduces anything less than a “perfect” transcript, for example, a guilty plea form, a ■ minute entry, an “imperfect” transcript, or any combination thereof, the judge then must weigh the evidence submitted by the defendant and by the State to determine whether the State has met its burden of proving that defendant’s prior guilty plea was informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boy-kin rights. We note that this new procedure will not only give appropriate significance to the presumption of regularity which attaches to judgments of conviction which have become final, but will also provide an advantage to defendants who were previously under Lewis unable to introduce any extra-record evidence and whose guilty pleas were heretofore under Tucker found constitutionally valid by mere proof of a minute entry and a guilty plea form.

State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769, 779-80 (La.7/1/1998).

InThus, Mr. Henry had the burden of providing some affirmative evidence. A “[djefendant can attempt to meet his burden of production with a transcript, with testimony regarding the taking of the plea, or with other affirmative evidence.” Id. 621 So.2d at 775 footnote 24.

Additionally, in State v. Weaver, 99-2177, p. 13 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/6/00) 775 So.2d 613, 621, this Court held that a minute entry or a docket master showing the defendant was represented by counsel at the time he pled guilty, along with a properly executed waiver of rights/guilty plea form is sufficient for the State to meet its burden of proof under La. R.S. 15:529.1, In doing so, this Court noted that a colloquy between the trial court and a defendant is preferable, but not indispensable for the State to carry its burden of proof where the record contains other evidence of proper waiver. Id.

At the multiple offender hearing, the State introduced a copy of the bill of information, a Waiver of Constitutional Rights form and a copy of the docket master showing Mr. Henry was represented by counsel when he pled guilty as charged to possession of crack cocaine on December 18, 1996. A copy of the Decern-ber 18, 1996 minute entry indicated that Mr. Henry was represented by counsel and informed of the rights he was waiving. Officer Jay Jaquet, a finger prints expert for the New Orleans Police Department, matched Mr. Henry’s finger prints to those on the back of the bill of information and the arrest register of the 1996 conviction. In addition, the trial court noted when it determined Mr. Henry was a three-time multiple offender, Mr. Henry admitted during his trial testimony to the 1996 conviction.

The totality of this evidence demonstrates that the State met its initial burden of showing the existence of the 1996 guilty plea and that Mr. Henry was [ ^represented at the time of his plea. Therefore, under Shelton, the burden shifted to Mr. Henry. Mr. Henry points to the fact that no signature on the waiver of rights form is legible. However, he fails to point to any affirmative evidence, such as a transcript, or his own testimony, to negate that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Accordingly, he fails to make any showing that an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity occurred in the taking of the 1996 plea. Furthermore, Mr. Henry admitted to the 1996 conviction during trial. Therefore, we find that Mr. Henry’s assertion has no merit.

DECREE

For the above-mentioned reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse it discretion in limiting voir dire. Mr. Henry’s defense counsel was given a full opportunity to question prospective jurors about police officer credibility, and the limitations imposed by the trial court served to avoid unnecessary prejudice and repetitive questioning. We also find that the evidence presented at the multiple bill hearing is sufficient to establish that Mr. Henry knowingly and voluntarily pled to possession of cocaine in 1996, and consequently, his adjudication as a triple offender is affirmed. Therefore, we affirm Mr. Henry’s conviction in the instant case and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

      . Throughout this opinion, brand name prescription drugs are capitalized and generic prescription drugs are not.

      . The term “coke” used in this opinion refers to cocaine.


author: SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jacolvy NELLON.
    No. 2012-KA-1429.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Sept. 4, 2013.

      Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Michael B. Redmann, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Appellant.
    Kenneth J. Beck, Gretna, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge' ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS).
   SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS, Judge.

|, The sole issue before the court is the discretion afforded the trial court in setting aside a judgment of bond forfeiture absent “a fortuitous event” that would make the bail bond obligation impossible to perform. See La. R.S. 15:83(C)(1); La. C.Cr.P. art. 345(1). We find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the surety’s motion to set aside the judgment of bond forfeiture. For the reasons stated below, the judgment of August 28, 2009 granting the surety’s motion to set aside judgment of bond forfeiture and petition for nullity is reversed. The original judgment of November 20, 2008 forfeiting the bond in this matter is re-instated. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant was arrested for violation of La. R.S. 40:967, possession of a controlled dangerous substance — cocaine. Immediately following arrest, the defendant secured a commercial surety bond with Safety National Casualty Corporation (“Safety”) in the amount of $7000. The defendant subsequently failed to appear for arraignment, and the State moved for forfeiture of defendant’s bond. The trial court granted the State’s motion to forfeit the commercial surety bond and, on November 20, 2008, executed a judgment in favor of the State of Louisiana Land against the defendant as principal, and Safety as commercial surety in the amount of $7000.00.

On April 30, 2009, Safety filed a motion to set aside bond forfeiture and petition for nullity of judgment. Safety stated that within the six months of the mailing of the notice of bond forfeiture, on or about December 15, 2008, the defendant was in the custody of the Harris County Sheriffs Office in Texas. Safety attached a letter of verification that defendant had been in jail in Harris County from April 10, 2009 to April 12, 2009. On the basis of those allegations, Safety prayed for the judgment of bond forfeiture to be set aside and declared an absolute nullity, and to be released from liability under the bail bond.

On May 18, 2009, the State filed an answer and reconventional demand. The State argued that Safety and its counsel did not comply with the requirements of La.C.Cr.P. art. 345, necessary to have a judgment of bond forfeiture set aside. Subsequently, Safety filed a motion for extension of time to surrender the defendant. In that motion, Safety asserted that it had complied with the policy that it knew to exist to have a forfeiture set aside. More specifically, Safety alleged the following:

.8.
It has for years been the practice in Orleans Parish (as in many other parishes and courts of the State of Louisiana) that a letter verifying the defendant’s incarceration in another parish, for however long of a period of time within six months of the mailing of the' notice of judgment of bond forfeiture, satisfies the surety’s obligation on a bond forfeiture without the surety doing anything further.
9.
Counsel has recently been made aware of a change in that policy, a change which was not promulgated in any way. The surety |scompanies had no way of knowing that this change of policy had taken place. The surety company had no was [sic] of suspecting that such a change of policy would take place.

Safety contended that if it had known of the policy change, then it would have complied with that policy in order to have the judgment of bond forfeiture set aside. Wherefore, Safety prayed for an extension of time to comply with the new policy and to surrender the defendant to satisfy Safety’s. bond obligation.

At the hearing on the motions, Safety argued that the change in policy by the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office was a fortuitous event that Safety could not have reasonably foreseen. Safety contended that this “fortuitous event” made the bond obligation impossible to perform within the six month timeframe, and therefore, Safety argued it should be granted an extension of time to surrender the defendant.

The State argued that there was no “change in policy,” and the provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 345 require more than a letter of verification that the defendant was in jail at some time during the six months after notification of bond forfeiture. The State opposed Safety’s motion to set aside the bond forfeiture based on Safety’s failure to conform to the statutory requirements of La.C.Cr.P. art. 345.

After the parties presented arguments, the trial court found that the “change in policy” was not a fortuitous event, because the State had followed the law by requiring more than a letter of verification. The trial court denied the request for extension of time to surrender the defendant. The trial court then granted Safety’s motion to set aside the judgment of bond forfeiture:

BY MR. BECK: I had filed the original Motion to Set Aside, based on 345 in a good faith filing of 345, based on how things have been done in this court for the past many years.
BY THE COURT: Granted.
|4BY MR. REDMANN: Your Honor, we just discussed that — One issue is I was arguing that it’s unfounded because it isn’t under 345.
BY THE COURT: And I think I can make an equity ruling that they’ve been given notice and I’m not forfeiting on this one.
BY MR. BECK: Thank you your Hon- or.
BY MR. REDMANN: So, your Honor, are you ruling under article 345, Subsection (I) as this is a fortuitous event?
BY THE COURT: No, I’m not. In my discretion, I can deny the relief, number 3.
BY MR. REDMANN: Your Honor, it says, “if upon proof satisfactory to the Court, that a fortuitous event—
BY THE COURT: I’m satisfied.

It is from this ruling, the State timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

The State argues that La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(1) does not afford the trial court discretion to set aside a judgment of bond forfeiture absent “a fortuitous event” that would make the bond obligation “impossible to perform as required under the contract.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(I).

The trial court found that La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(1) granted the court broad discretion in ruling on the motion to set aside the judgment. We review the trial court’s interpretation and application of the statute under a de novo standard of review. Iles v. Ogden, 11-0317, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/5/12), 99 So.3d 1035, 1038; Cleco Evangeline, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Tax Com’n, 01-2162, p. 3 (La.4/3/02), 813 So.2d 351, 353.

“A statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed purpose and intent of the legislature.” Moss v. State, 2005-1963, p. 15 (La.4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1196. The words of the law must |sbe given their generally prevailing meaning. La. C.C. art. 11. Where the language is susceptible to different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. La. C.C. art. 10. Legislative intent is to be determined “by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law.” Moss, p. 15, 925 So.2d at 1196.

Bond forfeitures are not favored in Louisiana. State v. Brown, 11-0804, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/11/12), 80 So.3d 1288, 1290 (citing Bankers Ins. Co. v. State, 37,080, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/11/03), 843 So.2d 641, 644.) The purpose of a criminal bail bond is to ensure that the accused will appear at all stages of the criminal proceedings against him. Criminal bail bonds are contractual and, therefore, civil in nature. La. R.S. 15:83(A). The implementation of criminal bail bonds, however, is governed by both civil and criminal Louisiana law. Id. When entering into a criminal bail bond obligation on behalf of a defendant, a surety assumes those risks that are reasonably foreseeable. La. R.S. 15:83(B). The surety is not liable for his failure to perform when it is caused by a fortuitous event, unless the surety has assumed the risk of such a fortuitous event. La. R.S. 15:83(0(1); see State v. Allen, 11-0693, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/8/12), 98 So.3d 926, 929. A fortuitous event is defined as one which could not have been reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made. La. R.S. 15:83(0(2).

If the defendant fails to appear, the State must strictly comply with statutory provisions to obtain a judgment of bond forfeiture. Brown, p. 2, 80 So.3d at 1290. Louisiana law also provides specific procedures for the defendant and sureties to object to judgments of bond forfeiture. At the time the judgment of bond forfeiture was entered, in this case, the governing statute provided in pertinent part:

Summary proceedings. The defendant and his sureties shall be entitled to bring defenses and actions in nullity by use of summary proceedings in the criminal matter before the trial court which issued the judgment of bond forfeiture within sixty days from mailing the notice of the signing of the judgment of bond forfeiture.... The defendant and his sureties shall be entitled to bring defenses pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 345 and R.S. 15:87 by use of summary proceedings in the criminal matter before the trial court which issued the judgment of bond forfeiture within six months from mailing the notice of the signing of the judgment of bond forfeiture.

La. R.S. 15:85(5) Acts 2006, No. 735, § 1, eff. August 15, 2006.

Safety attempted to avail itself of the defenses of La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(1) by alleging that a fortuitous event prevented it from complying with its obligations under the contract. At the time the motion was filed, La.C.Cr. P. art 345(1) provided:

In addition to and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a surety may seek an extension of time to surrender a defendant, or have the judgment of bond forfeiture set aside by filing a motion in the criminal court of record and after contradictory hearing with the district attorney and with proof satisfactory to the discretion of the court that a fortuitous event has occurred and that such event has made his performance required under the contract impossible to perform. A motion seeking relief pursuant to this Paragraph must be filed within twelve months from the date of the fortuitous event, excluding legal delays. The court in its discretion may do any of the following:
(1) Set aside the forfeiture or grant the nullity.
17(2) Grant an extension of time up to twelve months from the expiration of the initial six month time period from the date of the mailing of proper notice of bond forfeiture ....
(3) Deny the relief.

La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 345(1) Acts 2006, No. 466, § 2, eff. June 15, 2006. (emphasis added).

Paragraph (I) was added to the statute by Acts 2006, No. 466, § 2. The legislative notes accompanying the 2006 amendment to this statute reference Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as an underlying motivation for the amendment:

Section 3. This Act specifically recognizes that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused significant and devastating destruction of personal and real property, and resulted in the mandatory evacuation, relocation, and displacement of many residents.... Further, it recognizes that the damages caused by these hurricanes have made it impossible for sureties and law enforcement officers to locate some defendants.

In State v. Allen, 11-0693, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/8/12), 98 So.3d 926, 930, this court considered whether the trial court abused its discretion by applying La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(1) based on facts that did not constitute a statewide disaster or emergency situation. In Allen, the surety argued that it believed the defendant had been in federal protective custody working with federal agents on a case, and, due to these unforeseeable circumstances, it was unable to surrender the defendant within six months of the bond forfeiture. In granting the motion to set aside the bond forfeiture, the trial court reasoned that it would have granted the surety’s original motion to extend the time to surrender the defendant. ■ Since the surety found and surrendered the defendant shortly after it filed the motion for extension of time, the trial court stated that it would have ultimately granted the motion to set aside the bond forfeiture,

|RThis . court affirmed the trial court judgment, and held that the court was within its discretion, under the statute, to find the facts presented by the surety constituted satisfactory proof of a fortuitous event:

Clearly, it is preferable for a surety to come forward with some concrete evidence to support its motion, such as an affidavit from the U.S. Attorney ... This, however, is an unlikely scenario and, in any event, La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 345(1) requires only ‘proof satisfactory to the court.’ As such, although the proof before the trial judge was very circumstantial, we do not find that she abused her discretion ... Allen, p. 6, 98 So.3d at 930.

In the instant case, the trial court stated that it found no proof of a fortuitous event. La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(1) clearly requires (1) the surety to file a motion for the extension of time or to have the judgment set aside, (2) the court to hold a contradictory hearing with the district attorney, (3) proof satisfactory to the discretion of the court that a fortuitous event occurred, and (4) a finding that the event has made the surety’s performance impossible to perform. The trial court cannot use its discretion to make one of the three available rulings, provided by La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(I)(l)-(3), without a finding that the surety satisfied its burden of proof.

Safety argued that the State’s change of policy was a fortuitous unforeseeable event or circumstance that prevented it from performing its bond obligation. In the hearing, the trial court determined that Safety was claiming that the State’s enforcement of the statutory requirements of La.C.Cr.P. art. 345 was the unforeseeable change in policy. The trial court stated, “It’s not fortuitous, they | followed the law.” Based on this finding that the event was not fortuitous, the trial court denied the motion for extension of time to surrender the defendant.

The trial court then changed course, granted the motion to set aside the bond forfeiture, and reasoned that it was making an “equity ruling” by “not forfeiting.”

We agree with the finding that the “change of policy” was not a fortuitous event, and we find no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion for extension of time to surrender the defendant. We find that the trial court abused its discretion when it disregarded the need for a finding of a fortuitous event and granted Safety’s motion to set aside the bond forfeiture.

Finally, we briefly address the trial court’s statement that it made an “equity ruling.” The trial court did not provide any reasons, such as the interest of justice or judicial economy, that this case warranted a ruling based , on the balance of equities. While we recognize that bond forfeitures are not favored in Louisiana, sureties assume certain risks associated with posting criminal bail bonds and guaranteeing the appearance of the defendant. Sureties should also assume that the State will enforce the laws by which sureties must perform their obligations. In this case, Safety is a commercial surety with experience throughout Louisiana, and it should not be allowed to avail itself of ignorance of the law. We find that the trial court’s judgment granting Safety’s motion to set aside the bond forfeiture was an abuse of the court’s discretion.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, the trial court judgment of August 28, 2009 granting Safety’s motion to set aside the judgment of bond forfeiture is reversed. The original judgment of November 20, 2008 forfeiting the bond in this matter is | inre-instated. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . #1 Bail Bonds Recovery, LLC was also named in the judgment as surety, in solido, in the sum of $7000.00.

      . In its appeal, the State also argued that the trial court erred in granting the motion to set aside under La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(D), which allows for the constructive surrender of a defendant found to be incarcerated in a foreign jail. The record reflects that the trial court rejected Safety’s arguments based on La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(D), and, therefore, we will not address this argument. We find that the trial court ruled to set aside the judgment of bond forfeiture under La.C.Cr.P. art. 345(1).

      . At the time of the trial court proceedings, La. R.S. 15:85 was entitled "Forfeiture; procedure; notice; and collection” and provided the rules for obtaining and objecting to a judgment of bond forfeiture. Pursuant to statutory revisions by Acts 2010, No. 710, the pertinent provisions governing forfeiture procedure, hearing, notice of judgment, nullity and summary proceedings were redesignated, respectively, as La.C.Cr.P. arts. 349, 349.2, 349.3, and 349.5.

      . We noted that the version of the statute in effect at the time required "proof satisfactory to the discretion of the court” rather than "proof satisfactory to the court,” as written in the amended version made effective in 2010 by Acts 2010, No. 914, § 1. This court’s majority found that the additional discretionary language of the 2006 version did not give more discretion to the court, or allow for more subjectivity, than does the 2010 version.