source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PETERS, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    NEW IBERIA FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 775 et al. v. CITY OF NEW IBERIA.
    No. 13-1337.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    May 7, 2014.

      John F. Wilkes, III, Joy C. Rabalais, Ray F. Lucas, III, Tonya R. Smith, Kathy L. Smith, Adriane M. Reese, Borne & Wilkes, L.L.C., Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Relator City of New Iberia.
    Louis L. Robein, Jr., Christina L. Carroll, Robein, Urann, Spencer, Picard & Cangemi, Metarie, LA, for Plaintiff/Respondent Jason Enkey.
    Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, JIMMIE C. PETERS, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   PETERS, J.

It The matter now before us originated as a petition for declaratory judgment filed by the New Iberia Firefighters Association Local 755 and individual firefighters (firefighters) against their employer, the City of New Iberia (the City), relative to issues involving supplemental and longevity pay and the City’s sick leave, drug, and alcohol policies. The City filed this application for supervisory writs seeking to reverse the trial court’s rejection of its motion for summary judgment relative to one of the firefighters, Jason Enkey, wherein the City sought dismissal of Mr. Enkey’s claim for longevity pay pursuant to La.R.S. 33:1992(B).

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

The New Iberia Firefighters Association Local 755 and the individual firefighters brought suit against the City on April 10, 2012, raising a number of issues concerning employment and pay issues involving the firefighters. After resolution of a number of preliminary issues, the City filed motions for summary judgment on September 5, 2013, against nine of the named firefighters relative to their claims for longevity pay pursuant to La.R.S. 33:1992(B). After the City dismissed the motions against four of those firemen, the longevity pay issue of the remaining five firemen was heard by the trial court on October 4, 2013. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court granted the summary judgment as to four of the firemen, but denied it with respect to the claims of Jason Enkey.

After the trial court executed a judgment on the motion for summary judgment, the City filed the application for supervisory writs now before us, seeking to have the judgment with regard to Mr. Enkey reversed. For the following reasons, we grant the supervisory writ application, reverse the trial court judgment rejecting the City’s motion for summary judgment, and render judgment dismissing Mr. Enkey’s claim for longevity pay pursuant to La.R.S. 33:1992(B).

| .OPINION

Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:1992(A) sets forth the minimum monthly salaries that municipalities having a population of 12,000 or more, the City of Bastrop, and parish and fire protection districts must pay the various employees of those firefighting entities and, in doing so, recognizes the salary distinctions based on position. At issue in this litigation is La.R.S. 33:1992(B), which establishes the method of calculation of longevity pay as follows:

From and after the first day of August, 1962, each member of the fire department who has had three years continuous service shall receive an increase of two percent and shall thereafter receive an increase in salary of two percent for each year of additional service up to and including twenty years. Both the base pay and accrued longevity shall be used in computing such longevity . Pay.

The facts applicable to this matter are not in dispute. As evidenced by the affidavits attached to the motion for summary judgment and to Mr. Enkey’s memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment, Mr. Enkey began employment with the City on August 11, 2011. Prior to his employment with the City, he had worked as a firefighter with the City of Natchi-toches Fire Department (Natchitoches Fire Department) for over ten years. The City claims that Mr. Enkey is not entitled to longevity pay because he has not complied with the three-year continuous service requirement of La.R.S. 33:1992(B), and Mr. Enkey argues that he is entitled to credit for his service with the Natchi-toches Fire Department. We find merit in the City’s position.

We called this application for supervisory writs up because the question at issue is a matter of first impression, although several Louisiana Attorney General opinions have interpreted La.R.S 33:1992(B) as argued by the City. “Although | .opinions of the Attorney General are advisory only and not binding, this court has recognized their persuasive authority, particularly where no cases on point can be found.” State in Interest of J.M., 97-491, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 994, 997. Accordingly, a resort to statutory interpretation is necessary before we can answer which scenario is correct.

The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 2000-1695, p. 11 (La.6/29/01), 808 So.2d 294, 302; Succession of Boyter, 99-0761, p. 9 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature. Id.; Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044, p. 5 (La.7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, 766.
The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, 2000-1695 at p. 11, 808 So.2d at 302; Succession of Boyter, 99-0761 at p. 9, 756 So.2d at 1129. A statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed purpose and intent of the legislature. Id.
Further, it is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in a law was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Sultana Corporation v. Jewelers Mutual Insurance Company, 03-0360, p. 9 (La.12/3/03), 860 So.2d 1112, 1119. As a result, courts are bound, if possible, to give effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause or word as meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to, and preserving, all words can legitimately be found. St. Martin Parish Police Jury v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 212 La. 886, 33 So.2d 671, 676 (1947); State v. Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630, 634 (1904). Finally, it is presumed that the legislature acts with full knowledge of well principles of statutory construction. Sultana Corporation, 03-0360 at p. 9, 860 So.2d at 1119.
In addition to the above judicial principles which are guides to determine the intent of the legislature, the legislature has enacted rules for the construction of statutes in the provisions of the revised statutes. The following are pertinent to this case.

| ¿Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:3 provides:

Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.
The word “shall” is mandatory and the word “may” is permissive.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:4 provides:

When the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:9 provides:

Unless it is otherwise clearly indicated by the context, whenever the term “or” is used in the Revised Statutes, it is used in the disjunctive and does not mean “and/or.”

Moss v. State, 05-1963, pp. 15-16 (La.4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1196-97.

Additionally, based on prior jurisprudence interpreting La.R.S. 33:1992, it is well understood that the Louisiana Legislature has plenary power to enact laws pertaining to the minimum wages and working conditions of firemen. New Orleans Firefighters Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of New Orleans, 422 So.2d 402 (La.1982). It is also clear that laws pertaining to the wages and working conditions of firemen are remedial in nature, humanitarian in purpose, and are not to be narrowly construed. Id.

In New Orleans Firefighters Association, the supreme court stated that the minimum standards of income and working conditions that firemen could be subjected to are provided by La.R.S. 33:1992 and La.R.S. 33:2002. Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:2002 (emphasis added), which provides firemen with extra compensation from the state, provides in part:

|fiA. (1) In addition to the compensation now paid by any municipality, parish, fire protection district, or other political subdivision maintaining a fire department, or by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana or the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, hereinafter referred to as “tribe”, or by any nonprofit corporation contracting with any such political subdivision to provide fire protection services to every paid, regularly employed employee who is paid not less than three hundred dollars per month, not including supplemental pay, as distinguished from part-time employees and volunteers of such fire department, who are carried on the payroll of such fire department, and every employee as defined herein who is paid from funds of the parish or municipality or tribe obtained through lawfully adopted bond issues, lawfully assessed taxes, or other funds available for such purpose, either directly or through a ' board or commission set up by law or ordinance of the parish or municipality or tribe, shall be paid extra compensation by the state in the amount of five hundred dollars per month for each such paid employee who has completed or who hereafter completes one year of service. The provisions of Paragraph (5) of this Subsection shall govern the requirements for length of service for employees who were ordered to active military duty in the armed services of the United States during their initial term of employment.
B. In computing the period of service required by Subsection A of this Section, prior service of employees who have returned or who hereafter return to such service shall be included; provided that service in any municipal, parish, tribe, or fire protection district fire department, whether with the same fire department or not, shall be used in computing such prior service. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A to the contrary, any employee who received state supplemental pay prior to March 31, 1986, and returns to such service shall be entitled to receive state supplemental pay whether or not such employee completes training for and obtains National Fire Protection Association Standard 1001 Firefighter I certification or completes training and receives certification from a fireman’s training program as approved by the Louisiana State University Firemen Training Program in accordance with R.S. 40:1541 et seq.

In New Orleans Firefighters Association, the supreme court further stated that in order to reach a “fair and ungrudging construction” of La.R.S. 33:2002, that statute should be read in pari materia with La.R.S. 33:1992. Id. at 413.

Reading La.R.S. 33:1992 in pari materia with La.R.S. 33:2002, we find that the legislature intended the municipalities, the City of Bastrop, and the parish and fire protection districts subject to the minimum salary law to provide longevity pay Ifito only those firemen which worked a continuous three years in their fire departments. Our interpretation of Subsection B is based on the legislature’s placement of the word “the,” in front of “fire department.” “The” is a definite article, which refers to a specific person, place, or thing; whereas “a” or “an” are indefinite articles, which refer to people, places, or things in a general or nonspecific manner. BRYán A. GáRNER, The Redbook A Manual On Legal Style, § 10.38 (2d ed.2006).

Thus, we find that when the legislature stated that “each member of the fire department who has had three years continuous service shall receive an increase in salary[,]” it intended that only those firemen who served with that specific fire department for three years were entitled to the longevity pay. Had the legislature intended for any fireman with three years continuous service, no matter at which or how many fire departments they worked for, it could have stated that “each member of a fire department who has had three years continuous service” are entitled to longevity pay, or it could have replaced the language “member of the fire department” with “firemen.” This is just what the legislature did with regard to the supplemental pay provision found in La.R.S. 33:2002(B), wherein the legislature specifically provided that continuity of service with a specific fire department was not required for a fireman to receive state supplemental pay, as long as the fireman completed one year of service. Furthermore, although we recognize the constitutionally accorded plenary power afforded to the legislature in this area, we do not believe that it intended to saddle a municipality with the obligation of providing longevity pay to a fireman who earned that right while serving in another municipality’s fire department.

[¿DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant and make peremptory the application for supervisory writs filed by the City of New Iberia, and in doing so, reverse the judgment of the trial court recognizing Jason Enkey’s claim for longevity pay to be paid by the City of New Iberia, and render summary judgment dismissing the claim of Jason Enkey in full. We assess all costs of this writ application to Jason Enkey.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:1992(A) sets a minimum monthly salary for a fireman at $400.00 per month and establishes the minimum’ monthly salaries of all of the other potential fire department employees as a percentage of the fireman's minimum monthly salary.

      . Op.Atty.Gen., No. 94-10, Feb. 7, 1994; Op. Atty.Gen., No. 03-0192, Oct. 24, 2003.


author: STEWART, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Cory B. LEONE, Appellant.
    No. 48,892-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2014.

      Dyess Law Firm, by: William D. Dyess, Natchitoches, Mary B. Fair, for Appellant.
    Richard Z. Johnson, Jr., District Attorney, Britney A. Green, Ron C. Stamps, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before STEWART, DREW and LOLLEY, JJ. STEWART, J.
   STEWART, J.

| ^Defendant Cory B. Leone was convicted of attempted manslaughter, and sentenced to serve 20 years of hard labor. For the reasons that follow, this court affirms the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 21, 2012, the defendant shot his fiancé, Breanna Pearce, in the head while they were en route to their home in Zwolle, Louisiana, from Shreveport, Louisiana. On September 10, 2012, the defendant was initially charged via bill of information of attempted second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. The defendant’s charges were amended to attempted second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1, and second degree kidnapping, in violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1, on September 12, 2012.

On May 8, 2013, the jury trial began. The following evidence was adduced at trial.

Breanna Pearce (“victim”), testified that the defendant is the father of her youngest child, and that her relationship with him ended the night the incident occurred. She testified that on July 20, 2012, she and the defendant traveled to Shreveport from their hometown, Zwolle, to celebrate her 21st birthday. Upon their arrival, the couple stopped at Outback Steakhouse for dinner and drinks. She testified that she had one of the margarita samples, and the defendant had a “few” beers at Outback. The couple then went to El Dorado Casino, where the victim tasted several drinks that she didn’t like, and the defendant consumed at least eight beers. After staying at El Dorado for about an hour, the defendant decided to go to Horseshoe Casino. |sThe victim testified that they never went to the actual casino. Rather, they remained at the bar, where the victim stated that she ordered a margarita that she did not like, and the defendant had “too many [beers] to count.”

While at Horseshoe, the victim testified that she saw her brother’s brother-in-law, Zack. She greeted Zack with a hug, and talked to him and his three male friends for about two minutes when the defendant angrily approached them. The defendant, unaware of the victim’s relation to the Zack, confronted Zack. This interaction created a disturbance at the bar, and prompted the bouncer to ask the defendant to leave. After being asked to leave several times, the defendant left. The victim apologized to Zack and his friends, and followed the defendant.

The couple went to Horseshoe’s parking garage to retrieve the defendant’s truck. The victim stated the defendant was “just mad and ranting and raving” about Zack and his friends, and began to look for his gun, stating that he was going to “go find ’em.” The defendant found his gun, but she convinced him to stay inside the truck.

The victim began to drive them back to Zwolle, and while still holding the gun, the defendant called his mother using the victim’s phone. He told his mother about the events that took place at the bar. At some time during the defendant’s conversation with his mom, the victim testified that the defendant became belligerent. He began to accuse the victim of cheating on him because she was hugging Zack. As she merged onto 1-49, the defendant put the gun to her head. The victim testified that she began to cry and asked him to stop.

Still holding the gun to the victim’s head, the defendant tried to call |4her brother, but was unable to reach him. The victim testified that she had no choice as to whether she should continue driving because the defendant was holding his gun to her head, ordering her to drive. He also threatened to kill the victim, her parents, her brother, her brother’s wife, her oldest son, his family, and himself.

Once the couple reached DeSoto Parish, the victim exited 1-49, and began driving down a side road. The victim noticed the defendant fidgeting with the gun. He rolled down the passenger side window and attempted to fire the gun out of the window. After a couple attempts, the defendant was able to fire a successful shot out of the window. He then put the gun back to the victim’s head.

At that time, the victim testified that the defendant was on the phone with someone that she did not know. She overheard him saying, “it was too late, it’s not [sic] I [victim] would get out the truck and not say anything.” She interpreted this statement to mean that the defendant was going to kill her. At that moment, the victim asked the defendant to let her get out of the truck. The defendant told her to “shut up” and fired his gun through the windshield. The victim testified that at that point, she had almost reached a stop sign, and that she was about to turn left onto Highway 171.

After the defendant fired the gun through the windshield, he put it back to her head and started to cry. The defendant then shot her in the head. The victim recalled hearing a loud ringing, slowing the truck down, and pulling off the road. She testified that she blacked out, but remained conscious. She heard the defendant saying, “Oh my God, Oh my God,” and “I’m sorry.” Then, the defendant shot himself.

|RThe victim testified that she got out of the vehicle initially, but she decided to get back in, turn the vehicle around, and head back toward the hospital. When she saw headlights in the rear view mirror, she stopped the truck in the road, felt her way to the end of the tailgate, and attempted to get someone’s attention. When no one came, she got back into the truck, and continued driving until she was pulled over by the police. She was able to tell Deputy Stephanie White that the defendant shot her, that he shot himself, and that he was still in the truck. The victim was airlifted to the hospital.

A few minutes after arriving at the hospital, the victim gave her statement to the police. She testified that she told an officer that the shooting “had to be an accident,” because she loved the defendant and did not want to believe that he intended to shoot her. After thinking about the events that transpired that night, the victim’s beliefs changed. She stated that it couldn’t have been an accident if the defendant repeatedly expressed that he was going to kill her, and then shot her. The gunshot shattered the victim’s sinus cavity, leaving her permanently blind in her left eye.

Bobby Wayne Smith, a saltwater hauler, testified that on July 21, 2012, at approximately 2:00 a.m., he was driving on Highway 171 in DeSoto Parish. He testified that he approached a truck parked in the middle of the road, and the driver of the truck was leaning up against the back wheel of the vehicle with the door open. Smith had to swerve into the grassy median to avoid hitting the truck. He then pulled over onto the northbound shoulder of the road, and called 9-1-1. Smith explained that he called 9-1-1 because he noticed that the driver was leaning over against the back of the truck, and |fihe couldn’t tell what type of condition the passenger of the truck was in. While on the phone with an emergency dispatcher, he witnessed the driver get back into the truck and drive away. Soon thereafter, the truck was stopped by the police.

Deputy Stephanie White of the DeSoto Parish Sheriffs Office, was the first officer to arrive on the scene. White testified that upon arrival, the truck was stopped in the middle of the road. The victim exited the truck and dropped to her knees. The victim told White that her fiancé, the defendant, had shot her, then himself, and that he was still in the truck. White observed that the victim’s face and clothes were bloody, that the left side of her face was swollen, and that she had an injury to the right side of her face. White testified that she and the victim remained at the back of her vehicle until backup arrived. When the DeSoto Parish EMS team removed the defendant from the truck, White noticed that he also had a head injury. A shell casing was found in the folds of the defendant’s pants as he was being removed from the truck. Additionally, a .40 caliber firearm was found in the truck.

Deputy Joe West, an investigator for the DeSoto Parish Sheriffs office, testified that he spoke with the victim at LSU Hospital for approximately 20 to 30 minutes on July 21, 2012. West testified that during that time, the victim, who was fully alert, told him that the defendant had shot her. The victim also told West that she believed it was an accident, and that she did not think the defendant intended to kill her. West collected, as evidence, the victim’s and the defendant’s clothing, as well as the bullet that was recovered from the defendant’s head.

Gordon Miller and Brent Crawford of the DeSoto Parish EMS team 17responded to the shooting. Miller, who treated the victim at the scene, testified that she was upset, distressed, and sobbing, but that she was alert and able to answer all of his questions. Miller stated that she had a gunshot wound that entered below her right eye, and exited below her left eye. He explained that the victim had no exteri- or bleeding because the blood was draining down her throat. This caused the victim to vomit blood. There were gun powder burns and gun powder residue around the entry wound, which Miller testified was an indication of close contact between the firearm and the wound. Miller considered the victim’s injury to be life threatening.

Crawford, who treated the defendant at the scene, testified that the defendant suffered from a single gunshot wound to his right upper forehead region. He stated that the defendant was breathing, but was not responding otherwise. Crawford considered the defendant’s injuries to be life threatening.

Sergeant John Cobb, an investigator for the DeSoto Parish Sheriffs Office, testified that on August 9, 2012, he took a statement from the victim at his office. The victim admitted that she had a few drinks, and that the defendant was drunk. She also stated that the incident was an “accident,” and that the gun “wasn’t to my temple.” Cobb stated the victim’s statement that the gun wasn’t to her temple is inconsistent with the burns on her face. The victim’s burns indicated that the gun was fired from one to six inches away from her face.

On May 9, 2013, the jury found the defendant guilty of the responsive verdict of attempted manslaughter. Regarding the second degree kidnapping charge, the defendant was found not guilty.

IsAfter considering the information contained in the presentence investigation report, as well as the victim impact statements, the trial court concluded:

Because of the seriousness of the offense and the damage imposed, the defendant is in need of correctional treatment or custodial environment that can most be effectively provided by his commitment to an institution and the most serious part of it is any lesser sentence than the one imposed would deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime.

The trial court sentenced the defendant to 20 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, with credit for time served. On July 11, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that the defendant’s sentence was excessive considering his young age and first-felony offender status. The motion was denied, and the defendant now appeals, asserting two assignments of error.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In the defendant’s first assignment of error, he alleges that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict him. Specifically, he alleges that the state failed to negate that his intoxicated state prevented him from satisfying the specific intent requirement necessary to convict him of attempted second degree murder or attempted manslaughter.

When issues are raised on appeal, both as to the sufficiency of evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 1 ahave found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517; State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La. App.2d Cir.1/14/09), 1 So.3d 833. On appeal, a reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Jackson, supra.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Eason, 43,788 (La.App.2d Cir.2/25/09), 3 So.3d 685, writ denied, 2009-0725 (La.12/11/09), 23 So.3d 913, cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1013, 130 S.Ct. 3472, 177 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2010); State v. Hill, 42,025 (La.App.2d Cir.5/9/07), 956 So.2d 758, writ denied, 2007-1209 (La.12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of a fact, for example, a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So.2d 1154 (La.1985). Circumstantial evidence provides |inproof of collateral facts and circumstances, from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Id. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by the evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Speed, 43,786 (La.App.2d Cir.1/14/09), 2 So.3d 582, writ denied, 2009-0372 (La.11/6/09), 21 So.3d 299. This is not a separate test that applies instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction. Id. Rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Speed, supra; State v. Allen, 36,180 (La.App.2d Cir.9/18/02), 828 So.2d 622, writs denied, 2002-2595 (La.3/28/03), 840 So.2d 566, 2002-2997 (La.6/27/03), 847 So.2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.Ct. 1404, 158 L.Ed.2d 90 (2004). In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Gullette, 43,032 (La.App.2d Cir.2/13/08), 975 So.2d 753; State v. Burd, 40,480 (La.App.2d Cir.1/27/06), 921 So.2d 219, writ denied, 2006-1083 (La.11/9/06), 941 So.2d 35. The fact finder is charged with making a credibility determination and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness; thus, the reviewing court may impinge on that discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. State v. Eason, supra; State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La.01/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). Such testimony alone is sufficient even where the state does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. State v. Robinson, 36,147 (La. App.2d Cir.12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1207; State v. Ponsell, 33,543 (La.App.2d Cir.8/23/00), 766 So.2d 678, writ denied, 2000-2726 (La.10/12/01), 799 So.2d 490.

La. R.S. 14:30.1, which defines second degree murder, states in pertinent part:

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juvenile, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

La. R.S. 14:31, which defines manslaughter, states in pertinent part:

A. Manslaughter is:
(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 h?.(first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed;

Further, La. R.S. 14:27(A) provides:

A. Any person who, having the specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

To support a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the state must prove the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. State v. Glover, 47,311 (La.App.2d Cir.10/10/12), 106 So.3d 129, writ denied, 2012-2667 (La.5/24/14), 116 So.3d 659; State v. Mitchell, 39,305 (La.App.2d Cir.2/17/05), 894 So.2d 1240, writ denied, 05-0741 (La.6/3/05), 903 So.2d 457. Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1); Glover, supra; State v. Davies, 35,783 (La.App.2d Cir.4/05/02), 813 So.2d 1262, unit denied, 2002-1564 (La.5/9/03) 843 So.2d 389. Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. Glover, supra, The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact, and review of that determination is to guided by the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, supra. Glover, supra.

The Louisiana Supreme has held on more than one occasion that | ^specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant’s act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v. Seals, 95-0305 (La.11/25/96), 684 So.2d 368, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1199, 117 S.Ct. 1558, 137 L.Ed.2d 705 (1997); State v. Williams, 383 So.2d 369 (La.1980). Further, the discharge of a firearm at close range and aimed at a person is indicative of a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon that person. State v. Dooley, 38,763 (La.App.2d Cir.9/22/04), 882 So.2d 731, writ denied, 2004-2645 (La.2/18/05), 896 So.2d 30; State v. Brooks, 36,855 (La.App.2d Cir.3/05/03), 839 So.2d 1075, writ denied, 2003-0974 (La.11/07/03), 857 So.2d 517.

Intoxication is a defense when the circumstances indicate that the intoxicated or drugged condition precluded the presence of a specific intent or of special knowledge required in a particular crime. La. R.S. 14:15. Intoxication is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Guess, 47,370 (La.App.2d Cir.8/8/12), 104 So.3d 41; State v. Hall, 43,920 (La.App.2d Cir.2/25/09), 4 So.3d 295, writ denied, 2009-0691 (La.12/11/09), 23 So.3d 911; State v. Tolbird, 28,986 (La.App.2d Cir.12/11/96), 685 So.2d 415. If the defendant proves that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense, the state has the burden of negating that defense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Guess, supra; Hall, supra. The jury is the ultimate fact-finder of whether a defendant proved his intoxicated condition and whether the state negated the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Legrand, 2002-1462 (La.12/3/03), 864 So.2d 89, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 947, 125 S.Ct. 1692, 161 L.Ed.2d 523 (2005). A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part as to issues regarding the question of intoxication. State v. Taylor, 42,627 (La.App.2d Cir.10/24/07), 968 So.2d 1135; Mitchell, supra.

In this case, the defendant has not disputed that he shot the victim. Therefore, we must determine whether the state proved that the defendant had the requisite specific intent to kill the victim, even though he was intoxicated.

While driving back home to Zwolle, the victim testified that the defendant was angry, even belligerent, and had repeatedly threatened to kill her while holding a gun to her head. Even though the evidence establishes that the defendant consumed a large amount of alcohol and was intoxicated that night, the defendant was able to make several phone calls to accurately inform others of what had transpired at the bar. As the defendant and the victim were traveling along the side road in De-Soto Parish, the defendant rolled down his window and fired several shots to ensure that he had cleared his jammed gun. He then shot out the front windshield of the truck, put the gun back to the victim’s head, and shot her in the head. In fact, the shot was made so close to the victim’s head that she suffered from gun powder burns and had gun powder residue around the entry wound. The defendant’s expressions of remorse after he had shot the victim at close range does not mean that he did have the requisite specific intent to kill her.

The testimony and evidence presented at trial, when viewed pursuant to the Jackson standard in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to support the conviction of attempted manslaughter. This 11sevidence was sufficient for the jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of what he was doing in his intoxicated state. The defendant was not intoxicated to the point that he was unable to form the requisite specific intent to kill the victim. The overt acts of repeatedly holding the gun to the victim’s head while threatening to kill her, and ultimately firing it, when reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, manifests an intent to kill. This assignment of error is without merit.

Excessiveness of Sentence

In the defendant’s second assignment of error, he alleges that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence of 20 years for his attempted manslaughter conviction. He further alleges that the application of this maximum sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in accordance with La. Const. Art. 1, § 20.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial judge is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects that he adequately considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688 (La.1983); State v. Lathan, 41,855 (La. App.2d Cir.2/28/07), 953 So.2d 890, writ denied, 2007-0805 (La.3/28/08), 978 So.2d 297. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has h ¿not been full compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475 (La.1982); State v. Swayzer, 43,350 (La. App.2d Cir.8/13/08), 989 So.2d 267. The important elements which should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049 (La.1981); State v. Ates, 43,327 (La.App.2d Cir. 8/13/08), 989 So.2d 259, writ denied, 2008-2341 (La.5/15/09), 8 So.3d 581. There is no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Shumaker, 41,547 (La.App.2d Cir.12/13/06), 945 So.2d 277, writ denied, 2007-0144 (La.9/28/07), 964 So.2d 351.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. Art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Smith, 01-2574 (La.1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 166.

The trial judge is given wide discretion in imposing sentences within the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed by him should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of his discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La.12/13/04), 893 So.2d 7.

As a general rule, maximum or near maximum sentences are reserved 117for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 2007-2031 (La.2/15/08), 974 So.2d 665; State v. McKinney, 43,061 (La.App.2d Cir.2/13/08), 976 So.2d 802; State v. Woods, 41,420 (La. App.2d Cir.11/1/06), 942 So.2d 658, writs denied, 2006-2768, 2006-2781 (La.6/22/07), 959 So.2d 494. The maximum penalty for manslaughter is 40 years’ imprisonment at hard labor. La. R.S. 14:31(B). The maximum penalty for attempted manslaughter is 20 years’ imprisonment at hard labor. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

The record indicates that the trial court took cognizance of the sentencing guidelines set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that it had reviewed the victim impact statements and the presentence investigation report. It acknowledged that the defendant was a first felony offender, and recited the defendant’s criminal history. The trial court also noted for the record that in its opinion, the jury, despite ample evidence, showed great leniency and mercy on the defendant. It expressed that there was more than sufficient evidence to convict the defendant as charged of attempted second degree murder, but that the jury was within its province of finding the defendant guilty of attempted manslaughter.

Regarding the aggravating circumstances, the trial court noted that the evidence establishes that the defendant’s conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty, and that the defendant created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. Further, the defendant made threats and used actual violence during the commission of the offense. The offense resulted in the victim’s sinus cavity being shattered, | isleaving her permanently blind in her left eye, and her constant fear the defendant will harm her again. She also suffered from economic loss. The defendant used a firearm in the commission of this offense.

The court also acknowledged the mitigating circumstances, noting the defendant’s lack of any significant criminal history prior to this offense, and the defendant’s youth. It noted the defendant received, by his own hand, a significant injury to himself in response to his actions.

The trial court found no evidence that the defendant would commit another offense during a period of suspension or probation. However, as stated in the facts section of this opinion, the trial court determined that because of the seriousness of this offense, and the damage imposed, the defendant was in need or correctional treatment or a custodial environment that could be most effectively provided by his commitment to an institution.

The record reveals that the trial court adequately considered the appropriate mitigating and aggravating circumstances in determining the defendant’s sentence pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Considering the seriousness of the defendant’s offense in shooting his fiancé, who is also the mother of his child, and the significant permanent injury she sustained, the 20-year sentence imposed by the trial court does not shock the sense of justice, nor is it disproportionate to the severity of the offense. The defendant committed a very serious crime without regard for human life, including his own. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence for the defendant’s attempted manslaughter conviction. This assignment of error is meritless.

CONCLUSION

|1sWe affirm the defendant’s 20-year sentence pursuant to his attempted manslaughter conviction.

AFFIRMED.


author: WILLIAMS, J.

text:
    Kathy Long HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant v. MID-CITY PLAZA SOUTH, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 48,899-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2014.

      John S. Stephens, for Appellant.
    Steven E. Soileau, Shreveport, for Ap-pellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, STEWART and CARAWAY, JJ.
   WILLIAMS, J.

b The plaintiff, Kathy Hampton, appeals a judgment in favor of the defendant, Mid-City Plaza South, LLC. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal, finding that plaintiff failed to prove that defendant was liable for her injury. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

In July 2011, Kathy Hampton was a tenant at an apartment complex owned by Mid-City Plaza South, LLC (“the Plaza”), and located on Line Avenue in Shreveport. Hampton’s adult son, Joshua Bass, was residing with her at the time. On July 28, 2011, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Bass arrived at the apartment while employees of the Plaza were stripping and waxing the floors. When Bass sought to walk down the hallway to his mother’s apartment, a maintenance worker, Troy Tillman, asked him to wait 15-30 minutes so that the floor could dry. Bass did not want to wait and began arguing with Tillman. From inside her apartment, Hampton heard Tillman say that Bass needed to wait for the floor to dry. When Hampton stepped into the hallway she slipped and fell, hitting her left knee on the floor. During the morning on July 29, 2011, Hampton went to the emergency room at Christus Schumpert Medical Center complaining of left knee pain. She did not report her fall to anyone at the Plaza.

Subsequently, the plaintiff, Kathy Hampton, filed a petition for damages against the defendant, Mid-City Plaza South, LLC. At trial, the plaintiff and Bass testified. After plaintiff presented her evidence, the defendant moved for involuntary dismissal. The trial court granted the motion for involuntary dismissal, finding that plaintiff failed to present [^sufficient evidence to prove that the condition of the floor caused her fall. The court rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims. The plaintiff appeals the judgment.

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting the motion for involuntary dismissal. Plaintiff argues that she presented evidence to show that defendant’s act of waxing the floor created a dangerous condition that caused her to slip and fall.

In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party may move for a dismissal of the action as to him on the grounds that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has not shown a right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to render a judgment until the close of all the evidence. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1672(B). A motion for involuntary dismissal requires the trial court to evaluate the evidence and render a decision based on a preponderance of the evidence, without any special inference in favor of the party opposing the motion. Wolfe v. Town of Homer, 44,086 (La.App.2d Cir.4/15/09), 11 So.3d 39. The trial court’s decision to grant involuntary dismissal should not be reversed unless clearly wrong. Vig v. City of Shreveport, 28,530 (La.App.2d Cir.8/21/96), 679 So.2d 524. There is no manifest error if a reasonable factual basis exists for the trial court’s finding. Lowe v. Skyjacker Suspensions, 45,058 (La.App.2d Cir.3/3/10), 32 So.3d 340.

A landowner owes a duty to discover any unreasonably dangerous | ^condition and either correct the condition or warn of its existence. Eisenhardt v. Snook, 2008-1287 (La.3/17/09), 8 So.3d 541. The test to determine if a breach of a landowner’s duty has occurred is whether, in the management of his property, he has acted as a reasonable person in view of the probability of injury to others. Collins v. Whitaker, 29,324 (La.App.2d Cir.4/2/97), 691 So.2d 820. A landowner is not liable for an injury which results from a condition that should have been observed by the individual in the exercise of reasonable care. Eisenhardt, supra.

In the present case, Bass testified that he arrived at the apartment building in the early morning hours after work. Bass stated that upon reaching the floor where his mother’s apartment was located, Tillman told him that he needed to wait thirty minutes before walking down the hallway because the floor had just been waxed and was not dry. Bass testified that after an argument, he pushed past Tillman, walked down the hall and knocked on his mother’s door. Bass stated that after his mother opened the door, he entered the apartment and she stepped into the hallway, slipped and fell. Bass testified that the floor looked shiny after being waxed.

The plaintiff, Hampton, testified that prior to the accident, she was inside her apartment and heard a commotion in the hallway. Hampton stated that she heard the voices of her son and Tillman, an employee of the defendant. Hampton testified that when she opened the door, her son told her that Tillman had not wanted him to walk down the hallway because “he said the floor is wet.” Hampton acknowledged previously stating in her deposition that she had heard Tillman say that the floor was wet and needed to dry. Hampton testified that despite her knowledge that the floor was wet, |4she stepped into the hallway, slipped and fell on her left knee.

Although plaintiff presented evidence that the floor had been waxed shortly before the accident, there was no showing that the defendant acted unreasonably in waxing the floor at a time when few tenants would be expected to be walking in the hall. Additionally, the defendant’s employee informed Bass about the wet condition of the floor and tried to prevent him from walking in the hallway until the floor had dried. In her testimony, plaintiff acknowledged that before opening her door she heard the worker say that the floor had been waxed and was not dry.

Thus, the evidence demonstrates that before stepping into the hallway, plaintiff knew or should have known that the floor still could be slippery. Further, the floor appeared shiny, indicating that the surface was slick. Even though the floor may have been slippery, not every minor imperfection or defect in a thing will give rise to delictual responsibility. Eisen-hardt, supra.

The evidence contained in this record supports a finding that plaintiff, who walked into the hallway with knowledge of the wet condition of the floor, failed to act with sufficient care at the time of the accident. Plaintiff did not show any circumstance that would have required her to act in haste to venture into the hallway despite the condition of the floor. Consequently, we cannot say the trial court was clearly wrong in finding that plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of proving that her fall was caused by defendant’s negligence. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim. The assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

| ¡¿For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Kathy Hampton.

AFFIRMED.


author: JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.

text:
    Michael O. READ v. WILLWOODS COMMUNITY.
    No. 14-CA-20.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    May 21, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied June 9, 2014.

      Daniel Lund, Attorney at Law, Montgomery Barnett, LLP, Timothy J. Young, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
    Evans Schmidt, Attorney at Law, Koch & Schmidt, LLC, Robert J.A. Williams, Norris S.L. Williams, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellant.
    Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, JUDE G. GRAVOIS, and HANS J. LILJEBERG.
   JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.

| ¡.Defendant, Willwoods Community, appeals a judgment of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court in favor of plaintiff, Michael 0. Read, finding that defendant breached an oral employment contract having a five-year term and awarding plaintiff $510,328.75 in damages. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Willwoods is a private charitable foundation subject to the precepts of the Roman Catholic Church. It is uncontested in this case that Willwoods, like any private employer in Louisiana, is subject to Louisiana employment statutes and the laws relating to obligations.

Willwoods is governed by a Board of Trustees. In January of 2009, John Becker was chairman of the Board and Patrick Veters was vice chairman. Also on the Board were Monsignor Christopher Natty and Dr. Frank Schmidt. Father Thomas Chambers served as president of Will-woods.

At a Board meeting held on January 20, 2009, a hiring committee was appointed to fill the newly-created position of executive director. This position was created as part of a succession plan to succeed Father Chambers, who was 74 Lyears old at the time. As Mr. Becker explained, the executive director would be expected to work with Father Chambers, who would delegate responsibilities to him, so that at the time when Father Chambers was prepared to step aside, the executive director could step seamlessly into the position of president. The hiring committee was chaired by Mr. Veters, who was joined by Mr. Becker, Dr. Schmidt, and Monsignor Nal-

ty-

Later that month, plaintiff, who was then 65 years old, dined out with his wife, his mother, and Father Chambers, a close friend of plaintiffs family. The conversation drifted to Willwoods, at which point Father Chambers mentioned that a search for his successor was being conducted. Plaintiff expressed interest, stating that working for a non-profit was something he had considered doing in his “later years.” Within a few days, Mr. Becker contacted plaintiff regarding his interest in the position. Plaintiff submitted his resume and was asked to meet with the hiring committee for an interview.

On the afternoon of February 19, 2009, plaintiff met with the committee at Will-woods’ office. Plaintiff was one of three individuals interviewed for the position. All three individuals were interviewed on the same day, one after the other, with plaintiffs interview being conducted second. During his interview, according to plaintiff, Mr. Veters “made a statement that the committee did not want to go through this procedure again anytime soon, and said that they were looking for someone to make a commitment for five to six years.” Mr. Veters then asked plaintiff, “Mike, given your age of 65, are you prepared to make such a commitment?” Plaintiff responded that he was, explaining to the jury that , he had a very secure position at Capital One Bank where he had been Senior Vice President for eight years and from which he had planned to retire at age 70. He testified that | ¿Willwoods’ expressed need for a five- or six-year commitment was “pivotal in [his] decision to consider leaving Capital One” for employment with Willwoods. He added:

I would have raised the question had it not been asked, because as much as I wanted to work in the Willwoods’ Ministry with a friend such as [Father] Chambers, I could not have afforded to do so without the security of a five-year commitment. That was an absolutely essential component of the job.

Plaintiff further testified:

When [Mr. Veters] asked me that question, and I answered “yes,” I felt we had a meeting of the minds. They wanted a five-year commitment. I wanted a five-year commitment. I felt very comfortable. If I had answered that question “no,” the meeting would have ended right there, because I would have disqualified myself. And we never would have gone any further.

Monsignor Nalty described the interview with plaintiff as “very friendly,” where the committee members were “familiar” with plaintiff. Indeed, Monsignor Nalty testified that he had been friends with plaintiff since high school. Mr. Becker had served on several boards with plaintiff and was aware of plaintiffs involvement in the community. Mr. Veters had been acquainted with plaintiff for about ten years by virtue of his reputation in the community and their serving together on the Board of Holy Cross College. And Dr. Schmidt explained that he had known plaintiff “for quite a few years.”

According to Monsignor Nalty, because everyone on the committee was familiar with plaintiffs resume and his work in the community, the purpose of the interview was for the committee to determine if plaintiffs goals would align with Will-woods’. One factor in this consideration was the individual’s compatibility with Father Chambers. As Monsignor Nalty explained, the committee wanted “someone who [Father Chambers] would be very, very comfortable working with.” | sDue to plaintiffs long and close personal relationship with Father Chambers, plaintiff was thought to be “ideal” for the position.

In addition to compatibility with Father Chambers, the committee was also looking for a committed individual. Whether this commitment was to be for a definite period of time forms the core of the dispute between the parties. As indicated by plaintiffs testimony, he avows that during his interview, Mr. Veters stated the committee was looking for a five- or six-year commitment. However, Mr. Veters and the other committee members present for plaintiffs interview disputed this at trial.

Mr. Veters testified that when searching for an individual to fill the position, the committee was not interested in hiring someone who would leave after six months or a year. Mr. Veters stated he could not recall whether he asked plaintiff during the interview if he was prepared to make a commitment for a certain period of time. But, as he explained, “What was important to me was that [the] person for the executive director position would give it his best efforts.” This was especially so with plaintiff, who

was coming to us at an age of 65. And quite frankly, many people retire. And I wanted to make sure with [plaintiff], more than the other candidates, that he was prepared to give it his best efforts, and I was interested in how long he thought he might work. I was looking for him to give it a good run. And if his intent was to come to Willwoods to a nonprofit, work six months to one year, and then retire, that didn’t appeal to me.... [W]e ended our interview with [plaintiff] answering, “Pat, I’m going to work at this job as hard and as long as I can do it, and give it my best efforts.” When he told me that, I was satisfied.

Mr. Veters further testified that during the interview, plaintiff did not indicate a requirement for long-term employment, nor did he inquire as to the position’s duration. He further explained that from the time the hiring committee was formed until plaintiff was offered the job, there was never any discussion | ¿regarding a term of employment for the position. Throughout his testimony, Mr. Veters repeated that there were no job offers extended to any of the candidates during the interviews.

Monsignor Nalty reiterated the committee’s desire for a commitment longer than one year, testifying:

[G]iven [plaintiffs] age, Mr. Veters ... asked [plaintiff] “[W]hat are you thinking in terms of employment here?” Because we’re talking about a process, and we didn’t know if [plaintiff] was getting ready to retire, and he just wanted to work here for six months, or a year. Or whether he thought that he would be there longer. So, it was just a general interview question. Just like if you came in to hire somebody to work at your restaurant. “You want to work here for the summer, or you want to work here for a few years? And what are your intentions?” So the question revolved around that.

The following colloquy then occurred during plaintiffs direct examination of Monsignor Nalty:

[Plaintiffs Counsel]: The committee wasn’t into hiring someone for six months, or a year?
[Monsignor Nalty]: No.... We didn’t know how long the transition was going to go. To bring someone into this community with the relationships that’s in it, and to have them leave after six months we would have thought that was not our intention .... We did want someone who was desirous of staying there longer.
[Plaintiffs Counsel]: Longer than what?
[Monsignor Nalty]: We didn’t know. Because we didn’t know how long [Father Chambers] was going to be there. He’s still there.... We didn’t want someone who was going to treat Will-woods like a revolving door.
[Plaintiffs Counsel]: So the subject came up?
[Monsignor Nalty]: The subject came up. Yeah. The subject came up. Pat Veters asked [plaintiff] “[D]o you mean this? How long do you want to work?” Because, I think, we all thought [plaintiff] was getting ready to retire. And |7[plaintiff] said “[W]hatever it takes. As long as I can work.”

Then, on redirect, plaintiffs counsel recited a question that had been asked of Monsignor Nalty during his deposition: “ “Whether that succession plan period was fifteen years or ten years, ... did you have a feeling in your own mind as to what that minimum period would be?’ ” Monsignor Nalty recited his answer: “ ‘I don’t think it was more than ten. I probably thought it was. I’d say, perception that it wasn’t discussed. We didn’t discuss it. It was probably between five and ten.’ ”

Monsignor Natty also testified that the committee had not discussed the possibility of extending an offer for a definite term of employment, that there was never any discussion of hiring someone for five or six years, and that the committee did not ask plaintiff for a commitment. He further testified that plaintiff did not inform the committee of his need for long-term employment, nor did he request a commitment from Willwoods.

Mr. Becker also explained that the committee wanted to fill the position with a committed individual, testifying that they were “looking for a commitment to do the full time job.” For this reason, Mr. Becker acknowledged that Mr. Veters asked plaintiff if he was “willing to commit to the job.” Yet, as Mr. Becker explained, it was never determined what the duration of that commitment might be: “We really didn’t have a definite period in mind. It was indefinite. We hired an executive director, and said ‘[Njature will take its course if something comes about where he would take over[.]’” Mr. Becker further testified that there was never a discussion of a contract.

Dr. Schmidt testified that there was never a discussion of extending an employment contract for a certain number of years and that plaintiff never Vindicated during his interview that he needed an employment contract from Willwoods. Dr. Schmidt acknowledged that Mr. Veters inquired as to plaintiffs commitment, but never specified a period of time for that commitment:

Toward the end of the interview, Mr. Veters did ask [plaintiff] what he thought, about his future, and every member of the committee was aware of the fact that at the time [of plaintiffs interview], he was 65 years of age, and [Mr. Veters] wondered whether he was interested in working for a longer time, or what his plans were for the future, and as I remember, [plaintiff] said that he felt he would like to work as long as he felt that he could be productive and could make a contribution.

Dr. Schmidt also explained that the committee did not intend to make any offers on the day of the interviews.

Plaintiff was the unanimous choice of the committee and, about one month after the interview, was informed that he had been selected for the position. Plaintiff met with Mr. Veters on April 24, 2009, at which meeting they discussed more specifics about the job, including salary, benefits, and a start date. They did not discuss a duration for the position, five years or otherwise, and a written contract was not requested, nor was one offered. Plaintiff started working for Willwoods on June 1, 2009.

In late April of 2010, plaintiff learned from Mr. Becker that the committee was meeting to discuss his termination. This was a surprise to plaintiff, who had no knowledge that anything was wrong with his employment at Willwoods. During this conversation, plaintiff did not convey to Mr. Becker that he was under contract. On May 11, 2010, the Board convened and decided to terminate plaintiff. Thereafter, on May 22, plaintiff met with Monsignor Nalty to discuss the possibility of working things out. According to Monsignor Nalty, during this meeting, plaintiff acknowledged that he was not under contract. However, plaintiff | ^¡disputed this, testifying that a contract, or the lack thereof, was never mentioned at this meeting.

Plaintiff was officially notified of his termination at a meeting with Mr. Becker and Mr. Veters on May 25, 2010. According to Mr. Veters, plaintiff did not indicate that he was under contract at this meeting. Plaintiff testified that two days later, he drafted a letter to Mr. Becker and Mr. Veters, stating, among other things, that he expected to receive four years of salary and benefits.

On July 12, 2010, plaintiff filed suit against Willwoods, alleging that it had breached the parties’ oral employment contract for a minimum defined term of five years by terminating plaintiff after only one year without identifying any serious ground of complaint or issue of cause for the termination.

After discovery was conducted and depositions were taken, Willwoods moved for summary judgment, arguing that as a matter of law, plaintiff could not establish that he was employed for a definite term. The trial court granted Willwoods’ motion, dismissing plaintiffs suit with prejudice. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment and remanded the matter. Read v. Willwoods Cmty., 11-222 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/14/12), 88 So.3d 534, writ denied, 12-0616 (La.4/27/12), 86 So.3d 629. A jury trial on the merits was conducted, following which nine of the twelve jurors found that a limited duration employment contract existed between the parties for a term of five years.

On July 23, 2013, the trial court issued its judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict, noting that in the event the jury found a contract existed, damages would be calculated in accordance with the pretrial stipulations that plaintiffs annual salary was $130,000.00, that the contract was for a term of five years, and that plaintiff had been compensated for one year and 24 days prior to his termination. Pursuant to these stipulations, the court rendered judgment in favor of | inplaintif'f, awarding damages in the amount of $510,328.75, together with interest from date of judicial demand until paid, and for all costs of the proceeding.

On August 5, 2013, Willwoods filed a “Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, and in the alternative, Motion for New Trial.” The trial court denied this motion following a hearing on September 23, 2013. On October 16, 2013, Will-woods sought and was granted a suspen-sive appeal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In Louisiana, there are two types of contracts for hire: the limited duration contract and the terminable at will contract. Read, 88 So.3d at 538 (citing La. C.C. arts. 2746-2750). Under a limited duration contract, the parties agree to be bound for a certain period of time during which the employee is not free to depart without assigning cause, nor is the employer at liberty to dismiss the employee without assigning any reason for so doing. Id. The parties must consent to the period of time that is to be the duration of the contract. Id. The party relying on an alleged contract of employment for a set duration of time has the burden of proof that there was a meeting of the minds on the length of time of the employment. Id. Under facts showing no meeting of the minds, the contract of employment for a set duration of time is void for lack of consent, and what remains is a contract of employment terminable at will. Id.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 1846 requires that an oral contract with a “price or value ... in excess of five hundred dollars ... be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.” Suite v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459 (La.4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 58 (quoting La. C.C. art. 1846). A plaintiff may offer his own testimony in support of his claim; however, the other circumstances which corroborate the claim must come from a source other than the plaintiff. Id.; see also Regel L. Bisso, L.L.C. v. Stortz, 11-25 (La.App-n 5 Cir. 10/25/11), 77 So.3d 1033, 1035-36. For instance, in Swire, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had failed, as a matter of law, to establish the existence of an oral contract under La. C.C. art. 1846 where the only proof offered by the plaintiff consisted of his own uncorroborated deposition testimony. Id.

The “other corroborating circumstances” need only be general in nature; independent proof of every detail of the agreement is not required. Suite, 907 So.2d at 58.

Whether there are corroborating circumstances sufficient to establish an oral contract under La. C.C. art. 1846 is a finding of fact to be made by the trier of fact and will not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong. Treen Const. Co., Inc. v. Schott, 03-1232 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/27/04), 866 So.2d 950, 954; Gulf Container Repair Servs., Inc. v. FIC Bus. & Fin.Centers, Inc., 98-1144 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/10/99), 735 So.2d 41, 43.

In Brodhead v. Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges & Universities, 588 So.2d 748, 749 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 597 (La.1992), the First Circuit reversed the trial court, finding that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy his burden of proving that there was a meeting of the minds concerning an alleged oral employment contract for a five-year term. The plaintiff, a former athletic director of Louisiana State University, attended a meeting with representatives of defendant, Southeastern Louisiana University (SLU), where he was asked what it would take to get him as athletic director for SLU. Id. at 750. The plaintiff specified an annual salary of $72,000.00 and a five-year contract. Id. This answer |1i?was met with silence. Id. Approximately one month later, the plaintiff again met with a representative of defendant who had been delegated the task of negotiating a contract with the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff described this negotiation as follows:

Dr. [Robert] Butler and I discussed [$72,000.00] per year, five-year agreement. He said he would take those back to Dr. [G. Warren] Smith[, president of SLU]. Dr. Butler and I met with Dr. Smith after that and they were discussed again. So I felt at that point in time that since I was going to become Athletic Director, that the entire terms of the agreement had been reached.

Id.

While acknowledging that neither Dr. Smith nor Dr. Butler told him he had a five-year contract of employment, the plaintiff maintained that they told him he had a deal and it needed formalization only. Id. To the contrary, Dr. Smith and Dr. Butler maintained that whenever the five-year employment contract was mentioned, they responded that they would investigate a method for the university to enter into a multi-year contract. Id.

The plaintiff then attended a Board of Trastees meeting, prior to which Dr. Butler cautioned the plaintiff not to be alarmed at what he might hear. Id. at 750-51. At the meeting, the Board approved the plaintiffs employment at $46,600.00 for one year. Id. Following the Board meeting, attempts were made between the parties to agree upon a written contract. Id. at 751. Despite an offer from plaintiff and a counter-offer from defendant, the parties did not enter into a written contract. Id.

In support of his contention that there was a five-year contract between the parties, the plaintiff argued his conversation with Dr. Butler prior to the Board meeting demonstrated that the Board’s quotation of salary ($46,600.00) did not reflect the true agreement between the parties, as he was in fact being paid | ia$72,000.00. Id. From this, he argued that, correspondingly, the quotation of a one-year term also did not reflect the agreement between the parties. Id. The First Circuit rejected this argument, finding that “the parties’ meeting of the minds on the salary ... does not compel a conclusion that there was a meeting of the minds on the five-year term of employment.” Id. The court explained: “[TJhere was no prior agreement to a term of employment.... [Sjince there was no prior agreement to a five-year term, and since [the plaintiff] did not agree to an employment term of one year as announced by the Board, his employment was ‘at will.’ ” Id.

Turning to the instant case, the law as discussed above imposes upon plaintiff the burden of proving that there was a meeting of the minds on the duration of the alleged oral employment contract — a burden he was required to meet with at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances. While plaintiff himself may serve as the “one witness,” the “other corroborating circumstances” must come from a source other than plaintiff and need only be general, not independent proof of every detail of the contract. Suire, 907 So.2d at 58.

Upon review, we find that the jury was not clearly wrong in concluding that plaintiff upheld his burden of proving the existence of a fixed-term oral employment contract in light of plaintiffs testimony and other generally corroborative evidence introduced at the trial. Plaintiff testified that during his interview, Mr. Veters “made a statement that the committee did not want to go through this procedure again anytime soon, and said that they were looking for someone to make a commitment for five to six years.” Although Mr. Veters and the other committee members disputed this at trial, we find that the jury’s decision |uto credit plaintiffs testimony over that of the committee members was not clearly wrong.

Willwoods contends, on policy grounds, that a single interview question, such as Mr. Veters’, should not form a fixed-term employment contract lest a chilling effect would result on employers during the job interview process. We do not hold that Mr. Veters’ single interview question, by itself, established the fixed-term employment contract. Rather, this question, in conjunction with other corroborating facts and circumstances, formed a factual basis from which the jury could, and apparently did, reasonably infer a meeting of the minds between the parties concerning a five-year fixed-term employment contract.

Plaintiffs decision to leave “secure employment” with Capital One Bank for employment with Willwoods corroborates the claim that plaintiff only accepted Will-woods’ offer of employment on the condition that it would be for a fixed term. And testimony from each of the four committee members generally 11r,corroborates plaintiffs assertion that there was a meeting of the minds concerning a multi-year employment contract.

Mr. Veters’ testimony indicated that Willwoods wanted a commitment for longer than one year. He testified: “I was interested in how long [plaintiff] thought he might work. I was looking for him to give it a good run. And if his intent was to come to Willwoods to a nonprofit, work six months to one year, and then retire, that didn’t appeal to me.” Monsignor Nalty echoed this sentiment, testifying, “We did want someone who was desirous of staying there longer [than six months or a year].” Notably, the monsignor also acknowledged that he thought the succession plan “was probably between five and ten [years].” Mr. Becker testified: “I was looking for a commitment to do the full time job. And I think [plaintiff] was aware that that was our feeling.” Dr. Schmidt testified that during plaintiffs interview, Mr. Veters inquired as to plaintiffs future, wondering whether plaintiff was interested in working for a longer time and what his plans were for the future.

Although the four committee members avowed at trial that a five-year commitment for the executive director position had neither been discussed prior to nor raised during plaintiffs interview, we find that their testimony indicating their interest in plaintiffs future and his level of commitment, their expressed need for a commitment longer than one year, and Monsignor Nalty’s admission that the succession plan was probably between five and ten years, generally corroborates plaintiffs assertion that there was a meeting of the minds concerning a five-year employment contract. We therefore conclude that the jury was not clearly wrong in finding the existence of an oral five-year employment contract.

\ ^CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment under review in favor of plaintiff. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Willwoods.

AFFIRMED.

      . Mr. Becker recalled plaintiffs interview as being conducted last.

        . See also Lakewood Estates Homeowner’s Ass'n, Inc. v. Markle, 02-1864 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/03), 847 So.2d 633, 637-38, writ denied, 03-1511 (La.9/26/03), 854 So.2d 362 (affirming the trial court's judgment that no oral contract was established under La. C.C. art. 1846 where the only proof offered was the uncorroborated testimony of the party seeking to prove the contract).

      . See, e.g., Meredith v. Louisiana Fed'n of Teachers, 209 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir.2000) (finding that the "corroborating evidence may be the fact that the plaintiff left a secure position to work for [a] new employer.”).

      . The plaintiff was in fact paid $72,000.00 per year. Brodhead, 588 So.2d at 751. Dr. Smith explained that $45,000.00 of the plaintiff’s salary was derived from the university’s operating budget and the other $27,000.00 was derived from Booster contributions or external fees. Id. at 751, n. 3.

      . It is beyond dispute that the alleged employment contract with an annual salary of $130,000.00 had a “price or value ... in excess of [$500.00].” La. C.C. art. 1846.

      . It is noted that the jury was instructed on the law regarding the formation of oral contracts as follows: "In Louisiana, if the price or value is in excess of five hundred dollars, the contract must be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances. While a plaintiff may serves [sic] as a witness to establish the existence of an oral contract, the other corroborating circumstances must come from a source other than the plaintiff.”

      . Although Willwoods argues that the record contains absolutely no evidence that plaintiff left "secure employment” to go to Willwoods, we note that Willwoods, in brief and at oral argument, employs a narrow definition of "secure employment” to denote not-at-will employment, or fixed-term employment. Because plaintiff did not have fixed-term employment at Capital One Bank, Willwoods argues that his departure therefrom cannot corroborate the formation of a fixed-term employment contract with Willwoods. In support of this argument, Willwoods relies on Meredith, supra, at n. 3, in which the plaintiff left fixed-term employment to accept employment which, she argued and the jury found, was also for a fixed term.
      Although the plaintiff in Meredith did leave fixed-term employment, which the court described as "secure,” we find the court’s opinion does not stand for the proposition that "secure employment” only denotes employment for a fixed term. In Meredith, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated as a principle of law that "corroborating evidence may be the fact that the plaintiff left a secure position to work for the new employer.” Meredith, 209 F.3d at 403 (citing Higgins v. Smith Int’l, 716 F.2d 278, 283 n. 3 (5th Cir.1983), disavowed on other grounds by Overman v. Fluor Constructors, Inc., 797 F.2d 217, 219 n. 8 (5th Cir.1986); Lanier v. Alenco, 459 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir.1972)).
      Our review of Higgins and Lanier supports our determination that "secure employment” in this context is not limited to the narrow definition of fixed-term employment. In Higgins, the court stated:
      The evidence presented at trial indicated that, after some period of discussion initiated by Smith International, Higgins left a well-paying position with a stateside drilling company to do comparable work for Smith International in Brazil. The jury could, and apparently did, draw from these roundly-conceded facts an inference that Higgins took the job with Smith International only after he was assured of some security while in its employ[.]

        Higgins, 716 F.2d at 283. In Lanier, the court stated:
      [Plaintiff], with a wife and four children, left a secure and well-paying position with General Electric, a position that he had held for eleven years, to join Alenco as a branch sales manager. Like the trial judge, we find it unlikely that [plaintiff] would leave that sort of employment without some substantial representation of a secure position at Alenco.

        Lanier, 459 F.2d at 692.

      . Although apparently disputed at trial, we note that in its brief on appeal, Willwoods now admits that "... during [plaintiff's] initial February 19, 2009 job interview with Willwoods, Mr. Pat Veters, a member of the Hiring Committee, stated that he did not want to go through this process again anytime soon, and that they said that they were looking for someone to make a commitment for fire or six years.... Mr. Veters then asked [Mr.] Read, ‘Mike, given your age of 65, are you prepared to make such a commitment.' ... [Mr.] Read advised that he was.”