text:
    PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC., Appellant, v. Marisol SANTOS, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-3053.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    July 31, 2013.

      Weiss Serota Helfman Pastoriza Cole & Boniske, P.L., Edward G. Guedes, Coral Gables; and Angones McClure & Garcia, P.A., and Surama Suarez, Miami, for appellant.
    Billbrough & Marks, P.A., and Geoffrey B. Marks and Kristy Ochipinti, Coral Gables; Goldberg & Rosen, P.A., Judd Gordon Rosen, Miami, for appellee.
    Before CORTIÑAS, FERNANDEZ and LOGUE, JJ.
   FERNANDEZ, J.

Publix Super Markets, Inc., petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the trial court’s discovery order that instructed Publix to supplement its response to an earlier interrogatory. We grant Publix’s petition for writ of certiorari because the trial court’s discovery order gives the respondent carte blanche to irrelevant discovery, thus it departs from the essential requirements of the law and causes irreparable injury to Publix, for which there is no adequate remedy on appeal.

Marisol Santos filed suit against Publix for common law negligence and negligent mode of operation. Santos alleged she was an invitee on May 25, 2011, at a specific Publix store located in Miami, Florida. She also alleged that she slipped and fell as a result of “old wet spinach or some other transitory substance” on the floor at that Publix store. Santos sought the discovery of all slips and falls at the specific store where she fell, within the three years prior to her accident. Publix served Santos with its response to that interrogatory, which showed that no prior incidents occurred in the subject Publix store.

Santos thereafter sought to depose Pub-lix and requested that Publix produce all incident reports relative to any occurrence at kiosks located in Publix stores within the State of Florida. Publix objected and moved for a protective order, contending that the burden of proof standard set forth in section 768.0755, Florida Statutes (2011), did not require it to produce the information Santos sought. The trial court ordered Publix to supplement its response to an earlier interrogatory, which was directed to prior incidents at the store, with information as to all of Publix’s stores statewide within the past three years.

Publix correctly argues that cer-tiorari relief is appropriate. This Court has jurisdiction to review a discovery order when the order departs from the essential requirements of law, causes material injury throughout the remainder of the proceedings below and leaves no adequate remedy on appeal. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla.1995). Although overbreadth by itself is not a sufficient basis for certiorari jurisdiction, the Florida Supreme Court has held that cer-tiorari review is appropriate where the discovery order effectively grants “carte blanche” to irrelevant discovery. See Board of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. American Educ. Enters., LLC, 99 So.3d 450, 457 (Fla.2012) (citation omitted). In addition, because the trial court’s discovery order is limited to its interpretation of section 768.0755, we review the interpretation of the statute de novo. See West Fla. Reg. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So.3d 1, 8-9 (Fla.2012).

We agree with Publix that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law and misconstrued section 786.0755 when it required Publix to provide incident information relating to all Publix stores located in Florida. We conclude that the trial court misinterpreted section 768.0755 because it allowed Santos to procure information that is irrelevant with respect to her burden of proof under the applicable statute. In effect, the order grants Santos “carte blanche” discovery to this irrelevant information.

Section 768.0755(1) states, “[i]f a person slips and falls on a transitory substance in a business establishment, the injured person must prove that the business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it.” § 768.0755(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). Further, the statute states, “[t]his section does not affect any common-law duty of care owed by a person or entity in possession or control of a business premises.” § 768.0755(2), Fla. Stat. (2011).

When the legislature repealed section 768.0710, Florida Statutes (2009), and enacted section 768.0755, the “business establishment” language of subsection one replaced the “person or entity” language, which is still found in subsection two. Compare § 768.0710, Fla. Stat. (2009), with § 768.0755, Fla. Stat. (2010). Section 768.0710 focused primarily on the actual or constructive knowledge of the “person or entity in control of the business premises.” See § 768.0710 (2009), Fla. Stat. The legislature’s enactment of section 768.0755 instead focuses on the particular “business establishment” where the slip and fall occurred. An injured person must now prove that the particular “business establishment” where the injury occurred had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and discovery should be restricted to information on the particular establishment. See § 768.0755(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). However, the term “business establishment” is not defined in the statute, nor is it defined in any Florida case.

The Florida Supreme Court declared that when the legislature amends a statute and omits words, the courts must presume the omission gives the statute a different meaning than its predecessor. See Capella v. City of Gainesville, 377 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla.1979); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla.1977) (explaining that change in language indicates the legislature’s intent to change the meaning of the amended statute). Furthermore, when a statute has not defined a certain term, a basic canon of statutory-construction requires the specific term to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salgado, 22 So.3d 594, 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (quoting Florida Dep’t. of Revenue v. New Sea Escape Cruises, Ltd., 894 So.2d 954, 961 (Fla.2005)). The plain and ordinary meaning of a term can be ascertained through the use of a dictionary. Id.; Gardner v. Johnson, 451 So.2d 477, 478 (Fla.1984) (explaining that terms found in a statute can be given their plain and ordinary meaning and readily understood by referring to a dictionary).

The term “business establishment” is defined as “a location where business is conducted, goods are made or stored or processed or where services are rendered.” See http://definitions.uslegal.com/ b/business-establishment/ (last visited Jul. 18, 2013). As such, the “business establishment” in this case refers to the actual place of business where the slip and fall occurred, not the total network of stores which the “person or entity [Publix] in possession or control of the business premises” owns and operates.

The use of the term “business establishment” found in the current section 768.0755, instead of the use of the term “person or entity” found in the repealed section 768.0710, evidences the legislature’s intent to reject the previous language in the repealed section and construe premises liability based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the particular place or business establishment where the accident occurred. Section 768.0755(1) also employs the definite article “the” to modify “business establishment,” further evidencing the legislature’s intent to limit the statute’s scope to a specific and identifiable location. See § 758.0755, Fla. Stat. (2010). Thus, Santos’ discovery requests of accidents at kiosks located in other Pub-lix stores within the State of Florida are no longer proper.

We therefore conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it entered the discovery order for Publix to produce incident reports that dealt with slips and falls at kiosks located at all Publix stores in the State of Florida. To hold otherwise grants Santos “carte blanche” irrelevant discovery, which falls outside the context of section 768.0755. Santos must rely on the actual or constructive knowledge of the subject store where the accident occurred.

Petition granted; order quashed.

      . Santos alleged that the operation of a kiosk caused a dangerous condition. The substance was found at or near that kiosk located in the store. The kiosk is part of the Publix Aprons Program where Publix provides recipes and in-store cooking demonstrations to customers for their in-store sampling. See http://www. publix.com/aprons/about/ApronsProgram.do, last visited June 20, 2013.

      . See also https://www.vocabulary.com/ dictionary/business% 20establishment (“an establishment (a factory or an assembly plant or retail store or warehouse etc.) where business is conducted, goods are made or stored or processed or where services are rendered”)(last visited Jul. 18, 2013).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Landon L. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; William King, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Law Offices of R. Craig Hemphill & Associates; R. Craig Hemphill, Esq., Individually and in his Official Capacity, and Paul K. Dick, Esq., Individually and in his Official Capacity, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-2961.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 1, 2013.
    Landon L. Williams, pro se, Appellant.
    Daniel R. Duello, of Cole, Scott & Kis-sane, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of appellant’s response to the Court’s order of June 25, 2013, the Court has determined that the Order on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is not a final order because it fails to conclude the judicial labor in the case. We decline appellant’s suggestion that we undertake certiorari review, concluding that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the order on appeal will result in injury which cannot be adequately remedied on appeal following final judgment. Belair v. Drew, 770 So.2d 1164, 1166 (Fla.2000). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    BAGGETT BROTHERS FARM, INC., Appellant, v. ALTHA FARMER COOPERATIVE, INC., Appellee.
    No. 1D13-2782.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 1, 2013.
    Mark A. Bednar, Pensacola, for Appellant.
    Andrea Lyons of Emmanuel Sheppard & Condon, Pensacola, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Because the order on appeal merely determines entitlement to judgment without entering judgment, the order is not final, and the appeal is premature. Monticello Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 743 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed without prejudice to seeking appellate review upon entry of a final order.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles and Virginia BARNES, Appellants, v. The DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ST. JOHNS RIVER STATE COLLEGE, Florida, et al., Appellees.
    No. 1D13-2650.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 1, 2013.
    Charles Lee Stambaugh, of Stambaugh & Associates, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellants.
    Lisa L. Augspurger, of Bush, Augspur-ger & Lunch, Orlando, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of appellants’ response to the Court’s order of June 19, 2013, the Court has determined that the claim addressed by the lower tribunal in the order on appeal is inextricably intertwined with those claims left pending. Therefore, the Order on the District Board of Trustees of St. Johns River State College’s Motion for Summary Judgment is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed as premature.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Damarius Dewayne JORDAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-3971.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 2, 2013.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Kirkland v. State, 67 So.3d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Antonio TURNER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-2195.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 5, 2013.

      Antonio Turner, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The amended petition seeking a belated appeal of the order rendered on February 8, 2018, denying petitioner’s motion to correct illegal sentence in Alachua County Circuit Court case number 01-2011-CF-000928-A, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jennifer GOODMAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-2086.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 5, 2013.
    Matt Shirk, Public Defender, and Elizabeth H. Webb, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Perrone, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The motion of Jennifer Goodman seeking a writ of prohibition to review the denial of her motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice to the raising of a claim of immunity at trial. See Peterson v. State, 983 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Erin ELLIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-1331.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 5, 2013.
    Erin Ellis, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The amended petition seeking a belated appeal of the judgment and sentence rendered on or about November 16, 2012, in Okaloosa County Circuit Court case number 2012-CF-000631-F, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal. If petitioner qualifies for the appointment of counsel at public expense, the lower tribunal is directed to appoint counsel to represent her in the belated appeal authorized by this opinion.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Billy D. OWENS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-0353.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 5, 2013.
    Billy D. Owens, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking belated appeal is granted, and the appeal in case number 1D11-0706 will be reinstated by separate order issued in that proceeding.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Allen Leon FRAZIER, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-2819.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 5, 2013.
    Allen Leon Frazier, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charles F. Rivenbark II, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Allen Leon Frazier seeks mandamus relief to compel the circuit court to rule in a mandamus proceeding that appears to have been at issue and ripe for decision since February 2012. There has been no response to our order to show cause why Frazier should not be granted this relief, and although it appears that Frazier has recently been released from custody, thus presumably rendering his underlying claim for relief moot, the circuit court is nonetheless obligated to render a final order disposing of his claim on whatever grounds it finds appropriate. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the circuit court to render a final order within 30 days disposing of the petition for writ of mandamus pending below.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS GRANTED.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


author: SUAREZ, J.

text:
    GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and General Electric Capital Corporation, Appellants, v. CHULY INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 3D13-803.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 7, 2013.

      Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman and Gregory S. Grossman, Miami, and Adrian Nunez, for appellants.
    Lopez & Best, Miami, and Virginia M. Best and Johanna M. Menendez, for appel-lee.
    Before SUAREZ, ROTHENBERG and SALTER, JJ.
   SUAREZ, J.

General Electric Company and General Electric Capital Corporation (“GE”) appeal from a non-final order denying GE’s motion for pre-judgment writ of attachment or pre-judgment writ of garnishment against property of Chuly International, LLC (“Chuly”). We reverse.

In 2002, GE leased certain medical equipment to Millennium Open MRI. Millennium’s obligations were unconditionally guaranteed by Jorge de Cespedes. Millennium defaulted, and in 2005, GE sued Millennium for breach of those lease agreements, and de Cespedes personally to enforce the guaranty [“de Cespedes lawsuit”]. In 2009, GE won a final judgment against Millennium and co-defendants for $1.2 million. In 2004, before GE filed its complaint against Millenium, de Cespedes gave a $1.75 million loan to his then-girlfriend, Maria Palacio and another $1.74 million loan to her company, Chuly, which was formed to own and manage certain real property. Chuly purchased an office building with the money. Neither Palacio nor Chuly made any payments on the loans. In 2007, about midway through the de Cespedes lawsuit, de Cespedes forgave the loans to Palacio and Chuly.

A parallel action against de Ces-pedes for Medicare fraud took place in federal district court. The loans and loan forgiveness were discovered by GE, and it sought to intervene when it learned the federal court ordered the sale of Chuly’s real property. The federal court denied GE’s motion and allowed the sale. The sale proceeds were placed in the federal court registry. GE then filed the current case in state court against Chuly, seeking a determination that the Chuly loan forgiveness by de Cespedes was a fraudulent transfer under chapter 726, Florida Statutes. GE filed a verified motion for a prejudgment writ of attachment or garnishment against Chuly for the amount of the Chuly loan and was willing to post a bond in excess of the amount it sought from Chuly. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court summarily denied GE’s motion for prejudgment writ of attachment or garnishment. GE appeals.

A prejudgment attachment is available against assets fraudulently transferred from a debtor and held in the name of another. Cerna v. Swiss Bank Corp. (Overseas), 503 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). “Upon motion by plaintiff, a writ of attachment may issue when the grounds relied on for the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by a verified complaint or a separate affidavit of the plaintiff ...,” and all applicable requirements of the attachment statute are met. § 76.08, Fla. Stat. (2018). In an action for relief against an allegedly fraudulent transfer sought pursuant to Chapter 726, Florida Statutes, a creditor may seek an attachment against the transferred asset. § 726.108(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). Because the determination of actual fraudulent intent can be difficult, courts look to certain “badges of fraud” to determine whether the transfer was made with the intent to defraud creditors. Beal Bank SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So.2d 45, 60 (Fla.2001). Those “badges of fraud” are set forth in section 726.105, Florida Statutes (2013). “The existence of badges of fraud creates a prima facie case and raise a rebuttable presumption that the transaction is void.” Stephens v. Kies Oil Co., Inc., 386 So.2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Consideration may also be given to factors other than those listed. See In re Miller, 188 B.R. 302, 305-06 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995). Courts may take into account the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. Kirk v. Edinger, 380 So.2d 1336, 1337 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). After receipt of this evidence, the burden shifts to the debtor or transferor to show the transfer was made without intent to “delay, hinder or defraud creditors.” See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). The very function of a writ of attachment is to serve as a lien upon property that may be the subject of execution upon a later-obtained judgment. See Tilghman v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 90 Fla. 282, 105 So. 823 (1925). See also Cerna, 503 So.2d 1297, 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

At the hearing on GE’s motion for garnishment or attachment, GE presented competent, substantial evidence to support issuance of the writ. GE was not required at that time to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the loan forgiveness was, actually, a fraudulent transfer. GE merely had to raise a rebuttable presumption of fraudulent intent by asserting the existence of certain badges of fraud, thereby creating a prima facie case for fraudulent transfer to be determined later in the litigation between the parties. GE’s complaint clearly alleges several of these badges of fraud, and adequately stated a cause of action for fraudulent transfer. See Mejia, 985 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (noting that while a single badge of fraud may amount only to a suspicious circumstance, a combination of badges will justify a finding of fraud); Banner Constr. Corp. v. Arnold, 128 So.2d 893, 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) (“While a badge of fraud standing alone may amount to little more than a suspicious circumstance, insufficient in itself to constitute fraud per se, several of them when considered together may afford a basis from which its existence is properly inferable.”).

The record reveals that, of these statutory factors, GE showed the transfer was made to an insider (two $1.75 million loans, one to de Cespedes’ girlfriend and one to her company); the transfer was made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation (no consideration and the loans were never repaid); the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed (the loans were not publically recorded); and the transfer was made shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred (loans were made prior to, and forgiven during, the de Cespedes’ lawsuit). § 726.105(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). Chuly did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the initial presumption of fraudulent transfer. Further, GE asserted at the hearing that it would provide a bond in the amount of $3,200,000.00, more than twice the amount of the debt sought against Chuly. See § 76.12, Fla. Stat. (2013).

GE amply demonstrated, by competent substantial evidence, sufficient statutory grounds for prejudgment attachment or garnishment of the sale proceeds in order to secure its judgment debt, in the event a judgment is rendered in GE’s favor at the conclusion of GE’s fraudulent transfer claim against Chuly. See Zeskind v. Jockey Club Condo. Apartments, Unit No. II, Inc., 468 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (finding injunction was based on substantial, competent evidence adduced below). We reverse the trial court’s order denying the verified motion and remand with directions to authorize the issuance of a prejudgment writ of attachment or garnishment, and to set the amount of a reasonable bond.

Reversed and remanded.

      . A fraudulent conveyance action is an action by a creditor against a transferee directed against a particular transaction, which, if de-dared fraudulent, is set aside thus leaving the creditor free to pursue the asset, or it is an action against a transferee who has received an asset by means of a fraudulent conveyance and should be required to either return the asset or pay for the asset (by way of a judgment and execution). A fraudulent conveyance action, under section 726.108, is not an action against a debtor for failure to pay an amount owing from a prior judgment. Yusem v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 770 So.2d 746, 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

      . Chuly argues that it is not a "debtor," and that the Chuly property was not owned by de Cespedes, a judgment debtor by virtue of guaranteeing loans to the primary debtor, Millenium. We find that argument unpersuasive where “it seems clear that prejudgment attachment is available against assets which are held in the name of another and which have either been fraudulently transferred from the debtor or remain equitably owned by him.” Cema, 503 So.2d at 1298.

      . Section 726.105, Florida Statutes (2013), provides, in part:
      (2) In determining actual intent under paragraph (l)(a), consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:
      (a)The transfer or obligation was to an insider.
      (b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer.
      (c) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed.
      (d) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit.
      (e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets.
      (f) The debtor absconded.
      (g) The debtor removed or concealed assets.
      (h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred.
      (i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
      (j) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred.
      (k) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

      . The level of proof required to show that a transfer is fraudulent is by the preponderance of the evidence. Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, Inc., 475 So.2d 227 (Fla.1985). Proof of fraud requires proof of intent. See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).


text:
    REGIONS BANK d/b/a Regions Mortgage, Successor by merger to Union Planters Bank, N.A., Appellant, v. Sheila B. CUNY n/k/a Sheila Butler, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-2843.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 9, 2013.
    Ronald M. Gaché and Ileen J. Cantor, of Shapiro, Fishman & Gaché, LLP, Boca Raton, for Appellant.
    Lisa S. Minshew of Lisa S. Minshew, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Regions Bank, Appellant, appeals an adverse final judgment on two counterclaims Sheila Cuny, Appellee, asserted in a foreclosure suit. Although Appellant raises multiple issues, we conclude that one issue merits reversal and write to address that point. Specifically, Appellant argues that it was entitled to a directed verdict on Appellee’s counterclaim for slander of title because the statute of limitations on that claim expired before it was filed and it was not a proper claim in recoupment. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the appealed order awarding judgment to Appellee for slander of title and remand for entry of a judgment for Appellant on that claim.

Appellant instituted this suit in 2008 as a foreclosure of the first mortgage against Appellee’s home, which was recorded in 2003. Appellee asserted a counterclaim in recoupment for slander of title because Appellant had also recorded a second mortgage against the home in 2005, which Appellee claimed was void from its inception. It is undisputed that the statute of limitations had expired on Appellee’s claim for slander of title. The issue before the trial court, as argued in Appellant’s motion for directed verdict, was whether Appellee could nevertheless bring the claim under a recoupment theory and avoid the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion for directed verdict, concluding that the claim for slander of title was a proper recoupment claim under the facts of this case.

We review the denial of Appellant’s motion for directed verdict de novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellee as the non-moving party. Elliott v. Elliott, 58 So.3d 878, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). A motion for directed verdict should be granted if the nonmoving party would not be entitled to judgment under this -view of the evidence. See Ferguson v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 46 So.3d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

A civil defendant may assert a counterclaim in recoupment to recover an affirmative judgment even though the claim would be barred as an independent cause of action under the statute of limitations. Maynard v. Household Fin. Corp. Ill, 861 So.2d 1204, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Allie v. Ionata, 503 So.2d 1237, 1238-39 (Fla.1987)). “The distinguishing feature of a claim for recoupment is the same as a compulsory counterclaim — it must spring from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying claim.” Id.; see also U.S. v. Morrison, 28 So.3d 94, 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing U.S. v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1379-80 (11th Cir.1982)). This test is met if (1) “the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims” or (2) “the aggregate core facts upon which the original claim rests activates additional legal rights in a party defendant that would otherwise remain dormant.” Orix Capital Markets, LLC v. Park Ave. Assocs., Ltd., 881 So.2d 646, 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (quoting Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 609 So.2d 14, 20 (Fla.1992)) (setting forth the test for determining when a counterclaim is compulsory).

Appellee’s claim of slander of title does not meet the recoupment test. She argued that her title was slandered not by the first mortgage, but the second. The first mortgage was recorded approximately two years before the second mortgage, and it was security for separate debt. Therefore, two distinct transactions were at issue. Moreover, the recording of the first mortgage did not create any right for Appellee to pursue a slander of title claim. No basis existed for that cause of action until the distinct second transaction occurred. For these reasons, Appellee is barred from recovering for her late-filed claim of slander of title. We reverse for entry of a judgment in favor of Appellant on that claim. In all other respects, we affirm.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Darrell Shanta JENKINS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-1559.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 9, 2013.

      Darrell Shanta Jenkins, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the June 17, 2011, order denying the petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief, in Escambia County Circuit Court case number 2007-CF-003907B. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D).

BENTON, SWANSON, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Marcus David BEASLEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-1092.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 9, 2013.
    Bruce A. Miller, Public Defender; Thomas F. McGuire, III, and Bradley H. Rowe, Assistant Public Defenders, Pensacola, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brittany Rhodaback, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the October 26, 2012, judgment and sentence, in Escambia County Circuit Court case numbers 2012-CF-002195-B, 2012-CF-002203-B, and 2012-CF-002209-B. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

BENTON, SWANSON, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


author: VICTORY, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Giovanni BROWN.
    No. 2012-KP-0872.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2013.
    James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office, Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, Terry Michael Boudreaux, Assistant District Attorney, for Applicant.
    Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, Carol A. Kolinchak, Benjamin W. Maxy-mak, Pro Hac Vice, Bryan A. Stevenson, Pro Hac Vice, for Respondent.
   VICTORY, J.

|/We granted this writ application to consider whether the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), applies in a case in which the juvenile offender committed multiple offenses resulting in cumulative sentences matching or exceeding his life expectancy without the opportunity of securing early release from confinement. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we find Graham’s holding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment forbids the imposition of life in prison without parole for juveniles committing non-homicide crimes, applies only to sentences of life in prison without parole, and does not apply to a sentence of years without the possibility of parole. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court which amended defendant’s four 10-year sentences for four armed robberies.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 27, 1999, defendant, Giovanni Brown, and an accomplice approached seventeen year-old William Boada, Jr. (“Bill”) while he was outside his home washing his car. Bill declined defendant’s offer to purchase a phone card and |2went inside to retrieve a pen for defendant, and, as he entered his home, defendant put a gun to his back, removed the phone from its hook, and ordered Bill to lie on the ground. After demanding to know if anyone else was in the house, defendant went looking for Bill’s fifteen-year-old brother Brian while his accomplice held a gun on Bill. After defendant’s search was unsuccessful, Bill went to the locked bathroom where his brother was taking a shower, and defendant repeatedly attempted to kick down the bathroom door. When Brian came out, defendant and his accomplice pointed their guns at his face. Bill and Brian were questioned about the location of any money in the house and about when their father would be home. They were then taken at gunpoint to an upstairs bedroom where they were ordered to strip to their underwear, and bound with duct tape from their wrists to their elbows, from their ankles to their knees, and around their head and mouth, with small holes cut out around their mouths. They were then dragged to a bathroom and left lying on their sides with the door shut, where they could hear the perpetrators rummaging around the house. A short time later, Bill’s girlfriend, Amanda, came to the house, and when she opened the front door, she saw defendant and his accomplice, both with guns, coming down the stairs. She was brought into the kitchen. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Boada came home and was met by the perpetrators. They demanded money and stated they would hurt the bound victims if Mr. Boada did anything “stupid.” After forcing Mr. Boada to open a safe box and finding no money, they ordered Mr. Boada to go with defendant to an ATM machine and withdraw money. Mr. Boada insisted on seeing his children, and he and Amanda were taken upstairs, where Amanda was bound with duct tape in the same manner as Bill and Brian. Mr. Boada saw his children bound and visibly frightened. Defendant then forced Mr. Boada at gunpoint to drive Amanda’s car to the bank, with his accomplice threatening that if they didn’t |sreturn, he would hurt the remaining victims. At the bank, Mr. Boada realized he did not have his ATM card, and defendant became irritated and ordered Mr. Boada to return home. Upon return, Mr. Boada was bound with duct tape and placed in the bathroom with the other victims. The perpetrators continued to ransack and search the house, periodically checking on the victims and telling them they would let them know when they were leaving. The victims took this to mean defendant was going to kill them before they left and they all believed they were going to die. After some time had passed and the house became quiet, the victims untied themselves, escaped from the house and called the police. Bill’s hands were swollen and numb from lack of circulation, and he was having trouble breathing. When the police arrived, they discovered the house was ransacked and that various items had been stolen, including clothes, shoes, two watches, a stereo, computer, camcorder, digital camera, Bill’s BMW, and Amanda’s Malibu. A few weeks later, defendant and his accomplice were arrested and defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping and four counts of armed robbery. Defendant was sixteen years old when he committed these crimes.

Defendant was found guilty of all charges and the court sentenced him to the mandatory term of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the aggravated kidnapping, and to four 10-year terms, also “without benefit,” for each of the armed robberies. The court ordered all sentences to run consecutively. The court of appeal affirmed. State v. Brown, 01-160 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/30/01), 788 So.2d 667. Defendant did not seek review in this Court.

In 2011, defendant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham, supra, which held that imposition of life sentences without benefit of parole eligibility on juveniles who commit non-homicide offenses violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 14 cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted the motion and amended all of defendant’s sentences to delete the parole eligibility restrictions and instructed the Department of Corrections to amend his prison master to reflect that he is now parole eligible on all of his five convictions. In his oral reasons, the trial court explained:

So, from a standpoint of the arguments that have been made per the Defendant Brown’s motion too [sic] correct, what I agree, is an illegal sentence as it relates to Graham v. Florida, the Court will strike the sentence as it relates to there being no benefit of parole on the aggravated kidnaping charge, and in line with the consecutive sentences on the armed robbery charges subject to the State’s objection, which is under the law an understandable objection, the Court, because of the ruling in Graham, and the position taken by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Court is going to strike the component of the armed robbery sentences that were run consecutive to the life sentence on the aggravated kidnaping. I’m going to strike the component that called for those to be run without benefit of parole also. It would be illogical to require one to serve a life sentence even if you can get paroled when you then would be facing 40-years on the armed robbery charges without benefit of parole. It would negate the effect of the Court’s, both the Louisiana Supreme Court and The Supreme Court’s earlier rulings. So, I am not going to review the sentences in spite of the good work of Mr. Brown. I do not think that is my role here, and do not have any legal authority to do so to impact the sentences, but I will further dictate of those two higher courts, strike the inability of Mr. Brown to seek parole, and I will specifically allow that, and correct the sentence as it relates to both the aggravated kidnaping charge, and the four armed robbery charges.

The district court felt bound under Graham to delete the parole restrictions not just on the life sentence, but on all the sentences, in order “to give effect to Graham’s requirement that the defendant be given ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’ ” According to the court, imposing “40 years of additional time without benefits after a parole review of a life sentence would effectively negate Graham’s ultimate directive to provide an opportunity for rehabilitation for the juvenile.” The court of appeal affirmed, finding that Graham’s intent was “to give juvenile defendants convicted of non-homicide offenses some meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” State v. Brown, 12-0093 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/27/12) - So.3d -. We granted the State’s writ application to consider its argument that while the district court properly eliminated the parole restriction on the life sentence, nothing in Graham authorized it to amend his four 10-year armed robbery sentences. State v. Brown, 12-0872 (La.9/21/12), 98 So.3d 320.

DISCUSSION

The issue before us is whether, and to what extent, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham applies in cases in which the juvenile offender committed multiple offenses resulting in cumulative sentences matching or exceeding his life expectancy without the opportunity of securing early release from confinement on parole. According to our calculations, if we accept the State’s argument that the original armed robbery sentences should be reinstated, defendant will be eligible for parole on the life sentence after serving 30 years of that sentence, at approximately age 46, but will not be entitled to release, even if parole would otherwise have been granted, because his armed robbery sentences would run consecutively to the life sentence and he would then have to begin serving those four ten-year sentences; thus, he would not be subject to release until possibly age 86. | ^Therefore, the issue is whether this 70-year sentence is constitutional.

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has issued a string of cases applying the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to limit the punishment that may be imposed on juvenile defendants. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on persons who were under 18 when their crimes were committed. In Graham, the Supreme Court similarly held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of life in prison without parole for persons who were under 18 when they committed crimes other than homicide. Thereafter, in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. In contrast with the holdings in Roper and Graham, which categorically banned certain sentences for classes of offenders, the Miller holding permits the imposition of a life sentence without parole but only after an opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances.

In Graham, the Court focused on the uniqueness of juvenile offenders, i.e., their lessened culpability because of their young age and their greater capacity for reform than adult offenders, and the historical treatment of non-homicide crimes as less severe than homicide crimes. 560 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 2026, 2027. In determining that life without parole was unconstitutional for juveniles committing non-homicide crimes, the Court held:

A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation .... The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomieide crimes committed before adulthood will 17remain behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.

Id. at 2080. Justices Thomas and Alito dissented. Justice Thomas criticized the majority for ignoring its traditional “death is different” approach by applying the Eighth Amendment in the non-homicide arena. 560 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, dissenting). In his view, if the Court has the authority to categorically exempt a certain class of offenders from the “second most severe penalty,” there is nothing to prevent the Court from also exempting additional classes of offenders “from the law’s third, fourth, fifth, or fifteenth most severe penalties as well.” Id. Further, Justice Thomas urged that the Court does not have the power under the Constitution to determine whether a life without parole sentence fits the crime at issue because the Constitution has assigned that power to the voters and their elected officials. Id. at 2058. By doing so in this case, Justice Thomas felt that the Court “reached to ensure that its own sense of morality and retributive justice pre-empts that of the people and their representatives.” Id. Justice Alito joined Justice Thomas’s dissent, but wrote separately to make clear that “[njothing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.” 560 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 2058 (Alito, dissenting).

In light of the above, state courts are left to grapple with sentences such as the one possibly at issue here, i.e., a term of years that may exceed the life span of the defendant. Does Graham only apply to actual life sentences without parole, or is there some upper limit on a term of years sentence that would violate Graham’s vague directive that a state must give juvenile defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation? Courts are understandably split on this issue, with some holding that |sonly a life sentence without parole violates Graham, and others holding that various term of years sentences violate Graham, because they give defendants no meaningful opportunity to obtain release.

The United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Bunch v. Smith, a case in which the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant’s claim that his 89-year sentence without parole for nine non-homicide offenses violated Graham because it was the functional equivalent of life without parole and did not give him any meaningful opportunity to obtain release. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir.2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1996, 185 L.Ed.2d 865, 2013 WL 1704719 (April 22, 2013). In determining that the defendant was not entitled to relief, the court reasoned:

It is true that Bunch and Graham were both juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide. But while Graham was sentenced to life in prison for committing one nonhomicide offense, Bunch was sentenced to consecutive, fixed-term sentences — the longest of which was 10 years — for committing multiple nonho-micide offenses. In Graham, the Court made it clear that “[t]he instant case concerns only those juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense.” Id. at 2023 (emphasis added). The Court stressed that drawing a “clear line” was “necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will not be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.” Id. at 2030 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that “[bjecause ‘the age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood/ those who were below that age when the offense was committed may not be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 574, 125 S.Ct. 1183). The Court did not address juvenile offenders, like Bunch, who received consecutive, fixed-term sentences for committing multiple non-homicide offenses. Thus, we cannot say that Bunch’s sentence was contrary to clearly established federal law.
To be sure, Bunch’s 89-year aggregate sentence may end up being the functional equivalent of life without parole. For this reason, Bunch argues that he will not be given the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” called for in Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2030. But in Graham, the Court said that a juvenile is entitled to such a “realistic opportunity to obtain release” if a state imposes a sentence of “life.” Id. at 2034. That did not happen in this case. And since no federal court has ever extended Graham’s holding beyond its plain language to a juvenile offender who received consecutive, fixed-term sentences, we cannot say that Bunch’s sentence was contrary to clearly established federal law.

Bunch, 685 F.3d at 551 (footnote omitted).

[ inAnother case noted the difficulty of applying Graham to non-life sentences:

If we conclude that Graham does not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences, our path is clear. If, on the other hand, under the notion that a term-of-years sentence can be a de facto life sentence that violates the limitations of the Eighth Amendment, Graham offers no direction whatsoever. At what number of years would the Eighth Amendment become implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, some lesser or greater number? Would gain time be taken into account? Could the number vary from offender to offender based on race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria? Does the number of crimes matter? There is language in the GroAam majority opinion that suggests that no matter the number of offenses or victims or type of crime, a juvenile may not receive a sentence that will cause him to spend his entire life incarcerated without a chance for rehabilitation, in which case it would make no logical difference whether the sentence is “life” or 107 years. Without any tools to work with, however, we can only apply Graham as it is written. If the Supreme Court has more in mind, it will have to say what it is.

Henry v. State, 82 So.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Fla.App. 5th Dist.2012), review granted, 107 So.3d 405 (Fla.2012).

At the time Graham was decided, Louisiana law foreclosed the opportunity for anyone serving a life sentence to be granted parole, unless the life sentence was commuted to a term of years by the governor. La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(2) (allowing a person serving a term or terms of imprisonment with or without the benefit of parole for thirty years or more to be eligible for parole consideration after serving at least 20 years and reaching the age of 45, but specifically stating that “[t]his provision shall not apply to a person serving a life sentence unless the sentence has been commuted to a fixed term of years”); La. R.S. 15:574.4(B) (“[n]o prisoner serving a life sentence shall be eligible for parole consideration until his life sentence has been commuted to a fixed term of years”); La. Const, art. 4, § 5(E)(1) (“[t]he governor ... upon favorable recommendation of the Board of Pardons, may commute sentences .... ”); Bosworth v. Whitley, 627 So.2d 629, 635 (La.1993) (“since 15:574.4(B) provides unequivocally that no inmate serving a life sentence shall be eligible for parole, Inparole consideration would be withheld from the defendant, by operation of law, despite the fact that the applicable penalty provision did not include the words ‘without benefit of parole’ ”).

This Court first considered the effect of Graham on a life sentence for a juvenile defendant in State v. Shaffer, 11-1756 (La.11/23/11), 77 So.3d 939, and two other related cases, State v. Leason, 11-1757 (La.11/23/11), 77 So.3d 933 and State v. Dyer, 11-1758 (La.11/23/11), 77 So.3d 928. In those cases, three prisoners sought relief from their terms of life imprisonment at hard labor following their convictions for aggravated rape, La. R.S. 14:42, a non-homicide crime, committed when they were all under the age of 18. Only one prisoner’s sentence expressly precluded eligibility for parole, but we noted that parole eligibility was nonetheless precluded by operation of law for all life sentences by virtue of La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(2)(a) and (B). 77 So.3d at 940-41. Recognizing that Graham “require[s] that relators, and all other persons similarly situated, have a meaningful opportunity to secure release as a ‘regular part of the rehabilitative process,’ ” we held that the statutes as applied to the prisoners were unconstitutional under Graham:

We therefore hold, as we must under Graham, that the Eighth Amendment precludes the state from interposing the Governor’s ad hoc exercise of executive clemency as a gateway to accessing procedures the state has established for ameliorating long terms of imprisonment as part of the rehabilitative process to which inmates serving life terms for non-homicide crimes committed when they were under the age of 18 years would otherwise have access, once they reach the age of 45 years and have served 20 years of their sentence in actual custody.

Shaffer, 77 So.3d at 942. The prisoners argued that the appropriate remedy of the Graham violation was to resentenee them according to the penalties provided for the next lesser and included responsive verdict of attempted aggravated rape. We disagreed that this was required under Graham, but held that “[t]he state thus may not enforce the commutation provisos in La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(2) and 15:574.4(B) against |12relators and all other similarly situated persons, and the former provisions offer objective criteria set by the legislature that may bring into compliance with the Graham decision.” Id. at 942. Thus, we ordered the Department of Corrections to revise the prison master of the prisoner whose sentence was expressly without parole to reflect that the sentence was no longer without benefit of parole. Further, we ordered that all three prison masters be revised “according to the criteria in La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(2) to reflect an eligibility date for consideration by the Board of Parole.” Id. at 943. The effect of this ruling was that these prisoners would be eligible for parole consideration under La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(2) when they had served 20 years of their sentences in prison and had reached the age of 45, in spite of the language in the statute that would have precluded parole eligibility. We reasoned that “[a]ccess to the Board’s consideration will satisfy the mandate of Graham.” Id. However, our decision was only “an interim measure (based on the legislature’s own criteria) pending the legislature’s response to Graham.” Id. at 943, n. 6; see also State v. Handley, 11-2087 (La.2/1/12), 79 So.3d 1010 and State v. Skipper, 11-1598 (La.2/1/12), 79 So.3d 1011 (ordering the Department of Corrections to revise respondents’ prison masters in accordance with the directive in Shaffer).

After Shaffer, and in order to comply with Graham, the legislature, by Acts 2012, No. 466, added La. R.S. 15:574.4(D), which provides:

(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any person serving a sentence of life imprisonment who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the offense, except for a person serving a life sentence for a conviction of first degree murder (R.S. 14:30) or second degree murder (R.S. 14:30.1), shall be eligible for parole consideration pursuant to the provisions of this Subsection if all of the following conditions have been met:
(a) The offender has served thirty years of the sentence imposed.
(b) The offender has not committed any disciplinary offenses in the twelve consecutive months prior to the parole eligibility date.
113(c) The offender has completed the mandatory minimum of one hundred hours of prerelease programming in accordance with R.S. 15:827.1.
(d) The offender has completed substance abuse treatment as applicable.
(e) The offender has obtained a GED certification, unless the offender has previously obtained a high school diploma or is deemed by a certified educator as being incapable of obtaining a GED certification due to a learning disability. If the offender is deemed incapable of obtaining a GED certification, the offender shall complete at least one of the following:
(1) A literacy program.
(ii) An adult basic education program.
(iii) A job skills training program.
(f) The offender has obtained a low-risk designation determined by a validated risk assessment instrument approved by the secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
(g) The offender has completed a reentry program to be determined by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
(h) If the offender was convicted of aggravated rape, he shall be designated a sex offender and upon release shall comply with all sex offender registration and notification provisions as required by law.
(2) For each offender eligible for parole consideration pursuant to the provisions of this Subsection, the committee shall meet in a three-member panel and each member of the panel shall be provided with and shall consider a written evaluation of the offender by a person who has expertise in adolescent brain development and behavior and any other relevant evidence pertaining to the offender.
(3) The panel shall render specific findings of fact in support of its decision.

The legislature also amended La. R.S. 15:574.4(B) to read, in pertinent part, “[ejxcept as provided in Subsection D, no prisoner serving a life sentence shall be eligible for parole consideration until his life sentence has been commuted to a fixed term of years.” La. Acts 2012, No. 466, § 1 (emphasis added). Thus, it is now clear that under Louisiana law, a juvenile defendant serving a life sentence for a non-homicide offense committed before the age of 18 will be parole eligible after serving 30 years |14of his sentence, assuming the other provisions of La. R.S. 15:574.4(D)(1) are met. Had this defendant not committed four other non-homicide crimes in addition to the aggravated kidnaping for which he is serving a life sentence, he would have been parole eligible at age 46 under this new statute. This would assumably comport with Graham’s directive.

However, the complication here is that defendant did commit four other non-homicide crimes and was sentenced to a ten year term of imprisonment without parole eligibility for each of them. See La. R.S. 14:64 (providing that sentences for armed robbery are to be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence); La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(l)(a) (prohibiting parole consideration for a person convicted for three or more felony offenses); La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(2) (allowing a person serving a term or terms of imprisonment of 30 years or more with or without benefit of parole to be parole eligible after serving 20 years and reaching the age of 45, but specifically making this provision inapplicable to persons convicted under La. R.S. 14:64, i.e., armed robbery). There is no provision allowing parole eligibility for a person convicted of armed robbery, nor has the legislature provided any exception from that provision for juvenile defendants. The trial court ordered all sentences to run consecutively at the initial sentencing, and these sentences were affirmed on appeal and no application for relief was made to this Court. Upon defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, the trial court felt compelled under Graham to make defendant parole eligible on the armed robbery convictions and to make the armed robbery sentences concurrent with the aggravated kidnaping sentence. However, nothing in Graham prohibits a ten-year sentence without parole, four ten-year consecutive sentences without parole, or four ten-year consecutive sentences from running consecutive to a life sentence that has been amended to give a defendant 1j ¡¡parole eligibility at age 46. In fact, we see nothing in Graham that even applies to sentences for multiple convictions, as Graham conducted no analysis of sentences for multiple convictions and provides no guidance on how to handle such sentences. As our state legislature has provided for these sentences, as it has the constitutional authority to do, we have no authority, absent a disproportionality review not possible or requested here, to amend these sentences. In our view, Graham does not prohibit consecutive term of year sentences for multiple offenses committed while a defendant was under the age of 18, even if they might exceed a defendant’s lifetime, and, absent any further guidance from the United States Supreme Court, we defer to the legislature which has the constitutional authority to authorize such sentences.

CONCLUSION

In Graham, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence of life without parole upon an offender who commits a non-homicide offense when he is under the age of 18. The disputed issue in this case involves neither a life sentence, nor one non-homicide offense. In accordance with Graham, Shaffer and now La. R.S. 15:574.4(D) mandate that a juvenile’s life sentence without parole be amended so that he is parole eligible on the life sentence after a certain amount of time; therefore, the trial court correctly amended defendant’s life sentence. However, nothing in Graham addresses a defendant convicted of multiple offenses and given term of year sentences, that, if tacked on to the life sentence parole eligibility date, equate to a possible release date when the defendant reaches the age of 86. In the absence of further direction and guidance from the United States Supreme Court, we find the trial court erred in amending defendant’s four ten-year sentences for armed robbery and removing the parole eligibility | ^restrictions on those sentences. We remand this matter to the trial court for amendment of defendant’s sentences in accordance with this opinion.

DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

While Justice JEFFERSON D. HUGHES III was not on the Court at the time this case was argued, he now sits as an elected Justice and is participating in the rendering of this opinion.

       While Justice Jefferson D. Hughes III was not on the Court at the time this case was argued, he now sits as an elected Justice and is participating in the rendering of this opinion.

      . Under newly enacted La. R.S. 15:574.4(D), a juvenile defendant sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide offense is now eligible for parole consideration after serving 30 years of that life sentence. See discussion at pages 12-13, infra.

        . The present case is complicated by the difficulty of determining precisely how much time the defendant will be obligated to serve before becoming eligible for parole or release (and thus whether his sentences can be construed as the functional equivalent of life) when this Court reverses the district court to the extent it removed the prohibition of parole eligibility from the four 10-year sentences for armed robbery. Generally, the Department of Public Safety and Corrections administers the standards governing parole eligibility and determines whether a particular inmate is eligible for parole consideration by the Board of Parole. In determining parole eligibility dates, the Department looks to the applicable statutory criteria set out in La. R.S. 15:574.4, and "administers these standards and criteria by applying them, as well as other relevant statutes and interpretative jurisprudence, to determine whether or not a particular inmate is parole eligible, i.e., eligible for parole consideration by the board.” According to the Department, defendant is considered to first serve the life sentence. In this case, the Department has set a parole eligibility date of 2033. It is unclear how this date was reached.

      . Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir.2012) (a state court's determination that a juvenile petitioner's 89-year sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment was reasonable), cert. denied, Bunch v. Bobby, 569 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1996, 185 L.Ed.2d 865, 2013 WL 1704719 (April 22, 2013); Goins v. Smith, 2012 WL 3023306 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (84-year sentence not unconstitutional citing Bunch); Gridine v. State, 89 So.3d 909 (Fla.App. 1st Dist.2011) (declined to apply Graham to a 70-year sentence), cert. granted, 103 So.3d 139 (Fla.2012); Walle v. State, 99 So.3d 967 (Fla.App. 2nd Dist.2012) (effective total sentence of 92 years did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment or fall within the ruling of Graham); Thomas v. State, 78 So.3d 644 (Fla.App. 1st Dist.2011)(concurrent 50-year sentences did not violate Graham); Henry v. State, 82 So.3d 1084 (Fla.App. 5th Dist.2012) (90-year sentence constitutional under Graham, refusing to apply Graham to term of years sentence without further guidance from United States Supreme Court), review granted, 107 So.3d 405 (Fla.2012); Manuel v. State, 48 So.3d 94 (Fla.App. 2nd Dist.2010) (applying Graham to juvenile offender’s sentence of life without parole, but holding 40-year sentence on second conviction constitutional), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 446, 181 L.Ed.2d 259 (2011); Silva v. McDonald, 891 F.Supp.2d 1116 (C.D.Cal.2012) (sentence of 40 years to life resulting in parole eligibility at age 60 does not violate Graham); Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (Ga.2011)(sentence of mandatory 25 years followed by life on probation for aggravated molestation of a four-year old does not implicate categorical Eighth Amendment restriction under Graham, nor is it grossly disproportionate for particular crime); Middleton v. State, 313 Ga.App. 193, 721 S.E.2d 111 (Ga.Ct.App.2011) (aggregate sentence of 30 years without parole for multiple convictions did not implicate Graham because the defendant received a term of years sentence), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 867, 184 L.Ed.2d 679 (2013); State v. Kasic, 228 Ariz. 228, 265 P.3d 410 (Ariz.App.Div.2 2011) (Graham did not apply to aggregate sentence of 139.75 years for 30 convictions); Bell v. Haws, 2010 WL 3447218 (C.D.Cal.2010) (sentence of 54 years without parole does not violate Graham because Graham only applies to life sentences), vacated for failure to exhaust state remedies, 462 Fed.Appx. 692 (9th Cir.2011).

      . Floyd v. State, 87 So.3d 45 (Fla.App. 1st Dist.2012) (two consecutive 40-year sentences violated Graham because functional equivalent of life sentence without parole); United States v. Mathurin, 2011 WL 2580775 (S.D.Fla.2011) (mandatory minimum federal sentence of 307 years imprisonment for a juvenile was unconstitutional, sentence amended to 492 months); People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 282 P.3d 291 (2012) (concluding that "sentencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment"); State v. Macon, 46,696 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/25/12), 86 So.3d 662, 666-67 (finding that serving 50 years before parole consideration violated Graham because the offender would be 67 at that time and would therefore have no "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation....” and ordering his prison master revised in accordance with the directives of Shaffer, infra, making him immediately eligible for parole consideration), writ denied, 90 So.3d 411 (La.5/25/12).

      . The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed in Bunch on November 5, 2012. After the warden, David Bobby, waived his right to file a response, on January 4, 2013 the Supreme Court formally requested a response from him to be due February 4, 2013. On January 14,2013, the Supreme Court issued an order extending the deadline to March 18, 2013, and Warden Bobby filed his response on that date. All of this occurred as the case sub judice was pending before us, and based on the Supreme Court’s apparent interest in the issue involved in both cases, we decided to wait until the Supreme Court took action on the writ of certiorari in the Bunch case. As the Supreme Court has denied the writ of certiorari, we now issue our opinion.

      . It is our understanding that the Department will consider the four ten-year sentences to begin running at that time.


text:
    James KEYS v. REPUBLIC SERVICES/ALLIED WASTE OF ACADIANA-SCOTT, and Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc.
    No. 2012-C-2369.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2013.
    Breazale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP, Trenton John Oubre, Baton Rouge, LA, Nicholas Ryan Bursavich, for Applicant.
    Howard C. Dejean, Opelousas, LA, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

| We granted defendant’s application for a writ of certiorari in this case on January 18, 2013. After receiving briefing from the parties and reviewing the record, we conclude the judgment below does not require the exercise of this court’s supervisory authority. Accordingly, we recall our order of January 18, 2013 as improvidently granted, and we deny defendant’s writ application.

      . The posture of this litigation changed significantly between the granting of the writ and docketing of the case, as a result of a December 21, 2012 partial settlement between the parties. Although this settlement was con-fected prior to this court's grant of certiorari on January 18, 2013, defendant did not inform this court of the partial settlement until February 8, 2013, when it filed its brief.