author: WALLER, Chief Justice, for the court:

text:
    Henry W. KINNEY and Frank L. Schmidt, Sr., M.D., et al. v. The CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BILOXI, INC.; Most Reverend Thomas J. Rodi, as Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Mississippi, and as President of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc.; and Rev. Dennis Carver, individually, and as Pastor of St. Paul Catholic Church, Pass Christian, Mississippi.
    No. 2012-CA-01782-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    July 17, 2014.

      Henry W. Kinney, appellants, pro se.
    Eric D. Wooten, Gulfport, attorney for appellants.
    Julie Jarrell Gresham, Biloxi, Stephen J. Carmody, Jackson, Kevin J. Necaise, Dia-mondhead, Taylor B. McNeel, Biloxi, attorneys for appellees.
    Before WALLER, C.J., CHANDLER and KING, JJ.
   WALLER, Chief Justice, for the court:

¶ 1. Frank Schmidt Sr. and other former parishioners of the St. Paul Catholic Church in Pass Christian (“Plaintiffs”) seek review of the second dismissal with prejudice of their claims against the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., Most Reverend Thomas J. Rodi (“Bishop Rodi”), and Rev. Dennis Carver (“Church Defendants”). This is the second appearance of these parties before this Court. See Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So.3d 814 (Miss.2009) (“Schmidt /”). On remand, the chancellor denied Plaintiffs’ motions for additional discovery and granted Church Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs now file this appeal, asserting the chancellor erred in dismissing their claims for diversion of designated funds and intentional misrepresentation.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. The initial facts of this case are taken in part from those in Schmidt I:

¶ 2. The St. Paul Catholic Church was established in 1847 in Pass Christian, by the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church is a hierarchical church, meaning that local churches are subordinate members of the general church, which maintains ultimate authority or control. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 722-27, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871).
¶ 3. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The storm caused extensive damage to the St. Paul property. St. Paul’s gymnasium and the St. Paul Catholic Elementary School essentially were destroyed. The actual church building was also damaged, although the extent of the damage is disputed by the parties. Plaintiffs insist that the church remains structurally sound, that many of its sacred articles were unharmed, and that repair costs should be less than $2.5 million. Church Defendants maintain that the church and its most sacred places were “destroyed in large part.”
¶ 4. On November 27, 2005, Bishop Rodi issued a decree merging the St. Paul and Our Lady of Lourdes Parishes to form a new parish called the Holy Family Parish. The decree stated that the Holy Family Parish would maintain two church edifices, St. Paul Church and Our Lady of Lourdes Church. The decree also provided that “[i]n accordance with canon 121, Holy Family Parish obtains the goods and patrimonial rights proper to Saint Paul Parish and Our Lady of Lourdes Parish as well as the obligations with which they were burdened .... ” Pursuant to this decree, plans were initiated to rebuild the St. Paul Church, and donations were solicited and given for that purpose. More than one year later, on March 18, 2007, Bishop Rodi issued a second decree announcing that Our Lady of Lourdes would be the only church in the Holy Family Parish. This decision effectively closed the doors of the St. Paul Church. According to Father Carver, this decision was made because of a shortage of priests, and because Our Lady of Lourdes Church, unlike St. Paul, is located in a non-flood-zone area.
¶ 6. A number of St. Paul’s former parishioners, including some of the Plaintiffs in the subject case, filed a canonical appeal through the Roman Catholic Church’s ecclesiastical tribunals. On November 30, 2007, the Vatican issued a decree which stated that Bishop Rodi had acted in accordance with the requirements and procedures set forth under canon law.

Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 818-21.

¶ 3. While the canonical appeal was pending,157 former parishioners filed suit (“Schmidt I ”) against the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Bishop Rodi, and Father Carver, asserting, in part, that Bishop Rodi held the St. Paul Church property in trust for the members, that any financial contributions designated for reconstruction of the church were held in trust for that particular purpose, that Defendants had violated said trusts, and that Father Carver had made misrepresentations in soliciting donations for the rebuilding efforts. Id. at 819-20. The chancellor dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice, finding that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based on the church autonomy doctrine of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 821.

¶ 4. This Court affirmed the chancellor in part, finding that Plaintiffs “lack standing to assert that the St. Paul property is held in trust for their benefit.” Id. at 829. Also, the Court found “that the chancellor correctly determined that our courts may not consider whether Church Defendants’ management or administrative decisions were fiscally irresponsible, or whether those decisions were in the best interests of parishioners.” Id. at 829-30. However, the Court reversed and remanded the chancellor’s dismissal of the diversion-of-designated-funds claim, as well as the claim against Father Carver for intentional misrepresentation, finding subject-matter jurisdiction existed over these claims. Id. at 832.

¶ 5. On remand following Schmidt /, Plaintiffs pursued further discovery, serving Church Defendants with a subpoena duces tecum, directing Father Carver to appear for a deposition and to bring with him documents relating to every donation received by Church Defendants, from both plaintiffs and nonplaintiffs. Subsequently, Church Defendants filed a Motion to Quash the Subpoena, Motion to Stay Discovery, and a Motion for Summary Judgment. Essentially, the discovery dispute revolved around whether Plaintiffs’ claims were limited to those arising solely from Plaintiffs’ donations or whether they could seek discovery and maintain a suit on behalf of a class of donors, irrespective of whether the donors were named Plaintiffs.

¶ 6. The court ruled in favor of Church Defendants regarding discovery, finding that the “gravamen of both surviving claims pertains to the money each individual Plaintiff paid to [Church Defendants], [and] Plaintiffs are in a unique position to know everything they need to know about any donations which underpin their claims, so as to refute the Church Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment without any need for discovery.” The chancellor noted that the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize class actions; thus, the only claims before the court “are those of the named Plaintiffs.” In addition, the chancellor found that a claim for intentional misrepresentation could have been made only after Bishop Rodi’s March 13, 2007, decree, “when any solicitation statement by Father Carver ... became patently false,” but prior to the time when Plaintiffs received knowledge of the church’s closure.

¶ 7. After hearing oral arguments on Church Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the chancellor granted the motion. With regard to the diversion claim, the chancellor initially noted that, even taking into account Lead Plaintiff Schmidt’s affidavit opposing the motion, Plaintiffs did not produce evidence that disputed Church Defendants’ evidence regarding contributions received and refunds returned. Citing Schmidt I and its discussion of Barker v. The Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Barnabas Church, the chancellor found that this Court “explicitly recognized that the remedy for an improper diversion-of-designated-funds claim was for the donors to ‘reclaim their contributions.’ ”

¶ 8. The chancellor found that the four elements listed in Barker and cited with approval by this Court, were controlling and provided “the necessary elements of an improper diversion-of-designated-funds claim.” Thus, the chancellor dismissed the claims of the 115 Plaintiffs who did not donate any money to the rebuilding of St. Paul’s. In addition, the chancellor dismissed the diversion claims of thirty-five of the thirty-nine remaining Plaintiffs because they received letters advising them of the change in plans and allowing them to seek a refund but did nothing. Finally, the chancellor dismissed the diversion claims of the remaining four Plaintiffs who were given a refund because they could not satisfy the fourth element required of the claim.

¶ 9. Regarding the Plaintiffs’ intentional misrepresentation claim, the trial court found that 115 of the 154 did not contribute any funds to rebuild the church; therefore, they could not establish that they had been injured by any alleged misrepresentation. Further, in response to Father Carver’s letter regarding the return of donations, four Plaintiffs requested and received a refund; thus, the lower court found those four Plaintiffs suffered no injury. Finally, of the thirty-five remaining Plaintiffs who donated, none of them requested his or her donations be returned; thus, their claims were dismissed.

¶ 10. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. The assignments of error they raise may be summarized as followed: (1) whether Plaintiffs can maintain a claim for diversion-of-designated-funds, and (2) whether Plaintiffs can maintain a claim for intentional misrepresentation against Father Carver.

DISCUSSION

¶ 11. This Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Johnson v. Pace, 122 So.3d 66, 68 (Miss.2013) (citations omitted). If the pleadings, together with depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,” then the “moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

I. Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for diversion of designated funds.

¶ 12. Plaintiffs’ diversion-of-designated-funds claim hinges on this Court’s interpretation of Schmidt I. Indeed, Plaintiffs state in their brief that their claims “will either rise or fall on whether the Court finds Plaintiffs have standing to enjoin Church Defendants from diverting designated donations made by both Plaintiffs and non plaintiffs.”

¶ 13. Plaintiffs raise two arguments to support their contention that they have standing to assert claims on behalf of non-plaintiffs and on behalf of the 115 Plaintiffs who did not contribute funds to the rebuilding of St. Paul’s. First, by soliciting and accepting donations to rebuild St. Paul’s, Church Defendants created a charitable trust, which Church Defendants were required to hold for the benefit of the Holy Family Parish; therefore, Plaintiffs, as members of the Holy Family Parish, have standing to seek information regarding and assert claims on behalf of everyone who donated, regardless of their status before the court. Second, Plaintiffs contend Schmidt I did not limit their diversion claims to those donations made by named Plaintiffs, nor did this Court limit the remedy of Plaintiffs to a return of their donations; thus, the lower Court erred in dismissing those Plaintiffs who did not donate. As a threshold issue, we find that Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert claims on behalf of parties not before the court.

A. Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert claims on behalf of nonplaintiffs or those who did not donate due to any alleged charitable trust.

¶ 14. Standing is one aspect of subject-matter jurisdiction. Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 826 (citing Kirk v. Pope, 973 So.2d 981, 990 (Miss.2007)). “Mississippi’s standing requirements are quite liberal.” Dunn v. Miss. State Dep’t of Health, 708 So.2d 67, 70 (Miss.1998). This Court has stated the general rule as: “Mississippi parties have standing to sue ‘when they assert a colorable interest in the subject-matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by law.’ ” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 826-27 (quoting City of Picayune v. Southern Reg’l Corp., 916 So.2d 510, 525 (Miss.2005)). Stated differently, the question is “[wjhether a particular plaintiff had a right to judicial enforcement of a legal duty of the defendant or ... whether a party plaintiff in an action for legal relief can show in himself a present, existent actionable title or interest, and demonstrate that this right was complete at the time of the institution of the action.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 827 (quoting City of Picayune, 916 So.2d at 526). In addition, “for a plaintiff to establish standing on grounds of experiencing an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant/appellee, the adverse effect experienced must be different from the adverse effect experienced by the general public.” Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So.3d 25, 33-34 (Miss.2010) (citing Burgess v. City of Gulfport, 814 So.2d 149, 152-53 (Miss.2002)).

¶ 15. Plaintiffs maintain that they may pursue claims on behalf of those who did not donate and those not before the Court, because a charitable trust was established. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite City of Picayune v. Southern Reg’l Corp., in which this Court stated “[a] charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it, and it subjects the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties and mandates that the property be dedicated to a charitable purpose.” City of Picayune v. Southern Reg’l Corp., 916 So.2d 510, 522-23 (Miss.2005) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 (2005)). As an initial premise, Plaintiffs argue that if a charitable organization accepts donations for a specific purpose, “it is obligated to only use the donation for the designated purpose and ... is prohibited from using the donation for any other purpose.” See 15 Am.Jur.2d Charities § 77. Plaintiffs cite this Court’s quotation in Schmidt I of Canon 1267 § 3 and its consistency with “the general law of contributions,” but Plaintiffs carry the Court’s analogy further, arguing Canon 1267 also is consistent with a Mississippi secular charity’s authority to use donations being “subject to the intent of the settlor.” See Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830.

¶ 16. Plaintiffs aver that they have standing to pursue these claims, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Section 391, which states in part that a suit to enforce a charitable trust can be maintained by “a person who has a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust,” and if the trust is created for a small class of persons, “a member of the association can maintain a suit on behalf of himself and the other members against the trustees for the enforcement of the trust.” See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391, cmt. (c). See also Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 414 (1964) (Stating that if a trust is created for a definite local church, the members have a certain interest in enforcing the trust.) Plaintiffs contend that Church Defendants solicited donations for the repair of St. Paul’s, which was within the Holy Family Parish; Church Defendants “received the donations for and on behalf of the Holy Family Parish;” Church Defendants were then obligated to hold said donations for the benefit of the members of the Parish and subsequently were bound to “follow the intentions of the donors and utilize the donations for the intended purpose.” Therefore, because Plaintiffs were all members of the Holy Family Parish, they were beneficiaries of the donations, and, as such, “a definable class of persons of the Catholic Faith; distinguishable from both the general public and other Catholics.”

¶ 17. As acknowledged in the chancery court’s opinion, there is no class-action rule in Mississippi state courts that would allow Plaintiffs to make claims and arguments on behalf of parties not before the court. See USF & G of Miss. v. Walls, 911 So.2d 463, 468 (Miss.2005) (“Accordingly, as we have not made a rule which provides for class actions, they are not a part of Mississippi practice — chancery, circuit, or otherwise.”). After Church Defendants decided not to rebuild St. Paul’s, they sent letters to donors advising them of their decision not to rebuild and stated “that if you wish for any reason to receive a refund of your donation, [Church Defendants] would be most happy to accommodate you.” We find that Schmidt I established that each individual donor may request his or her donations returned; however, Plaintiffs, as alleged beneficiaries of a charitable trust, cannot have a civil court force Church Defendants to do anything with donations from parties not before it. As this Court stated in Schmidt I, standing depends on whether a particular plaintiff can find, in himself, “a right to judicial enforcement of a legal duty of the defendant.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 827 (quoting City of Picayune, 916 So.2d at 526) (emphasis added). The relief sought by Plaintiffs, as alleged beneficiaries of a charitable trust, falls outside any legal interest in donations that are not their own. See City of Picayune, 916 So.2d at 528. We find that Schmidt I recognized a right to judicial enforcement of a claim for diversion of designated funds, but only in those Plaintiffs who contributed to the rebuilding of St. Paul’s. Plaintiffs are attempting to maintain claims against a hierarchical church, in which they have no control over management decisions, and thus, no proprietary interest in anything but the donations they themselves contributed. See id.

¶ 18. In Schmidt I we found Plaintiffs did not have standing to assert the St. Paul real property was held in trust for their benefit, citing cases in other jurisdictions that addressed this issue. Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 823-829. Thus, we disagree with Church Defendants’ contention that Schmidt I foreclosed Plaintiffs’ trust argument with regard to donations made for the specific purpose of rebuilding St. Paul’s. However, when this Court analyzed Plaintiffs’ claims for a diversion of designated funds, we did not discuss trust law to find Plaintiffs could maintain a suit for diversion of designated-funds. See id. at 829-831. Instead, this Court cited cases dealing with the general law of contributions. We did this for a reason; that reason being the problem the general law of contributions addresses and the remedy applied. Therefore, we find that, to the extent Church Defendants were holding designated donations in an alleged trust, only those who donated had a legally enforceable interest in their donation, and thus, standing to bring a claim for diversion of designated funds. See City of Picayune, 916 So.2d at 528. Although some Plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim, they did not meet the necessary elements to maintain a diversion-of-designated-funds claim as set out in Schmidt I.

B. Schmidt I established the requisite elements for a diversion-of-designated-funds claim.

¶ 19. Finding subject-matter jurisdiction existed over Plaintiffs’ claims for diversion of designated funds, this Court in Schmidt I first noted that, “[wjhile churches have large, almost-unfettered discretion in their administrative decision-making, they are not entitled to violate recognized duties or standards of conduct.” Id. at 830 (citing Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213, 1242 (Miss.2005)). We quoted the general law of contributions, stating “[w]here a religious society raises a fund by subscription for a particular purpose, it cannot divert the funds to another purpose, and, if it abandons such purpose, the donors may reclaim their contributions.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830 (quoting Columbus Cmty. Hosp., Inc., v. Califano, 614 F.2d 181, 187 (8th Cir.1980) (quoting Barker v. The Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Barnabas Church, 176 Neb. 327,126 N.W.2d 170, 177 (1964))). The opinion then analyzed Barker, noting that the Nebraska Supreme Court, when faced with a similar factual situation, found “a viable legal claim where (1) money was pledged and paid pursuant to a fund-raising drive to build a new church; (2) the plan was abandoned and the funds were diverted for a different purpose; (3) the plaintiff demanded that the contribution be returned; and (4) the church refused to refund the plaintiffs donation.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830 (citing Barker, 126 N.W.2d at 177). Finally, the Court found that subject-matter jurisdiction existed “over a claim that a religious entity breached a fiduciary duty by improperly diverting designated funds.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830.

¶ 20. Plaintiffs label the Schmidt I Court’s discussion of Barker “dicta,” and argue the lower court “improperly declared dictum in the Schmidt decision was the law of the State of Mississippi.” They note that Barker and Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison were cited when this Court “established the following requirements” for a diversion-of-designated-funds claim: “[t]o establish a viable claim, a plaintiff must prove certain facts.” Both Morrison and Barker require that the funds be solicited by the church. The donor must then pledge his or her contribution for the solicited purpose. Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830-31 (citations omitted). Thus, the crux of Plaintiffs’ contention is that Schmidt I required only the above two elements to establish a claim for diversion of designated funds.

¶ 21. With the above reading of Schmidt I as their foundation, Plaintiffs argue this Court “did not intend for Plaintiffs’ diversion claim to be limited to Plaintiffs’ donations, because if this had been the Court’s intention, it would have used ‘plaintiff instead of ‘donor’ in its findings.” Plaintiffs aver this Court never expressly adopted all four elements listed in Barker; nor did this Court state the only remedy was for Plaintiffs to reclaim their contributions. Thus, the chancellor erred by limiting Plaintiffs’ claims to those before the Court and by requiring them to establish the four elements from Barker.

¶ 22. We find that Plaintiffs’ argument is without merit. In Schmidt I, this Court expressly stated, with regard to Plaintiffs’ diversion claim, that the “only issue before us is whether our courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 831 (emphasis added). The only express finding of the Court regarding a diversion-of-designated-funds claim was that subject-matter jurisdiction existed; thus, courts of this state could hear such a claim. Therefore, Schmidt I neither officially adopted elements for a diversion-of-designated-funds claim, nor addressed whether Plaintiffs had standing to pursue claims on behalf of all who had donated. See id. This is simply because these issues were not before this Court. Thus, this Court’s use of “donor” when discussing the commonalities between Barker and Morrison was dicta. The chancellor correctly applied the elements of Barker to Plaintiffs’ diversion-of-designated-funds claim.

¶23. The lower court found that the elements of Barker were quoted and cited favorably by this Court; these elements controlled Plaintiffs’ diversion claim and therefore provided “the necessary elements of an improper diversion-of-designated-funds claim.” Under Plaintiffs’ interpretation, all that is needed to establish a claim for a diversion of designated funds, is that a religious organization solicit donations for a cause, and someone donate for the purpose. This Court’s discussion in Schmidt I of the general law of contributions and the elements of Barker are instructive because of the problem they address and the remedy they provide. The general law of contributions and the elements of Barker directly address Plaintiffs’ claim that a religious organization may not solicit funds for one reason and then divert them for another purpose. See Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830; Barker, 126 N.W.2d at 177; Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church, 103 Ariz. 349, 442 P.2d 93, 95 (1968). If the religious organization abandons the stated purpose, which we emphasize Church Defendants have a right to do, the remedy suggested is that Plaintiffs may reclaim their donations. See Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830.

¶ 24. We previously have held that courts in Mississippi “may not consider whether Church Defendants’ management or administrative decisions were fiscally irresponsible, or whether those decisions were in the best interests of parishioners.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 829-30. We find that “management or administrative decisions” necessarily include a hierarchical church’s decision whether or not to close, open, build, or rebuild a church, and how much money to expend on such a project. See id. at 822-23 (“[i]t is only for the diocesan bishop to erect, suppress, or alter parishes.”). Thus, we hold that Schmidt I established that Plaintiffs cannot use civil courts to second-guess Church Defendants’ decision not to use the funds to rebuild St. Paul’s. See id. at 829-831. Because we find Plaintiffs cannot tell Church Defendants what to do with the money via civil courts in this state, the remedy is what was stated in Schmidt I: Plaintiffs may obtain a refund of their donations from the church. Only when this request is refused would a prospective plaintiff have a cause of action.

¶ 25. However, Plaintiffs argue they did not request a refund of their donations; rather, their request was for the lower court to “enjoin Church Defendants from diverting the designated donations and for the Church Defendants to replace any misappropriated funds.” Throughout the record and in their briefs, Plaintiffs make several assertions about the remedy to which they are entitled. For example, they argue any misappropriated donations should be “replaced” or that the lower court should order Church Defendants “to follow the intention of the donors.” As noted above, a hierarchical religious organization has a right to change its mind regarding whether to rebuild a church, and that decision cannot be second-guessed by courts in this state. Because Plaintiffs’ only remedy is obtain a refund of their donations, the chancellor correctly found that the elements of Barker, as favorably cited by this Court in Schmidt I, controlled Plaintiffs’ claims.

¶ 26. For the above reasons, we hold that only Plaintiffs who donated have a “legally enforceable right” to the return of their donations once the Church announced it was not going to rebuild St. Paul’s. Further, under this Court’s guidance in Schmidt I, only those Plaintiffs who asked for a refund but were subsequently refused have a claim for a diversion of designated funds. Thus, the lower court properly limited discovery and diversion claims to those individuals actually before the Court and who met the elements outlined in Schmidt I and Barker.

C. Summary judgment on this claim was appropriate.

¶ 27. Church Defendants’ motion for summary judgment essentially stated Plaintiffs did not have a cause of action because “they either (1) did not donate any money; (2) donated and obtained a refund; (3) or donated and did not ask for a refund when offered.” Therefore, money donated by nonplaintiffs was irrelevant. Because we find the lower court was correct in limiting the claims of Plaintiffs to those before the court who actually donated, we find the Plaintiffs had within their possession all the information needed regarding their donations to dispute Church Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

¶ 28. The lead Plaintiff, Schmidt, filed an affidavit disputing the alleged facts in Church Defendants’ Motion for Summary-Judgment, but the lower court found his affidavit “fail[ed] to specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the motion [would] enable [Schmidt] by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” See Vaughn v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr., 20 So.3d 645, 655 (Miss.2009). In his affidavit, Schmidt does not dispute that Church Defendants sent him the letter stating the change in plans; that the amount they claimed he donated was incorrect; or that his donation was not refunded upon request. Any of the named Plaintiffs who donated were in a position to submit an affidavit to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding their own donations.

¶ 29. Although this Court did not expressly adopt the elements from Barker in Schmidt I, the chancellor was correct in finding they applied to Plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, because 115 of the 154 Plaintiffs did not donate to rebuild St. Paul’s, the chancellor was correct in dismissing these Plaintiffs’ diversion claims, because they could not meet the threshold requirement of a donation being made for as stated purpose. In addition, four Plaintiffs, including Schmidt, requested and had their donations refunded after receiving the letter from Church Defendants notifying them of the change in plans; therefore, the chancellor also was correct in dismissing their diversion claims. Of the thirty-five remaining Plaintiffs, none requested a refund. Thus, we agree with the chancellor that, because they made no demand, those remaining Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the third and fourth elements to establish a diversion claim. Therefore, because Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facia case for improper diversion of designated funds, we affirm the chancellors’ grant of summary judgment on this issue.

II. Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for intentional misrepresentation against Father Carver.

¶ 30. To make a claim for intentional misrepresentation, Plaintiffs must establish, by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity, (7) his reliance on its truth, (8) his right to rely thereon, and (9) his consequent and proximate injury.

Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 831 (quoting McCord v. Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., 960 So.2d 399, 406 (Miss.2007)) (emphasis added); Gallegos v. Mid-South Mortgage & Inv., Inc., 956 So.2d 1055,1059 (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (recognizing the elements of intentional misrepresentation and fraud are the same). “Clear and convincing evidence is of such a high order that this Court held that the overwhelming weight of the evidence falls short of being clear and convincing.” Phillips Brothers v. Winstead, 129 So.3d 906, 915 (Miss.2014) (internal quotations omitted). This Court has held that “[i]t is clearly the law that a misrepresentation which neither does a plaintiff any harm nor causes a loss is not actionable.” Koury v. Ready, 911 So.2d 441, 446 (Miss.2005) (quoting McMullan v. Geosouthern Energy Corp., 556 So.2d 1033, 1037 (Miss.1990)); Monsanto Co. v. Cochran, 254 Miss. 399, 180 So.2d 624, 628 (1965) (“It is a fundamental principle of law that ... in order to secure relief on a basis of fraud ... the person seeking redress must have been damaged, injured, or harmed as a result of the asserted fraud ....”) (quotation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454 (Miss.1983).

¶ 31. The chancery court cited Koury v. Ready in finding Plaintiffs had not established an injury. There, this Court addressed a misrepresentation claim stemming from a dispute between partners of an accounting firm over the nondisclosure of accounts receivable. Koury v. Ready, 911 So.2d 441, 443-447 (Miss.2005). This Court found that the failure of Koury to disclose accounts receivable to Ready “caused no injury” because Ready owed Koury money; therefore, an essential element was missing, and the claim failed. Id. at 446. Plaintiffs argue that Koury is distinguishable because the facts are different, rendering “the Koury Court’s conclusions about the type of injury sufficient to satisfy a misrepresentation claim” inapplicable to the case sub judice.

¶ 32. Plaintiffs contend that they would have met the nine elements required to establish a claim for intentional misrepresentation if they had been allowed to take the deposition of Father Carver. Plaintiffs also argue that the loss of their donations was not the only damages they could suffer, and this Court never said such in Schmidt I. Other than “irreparable harm,” Plaintiffs argue that they, and “many of their ancestors, children, grandchildren ... have attended christenings, weddings, funerals, Mardi Gras balls, draw downs, fish fries, and other events at the former St. Paul Church site. If Church Defendants are allowed to divert the designated donations to other purposes of their choosing, Plaintiffs and the other members of Holy Family Parish will be deprived of the use of the facilities the Most. Rev. Roger Morin committed would be constructed at the former St. Paul Church site.”

¶ 33. As noted above, Plaintiffs’ claims are limited to those actually before the Court. Because 115 Plaintiffs did not donate to rebuild the church, it is impossible for them to have been injured by any alleged misrepresentation by Father Carver. Plaintiffs’ other alleged injury is not an injury this Court can redress, as this Court cannot force Church Defendants to do anything with the St. Paul’s property. Of the thirty-nine remaining Plaintiffs, four requested a refund and did not state by affidavit that they did not receive this refund or that it was for an incorrect amount; therefore, we find they were not harmed by any alleged misrepresentation. The remaining Plaintiffs each were offered refunds of their donations; none averred by affidavit or otherwise that they did not receive this letter; therefore, we find they have suffered no harm by any alleged misrepresentation by Father Carver.

CONCLUSION

¶ 34. Because none of the Plaintiffs established the requisite elements for a diversion of designated funds, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on this issue. In addition, because no Plaintiffs could establish a claim for intentional misrepresentation, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on this issue. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court.

¶ 35. AFFIRMED.

DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . On November 30, 2007, the Vatican decreed that Bishop Rodi's actions "were in accordance with the requirements and procedures set forth under canon law.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 819.

      .This decree announced that Our Lady of Lourdes would be the only church in the new Holy Family Parish and “effectively closed the doors of St. Paul Church.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 819. Because Bishop Rodi's 2005 decree stated the Church was to be rebuilt, and only a Bishop can make that decision, the chancellor reasoned that Father Carver was under the compulsion of that decree until the 2007 decree "closed the doors” of St. Paul’s. Further, the chancellor noted Plaintiffs did not allege that Bishop Rodi conspired with Father Carver in any alleged misrepresentation, and the remanded claim involved only Father Carver.

      . The chancellor adopted Church Defendants’ findings of fact and conclusions of law almost verbatim.

      . Barker v. The Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Barnabas Church, 176 Neb. 327, 126 N.W.2d 170 (1964).

      . The elements are: "(1) money was pledged and paid pursuant to a fund-raising drive to build a new church; (2) the plan was abandoned and the funds were diverted for a different purpose; (3) the plaintiff demanded that the contribution be returned; and (4) the church refused to refund the plaintiff's donation.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830 (citing Barker, 126 N.W.2d at 177).

      . Plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment. However, many of their assignments of error involve the initial discovery ruling by the trial court.

      . "Colorable,” when used to describe a claim or action, means “appearing to be true, valid, or right.” Black’s Law Dictionary 212 (abr. 7th ed.2000).

      . "Church Defendants readily acknowledge that, under canon law, '[ojfferings given by the faithful for a certain purpose can be applied only for that purpose,’ and may not be used for any other purpose without the donor’s consent.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 830 (quoting Canon 1267 § 3).

      .Plaintiffs argue this principle "has been universally accepted” and include a footnote which cites in part Jones v. Grant, 344 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Ala.1977); Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 61 Cal.2d 750, 40 Cal.Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932 (1964). Jones was a class action by members of a college to enforce a charitable trust, and the holding subsequently was superceded by statute. Jones, 344 So.2d at 1211. Holt was a case involving a suit by one trustee against the other two trustees of a California charitable corporation. Holt, 394 P.2d at 933.

      . In addition, Plaintiffs do not make any arguments that they have associational standing. See Belhaven Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 507 So.2d 41, 47 (Miss.1987).

      . Church Defendants maintained throughout that any donors wishing to receive a refund of their donations still would be accommodated upon request.

      .Some donors may be perfectly fine with Church Defendants' decision to rebuild the Holy Family Parish church on another site and having their donations going toward that project. Therefore, it is up to each individual to decide what they want their money to go toward.

      . Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213 (Miss.2005).

      . Plaintiffs' interpretation that the Schmidt I Court established only two elements to find a claim for diversion of designated funds is complicated by the fact that they also argue that, "although not expressly stated, it should go without saying” that the third element was the funds subsequently were diverted. (Emphasis added.).

      . Indeed, Plaintiffs admitted several times during arguments they could not make Church Defendants rebuild St. Paul's.

      . The reason for this is that a prospective plaintiff could not use civil courts to force Church Defendants to do anything other than this.

      . The letter from Church Defendants announcing the change in plans does not ask for the specific consent of the donor to use the funds for another purpose. However, Plaintiffs cite only this Court’s mention of canon law and Mississippi statutes involving secular charities, which is not applicable to Church Defendants. Regarding the interpretation of canon law, this Court cannot second-guess the Vatican's judgment that Church Defendants "acted in accordance with the requirements and procedures set forth under canon law.” Schmidt I, 18 So.3d at 819.

      . Again, none of the Plaintiffs averred by affidavit or otherwise that: they did not receive the letter advising them of Church Defendants’ change of plans; they could not reclaim their donations if unsatisfied; the amount of money they donated was incorrect; or they were denied a refund upon request.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: IRVING, P.J., for the Court:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Clarence JONES a/k/a Clarence Tyrone Jones a/k/a Clarence T. Jones, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2012-KA-00421-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 22, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied April 8, 2014.
    Certiorari Denied July 17, 2014.

      Office of State Public Defender by Hunter Nolan Aikens, attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., CARLTON and JAMES, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J., for the Court:

¶ 1. On November 17, 2011, a Rankin County jury convicted Clarence Jones of capital murder, petit larceny, and motor-vehicle theft. The circuit court sentenced him to life for the capital-murder conviction, six months’ imprisonment for the pet-it-larceny conviction, and ten years’ imprisonment for the motor-vehicle-theft conviction, with the sentences for the pet-it-larceny conviction and the motor-vehicle-theft conviction to run concurrently with the sentence for the capital-murder conviction, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without eligibility for parole or probation. Jones filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which the circuit court denied.

¶ 2. Feeling aggrieved, Jones appeals and argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements that he gave to law enforcement officials and in giving a jury instruction that allegedly required him to prove his innocence.

¶ 3. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 4. On February 28, 2011, Rankin County law enforcement officials arrested Jones, Jerry Durr, and Trammel Warren for the murder of Stephen Johnson. Jones eventually gave three statements to police indicating that he had some involvement in Johnson’s death.

¶ 5. Jones gave his first statement to law enforcement officials on February 28, 2011, shortly after his arrest. During Jones’s first statement, he told officers that he had a tenth-grade education. Investigator Tim Lawless, with the Rankin County Sheriffs Department, read Jones his rights. Jones indicated that he understood his rights and signed a waiver-of-rights form. He initially indicated that he vaguely knew Johnson through Durr, but had never been to Johnson’s home and had not seen Johnson in approximately two years. Investigator Lawless told Jones that Durr had confessed to killing Johnson and had also stated that Jones was with him during the murder. When confronted with Durr’s statement, Jones said: “I can’t let him go down for murder by [himself].... I’ll just say I was with him.” Later, after Investigator Lawless asked Jones about a female being involved, Jones responded that he was not aware of a female being involved and stated: “But I will say, even though I’m lying, I was with him.” During this first statement, Investigator Lawless also explained the difference between the possible punishments for “murder” and “accessory.” Investigator Lawless stated: “Murder’s one thing. Accessory’s another. Murder can put you away, can get you the lethal injection — in Rankin County, especially. Or accessory might get you a little ... time in the jail.”

¶ 6. Jones provided a second statement — written this time — on February 24, 2011, the day following his arrest. Investigator Wayne Humphreys, with the Rankin County Sheriffs Department, showed Jones a waiver-of-rights form and told Jones that his rights were the same as they were when he gave his previous statement. Investigator Humphreys gave Jones a sheet of paper to provide a written statement. After Jones completed his written statement, he explained to Investigator Humphreys that Warren had Johnson in a choke hold the last time that he saw Johnson alive. When he and Durr put Johnson in the back of the truck, he did not think that Johnson was dead but thought that Johnson was unconscious as a result of Warren’s assault. Further, although he did not know Johnson very well, he went along with the plan because he thought that Johnson had some money hidden inside his home.

¶ 7. On March 2, 2011, Jones volunteered a third statement. Investigators Humphreys and Lawless were present during this statement. Investigator Hum-phreys explained that while the court had assigned an attorney to Jones for his preliminary hearing, that attorney no longer represented him. Investigator Hum-phreys also explained that Jones was still entitled to have an attorney present during any statement that he made to law enforcement officers. Jones indicated that he did not need an attorney. Investigator Humphreys read Jones his rights, and Jones signed the waiver-of-rights form.

¶ 8. In his third statement, Jones stated that Durr woke him and said that they were going to go “hit a lick.” When Jones asked “who,” Durr named Johnson as their target. Jones, Durr, and Warren traveled to Johnson’s home in Warren’s car. When the trio reached Johnson’s home, they noticed that Warren’s car had a flat tire. They nevertheless decided to proceed with the plan. Jones revealed that Johnson would not let them inside the home at first, but Warren kicked in the door. Jones admitted that he hit Johnson a couple of times. He also admitted to sitting on Johnson’s chest to make sure that he did not move while Warren and Durr searched Johnson’s house for money. Jones also searched the home for money, found nothing, and decided to go outside with Warren and change the flat tire on Warren’s car. When he went outside, Johnson was still alive, and Durr was still questioning Johnson about the location of the money. While Jones was outside trying to change the flat tire on Warren’s car, Durr came outside and told Jones and Warren that he had killed Johnson. Durr had the keys to Johnson’s truck. Jones and Durr loaded Johnson’s body into Johnson’s truck and drove to Pelahatchie, Mississippi, to dump Johnson’s body. After they dumped the body, they drove back to Jackson. Jones stated that he “just want[ed] this murder off [him because he] did not kill [Johnson].” Investigator Lawless advised Jones that when his family hired a lawyer for him, he should talk to someone in the district attorney’s office to see if they would work with him.

¶ 9. At the suppression hearing, Investigator Lawless testified that he discussed the difference between accessory and murder with Jones during the first interview. He stated that he explained the difference between the two because he wanted Jones to understand the kind of charges that he could be facing. During cross-examination, Investigator Lawless stated that he had told Jones that if he just “passed a couple licks” he could be charged as an accessory. Investigator Lawless also admitted that he had told Jones during one of the earlier interviews that it would not look good to the judge if he did not cooperate.

¶ 10. Jones testified that he only had an eighth-grade education, even though he told officers that he had a tenth-grade education. Jones noted that he had been arrested before but had never been read his Miranda rights, and he had never read them for himself. He stated that he was led to believe that he would be charged as an accessory, although Investigator Lawless never promised that he would be charged as an accessory. Jones admitted that the investigators did not coerce him, make promises to him, or threaten him. The court determined that the law enforcement officers had not acted improperly and that Jones had given his statements voluntarily.

¶ 11. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

I. Motion to Suppress

¶ 12. Jones argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers. “[Appellate courts] will reverse a [circuit] court’s ruling on a motion to suppress ‘if the incorrect legal principle was applied; if there was no substantial evidence to support a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights; and if the denial was a result of manifest error.’ ” Redmond v. State, 66 So.3d 107, 111 (¶ 12) (Miss.2011) (quoting Scott v. State, 8 So.3d 855, 861 (¶ 22) (Miss.2008)). The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated:

For a confession to be voluntary, it must have been freely given and must not be the product of coercion by threats, promises, or inducements. The State bears the burden to prove a confession was voluntary. Voluntariness may be established through testimony from officers or those who may have specific knowledge of the facts that the confession was made without any threats, offers of reward, or coercion. This testimony establishes a prima facie case of voluntariness. Then, the defendant may rebut the testimony with contrary evidence; whereupon the State must offer the testimony of all officers who witnessed the confession, or give an adequate reason for their absence.

Harden v. State, 59 So.3d 594, 605 (¶ 25) (Miss.2011) (internal citations omitted).

¶ 13. Here, there is substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s decision that Jones gave his statements voluntarily. The officers that were present during Jones’s statements testified that they did not coerce him, make promises to him, or threaten him. Jones received Miranda warnings prior to giving each statement. Jones never indicated that he did not understand his rights or that he did not want to talk to the officers. In fact, Jones initiated the third interview with officers because he thought that it would help him avoid a murder conviction. Also, Jones testified that the officers made no promises to him. Additionally, even though Investigator Lawless admitted that he told Jones that it would not look good to the court if he did not cooperate, this statement did not influence Jones’s decision to confess his role in Johnson’s death. Jones chose to confess his involvement in the crime because he did not want Durr to “go down for murder by [himself].” Therefore, it was, initially, his loyalty to Durr and not any statement by law enforcement officers that moved Jones to confess his involvement in Johnson’s murder. He later revealed his complete involvement in the crime out of fear of being charged, tried, and sentenced for capital murder, and he did so voluntarily. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

II. Instruction S-lA

¶ 14. Jones argues that the circuit court erred in giving jury instruction S-lA because it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Jones to prove his innocence. Appellate courts review jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury was properly instructed on the applicable law. Flowers v. State, 51 So.3d 911, 912 (¶ 5) (Miss.2010). Instruction S-1A reads, in pertinent part:

The [c]ourt instructs the [j]ury that if you unanimously find that the State has failed to prove all the elements of the crime of capital murder, you may then proceed in your deliberations to consider the lesser charge of murder. However, it is your duty to accept the law given to you by the [e]ourt; and if the facts and the law warrant a conviction of the crime of capital murder, then it is your duty to make such a finding, and not be influenced by your power to find a lesser offense.

¶ 15. We first note that Jones’s challenge to instruction S-lA is procedurally barred. It is well settled that in order “[t]o preserve a jury instruction issue on appeal, the defendant must make a specific objection to the proposed instruction to allow the [circuit] court to consider the issue.” Boyd v. State, 47 So.3d 121, 124 (¶ 10) (Miss.2010) (quoting Harris v. State, 861 So.2d 1003, 1013 (¶18) (Miss.2003)). Additionally, “an objection on one or more specific grounds constitutes a waiver of all other grounds.” Killen v. State, 958 So.2d 172, 186 (¶ 56) (Miss.2007) (quoting Morgan v. State, 741 So.2d 246, 253 (¶ 15) (Miss.1999)). The record reflects that Jones objected to a preceding paragraph in instruction S-1A concerning the addition of language regarding aiding and abetting. However, Jones did not object to instruction S-1A on the ground that the instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him to prove his innocence. Accordingly, Jones’s challenge to instruction S-1A on this ground is procedurally barred.

¶ 16. Procedural bar notwithstanding, Jones’s argument is without merit. Our supreme court has previously approved an instruction identical to instruction S-1A. In Fulgham v. State, 46 So.3d 315, 330 (¶ 40) (Miss.2010), the court reiterated that an “acquit-first instruction,” like instruction S-1A, is not prohibited by Mississippi law. Jones contends that this instruction is analogous to the instruction erroneously given by the circuit court in Banyard v. State, 47 So.3d 676, 684 (¶ 21) (Miss.2010), which instructed the jury as follows: “if you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is NOT GUILTY of either ‘Capital Murder’ or ‘Murder,’ then the verdict shall be in the following form.... ” (Emphasis added). Our supreme court determined that the instruction was erroneous because it misstated the State’s burden in proving the defendant’s guilt.

¶ 17. However, instruction S-1A is significantly different from the Banyard instruction. While it is an acquit-first instruction, instruction S-1A did not shift the burden to Jones to prove his innocence. Instead, the instruction reminded the jury that the State carried the responsibility to prove every element of the top count — capital murder — and that if the State failed to prove any element of capital murder, then the jury could consider the lesser crime of simple murder. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by giving instruction S-1A to the jury.

¶ 18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF COUNT I, CAPITAL MURDER, AND SENTENCE OF LIFE; COUNT II, PETIT LARCENY, AND SENTENCE OF SIX MONTHS; AND COUNT III, MOTOR-VEHICLE THEFT, AND SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS, WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH EACH OTHER, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO RANKIN COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).


author: LEE, C.J., for the Court: CARLTON, J.,

text:
    Kimberlye Estes BROWN, Appellant v. Hickman Scott BROWN, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CA-00672-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Dec. 3, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied April 15, 2014.
    Certiorari Denied July 17, 2014.

      Rex F. Sanderson, Houston, attorney for appellant.
    James E. Brown Jr., Matthew Daniel Wilson, Starkville, attorneys for appellee.
   LEE, C.J., for the Court:

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ Kimberlye Estes Brown (Kim) and Hickman Scott Brown (Scott) were married on December 6, 2002. They have one child together, and Kim has two children from a previous marriage. Scott left the marital home in Okolona, Mississippi, on December 30, 2009.

¶ On January 6, 2010, Kim filed a petition for child custody and separate maintenance. The parties entered an agreed temporary order addressing marital property and child custody, support, and visitation. Subsequently, Scott filed his answer and counter-petition for child custody and separate maintenance. On April 23, 2010, Scott filed his complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. The chancellor consolidated the separate maintenance action and the divorce action. On February 2, 2011, Kim filed her counterclaim for divorce on the grounds of desertion and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.

¶ 3. After numerous hearings on discovery issues, as well as motions for contempt and motions for modification, the case was heard in the Chickasaw County Chancery Court on May 24, 2011, and July 7, 2011. The chancellor found that both parties failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence any credible evidence to meet their burdens of proof and failed to present any corroborating evidence for their respective habitual-cruel-and-inhuman-treatment claims. As for the desertion claim, the chancellor found that although Kim testified that she repeatedly asked Scott to resume the marriage, her actions proved differently. Therefore, the chancellor denied and dismissed both petitions for divorce. After addressing each Albright factor and considering the totality of the circumstances, the chancellor awarded custody of the couple’s child to Kim and granted Scott visitation. The chancellor did not award Kim separate maintenance.

¶ On October 29, 2011, Scott filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment to reflect the previous visitation schedule the parties had agreed to. Kim filed a motion for a new trial on November 3, 2011. Those motions, along with each party’s motions for contempt, were heard on January 19, 2012. The chancellor denied the motion for a new trial and motions for contempt.

¶ Kim appeals, arguing the chancellor erred in (1) denying her a divorce, (2) denying separate maintenance, (3) failing to order a division of the marital assets and debts, and (4) denying her motion for contempt. Kim does not appeal any issue regarding child custody.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. “This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial credible evidence unless the chancellor abused his or her discretion, was manifestly wrong [or] clearly erroneous, or [applied] an erroneous legal standard....” Dupre v. Dupre, 71 So.3d 1226, 1228 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2011). However, “[l]egal questions are reviewed de novo.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. DIVORCE

¶ 7. Kim claims that the chancellor erred in refusing to grant her petition for divorce on the grounds of desertion and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.

A Desertion

¶8. Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-1 (Supp.2013) permits a divorce for “[w]ilful, continued[,] and obstinate desertion for the space of one year.” The party seeking the divorce must establish the ground for divorce, but must not have “provok[ed] the defendant into the acts which constitute the alleged ground[ ] for divorce.” Ammons v. Ammons, 144 Miss. 314, 318, 109 So. 795, 795 (1926). The defendant may defend against a claim of desertion by “set[ting] up any misconduct of [the] plaintiff which justified the separation!.]” Id.

¶ 9. Scott left the marital home on December 30, 2009. Kim filed her counterclaim for divorce on February 2, 2011. Scott never attempted to reconcile, and he never returned to the marriage. In denying the divorce on the ground of desertion, the chancellor found that although Kim had “testified she repeatedly asked [Scott] to resume the marriage, her actions during the pendency of her [c]omplaint for [separate [m]aintenance and the divorce paint[ ] a different picture.”

¶ 10. On January 4, 2010, Kim applied for and was granted a protective order after an incident at Scott’s mother’s home in Louin, Mississippi. The protective order prohibited Scott from contacting Kim in person or by phone unless he was telephoning their son or exchanging him for visitation. The protective order expired on January 14, 2010, and was not renewed. This was not the only incident between Kim and Scott that warranted law-enforcement intervention. In May 2010, according to Kim, Scott arrived at her house and blocked in her car. Scott contends that he was there to exchange their son for visitation, albeit in a different place and time than previously agreed on. Kim called the police. After they arrived, Scott was instructed to leave or he would be arrested for trespassing.

¶ 11. While both parties argue at great lengths about these incidents, both occurred past the statutory period of one year. If the desertion occurred, the year period would have ceased on December 30, 2010.

¶ 12. In the final judgment and opinion, the chancellor addressed the substantial credible evidence presented to defend against the claim of desertion. Scott testi-fled that Kim had put him out of the bedroom in November 2009. He stated that while Kim was working in Oxford, Mississippi, she often stayed at her father’s condominium overnight instead of returning home. And when Kim switched to a job in Columbus, Mississippi, she often left home early in the morning and returned late at night. In Kim’s absence, Scott raised the children and took care of the household duties. Scott testified that taking on these responsibilities caused him great stress, and when he told Kim about it, she screamed at him.

¶ 13. Scott also stated that his marital problems led to depression, for which he sought medical attention. Scott’s mother and brother also testified that he had been depressed and had seen a doctor for treatment. On one occasion, Scott stated that he wanted to take his son to his mother’s house in Louin for Christmas. According to Scott, when he informed Kim of this, she told him that if he took the child, he would be single when he returned.

¶ 14. Kim testified to the contrary, stating that there were no problems in the marriage until Scott left on December 30, 2009.

¶ 15. The chancellor clearly found Scott to be more credible than Kim. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated numerous times, “A chancellor sits as a fact-finder and[,] in resolving factual disputes, is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses.” Murphy v. Murphy, 631 So.2d 812, 815 (Miss.1994). Contrary to the dissent’s approach, this Court “cannot, and will not, reweigh the evidence or reconsider the credibility of the witnesses. The chancellor is in ‘a better position [than] this Court to judge the veracity of witnesses and credibility of evidence.’ ” Hammers v. Hammers, 890 So.2d 944, 951 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1291 (¶29) (Miss. 2001)). While this Court may have considered the evidence differently than the chancellor, nevertheless, we will not reweigh the evidence. Based on our review of the record, the chancellor’s decision was supported by substantial credible evidence. This issue is without merit.

B. Habitual Cruel and Inhuman Treatment

¶ 16. Kim fails to cite any legal authority in support of her argument that the chancellor erred in denying her claim of divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. “It is well established that appellate courts in Mississippi will not review any issues on appeal if the party fails to cite relevant authority in support of his or her arguments.” Lambert v. Lambert, 872 So.2d 679, 683 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2003). This issue is without merit.

II. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE

¶ 17. Kim contends that the chancellor erred by failing to award separate maintenance. In the final judgment and opinion, the chancellor found that when Kim filed her counterclaim for divorce, she abandoned her claim for separate maintenance. After a hearing on the parties’ respective post-trial motions, the chancellor entered an order altering that finding. The chancellor clarified the record and found that Kim was not entitled to separate maintenance and that she materially contributed to the separation of the parties.

¶ 18. A chancellor may grant separate maintenance to a wife if the “separation [occurred] without fault on the wife’s part” and the husband “willful[ly] abandon[ed]” her and refused to support her. Bridges v. Bridges, 330 So.2d 260, 262 (Miss.1976). As discussed above, from a thorough review of the record, substantial credible evidence was presented that Kim contributed to the separation. This issue is without merit.

III. DIVISION OF MARITAL ESTATE

¶ 19. Kim contends that the chancellor erred in refusing to divide the marital estate. A chancellor has the authority to divide the marital estate after a divorce has been granted. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 927 (Miss.1994). In cases where only separate maintenance has been granted, however, a chancellor does not have the power to award either party a portion of the marital estate. In Daigle v. Daigle, 626 So.2d 140, 146 (Miss.1993), the supreme court stated that separate maintenance “is not a dissolution of a marriage and dividing of marital assets .... ” And the court found that the chancellor erred by dividing the marital assets. Id.

¶ 20. Furthermore, in Thompson v. Thompson, 527 So.2d 617, 622-23 (Miss.1988), the court stated:

The legal duty of the husband to support his wife does not require that he convey any property to her. During cohabitation the wife has the legal right to live in the husband’s home, but he is under no legal duty to convey it to her. And after separation her legal rights are no greater than before.... [T]he court should not, under the guise of enforcing that contractual duty, deprive him of his lands or other specific property, where not necessary for the enforcement of that duty. tort actions concerning Sonat’s mercury metering stations are within the jurisdictional limits of this Court.”

(Citations omitted).

¶ 21. By asking the chancellor to divide the marital assets in the absence of a divorce decree, Kim is asking for her legal rights to be greater than they were before the separation. The chancellor did not have the authority to divide the marital assets, because the claims for divorce had been denied. This issue is without merit.

IV. CONTEMPT

¶ 22. Kim argues that the chancellor erred in denying her motion for contempt, because Scott failed to pay her in accordance with the temporary agreed orders. The chancellor found that when the final judgment was entered denying the divorce, Scott’s financial obligations under the temporary orders stopped.

¶ 23. “[T]he supreme court has held that: ‘contempt matters are committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court which, by institutional circumstance and both temporal and visual proximity, is infinitely more competent to decide the matter than are we.’ ” Keys v. Keys, 930 So.2d 438, 443 (¶18) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (quoting Morreale v. Morreale, 646 So.2d 1264,1267 (Miss.1994)).

¶ 24. The chancellor was well within her discretion to deny Kim’s motion for contempt. This issue is without merit.

¶ 25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHICKASAW COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

CARLTON, J.,

dissenting:

¶ 26. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. The record reflects that the evidence satisfied the requirements of Kim’s requested relief for a divorce based upon the fault ground of Scott’s desertion of the marriage. A spouse’s wilful, continued, and obstinate desertion for the space of one year is a ground for divorce. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev.2013). Simply stated, “[t]he essence of desertion is one spouse’s abandonment of the marriage without the other’s consent.” Debbie Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 4.02 (2005).

¶ 27. To prove desertion, Kim had to show: (1) that Scott was absent for one year; (2) that Scott intended to abandon the marriage; and (3) that Kim did not consent to the separation. Id. As discussed herein, the record shows that each of these requirements was met. Moreover, the record fails to show evidence that Scott, the deserting spouse, offered any good-faith reconciliation. A deserted spouse’s unreasonable refusal of a good-faith offer may provide the spouse offering the reconciliation with grounds for divorce based on desertion. Id. In this case, however, Scott made no offer of reconciliation, in good faith or otherwise. The evidence in the record satisfies the elements required to support Kim’s petition for divorce on the ground of desertion by evidence of Scott’s wilful, continued, and obstinate desertion of the marriage for the space of one year.

¶ 28. The majority affirms the chancellor’s finding that Kim’s conduct justified Scott’s desertion of the marriage. However, precedent reflects that the evidence the chancellor found to be causation of Scott’s departure from the marriage is insufficient to serve as a reasonable cause or legal justification for Scott’s desertion of the marriage. While the chancellor found fault with Kim, the chancellor failed to find that Kim’s conduct rose to the level of an independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation or an independent ground for divorce. Therefore, the record fails to show that Scott possessed a reasonable cause for leaving the marriage. See Bell, at § 4.02 (addressing situations where the conduct of one spouse is so extreme that the conduct drives away the other spouse).

¶ 29. Mississippi law holds that the deserted spouse need not be blameless. See Rodgers v. Rodgers, 349 So.2d 540, 541 (Miss.1977) (discussing the fault of both spouses in determining whether to uphold wife’s petition for separate maintenance). To be considered fault, “the spouse’s ‘misconduct must not only be of a serious nature but must also be an independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation.’ ” See Saucier v. Saucier, 357 So.2d 1378, 1379 (La.Ct.App.1978) (citing Kendrick v. Kendrick, 236 La. 34, 106 So.2d 707, 709 (1958)). The denial of sexual intercourse must be both unjustified and persistent to constitute marital fault rising to the level of an independent contributory or proximate cause. Stated otherwise, to provide grounds for divorce, the refusal to have sexual relations must be inexcusable and long-continued. Handshoe v. Handshoe, 560 So.2d 182, 184 n. 5 (Miss.1990) (citing Culver v. Culver, 383 So.2d 817, 818 (Miss.1980)).

¶ 30. As stated, the facts and the chancellor’s findings fail to support that Scott possessed any reasonable cause to abandon the marriage. Rather, the record reflects the following: (1) that Scott claimed a cessation in sexual relations at times during the marriage because of Kim’s work demands, work hours, and fatigue from work and for approximately thirty days from November 2009 until he left in December 2009; (2) that he wanted to spend Christmas of 2009 with his mother rather than his wife; (3) that when he married Kim, she worked and had two children from a prior marriage; (4) that Scott and Kim had another child during the marriage; (5) that Kim continued to work throughout the marriage, and her work often required her to commute or stay overnight; (6) that Scott became stressed managing the duties of housework and helping with the kids; (7) that Scott possessed problems with sexual intimacy due to medical conditions or medications; and (8) that Scott deceived Kim by failing to disclose his intent to leave the marriage until after he left with their young son. For Kim’s conduct to rise to the level to justify Scott’s departure from the marriage, Kim’s conduct, as discussed, would need to rise to the level of an independent ground for divorce or an independent proximate cause of the separation.

¶ 31. Regarding Scott’s complaints as to sexual relations, cessation of sexual relations must be unjustified and persistent. Cessation due to work, work demands, or health is not unjustified. Evidence in the record fails to support Scott’s claim of cessation of sexual relations for any significant period. The record also contains evidence disputing Scott’s claim that Kim forced him to leave the marital bedroom. He claims to have been removed from the bedroom for approximately thirty days, from the end of November 2009 until he left on December 30, 2009. However, Kim’s thirteen-year-old daughter, Ann Marie, testified that she had no memory of Scott being removed from the marital bedroom and that her mom and Scott, whom she called Daddy, always slept together, except when the kids were sick. Kim also refuted any denial of sexual relations and claimed that she and Scott slept together the night before Scott left.

¶ 32. What is clear in the record is that Scott concealed not only his intent to leave but also his actual departure with the couple’s child. The record shows that after sleeping with Kim, the very next morning on December 30, 2009, Scott concealed from Kim his intent to leave. He asked her to leave her car at the house when she went to work so that he could change the oil. She claims that they kissed, and she went to work. Shortly thereafter, Scott’s mother and brother arrived, and they took Scott’s clothes, gun safe, an all-terrain vehicle, other personal property, and Scott and Kim’s son, Rex, and left for Loin, Mississippi. At 5 p.m. that day, Scott called Kim at her workplace and told her that he had left her and had taken Rex. On January 2, 2010, Kim went to Scott’s mother’s house to retrieve Rex, who had been taken without her knowledge, and after an altercation, Scott allowed Kim to leave with Rex. The record indicates that Scott called his attorney, who advised him to allow Kim to have custody of Rex and to not fight the protective order because Kim had been injured in the altercation with Scott. Kim received a protective order from justice court on January 4, 2010. The chancery court entered a temporary order on January 14, 2010.

¶ 33. At the trial on the divorce, however, the chancellor found Scott’s mother more credible than Kim regarding the altercation. The chancellor made this finding even though Kim received injuries, including a broken bone, in the altercation and even though Scott raised no objection or contest to the justice court’s protective order or the chancellor’s temporary order placing custody with Kim. The issues raised in Kim’s petition for a protective order had already been adjudicated and an order issued by another court. A victim of domestic violence may procure an order of protection even if the victim seeks to pursue the goal of reconciliation. Cole v. Cole, 147 Misc.2d 297, 301, 556 N.Y.S.2d 217, (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1990); 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 266 (2008). The chancellor erred in reasoning that Kim’s action to obtain the protective order from justice court effectively prohibited Scott from returning, and therefore, desertion could not be found. The protective order did not prevent Scott from seeking marital counseling, making an offer of reconciliation to Kim, or stating any reasonable concerns.

¶ 34. The law requires neither that the deserted spouse give an immediate response nor that the offer to reconcile be made face to face. In Thrasher v. Thrasher, 229 Miss. 536, 539, 91 So.2d 543, 544 (1956), the court found that where a wife sent her reconciliation offer through a local sheriff, her husband’s request for time to discuss the offer with his lawyer was not an unqualified refusal. The offer to reconcile must be unqualified and in good faith; the innocent spouse must be given sufficient time to consider a reply to the offer; and the deserter must respond to any reasonable concerns. See Bell, at § 4.02. Kim’s efforts in obtaining a protective order and then a temporary order constituted reasonable steps toward achieving a peaceful resolution of the situation created by Scott, whose deceitful departure from the marital residence included absconding with the couple’s son and injury to Kim when she attempted to retrieve their child. The purpose of domestic-abuse civil statutes is remedial and protective rather than criminal. 28 C.J.S. Domestic Abuse and Violence § 3 (2008). Domestic-abuse statutes act to prevent individual acts of abuse or recurrence of abuse by removing the perpetrator from the household for a period of time, providing the victim with a buffer zone of safety. Id.; see also Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7 (Supp.2013). The purpose of domestic-violence statutes is to preserve the safety of the family unit. 28 C.J.S. Domestic Abuse and Violence § 3 (2008). The chancellor erred in applying the law to these facts in finding that the protective order prevented reconciliation, since the law fails to support such a conclusion. Furthermore, the conclusion punished Kim for taking responsible and reasonable steps to prevent further violence against her person and to achieve a peaceful, not deceitful, resolution.

¶ 35. Kim’s petition for divorce similarly fails to provide any evidence of marital fault. The duty to reconcile does not extend beyond the one-year period. Bell, at § 4.02. Once the statutory period has run, the innocent spouse may obtain a divorce even though the deserter offers to reconcile. Id.; see also Lynch v. Lynch, 217 Miss. 69, 85, 63 So.2d 657, 663 (1953) (“[W]hen the desertion has ripened into a ground for divorce, the day of repentance is ended[.]”). The evidence in the record shows that Scott never offered to reconcile, in good faith or otherwise. Therefore, Kim did not reject any offer by Scott to reconcile, and as stated, the one-year period expired.

¶ 36. Additionally, Scott complains and asserts as fault: (1) the stress he feels from managing a household; (2) the parental responsibility of managing children; and (3) Kim’s work, work hours, commute to work, and fatigue from working. Precedent reflects, however, that absence from the marriage for legitimate reasons fails to constitute desertion. For example, a husband’s lengthy absence from Mississippi to find work in Florida was not desertion because he intended to return to his family. Walton v. Walton, 76 Miss. 662, 662, 25 So. 166, 168 (1899). In the present case, Kim’s commute to work and her short absences caused by travel to and from work fail to constitute marital fault, much less just cause for Scott to desert the marriage. The stress that Scott claims resulted from managing a household of three children and marriage to a working mom fails to evidence marital fault by Kim. Even though Scott may have felt stress from working, managing his parental and household responsibilities, and raising a family, the existence of these marital and parental responsibilities fails to constitute a basis of marital fault by Kim. Moreover, this stress could be resolved or managed by Scott without deserting the marriage by assigning chores or obtaining household help for this dual-working-parent household.

¶ 37. Abandonment is “the voluntary separation of one spouse from the other, or the voluntary refusal to renew a suspended cohabitation, without justification either in the consent or wrongful conduct of the other spouse.” 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 § 2 (1981). A wilful and malicious desertion is presumed when one spouse voluntarily separates from and abandons the other spouse without adequate legal reason. See Commonwealth ex rel. Udis v. Udis, 174 Pa.Super. 624, 101 A.2d 144, 145 (1953); 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 § 2 (1981). Moreover, the law fails to require that the abandoned spouse, Kim in this case, be blameless. See 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 § 3 (1981); see also Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 172 A.D.2d 719, 569 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (N.Y.App.Div.1991).

¶ 38. A determination of whether Kim’s conduct rose to the necessary level should be based upon factual findings showing that Kim’s fault factually supported an independent ground for divorce or an independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation. See Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 222 Va. 53, 278 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1981) (holding that temporary cessation of sexual relations for less than two months prior to wife’s hospitalization, where wife worked and financially contributed to the family, was insufficient to show wilful desertion).

¶ 39. The evidence in the record satisfied the requirements for Kim to prove the ground of desertion, and no evidence shows that Kim rejected any offer of reconciliation, in good faith or otherwise. The evidence in the record showing fault by Kim during the marriage fails to rise to a level to provide Scott with a reasonable cause or legal justification to desert the marriage. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s opinion and would remand this case to the chancellor to grant Kim’s petition for divorce on the ground of desertion by Scott.

      . Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003 (Miss.1983).

      . See also Thrasher v. Thrasher, 229 Miss. 536, 539, 91 So.2d 543, 544 (1956) (finding that husband filed for divorce based upon desertion, that wife made no good-faith offer of reconciliation, and that, good faith or otherwise, husband did not reject an offer of reconciliation).

      . See Riley v. Wiggins, 908 So.2d 893, 899 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (discussing the final nature of a consent decree, which "has the force of res judicata”); see also 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 266 (2008) (party requesting protective order bears burden of proof of showing actual or imminent domestic violence; protection order is warranted where potential for future abuse exists based upon past behavior).

      . See generally Bell, at § 4.02 (discussing offers to reconcile).

      . At oral argument, counsel for Scott argued that Kim should agree to an irreconcilable-differences divorce, but in Mississippi Kim cannot be forced into such an agreement. See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp.2013).

      . But cf. Wilson v. Wilson, 198 Miss. 334, 341-42, 22 So.2d 161, 163 (1945) (discussing that, when a wife abandons her husband without legal justification, she is not entitled to alimony).

        .But cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 207 Miss. 500, 504, 42 So.2d 720, 722 (1949) (reflecting precedent that a spouse is justified in leaving a husband whose complete refusal to work left the family without adequate food and shelter and dependent on friends).