text:
    Warren LALLY, Appellant, v. CITY OF HOMESTEAD, et. al., Appellee.
    No. 3D12-2808.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.
    Schuler, Halvorson, Weisser & Zoeller, P.A., Jason D. Weisser and David M. Ker-ner (West Palm Beach); Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., Andrew A. Harris and Bard D. Rockenbach (West Palm Beach), for appellant.
    Weiss Serota Helfman Cole Bierman & Popok, P.L., Edward G. Guedes, Laura K. Wendell, Kelly Rains Jesson, Michael Po-pok and Samuel I. Zeskind, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
   ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

PER CURIAM.

Based upon appellee’s confession of error, and in light of Masone v. City of Aventura, 147 So.3d 492 (Fla.2014), we reverse the final judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Enrique BARNET, Appellant, v. CITY OF CORAL GABLES, et. al., Appellee.
    No. 3D12-2809.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.
    Schuler, Halvorson, Weisser & Zoeller, P.A., Jason D. Weisser and David M. Ker-ner (West Palm Beach); Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., Andrew A. Harris and Bard D. Rockenbach (West Palm Beach), for appellant.
    Weiss Serota Helfman Cole Bierman & Popok, P.L., Edward G. Guedes, Laura K. Wendell, Coral Gables, Kelly Rains Jesson and Samuel I. Zeskind, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
   ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

PER CURIAM.

Based upon appellee’s confession of error, and in light of Masone v. City of Aventura, 147 So.3d 492 (Fla.2014), we reverse the final judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.


text:
    Sophia WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-1785.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The judgment and sentence are affirmed in this Anders appeal. This case is remanded for the entry of a written order specifying which condition of probation Appellant violated. Leggs v. State, 27 So.3d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

PADOVANO, THOMAS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.

      . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).


text:
    Rossi DeJour ARMSTEAD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4728.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Joanna A. Mauer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brittany Ann Rhodaback, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Walton v. State, 106 So.3d 522, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), rev. granted, 145 So.3d 830 (Fla.2014).

WOLF, BENTON, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Diane RHEA, Petitioner, v. CITIBANK, N.A., Respondent.
    No. 1D14-3201.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 17, 2014.

      Diane Rhéa, pro se, Petitioner.
    Brett A. Foster of Patrick A. Carey, P.A., Orlando, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks review of an order dismissing her appeal to the circuit court, in its appellate capacity, in relation to the entry of a final summary judgment. Petitioner also seeks review of an order entered by one of the circuit court judges, sitting in his appellate capacity on a three-judge panel.

As to the first issue, we accept Respondent’s concession that it was apparent that Petitioner was seeking review of the county court’s final summary judgment and that Respondent does not object to entry of an order quashing the circuit court’s order of dismissal to allow a review of the merits by the circuit court. Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash the circuit court’s order of dismissal.

As to the second issue, we deny the petition, as Judge Monaco’s order denying the motion to disqualify correctly found that the motion was legally insufficient, as Petitioner failed to support the motion with her sworn signature. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Carter, 768 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Thus, we deny the petition as to this issue.

GRANTED in part; DENIED in part.

WOLF, THOMAS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.


author: ROBERTS, J.

text:
    Robert R. MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-5503.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 18, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Pamela D. Presnell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   ROBERTS, J.

The Appellant, Robert Miller, appeals his consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for kidnapping, aggravating battery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues that the trial court incorrectly imposed consecutive mandatory minimum sentences under section 775.087, Florida Statutes, the 10-20-Life statutes, when there was only one victim of the offenses. We reject this argument. In accordance with Walton v. State, 106 So.3d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), we affirm the sentencing scheme .because the plain language of section 775.087(2)(d) permits the imposition of consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for multiple convictions involving only one victim where the defendant was carrying a fireai'm.

AFFIRMED.

MARSTILLER and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    John PAUL, Appellant, v. HOSPITAL HOUSEKEEPING SYSTEMS, Ltd and Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Appellees.
    No. 1D14-2672.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 19, 2014.
    Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellant.
    Gwen G. Jacobs of Sponsler, Bennett, Jacobs & Adams, P.A., Tampa, for Appel-lees.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Lane v. Workforce Bus. Servs., Inc., 151 So.Sd 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

BENTON, WETHERELL, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


author: WOLF, J.

text:
    Amato SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4492.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 22, 2014.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   WOLF, J.

Appellant .challenges his conviction for second-degree murder. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress two separate statements made to the police. We determine both the April 27, 2012, and April 29, 2012, statements were obtained in violation of appellant’s right to remain silent. We also determine the State failed to establish that erroneous admission of these statements was harmless. We, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Motion to Suppress Statements on April 27, 2012

Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to officers on April 27, 2012. He argued the statements were given as a result of continued and persistent questioning and threats after he invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

A transcript of the interview appears in the record. The interview was conducted in Adele, Georgia, where appellant lived, regarding a shooting that took place during a drug deal in Jacksonville, Florida. Detectives Mirandized appellant and then confronted him with evidence of his guilt, including that the co-defendant Dexter Bridges had identified appellant as the shooter. Appellant initially denied being in Jacksonville and denied involvement in the drug deal or shooting. Then the following exchange took place:

Det.: You wasn’t there?
Appellant: No and I am through with this interview because I am not—
Det.: You don’t want to talk to me?
Appellant: No, I am through with the interview because I am not fixing to sit here and—
Det.: Do you want to talk to me?
Appellant: I am not fixing to sit here and let you manipulate me to say something—
Det.: The truth, I can’t manipulate the truth man. Either I’ve got evidence or I don’t. Christina, Christina is lying to me?
Appellant: Man, I am not fixing to sit here and—
Det.: Do you want Christina to come back here and tell you—
Appellant: I am not fixing to sit here and let you, let you fellows make me say that I did something that I ain’t do?
Det.: Were you in Jacksonville on April 7th?
Appellant: I am through with this interview.
Det.: What are you saying? Do you not want to talk with us anymore? Because I will tell you what happens when you don’t want to talk with us anymore. You sit here. I go get, I call Jacksonville, get a warrant and I serve you with a murder warrant. Are you saying you don’t want to talk to me now anymore?
Appellant: I am saying, I ain’t saying I am not, I don’t want to talk to you. What are we talking about?
Det.: Alright. I am about to charge you with murder. You won’t leave here without being charged with murder.
Appellant: Why?
Det.: Because I have all of this against you.
Appellant: Right.
Det.: I have evidence against you.
Appellant: You have evidence against me? How you got evidence against me?
Det.: I got two witnesses saying you drove to Jacksonville. Three, two witnesses saying you drove to Jacksonville.
Appellant: I drove to Jacksonville on April 7th.
Det.: If you want to talk to me knock on the door. I am going to go type up your warrant. You are under arrest. You have already been read your rights for murder and we will probably get a grand jury indictment for first degree murder once you are back in Jacksonville.
Appellant: I am saying. But how you going to—
Det.: Knock on the door if you want to talk to me.
Appellant: I am trying to talk to you now.
Det.: Knock on the door when you want to tell me the truth.
Appellant: I am trying to talk to you now. I am trying to talk to you now.
Det.: Have a seat. Are we going to play this I wasn’t in Jacksonville game, because I am not going to play that. If you say I am not in Jacksonville I am walking out. I am done with it. I will tell you I don’t want to talk to you no more.
Other Det.: If you want that, just let us know and we will just walk right back out and there ain’t no coming back.
Appellant: Inaudible.
Det.: He said you shot the dude over all this weed. Seven pounds man. You are about to take a ride and act like you are going to bone up with me like I don’t know my job.
Appellant: I am saying I ain’t trying, I ain’t trying to bow up to you or nothing. I ain’t trying. I am just telling you.
Det.: You want to tell me you wasn’t in Jacksonville? Because I am ready to walk. I got a lot of shit to do on you man.
Appellant: You got a lot of shit to do on me?
Det.: Typing up your warrant, that’s a lot of time.
Appellant: For what?
Det.: For murder.
Other Det.: We explained that to you.
Det.: I got to go get a judge in Jacksonville to sign a warrant, fax it up here. Arrest you up here or put a detainer on you and get you extradited down in Jacksonville. So what are we going to do ? Are we going to talk about the truth, of [sic] are you going to give me some sort of bullshit about I wasn’t even there.

(Emphasis added).

Appellant then admitted to giving the co-defendant his phone. He stated the co-defendant said he needed to drive to Jacksonville to get his clothes because he was moving back to Georgia, and he asked to borrow appellant’s phone. The detective asked appellant if he was in Jacksonville on the day of the shooting, and he responded, “No.” The detective stated, “Come on man, we are done.” Appellant responded, “Can you listen to me.” Detectives then presented appellant with evidence of his guilt, including a statement from the co-defendant that appellant was the shooter. Appellant denied being the shooter or knowing anything about the incident. The detectives stated, “Okay, thank you, we are done. Have a nice life.:.. Tell us the truth and we — Appellant responded, “Can you come talk to me?” Appellant continued denying knowledge of the incident. The detective stated, “If you want to sit here and try and mold a story, I am done dude. I got a lot of work to do.” The detective left. Appellant immediately began banging, and the detective returned. Appellant continued denying culpability. The detective stated he was “done” with the interview, explaining, “You are going to be arrested for murder. .. .Dude, I’ve got to write a warrant on you man.” (Emphasis added). Appellant responded, “Come here man... .Come in.”

Appellant agreed to speak without a lawyer, but asked that his mother be brought in. The detective agreed, but only if appellant admitted to involvement in the incident. Appellant continued to deny involvement. The detective stated, “We are done.... I am going to lock this door. You are under arrest.” (Emphasis added). The detective left. Appellant knocked on the door. The detective returned. Appellant renewed his request for his mother and stated he did not want a lawyer. Then the detective asked appellant if he saw a murder. Appellant did not answer, but again asked for his mother. The detective then handcuffed appellant and stated he was “under arrest.” The detective left. Appellant knocked and yelled through the door repeatedly, “I will talk.” The second detective, who was still in the room continued questioning appellant, who continued denying involvement. The second detective reminded appellant “you are under arrest” and left. Appellant knocked on the door three separate times, and a few minutes later the detectives returned. Appellant continued to request his mother. He also asked why he was under arrest. They did not answer him, but instead removed his handcuffs.

Appellant admitted to going to Jacksonville in his girlfriend’s daughter’s car, with the co-defendant, in order to get the co-defendant’s clothes from a motel where he had been staying. He stated the co-defendant left him at the motel and came, back a few minutes later, and they returned to Georgia. The detectives told appellant he was not telling the truth and they left. Appellant began vomiting. He knocked on the door. The detectives returned less than a minute later and asked, “Are you ready to talk and tell the truth man? Or are we going to go with that before we type that up? ” (Emphasis added). Appellant renewed his request for his mother. He began throwing up again. His mother was then brought in. After additional questioning, appellant admitted to being in the car when the co-defendant got out and shot the victim. He denied knowing in advance what the co-defendant intended to do, but he admitted knowing the co-defendant had conflict with someone and wanted to send a “message.”

Trial Court Order on April 27 Interview

The trial court entered an order granting the motion to suppress in part. The court found that when appellant repeatedly stated, “I am through with this interview,” he “invoked his right to remain silent with sufficient clarity such that questioning by the officers should have ceased.” Moreover, the court found that the detective made a threat when he responded, “I will tell you what happens when you don’t want to talk to us anymore. You sit here. I go get ... a warrant and I serve you with a murder warrant.” The court found that statement “may reasonably be construed as a threat” and thus “any subsequent statement was not freely and voluntarily made.”

However, the court noted that soon thereafter, the detective stated, “If you want to talk to me knock on the door. I am going to go type up your warrant. You are under arrest. You have already been read your rights for murder....” (Emphasis added). The court reasoned after the detective told appellant he was under arrest, the possibility of arrest could no longer be a threat used to coerce a response to the questioning. The court also noted that the detective then attempted to cease questioning and told appellant to knock on the door if he wanted to talk, and appellant responded that “I am trying to talk to you now.” “Given [appellant’s] prior advisement of his Miranda rights and his invocation of his right to remain silent immediately prior to his request to continue communicating with the officers,” the court found appellant’s re-initiation of the conversation was voluntary. Thus, the court granted the motion to suppress any statements made by appellant during the brief period of time between when arrest was threatened and when he was first told he was under arrest, but the court denied the motion for statements after the arrest.

Motion to Suppress Statements on April 29, 2012

Appellant filed a second motion to suppress regarding statements made on April 29, 2012, during an interview with himself and his co-defendant. He alleged the detectives failed to cease questioning him when he repeatedly and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent by, saying things like, “I ain’t talking to you,” “I want to go back to my cell,” “I just want my visitation,” and “May I leave, man?” He further argued he twice invoked his right to counsel: the first time was when he was alone with the co-defendant, whom he alleged was an agent of the State, and the second time was when the detectives were in the room. He conceded the detectives stopped questioning him after his second request for counsel; however, he asserted they failed to scrupulously honor that request because they left him in the interview room with the co-defendant, who was an agent of the State.

The transcript of the interview reflects the following. Two detectives entered the interview room and reminded appellant and the co-defendant that they were under arrest. They agreed they still understood their rights. The detectives then left the room and encouraged appellant to admit to the co-defendant that he identified the co-defendant as the shooter during his April 27 interview. While the detectives were gone, appellant told the co-defendant, “I ain’t talking no more until I get a lawyer.” The detectives later reentered the room and began questioning. Appellant did not answer the questions, but instead asked to go to the bathroom, and he was escorted out of the room. While he was gone, the co-defendant stated he did not believe that appellant identified him as the shooter and asked to see the videotape of appellant’s interview. Appellant returned from the bathroom, and one detective stated to appellant:

Det.: Okay, look at me and be clear. He [the co-defendant] don’t believe me what I just told him. When we talked to you the other day with your mama, please look at me, give me respect, I am giving respect.
Appellant: Inaudible.
Det.: Huh?
Appellant: I ain’t talking to you.
Det.: Okay, let’s go get the video of him.

(Emphasis added). The detective explained he was about to play the portion of the video during which appellant named the co-defendant as the shooter, unless appellant would admit to the co-defendant that he identified him as the shooter. Appellant stated, “I want to go back to my cell.” The detective responded, “you don’t determine what goes on in here. Really, who do you think you are?” Appellant stated, “I am asking man.” The detective told appellant “[y]ou are going to see this” video. The detective then played a portion of the video in which appellant stated the co-defendant was the shooter. The detectives continued questioning. Appellant stated, “I want my visitation man, got to see_I will go back to my cell and_ about.” The detective responded, “Well you know it don’t work that way. You know.” Appellant asked again, “I can’t do visitation?” The detective stated that appellant was in custody, that the interview would take “as long as you let it,” and that appellant was “dragging this out” by denying that he implicated the co-defendant when the video would clearly show that he did. The detectives continued playing the video of appellant’s interview. Appellant then asked, “May I leave man?” There was an inaudible response.

The first detective asked appellant, “[d]o you want to see his?”, apparently referring to the co-defendant’s videotaped interview. The second detective responded, “No, it’s not finished yet. You going to show how you did it.” After the video stopped, appellant stated he identified the co-defendant as the shooter because appellant’s girlfriend said the police threatened to prosecute her unléss appellant talked, and because his mother told him the co-defendant had already identified appellant as the shooter. Appellant then stated, “I don’t got nothing else to say before I get a lawyer.” The detectives immediately stopped the interview, stating, “You need a lawyer. All right ... We are done.”

Trial Court Order on April 29 Statements,

The trial court denied the motion to suppress the April 29 interview. The court found that when appellant stated, “I ain’t talking to you,” that was “merely a clarification of an inaudible comment the detective asked him to repeat by saying, ‘huh?’ ” “Within context,” the court found that statement “merely means that the inaudible comment made by [appellant] was not initially directed to the Detective.” Further; the court found appellant’s requests to return to his cell or to go to visitation were “a mere expression that he would prefer to be someplace else and is not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent.” Similarly, the court found appellant’s statement that he did not want to watch, the video of Bridges’ interrogation was a “mere expression of his desire to forego a proffered video view rather than an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent.”

II. Analysis

Standard of Review

“ ‘The ruling of the trial court on a motion to suppress comes to us clothed with a presumption of correctness and we must interpret the evidence and reasonable inference and deductions in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.’ ” Johnson v. State, 608 So.2d 4, 9 (Fla.1992) (quoting Owen v. State, 560 So.2d 207, 211 (Fla.1990)). The standard of review for the trial court’s factual findings is whether competent substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s findings. To the contrary, a de novo standard of review is applied to findings of law. Delhall v. State, 95 So.3d 134, 150 (Fla.2012). A ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for harmless error. Amparo v. State, 818 So.2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

General Rule as to Voluntariness

In Deviney v. State, 112 So.3d 57, 74 (Fla.2013), the supreme court determined that the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution stand for the proposition that if a suspect “in any manner, indicates that he or she does not wish to engage in an interrogation with law enforcement ... if it has begun, must cease immediately.”

While a suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal and unambiguous, there are no magic words that must be used. State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715, 719 (Fla.1997).

A suspect unequivocally invokes the right to remain silent if, with sufficient clarity, he or she expresses a desire to end questioning in such a manner that a reasonable officer under the circumstances would understand that the suspect has invoked his or her right to end questioning.

Deviney, 112 So.3d at 74 (citing Owen, 696 So.2d at 718).

April 27, 2012 Statement

Appellant argues the court correctly held that he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent, and that the detective responded by threatening him with arrest; thus, appellant’s subsequent statements were not voluntary. However, he argues the court erred as a matter of law in concluding that his subsequent re-initiation of the conversation when the detective left the room was voluntary. He argues his re-initiation was not voluntary, but instead was the result of the coercive police tactic of persisting to threaten him with an arrest warrant if he did not talk. We agree.

It is well-established that “[a]fter a suspect invokes his or her Miranda rights, police officers are prohibited from engaging in words or actions that the officers ‘should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 164 (Fla.2007) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). The Cuervo court found officers “engaged in conduct they could reasonably anticipate would elicit an incriminating response” when the suspect stated he did not want to talk, but the officer stated “ ‘now would be your opportunity if you wish to speak and explain your side of the story, your version of what happened.’ ” Id. at 164.

Stated similarly, “[p]olice fail to scrupulously honor a defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent ... when, in the face of the invocation of that right, the police persistently and repeatedly engage in efforts to wear down a suspect’s resistance and make the suspect change his or her mind.” Deviney, 112 So.3d at 74. The Deviney court found detectives did not scrupulously honor a suspect’s unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent when they responded by taking him into formal custody without re-administering his Miranda rights, “kept [the suspect] in the police interrogation room, which is innately intimidating, and persisted in their repeated attempts to elicit incriminating statements.” Id. at 78.

Appellant argues that Calder v. State, 133 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), is factually analogous to the case at hand. In Calder, the suspect invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 1028. The officer stated that if the suspect invoked his right to counsel, “I’m not gonna be able to get your side of the story and I’m not gonna be able to present your side of the story to the State Attorney’s office.” Id. The suspect stated he would be more comfortable obtaining counsel. Id. The officer repeatedly asked him if he wanted counsel, warning him that he could not talk to the suspect anymore if he wanted a lawyer present.

The suspect repeatedly requested counsel. Id. The officer left but told the suspect to knock on the door if he changed his mind, stating:

“if you say ... it really would make me feel better if I got the opportunity to give my side of the story, talk about what happened.... I know that it’s very difficult for you and it’s going to be tough for you to sleep because the bottom line is you been through a tough situation and nobody wants to be in your shoes ... one of the things that makes somebody feel a lot better is if they get the opportunity to get things off of their chest....

Id. at 1028-29. After the officer left, the suspect cried for several minutes and then asked to speak to the officer. Id. at 1029. The officer then had the suspect sign a Miranda waiver, and he ultimately confessed. Id.

The trial court found the officer ceased questioning when the suspect invoked his right to counsel, and the suspect’s re-initiation of the conversation was voluntary. Id. However, the Calder court reversed, finding the “substance of the entire transaction confirmed that Calder did not voluntarily initiate the further conversation with police, and that his action in requesting the detective was merely the delayed product of the coercive police conduct.” Id. at 1032-83. The court found the officer’s statements “were designed to induce [the suspect] to reinitiate the communication without a lawyer.” Id. at 1033. The court found this “ploy” worked, “bringing Calder to tears and prompting him to ask to speak to the detective only a few minutes after the first interrogation had ended.” Id. Although recognizing it was bound by the trial court’s findings of fact, Calder found it was “not required to defer to the trial court’s conclusions regarding voluntariness. This is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Id.

The Calder court relied in part on a case out of the Ninth Circuit in which a suspect invoked his right to counsel, but then the officer told him it “ ‘might be worse’ ” if he talked to an attorney. Id. at 1032 (quoting Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir.1991)). Three hours later, the suspect “ ‘changed his mind’ ” and spoke with police. Collazo, 940 F.2d at 414. The Ninth Circuit found that in viewing the entire transaction, the suspect did not voluntarily initiate further conversation, but instead the suspect’s request to talk was a “direct product” of coercive police conduct. Id. at 422.

Appellant also relies on Moss v. State, 60 So.3d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), in which the Fourth District similarly held a suspect’s re-initiation was involuntary. In Moss, after a detective read the suspect his Miranda rights, the suspect stated, “I want a lawyer.” Id. at 542. The detective responded, “Before you talk to me?” He stated, “Yes.” The detective stated, “Okay. So that means, if you request to talk to a lawyer before you talk to me, then we won’t be able to talk about what happened in this incident.... ‘Cause I don’t have a lawyer here for you. Do you understand what I’m saying?” Id. The suspect stated he understood, and the interrogation continued. Id. The Fourth District found the detective’s “continued conversation was a strategy to ‘wear down [Moss’s] resistance and make him change his mind’ about talking with the detective before, consulting a-lawyer.” Id. at- 544 (quoting Black v. State, 59 So.3d 340, 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). Thus, the court found “the state has not met its ‘heavy burden’ to demonstrate that Moss knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.” Id. (quoting Youngblood v. State, 9.So.3d 717, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)).

Appellant is correct that here, as in Calder, the “substance of the entire transaction confirmed that [appellant] did not voluntarily initiate the further conversation with police, and that his action in requesting the detective was merely the delayed product of the coercive police conduct.” 133 So.3d at 1032-33. Here, the court reasoned appellant’s re-initiation of the conversation was voluntary because the threat of arrest was gone after the detective first told appellant he was “under arrest,” and “[g]iven [appellant’s] prior advisement of his Miranda rights and his invocation of his right to remain silent immediately prior to his request to continue communicating,” his reinitiation was voluntary. Although this court is bound by the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by the record, it is “not required to defer to the trial court’s conclusions regarding voluntariness. This is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Calder, 133 So.3d at 1033.

Here, the record clearly supports the court’s finding that appellant unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent, and that the detectives’ threat of arrest if he would not confess was coercive. However, the record does not support the court’s finding that this threat ended when the detective first stated appellant was “under arrest.” The detective had already explained to appellant that he first had to obtain an arrest warrant, and the detectives repeatedly threatened appellant with an arrest warrant throughout the remainder of the interview.

Moreover, the court erred in concluding that appellant’s re-initiation was voluntary “[g]iven [appellant’s] prior advisement of his Miranda rights and his invocation of his right to remain silent immediately prior to his request to continue communicating with the officers.” Other courts have found these factors indicate re-initiation was involuntary. As noted in the Calder opinion, the supreme court found re-initiation is voluntary if the suspect “ ‘initiates further conversation, is reminded of his rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating statements made during this conversation may be properly admitted.’ ” Calder, 133 So.3d at 1031 (quoting Welch v. State, 992 So.2d 206, 214 (Fla.2008) (emphasis added) (finding statements were admissible where the defendant reinitiated 45 minutes after invoking his rights, was reminded again of his Miranda rights, and then waived them “without pressure” from the officer)). Similarly, the supreme court in Deviney, 112 So.3d at 78, found officers failed to scrupulously honor a suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel when they responded by placing him into formal custody and continued questioning him without re-administering his Miranda rights. Here, appellant was not reminded of his right to remain silent any of the times he was told he was under arrest. Thus, we conclude as a matter of law that appellant’s re-initiation of the conversation was involuntary.

April 29, 2012 Statement

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during the interview on April 29, 2012, because he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and his right to remain silent, but the detectives failed to scrupulously honor those invocations. We agree with appellant concerning the invocation of his right to remain silent, but not his right' to counsel.

Appellant argues he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent when he stated, “I ain’t talking to you... .1 want to go back to my cell_I am asking man.” He argues these statements were analogous to those in Deviney, in which the defendant stated during an interview, “I’m done. I’m done... .I’m done. I’m ready to go home. Can I leave?” Deviney, 112 So.3d at 77. The Deviney court found his “ ‘I’m done’ statements, along with his attempts to end questioning by leaving the interrogation room, were a clear and vociferous invocation of his right to remain silent.” Id. at 78. See also Pierre v. State, 22 So.3d 759, 766 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (finding defendant’s statement “I’m not saying anymore” was an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent); Smith v. State, 915 So.2d 692, 693 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (finding defendant’s statement during interrogation that he had “nothing to say” was an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent).

Instead of scrupulously honoring the invocation of his right to remain silent, appellant argues the detectives insisted on playing a video recording of the co-defendant’s interview, to which appellant protested. After a portion of the video was played, he notes he asked for visitation, or to go back to his cell, but the detective continued playing the video. Soon thereafter appellant asked, “May I leave man?” However, appellant asserts the detective stated in response, “No, it’s not finished yet. You going to show how you did it.” Appellant argues that statement was intended to elicit an incriminating response.

The trial court found the first statement, “I ain’t talking to you,” was not an invocation of the right to remain silent. Instead in context, it was “merely a clarification of an inaudible comment the detective asked him to repeat by saying, ‘huh?’ ” The record supports this conclusion. The transcript reflects that appellant said something inaudible, the detective asked, “Huh?”, and appellant responded, “I ain’t talking to you.” There were two other men in the room in addition to the detective — a second detective and the co-defendant. The record supports the court’s conclusion that in context, appellant was merely clarifying that his inaudible comment was not directed at the first detective.

The court also found appellant’s requests for visitation and to return to his cell were “a mere expression that he would prefer to be someplace else and is not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent.” Taken in context, we cannot agree with the trial judge.

The case at hand is materially indistinguishable from Deviney, 112 So.3d 57. Deviney was not under arrest or in custody. During the interview, he repeatedly stated he was “done,” and then he stated, “I’m done. I’m ready to go home. Can I leave?”, and then stood up and attempted to leave the interrogation room. Id. at 77. The court found this “conduct demonstrated an obvious desire by Deviney to leave the interrogation room for the purpose of ending questioning.” Id. at 78.

In Deviney, 112 So.3d at 76, the court specifically cited with approval to the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision State v. Kasel, 488 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1992), in which the court found a suspect unequivocally invoked her right to remain silent when she left the interrogation room.

In the instant case, while appellant, who was in custody, obviously could not leave without permission, his repeated desires to return to his cell in context could only reasonably be interpreted as a desire not to be interviewed and as an invocation of his right to remain silent. Therefore, we find that appellant unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent, and the detectives violated that right by continuing questioning.

The trial court’s orders denying suppression of the statements of April 27 and April 29 constituted error. We find that error was not harmless here. Therefore, we REVERSE the judgment and sentence.

ROWE and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

      . Statements by appellant indicating his de- ' sire to end the interview are italicized. Statements made by detectives threatening an arrest or arrest warrant are underlined.

      . The court made further findings concerning statements made to the co-defendant which are not pertinent to our disposition of this case.

      . It is noted that Moss v. State, 60 So.3d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), and Calder v. State, 133 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), involved suspects who invoked their right to counsel, whereas appellant invoked his right to remain silent. That distinction does not make a difference in determining whether the re-initiation of a conversation after invoking a Miranda right was voluntary. As noted above, "[ajfter a suspect invokes his or her Miranda rights, police officers are prohibited from” attempting to "elicit an incriminating response.’ ” Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 164 (Fla.2007) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (emphasis added)). Further, "when an accused has invoked the right to silence or right to counsel, if the accused initiates further conversation, is reminded of his rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating statements made during this conversation may be properly admitted.” Welch v. State, 992 So.2d 206, 214 (Fla.2008) (emphasis added). Thus, the analysis is the same regardless of which Miranda right is invoked.


text:
    David Jude MOORE, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-0790.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 22, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm appellant’s convictions without further comment. We write, however, to reverse and remand that portion of the sentence imposing a public defender fee and application fee because the record does not indicate that the trial court informed appellant of his right to contest the amount of those fees. Vaughn v. State, 65 So.3d 138, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). We also reverse and remand the trial court’s imposition of a lump sum of $870 for court costs. Costs must be specifically delineated with reference to the statutory authority for each cost imposed. Oliver v. State, 75 So.3d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Smiley v. State, 704 So.2d 191, 194-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM appellant’s conviction; AFFIRM the sentence in part; REVERSE the sentence in part; and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LEWIS, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carolyn DEAL.
    No. 2014-OC-2368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 13, 2014.
   In re Carolyn Deal; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No 125207-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No.: CW 14-01144.

Prior report: La.App., 150 So.3d 966.

h Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny as moot.

KNOLL, J., would deny as moot.


text:
    In re Christopher Luke EDWARDS.
    No. 2014-OB-2341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 13, 2014.
   ORDER

| j Considering the Joint Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status,

IT IS ORDERED that Christopher Luke Edwards, Louisiana Bar Roll number 23051, be and he hereby is transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 22(B). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Greg G. Guidry Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Cory Scott MORTON.
    No. 2014-B-2194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

|,In May 2014, respondent was arrested and booked with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a Schedule' III controlled dangerous substance (synthetic marijuana), possession of a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance (diazepam), money laundering (between $20,000 and $100,000), and possession of drug paraphernalia. In June 2014, respondent pleaded guilty in the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court to money laundering. Following the filing of formal charges, respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which respondent acknowledges that his conduct constitutes a violation of Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and- that Cory Scott Morton, Louisiana Bar Roll number 28474, be and he hereby is disbarred, retroactive to June 27, 2014, the date of his interim suspension. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his. license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    Darrius HENRY v. COX COMMUNICATIONS LOUISIANA, L.L.C. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CC-1166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Cox Communications Louisiana, L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2012-04713; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0398.

Denied.

GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    Gina WILTZ, Wife of, and Timothy Wiltz, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Son, R.W. v. BROTHERS PETROLEUM, L.L.C., Meraux Food Store, Inc., Alex Chevron, Inc., Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., Bogue Chitto Canoeing and Tubing Center, Inc., and Infinity Insurance Company. Tina Tommaseo v. Brothers Petroleum, L.L.C., Meraux Food Store, Inc., Alex Chevron, Inc., Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., Bogue Chitto Canoeing and Tubing Center, Inc. Glen Gabb and Cynthia Gabb, Individúally and on Behalf of their deceased Daughter, R.G. v. Brothers Petroleum, L.L.C., Meraux Food Store, Inc., Alex Chevron, Inc., Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. and Bogue Chitto Canoeing and Tubing Center, Inc., Byron Lafontaine and Tina Tommaseo, Individually and on Behalf of their Deceased Son, B.L., Regal Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-1252.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Meraux Food Store Inc.; United Fire & Casualty Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 630-138, 634-479, 634-752; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-332 CAV 13-CA-333 & 13-CA-334.

Denied.


text:
    Timothy G. MORALES, et al. v. The PARISH OF JEFFERSON and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. Earl J. Falgoust and Kathy McMenamin Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. The Parish of Jefferson and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-1293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re The Parish of Jefferson; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 673-195 C/W 691-768; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-486 C/W 13-CA-487 & 13-C-500.

Denied.


text:
    Timothy G. MORALES, et al. v. The PARISH OF JEFFERSON and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. Earl J. Falgoust and Kathy McMenamin individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. The Parish of Jefferson and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-1296.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Earl J. Falgoust, et al; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 673-195; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-486 C/W 13-CA-487 & 13-C-500.

Denied.


text:
    Gina WILTZ, Wife of, and Timothy Wiltz, Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Son, R.W. v. Brothers PETROLEUM, L.L.C., Meraux Food Store, Inc., Alex Chevron, Inc., Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., Bogue Chitto Canoeing and Tubing Center, Inc., and Infinity Insurance Company. Tina Tommaseo v. Brothers Petroleum, L.L.C., Meraux Food Store, Inc., Alex Chevron, Inc., Winn Dixie Montgomery, Inc., Bogue Chitto Canoeing and Tubing Center, Inc. Glen Gabb and Cynthia Gabb, Individually and on Behalf of their Deceased Daughter, R.G. v. Brothers Petroleum, L.L.C., Meraux Food Store, Inc., Alex Chevron, Inc., Winn Dixie Montgomery, Inc. and Bogue Chitto Canoeing and Tubing Center, Inc., Byron Lafontaine and Tina Tommaseo, Individually and on Behalf of their Deceased Son, B.L., Regal Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-1298.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Winn Dixie Montgomery Inc.; — • Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 680-138, 634-479, 634-752; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 13-CA-332,13-CA-333,13-CA-334.

Denied.


text:
    Timothy G. MORALES, et al. v. The PARISH OF JEFFERSON and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. Earl J. Falgoust and Kathy McMenamin individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. The Parish of Jefferson and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-1299.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Bernard, Edwin; Morales, Timothy G.; Sevin, Barry; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 673-195 C/W 691-768; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-468 C/W 13-CA-487 & 13-C-500.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ryan Michael POURCIAU.
    No. 2014-KK-1302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Pourciau, Ryan Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 1301894; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 KW 0511.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian SMITH.
    No. 2014-KK-1367.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Smith, Brian; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 12-313, 12-303, 12-366; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-K-260.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clement ANDOLLINA.
    No. 2014-KK-1394.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Andollina, Clement; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 489-819; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0435.

Denied.


text:
    Talesha BERTRAND, et ux. v. Michael KUDLA, M.D., et al.
    No. 2014-C-1447.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund; Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board through the nominal defendant, Dr. Michael Kudla; — Defendant (s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2007-4047; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-61 C/W 14-62.

Denied.


text:
    REGIONS BANK v. ST. JAMES HOTEL, L.L.C., St. James Development, L.L.C., Decatur Hotels, L.L.C., et al. 330 Magazine Street, LLC v. St. James Hotel, L.L.C., St. James Development, L.L.C., Decatur Hotels, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2014-C-1450.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re 330 Magazine Street, LLC;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2012-02998 C/W 2012-06946; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1628 C/W 2013-CA-1629.

Denied.


text:
    Timmy and Shelly BIHM v. DECA SYSTEMS, INC. and Gerald Callaway.
    No. 2014-C-1452.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Bihm, Shelly; Timmy Bihm, et al.; — Plaintiff/s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 22, No. 598516; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 2247.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Daniel MORRIS v. The BULLDOG BR, LLC, State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, ABC Insurance Company and Joseph Branch.
    No. 2014-C-1453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Morris, Daniel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C618472; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1861.

Denied.


text:
    Fred BULLIARD v. The CITY OF ST. MARTINVILLE, et al.
    No. 2014-C-1455.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Bulliard, Fred; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 79676; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-140.

Denied.


text:
    James Kevin JOHNSON and Denise Johnson v. MIKE ANDERSON’S SEAFOOD, INC., Mike Anderson’s Seafood of New Orleans, Inc. and United Fire Group Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-1459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Lafayette Insurance Company; Mike Anderson’s Seafood of New Orleans, Inc.; Mike Anderson’s Seafood, Inc.; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2005-11225; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0379.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    CITIZENS AGAINST MULTI-CHEM and Marcella Manuel v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.
    No. 2014-C-1464.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Citizens Against Multi-Chem; Manuel, Marcella; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 617003; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1416.

Denied.


text:
    MEYER & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. COUSHATTA TRIBE OF LOUISIANA.
    No. 2014-CC-1478.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Meyer & Associates, Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2006-2688; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW14-00587.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Errol VICTOR, Sr. and Tonya Victor.
    No. 2014-KH-1636.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Victor Sr., Errol; Victor, Tonya;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2010-CR-172; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-K-441.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenwin J. LEWIS.
    No. 2014-OK-1932.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 12-600, 09-2126; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 14-00277.

Denied.


text:
    Todd FREDRICK and Lori Fredrick v. R. Scott BELAIRE d/b/a Belaire Construction.
    No. 2014-CC-1975.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re R. Scott Belaire D/B/A Belaire Construction; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 97908-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00829.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael FINNIE.
    No. 2014-KK-2098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Finnie, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. O, No. 546932; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-1119.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dean L. HART, Jr.
    No. 2014-KK-2099.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2014.
   In re Hart Jr., Dean L.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 14-F0002-2; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,734-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary SIMMONS.
    No. 2014-KK-2086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 512-301; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-1036.

Granted. The ruling by the trial court to sever count 4 of the indictment is reversed for the reasons assigned by J. Tobi-as in his dissent. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny.


text:
    Kip BASS and Melissa Bass, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Child, Blaire Bass v. STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 2014-CC-2116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 2014.
   In re Bass, Blaire; Bass, Melissa; Kip Bass, et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Fointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 45458; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 1452.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas CARR.
    No. 2014-KK-2136.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 16, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 521-019; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-1078.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny and additionally notes the application is frivolous.


text:
    Kenneth C. LOPICCOLO and Brenda Lopiccolo v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and Jaynes I. Gandy.
    No. 2014-CC-2118.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 22, 2014.
   In re Lopiccolo, Brenda; Lopiccolo, Kenneth C. et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2012-10715; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 1447.

Denied.

HUGHES, J„ would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Johnathan Tramaine GIVENS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0255.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Givens, Johnathan Tramaine;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 253,104; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48929-KH.’

Granted in part, otherwise denied. The district court is ordered to provide relator with a copy of the judgment denying relief of his application for post-conviction relief. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.1; State ex rel. Chargois v. State, 12-0166 (La.8/22/12), 95 So.3d 1060; State ex rel. Lemar v. State, 11-2771 (La.8/22/12), 95 So.3d 1060; State ex rel. Hackett v. State, 96-0224 (La.2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1097; State ex rel. Foy v. Criminal Dist. Court, 96-0225 (La.2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1097; State ex rel. Baker v. State, 95-2228 (La.12/8/95), 664 So.2d 410; State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lombard, 559 So.2d 116 (La.1990).

CLARK, J., would deny.


text:
    In re Randall J. CASHIO.
    No. 2014-OB-2095.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Cashio, Randall J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Application for Supervisory Writs, Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 14-DB-001.

Granted for the sole purpose of striking that portion of the order of the hearing committee chair which requires respondent to disclose any exhibits which he intends to use as impeachment evidence. In all other respects, the application and request for a stay a re denied.


text:
    VERMILION PARISH POLICE JURY v. John DOE, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-2125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Broussard, Clara; Romero, Tyler; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 92228; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW14-00704.

Not considered; not timely filed. Although Columbus Day is a legal holiday pursuant to La. R.S. 1:55(A)(1), it is not one of the specific enumerated holidays which are listed as legal holidays in La. R.S. 1:55(E)(3) for purposes of the calculation of time delays under La.Code Civ. P. art. 5059. See Hooper v. Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 13-2433 (La.1/27/14), 130 So.3d 954.

HUGHES, J., dissents and would consider on the merits.


text:
    In re Appeal of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-118.
    No. 2014-OB-1762.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Markle, Edward D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-118.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Desiree DANIELS.
    No. 2014-KK-1513.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 518-488; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0512.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Franklin JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Jones, Franklin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 6391-71; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-65.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vester JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0231.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Vester; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of. Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 101,994; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-866-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy L. JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0275.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Jones, Roy L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 207,640; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-01109.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sean MONROE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0301.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Monroe, Sean; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 99-947; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-906.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joe Raymond HAWTHORNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0308.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Hawthorne, Joe Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 166,067; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,065-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 98-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie Carl JONES, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0310.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Jones Jr., Willie Carl; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 171,940 C/W 171,910-A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,022-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry HALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Hall, Jerry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1557.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry Richard BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Brown, Larry Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 83,401; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49108-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clarence MAYS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Mays, Clarence; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 99-5507; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-903.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael G. BISHOP v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0342.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Bishop, Michael G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 381,798; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1564.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael G. BISHOP v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Bishop, Michael G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 381,798; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1556.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert Lee HOLLIS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Hollis Jr., Robert Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 297,091; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48, 964-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Everett BENN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0345.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Benn, Everett; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 505-948; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 18-K-1690.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marlon J. WELLS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0361.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Wells, Marlon J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 409433-1, 413943-1, AND 500145; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1585.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lance SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Smith, Lance; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 489-444; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0022.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Theiring CHARLES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0363.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Charles, Theiring; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2012-189500; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1543.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry Lee WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0364.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Williams, Jerry Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 246,465; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos.. 48,-883-KH, 48,904-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory SKIPPER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0375.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Skipper, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 477-105; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1346.

Denied.


text:
    Maurice GIBBS v. James LEBLANC and Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
    No. 2014-CI-0376.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Gibbs, Maurice; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 612,046; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0454.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clifton Joseph ROBIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0395.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Robin, Clifton Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 111603; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-01154..

Denied. La,C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kaled HAMDAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0397.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Hamdan, Kaled; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 436-707; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0012.

Denied.


text:
    Gregory JEANLOUIS v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS and James LeBlanc, Secretary.
    No. 2014-CI-0404.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Jeanlouis, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish' of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 604,498; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0023.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Arthur Leon LeBLANC, Jr.
    No. 2014-K-0467.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re LeBlanc Jr., Arthur Leon; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 10-183663; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0202.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leonard A. NELLUM.
    No. 2014-KO-0516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Nellum, Leonard A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 493-936; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-360.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald Millard IRBY.
    No. 2014-KO-0553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Irby, Ronald Millard; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 35488-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-899.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Winford Jay MOORE.
    No. 2014-KO-0559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Moore, Winford Jay; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 59,429; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-769-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Arthur STAMPLEY.
    No. 2014-KO-0571.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Stampley, Arthur; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 12-11-0426; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1070.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie Ray JACKSON.
    No. 2014-KO-0575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Jackson, Eddie Ray; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 307621; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 13-808.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carter V. ANDERSON.
    No. 2014-KO-0591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Anderson, Carter V.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 503016; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0836.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Deangilo L. WHITE.
    No. 2014-KO-0603.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re White, Deangilo L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 280,488; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-788-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey Lynn GAY.
    No. 2014-KO-0605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Gay, Corey Lynn; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 299,083; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-832-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thilero TAPP.
    No. 2014-KO-0620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Tapp, Thilero; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 319-007; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0024.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony Mark MANDIGO.
    No. 2014-KO-0630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Mandigo, Anthony Mark; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 266,965; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,801-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick C. PARKER.
    No. 2014-K-0631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Parker, Patrick C.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 17543; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1050.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Erice C. LANEHEART.
    No. 2014-KO-0638.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Laneheart, Erice C.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 503-735; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1580.

Denied.


text:
    Laureen OLSON v. LOUISIANA MEDICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., et al.
    No. 2014-C-1053.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Dr. Paul M. Toce, Jr., A.P.M.C.; Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company et al.; Toce Jr. M.D., Paul M.;— Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2013-1850-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1182.

Denied.


text:
    Corey LaMARTINIERE v. BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION.
    No. 2014-C-1290.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Boise Cascade Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 2, No. 07-07255; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1075.

Denied.


text:
    David DeSALVO v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2014-C-1343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Department of Police; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review City Civil Service Commission Orleans, No. 8038; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1598.

Denied.


text:
    Shannon CASON v. Corey SANIFORD, Sheila Saniford, Mark Saniford, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Bethany World Prayer Center, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-1431.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Cason, Shannon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 608^401; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1825.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J„ would grant.


text:
    Adrienne STERMER v. ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND COMPANY and American River Transportation Company.
    No. 2014-C-1434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Agrinational Insurance Company; American River Transportation Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 08-C-6424; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-147.

Denied.


text:
    Byron ASMORE v. Officer Jonathan CHAISSON, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, B.B. “Sixty” Rayburn Correctional Center.
    No. 2014-C-1440.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Asmore, Byron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 104880; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1734.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    ADVANTAGE PERSONNEL and Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen v. Aaron L. VAN CLEAVE.
    No. 2014-C-1443.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Advantage Personnel; Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District # 5, No. 10-11072; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1618.

Denied.


text:
    Troy A. LANDRY, Jacob A. Landry, and Troy Landry Productions, LLC v. BASE CAMP MANAGEMENT, LLC, Creative Media Solutions, LLC, the Maughan Law Firm, LLC, and Roy H. Maughan, Jr.
    No. 2014-CC-1500.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Base Camp Management, LLC, et al.; Creative Media Solutions, LLC; Mau-ghan Jr., Roy H.; The Maughan Law Firm, LLC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 34,318; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0625.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William BUSKER.
    No. 2014-KK-1504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 516-116; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0439.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jada MARSHALL.
    No. 2014-KK-1505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 514-117, 516-186, AND 517-647; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0598. .

Denied.


text:
    Alvera JONES v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 2, Parish of Jefferson, d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital.
    No. 2014-CC-1506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Jefferson Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, Parish of Jefferson, d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 695-379; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-C-411.

Denied.


text:
    Robert CHASTANT, Michele Chastant Stark and Megan Duval-Chastant Qualls v. Laurie Futral CHASTANT.
    No. 2014-C-1508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Chastant, Laurie Futral; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 119347-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1402.

Denied.


text:
    Deon DANNA v. The RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL COMPANY, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1509.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Curry, Zachary; Marriott International, Inc.; Miller, Russell; The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, L.L.C.; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2011-1015; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0339.

Denied.


text:
    Benjamin CROSBY, et al. v. SAHUQUE REALTY COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1510.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Sahuque Realty Company, Inc.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2009-11421 C/W 2010-6486; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0441.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tammy ROMERO.
    No. 2014-KK-1512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Romero, Tammy; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 139480; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 14-00495.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Earl COLEMAN.
    No. 2014-KK-1524.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Coleman, Earl; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E.' Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 06-13-0237; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 KW 0464.

Denied.


text:
    Fred BADKE, et al. v. USA SPEEDWAY, LLC.
    No. 2014-C-1533.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re USA Speedway, LLC; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Union, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 44,006; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,060-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Amos DORSEY.
    No. 2014-KK-1534.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 76494; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 KW 0520.

Denied.


text:
    Larry M. COOPER v. CASINO CRUISES, INC., Tradename Hollywood Casino.
    No. 2014-C-1538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Cooper, Larry M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 565,489; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0330.

Denied.


text:
    Denise T. RANZINO v. OUR LADY OF THE LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER.
    No. 2014-C-1540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 5, No. 11-09689; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1684.

Denied.


text:
    Amanda Fontenot MATHEWS v. Jennifer Lynn Emerson O’Brien DUKE and Kevin Michael Duke.
    No. 2014-C-1541.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Duke, Jennifer Lynn Emerson O’Brien; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of De-soto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 70490; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,887-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph R. PALERMO, Jr. v. ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1545.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Doyle, James B.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2010-004224; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00273.

Denied.


text:
    Shirley WEST v. HOUSE OF BLUES NEW ORLEANS RESTAURANT CORP., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Rue, Stephen R.; — Third Party; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 09-12381; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0494.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher ODIS.
    No. 2014-KH-1564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Odis, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 501149; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 KA 0534.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Shirley RONDENO v. Dr. Jonathon YUN-HOW LEE, et al.
    No. 2014-C-1577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Rondeno, Richard R.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2012-06477; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-CA-0063.

Denied.


text:
    Monica HAAB, Wife of/and Garret Haab, Individually and on Behalf of his Minor Children, Aiden Haab, Amelia Haab, and Sophie Haab v. EAST BANK CONSOLIDATED SPECIAL SERVICE PROTECTION DISTRICT OF JEFFERSON PARISH, Louisiana, Parish of Jefferson, Jefferson Parish Department of Homeland Security, Jefferson Parish Department of Emergency Management, David Saunders, Deano Bonano, Kenneth L. Padgett, Sr., M. Joseph, and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-1581.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Haab, Aiden; Haab, Amelia; Haab, Garret; Haab, Monica; Haab, Sophie; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 677-006; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-954.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James STEWART.
    No. 2014-KK-1627.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Stewart, James; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 11-5440; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-K-407.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Teddy CHESTER.
    No. 2014-OK-1966.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re Chester, Teddy; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 96-2598.

Treating petitioner’s letter as another application to remove present post-conviction counsel either by substituting new counsel or by permitting him to represent himself in the post-conviction proceedings, the application is DENIED. See also State ex rel. Chester v. State, 13-0906 (La.6/26/13), 118 So.3d 429, State ex rel. Chester v. State, 13-0511 (La.6/26/13), 118 So.3d 429; State ex rel. Chester v. State, 12-1225 (La.11/2/12), 99 So.3d 664.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Twan BREAUX.
    No. 2014-KK-2192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 24, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 516-570; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1049.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

CLARK, J., would grant the stay and the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George WELLS.
    No. 2014-KD-2219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 26, 2014.
   In re Wells, George; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 517-340; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-1179.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    In re CONFIDENTIAL PARTY.
    No. 2014-OB-2072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 2014.
   In re Confidential Party; — Plaintiff; Applying For Petition for Transfer to Active Status.

Denied.

KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ., would order hearing.


text:
    Scott D. LEMOINE; Beverly P. Lemoine v. Elizabeth P. WOLFE.
    No. 2014-CQ-1546.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; Other; Applying For Certified Question United States Court of Appeals, No. 13-30178.

Certification granted.


text:
    R.T. FAULK, III, Corey Farms, L.L.C.; Faulk Farms, Incorporated; Joanne Hodges; River Valley Properties; McHenry Farms, L.L.C.; Sherman Shaw; T.P. Godwin; William G. Nadler; McHenry Realty Partnership v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
    No. 2014-CQ-1598.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; — Other; Applying For Certified Question United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 13-30669.

Certification granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne G. TAYLOR a/k/a Wayne Taylor.
    No. 2014-K-0432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 11-3517; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0265.

Granted.


text:
    Michael O. READ v. WILLWOODS COMMUNITY.
    No. 2014-C-1475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Willwoods Community; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 689-843; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-CA-20.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary LAYTON. State of Louisiana v. Gary Layton.
    No. 2014-KK-1910.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 518-498; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0748 C/W 2014-K-0751.

Granted.


text:
    Angela Marie COSTANZA, et al. v. James D. CALDWELL, et al.
    No. 2014-CD-2016.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Barfield, Tim; George, Devin; James D. Caldwell, ET AL.; — Defendant/s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No’. 2013-0052.

Denied. Moot. Appeal has been docketed under 2014-CA-2090.


text:
    Ketric BARNES v. Emma Lee WISE.
    No. 2014-CJ-2101.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Wise, Brenda; Wise, Emma Lee; Wise, Terry; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 578252; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49640-CW.-

Granted. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and relators’ exception of improper venue is granted. See La. Code Civ. P. art.74.2(B); St. Amant v. St. Amant, 564 So.2d 1312 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990), writ denied, 567 So.2d 622 (La.1990). Pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 121, the case is transferred to the 8th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Winn for further proceedings.

JOHNSON, C.J., and VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would deny.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John MORAN.
    No. 2013-KP-2580.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 293-918; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0774.

Not considered; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alfred RICARD, III.
    No. 2013-KP-2858.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Ricard III, Alfred; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 880-04; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW1607.

Not considered. Untimely.


text:
    Amy LANDRY v. Emile D. BROUSSARD, M.D., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1638.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Landry, Amy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. C-93129; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00419.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(d).


text:
    In re William P. McGOVERN, Jr.
    No. 2014-OB-2004.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re McGovern Jr., William P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Petition for Reinstatement and Application for Transfer to Inactive Status.

Denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 14-PDB-022.
    No. 2014-OB-1813.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Arbona, Henry W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 14-PDB-022.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 30(c).


text:
    Rebecca VALLERY, et al. v. M. Lawrence DRERUP, et al.
    No. 2014-C-1192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Vallery, Rebecca; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated September 19, 2014; Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 237,118; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1369.

Reconsideration not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Jennifer Diane NUNEZ v. PINNACLE HOMES, L.L.C. and Sua Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-0921.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Lenard, Allen; Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-18501; to the Court, of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1302.

Remanded to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Ogea v. Merritt, 13-1085 (La.12/10/13), 130 So.3d 888.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyrone LARTIGUE, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2810.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
   In re Tyrone Lartigue Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated September 12, 2014, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 131906; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00505.

Reconsideration denied.