author: JAMES, J.,

text:
    Philip A. VAZZANA, Appellant v. CITY OF GREENVILLE, Appellee.
    No. 2011-CP-01572-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 25, 2013.

      Philip A. Vazzana, appellant, pro se.
    Andrew N. Alexander III, Greenville, attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, C.J., FAIR and JAMES, JJ.
   JAMES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Philip Vazzana appeals the Washington County Circuit Court’s order affirming the decision of the City Council of Green-ville, Mississippi, which found that several properties owned by Vazzana were a menace. He argues that (1) he received insufficient notice of the hearing; and (2) the city council’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. Upon review, we find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Vazzana owns four properties in Greenville, Mississippi. On February 9, 2010, the Greenville City Clerk issued a notice to Vazzana, which stated that his four properties were believed to be in a state of uncleanliness to such an extent that they constituted a menace to the public health, as well as the safety and welfare of the community. This notice advised Vazzana that a hearing would be held on March 3, 2010, at 4:00 p.m. to determine whether the properties were a menace to the community, and if so, whether the properties should be cleaned or demolished.

¶ 3. On February 24, 2010, the clerk issued a notice of a public hearing to Vaz-zana, notifying him that a hearing would be held at the city council’s chambers on March 16, 2010, at 4:00 p.m. to make a final determination as to the disposition of the properties. A public hearing was held as scheduled on March 16. Vazzana was present at the hearing, and he acknowledged that he had been personally served with the notice of the hearing. At the March 16 hearing, the city council addressed all four properties, and on that same day, entered a resolution concerning each property.

¶ 4. The city council determined that the properties located at 308 Central Street and 248 Poplar Street were in such a condition as to be a menace to the public health and the safety of the community. It was ordered that the city would have the grass and weeds cut, cleaned, and sprayed, and all trash and debris removed from these properties. The actual cost of cleaning and cutting the lots, plus a twenty-five percent penalty, was to be assessed against Vazzana.

¶ 5. The city council also determined that the property located at 242 South Poplar Street was in such condition as to be a menace to the public health and the safety of the community. This property was partially burned in a fire on August 11, 2009. The city council allowed Vazzana two weeks to show substantial improvement on demolition and lot cleaning, and Vazzana was to report back to the city council. If Vazzana failed to do so, the city was to have the structure demolished; the grass and weeds cut, cleaned, and sprayed; and all trash and debris removed from the property. The actual cost of cleaning and cutting the lot, plus a twenty-five percent penalty, was to be assessed against Vazzana.

¶ 6. An inspection report dated February 9, 2010, indicated that the property located at 242 South Poplar Street was dilapidated and that ninety percent of the structure was damaged by fire. This report also indicated several structural defects, including: defective sills, piers, porch, rafters, and sheeting; sagging and unsound floors, walls, and roof; and broken windows. The report also listed several plumbing issues: defective fixtures; missing fixtures; poor ventilation; and no restroom privacy. Electrical problems consisted of the following: unsafe wiring; unsafe switch box; and bad service entrance. Sanitation and health conditions were present, including: inadequate or unsafe heating; building unfit for human habitation; and excessive Utter and debris on the premises. Further, the electrical, water, and gas services were disconnected. Finally, the report noted the following: “Entire building was burned to the ground. All of the debris is still at the location. It is hazardous to the community and also an eyesore to this community.”

¶ 7. The city council further determined that the property located at 228 South Poplar Street was in such condition as to be a menace to the public health and the safety of the community. It was ordered that the city would have the structure demolished; the grass and weeds cut, cleaned, and sprayed; and all trash and debris removed from the property. The actual cost of demohtion, cleaning, and cutting the lot, plus a twenty-five percent penalty, was to be assessed against Vazza-na.

¶ 8. On March 26, 2010, Vazzana appealed the city council’s decision to the Washington County Circuit Court. On September 20, 2011, the circuit court entered an order and opinion affirming the city council’s decision. The circuit court found that Vazzana had proper notice, and it noted Vazzana’s appearance and participation at the hearing. The circuit court further found that city council’s decision concerning the four properties was supported by substantial evidence.

DISCUSSION

¶ 9. “The decision of an administrative agency is not to be disturbed unless the agency order was unsupported by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the agency’s scope or powers; or violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party.” Van Meter v. City of Greenwood, 724 So.2d 925, 927 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (quoting Bd. of Law Enforcement v. Butler; 672 So.2d 1196, 1199 (Miss.1996)). “Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’ or to put it simply, more than a ‘mere scintilla’ of evidence.” Id. at 927-28 (¶ 6) (quoting Johnson v. Ferguson, 485 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss.1983)).

I. Whether Vazzana received insufficient notice of the hearing.

¶ 10. Vazzana claims that he was only given one day’s notice of the hearing. Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-19-11 (Supp.2012) states:

(1) To determine whether property or parcel of land located within a municipality is in such a state of uncleanliness as to be a menace to the public health, safety and welfare of the community, a governing authority of any municipality shall conduct a hearing, on its own motion, or upon the receipt of a petition signed by a majority of the residents residing within four hundred (400) feet of any property or parcel of land alleged to be in need of the cleaning. Notice shall be provided to the property owner by:
(a) United States mail two (2) weeks before the date of the hearing mailed to the address of the subject property and to the address where the ad valo-rem tax notice for such property is sent by the office charged with collecting ad valorem tax; and
(b) Posting notice for at least two (2) weeks before the date of a hearing on the property or parcel of land alleged to be in need of cleaning and at city hall or another place in the municipality where such notices are posted.

(Emphasis added).

¶ 11. In the case before us, the record shows that on February 24, 2010, the clerk issued a notice of a public hearing to Vaz-zana, notifying him that a hearing would be held at the city council’s chambers on March 16, 2010, at 4:00 p.m. to make a final determination as to the disposition of the properties. A public hearing was in fact held on March 16, 2010, beginning at 4:00 p.m. Vazzana was present at the hearing, and he acknowledged that he had been personally served with the notice of the hearing. In fact, Vazzana actively participated in the hearing. Therefore, this issue is without merit.

II. Whether the city council’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.

¶ 12. Under this assignment of error, Vazzana argues that the city council’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. Under Mississippi law, an act is arbitrary when “it is not done according to reason or judgment, but depending on the will alone.” Valley Road Action Comm. v. Lauderdale Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 97 So.3d 1242, 1246 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So.3d 25, 36 (¶ 33) (Miss.2010)). “An act is capricious if ‘done without reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding or a disregard for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles.’ ” Id. (quoting Hall, 37 So.3d at 36 (¶ 33)).

¶ 13. Vazzana relies on the following city ordinance to support his position that he can have trash on his property as long as he has a fence around the property:

Where a C-3, Central Business District borders on a residential district, except where separated by a street, but where it abuts on an alley as defined in this Ordinance, a fence shall be erected on the side and rear lot lines abutting a residence and/or residential district. The fence shall consist of wood, brick and/or concrete to hide storage, trash bins and/or receptacles, service yards, equipment, refuse, garbage, trash, etc.

However, this ordinance does not permit Vazzana to maintain his property in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-19-11, our menace statute.

¶ 14. Further, we cannot say that the city council’s actions were arbitrary or capricious. Vazzana admitted that his yards were messy. Further, he states in his appellant’s brief that he has been a “compulsive collector of collectibles” for forty-five years and has stored these items on his properties. At the hearing, Vazzana failed to present any evidence to show that his properties were not a menace.

¶ 15. A video of Vazzana’s property was admitted into evidence. The video clearly shows that Vazzana’s properties are a mess. There are piles of wood stacked high in the yard, vines growing all over structures, and a huge tree lying in the yard. Several windows are broken, and there are broken window panels lying in the yard. He has several old cars and a bread truck parked in the yard, none of which appear operable. The wire fence surrounding the perimeter of the yard is broken in several places. Several tires and other pieces of equipment are scattered throughout the yard. There are random items scattered and piled up outside, including an umbrella, car seat, pet carrier, gas tank, bike, cooler, bucket, baskets, hose, extension cord, and other tools. After viewing the video and the record, we cannot say that the city council’s decision was arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, we affirm.

¶ 16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ„ CONCUR.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: IRVING, P.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    George MAY a/k/a George Edward May, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CP-00800-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 25, 2013.

      George May, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by W. Glenn Watts, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., BARNES and MAXWELL, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On August 25, 2008, George May pleaded guilty to statutory rape. The Marion County Circuit Court sentenced May to a term of thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On January 27, 2012, May filed a motion requesting copies of the transcripts from his plea and sentencing hearings. The circuit court interpreted May’s motion as a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) and summarily dismissed the motion as time-barred. Feeling aggrieved, May appeals and argues that the circuit court erred in construing his motion as a PCR motion.

¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. Three years and five months after pleading guilty to statutory rape, May filed a motion in the circuit court, which reads, in part, as follows:

George May (May) enter[ed] a plea of guilty in the above cause on August 25, 2008. He was sentenced to 30 [years] under the custody of [the Mississippi Department] of Corrections on September 05, 2008.
May [is] now aggrieved by his plea[,] which was the result of ineffective assistance of [counsel]. May now seek[s] Post[-]Conviction Collateral Relief pursuant to [Mississippi] Code [Annotated section 99-39-1.]
The purpose of this motion is to ask the court[ ] for the plea transcript, the sentencing transcript, and any pretrial motions that [were] recorded in the Marion County Circuit Court. The records are needed to assist May in his [PCR motion].

The circuit court interpreted May’s motion as a PCR motion, which it dismissed as time-barred. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issue.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE

¶ 4. May contends that the circuit court erred in characterizing his request for documents as a PCR motion. Appellate courts review a circuit court’s dismissal of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion. Burrough v. State, 9 So.3d 368, 371 (¶ 6) (Miss.2009). According to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Supp.2012), a circuit court may summarily dismiss a PCR motion “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibitsf,] and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief.” Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that “pleading[s] cognizable under the [Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA)] will be treated as ... motion[s] for post-conviction relief that [are] subject to the procedural rules promulgated therein, regardless of how the plaintiff has denominated or characterized the pleading[s] Knox v. State, 75 So.3d 1030, 1035 (¶ 12) (Miss.2011) (citations omitted).

¶ 5. Contrary to May’s assertion that his motion was not a PCR motion, the plain language of the motion suggests otherwise. May states in his motion that he is seeking “Post[-]Conviction Collateral Relief pursuant to [Mississippi] Code [Annotated section 99-39-1]” because his plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore May’s motion is indeed a PCR motion, and the circuit court did not err in disposing of May’s motion as such.

¶ 6. Also, we find that the circuit court properly dismissed the motion as time-barred. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Supp.2012) states that a PCR movant who has previously entered a guilty plea has three years from the date of the entry of his judgment of conviction to file a PCR motion. Here, May filed his PCR motion approximately five months after the limitations period had expired. Thus, May’s motion was time-barred.

¶ 7. Even if the circuit court had not disposed of May’s motion as a PCR motion, it, nevertheless, properly dismissed the motion. “[T]here are two ... ways in which a criminal defendant may challenge a [circuit] court proceeding: (1) a direct appeal from a conviction, or (2) a proceeding under the [UPCCRA].” Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505, 506 (Miss.1989). Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-35-101 (Supp.2012), an individual is not entitled to a direct appeal to our supreme court if he “enters a plea of guilty and is senteneed[.]” Therefore, because May pleaded guilty, he was not entitled to a direct appeal to our supreme court.

¶ 8. Accordingly, May’s only option for appellate review is pursuant to the UPCCRA. A PCR movant “who has filed a proper motion pursuant to [the UP-CCRA], and whose motion has withstood summary dismissal under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) ..., may be entitled to trial transcripts [or other relevant documents] under ... Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-15 (Rev. 2007),” within the discretion of the circuit court, if the movant shows good cause. Bell v. State, 105 So.3d 401, 403 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Fleming, 553 So.2d at 506). If his PCR motion is later denied, he may appeal the denial and include in his appeal the claim that the circuit court erred in denying his request for documents. Id.

¶ 9. However, the UPCCRA does not allow a prisoner to initiate “an independent, original action for free documents [and] where he is not pleased with the [circuit court’s] ruling, to directly appeal that ruling to this Court as a separate and independent action.” Kemp v. State, 904 So.2d 1137, 1139 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Fleming, 553 So.2d at 506) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed May’s motion because, having instituted an action outside of the UPCCRA and having failed to demonstrate any need for the documents other than to search them for mistakes allegedly committed by his trial attorney, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.

If 10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MARION COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.


author: WISE, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte James WALTMAN. (In re John Owens v. Griffin Wood Company, Inc., et al.). Ex parte Progressive Casualty Insurance Company. (In re John Owens v. Griffin Wood Company, Inc., et al.).
    1111598 and 1120080.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Jan. 11, 2013.

      Thomas R. Jones, Jr., and Randal Kevin Davis of Jones, Wyatt & Davis, P.C., Tuscaloosa, for petitioner James Waltman.
    Alex L. Holtsford, Jr., and Jarred E. Kaplan of Holtsford, Gilliland, Higgins, Hitson & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioner Progressive Casualty Insurance Company.
    Ted L. Mann of Mann & Potter, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent John Owens.
    Hope Curtis Hicks of Webb <& Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for respondent Griffin Wood Company.
   WISE, Justice.

James Waltman and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Progressive”) (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the petitioners”) separately petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Waltman’s and Progressive’s motions to transfer this action from the Perry Circuit Court to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motions. We grant the petitions and issue the writs.

Facts and Procedural History

On July 14, 2011, John Owens, a resident of Hale County and an employee of Griffin Wood Company, Inc. (“Griffin Wood”), was operating a log truck on Greensboro Avenue in Tuscaloosa County; the log truck was not carrying any logs. At the same time, Waltman, a resident of Tuscaloosa County, was operating a vehicle that was towing a utility trailer on Greensboro Avenue. The utility trailer Waltman was towing disconnected from his vehicle and struck Owens’s truck, resulting in injuries to Owens.

On December 20, 2011, Owens sued Griffin Wood, Waltman, Progressive, and GEICO Indemnity Company (“GEICO”). Owens included a workers’ compensation claim against Griffin Wood based on an allegation that he was working in the line and scope of his employment for Griffin Wood at the time of the accident; claims of negligence, wanton and reckless conduct, and negligent, reckless, and/or wanton violations of the rules of the road against Waltman; and uninsured/underinsured-motorist claims against Progressive and GEICO. Owens alleged, in part, that he filed the action in Perry County because Griffin Wood’s principal place of business is in Perry County. See § 6-S-7(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.

On February 8, 2012, Waltman filed a motion to transfer the action from Perry County to Tuscaloosa County. In support of his motion, Waltman contended that venue would be appropriate in Tuscaloosa County pursuant to § 6-3-2(3), Ala.Code 1975, because the accident occurred in Tuscaloosa County; because the “hitch on the tongue of the utility trailer Waltman was pulling had been attached to his vehicle by a company in Tuscaloosa [County on] the morning of’ the accident; and because Waltman was then residing in Tuscaloosa County and he was a resident of Tuscaloosa County at the time the accident occurred and at the time the complaint was filed. Waltman also argued that Perry County’s connection to the claims was very weak and that Tuscaloosa County’s connection to the claims was much stronger. Specifically, he contended that Perry County’s only connection to the case is that Griffin Wood has its principal place of business in Perry County and that, although Owens had alleged that he was engaged in the line and scope of his duties as an employee of Griffin Wood at the time of the accident, his log truck was not carrying any logs at the time of the accident. Therefore, citing § 6-3-21.1, Ala.Code 1975, Waltman argued that the action should be transferred to Tuscaloosa County based on the interest-of-justice prong of the doctrine of forum non conve-niens.

On February 9, 2012, Progressive filed a motion to transfer the case from Perry County to Tuscaloosa County. It adopted in its entirety the motion Waltman filed. Also, citing § 6-3-2(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, it argued that venue for an automobile accident is normally proper in the county in which the accident occurred or the county in which the alleged tortfeasor resides, both of which, in this case, would be Tuscaloosa County.

On April 4, 2012, Owens filed an opposition to the motions to transfer. He argued that the citizens of Perry County have a strong interest in the affairs of one of its resident corporations and the determination of workers’ compensation benefits owed to its employees. Owens also argued that the provision for subrogation in § 25-5-11(a) of the workers’ compensation act

“clearly sets forth a strong interest and connection in the motor vehicle accident case to Perry County. Namely, one of the employers and participants in Perry County’s all-important timber business has a right to be fully compensated for any benefits extended to Owens from the party responsible for Owens’[s] injuries.”

Finally, he argued that “Alabama law is replete with cases tried in a county other than where an [automobile] accident occurred.” Owens concluded that Perry County did have a strong connection to and interest in the case and that, therefore, the interest of justice would not require a change of venue from Perry County to Tuscaloosa County. On April 11, 2012, Waltman filed a reply to Owens’s opposition.

Griffin Wood moved to bifurcate the workers’ compensation count from the other counts in the complaint. On April 29, 2012, the circuit court granted the motion, ordering that “the workers’ compensation claim shall be tried without a jury and separately from the remaining counts in this lawsuit.”

On May 16, 2012, Waltman filed a supplement to his motion to transfer. In that supplement, he cited this Court’s decision in Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So.3d 371 (Ala.2012), as being on point and supporting the transfer to Tuscaloosa County.

On September 9, 2012, the circuit court denied the motions to transfer the case. These petitions followed.

Standard of Review

“A petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate ‘method for obtaining review of a denial of a motion for a change of venue’ pursuant to § 6-3-21.1. Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 788, 789 (Ala.1998)....

“ ‘A party moving for a transfer under § 6-3-21.1 has the initial burden of showing, among other things, one of two factors: (1) that the transfer is justified based on the convenience of either the parties or the witnesses, or (2) that the transfer is justified “in the interest of justice.”’ Ex parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So.3d 536, 539 (Ala.2008). Although we review a ruling on a motion to transfer to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting or denying the motion, id., where ‘the convenience of the parties and witnesses or the interest of justice would be best served by a transfer, § 6-3-21.1, Ala.Code 1975, compels the trial court to transfer the action to the alternative forum.’ Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 994 So.2d 906, 912 (Ala.2008) (emphasis added).”

Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So.3d 570, 573 (Ala.2011).

Discussion

The petitioners argue that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying their motions to transfer the action from Perry County to Tuscaloosa County. Specifically, citing § 6-3-21.1, Ala.Code 1975, which governs when an action must be transferred to another venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, they contend that the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute mandates a transfer to Tuscaloosa County.

Section 6-3-21.1, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

“With respect to civil actions filed in an appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil action or any claim in any civil action to any court of general jurisdiction in which the action might have been properly filed and the case shall proceed as though originally filed therein.”

(Emphasis added.) The parties do not dispute that the complaint was filed in an appropriate venue, namely, Perry County. Likewise, they do not dispute that the action could properly have been filed in Tuscaloosa County. However, they do dispute whether the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1 requires a transfer of this case from Perry County to Tuscaloosa County.

“Historically, the plaintiff has had the initial choice of venue under the system established by the legislature for determining venue. Before the enactment of § 6-8-21.1 by the Alabama Legislature in 1987, a plaintiffs choice of venue could not be disturbed on the basis of convenience to the parties or the witnesses or in the interest of justice. With the adoption of § 6-3-21.1, trial courts now have ‘the power and the duty to transfer a cause when “the interest of justice” requires a transfer.’ Ex parte First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 718 So.2d 658, 660 (Ala.1998) (emphasis added). In First Family, this Court noted that an argument that trial judges have almost unlimited discretion in determining whether a case should be transferred under § 6-3-21.1 ‘must be considered in light of the fact that the Legislature used the word “shall” instead of the word “may” in § 6-3-21.1.’ 718 So.2d at 660. This Court has further held that ‘Alabama’s forum non conveniens statute is compulsory.’ Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So.2d 898, 905 n. 9 (Ala.2004).”

Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So.3d 745, 748-49 (Ala.2010).

“The ‘interest of justice’ prong of § 6-3-21.1 requires ‘the transfer of the action from a county with little, if any, connection to the action, to the county with a strong connection to the action.’ Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.2d [788,] 790 [(Ala.1998)]. Therefore, ‘in analyzing the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1, this Court focuses on whether the “nexus” or “connection” between the plaintiffs action and the original forum is strong enough to warrant burdening the plaintiffs forum with the action.’ Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 994 So.2d 906, 911 (Ala.2008). Additionally, this Court has held that ‘litigation should be handled in the forum where the injury occurred.’ Ex parte Fuller, 955 So.2d 414, 416 (Ala.2006). Further, in examining whether it is in the interest of justice to transfer a case, we consider ‘the burden of piling court services and resources upon the people of a county that is not affected by the case and ... the interest of the people of a county to have a case that arises in their county tried close to public view in their county.’ Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982 So.2d 484, 490 (Ala.2007).”

Ex parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So.3d 536, 540 (Ala.2008).

The petitioners rely primarily on this Court’s decisions in Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, supra, Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., supra, and Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So.3d 371 (Ala.2012), all of which involved requests for a change of venue under the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. In Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, a vehicle being driven by Lori Wright, a resident of Elmore County, was involved in an accident in Elmore County with a vehicle owned by Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, which had its principal place of business in Autauga County, and driven by Richard Alexander Rogers, a Montgomery resident. Wright sued Rogers and Autau-ga Heating & Cooling in Montgomery County, and Rogers and Autauga Heating & Cooling filed a motion to transfer the action to Elmore County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. After the circuit court denied the motion, Autau-ga Heating & Cooling and Rogers petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus, and we issued the writ based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non con-veniens statute, reasoning, in part:

“Although we agree with Wright that the case has a connection with Montgomery County because Rogers is a resident of Montgomery County and Au-tauga Heating & Air may have some business connections there, we hold that the overall connection between Montgomery County and this case is weak and that the connection between the case and Elmore County is strong.
“First, the accident occurred in El-more County. Wright, the plaintiff, is a resident of Elmore County. Further, Rebecca McCullers, the emergency medical technician who responded to the accident, testified in her affidavit that she worked for Haynes Ambulance of Wetumpka, Inc., and that she is a resident of Elmore County. The principal place of business of Haynes Ambulance of Wetumpka, Inc., is in Elmore County. On the other hand, the connection between the case and Montgomery County, given the evidence before the trial court, is weak. Besides the fact that Rogers is a resident of Montgomery County, there was no other evidence before the trial court indicating a connection between the case and Montgomery County.
“The accident underlying this action occurred in Elmore County, and the emergency personnel who responded to the accident were from Elmore County. The plaintiff herself is a resident of El-more County. This Court sees no need to burden Montgomery County, with its weak connection to the case, with an action that arose in Elmore County simply because the individual defendant resides in Montgomery County and the corporate defendant does some business there. We thus conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion for a change of venue. The trial court is hereby directed to transfer the case to the Elmore Circuit Court.”

Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So.3d at 750-51.

Also, in Ex parte Wachovia Bank, Tameka Floyd and Adam Lee Floyd were signatories on a business-checking account in the name of Adam Lee Floyd d/b/a Unique Image Pro Car Care (“Unique”) at a branch of Wachovia Bank in Lee County. After discovering that Tammy Sistrunk, “a sometime employee of Unique,” had taken funds from Unique’s account by forging names on withdrawal slips, the Floyds sued Sistrunk and Wachovia in Macon County, where Sistrunk lived. The Floyds later added as a defendant James M. Sutherland, an employee of Wachovia, who also resided in Macon County. Wachovia moved to transfer the action to Lee County under the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute, but the circuit court denied the motion. Wachovia then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus, and we issued the writ, reasoning, in part:

“Lee County is the situs of all the alleged acts or omissions giving rise to the plaintiffs’ claims. Any allegedly unauthorized withdrawals were made from a Wachovia branch in Lee County. Police investigation of the matter was conducted in Lee County. Lee County is Floyd’s place of residence, as well as the location of Unique. Thus, Lee County is the place where all the injury alleged in the complaint occurred. Although it is not a talisman, the fact that the injury occurred in the proposed transferee county is often assigned considerable weight in an interest-of-justice analysis. See Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So.3d 745, 748 (Ala.2010) (‘ “[Tjhis Court has held that ‘litigation should be handled in the forum where the injury occurred.’ ” ’ (quoting Ex parte Indiana Mills [& Mfg., Inc.], 10 So.3d [536,] 540 [(Ala.2008)])); Ex parte McKenzie Oil, Inc., 13 So.3d 346, 349 (Ala.2008) (same).
“In short, nothing material to this case transpired in Macon County. Macon County’s sole material contact with this case is that the two individual defendants, Sistrunk and Sutherland, reside there.”

77 So.3d at 573-74.

Finally, in Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber, Patricia Gail Webster was injured in an accident involving a vehicle that was owned by Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC (“Southeast”), and driven by one of its employees, Michael J. Smith. Although the accident occurred in Lee County, Webster sued Southeast and the driver of its vehicle in Chambers County, where Southeast had its principal place of business. After the circuit court denied the defendants’ motion to transfer the case to Lee County, they petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus, and we issued the writ, reasoning, in part:

“[T]his action was filed in the county of a defendant’s residence or principal place of business — Chambers County— although the accident occurred in another county — Lee County. As this Court has observed: ‘Although it is not a talisman, the fact that the injury occurred in the proposed transferee county is often assigned considerable weight in an interest-of-justice analysis.’ Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So.3d 570, 573-74 (Ala.2011). Also, ... the emergency personnel who responded to the accident in which Webster was injured work in the county to which Southeast and Smith seek to have the action transferred. Further, the only nonparty eyewitness to the accident lives and works in Lee County, and Webster was living and working in Lee County at the time of the accident.
“This Court has held that the ‘interest of justice’ requires transferring an action to a county with a strong connection to the case as opposed to keeping it in a county with an overall weak connection. Chambers County’s sole connection with the case — that it is the principal place of business of Southeast — is weak in comparison to Lee County’s connection with the case.
“Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Southeast and Smith’s motion for a change of venue based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. We therefore grant Southeast and Smith’s petition for the writ of mandamus and direct the circuit court, in the interest of justice, to enter an order transferring the case from the Chambers Circuit Court to the Lee Circuit Court.”

Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber, 94 So.3d at 375-77.

Based on the reasoning in Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, Ex parte Wachovia Bank, and Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber, the petitioners have established that Tuscaloosa County has a stronger connection to the claims in this case than has Perry County. The accident occurred in Tuscaloosa County; the hitch on the tongue of the utility trailer Wait-man was pulling had been attached to his vehicle by a company in Tuscaloosa County on the morning of the accident; and Wattman currently resides in Tuscaloosa County and he was residing there at the time the accident occurred and at the time the complaint was filed.

In contrast, the only connection the case has to Perry County is that Griffin Wood has its principal place of business there. Owens argues that the citizens of Perry County have a strong interest in the affairs of one of its resident corporations and the determination of workers’ compensation benefits owed to its employees and any possible subrogation rights of Griffin Wood. However, the circuit court bifurcated the workers’ compensation claim from the remaining claims and ordered that the workers’ compensation claim be tried without a jury. Therefore, a jury would not be hearing those claims in Perry County. Also, there was no evidence indicating that Griffin Wood had paid any workers’ compensation benefits and filed any claim for subrogation. Citing Ex parte Yocum, 963 So.2d 600 (Ala.2007), and Ex parte City of Haleyville, 827 So.2d 778 (Ala.2002), Owens argues that there are numerous decisions that did not require that an action be tried in the county where the incident occurred. However, in Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber, 94 So.3d at 376, this Court distinguished Ex parte Yocum and Ex parte Haleyville as follows:

“In Yocum, the plaintiff, a resident of Dallas County, filed her action in Jefferson County, the residence or principal place of business of two of the defendants. Several defendants who resided in Dallas County filed a motion to transfer the action to Dallas County on the basis of the doctrine of forum non con-veniens. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the motion to transfer, and this Court denied the defendants’ subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus. Unlike this case, Yocum involved a contract dispute in which the claims against the Jefferson County defendants included fraud, suppression, conversion, and interference with business relations. This Court concluded that the Jefferson Circuit Court did not exceed its discretion in denying the motion to transfer ‘[bjecause of the nexus between Jefferson County and the alleged participation of the two Jefferson County defendants in the alleged scheme to overcharge Ca-haba Timber so as to deflate its profits and hence the amount due [the plaintiff].’ Ex parte Yocum, 963 So.2d at 603. Thus, this Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a transfer of the case from Jefferson County not simply because two of the defendants resided or had a principal place of business in Jefferson County, but because Jefferson County had a substantial connection to the matters giving rise to the action. [Two of the alleged principal wrongdoers operated out of Jefferson County.]
“Haleyville involved an action filed in Marion County by a plaintiff who fell at the Downtown Mall of Haleyville, which is located in Winston County. The defendant, the City of Haleyville, filed a motion for a change of venue to Winston County based on § 6-3-11, Ala.Code 1975, the statute that controls venue for civil actions filed against municipalities. Webster argues that in Haleyville ‘the trial court and this Court did not feel that the interest of justice required that the plaintiff must prosecute her case in the county where she fell rather than her chosen forum.’ Webster’s brief, p. 10. In fact, this Court did not address the interest-of-justiee factor in Haley-ville because the defendant’s motion to transfer the case was not based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The City of Haleyville contended that venue was improper in Marion County, not that Winston County was a more appropriate or more convenient forum. Therefore, Haleyville provides no support for Webster’s position.”

Finally, although Owens makes reference to Perry County’s timber industry and cites Ex parte Siemag, 53 So.3d 974 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), to compare that industry to the coal-mining industry in Walker County, he did not present any evidence to the circuit court to support his allegations regarding Perry County’s timber industry.

“ ‘ “In considering a mandamus petition, we must look at only those facts before the trial court.” Ex parte American Res. Ins. Co., 663 So.2d 932, 936 (Ala.1995) (emphasis added). Of course, facts must be based upon “evidentiary material,” which does not include statements of counsel in motions, briefs, and arguments. Ex parte McCord-Baugh, 894 So.2d 679, 686 (Ala.2004). See also Providian Nat’l Bank v. Conner, 898 So.2d 714, 719 (Ala.2004).’
“Ex parte ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 933 So.2d 343, 345 (Ala.2006). See also Ex parte Verbena United Methodist Church, 953 So.2d 395, 399 (Ala.2006). Because the information before this Court regarding Wright’s assertions is contained in ‘statements of counsel in motions, briefs, and arguments,’ it cannot be considered ‘evidentiary material’ and thus will not be considered by this Court.”

Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So.3d at 749-50. Therefore, we have not considered those assertions about the presence of the timber business in Perry County in determining Perry County’s connection to this case.

Because Perry County has only a very weak overall connection to the claims and Tuscaloosa County has a much stronger connection to the claims, the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute requires that the action be transferred to Tuscaloosa County.

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Waltman’s and Progressive’s motions for a change of venue based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, we grant Waltman’s and Progressive’s petitions for the writ of mandamus and direct the circuit court, in the interest of justice, to enter an order transferring the case from the Perry Circuit Court to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.

1111598 — PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

1120080 — PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

MALONE, C.J., and STUART and PARKER, JJ., concur.

SHAW, J., concurs in the result.

      . Waltman alleges in his petition that GEICO was subsequently dismissed from the case.

      . With regard to the venue for actions against corporations, § 6-3-7 provides, in pertinent part:
      "(a) All civil actions against corporations may be brought in any of the following counties:

      "(2) In the county of the corporation's principal office in this state ...."

      . With regard to venue of actions against individuals, § 6-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

        "(a) In proceedings of a legal nature against individuals:

      "(3) All other personal actions, if the defendant or one of the defendants has within the state a permanent residence, may be commenced in the county of such residence or in the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred.”