author: BARNES, J.,

text:
    Exso CHANDLER a/k/a Exo Chandler, Jr., Appellant v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Mississippi Parole Board, Appellees.
    No. 2012-CP-00597-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    July 30, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 5, 2013.

      Exso Chandler, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by R. Stewart Smith Jr., attorney for appellees.
    Before IRVING, P.J., BARNES and MAXWELL, JJ.

      . Compare Miss.Code Ann. § 97 — 3—7(I)(b) (Rev.2006) (penalty for simple assault on a law enforcement officer: fine of not more than $1,000, imprisonment not more than five years, or both) with Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(1) (Supp.1982) (same).

   BARNES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Exso Chandler, appearing pro se, appeals the Circuit Court of Sunflower County’s dismissal of his motion to clarify his records. Through this motion, Chandler argues that he should be eligible for parole on his current sentence. We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of his motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Chandler is an inmate in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Currently, he is serving a ten-year sentence for the crime of sale of cocaine. He committed this crime on December 12, 2008, in Scott County, Mississippi.

¶ 3. Chandler argues that he should be eligible for parole on his current sentence because his crime was not one with an “enhanced penalty” under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(l)(h) (Rev. 2011). He filed this action in the Sunflower County Circuit Court in December 2011, styling his complaint as a “Motion to Clarify Records.” In the circuit court, it was established that Chandler had been convicted of simple assault of a police officer in 1983 and received a three-year sentence. From court records, it also appears that Chandler pleaded guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana in 1983 and received a six-month sentence in the Scott County jail.

¶ 4. In 1993, the record shows Chandler was indicted for the crime of sale of cocaine, again in Scott County, as a second offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-147 (Rev.2009). After a trial in 1994, he was convicted of the charge and was sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the MDOC.

¶ 5. In December 2008, after being released from his 1994 sentence and “out on parole,” Chandler committed the instant crime, for which he pleaded guilty. Chandler was sentenced to ten years in the custody of the MDOC. Chandler claims that it was not until July 2011 that he found out he had been deemed ineligible for parole by the MDOC.

¶ 6. In January 2012, at a pre-hearing conference, the State deemed him ineligible for parole because his prior offenses carried enhanced penalties. The circuit court agreed, and dismissed his motion. Chandler now appeals that decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. The standard of review for questions of law is de novo. Williams v. State, 110 So.3d 840, 842 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2013).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. After the pre-hearing conference on Chandler’s motion to clarify, the circuit court issued an order finding Chandler was not eligible for parole on his current sale-of-cocaine sentence. We agree, but for a different reason than determined by the circuit court.

¶ 9. Section 47-7-3(l)(h) precludes parole for those inmates who are convicted after June 30,1995, except offenders

convicted of only nonviolent crimes after June 30, 1995, may be eligible for parole.... For purposes of this paragraph, “nonviolent crime” means a felony other than homicide, robbery, manslaughter, sex crimes, arson, burglary of an occupied dwelling, aggravated assault, kidnapping, felonious abuse of vulnerable adults, felonies with enhanced penalties, the sale or manufacture of a controlled substance under the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, felony child abuse, or exploitation....

(Emphasis added). In the circuit court, the State and Chandler focused on the enhanced-penalty provision of this statute. The simple reason Chandler is not entitled to parole is that section 47-7-3(l)(h) defines sale of a controlled substance as a crime of violence. Chandler pleaded guilty to the sale of cocaine in December 2008 and was sentenced to ten years. Accordingly, he is ineligible for parole on his current drug-sale conviction under section 47-7-3(l)(h).

¶ 10. Therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed Chandler’s motion, and Chandler is ineligible for parole on his current sentence.

¶ 11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SUNFLOWER COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO SUNFLOWER COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.

      . The circuit court found Chandler had two convictions subject to enhanced-penalty status. First, his misdemeanor possession-of-marijuana conviction in 1983 caused him to be indicted on his first sale-of-cocaine charge in 1994 as a second offender under section 41-29-147. Thus, the court found this 1994 felony is subject to an enhanced penalty. Second, his sentence for the prior conviction of simple assault on a law enforcement officer was found to be an enhanced penalty since the status of Chandler's victim subjected him to a stiffer sentence. Both of these felonies, however, occurred prior to June 30, 1995, and would not make Chandler ineligible for parole for his current sentence.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JAMES, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Danny REA, Appellant v. FOAMEX and American Home Assurance Company, Appellees.
    No. 2012-WC-00625-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Aug. 27, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 2013.
    Certiorari Denied March 13, 2014.

      Carter Dobbs Jr., attorney for appellant.
    Sandra Taylor Doty, David E. Stovall, Sharon Moncure-Mangum, Jackson, attorneys for appellees.
    Before IRVING, P.J., CARLTON and JAMES, JJ.
   JAMES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Danny Rea appeals the Chickasaw County Circuit Court’s affirmance of the Mississippi Worker’s Compensation Commission’s decision, which declined to reopen Rea’s workers’ compensation claim after it was dismissed for failure to prosecute. He raises one issue on appeal: whether the Commission erred in failing to reopen his claim under Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-53 (Rev.2011) because of a mistake in a determination of fact. Upon review, we find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Rea was employed as a truck driver and unloader at Foamex. On March 22, 2002, Rea filed a petition to controvert with the Commission, alleging that he suffered a compensable injury on March 7, 2002. On April 10, 2002, Foamex and its insurance carrier, American Home Assurance Company (“American”), filed their answer.

¶ 3. On April 10, 2002, Foamex and American filed a motion for leave to suspend benefits after Rea was terminated for allegedly threatening violence against others at work. On April 18, 2002, Rea filed his response, which denied any violence, and a motion to authorize medical treatment.

¶ 4. Almost one year later, on March 20, 2003, Foamex and American filed a notice of independent medical examination. On July 15, 2003, Foamex and American filed a second motion for leave to suspend benefits. On September 12, 2003, the administrative judge (AJ) entered an order granting the motion for leave to suspend benefits.

¶ 5. On November 10, 2003, the AJ entered an order dismissing Rea’s claim for his failure to file a completed prehearing statement, but the AJ expressly stated that Rea could file a motion to reinstate his claim if he completed a prehearing statement. On May 14, 2004, Rea filed a motion to reinstate his claim, and he attached a prehearing statement. Thus, on May 19, 2004, the AJ entered an order reinstating Rea’s claim.

¶ 6. On June 3, 2004, Foamex and American filed their prehearing statement. On June 18, 2004, a notice of hearing was entered, setting the hearing on the merits for September 29, 2004, but that hearing was cancelled by order dated September 16, 2004. On September 16, 2004, another notice of hearing was entered, setting the hearing on the merits for January 5, 2005, but that hearing was cancelled by order dated January 5, 2005.

¶ 7. On June 27, 2005, Foamex and American filed their notice of final payment. On October 19, 2005, the AJ entered an order allowing Rea’s attorney, Michael Williams, to withdraw as counsel. On November 21, 2005, attorney Carter Dobbs Jr. entered his appearance for Rea.

¶ 8. On July 7, 2006, a notice of hearing was entered, setting a hearing on the merits for November 1, 2006. On October 3, 2006, Foamex and American filed a pre-hearing statement. On November 3, 2006, a notice of hearing was entered, setting a hearing on the merits for February 13, 2007. On January 26, 2007, Foamex and American filed a supplemental prehearing statement.

¶ 9. On February 27, 2007, a notice of hearing was entered, setting a hearing on the merits for May 15, 2007. On May 1, 2007, Rea filed a motion for continuance of the hearing set for May 15, 2007, in order to take the deposition of Rea’s treating physician. On May 3, 2007, Foamex and American filed their response to Rea’s motion for continuance, noting that the case had already been continued several times.

¶ 10. On May 10, 2007, a notice of hearing was entered, setting the case for a telephonic prehearing conference on May 11, 2007. On May 15, 2007, a notice can-celling the hearing set for May 15, 2007, was entered.

¶ 11. On July 16, 2008, Foamex and American filed a notice of employer medical examination. On January 23, 2009, the AJ sent Rea a status inquiry, but there is no response in the record. On February 23, 2009, the AJ entered a notice returning the case to the active hearing docket.

¶ 12. On April 8, 2009, the AJ entered an order dismissing Rea’s claim for failure to prosecute as follows:

This matter is before the [AJ] on periodic review of the case file, and it appears that [Rea] has for some time failed to notify counsel or the Commission of his ... current address and/or has otherwise failed to pursue this claim for workers’ compensation benefits[,] and the claim file should thus be closed.

On May 14, 2009, Rea filed a motion to reinstate the case, on the basis that the parties had been conducting settlement negotiations and taking depositions, and because Rea had several medical examinations. This motion did not allege a mistake in a determination of fact or a change in condition.

¶ 13. On May 18, 2009, the AJ entered an order reinstating Rea’s claim. On May 26, 2009, Foamex and American filed an objection to Rea’s motion to reinstate the claim and a motion to vacate the order reinstating the claim, arguing that the AJ entered the order reinstating the case pri- or to the expiration of the time in which they were entitled to file an objection or response.

¶ 14. On May 28, 2009, the AJ entered a notice of hearing, setting a telephonic hearing for June 5, 2009. On June 5, 2009, Rea filed a response to the motion to vacate the order reinstating his claim. On September 2, 2009, the AJ entered an order dismissing Rea’s claim for failure to prosecute, again stating that Rea had “failed to notify counsel or the Commission of his ... current address and/or has otherwise failed to prosecute this claim for benefits, and, therefore, ... this claim should be dismissed.” The order further states:

This order will become final unless [Rea] or any other party files a written request for review of this order within twenty (20) days per [Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-47 (Rev.2011) ]. A final order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is “the rejection of a claim” sufficient to trigger the one-year statute of limitations set forth in [section 71-3-53].
To request reinstatement of this claim, [Rea] must timely file a motion to reinstate with the Commission. The motion should provide [Rea’s] current address and state [Rea’s] desire to continue prosecution of this claim.

¶ 15. On September 17, 2009, the AJ entered an order granting Foamex and American’s motion to vacate the order reinstating Rea’s claim and denying Rea’s motion to reinstate the case. The order states:

[T]his [AJ] ... hereby find[s] that [Rea’s] claim was dismissed for failure to prosecute the case and for [Rea’s] failure to pursue his claim for workers’ compensation benefits, as required by the applicable rules of the [Commission] .... The [AJ] finds that [Rea] was represented at the time and did not file his [m]otion to [r]einstate within 20 days from the entry of the [o]rder [dismissing [the][c]laim for [Rea’s] [f]ailure to [p]rosecute the [c]ase. This [o]rder became final on April 28, 2009. Only after this order became final did [Rea] move to reinstate this matter, on May 14, 2009. In support, [Rea] indicated that the parties had previously discussed settlement and that discovery was ongoing.
This [AJ] does hereby find that [Rea] has failed to demonstrate, as required by [Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-53], a change in condition or a mistake in [a] determination of fact in order to support [Rea’s] ... motion to reopen. This [AJ], having heard the evidence, and reviewed the files and motions, finds that [Foamex and American’s] [m]otion to [v]aeate [the][o]rder Reinstating [the][c]laim is well taken and is, therefore, granted. This [AJ] further finds that [Rea’s] [m]otion to Reinstate [the] Rase is not well taken and is, therefore, denied.

¶ 16. On September 24, 2009, Rea filed a motion to reinstate his case. On October 1, 2009, the AJ entered an order denying Rea’s motion to reinstate his case, again stating that the parties had twenty days to file a request for review of the order.

¶ 17. On October 9, 2009, Rea filed a motion to reconsider or amend the order granting the motion to vacate and denying Rea’s motion to reinstate the case, and in the alternative, to reinstate or reopen the case because of a mistake of fact. On October 21, 2009, the AJ entered an order denying Rea’s motion to reinstate his claim.

¶ 18. On October 23, 2009, Rea filed a request for review of the order denying his motion to reinstate the claim. After a hearing before the full Commission, the full Commission entered an order on March 12, 2010, stating:

The claim was previously dismissed for failure to prosecute the claim by an [o]r-der of [the AJ] dated April 8, 2009.[Rea] failed to request review of this decision within twenty (20) days, and therefore, pursuant to [section 71-3-47], the April 8, 2009 [o]rder became final. Despite the procedural missteps alleged by the respective parties that occurred subsequent to the finality of the April 8, 2009 [o]rder, the fact remains that this [o]r-der of [dismissal was final, and thus[,] the only remaining option for a possible reopening of the claim would be pursuant to [section 71-3-53]. Reopening of this claim [under section 71-3-53] would require [Rea] to demonstrate a mistake in a determination of fact or a change in conditions. A hearing on the alleged grounds for reopening this claim pursuant to [s]ection 71-3-53 has not yet been held, and the Commission hereby remands this matter to the [AJ] for such hearing.

¶ 19. A hearing was held, and on July 1, 2010, the AJ entered an order denying Rea’s motion to reinstate the case, finding that Rea had failed to demonstrate a change in condition or a mistake in a determination of fact as required by section 71-3-53.

¶ 20. On July 21, 2010, Rea filed another request for review of the order denying his motion to reinstate the case with the full Commission. On August 11, 2010, the full Commission entered a notice of hearing, setting the hearing for September 27, 2010. On September 28, 2010, the full Commission entered an order affirming the AJ’s order dated July 1, 2010.

¶ 21. On October 29, 2010, Rea appealed to the Chickasaw County Circuit Court. On September 26, 2011, Foamex and American filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). On January 20, 2012, Rea filed his response to the motion to dismiss. On January 30, 2012, Foamex and American filed a motion to strike Rea’s appellate brief as untimely. A hearing was set for January 31, 2012. On February 1, 2012, Foamex and American filed a motion to strike Rea’s response to the motion to dismiss as untimely.

¶ 22. On March 14, 2012, the circuit court found the Commission had substantial evidence to support its decision and, therefore, affirmed the dismissal. On April 16, 2010, Rea appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶23. This Court has summarized the standard of review of workers’ compensation cases as follows:

The standard of review in appeals of workers’ compensation cases is limited; this Court must determine only whether the decision of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence and whether the law was correctly applied. The Commission sits as the ultimate finder of facts; its findings are subject to normal deferential standards upon review. Because our review is limited, we will only reverse the Commission’s rulings where findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence, matters of law are clearly erroneous, or the decision was arbitrary and capricious. This Court maintains a deferential standard even when we would have been persuaded to rule otherwise if we had been the fact-finder.

Brock v. Wal-Mart, 105 So.3d 1151, 1155 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

¶ 24. Rea argues that the Commission should have reopened his claim because there was a “mistake in a determination of fact” under section 71-3-53, which states:

Upon its own initiative or upon the application of any party in interest on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact, the [C]ommission may, at any time prior to one (1) year after date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one (1) year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case, issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation. Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury; and if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the [C]ommission.

(Emphasis added). “The kind of mistake that will warrant reopening is ordinarily a mistake on the part of the fact-finder, not on [the] part of one of the witnesses.” N. Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Stevenson, 12 So.3d 1149, 1152 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Bailey Lumber Co. v. Mason, 401 So.2d 696, 704 (Miss.1981)).

¶ 25. Rea argues that the Commission should have reopened his claim because there was a “mistake in a determination of fact.” Specifically, Rea states that one reason for the dismissal of his claim was that Rea failed to notify counsel and the Commission of his address. The April 8, 2009 order dismissing Rea’s claim stated: “[I]t appears that [Rea] has for some time failed to notify counsel or the Commission of his ... current address and/or has otherwise failed to pursue this claim for workers’ compensation benefits[,] and the claim file should thus be closed.” According to Rea, neither he nor his attorney was aware that the Commission did not have Rea’s address. However, Rea contends that the Commission had his attorney’s address, and as such, this was a mistake in a determination of fact. We find no merit to this assertion.

¶ 26. Rea also argues that the April 8, 2009 order and the September 2, 2009 order erroneously state that the claim was dismissed for Rea’s failure to pursue his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. According to Rea, this is a mistake in a determination of fact because he was pursuing his claim by conducting settlement negotiations. However, this is not a “mistake in a determination of fact” as contemplated under the statute. In sum, Rea has failed to demonstrate a mistake in a determination of fact. Therefore, we affirm. '

1127. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHICKASAW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Because no action was taken within twenty days of April 8, 2009, this order became final on April 28, 2009, under Rule 10 of the Commission’s rules. Therefore, Rea’s only avenue for relief was to show a mistake in a determination of fact or a change in condition under section 71-3-53.

      . The September 2, 2009 order dismissing Rea’s claim for failure to prosecute contained virtually identical language.


author: MAIN, Justice. MURDOCK, Justice

text:
    Ex parte GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. (In re SafetyNet Youth Systems, LLC v. Guarantee Insurance Company et al.).
    1120337.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    June 14, 2013.

      Sybil V. Newton of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, Birmingham; M. Warren Butler and Scott D. Stevens of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, Mobile; and Allen S. Reeves, Selma, for petitioners Guarantee Insurance Company and Patriot National Insurance Group; William J. Gamble of Gamble, Gamble & Caíame, LLC, Selma, for petitioner Paul Harper; and Tommy Ritter of Taylor Ritter, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner Randy Thomas.
    Thomas E. Bazemore III, H. Cannon Lawley, and Martha Thompson of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham; and Robert H. Turner, Sr., Marion, for respondent.
   MAIN, Justice.

Guarantee Insurance Company, Patriot National Insurance Group, Randy Thomas, and Paul Harper (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the insurance-company parties”) are the defendants in an action filed by SafetyNet Youth Systems, LLC, that is pending in the Dallas Circuit Court. The insurance-company parties petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Dallas Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to transfer the action to the Lee Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion because, they argue, venue in Dallas County is improper. We grant the petition on the basis that venue is improper in Dallas County, and we issue the writ directing the Dallas Circuit Court to transfer the case to the Lee Circuit Court.

I. Facts and Procedural History

SafetyNet is an Alabama limited-liability company. Its managing member is Lyn-dell Wheatley. Guarantee is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Ft. Lauderdale and its registered agent in Alabama in Jefferson County; it is a wholly owned subsidiary of Patriot. Patriot is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ft. Lauder-dale; it is solely a holding company. Randy Thomas and Paul Harper are insurance agents with Cobbs, Allen & Hall, an insurance-brokerage and risk-management firm in Montgomery (“the brokerage firm”). Thomas resides in Montgomery County; Harper resides in Lee County.

SafetyNet was formed in 2001. It provides housing, treatment, and other services, including residential psychiatric treatment, to disadvantaged, abused, or emotionally disturbed youth. SafetyNet has three facilities — two in Montgomery County and one in Dallas County. In 2009, SafetyNet purchased a workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurance policy issued by Guarantee that covered the period August 25, 2009, to August 25, 2010. The insurance-company parties briefly describe a meeting that took place in Montgomery regarding the issuance of that insurance policy, but the materials before us contain no information as to when that meeting was held. A premium notice from Guarantee contained in the materials before us indicates that SafetyNet renewed that policy for the period August 25, 2010, to August 25, 2011. SafetyNet states that it also had purchased a policy of insurance from Guarantee in 2008; however, it is undisputed that the policies at issue in this case are the two policies covering 2009-2011 (hereinafter referred to as “the subject policies”). SafetyNet describes the subject policies as follows:

“The policies in question were marketed and sold as ‘retro policies’ which, because they offer a retrospective analysis after the policy period, would present the opportunity for SafetyNet to receive a policy refund. Such a refund would occur after a final premium calculation and audit of SafetyNet’s financial records with respect to Workers’ Compensation and Employer’s Liability which was to be conducted subsequent to the expiration of the policy year.”

SafetyNet’s brief, at 1 (reference to an exhibit omitted).

After a dispute over premiums arose, SafetyNet sued the insurance-company parties and several fictitiously named parties in the Dallas Circuit Court on July 31, 2012, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, fraudulent suppression, negligence and wantonness, “negligent procurement of insurance coverage,” and conversion stemming from SafetyNet’s purchase of the subject policies. Safe-tyNet seeks to have refunded to it premiums it paid that it alleges were excessive.

On September 12, 2012, the insurance-company parties filed a joint motion requesting the transfer of this action to the Lee Circuit Court. Their motion was supported by, among other things, records from the Alabama Secretary of State’s office; the affidavit of Frank Kushler, Patriot’s senior vice president; and the affidavits of Paul Harper and Randy Thomas. The Secretary of State’s records reflect that SafetyNet was formed on January 16, 2001, with a registered office address in Montgomery, and that SafetyNet amended its articles of formation in September 2004 and November 2006. Kushler testified in his affidavit that he oversees operations for both Guarantee and Patriot; that Patriot has neither an office nor a resident agent in Dallas County; and that, although Guarantee is registered to do business in Alabama, it has neither an office nor a registered agent in Dallas County. Harper testified in his affidavit that he never sent e-mails to or received e-mails from any employee of SafetyNet regarding the subject policies, that he did not place any telephone calls to any employee of Safe-tyNet regarding the subject policies, and that the only meeting he had “with someone from SafetyNet regarding the placement or renewal of the [subject policies] referenced in the lawsuit took place at the office of SafetyNet in Montgomery, Alabama.” Thomas testified in his affidavit that any e-mails he sent to any employee of SafetyNet regarding the subject policies were sent from Montgomery and that he did not have any meetings with any employee from SafetyNet concerning the placement or renewal of the subject policies.

SafetyNet filed a response in opposition to the insurance-company parties’ motion to transfer. The response was supported by, among other things, the application for the 2010-2011 policy; the insurance binder for the 2009-2010 policy issued by the brokerage firm dated August 25, 2009; and Wheatley’s affidavit. SafetyNet’s application states its mailing address as “Lyn Wheatley, 80 Mel Bailey Drive, Minter, AL 36761.” The binder states as the insured “SafetyNet Youth Systems, LLC, Attn: Mr. Lyn Wheatley, 80 Mel Bailey Drive, Minter, AL 36761.” In his affidavit, Wheatley testified, in pertinent part, as follows:

“2. SafetyNet Youth Systems, LLC was formed in 2001. At that time Safe-tyNet did not maintain any property or offices but was simply in the ‘formation stages.’ It has been brought to my attention that the Secretary of State website maintains a listing indicating that SafetyNet Youth Systems, LLC has an address of Montgomery, Alabama. While SafetyNet does maintain facilities in Montgomery County, SafetyNet’s principal office in Alabama is located in Minter, Dallas County, Alabama. In 2009 at the time SafetyNet purchased policies and insurance through Guarantee Insurance Company, Patriot National Insurance Group, Randy Thomas and Paul Harper, SafetyNet’s principal office in the state of Alabama was located in Minter, Dallas County, Alabama.
“3. While SafetyNet maintains facilities in counties other than Dallas County, Alabama, SafetyNet’s largest facility and its’ [sic] corporate offices are located in Minter, Dallas County, Alabama. In addition, all administrative staff report to SafetyNet’s Minter, Dallas County, Alabama offices. SafetyNet’s business manager, human resources director and accounts payable clerk all maintain offices at the SafetyNet principal office in Minter, Dallas County, Alabama. Additionally, the address maintained with the Internal Revenue Service as well as the Alabama Department of Industrial Relations and all other Alabama State Agencies is SafetyNet’s corporate office located in Minter, Dallas County, Alabama.”

The insurance-company parties filed a reply to SafetyNet’s response. That reply was supported by, among other things, a second affidavit from Kushler. In his second affidavit, Kushler stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

“3. Patriot and Guarantee do not do business by agent in Dallas County, Alabama, and did not do business by agent in Dallas County at the time of filing of this lawsuit in 2012. Patriot and Guarantee do not currently insure any locations in Dallas County and did not insure any locations in Dallas County at the time of filing of this suit in 2012. Patriot and Guarantee do not have any employees or agents physically present in Dallas County and did not have any employees or agents physically present in Dallas County at the time of filing of this suit in 2012.
“4. The policies previously issued by Guarantee to SafetyNet Youth Systems, LLC (none of which are current) covered two locations in Montgomery County, Alabama and one location in Minter, Alabama. I am unaware of any other policies having been issued by Patriot or Guarantee that covered any location for any other insured in Dallas County.”

The trial court denied the insurance-company parties’ motion for a change of venue. The insurance-company parties then filed what they called a “motion to reconsider,” supporting that motion with the affidavit of Evie Perry, the premium audit market manager for Guarantee and Patriot. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. The insurance-company parties then filed their petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court; we ordered answer and briefs.

II. Standard of Review

“‘The question of proper venue for an action is determined at the commencement of the action.’ ” Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So.2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.2002) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 815 So.2d 532, 534 (Ala.2001)). If venue is improper at the outset, then, upon motion of the defendant, the court must transfer the case to a court where venue is proper. Pike Fabrication, 859 So.2d at 1091. If the defendant’s motion is denied,

“ ‘[t]he proper method for obtaining review of a denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.’ Ex parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So.2d 886, 888 (Ala.2000). ‘Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala.1995). Moreover, our review is limited to those facts that were before the trial court. Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 788, 789 (Ala.1998).
“ ‘The burden of proving improper venue is on the party raising the issue and on review of an order transferring or refusing to transfer, a writ of mandamus will not be granted unless there is a clear showing of error on the part of the trial judge.’ Ex parte Finance America Corp., 507 So.2d 458, 460 (Ala.1987). In addition, this Court is bound by the record, and it cannot consider a statement or evidence in a party’s brief that was not before the trial court. Ex parte American Res. Ins. Co., 663 So.2d 932, 936 (Ala.1995).”

Pike Fabrication, 859 So.2d at 1091.

If the insurance-company parties made a prima facie showing that venue in' Dallas County was improper, the burden then shifted to SafetyNet to rebut that showing. Ex parte East Alabama Med. Ctr., 109 So.3d 1114 (Ala.2012).

III. Analysis

The insurance-company parties argue that, under the circumstances of this case, venue is improper in Dallas County. They rely on §§ 6-3-2 and 6-3-7, Ala.Code 1975, the Aabama statutory authorities that define proper venue in this case, and on § 6-3-21.1, Ma.Code 1975, Aabama’s forum non conveniens statute. SafetyNet counters that venue in Dallas County is proper pursuant to the venue statutes because, it contends, its principal place of business is located in Dallas County and the insurance-company parties do business by agent in Dallas County.

A. Section 6-3-2, Ala.Code 1975

We first address whether venue in Dallas County is improper as to Thomas and Harper under § 6-3-2. Section 6-3-2 governs venue of actions against individual defendants. That statute reads, in pertinent part:

“(a) In proceedings of a legal nature against individuals:
“(2) A1 actions on contracts, except as may be otherwise provided, must be commenced in the county in which the defendant or one of the defendants resides if such defendant has within the state a permanent residence.
“(3) All other personal actions, if the defendant or one of the defendants has within the state a permanent residence, may be commenced in the county of such residence or in the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred.”

The- insurance-company parties argue that venue in Dallas County is improper as to Thomas and Harper because Thomas is a resident of Montgomery County and Harper is a resident of Lee County. Thomas submitted an affidavit stating that he resides in Montgomery County; Harper submitted an affidavit stating that he resides in Lee County. SafetyNet submitted no evidence to contradict either affidavit. Because § 6-3-2(a)(2) clearly provides that a breach-of-contract claim against an individual defendant must be brought in a county in which “one of the defendants resides,” venue in Dallas County as to the breach-of-contract claim against Thomas and Harper is improper pursuant to § 6-3-2(a)(2).

An action against an individual defendant may also be brought in the county “in which the act or omission complained of’ occurred if the action is a personal action other than an action on a contract, pursuant to § 6-3-2(a)(3). According to the evidence before the trial court, Harper met with “someone from SafetyNet” in Montgomery County before the subject policies were issued, and Thomas sent any e-mails directed to SafetyNet from Montgomery County. The documents in the materials before us concerning the subject policies indicate that applications, binders, premium notices, and other paperwork were all issued either from the brokerage firm’s office in Montgomery or from Guarantee’s office in Florida. Nevertheless, SafetyNet argues that because the insurance-company parties directed communications to Dallas County, because the subject policies “were to be delivered” in Dallas County, and because the insurance-company parties collected premiums from Dallas County, venue is proper in Dallas County. We disagree.

In Ex parte Sierra Development, Inc., 652 So.2d 251, 253 (Ala.1994), this Court held that “[a] claim alleging fraud or conversion is a ‘personal action’ within the exception stated in” § 6 — 3—2(a)(3). Safe-tyNet’s complaint alleges the following personal-injury claims: fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, fraudulent suppression, negligence and wantonness, “negligent procurement of insurance coverage,” and conversion. Analyzing the issue of proper venue pursuant to § 6-3-2(a)(3) in Ex parte Windom, 840 So.2d 885, 890 (Ala.2002), this Court noted that “the Legislature has made the site of the act complained of the appropriate venue.” The Court further stated:

“Significantly, in venue cases, the word injury commonly refers not to the damage allegedly suffered by the plaintiff, but to the wrongful act or omission allegedly committed by the defendant; the word injury, as used in these cases, derives from the Latin word injuria, meaning the wrongful act or omission. Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Ala.1999); Ex parte SouthTrust Bank of Tuscaloosa County, N.A., 619 So.2d 1356, 1358 (Ala.1993); and Age-Herald Publ’g Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 44, 92 So. 193, 197 (1921). Thus, even those venue cases that hold that venue of a personal action lies in the county where the injury occurred commonly mean the county where the defendant committed the alleged wrongdoing. Id.”

Windom, 840 So.2d at 889 n. 2. As to SafetyNet’s personal-injury claims against Harper and Thomas, from the evidence before us, Montgomery County is the only Alabama county in which “the act or omission complained of ... may have occurred.” Therefore, venue in Dallas County as to those claims is improper pursuant to § 6-3-2(a)(3).

We conclude that, under § 6-3-2, venue as to SafetyNet’s claims against Thomas and Harper is improper in Dallas County.

B. Section 6-3-7, Ala.Code 1975

We next address whether venue in Dallas County is improper as to Guardian and Patriot under § 6-3-7. Section 6-3-7 governs venue of actions against corporate defendants. That statute reads, in pertinent part:

“(a) All civil actions against corporations may be brought in any of the following counties:
“(1) In the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of real property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
“(3) In the county in which the plaintiff resided, or if the plaintiff is an entity other than an individual, where the plaintiff had its principal office in this state, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, if such corporation does business by agent in the county of the plaintiffs residence .... ”

We first consider whether venue under § 6 — 3—7(a)(1) is proper in Dallas County. The analysis used to determine proper venue pursuant to § 6-3-7 is the same as the analysis of proper venue pursuant to § 6-3-2. As to SafetyNet’s allegations of fraud, negligence, wantonness, and conversion, we note that this Court held in Ex parte Pikeville Country Club, 844 So.2d 1186 (Ala.2002), that venue of a personal-injury claim is proper where the defendant committed the alleged wrongful act, not where its effect was felt by the plaintiff.

“ ‘In Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1922), a libel action, this Court established that the term “injury” for purposes of § 6-3-7 refers to the urrongful act or omission of the corporate defendant, not to the resulting damage to the plaintiff, and thus determined that venue for such an injury is proper where a wrongful act was committed, not where the damage resulted....’”

844 So.2d at 1188-89 (quoting Ex parte SouthTrust Bank of Tuscaloosa County, N.A., 619 So.2d 1356, 1358 (Ala.1993)). In SouthTrust Bank, which involved fraud allegations, this Court, interpreting an earlier version of § 6-3-7, held that because SouthTrust Bank had made the alleged misrepresentations in Tuscaloosa County, where it had made telephone calls and had sent mail to the plaintiff, the plaintiffs alleged injuries occurred in Tuscaloosa County, not in the county where the plaintiff received those communications. See also Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc., 74 So.3d 940, 943 (Ala.2011) (the phrase “events or omissions giving rise to the claim” refers to the wrongful acts or omissions of the corporate defendant). As to SafetyNet’s personal-injury claims against Guarantee and Pioneer, it is clear that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim[s]” occurred in Montgomery County, not Dallas County;. venue of those claims is therefore improper in Dallas County pursuant to § 6-3-7(a)(l).

As to SafetyNet’s breach-of-contract claim, SafetyNet maintains that the events or omissions giving rise to the breach-of-contract claim occurred in Dallas County. SafetyNet relies on Vulcan Materials Co. v. Alabama Insurance Guaranty Ass’n, 985 So.2d 376, 382 (Ala.2007), in which this Court stated that, “under the law of Alabama, a breach-of-contract claim, like the claim between [the plaintiff] and its insurance companies, arises where the contract was breached.” SafetyNet then argues:

“SafetyNet’s breach-of-contract claim is based upon [the insurance-company parties’] failure to tender the performance required by the insurance contracts. This failed performance included not performing a proper retroactive audit of SafetyNet’s business records which are located in Dallas County, and failing to tender the contractually required refund of premiums to Safety-Net’s Dallas County corporate office. ‘ “A breach of contract occurs where the contract is to be performed.” ’ Vulcan Materials Co., 985 So.2d at 382 (quoting Strickland v. Trion Group, Inc., 463 F.Supp.2d 921, 925 (E.D.Wis.2006)). [The insurance-company parties] admit here that ‘no employee of Patriot or Guarantee entered Dallas County for the purpose of any audit.’ Petition at pp. 11-12. SafetyNet agrees, and that is a primary basis of its breach-of-contract claim. The performance which [the insurance-company parties] failed to provide was to be tendered in Dallas County, and, therefore, Dallas County is a proper venue under § 6-3-7(a)(1)....”

SafetyNet’s brief, at 23-24 (footnote omitted). SafetyNet’s argument is premised on its contention that the contracts at issue in this case — the subject policies — were breached in Dallas County. We disagree.

Count 1 of SafetyNet’s complaint alleges breach of contract as follows:

“19. As set forth above, [SafetyNet] entered into an insurance contract with Defendant Guarantee Insurance Company. However, Defendant Guarantee Insurance Company and its agents improperly demanded premiums well in excess of those appropriate under the policy. Furthermore, Defendant Guarantee Insurance Company sought premiums in excess of those disclosed at the time of sale and contrary to the representations which formed the basis of the contractual agreement by and between SafetyNet and Guarantee Insurance Company.
“20. Defendant ] Guarantee Insurance Company and its agents and employees have breached the agreement and contract by failing and refusing to abide by the terms and conditions of the policy including those governing the premiums to be charged and the manner by which SafetyNet has [sic] to receive a refund.
“21. [The insurance-company parties] have breached the contract by, among other things, refusing to abide by the appropriate terms of the policy with respect to premium and refusing to appropriately refund premium and otherwise exacting improper premiums in a manner which is unlawful and inconsistent with the policy and disclosures provided to SafetyNet.”

All the acts or omissions alleged by Safe-tyNet in its complaint would have been performed (or not performed) by Guarantee and Patriot in Montgomery County by agent or in Florida, where the decisions concerning the subject policies that form the basis of SafetyNet’s claim were made. There simply is nothing in connection with Guarantee’s or Patriot’s performance under the subject policies that was performed in Dallas County. SafetyNet references an audit that it says Guarantee should have performed in Dallas County but did not. This “inaction” alone on the part of Guarantee is not sufficient to allow us to conclude that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in Dallas County. § 6-3-7(a)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, as to SafetyNet’s breach-of-contract claim against Guarantee and Patriot, venue is improper in Dallas County pursuant to § 6-3-7(a)(l).

We next consider whether venue under § 6-3-7(a)(3) is proper in Dallas County. Section 6-3-7(a)(3) requires a two-prong analysis if a plaintiff other than an individual has filed a complaint. Because SafetyNet is a corporate plaintiff, venue in Dallas County would be proper against a corporate defendant only (1) if SafetyNet’s principal place of business was in Dallas County at the time the action accrued and (2) if the corporation sued did business by agent in Dallas County, the county in which SafetyNet claims it “resides” or has its principal place of business. The parties devote considerable attention in their briefs to the issue whether SafetyNet’s principal place of business was in Montgomery County or in Dallas County at the time the cause of action accrued. We need not address that issue, however, because SafetyNet has not proven the second prong of the § 6-3-7(a)(3) analysis.

According to Kushler’s affidavits, neither Guarantee nor Patriot does business by agent in Dallas County. In his second affidavit, Kushler provided more detail concerning the insurance-company parties’ contention that Guarantee and Patriot do not perform any business functions in Dallas County. In addition to stating that neither Guarantee nor Patriot has even had any employees or agents physically present in Dallas County, Kushler stated that Guarantee and Patriot had not issued any policies currently in force covering any location in Dallas County and had not issued any such policies that were in force at the time this case was filed in 2012. Moreover, Kushler testified that other than the subject policies, which covered two locations in Montgomery County and one location in Dallas County from 2009 to 2011, he was not aware of any other policies having been issued by Guarantee or Patriot that covered any other insured in Dallas County. Because Kushler’s affidavits were sufficient to make a prima facie showing that Guarantee and Patriot do not do business in Dallas County, the burden thereby shifted to SafetyNet to prove that Guarantee and Patriot do in fact conduct business by agent in Dallas County. Thomasville Feed & Seed, 74 So.3d at 943 (citing Ex parte Citizens State Bank, 989 So.2d 507, 508 (Ala.2008)).

In its answer in response to the mandamus petition, SafetyNet contends that, because the subject policies provided workers’ compensation insurance covering injuries to SafetyNet employees working in Dallas County, Guarantee and Patriot did business in Dallas County. Relying on the insurance documents in the materials before us, SafetyNet also contends that because the original insurance prospectus was sent to its office in Dallas County, as were the applications, billing notices, and premium statements, and because premiums were collected from Dallas County, Guarantee and Patriot did business by agent in Dallas County.

In Ex parte Elliott, 80 So.3d 908, 912 (Ala.2011), this Court held:

“To establish that a corporation does business in a particular county for purposes of venue, past isolated transactions are inconclusive. Ex parte Harrington Mfg. Co., 414 So.2d 74 (Ala.1982). A corporation does business in a county for purposes of § 6-3-7 if it performs with some regularity in that county some of the business functions for which the corporation was created. Ex parte SouthTrust Bank of Tuscaloosa Cnty., N.A., 619 So.2d 1356, 1358 (Ala.1993).”

(Emphasis added.) This Court has also held that “ ‘ “not every act done within the corporate powers of a foreign corporation will constitute doing business within the meaning of the statute.” ’ ” Ex parte Greenetrack, Inc., 25 So.3d 449, 453 (Ala.2009) (quoting Ex parte Scott Bridge Co., 834 So.2d 79, 81 (Ala.2002), quoting in turn Ex parte Charter Retreat Hosp., Inc., 538 So.2d 787, 790 (Ala.1989)). Considering the evidence before us, we find very little, if anything, to indicate that Guarantee or Patriot did business in Dallas County. The corporate functions they performed with regularity in connection with the subject policies were actions taken in Montgomery or in Florida. Even if Guarantee or Patriot performed some isolated transaction in Dallas County in the past, such a transaction is insufficient to establish that Guarantee or Patriot was doing business in Dallas County for venue purposes. Safe-tyNet has not met its burden to rebut the insurance-company parties’ showing that Guarantee and Patriot did not conduct business by agent in Dallas County. Venue, therefore, is improper in Dallas County as to Guarantee or Patriot pursuant to § 6-3-7(a)(3).

We conclude that, under § 6-3-7, venue as to SafetyNet’s claims against Guarantee and Patriot is improper in Dallas County.

C. Section 6-3-21.1, Ala.Code 1975

The parties devote a substantial portion of their briefs to the argument that both the interest of justice and the convenience of the parties and witnesses dictate the transfer of this case from Dallas County. Section 6-3-21.1, which codifies the doctrine of forum non conveniens, provides when an action must be transferred to another venue pursuant to that doctrine. This Court has held, however, that § 6-3-21.1 “has a field of operation only where an action is commenced in a county in which venue is appropriate.” Ex parte New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 663 So.2d 952, 956 (Ala.1995) (emphasis added). In Ex parte Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, LLC, 978 So.2d 12, 14 (Ala.2007), this Court stated:

“The doctrine of forum non conve-niens is applicable only ‘[w]ith respect to civil actions filed in an appropriate venue.’ § 6-3-21.1(a) (emphasis added). This statutory language is consistent with ‘the fundamental premise of all transfers for convenience — i.e., that venue is good at the time of filing, but that a transfer to a better venue is, or has become, appropriate.’ Ex parte Wilson, 854 So.2d [1106,] 1112 [(Ala.2002)] (emphasis added).”

Because we conclude that venue is not proper in Dallas County, the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply; therefore, we do not address the parties’ arguments as to this issue.

IV. Conclusion

We hold that when SafetyNet commenced this action, venue was improper in Dallas County; therefore, the insurance-company parties have demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief they seek. As the prevailing parties on a motion to transfer the action for improper venue, the insurance-company parties are entitled to select the appropriate county to which the action must be transferred when venue is proper in more than one county. Windom, 840 So.2d at 890; Rule 82(d)(8), Ala. R. Civ. P. Moreover, it is well settled that an action may be brought against a domestic corporation “in a venue otherwise improper as to it, so long as venue is proper as to one or more of its joint defendants.” Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So.2d 71, 84 (Ala.2003). In this case, venue is proper in Lee County as to Harper under § 6-3-2(a)(2) and (3) because Lee County is the county in which Harper resides. In their motion to transfer, the insurance-company parties requested that this action be transferred to Lee County. Therefore, we grant the insurance-company parties’ petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the insurance-company parties’ motion to transfer and to enter a new order transferring SafetyNet’s action to the Lee Circuit Court.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

STUART, BOLIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

BRYAN, J., concurs in the result.

MOORE, C.J., and MURDOCK, J., dissent.

MURDOCK, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

First, I question the significance of the main opinion’s quotations from Ex parte Windom, 840 So.2d 885, 889 n. 2 (Ala.2002), and Ex parte Pikeville Country Club, 844 So.2d 1186, 1188-89 (Ala.2002), insofar as those cases discuss the meaning of the term “injury” in venue cases applying the predecessor of current § 6-3-7(a)(1), Ala Code 1975. That term no longer is found in § 6-3-7(a)(l). See Act 99-249, Ala. Acts.1999.

Further, those cases are quoted as part of two separate discussions of the proper venue of the various tort claims asserted by SafetyNet Youth Systems, LLC (“Safe-tyNet”). It appears to me, however, that SafetyNet could bring this action in Dallas County because Dallas County is a proper venue for its contract claims against the corporate defendants. See § 6 — 3—7(a)(1) (“All civil actions against corporations may be brought in any of the following counties: (1) [i]n the county in which a substantial part of the events were omissions giving rise to the claim occurred....”); see also Rule 82(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. (‘Where several claims or parties have been joined, the suit may be brought in any county in which any one of the claims could properly have been brought.”). In this regard, I agree with the following argument by Saf-etyNet:

“Safetynet’s breach-of-contract claim is based upon Defendants’ failure to tender the performance required by the insurance contracts. This failed performance included not performing a proper retroactive audit of Safetynet’s business records which are located in Dallas County, and failing to tender the contractually required refund of premiums to Safetynet’s Dallas County corporate office. ‘ “A breach of contract occurs where the contract is to be performed.” ’ Vulcan Materials Co. [v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass’n], 985 So.2d [376] at 382 [(Ala.2007)] (quoting Strickland v. Trion Group, Inc., 463 F.Supp.2d 921, 925 (E.D.Wis.2006)).”

SafetyNet’s brief, p. 23.

Finally, I disagree with the main opinion’s application of the phrase “events or omissions giving rise to the claim.”

“For reasons I previously have expressed, I believe that this Court’s holdings in Ex parte Volvo Trucks North America, Inc., 954 So.2d 583, 587 (Ala.2006), and in Ex parte Suzuki Mobile, Inc., 940 So.2d 1007, 1010 (Ala.2006), construing the phrase ‘events or omissions giving rise to the claim’ in Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-7(a)(l), as meaning ‘the acts or omissions of the corporate defendant’ is incorrect. See Ex parte Ford Motor Co., 73 So.3d 597, 605-06 (Ala.2011) (Murdock, J., dissenting); Ex parte Ford Motor Co., 47 So.3d 234, 241 (Ala.2010) (Murdock, J., concurring in the result).”

Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc., 74 So.3d 940, 943-44 (Ala.2011) (Murdock, J., concurring in the result).

      . One of the exhibits in this case, a copy of letterhead bearing the logo "SafetyNet Academy . Villa . Crossings,” refers to a "SafetyNet Academy” with an address in Dallas County and a "SafetyNet-Montgomery Villa & Crossings” with an address in Montgomery County. Another exhibit, a record from the Alabama Secretary of State, shows the incorporation of "SafetyNet YouthCare, Inc.” It is undisputed, however, that the entity involved in this case is SafetyNet Youth Systems, LLC.

      . In the alternative, the insurance-company parties sought to have the action transferred to the Montgomery Circuit Court.

      . Kushler also testified that Patriot was not an insurance company and took no actions in the matters relating to SafetyNet’s claims.

      . We note that although SafetyNet states in its brief to this Court that the subject policies "were to be delivered” in Dallas County, there is no evidence to that effect in the materials before us.