author:
GUIDRY, Justice
     WEIMER, J.,

text:
    Collette Josey COVINGTON and Jade Covington v. McNEESE STATE UNIVERSITY and the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System.
    No. 2012-C-2182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2013.

      James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Veron, Bice, Palermo & Wilson, J. Michael Veron, Esq., Alonzo P. Wilson, Esq., J. Rock Palermo, III, Esq., Lake Charles, LA, for Applicant.
    Seth Hopkins, Esq., James Edward Hopkins Esq., Sulphur, LA, Law Office of James B. Doyle, APLC, James Buckner Doyle Esq., Heath Joseph Dorsey Esq., The Law Office of Lee A. Archer, Lee Ann Archer Esq., Lake Charles, LA, for Respondent.
   GUIDRY, Justice

hThe plaintiffs prevailed in their action under the Americans with Disabilities Act and sought attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. The district court rendered a fee award in favor of the plaintiffs, but reduced the requested number of billable hours by 20%, set an hourly rate of $240, and declined to enhance the overall award. The plaintiffs and the defendants both appealed. The court of appeal amended the award for purposes of the lodestar calculation to increase the number of billable hours to the amount requested and the prevailing hourly rate to $265. The court of appeal further enhanced the fee award, finding the case to be “rare” and “exceptional” based upon the results achieved and the protracted and highly-contested litigation. For the reasons set forth above, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s fee award. We therefore reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the district court.

| .FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case concerns a motion for attorney fees awarded to a prevailing party under the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter, “ADA”). The underlying facts of the case were set forth in Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 08-505 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 667, writ denied, 09-69 (La.3/6/09), 3 So.3d 491. In January 2001, Collette Covington was a student at McNeese State University. At the time, Covington required an electric wheelchair to traverse the campus due to a seizure disorder and orthopedic problems. She sustained injuries while attempting to exit a restroom in the Holbrook Student Union (hereinafter “Old Ranch”), the doorway of which was too narrow for her wheelchair to negotiate easily. It was ultimately determined there was not a single restroom in the entire Old Ranch building that was properly accessible to individuals with disabilities.

Covington sued McNeese and the University of Louisiana System for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter, “ADA”). She alleged in her petition that she was injured while trying to use and exit a non-compliant restroom on the McNeese campus. She asserted the non-compliant restroom violated both the provisions of Title II of the ADA and La.Rev.Stat. 46:2254, which mandates “[A]n educational institution shall not: (1) Discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of the institution....” After years of protracted litigation, McNeese ultimately admitted that numerous ADA violations existed across its campus and that the university had expended little to no effort to bring the campus into compliance with the ADA since the law was passed in 1990, despite renovations on the campus during which federal law mandated compliance.

On a motion for summary judgment in 2007, the district court found there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding the following issues: 1) | .McNeese did not have immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; 2) Covington was disabled as defined by the ADA at the time of the incident giving rise to the lawsuit; and 3) McNeese discriminated against Covington based on her disability. The court of appeal affirmed in a powerfully worded opinion, stating McNeese’s deliberate ignorance of the federal mandate to provide accessibility to handicapped persons is “reminiscent of the intolerance of the past” and expressed amazement at the audacity of McNeese’s decision to bring the case into an appellate court “where published, written opinion will forever memorialize its discrimination against this country’s disabled citizens.” McNeese State Univ., 996 So.2d at 687.

McNeese eventually agreed to settle Covington’s personal injury claim. After a Department of Justice investigation, McNeese, albeit slow in response, eventually agreed to bring its campus into compliance with the ADA. Covington subsequently filed a motion seeking an award of attorney fees for her six attorneys, requesting a single hourly rate of $265 per hour be applied uniformly to all -hours recorded. Covington also requested an enhancement based upon the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (1974), such as the novelty or difficulty of the claim, the time and labor required to litigate the claim, and the extent to which the case hindered the attorney’s acceptance of other work. Covington’s lead counsel, Seth Hopkins, who had graduated from law school in 1999, took on the case in 2001. For the next decade, counsel logged in excess of 5,400 hours of legal work without compensation. To | ¿support himself, Covington’s lead counsel worked as a staff attorney at a law firm in Houston, Texas. Counsel testified his continued involvement with his client’s ease had kept him from accepting more lucrative work.

After lengthy litigation and a six-day hearing, the district court ordered McNeese to pay attorney fees at the rate of $240 per hour for all six of Covington’s attorneys, as well as costs and $41,570.47 in expenses. The district court reduced lead counsel’s request for 5489.5 hours in billable time by 20% to 4,391.6, citing counsel’s inexperience in being an attorney and in ADA law. The district court denied the request for an enhancement of the assigned reasonable hourly rate, explaining the four factors urged by Covington’s counsel in support of the enhancement had been taken into account in the lodestar calculation. In doing so, the district court noted the exception to the rule against enhancement is strictly limited to “rare and exceptional circumstances.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn et al., 559 U.S. 542, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1667, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010).

Both Covington and McNeese appealed the district court’s judgment. The court of appeal affirmed the lower court’s award of attorney fees but amended the judgment to: 1) award lead counsel 5,489.5 billable hours; 2) set the reasonable hourly rate at $265 per hour; and 3) set the enhancement at nine and one-half percent. The court of appeal denied Covington’s request for sanctions and her |,.¡motion to strike McNeese’s reply brief, but it granted Cov-ington’s motion to strike certain passages from McNeese’s brief.

We granted the defendant’s writ application to consider the correctness of the court of appeal’s decision. Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 12-2182 (La.12/14/12), 104 So.3d 427.

DISCUSSION

The Americans with Disabilities Act was passed in 1990 to remedy discrimination against persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The fee shifting statute within the ADA provides authority for the court to award a reasonable attorney fee to a successful plaintiff in ADA actions. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“[T]he court ..., in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs”). As the appellate court noted, the attorney fee provision in the ADA is intended to encourage individuals injured by discriminatory practices to seek judicial redress, and “to ensure that the costs of violating civil rights laws [are] more fully borne by the violators, not the victims.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enter. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). The U.S. Supreme Court established in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), that the initial estimate of a reasonable attorney fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate, otherwise known as the “lodestar method.” A “reasonable hourly rate” is to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). | a“The amount of the fee, of course, must be determined on the facts of each case.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937.

The appellate court reviews an award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Corder v. Gates, 104 F.3d 247, 249 (9th Cir.1996); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437,103 S.Ct. at 1941. The district court’s factual determinations will not be set aside absent manifest error. Stobart v. State, Dep’t of Trans. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 n. 2 (La.1993).

A. Reasonable Number of Hours Expended

McNeese first asserts the lower courts erred in not rejecting lead counsel’s fee application in its entirety. McNeese vehemently claims the fee application is so riddled with errors and contradictions that reliability in the application should be deemed lacking. McNeese also complains of the lack of contemporaneous records and disputes counsel’s efforts in reconstructing billing records, arguing the fee application should have been rejected on these bases as well. We find no error in the appellate court’s rejection of this argument and adopt the court’s reasoning in Part I of its opinion below. Covington v. McNeese State University, 11-1077, pp. 9-13, 98 So.3d 414, 423-25 (La.App. 3 Cir.2012).

Moreover, our review of the record reveals no clear error in the district court’s finding that counsel provided sufficient documentation of his time working on the case. Although there is a “preference” for contemporaneous records, they are not absolutely necessary. See Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.2000). It is well settled that fee requests can be based on reconstructed records developed by reference to litigation files. Id. Ac cordingly, the lack of “contemporaneous records” or the submission of reconstructed records is by itself not a basis for denying counsel’s fee request in its entirety. Although the fee applicant bears the burden of submitting “evidence supporting the hours worked |7and rates claimed,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433,103 S.Ct. at 1939, the Supreme Court has also stated that plaintiffs counsel “is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended. But at least counsel should identify the general subject matter of his time expenditures.” Id. at 437 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 1941 n. 12. Where the documentation is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly. Id. at 433,103 S.Ct. at 1939.

Here, the district court had a sufficient basis in the record for finding that counsel’s “timesheets reflect that, over the last decade, he has worked tirelessly in the face of aggressive opposition, and he ultimately has prevailed.” The district court was in the best position to determine the credibility of counsel’s and the witnesses’ testimony in support of the fee application and the accompanying documents. The district court, in determining the amount of a fee award, certainly has “a superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what are essentially factual matters.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. As more fully discussed below, the district court, at any rate, reasonably took into account counsel’s inexperience in billing practices, as well as in ADA law, when it reduced the submitted hours by 20%. For these reasons, we find no merit to the defendant’s contention that the fee application should have been rejected by the lower courts in its entirety.

The defendant next asserts the court of appeal erred in overturning the district court’s reduction in lead counsel’s submitted hours, and also asserts the number of hours should be further reduced. On appeal, Covington asserted the trial court had erred in reducing the number of hours earned by lead counsel by 20%, from 5,489.5 to 4391.6 hours. The court of appeal, citing the voluminous record, the protracted nature of the litigation, and the testimony of Covington’s 1 sfour expert witnesses, found the trial court’s 20% reduction in the number of hours submitted to be an abuse of discretion.

The trial court explained its ruling as follows:

It is evident from what has been presented to the court that Hopkins took a personal interest in this case. He passionately pursued the interests of his clients, and immersed himself in ADA law in order to provide the most effective representation he possibly could. Hopkins[’s] timesheets reflect that, over the last decade, he has worked tirelessly in the face of aggressive opposition, and he ultimately has prevailed.
The court does recognize that Hop-kinses] initial inexperience both with ADA law and as an attorney, having begun this litigation less than two years out of law school, likely contributed to the number of hours spent researching and preparing pleadings, memoranda and other case materials. While certainly not intending to discourage diligence or attention to detail, the court finds that, had an attorney more experienced in ADA law been lead counsel in this case, significantly fewer hours would have been billed. Thus, the court finds it appropriate to reduce Hopkins[’s] time by 20% in order to arrive at a reasonable number of hours expended for purposes of a lodestar calculation.
As for the other five attorneys representing the plaintiff in this matter, the court accepts that each exercised reasonable billing judgment and the court finds their time reasonable.

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 20% reduction in the total number hours submitted in the fee application, and reverse the court of appeal’s ruling in that regard. It is well settled that a court, in awarding an appropriate attorney fee, should reduce the number of hours submitted in the fee application if the claimed time is “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 484, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40. Although the appellate court relied heavily on the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, some of those witnesses, for example, also indicated concerns with the reasonableness of lead counsel’s billable hours as opposed to overall hours expended on the case. The district court also reviewed all of the submissions and evidence in support of counsel’s fee 19appIication. We do not discount the valiant efforts lead counsel put into advocating for his client, as the appellate court so expressively details, but on the record before us, we conclude there was a sufficient basis on which the district court could have determined that a percentage reduction in the number of billable hours was appropriate to determine a reasonable number of hours for purposes of the lodestar calculation. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeal’s ruling in that respect and reinstate the district court’s judgment awarding 4,391.6 hours.

B. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The defendant next asserts the court of appeal erred in finding the district court abused its discretion in setting an hourly rate of $240 and then increasing that rate to $265. Based on our review of the record evidence on this issue, we find the court of appeal erred in concluding the district court abused its discretion in setting a reasonable hourly rate of $240 for the particular geographical area.

To calculate attorney fees under the “lodestar” method, the court multiplies the reasonable number of hours expended on the case by the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers. A reasonable hourly rate is to be determined “according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community” for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); see also Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.1990). “To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the' burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence — in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits — that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541. A rate determined in this way is normally deemed to be reasonable, and is considered to | mbe “the prevailing market rate.” Id. To be sure, an award of attorney fees should be high enough to “facilitate plaintiffs’ access to the courts to vindicate their rights by providing compensation sufficient to attract competent counsel.” McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir.2011). We reiterate that, in determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees to award under federal fee shifting statutes, the district court is afforded considerable discretion. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941.

In supporting her request for an hourly rate of $265 as the prevailing base rate for civil rights litigation in Lake Charles, Cov-ington relied on the affidavits and deposition testimony of her experts, who opined that $265 was a reasonable hourly rate for the work performed in this case. McNeese presented several decisions from the Western District of Louisiana in its effort to show that the prevailing market rate in the Lake Charles community ranges from $105.00 to $200.00 per hour. The defendants also pointed to the testimony of one of the plaintiffs own experts, who has been practicing for over 40 years and who stated he regularly charges his clients $180 per hour. The trial court noted the recent cases cited by McNeese, but declined to rely on them because they were not published decisions. It noted the only published case cited by McNeese was decided in 1996 and found a reasonable hourly rate in an ERISA action was $120.00 to $140.00. The trial court concluded, “[b]ased on the testimony and authority submitted to the court, the court finds that $240 is a reasonable hourly rate in this case.”

The court of appeal found the district court had abused its discretion, claiming there was nothing in the record to support a rate below $265. The court pointed to the testimony of two of Covington’s experts, who attested that the $265 Inrate was “extremely reasonable.” The court also described the success achieved in the case: the $400,000 cash settlement and six-year scholarship for Covington, the injunc-tive relief prohibiting McNeese from continuing to discriminate against the disabled, and the fact that the case both prompted a U.S. Justice Department investigation and resulted in $13.8 million being dedicated to bring the campus into ADA compliance. Given counsel’s superi- or performance, the court of appeal found a rate of $265 to be reasonable.

We find the court of appeal erred in finding the district court abused its discretion. Although it stated the proper standard of review, the appellate court failed to give due deference to the district court’s determination that $240 was a reasonable hourly rate for this case. Where the standard of review is an abuse of discretion, the role of the reviewing court is not to determine what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather it is to review the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. See Bouquet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 08-0309, p. 5 (La.4/4/08), 979 So.2d 456, 459. Although there was testimony that $265 was the prevailing rate, there was also testimony that $180-$200 was a going rate for this type of case. On that basis alone, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining an hourly rate of $240 as a reasonable hourly rate for this case. The court of appeal’s decision in that respect is reversed, and the district court’s hourly rate is reinstated.

C. Enhancement of the Lodestar

We turn last to the enhancement of the fee award by the court of appeal, which found the district court had abused its discretion in failing to enhance the award. We find no error in the district court’s decision to not enhance the award on the basis that it had considered the factors relied upon by the plaintiff when it determined the fee award under the lodestar method.

| i2A “strong presumption” exists that the lodestar figure represents a “reasonable fee,” and therefore, it should only be enhanced or reduced in “rare and exceptional cases.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). If any enhancement to the lodestar calculation is granted, it cannot be based upon a factor which is subsumed in the lodestar calculation. Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1673. Although the Fifth Circuit laid out twelve factors upon which to base an award in Johnson, see Note 1, supra, most, if not all, of these factors are taken into consideration in the lodestar calculation. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. at 566, 106 S.Ct. 3088. Therefore, an applicant seeking an enhancement must produce specific evidence supporting the enhancement of the award that is objective and capable of appellate review. Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1673.

The defendant contends the court of appeal erred in enhancing the attorney fee award calculated under the lodestar method by 9.5%. The defendant asserts the court of appeal’s enhancement of the lodestar calculation fails to comply with Per-due, because all of the factors relied upon by the court of appeal to enhance the fee award (the results achieved, the protracted nature of the litigation, lead counsel’s commitment to the prosecution of this action, his level of preparedness and the substantial benefit gained by McNeese as part of the Department of Justice settlement) were considerations expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Perdue because they are taken into account by the lodestar calculation.

The plaintiff had originally sought an attorney fee award of approximately $5.1 million, based upon a total of 6,481.8 hours worked by six attorneys multiplied by the requested hourly rate of $265 per hour, increased by an upward adjustment of 300%. Although the plaintiff argued for this enhancement based upon all twelve of the Johnson factors, in denying the request, the district court | iSnoted the plaintiff had relied primarily upon the following four factors: 1) time and labor required for the litigation; 2) the customary fee; 3) the amount involved and the results obtained; and 4) the experience, reputation and ability of counsel. The district court found all four of these factors were taken into account in the lodestar calculation. Acknowledging that the plaintiff and her counsel had achieved substantial success through this litigation, the district court did not find this case to exhibit one of those “rare and exceptional circumstances” warranting an exception to the rule against enhancement. The court further noted that the Supreme Court has never sustained an enhancement of a lodestar award for performance.

The court of appeal found the district court abused its discretion in not enhancing the fee award and held that this case is the kind of rare and exceptional case in which enhancement is entirely merited. The court of appeal found two primary reasons for concluding the district court had abused its discretion. First, the court of appeal agreed with the plaintiff that the district court had unduly relied on the fact that the taxpayers of this state would be burdened by any additional fees rather than those responsible for the discriminatory violations on which the plaintiffs judgment is based. The court of appeal reasoned that the Perdue court had rejected the contention that a fee determined by the lodestar method may not be enhanced in any situation wherein the government will ultimately pay the award. Second, the court of appeal noted that Perdue specifically acknowledged an enhancement may be necessary when an attorney’s performance involves “exceptional delay in the payment of fees” and when “the litigation is exceptionally protracted.” The court of appeal reasoned the results achieved by counsel, as well as the hostile behavior engaged in by McNeese, conduct which served only to protract the litigation in these proceedings, are factors that weigh heavily in favor of an enhancement to the lodestar award. From the plaintiffs 114initial request in 1995 for a meager accommodation for handicapped students, one accessible women’s restroom in one identified building, it had taken McNeese a total of almost 5,000 days to respond at all to this plea and only to wage a war of attrition against the plaintiff and her attorneys. The court of appeal fixed the enhancement at nine and one-half percent interest, which was the statutory judicial interest rate in 2007 when summary judgment was rendered in this case. The appellate court reasoned this increase was in keeping with the Supreme Court’s method of applying a standard rate of interest to expenses or attorney fees, which is capable of review on appeal. The court of appeal noted it had limited its enhancement out of consideration that the awards will be borne by the taxpayers of Louisiana.

We find the court of appeal erroneously applied Perdue and the correct standard of review. Reviewing the district court’s reasons, we do not find any undue reliance on the fact that the fee award would come from the taxpayer. Perdue itself cautioned, in light of the fact that taxpayers are often ultimately responsible for the fee, that “unjustified enhancements that serve only to enrich attorneys are not consistent with the statute’s aim,” which is to make it possible for persons without means to bring suit to vindicate their rights. Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1677-78. Although the court of appeal awarded an enhancement based upon the results achieved and the protracted and highly contested nature of the litigation, the Supreme Court in Perdue held the quality of an attorney’s performance and the results obtained are treated as one factor of the lodestar calculation. Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1673. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged there may be circumstances in which superior attorney performance is not adequately taken into account in the lodestar calculation, it cautioned that “these circumstances are indeed ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional,’ and require specific evidence that the lodestar fee |1fiwould not have been ‘adequate to attract competent counsel.’ ” Id. at 1673 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541).

In the instant case, the appellate court’s enhancement was not warranted because the length of the litigation and the results achieved were already included in the district court’s lodestar calculation of the reasonable number of hours expended and the reasonable hourly rate. Moreover, neither the plaintiff, nor the amici who have submitted briefs in support of the plaintiff, have produced or pointed to “specific evidence” showing the lodestar hourly rate of $240 would not have been adequate to attract competent counsel. In light of the district court’s considerable discretion in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee to award under federal fee shifting statutes, we conclude the court of appeal erred in finding the district court abused that discretion in refusing to enhance the attorney’s fee awarded to the plaintiff. Thus, the decision of the court of appeal enhancing the fee award is reversed, and the ruling of the district court is reinstated.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s fee award. We therefore reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the district court.

REVERSED; DISTRICT COURT’S JUDGMENT REINSTATED

Judge JEFFERSON D. HUGHES III, assigned as Justice pro tempore, sitting for KIMBALL, C.J. for oral argument. He sits as an elected Justice at the time this opinion is rendered.

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents in part for reasons assigned by WEIMER, J.

WEIMER, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J.,

dissenting in part.

|) From that portion of the opinion cutting attorney Hopkins’ total hours by 20 percent from the lodestar, I respectfully dissent.

At its most basic level, the lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended times a reasonable hourly rate, as the majority has correctly observed. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). However, by reversing the court of appeal and reinstating the district court’s reduction of attorney Hopkins’ total hours by 20 percent for attorney Hopkins’ “initial inexperience” during the course of this decade-long litigation, the majority distorts the lodestar calculation. Under prevailing jurisprudence, any reduction owing to initial inexperience is more properly accounted for by reducing the hourly rate, not by reducing the attorney’s hours.

Before addressing the jurisprudence on the more specific issue of inexperience, in my view, the error of the district court which is affirmed by the majority stems from a misapplication of the lodestar factors. Lodestar factors are not to be applied twice, as the majority points out when denying an upward enhancement to the lodestar for counsel’s remarkable success. “If any enhancement to the lodestar calculation is granted, it cannot be based upon a factor which is subsumed in the ^lodestar calculation.” Covington v. McNeese, 2012-2182, Op. at 351, citing Perdue v. Kenny A ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1673, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010). However, when cutting attorney Hopkins’ hours by 20 percent, the majority engages in the same impermissible double factoring, because the 20 percent cut from his hours worked is based on Hopkins’ experience, one of the very same factors the majority cites for arriving at $240 as Hopkins’ hourly rate. Covington, Op. at 349 & 351.

Recently, in the Perdue opinion briefly mentioned by the majority, the Court emphasized the point that the lodestar is intended to promote three “important virtues.” These virtues are not cited in the majority’s opinion, but because they represent the current view of the nation’s highest court on attorney fee-shifting and we are informed by the Court itself that those virtues are “important,” those intended virtues bear consideration. First, “the lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case.” Second, “the lodestar method is readily administratable.” Third, “the lodestar calculation is ‘objective,’ ... and thus cabins the discretion of trial judges, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable results.” Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1672. Here, instead of promoting these virtues, the majority’s 20-percent cut in hours for an attorney’s initial inexperience thwarts each of these virtues.

As to the first virtue of compensating the attorney on an hourly basis, cutting the attorneys’ hours is directly opposed to hourly compensation. For any given case to be handled on an hourly basis, some attorneys are already experienced, others are not at all, and still others have varying degrees of experience. All attorneys, however, without exception, are required to represent a client with competence and diligence. | ?See Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1(a) (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”); see also Rule 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). The 20 percent cut in hours under the majority’s ruling essentially assumes the most experienced attorney must handle a fee-shifting case, otherwise the hours an attorney spends ensuring competence and diligence beyond those hours the most experienced attorney would have expended may be cut. Such a ruling is an obvious disincentive for all but the most experienced attorney to undertake a fee-shifting case. This disincentive runs contrary to the remedial purpose of fee-shifting schemes and disregards the fact that the most experienced attorney is not available in every geographic area or for every type of case. See McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., 649 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 589, 181 L.Ed.2d 423 (2011). In McClain, the court noted: “The precedents and purposes governing fee-shifting awards in civil rights cases are well established. The awards facilitate plaintiffs’ access to the courts to vindicate their rights by providing compensation sufficient to attract competent counsel.” Id. at 381. The McClain opinion also collects cases in which “out-of-district counsel were necessary” and concluded that when local counsel is unavailable, counsel who normally command a higher rate in their own districts should be similarly compensated by the lodestar “as the starting point.” Id. at 382.

The second virtue of being “readily ad-ministratable” is similarly thwarted by the majority’s 20 percent reduction in hours. Quoting Hensley, the majority explains that courts should cut time that is “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. However, the Hensley opinion does not give guidance as |4to how a court should administer a percentage cut in hours due to an attorney’s inexperience. Instead, the Hensley Court was admonishing counsel, not courts, as follows: “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933.

The statement by the Hensley Court provides no guidance for courts to administer when cutting hours by any percentage, as the district court here has done and as the majority here has sanctioned. Returning for a moment to one of the virtues of the lodestar extolled by the Court more recently in Perdue, the lodestar should approximate an hourly compensation for the attorney as “if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case.” Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1672. As a practical matter, and as dictated by market forces, an attorney’s inexperience with a given type of matter is usually reflected in the attorney setting a lower rate, not by erasing time that the attorney properly expended to ensure competent and diligent representation.

Not surprisingly, the cases are numerous that hold an attorney’s inexperience is to be factored in the hourly rate. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (directing that the goal of the rate setting process in a fee-shifting case is to ensure “rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation”); Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.2011), quoting Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir.2001) (describing lodestar process as requiring a court to “ealculate[] the time counsel spent on the case, subtract[ ] duplicative, unproductive, or excessive hours, and ... |sappl[y] prevailing rates in the community (taking into account the qualifications, experience, and specialized competence of the attorneys involved).”); Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir.2008) (ruling that when determining a reasonable attorney fee award, “the court must consider what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate for work performed in the relevant community by attorneys of similar skill, experience and reputation.”); Farbotko v. Clinton County of New York, 433 F.3d 204, 208 (2nd Cir.2005), quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 & 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (holding that “a reasonable hourly rate is the ‘prevailing market rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the [relevant] community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’ ”).

Furthermore, in the following cases in which a court was asked to cut hours based on an attorney’s inexperience, the courts refused to cut the hours. In Parker v. Town of Swansea, 310 F.Supp.2d 376, 395-96 (D.Mass.2004), the court ruled that elimination of research time spent by the attorney for the prevailing plaintiff in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not warranted in calculating the attorney fee award. The defendant claimed the attorney spent such time educating himself on basic issues of federal procedure and practice and straightforward or generally known issues of federal and state tort law. Id. The court found the attorney’s time entries indicated that most of challenged time was spent researching specific issues related to the case and, to the extent that the work took longer for the attorney than it would have taken for a litigator with more extensive experience in civil rights litigation, the discrepancy was addressed through application of a lower hourly rate. Id. Similarly, in Roberson v. Brassell, 29 F.Supp.2d 346, 352-53 (S.D.Tex.1998), the court found that the lead counsel’s submission of 186.3 billable hours spent in prosecution of the prisoner’s civil rights claim did not reflect excessive or wasteful preparation time, | ^duplicative work, or overly vague entries. Lead counsel’s total hours submitted were, therefore, included in the calculation of the lodestar figure. Id. at 353. The court explained that unlike defendant’s counsel, plaintiffs counsel had no prior experience with prisoner litigation and needed adequate time to research relevant legal issues and prepare for trial. Id.

Lastly, the majority’s 20-percent cut in hours frustrates the third virtue intended for the lodestar calculation of being, “ ‘objective,’ ... and thus cabins the discretion of trial judges, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable results.” Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1672. If the district court found any of attorney Hopkins’ time-specific entries “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” (Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933), then it would be proper to cut such entries from the lodestar. However, the majority does not identify any such entries in their review because the district court did not make such identification.

There is, in short, nothing meaningful in the district court’s findings to withstand scrutiny for a 20-percent cut in hours. In turn, by condoning the approach of cutting 20 percent in hours because “an attorney more experienced” would have billed less, the majority opinion of this court provides nothing to ensure “reasonably predictable results” will be obtained in future cases. The best that can be said of the 20-percent cut in terms of predictability is that it bears a sketchy resemblance to comparative fault in tort law, which calls for a determination of “the degree or percentage of fault.” La. C.C. art. 2323. However, unlike the comparative fault doctrine, the majority’s ruling gives no guideposts for how much or when to make a 20-percent cut in the hours an attorney has worked. Carrying the analogy to tort doctrine further, from all appearances, it seems the majority has adopted a doctrine of “inexperience per se,” by which any attorney whose hours do not compare 17favorably to “an attorney more experienced” is susceptible to having 20 percent of the hours cut. Such a rule does not promote the best “billing judgment,” which the Court described in terms of discouraging inflated billing: “In the private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an important, component in fee setting. It is no less important here. Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933.

Lastly, from my review of the district court’s ruling and the larger record, and given the long held position by defendant that compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act was somehow optional or unnecessary, the most reasonable conclusion is that 100 percent of counsel’s hours were well spent. Lest we forget, “[ojurs is an adversarial system of justice that relies on the ability and resources of adversaries to uncover the truth.” Wolford v. JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital, 96-2460, p. 6 (La.5/20/97), 693 So.2d 1164, 1168. In light of the ultimate resolution in this matter, the so-called inexperienced attorney obviously achieved appropriate, relevant experience necessary to represent his client well.

       Judge Jefferson D. Hughes III, assigned as Justice pro tempore, sitting for Kimball, C.J. for oral argument. He sits as an elected Justice at the time this opinion is rendered.

      . The twelve factors include: 1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the amount involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; 10) the "undesirability” of the case; 11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar cases.

      . The district court accepted, without adjustments, the time sheets filed by five of Coving-ton’s attorneys and rendered the following fee awards:
      James Hopkins, 624.7 hours at $240.00 per, for a fee of $149,928.00.
      James Doyle, 28.6 hours at $240.00 per, for a fee of $6,864.00.
      Heath Dorsey, 76.85 hours at $240.00 per, for a fee of $18,444.00.
      Robert Breen, 114.9 hours at $240.00 per, for a fee of $27,576.00.
      Lee Archer, 147.25 hours at $240.00 per, for a fee of $35,340.00.
      McNeese did not object to the time submitted by these five attorneys and has not challenged the reasonableness of their hours.

      . Covington has similarly moved to strike portions of McNeese’s brief in this court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
JOHNSON, C.J.
      WEIMER, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Phillip Ray MULKEY v. Vicki Juanita Harris MULKEY.
    No. 2012-CJ-2709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2013.

      John Scott Sartin, for Applicant.
    The Law Offices of Chris L. Bowman, Chris Lane Bowman, Jonesboro, LA, for Respondent.
   JOHNSON, C.J.

Bln this custody dispute, the trial court ordered a change in custody, finding the father satisfied the requirements of Ber geron v. Bergeron by establishing that any harm caused by a modification of a 2004 custody decree would be substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child. The trial court’s ruling was reversed by the court of appeal. We granted this writ application to review the correctness of the court of appeal’s ruling. Because we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in modifying custody, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate the ruling of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Phillip Ray Mulkey (“Phillip”) and Vicki Juanita Harris Mulkey Pyles (“Vicki”) were married on June 26, 1993, and established their matrimonial domicile in Winnsboro, Louisiana. They had one child during their marriage, Matthew Harris Mulkey (“Matthew”), who was born on January 19, 1998. The couple was divorced by judgment rendered on March 5, 2001. The parties thereafter jointly entered into two separate consent decrees regarding custody of Matthew. Essentially, the consent [¡.decrees provided the parents with seven-day alternating custodial periods with Matthew.

Ultimately, the consent decrees were not able to be maintained. In 2003, both parties petitioned the court to modify the custody plan then in effect. Vicki filed a “Rule to Modify Custody and Increase Child Support.” As grounds for her motion seeking domiciliary custody of the minor child, Vicki alleged the following material changes in the lives of the parties: (1) Matthew, then age five, would begin his formal education in August 2003; (2) Vicki had remarried and had moved to Ruston, Louisiana; (3) the seven-day alternating custody schedule was no longer a viable custody plan because of Matthew’s schooling requirements; and (4) Vicki and her family could provide Matthew with a stable home. In addition, Vicki sought child support and requested that Phillip be ordered to pay his share of the minor child’s medical expenses.

Phillip filed an “Answer to Rule to Modify Custody and Increase Child Support and Reconventional Demand” wherein he sought to be named the domiciliary parent based on the following grounds: (1) Matthew had resided with him in Franklin Parish since his birth; (2) Phillip had been responsible for Matthew’s care and rearing while providing him with a stable home; and (3) Phillip and his family could provide Matthew with a superior custodial environment.

After a trial, the court rendered judgment on June 29, 2003, awarding the parties joint custody of Matthew, with Vicki named the domiciliary parent. Vicki was also granted primary custody during the school year. The trial court signed a judgment to this effect on December 9, 2004. No modification was sought by the parties until 2011.

On July 28, 2011, Vicki filed a “Rule for Payment of Medical Expenses and RRule to Show Cause for Judgment of Past Due Medical Support, Contempt, and Attorneys Fees” alleging Phillip failed to pay his share of Matthew’s uncovered medical expenses and extracurricular activities. In addition, Vicki requested an increase in child support.

In response, Phillip filed an “Answer and Reconventional Demand” seeking to be named the domiciliary parent. Phillip also requested that his child support obligation be terminated, and that Vicki be ordered to pay him child support. As grounds for the modification of custody, Phillip asserted several particular changes in circumstances since the previous custody order. Notably, Phillip asserted that Vicki voluntarily changed employment requiring night shift work, thus she is not home at night with Matthew; Matthew has a history of excessive absences and poor academic performance at school; Matthew has expressed a preference to live with Phillip; and Phillip has remarried and he now lives in a spacious home with Matthew’s half-siblings, with whom Matthew has a close bond.

After a Hearing Officer Conference, the Hearing Officer recommended a finding that Phillip did not carry his heavy burden of proof for custody modification pursuant to Bergeron. Phillip timely filed an objection to the Hearing Officer’s recommendation. The parties resolved some issues prior to trial, leaving only the issues of custody and support before the trial court.

After trial and submission of post-trial briefs, the trial court determined that although Phillip did not demonstrate that the present custody arrangement was harmful to Matthew, modification of the 2004 custody decree was nevertheless in Matthew’s best interest. The court named Phillip the primary domiciliary parent, and made a finding that any harm caused by the modification would be substantially outweighed by the advantages to Matthew.

|4In lengthy reasons for judgment, the trial court found that after the 2004 custody decree was rendered, there was a material change in circumstance in the lives of Vicki, Phillip, and Matthew. The court noted Matthew was five when the 2004 decree was rendered, and he is now fourteen, has matured, and his needs, activities and interests have changed. Matthew confirmed that he wanted to live with his father, testifying: “I’ve lived most of my life at my mama’s [in Ruston] so I want to live down here [at my father’s house in Winnsboro] for the rest of the time I have until I move and get my own house.” After questioning Matthew at trial, the court determined he was mature enough to express his parental preference.

The court further noted that Vicki voluntarily changed her employment since custody was originally set, requiring her to frequently work nights. Thus, she was at work when Matthew went to bed and woke up and Matthew had to prepare his own breakfast each morning as well as several of his evening meals, which he generally eats by himself in his room. The court noted that at his father’s house Matthew enjoys outdoor activities such as fishing, hunting and riding dirt bikes with Phillip and his cousins. Matthew is also involved in church and youth group activities offered at Life Church where Phillip and his family attend. Testimony revealed the family ate meals together, played games and watched television together.

The court also recognized that Matthew developed several medical conditions since the 2004 decree. He now has Type I diabetes, requiring Matthew to wear an insulin pump which is monitored throughout the day. Vicki also testified he has hypothyroidism and takes medication to control that condition. Vicki complained that Phillip did not participate in Matthew’s medical care, and failed to monitor his insulin needs and dietary restrictions. Phillip stated he offered Matthew a balanced diet, but | ¡¡admitted that Matthew is primarily in charge of monitoring his insulin pump and adjusting his own medication. Phillip criticized Vicki for over-medicating Matthew, and claimed she failed to regularly inform him about Matthew’s medical treatment.

Another change noted by the trial court was that Vicki’s husband had developed medical problems since the 2004 trial, including depression, CREST Syndrome and Sarcoidosis. The court noted that as a result of these conditions and other extraneous reasons, he has been unable to maintain steady employment.

The court observed that in the past, Matthew excelled in school and won many academic awards until he reached seventh grade. His performance in the eighth grade revealed a significant decline, and he appears to prefer playing video games to doing school work. In addition, whereas he formerly participated in various extracurricular activities, the court noted Matthew reduced his activities in the eighth grade year.

Having found a material change in circumstances, the trial court then evaluated the case using the Bergeron requirements. The court first made a finding that the present custody arrangement was not so deleterious to Matthew as to justify a modification of the custody decree. Thus, the trial court went on to consider whether Phillip proved by clear and convincing evidence that the harm caused by a change of environment was substantially outweighed by the advantages to Matthew. After considering the testimony and evidence, the court found this is a case where modification of the considered custody decree was in the child’s best interest even though Phillip was unable to show that the present custody was harmful to Matthew. The court explained:

Vicki was awarded the position of primary domiciliary parent [in 2004] because she offered Matthew more stability and permanency in her family unit, better after-school care and slightly superior parenting abilities at that time. Now that he is fourteen and will be entering high school in the fall, |fiMatthew has matured and his world has expanded. He is now involved in after-school, church, athletic, outdoor and social activities which were not part of his life when the case was originally heard. He has expressed a desire to live with his dad and to enjoy the relatives, friends and activities offered in the Winnsboro area.
* * *
There can be no doubt that Vicki has provided Matthew with an adequate environment for the past nine years and that Phillip can provide the minor child with an equally adequate environment for the next four years.
* ⅝ *
This court was impressed with Matthew’s ability to communicate his sincere desire to live with his father the next four years before he reaches the age of majority. His testimony did not appear to reflect coaching or pressure tactics by Phillip or anyone else. Therefore, his expressed preference will be given great weight as I apply the Bergeron standard to the facts of this case.
With his maturity, however, comes increased opportunities and greater responsibilities. Matthew’s high school schedule and his academic work load will undoubtedly become increasingly more demanding. His social life will likely expand, presenting new challenges for his primary domiciliary parent. Experience dictates that relationships with his peers will become more and more important as Matthew seeks to find his identity as a developing teenager.
Vicki has tried many ways to help motivate the minor child to excel scholastically like she did. She has also offered him social activities and personal development opportunities. Vicki is to be commended for her efforts in this regard. Nevertheless, Matthew remains satisfied with a level of scholastic performance well below his parent’s expectations.
The testimony reflects that Matthew enjoys playing with neighbors his age in Ruston. However, the minor child confirmed he is looking forward to making new friends in Winnsboro. Matthew also explained he would like to be given the chance to participate in the social activities and personal development opportunities offered in Winnsboro. Phillip stated he is convinced he can provide Matthew with the proper motivation to succeed in all areas of life. Phillip’s wife, Jessica, is a school teacher. She has also offered her assistance in helping the minor child with his school work. After hearing the testimony, this court is concerned about Vicki’s ability to deal with the challenges Matthew will undoubtedly face in the next few years. Reading between the lines of Matthew’s testimony, it appears that if Vicki is maintained as the primary domiciliary parent, Matthew will feel he has been deprived of the relationships and activities he has come to cherish in Winns-boro. An undercurrent of anger or hopelessness may result if Matthew perceives he is being forced to miss out on the life offered by his father. While the minor child’s disappointment with this | ycourt’s decision and his anticipated attitude in the home of his mother should not be a controlling factor, it is an important consideration.
[I]n 2003 this court determined that Vicki had a slight edge over Phillip in the La. C.C. art. 134 factors relating to stability, permanency of the family unit, after-school care and parenting abilities. Over the past nine years, however, the record reflects that Phillip has proven to be a very capable father and husband who provides his family with a stable, loving home environment.
The clear and convincing evidence presented shows that Matthew should not suffer any significant harm caused by a change of his established mode of living. Matthew has spent much of his childhood and his adolescence with his father. He has been in Phillip’s care every other weekend, one-half of the major holidays and most of the summers for the past nine years. Consequently, the transition from one home to the other should not require a great deal of adaptation by Matthew or Phillip and his family. Also, with expanded custodial privileges awarded to Vicki, she should be able to maintain meaningful, frequent and continuing contact with the minor child.In addition, any harm caused by a modification of the 2004 custody decree will be substantially outweighed by its advantages to Matthew. The minor child already has significant connections with friends, family and activities in Winns-boro. Phillip and his family appear to be able and willing to provide Matthew with a supportive, nurturing and comfortable place to live and grow. His lack of interest in school, his perceived need to build self-esteem and self-confidence and his desire to live primarily with his father for the next four years present compelling reasons to modify the present custodial arrangement.
Considering the Bergeron burden of proof, this court finds that the minor child’s best interests require his placement with the parent whose home environment can provide him with the greatest opportunity to thrive and succeed scholastically, spiritually, socially, emotionally and physically during this very important stage of his adolescent life, as he prepares for manhood. Phillip has proven that he is that parent in the mind of this court.

Vicki appealed. The court of appeal reversed the trial court and reinstated the original custody plan. In reversing the trial court, the court of appeal agreed this case did not involve deleterious circumstances. Accordingly, the court went on to review the trial court’s application of the alternative ground in Bergeron, ie., whether Phillip met his burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to|sbe caused by the change of environment was substantially outweighed by the advantages to Matthew of having Phillip as domiciliary parent with primary custody. The court of appeal agreed with the trial court that the transition from Vicki’s home to Phillip’s home would not require excessive adaptation because Matthew was already accustomed to spending alternate weekends, half of the holidays, and most of every summer at Phillip’s house. However, the court of appeal noted that Matthew’s time at his father’s house was largely “play time,” without the stresses of attending school on time, doing homework, participating in extracurricular activities, or going to the doctor. The court of appeal acknowledged that Vicki’s job required her to be away from home approximately half of the school nights, but noted Matthew had an established routine at Vicki’s house which fostered a degree of personal responsibility, independence and reliance.

The court of appeal further stated:

After review, we conclude that the record presents little evidence to support the conclusion that making Phillip domiciliary parent offers clear and substantial advantages for Matthew. Phillip has shown little interest in Matthew’s schoolwork for most of the years he has attended school. Although it is clear that Vicki has not fully complied with the custody decree requirements of sharing information regarding to Matthew’s school work, such as sending him copies of report cards, Phillip apparently never protested or exercised his right to demand such information. There is really no reason to think that Phillip will now take a more active interest in Matthew’s school work other than blaming Matthew’s recent poor performance on Vicki. While Matthew, like many children, is not necessarily a model student achieving in the top of his class, the evidence indicates that historically he has made average to above average grades in most courses. When he has struggled with a course, Vicki obtained tutoring for him at her own expense. Matthew’s recent struggles in school or lack of interest appear to coincide with the instant custody dispute. He will be transferring to another school if Phillip is named the domiciliary parent. We suggest that Matthew’s belief that he will be transferring to Franklin Academy [in Winnsboro] in the near future and the negative impact of the instant custody dispute has likely contributed significantly to his lack of interest in his school work.
We also note that the trial court did not consider the impact this | ^modification would have regarding Matthew’s medical issues, especially his Type I diabetes. Our review of the record indicates that Vicki has carried the load completely in this regard by taking Matthew to the physician treating his diabetes every three weeks and daily making sure Matthew takes the appropriate amounts of medication. Matthew also apparently has other medical issues, such as hypothyroidism (which could explain his recent academic disinterest), suffers from asthma, and has ear wax buildup problems that require periodic attention. Phillip’s testimony indicates that he believes Vicki takes him to the doctor too often and pretty much leaves it up to Matthew to take his medications. There is no medical expert testimony in the record to suggest that Matthew’s medical problems are not real and serious. Considering that Vicki has historically been the person to tend to Matthew’s medical issues, we find this to be a decisive factor in the instant dispute.

Next, the court of appeal discussed the great weight the trial court gave to Matthew’s stated preference to live with his father. The court agreed that Matthew had reached an age such that his preference can be seriously considered, however the court noted that Matthew’s preference to live with his father may have been influenced by the fact his father lives on eleven acres of land offering many activities that appeal to a teenage boy, including fishing, and riding the dirt bike and four-wheeler. The court of appeal observed that Matthew already enjoys these activities during the ample visitation time he already spends at his father’s house.

In conclusion, the court of appeal stated: We therefore find that Phillip has not met his burden under Bergeron to warrant a change in the considered custody decree rendered December 9, 2004. For this reason, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the previous custody order and designating Phillip as the domiciliary parent.

Accordingly, the court of appeal reinstated the 2004 custody decree.

Phillip filed a writ application in this court, which we granted.

DISCUSSION

The primary consideration in a determination of child custody is the best | ¶ ninterest of the child. This applies not only in actions setting custody initially, but also in actions to change custody. A considered decree is an award of permanent custody in which the trial court receives evidence of parental fitness to exercise care, custody, and control of children. In an action to change custody rendered in a considered decree, additional jurisprudential requirements set forth by this court in Bergeron v. Bergeron, supra, are also applied. There is no question in this case that the 2004 custody award is a considered decree. Thus, the burden of proof on the party seeking to modify custody is dictated by Bergeron.

In Bergeron, this court considered whether the heavy burden of proof rule in modification cases should be continued. That rule provided that “when a trial court has made a considered decree of permanent custody the party seeking a change bears a heavy burden of proving that the continuation of the present custody is so deleterious to the children as to justify removing them from the environment to which they are accustomed.” While recognizing that the heavy burden of proof in custody modification cases was justified for several reasons, we were convinced that in a narrow class of cases a modification of custody may be in the child’s best interest even though the moving party is unable to show that the present custody is deleterious to the child. Recognizing that the heavy burden of proof rule could inflexibly prevent a modification of custody that is in the child’s best interest, and also cognizant of the need to protect children from the detrimental effects of too |nliberal standards in custody change cases, we restated the burden of proof rule as follows:

When a trial court has made a considered decree of permanent custody the party seeking a change bears a heavy burden of proving that the continuation of the present custody is so deleterious to the child as to justify a modification of the custody decree, or of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child.

Thus, when a party seeks to change custody rendered in a considered decree, the proponent of change must not only show that a change of circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child has occurred since the prior order respecting custody, but he or she must also meet the burden of proof set forth in Bergeron. ,

Phillip asserts the court of appeal erred in finding he did not meet the burden of proof outlined in Bergeron. Phillip argues the court of appeal erroneously expanded the Bergeron test to require him to prove that the advantages of Matthew moving in with him were “clear and convincing.” Bergeron only requires the advantages substantially outweigh the perceived harm of relocation. He notes the trial court and the court of appeal essentially agreed that, under the circumstances presented in this case, there was no harm in relocating Matthew from Ruston to Winnsboro. Further, the court of appeal did not deny the advantages for Matthew in Phillip’s home, namely the significant connections Matthew had with friends, family and activities, combined with a more structured and traditional environment and schedule.

Phillip also suggests that if the instant case does not warrant a change in custody under the alternate ground in Bergeron, then no such case exists. He submits that in a case where both parents love the child, but the best interest of the child |i2would be served by a modification of custody, without any harm to the child, application of Bergeron’s alternative ground is necessary. Phillip asserts the court of appeal’s ruling effectively limits Bergeron’s, intended application.

Vicki first argues the trial court’s finding that a material change in circumstance had occurred since the rendition of the 2004 custody decree was an abuse of discretion. Although she was working night shifts at the time the request for modification was filed, her testimony at trial established she was returning to a regular forty-hour work week. Thus, her employment schedule should not be an issue.

Further, while Matthew’s age and preference should be given consideration, it should not be a reason for a change of circumstances under the facts of this case. Vicki suggests that Phillip influenced Matthew prior to trial. Vicki further asserts that Matthew’s weekends at his father’s house were his “lazy time,” as it consisted of weekends, holidays and summers without the pressure, stress and strains required by the routine of everyday life.

Vicki also asserts that Matthew’s school performance is not a material change in circumstance. She argues that Matthew’s poor school performance has to be considered in light of the facts and circumstances of this case. Matthew testified that eighth grade was harder for him, and the trial court also did not consider the impact Matthew’s health may have had on his school performance. She also notes Phillip had very little involvement in Matthew’s school activities in the past, never attending a parent/teacher conference, and only attending one football game to see Matthew perform in the band. Further, the trial court did not consider the impact of the trial itself on Matthew’s school performance. Vicki asserts the stress of the custody trial placed great strain on Matthew’s mental, physical, and emotional health, and this stress coincided with his poor performance in the eighth grade.

11sVicki contends Phillip failed to meet the Bergeron standard of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a change in custody would provide substantial advantages to Matthew. The advantages alleged by the trial court were not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, as the trial court had to “read between the lines” of Matthew’s testimony to make its decision. She argues this case does not fit the “narrow class” discussed in Bergeron. Here, the only advantages the trial court could offer was that Matthew would go to a new school, and already had family and friends in Winnsboro. She notes that Matthew has the same advantages with her in Ruston. The trial court also did not address the harm associated with Matthew’s health because of his father’s lack of interest therein. The possibility that Matthew might improve his grades at a new school in Winnsboro does not outweigh the potential harm of his medical issues being ignored by his father.

At the outset, we agree with the trial court’s finding that a material change in circumstances has occurred since 2004. It is clear from the record that the dynamics of both households have changed since the previous custody order. Matthew’s age, Vicki’s change of employment and work schedule, Phillip’s change in home environment and Matthew’s academic performance are all changes that materially affect Matthew’s welfare. Thus, we move on to consider whether the burden of proof of Bergeron was met. In the instant case, the lower courts found, and the parties agree, that the present custody decree is not deleterious to Matthew. Therefore, the narrow issue presented in this case is whether Phillip proved by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a change of custody naming him as domiciliary parent is substantially outweighed by its advantages to Matthew.

After reviewing the record and considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, we find the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court’s ruling. We find | 14no sufficient basis in the record to conclude the trial court’s findings were manifestly erroneous. In In re A.J.F., this court stressed the importance of deference to the trial court’s factual findings:

After reviewing those reasons in light of A.E.’s burden of proof under LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1138, it is clear to us that the appellate court disagreed with many of the conclusions and inferences that the juvenile court drew from the facts and substituted its opinion for that of the juvenile court. In manifest error review, it is important that the appellate court not substitute its opinion when it is the juvenile court who is in the unique position to see and hear the witnesses as they testify. The trier of fact is not disadvantaged by the review of a cold record and is in a superior position to observe the nuances of demeanor evidence not revealed in a record, [internal citations omitted; emphasis added]

In this case, the trial court had the benefit of seeing the parties and witnesses and hearing their testimony. After hearing the evidence, the trial court concluded there were substantial advantages to Matthew with a change in custody. While the court of appeal disputes some of the inferences made by the trial court, the court of appeal did not point to any evidence which demonstrates the trial court’s findings are clearly wrong.

Vicki argues Matthew could be harmed by a change in custody because Phillip will ignore his medical problems. However, nothing in the trial court’s reasons for judgment indicate the court had any concerns that Phillip would neglect Matthew’s medical issues. Rather, the trial court apparently rejected Vicki’s assertion that Phillip did not participate in Matthew’s medical care, and failed to monitor his insulin needs and dietary restrictions. The court noted Phillip’s testimony that he offered Matthew a balanced diet, but Matthew is primarily in charge of monitoring his insulin pump and adjusting his own medication. Considering Matthew’s age, it is not unreasonable for Phillip to allow him to assume some role in his own medical care. Additionally, Matthew has been in Phillip’s care every other weekend, one-half of the major [ ^holidays, and most of the summers for the past nine years. There is no evidence his medical condition has deteriorated while he was in Phillip’s custody.

Vicki also argues Phillip has not participated in Matthew’s schooling or extra-curricular activities in the past. However, the trial court made a finding that granting custody to Phillip provided Matthew with the best chance to thrive and succeed in all areas of his adolescent life. The trial court further made a finding that “Phillip has proven to be a very capable father and husband who provides his family with a stable, loving home environment.” Thus, despite his past actions, Phillip is now ready to assume a greater role in his son’s life.

Additionally, Vicki suggests Phillip did not meet his burden by clear and convincing evidence because the trial court indicated it had to “read between the lines” to reach its decision. While the trial court stated it was “reading between the lines” to reach its conclusion, this is precisely why deference is given to the trial court’s judgment. The trial court clearly observed certain nuances in Matthew’s testimony which cannot be communicated by the record, but which convinced the court of Matthew’s strong preference to live with his father and convinced the court a modification in custody would be in Matthew’s best interest.

Every child custody case must be viewed based on its own particular facts and relationships involved, with the goal of determining what is in the best interest of the child. Our decision in Bergeron was not meant to tie the hands of a court when the facts and circumstances of a case and the needs of a child necessitate a change in custody. The record reveals that both parents love Matthew and have raised him well. The record further demonstrates that Matthew is a well-adjusted, appropriately mature teenager who has expressed a desire to live with his father and finish his high school years in Winnsboro. In determining the best interest of the child, a court is permitted |1fito consider the child’s custodial preference, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference. Matthew was fourteen years old at the time of trial, and the trial court found him to be a mature and grounded teenager, and was “impressed with Matthew’s ability to communicate his sincere desire to live with his father the next four years before he reaches the age of majority.” After reviewing the record, we find no error in the weight the trial court placed on Matthew’s preference to live with his father. The record clearly shows that although Matthew loves his mother, and has a good relationship with her and his stepfather, he yearns for the family structure and interaction provided in his father’s household. The record reveals that Matthew spends a lot of time alone at Vicki’s house, where the family does not participate in many activities together. Matthew’s preference to live with Phillip is based in large part on the routine, structure, family connection and interaction in his father’s household. We find in this case, where the parents are relatively equally balanced in terms of caring for the child, the preference of a mature and grounded teenager such as Matthew is entitled to great weight. In this case, we find Matthew is entitled to live in an environment which supports his desire for a family life while he is still a minor. We see no error in the trial court’s finding that Phillip is the parent “whose home environment can provide him with the greatest opportunity to thrive and succeed scholastically, spiritually, socially, emotionally and physically during this very important stage of his adolescent life, as he prepares for manhood.”

Further, the court of appeal cannot simply substitute its own findings for that of the trial court. The determination of the trial court in child custody matters is entitled to great weight, and its discretion will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. The trial court thoughtfully considered all of |17the trial testimony and evidence and set forth in great detail the reasons why a change in custody was justified and in Matthew’s best interest. Given Matthew’s age and demonstrated level of maturity, and considering the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we find the record supports the trial court’s finding that Phillip has met the burden of Berger-on by proving that any harm caused by a modification of the 2004 custody decree would be substantially outweighed by its advantages to Matthew.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we find the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court’s modification of custody. Phillip met the burden of Bergeron by proving that any harm caused by a modification of the 2004 custody decree would be substantially outweighed by its advantages to Matthew. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling modifying the 2004 custody decree.

DECREE

REVERSED. RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT REINSTATED.

WEIMER, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J.,

dissenting.

111 respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the modification of custody undermines the standards imposed by Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1198 (La.1986).

This case involves a 2004 considered decree that awarded joint custody of a then almost seven-year-old child, with the mother being named as the domiciliary parent, and the father, who resided approximately 75 miles away, enjoying visitation every other weekend, one-half of the major holidays, and most of the summer. Prior to that time, the mother and father shared custody of the child on a seven-day alternating basis pursuant to a 2001 consent decree. The 2004 change was prompted by the mother’s move from Winnsboro to Ruston. The 2004 custody decree remained in place until 2011, when, following the mother’s rule for payment of medical expenses and contempt, the father sought a change in custody such that he would be named as the domiciliary parent and be awarded child support.

The child in this case benefits from the fact that he has two parents who care for him and are willing and able to provide a good home for him. As stated by the majority, “the parents [in this case] are relatively equally balanced in terms of ear-ing for the child.” Mulkey v. Mulkey, 2012-2709, (La.5/7/13), 118 So.3d 357, 368, 2013 WL 1909035. The ^evidence reveals that there are advantages and disadvantages relative to the situation of each parent, and, in my opinion, when these are balanced, the decision as to who is best suited to be the domiciliary parent in this case is effectively a draw. The closeness of this matter is readily evidenced by the differences in the decisions reached by the hearing officer, the trial court, and the court of appeal.

Admittedly, there is no doubt that the father in this case is suited to serve as the domiciliary parent. However, to obtain a change of custody, the father is charged with meeting the heavy burden rule of Bergeron. This court, in Bergeron, cautioned that the heavy burden of proof in change of custody cases is necessary to protect children, whose “best interest and welfare ... may be irreparably damaged not only by a mistaken change in custody but also by the effects of an attempted or threatened change of custody on grounds that are less than imperative.” Bergeron, 492 So.2d at 1200.

In this case, the parties do not dispute that continuation of the present custody was not so deleterious to the child as to justify a modification. Therefore, to justify a change in custody, the father was required to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child.” Bergeron, 492 So.2d at 1200. “Clear and convincing” means more than a “preponderance” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 442 (La.1976). Under the clear and convincing standard, the existence of the disputed fact must be highly probable or much more probable than its nonexistence. Id.

In addressing the harm to the child, the majority notes that the transition from the mother’s home to the father’s home “would not require excessive adaptation” 1 ^because of the time that the child spent with the father pursuant to the 2004 considered decree. Mulkey, 118 So.3d at 363. The majority further notes that “under the circumstances presented in this case, there was no harm in relocating [the child] from Ruston to Winnsboro,” without recognizing the harm inherent in all change of custody cases as recognized in Bergeron. Mulkey, 118 So.3d at 365.

However, in weighing the harm to the child, the court is required to consider that “more harm is done to children by-custody litigation, custody changes, and in-terparental conflict, than by such factors as the custodial parent’s post divorce amours, remarriage, and residential changes, which more often precipitate custody battles under liberal custody modification rules.” Bergeron, 492 So.2d at 1199. “The reasons for the rule are that it is desirable that there be an end of litigation and undesirable to change the child’s established mode of living except for imperative reasons.” Bergeron, 492 So.2d at 1195. Moreover, this provision protects the child and the families from “the vexation and expense attending multiple unjustified lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial actions by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Id.

There is no indication that the trial court considered the stress that accompanies the litigation of child custody suits or the importance of stability of environment in considering the harm to the child and ultimately in determining if the father satisfied his heavy burden of proof. By failing to give adequate weight to the harm related to the potential for constant turmoil, the trial court lowered the standards imposed by Bergeron and opened the gate for more litigation to the detriment of the child and his parents. While never final, the child and his parents benefit from the protection afforded by the heavy burden standard imposed by Bergeron, which prevents ajjtug-of-war between parents that is occasionally guided by desire to terminate payment of child and medical support to the domiciliary parent.

Furthermore, I agree with the court of appeal that there was an inadequate consideration by the trial court of the child’s various medical issues, which appear to be real and significant, in examining the possible harm to the child. In addressing this issue, the majority simply notes, from the trial court’s mention of the father’s testimony regarding a balanced diet and the child’s role in his own medical care, “the trial court apparently rejected [the mother’s] assertion that [the father] did not participate in [the child’s] medical care, and failed to monitor his insulin needs and dietary restrictions.” Mulkey, 118 So.3d at 367. The majority further finds that “it is not unreasonable for [the father] to allow [the child] to assume some role in his own medical care” while at the same time faulting the mother for making the child responsible for the preparation of some of his meals while she is at work. Id.

With respect, I believe the majority focuses on the manifest error rule while not adequately considering the Bergeron requirements, which were adopted to limit custody contests on grounds that are less than imperative given the substantial visitation the father already enjoys.

Mindful of the great discretion afforded to the trial court in custody matters, I believe that the trial court’s opinion, while thoughtful and thorough, is deficient in that the trial court legally erred in not appropriately applying the Bergeron requirements in modifying custody in this case. Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeal’s equally thoughtful and thorough opinion.

      . 492 So.2d 1193 (La. 1986).

      . We note Matthew is currently fifteen years old.

      . Mulkey v. Mulkey, 47,748 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/14/12), 108 So.3d 116.

      . Mulkey v. Mulkey, 12-2709 (La.12/21/12), 108 So.3d 757.

      . La. C.C. art. 131 provides that "[i]n a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child.”

      . Gray v. Gray, 11-548 (La.7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1247, 1258.

      . Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La.2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 738.

      . Gray, 65 So.3d at 1259; AEB v. JBE, 99-2668 (La.11/30/99), 752 So.2d 756, 761.

      . Bergeron, 492 So.2d at 1199.

      . Id. (citing Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So.2d 603 (1971)).

      . Id. at 1200.

      . Gray, 65 So.3d at 1258; AEB, 752 So.2d at 761.

      . 00-0948 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47, 62.

      . See La. C.C. art. 134(9).

      . Gray, 65 So.3d at 1259.

      . See AEB v. JBE, 99-2668 (La.11/30/99), 752 So.2d 756, 761.


text:
    In re MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL on behalf of Nancy and Mark FOY.
    No. 2013-CC-0970.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 15, 2013.
   In re Patwardhan, M.D., Ravish;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 552,823; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48291-CW.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Joseph W. URQUHART, et al. v. METROPOLITAN HOSPICE, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0969.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 15, 2013.
   In re Esteve, Nelda Toups; Posey, Ruth Toups; Urquhart, Joseph W. et al.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, Nos. 06-3826, 06-5687, 06-7014, 06-7523, 06-7650, 06-10288; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0377.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anson HOLLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2073.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Holley, Anson;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 416529; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 0946.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Felix A. PRICE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2185.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Price, Felix A.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 12, 2013, and from Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 269-823.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David IBURG a/k/a David Ralph Saracino v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re David Iburg a/k/a David Ralph Saracino;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 5751-05; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-401.

Writ granted in part, denied in part. The trial court is ordered to appoint counsel and conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether relator pled guilty involuntarily as a result of his counsel’s erroneous representation that the court would order his sentence to run concurrently with a term he was serving in Utah. See La.C.Cr.P. arts. 930(A), 930.7(C); State ex rel. Aleman v. State, 99-0488 (La.10/1/99), 745 So.2d 601; State v. Manchester, 545 So.2d 528, 528-30 (La.1989); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 20.2(f), p. 607 (West 1984). Writ denied in all other respects.

KNOLL, CLARK and HUGHES, JJ., would deny.


text:
    In the Matter of the SUCCESSION OF Coley Austill SCOTT, Sr.
    No. 2013-C-0720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Succession of Katie Robinson Scott; Scott Jr., Coley A. et al.; Scott, Charles; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 81,518; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2012 CW 0142, 2012 CA 0350.

Denied.


text:
    In re Randy J. UNGAR.
    No. 2013-OB-521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Randy J. Ungar.; Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 5, 2013; Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-DB-030.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER and GUIDRY, JJ, would grant.


text:
    In re Gregory J. AVERY.
    No. 2012-B-598.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Gregory J. Avery;—other; Applying For Rehearing of this court order dated April 5, 2013.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2012-ADMIN-1207.
    No. 2013-OB-0931.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Washington, Edward;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 202-ADMIN-1207.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the matter to the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel for review by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(A).


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-PDB-119.
    No. 2013-OB-0742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Ceasar, Millie Lavergne;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 12-PDB-119.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    James S. STUTTS and Lisa K. Stutts v. Chad Z. MELTON and Lauren Meadors Melton.
    No. 2013-C-0557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Stutts, James S.; Stutts, Lisa K.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 115,741; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0438.

Granted.


text:
    Steven M. DAVIS v. Elmer E. PRESCOTT, III, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0669.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Davis, Steven M.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Claiborne, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 38398; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,799-CA.

Granted.


text:
    Succession of Simon HARRELL, et al v. ERRIS-OMEGA PLANTATION, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-0438.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Succession of Clara Hadnot Harrell; Succession of Simon Harrell et al.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s order dated April 5, 2013, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 222,091; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-696.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    Aaron MELVIN v. Tawanna B. MELVIN.
    No. 2013-CJ-0916.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Purpera, Tawanna B.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div., No. 80,879; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CU 2009.

Denied.


text:
    Kevin MORALES v. Cherie BERGERON.
    No. 2013-CJ-0766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Bergeron, Cherie;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 112488; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CU 1907.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Mary Elizabeth SIGURE, et al. v. Dennis Wayne LOGER, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0751.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Mary Elizabeth Sigure, et al.; Sigure, Crystal Antiqua;—Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 113089; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1142.

Denied.


text:
    Peter ALBERT v. AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS and Esis.
    No. 2013-C-0744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Air Products and Chemicals Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 05, No. 10-06109; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0773.

Denied.


text:
    Alton JILES o/b/o Kayla JILES v. Wilton ANTHONY, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0735.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Jiles, Alton;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 62507; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1077.

Denied.


text:
    MORETCO, INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH COUNCIL, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Moreteo, Inc.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 58-671; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0430.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Joshua GODCHAUX and Anna Godchaux v. PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0721.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Gilchrist Construction Company, L.L.C.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 11-C-1647-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01310.

Denied.


text:
    Willie J. ZENO, Sr. v. FLOWERS BAKING COMPANY.
    No. 2013-CC-0719.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Zeno Sr., Willie J.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 4, No. 10-02790; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1413.

Denied.


text:
    Barbara HOUSSIERE, et al. v. ASCO USA, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0694.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Houssiere, Barbara et al.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 84068; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-791.

Denied.


text:
    Amelia COPPAGE v. WAL-MART LOUISIANA, LLC.
    No. 2013-CC-0692.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 706-137; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-C-944.

Denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Waylon LOPEZ v. MARQUES FOOD DISTRIBUTORS and LRASIF.
    No. 2013-C-0652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re LRASIF; Marques Food Distributors;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 7, No. 10-08391; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-482.

Denied.


text:
    CENTRAL ELECTRIC COMPANY OF ALEXANDRIA, INC. v. ENGLAND ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT.
    No. 2013-C-0590.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Central Electric Company of Alexandria, Inc.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 210,104; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-302.

Denied.


text:
    CENTRAL ELECTRIC COMPANY OF ALEXANDRIA, INC. v. ENGLAND ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT.
    No. 2013-C-0574.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re England Economic & Industrial Development District;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 210,104; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-302.

Denied.


text:
    Benjamin G. FIDELAK and Keri Tubre Fidelak v. HOLMES EUROPEAN MOTORS, L.L.C. d/b/a Land Rover Shreveport, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Foreign & Classic Auto Centre Inc.;—Third Party; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 547,378; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,915-CA.

Granted.


text:
    SHIH CHANG HU v. EVERGREEN OF THE SOUTH, INC. d/b/a Taste of China Restaurant & Yi Hua.
    No. 2013-C-0750.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Hua, Fang; Hua, Yi;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 562,149; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 2170.

Denied.


text:
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge through the GREATER BATON ROUGE METROPOLITAN AIRPORT DISTRICT v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and J. Caldarera & Company, Inc.
    No. 2013-C-0746.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re J. Caldarera & Company, Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 493,788; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0048.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Andrea ADAMS, Diane Breaux, Carol Leblanc, Melvin Terrebonne, Kylie Terrebonne, Vincent Dufrene, Sr., Janet Dufrene, Pernel Dufrene, Sr. and Pernel Dufrene, Jr. v. ALLIED SHIPYARD, INC.
    No. 2013-CC-0723.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Allied Shipyard, Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 116,275; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 0059.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    ST. BERNARD PORT, HARBOR AND TERMINAL DISTRICT v. GUY HOPKINS CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. United States Fire Insurance Company and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-0705.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Guy Hopkins Construction Co. Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 95-852; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0167.

Denied.


text:
    Melanie ANSARDI v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION. Eric Johnson, et al. v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.
    No. 2013-C-0698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Divs. B, E, Nos. 114-553, 117-567; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-1717 C/W 2012-CA-0166.

Denied.


text:
    Meianie ANSARDI v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION. Eric Johnson, et al. v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.
    No. 2013-C-0697.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 114-553 C/W 117-567; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-1717 C/W 2012-CA-0166.

Denied.


text:
    Derek HUSTON and J. Keith Hardie, Jr. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and John H. Shires, in his Official Capacity as Director, Department of Public Works of the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2013-C-0695.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Newcomb Boulevard Association;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2007-983; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1171.

Denied.


text:
    CATAHOULA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Catahoula Parish Police Jury v. LOUISIANA MACHINERY RENTALS, LLC. Catahoula Parish School Board, Catahoula Parish Police Jury v. Louisiana Machinery Company, LLC.
    No. 2012-C-2504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 2013.
   In re Catahoula Parish Police Jury; Catahoula Parish School Board et al.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 26,291, 26,292; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 12-443,12-444.

Granted.