author: MOORE, Judge. BRYAN, Judge,

text:
    Scott Christopher HOBBS v. Dorarena Kay HEISEY.
    2110275.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    June 8, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 2012.
    Certiorari Denied Jan. 4, 2013 Alabama Supreme Court 1111519.

      Dinah P. Rhodes of Rhodes & Creech, Huntsville, for appellant.
    William P. Burgess, Jr., and Amanda Chrisley Canupp of William P. Burgess, Jr., P.C., Huntsville, for appellee.
   MOORE, Judge.

Scott Christopher Hobbs (“the father”) appeals from a judgment of the Madison Circuit Court (“the trial court”) that denied his motion to vacate all judgments or orders regarding the custody of B.C.H. (“the child”) that were entered after March 2002. We affirm.

Procedural Background

The father and Dorarena Kay Heisey (“the mother”) are the parents of the child, who was born in February 1997 during the parties’ marriage. The parties separated when the child was a toddler and were eventually divorced by a judgment entered by the trial court in 2000. By agreement, the parties shared joint legal and physical custody of the child until June 2006, when the trial court awarded the mother sole physical custody of the child. See § 30-3-151(5), Ala.Code 1975 (defining “sole physical custody” as “[o]ne parent has sole physical custody and the other parent has rights of visitation except as otherwise provided by the court”). The father filed a postjudgment motion under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting, among other things, that the trial court vacate the June 2006 judgment and reinstate the joint-physical-custody arrangement. The trial court purported to grant that motion and to enter an amended judgment, but only after the motion had already been denied by operation of law, see Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. (stating that, in general, a postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rule 59 shall be automatically denied if not ruled upon within 90 days of its filing); this court determined that the amended judgment was void. See Hobbs v. Heisey, 979 So.2d 821, 823 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (“Hobbs I”). The father subsequently moved the trial court to vacate the June 2006 judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court denied that motion, and this court subsequently affirmed that judgment on appeal. Hobbs v. Heisey, 6 So.3d 529 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“Hobbs II”).

The instant proceedings began when the father filed a petition to modify his child-support obligation based on the loss of his supplemental part-time employment. The father amended his petition several times, eventually requesting that the trial court modify the June 2006 judgment to restore the prior joint-custody arrangement and moving the trial court, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., to vacate all judgments and orders regarding the custody of the child that had been entered after March 2002, which was the date the last judgment was entered confirming the agreement of the parties to share joint custody of the child. The trial court entered an order on July 18, 2011, denying the father’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion. The trial court subsequently entered a final judgment on October 31, 2011, disposing of the remaining issues in the case. The father timely appealed. This court held oral argument on May 1, 2012.

Issues

The father argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom of association when it entered the October 2011 judgment denying his motion to vacate.

Analysis

Rule 60(b) provides, in pertinent part:

“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (4) the judgment is void.”

“ ‘ “A judgment is void only if the court that rendered it [1] lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or [2] of the parties, or [3] if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.”’” M.H. v. Jer. W., 51 So.3d 334, 337 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (quoting Neal v. Neal, 856 So.2d 766, 781 (Ala.2002), quoting in turn Seventh Wonder v. Southbound Records, Inc., 364 So.2d 1173, 1174 (Ala.1978)) (emphasis added).

As the basis for his Rule 60(b)(4) motion, the father maintained that he has a fundamental right to the care, custody, companionship, and control of the child. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case — the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). The father argues that the June 2006 judgment infringed on his fundamental custodial rights by modifying the parties’ joint-physical-and-legal-custody arrangement so as to leave him with substantially less associational time with, and considerably less authority over, the child. “State action that limits a fundamental right is generally subject to strict scrutiny.” Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So.3d 634, 645 (Ala.2011). Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, the state must “show a compelling interest, advanced by the least restrictive means.” Id. The father maintains that, using a strict-scrutiny analysis, the trial court could not have modified the prior joint-custody arrangement unless it found from clear and convincing evidence that it needed to do so in order to protect the child from the father because the father was unfit to parent the child and posed a threat of substantial harm to the child. See generally Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So.3d at 644 (“In this context, ... the Constitution requires that a prior and independent finding of parental unfitness must be made before the court may proceed to the question whether an order disturbing a parent’s ‘care, custody, and control’ of his or her child is in that child’s best interests.”). The father argues that, because the trial court had never found the father to be unfit, the June 2006 judgment was entered in a manner inconsistent with due process and is therefore void.

In Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Smith, 719 So.2d 797, 806 (Ala.1998), the supreme court declared that, in order to be consistent with due process, a jury must award either compensatory or nominal damages in order to support an award of punitive damages. In Ex parte Third Generation, Inc., 855 So.2d 489, 490 (Ala.2003), Stephen Wilson, relying on our supreme court’s holding in Smith, filed a Rule 60(b)(4) motion in 2002 asserting that a 1993 judgment, which had been entered on a jury’s verdict awarding Third Generation, Inc., $0 in compensatory damages and $125,000 in punitive damages on its claims against Wilson, should be set aside as void because it had been entered in a manner inconsistent with due process. The trial court subsequently granted Wilson’s motion. Id. Third Generation petitioned the supreme court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to, among other things, reinstate the 1993 judgment. 855 So.2d at 491. In granting the petition for the writ of mandamus, the supreme court stated, in pertinent part:

“As stated above, Satterfield [v. Winston Industries, Inc., 553 So.2d 61 (Ala.1989),] includes in the definition of a ‘void’ judgment for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] those judgments in which the trial court has ‘acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.’ 553 So.2d at 64. However, as we recently discussed in Neal v. Neal, 856 So.2d 766 (Ala.2002), the term ‘due process,’ in the context of providing a foundation for declaring a judgment void, refers to procedural, rather than substantive, due process:
“ ‘ “[I]t is established by the decisions in this and in Federal jurisdictions that due process of law means notice, a hearing according to that notice, and a judgment entered in accordance with such notice and hearing.”
‘Frahn v. Greyling Realization Corp., 239 Ala. 580, 583, 195 So. 758, 761 (1940)(emphasis added [in Neal ]). The rule that a want of due process, so defined, voids a judgment is not redundant with the rule that a want of personal jurisdiction likewise voids a judgment, for a person already effectively made a party to litigation could, on some critical motion or for some critical proceeding within that litigation, be deprived of the “notice, a hearing according to that notice, and a judgment entered in accordance with such notice and hearing,” required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Frahn, supra. See Winhoven v. United States, 201 F.2d 174 (9th Cir.1952), Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.1949), Cassioppi [v. Damico, 536 So.2d 938 (Ala.1988) ], and Seventh Wonder [v. Southbound Records, Inc., 364 So.2d 1173 (Ala.1978) ].’
“Neal, 856 So.2d at 781-82.
“Because our decision in [Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v.] Smith [, 719 So.2d 797 (Ala.1998),] was based on substantive due-process grounds (following the lead of the United States Supreme Court’s BMW [of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996),] decision), the Smith rationale may not be used as a ground for declaring a judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4). Therefore, the original judgment entered on the jury’s verdict was not void, and the trial court erred in granting Wilson’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion.”

855 So.2d at 492-93.

Notably, in the present case, the father did not claim in his Rule 60(b)(4) motion that the trial court, in the proceedings that resulted in the June 2006 judgment, had failed to provide him proper notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue whether the joint-custody arrangement should be modified. The father also did not contend that the judgment awarding the mother sole physical custody of the child did not address an issue litigated by the parties in 2006. Instead, the father asserted only that the trial court had failed to require clear and convincing evidence of his unfitness before modifying the joint-custody arrangement. Assuming that the trial court erred in that regard, any such error would have amounted solely to a violation of substantive, not procedural, due process. Hence, under Ex parte Third Generation, Inc., supra, that alleged error cannot serve as a basis for vacating the June 2006 judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). 855 So.2d at 493.

We recognize that the trial court did not reject the father’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion based on the distinction between procedural and substantive due process, but we review the denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion de novo. Looney v. State, 60 So.3d 293, 296 (Ala.Civ.App.2010). Moreover, “[i]n reviewing a trial court’s judgment, we are not limited by the reasoning the trial court applied in reaching its judgment. Instead, we can affirm a trial court’s judgment if it was correct for any valid legal reason.” Rogers v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 37 So.3d 780, 789 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). Thus, the only question for review by this court is the legal question whether the judgment is void. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 34 So.3d 1238, 1242 (Ala.2009). Having determined that the 2006 judgment is not void, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to set that judgment aside.

Because the 2006 judgment awarded the mother sole physical custody of the child, the trial court could modify that aspect of the 2006 judgment only based on the standard set forth in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984). At oral argument, counsel for the father clarified that the father was not contesting the constitutionality of the McLendon standard. Furthermore, in his brief to this court, the father does not argue that the trial court erred in denying his petition to modify custody based on the McLendon standard. Any additional arguments he makes relate solely to the constitutionality of the June 2006 judgment and the statutes upon which the trial court relied in modifying the joint-custody arrangement in June 2006. However, on appeal from the denial of a motion for relief from a judgment, this court cannot review issues addressed to the correctness of the underlying judgment. See Malloy v. Sullivan, 431 So.2d 514, 515 (Ala.1983). Any arguments the father makes concerning the correctness of the 2006 judgment should have been raised in any appeal of that judgment, and the father cannot now use Rule 60(b) as a substitute for an appeal of that judgment. See Hobbs II, 6 So.3d at 533 (“Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal of a final judgment”).

The mother’s request for the award of attorney fees on appeal is denied.

AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

BRYAN, J., concurs specially.

BRYAN, Judge,

concurring specially.

As noted in the main opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that a violation of due process “ ‘provides] a foundation for declaring a judgment void’ ” pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., only if the alleged due-process violation related to a violation of “ ‘procedural, rather than substantive, due process.’ ” 118 So.3d at 190 (quoting Ex parte Third Generation, Inc., 855 So.2d 489, 492 (Ala.2003)). I agree with the main opinion insofar as it concludes that the errors alleged by Scott Christopher Hobbs in his Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the June 2006 judgment “amounted solely to a violation of substantive, not procedural, due process.” 118 So.3d at 191. Because I am constrained by our supreme court’s decision in Ex parte Third Generation, supra, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Carlton, 867 So.2d 320, 325 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (“[The Court of Civil Appeals] is bound by the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court, see § 12-3-16, Ala. Code 1975, and we have no authority to overrule that court’s decisions.”), I concur in the decision reached in the main opinion.

However, I take this opportunity to remind the parties that

“[i]t is the policy of this state to assure that minor children have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of their children and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of rearing their children after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.”

§ 30-3-150, Ala.Code 1975. Cf § 30-3-160, Ala.Code 1975 (the Alabama Parents Child Relationship Protection Act, § 30-3-160 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, “promotes the general philosophy in this state that children need both parents, even after a divorce, established in [§ ] 30-3-150”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO The FLORIDA RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-RULE 2.451 (USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES).
    No. SC12-764.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 3, 2013.
    Alexandra V. Rieman, Chair, Judicial Administration Committee, Fort Lauder-dale, FL, John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Jodi Jennings, Bar Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

Before the Court is the out-of-cycle report of The Florida Bar’s Rules of Judicial Administration Committee (Committee) proposing new Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.451 (Use of Electronic Devices). See Fla. Rule Jud. Admin. 2.140(e). We have jurisdiction and adopt the proposed new rule, with a minor modification as explained below.

BACKGROUND

The Committee proposes new rule 2.451 in response to the Court’s requests that the Committee address the use of electronic devices in the courtroom by jurors and individuals other than the media. The Committee, which had been studying the issue prior to receiving the Court’s requests, published two different drafts of the proposed new rule, which will govern the use of electronic devices by jurors and other non-media courtroom attendees. After considering the first group of comments, the Committee made a number of revisions to its proposal. The Committee did not make any changes to its proposal after the second publication. The Committee voted 23-0 in favor of the version of the new rule filed with the Court. The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar unanimously approved that version of the rule.

The Court published the proposed new rule after the Committee filed its report. Two comments were filed with the Court, one from Circuit Judge J. Thomas McGra-dy, Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, supporting the new rule; the other from R. Blaise Trettis, Executive Assistant Public Defender, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, opposing the new rule.

After considering the Committee’s report, the comments filed, and the Committee’s response to the comments, we adopt proposed new rule 2.451, with a minor modification as explained below. Subdivision (a) (Electronic Devices Defined) of the new rule defines electronic devices as that term is used in the rule. Subdivision (b) (Use of Electronic Devices by Jurors) addresses the use of electronic devices by jurors. Subdivision (b)(1) provides that electronic devices may be removed as directed by the judge from all members of a jury panel at any time before deliberations and that electronic devices must be removed from all members of a jury panel before jury deliberations begin. Subdivision (b)(2) allows for return of electronic devices to jurors during recesses and allows the judge to determine whether electronic devices will be removed from jurors who are sequestered. Subdivision (b)(3) lists prohibited uses of electronic devices by jurors. Subdivision (b)(4) recognizes a judge’s authority to permit jurors to retain their electronic devices during trial proceedings. Based on Mr. Trettis’s suggestion that jurors should be put on notice early in the proceedings that their electronic devices will be removed before deliberations begin, we have added subdivision (b)(5) to the new rule. The notice provided in that subdivision is intended to give members of the jury panel the opportunity to avoid having their electronic devices removed.

Finally, subdivision (c) (Use of Electronic Devices by Others) governs use of electronic devices by non-media courtroom attendees. According to the committee note, subdivision (c) parallels rule 2.450(a) regarding the use of electronic devices by the media. Subdivision (c)(1) recognizes the authority of the presiding judge or quasi-judicial officer to control the use of electronic devices in the courtroom. Subdivision (c)(2) recognizes the general authority of the chief judge to control the use of electronic devices in a courthouse or court facility.

Accordingly, we adopt new Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.451 as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. The committee note is offered for explanation only and is not adopted as an official part of the rule. The new rule shall become effective October 1, 2013, at 12:01 a.m.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 2.451. USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES

(a) Electronic Devices Defined. An electronic device is any device capable of making or transmitting still or moving photographs, video recordings, or images of any kind; any device capable of creating, transmitting, or receiving text or data; and any device capable of receiving, transmitting, or recording sound. Electronic devices include, without limitation, film cameras, digital cameras, video cameras, any other type of camera, cellular telephones, tape recorders, digital voice recorders, any other type of audio recorders, laptop computers, personal digital assistants, or other similar technological devices with the ability to make or transmit video recordings, audio recordings, images, text, or data.

(b) Use of Electronic Devices by Jurors.

(1) Electronic devices, as that term is defined in subdivision (a), may be removed as directed by the presiding judge from all members of a jury panel at any time before deliberations, but such electronic devices must be removed from all members of a jury panel before jury deliberations begin. The electronic devices will be removed and appropriately secured by the bailiff or other person designated by the chief judge.
(2) Any electronic devices removed from members of a jury panel may be returned to the members of the jury panel during recesses in the trial. When jurors are sequestered, the presiding judge may determine whether the electronic devices will be removed from jurors during the entire period of sequestration.
(3) From the time a person reports for jury service until the person is discharged from jury service, that person is prohibited from using electronic devices for any of the following purposes:
(A) making or transmitting still or moving photographs, audio recordings, video recordings, or images of any kind of the court proceedings;
(B) transmitting or accessing text or data during the court proceedings;
(C) transmitting or accessing text or data about the case on which the juror is serving;
(D) researching, transmitting, or accessing information about the case on which the juror is serving;
(E) otherwise communicating about the case on which the juror is serving; or
(F) otherwise communicating about the jury deliberations.
(4) Nothing in this rule is to be construed to limit or impair the authority of a chief judge or presiding judge to grant permission to a juror to retain his or her electronic device during trial proceedings.
(5) The jury summons mailed to prospective jurors should contain a notice that electronic devices will be removed from all members of a jury panel before jury deliberations begin and as directed by the presiding judge, may be removed at other stages of a trial. At the beginning of the trial, the presiding judge should advise the jury panel about the removal of electronic devices.

(c) Use of Electronic Devices by Others.

(1) The use of electronic devices in a courtroom is subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge or quasi-judicial officer to
(A) control the conduct of proceedings before the court;
(B) ensure decorum and prevent distractions; and
(C) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending cause.
(2) The use of electronic devices in a courthouse or court facility is subject at all times to the authority of the chief judge to
(A) ensure decorum and prevent distractions;
(B) ensure the fair administration of justice; and
(C) preserve court security.

Committee Note

2013 Adoption. Subdivision (c), Use of Electronic Devices by Others, parallels Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.450(a) regarding the use of electronic devices by the media.

      . See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

      . Specifically, the Court asked the Committee to review rule 2.450, which governs the use of electronic devices by the media, in light of then pending proposed jury instruction amendments addressing juror use of electronic devices. See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2010-01 & Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases-Report No. 2010-01, 52 So.3d 595 (Fla.2010) (authorizing for publication and use amendments to the standard jury instructions addressing the use of electronic devices by jurors and potential jurors). The Court first asked the Committee to consider whether the rules of judicial administration should be amended to address the use of electronic devices in the courtroom by persons that are not part of the media. See Letter from Thomas D. Hall, Clerk of Supreme Court, to Circuit Judge Lisa Davidson, Chair of the Rules of Judicial Administration. Committee (April 14, 2010) (on file with Clerk of the Supreme Court). The Court then asked the Committee to propose a rule requiring the removal of cell phones and other electronic devices from jurors during trial court proceedings. See Letter from Thomas D. Hall, Clerk of Supreme Court, to Katherine Eastmoore Giddings, Chair of Rules of Judicial Administration Committee (August 20, 2010) (on file with Clerk of the Supreme Court).

      . We ask the civil cases, criminal cases, and contract and business cases jury instruction committees to review their respective bodies of instructions and propose any amendments needed to conform the instructions to the new rule.


text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS.
    No. SC13-1120.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 11, 2013.
   PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Criminal Court Steering Committee (Steering Committee) has filed a petition to amend the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators (the Jimmy Ryce Rules of Procedure). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The Steering Committee proposes amendments to rule 4.030 (Nonverification of Pleadings); rule 4.080 (Service of Pleadings and Papers); rule 4.100 (Pleadings and Motions); and rule 4.440 (Rules of Procedure and Evidence). The amendments conform the Jimmy Ryce Rules of Procedure to the procedures and requirements for e-mail service and electronic filing adopted by the Court in In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Florida Probate Rules, the Florida Rules of Traffic Court, the Florida Small Claims Rules, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure — E-Mail Service Rule, 102 So.3d 505 (Fla.2012), and In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Florida Probate Rules, the Florida Small Claims Rules, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure — Electronic Filing, 102 So.3d 451 (Fla.2012).

After considering the Steering Committee’s straightforward proposals under our fast-track procedures, we adopt the amendments as proposed. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators are amended as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The amendments will take effect on October 1, 2013, at 12:01 a.m. Because the amendments were not published for comment prior to their adoption, interested persons shall have sixty days from the date of this opinion in which to file comments with the Court.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 4.030. NONVERIFICATION OF PLEADINGS

Every written pleading or other paper-doeument-of a-party represented by an attorney need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit except when otherwise specifically provided by these rules or an applicable statute.

RULE 4.080. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND, PAPERS, AND DOCUMENTS

(a) Service; When Required. Unless the court otherwise orders, every pleading subsequent to the initial pleading and every other paperdocument filed in the action, except applications for a witness subpoena, shall be served on the opposing party.

(b) Service of Subsequent Pleadings Other Than Original Petition; How Made. When service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service on the attorney or party shall be made by delivering-a-copy -or mailing it to the-attorney or the party — or—as ■ provided-in-4.070(b)as required by Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.516.

(c)Service by Electronic Mail, Service by electronic mail shall-be permitted if all parties or their counsel file with the clerk of-the-court a written agreement that such sendee is-acceptable. The agreement shall set forth-the methed-of-service and provide e-mail ■ addresses or facsimile. ■ numbers. ■The original pleadings shall be^ filed with the-elerk-with the-counsel’s attestation of ■the time of electronic service.

(c) Filing. All documents that are “court records” as defined in the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration must be filed with the clerk in accordance with Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.520 and 2.525.

(d) Deposit with the Clerk. Any paper document that is a judgment or required by statute or rule to be sworn to or notarized shall be filed and deposited with the clerk immediately thereafter. The clerk shall maintain deposited original paper documents in accordance with Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.430, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

RULE 4.100. PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS

(a)-(b) [No Change]

(c) Caption. Every pleading, motion, order, judgment, or other paperdocument shall have a caption containing the name of the court, the uniform case number, the name of the party on each side, and a designation identifying the party filing it and its nature or the nature of the order, as the case may be. All papersdocuments filed in the action shall be styled in such a manner as to indicate clearly the subject matter of the paper and the party requesting or obtaining relief.

RULE 4.440. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

(a) In all commitment proceedings initiated under part V, chapter 394, Florida Statutes and this rule, the following applies:

(1) The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Florida Rules of Judicial Administration apply unless otherwise superseded by these rules.

(2)-(5) [No Change]

(b)-(c) [No Change]

      . All comments must be filed with the Court on or before September 9, 2013, with a certificate of service verifying that a copy has been served on the Committee Chair, Judge Kevin Emas, Third District Court of Appeal, 2001 S.W. 117th Avenue, Miami, Florida, 33175, emask@flcourts.org, and on the Staff Liaison to the Steering Committee, Bart Schneider, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida, 32399, schneidb@flcourts.org, as well as a separate request for oral argument if the person filing the comment wishes to participate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case. The Committee Chair has until September 30, 2013, to file a response to any comments filed with the Court. If filed by an attorney in good standing with The Florida Bar, the comment must be electronically filed via the Portal in accordance with In re: Electronic Filing in the Supreme Court of Florida via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC13-7 (Feb. 18, 2013). If filed by a non-lawyer or a lawyer not licensed to practice in Florida, the comment must be electronically filed via e-mail in accordance with In re: Mandatory Submission of Electronic Copies of Documents, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC04-84 (Sept. 13, 2004). Electronically filed documents must be submitted in Microsoft Word 97 or higher. Any person unable to submit a comment electronically must mail or hand-deliver the originally signed comment to the Florida Supreme Court, Office of the Clerk, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida, 32399-1927; no additional copies are required or will be accepted.