text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sidney DELOCH, Jr.
    No. 2013-KP-1975.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 767-79; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 0995.

Writ granted. The district court’s judgment overruling the state’s procedural objection is vacated. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 132 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), announced a rule permitting federal courts conducting habeas corpus review of final state court convictions to consider the merits of a claim otherwise procedurally defaulted. The decision does not apply to relator’s post-conviction claims made in state court. Relator fails to show an exception to the post-conviction limitations period of La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 and his application is time barred. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Chris J. ROY, Sr. and Mary Roy v. Bernell WARNER, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0438.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; Warner, Bernell et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div F, No. 236,954; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00030.

Granted. It is well settled that the right of a litigant to a jury trial is fundamental in character and the courts will indulge every presumption against a waiver, loss, or forfeiture thereof. State v. Walker, 95-0185 (La.6/30/95), 658 So.2d 190, 192. The record of the instant case reflects relator made a timely request for jury trial upon learning the value of plaintiffs’ claims exceeded the jury trial threshold. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court striking the jury trial is reversed. Case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

CLARK and HUGHES, JJ., would deny.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis Ray DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1968.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Davis, Curtis Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 151,815; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-568-KH.

Writ granted; case is remanded to district court for an evidentiary hearing.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would deny.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Damien HALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2488.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Hall, Damien; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2013 KA 0014; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0014.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wayne P. WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2520.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Wilson, Wayne P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 493-006; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1304.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Steve Byron ROBERT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Robert, Steve Byron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 257551; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-796-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nathan PETTUS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Pettus, Nathan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 09-656; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-714.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin EAGLIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2524.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Eaglin, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 366-535; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2013-K-1229, 2013-K-1229.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Adrian B. BROUSSARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2527.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Broussard, Adrian B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 547078; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1091.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cedrick MORGAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2529.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Morgan, Cedrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 07-04-0479; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1123.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cedrick MORGAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Morgan, Cedrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 07-97-0849; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1124.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Byron DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2533.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Davis, Byron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 475-618; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1184.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Courtney SAVOY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2534.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Savoy, Courtney; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 79487, 82193, 83969, 84146, 84406; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00685.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenny R. THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Thomas, Kenny R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 57,594-FA; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00774.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael W. WITHERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2541.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Withers, Michael W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 13-WCR-183; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1333.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Samuel MARTIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2542.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Martin, Samuel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 09-5197; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-766.

Denied. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6(A)


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brandon LAVERGNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2544.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Lavergne, Brandon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 138234; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00507.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of C.M.
    No. 2013-CK-2796.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re C.M.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Juve-nUe Court> No- 09-JU-695; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-128.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel F. LOPEZ.
    No. 2013-KO-2812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Lopez, Daniel F.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 516731; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0373.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jody D. HAMILTON.
    No. 2013-KO-2925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Hamilton, Jody D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C16173; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-204.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Demarcus Cartez JONES.
    No. 2013-KO-2926.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Jones, Demarcus Cartez; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 272565; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,458-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Steven C. LAWSON.
    No. 2013-C-2950.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, . Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 476-905; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0812.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jimmie SPRATT.
    No. 2013-K-2960.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Spratt, Jimmie; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 502-077; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0158.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Harold L. FREE.
    No. 2013-K-2978.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Free, Harold L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 289,428; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,260-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael ALLEN.
    No. 2013-KO-2994.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Allen, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 490-990; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1118.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Freddie Lee COOK.
    No. 2013-KO-3000.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Cook, Freddie Lee; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 11F0957; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-355-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Latellas Delanio MOORE.
    No. 2013-K-3003.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Moore, Latellas Delanio; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 178,998; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,492-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Damon Patterson v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0156.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Patterson, Patterson; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 505-248, 509-482, 509-734, 511-187; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1636.

Denied.


text:
    Erica JACOBS v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE, RECREATION AND TOURISM, New Orleans City Park Improvement Association.
    No. 2014-CC-0460.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism; New Orleans City Park Improvement; State of Louisiana et al.; — -Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2012-08867; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1575.

Denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


author: HUGHES, J.,

text:
    Todd GRANTHAM v. Bonnie JOHNSON.
    No. 2014-C-0701.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Grantham, Todd; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C-2010-0375; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1081.

Denied.

HUGHES, J.,

dissents. I would grant the writ. “Any obligation arising from” is a much broader category than “convicted of.” I would reinstate the judgment of the trial court.


text:
    Lucas SALVATO, Sammy Salvato, and Wanda Salvato v. ROTOR SOURCE, INC. and John Dear.
    No. 2014-CC-0764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Salvato, Lucas; Salvato, Sammy; Salvato, Wanda; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 612,307; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 2054.

Denied.

JOHNSON,' C.J., would grant.


text:
    Levelt MYLES and Dorothy Myles v. MOSAIC FERTILIZER, LLC, James Construction Group, LLC and John Doe.
    No. 2014-CC-0766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Mosaic Fertilizer L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 102262; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 2008.

Denied.


text:
    Kevin MADDOX v. Patricia BAILEY, Diesel Specialist, and 21st Century National Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-0789.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Bailey, Patricia; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 99,228; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0564.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edmond A. CHAISSON.
    No. 2014-KK-0790.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Chaisson, Edmond A.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 513-133; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0121.

Denied.


text:
    John LEE v. TOURO INFIRMARY and the Schumacher Group.
    No. 2014-CC-0796.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Lee, John; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No 2013-7522; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1533.

Denied.


text:
    Kendall L. WILLIAMS v. 23RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 2014-CP-0797.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Williams, Kendall L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 20,177; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2013 CW 2193, 2013 CW 2193.

Denied.


text:
    Bob WELCH & Daniel Hoover v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH METROPOLITAN COUNCIL.
    No. 2014-C-0805.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re 2590 Associates L.L.C.; — Third Party; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 563,619; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1440.

Denied.


text:
    CHRISTUS HEALTH NORTHERN LOUISIANA d/b/a Christus Schumpert Health System v. PLATINUM ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC. and New Hampshire Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CC-0907.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Christus Health Northern Louisiana d/b/a Christus Schumpert Health System; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation 1st District West, No. 13-00148; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,287-WCW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James R. TOWNLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-KH-0927.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Townley, James R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. RC14-808; to the Court of Appeal, Third- Circuit, No. KH 14-00327.

Denied.


text:
    Carol C. DURGAN and Lynell Durgan v. CHRISTUS HEALTH SOUTHWESTERN LOUISIANA d/b/a St. Patrick’s Hospital.
    No. 2014-CC-0939.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Christus Health Southwestern Louisiana d/b/a St. Patrick’s Hospital;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court, No. 2011-1140; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00246.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George WELLS.
    No. 2014-KK-0983.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Wells, George; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 517-340; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0350.

Denied.

HUGHES, J.,

concurs. As the state has committed to proving guilt only by showing that the victim was rendered unconscious, the defendant does not need an expert witness.


text:
    DOCTOR PLAINTIFF v. LIFEPOINT HOSPITAL, INC., PHC Morgan City LP, Hospital Auxiliary of Morgan City, Inc. Board of Trustees of Teche Regional Medical Center and Medical Executive Committee Teche Regional Medical Center.
    No. 2014-CC-1023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Board of Trustees of Teche Regional Medical Center; Hospital Auxiliary of Morgan City Inc.; Lifepoint Hospital Inc. et al.; Medical Executive Committee Teche Regional Medical' Center; PHC Morgan City L.P.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 126844; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CA 0294.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vance CHAMPAGNE.
    No. 2014-KK-0821.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Champagne, Vance; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 518-513; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0272.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George WELLS.
    No. 2014-KK-0983.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 6, 2014.
   In re Wells, George; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 30, 2014, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 517-340; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0350.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX.


text:
    MAPP CONSTRUCTION, LLC, and Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. AMERISURE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-1124.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 2014.
   In re Southgate Residential Towers, LLC, and Southgate Penthouses, LLC, As assigness of the Claims of MAPP Contraction, LLC, and Bituminous Casualty Corporation and Bituminous Fire and Marine Insurance Company; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 584,205; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0750.

Denied.


text:
    Dena ROMERO v. GARAN’S, INC.
    No. 2014-C-0204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Garan’s Inc.; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 4, No. 02-02417; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-482.

Granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is vacated. The case is remanded to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of Church Mutual Co. v. Dardar, 13-2351 (La.5/7/14), — So.3d -, 2014 WL 1800067, and Cook v. Family Care Services, Inc., 13-2326 (La.5/7/14), — So.3d -, 2014 WL 1800038.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerard TURNER.
    No. 2014-K-0012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Turner, Gerard; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 502-859; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0285.

Not considered; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thaddius Brock BERGERON.
    No. 2014-K-0107.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Bergeron, Thaddius Brock; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 131236; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-627.

Not considered; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).


text:
    Malik Alqadr IHSAAN v. BLUE RIBBON FOOD STORES OF BATON ROUGE, et al.
    No. 2013-CP-2403.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Ihsaan, Malik Alqadr; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 10, 2014, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 446248; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 0118.

Not Considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard McGEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2018.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re McGee, Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s a action dated April 11, 2014, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 04-364; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-531.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Lewis, Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Reconsideration of this court’s action dated April 4, 2014, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 67408; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00095.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ehab MOHAMED.
    No. 2013-KP-1841.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Mohamed, Ehab; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 435983; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0718.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darren Tyrone SLOAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2132.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Sloan, Darren Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 173,211-A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,538-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wilbert CLARK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Clark, Wilbert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 117,650; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00659.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lavern Lee HAMPTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Hampton, Lavern Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 08-F-22974; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,875-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alex P. PAPILLION v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Papillion, Alex P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 398707; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. KH 13-00706, KH 13-01226.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory Glenn CALDWELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Caldwell, Gregory Glenn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, No. 285-461; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,733-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jamarcus Dewayne DORSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Dorsey, Jamarcus Dewayne;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 298,636; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1021.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Everett Charles WILLS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2563.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Wills Jr., Everett Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 296490; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-469-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jonica H. PHILLIPS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2596.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Phillips, Jónica H.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Grant, 35th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 07-226; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00721.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mozine JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Mozine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 05-2244; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-740.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tanesha HARDY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2608.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Hardy, Tanesha; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C — 16019; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00752.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bashan STANTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Stanton, Bashan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 436-978; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1277.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John LINDSEY.
    No. 2013-KO-2993.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Lindsey, John; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 508-185; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1195.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth MARTIN.
    No. 2014-K-0004.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Martin, Kenneth; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 502-361; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0115.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robyn B. Little DAVIS.
    No. 2014-K-0010.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Davis, Robyn B. Little; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 34876-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-275.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carol Noland SALTZMAN.
    No. 2014-K-0011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Saltzman, Carol Noland; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 34876-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-276.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tolbert MORRIS, a/k/a Talbert Morris, a/k/a Tolbert Morris, Jr., a/k/a Morris Talbert, Jr.
    No. 2014-KO-0023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Tolbert Morris a/k/a Talbert Morris a/k/a Tolbert Morris, Jr. a/k/a Morris, Talbert, Jr.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 27652; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0456.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kian TATE.
    No. 2014-KO-0024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Tate, Kian; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 09-09-0319; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0728.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rodney Ian BARNES.
    No. 2014-KO-0043.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Barnes, Rodney Ian; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C 16783; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-576.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mazen S. HAMDAN.
    No. 2014-KO-0051.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Hamdan, Mazen S.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 502-633; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0113.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph NORAH, Sean Watts.
    No. 2014-KO-0084.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Watts, Sean; State of Louisiana;— Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 497-717; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1194.

Denied.


text:
    John C. DUCK v. HUNT OIL COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0703.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Chevron U.S.A. Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 45,505; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-628.

Denied on the showing made.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    John C. DUCK v. HUNT OIL COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Pinnacle Operating Company, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Con-cordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 45,505; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-628.

Denied on the showing made.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    John C. DUCK v. HUNT OIL COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0715.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Hunt Oil Company; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 45,505; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-628.

Denied on the showing made.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    John C. DUCK v. HUNT OIL COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0735.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Harvest Petroleum Inc.; — -Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 45,505; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-628.

Denied on the showing made.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    BOARD OF COMMISSIONER OF the PORT OF NEW ORLEANS v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; Erroll G. Williams, Orleans Parish Assessor; and Marlin N. Gusman, Orleans Parish Sheriff.
    No. 2014-C-0809.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Board of Commissioner of the Port of New Orleans; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2012-9003; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0881.

Denied.


text:
    Martha and Levy SPEARS v. Kenya RABY, XYZ Insurance Company, City of Baker, East Baton Rouge Parish, and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-0810.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Spears, Levy; Spears, Martha et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 578,220; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0528.

Denied.

KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Larry E. CLARK, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 2014-C-0814.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Clark, Larry E. et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. C425690; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0371.

Denied.


text:
    William McDOUGALD, Joey McDonald & Tracy McDonald v. ST. FRANCIS NORTH HOSPITAL, INC., Dr. Mack Temple Douglas, Dr. Ronald Koepke & Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co.
    No. 2014-C-0815.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re McDonald, Joey; McDonald, Tracy; McDougald, William et al.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2012-0195; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,955-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Byard “Peck” EDWARDS, Jr. v. Andrew M. EDWARDS, II and Beryl Edwards Trawick.
    No. 2014-C-0816.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Edwards Jr., Byard “Peck”;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2011-14513; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0114.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Danny W. JONES v. TEXAS INDUSTRIES. Danny W. Jones v. Lafarge North America, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-0818.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Texas Industries; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 06, Nos. 11-09988, 11-09990; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2013 CA 1272, 2013 CA 1273.

Denied.


text:
    Danny W. JONES v. TEXAS INDUSTRIES. Danny W. Jones v. Lafarge North America, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-0820.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Lafarge North America Inc.;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 06, Nos. 11-09988, 11-09990; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2013 CA 1272, 2013 CA 1273.

Denied.


text:
    Rebecca Louise Fitch GUILLOT and Peter M. Guillot, Individually and on Behalf of Connor Guillot v. Rodney Bryan DOUGHTY and Allen Leroy Doughty.
    No. 2014-C-0824.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Guillot, Peter M.; Guillot, Rebecca Louise Fitch; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2003-0000210; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1348.

Denied.


text:
    SPANISH LAKE WILDLIFE REFUGE AND BOTANICAL GARDENS, INC. d/b/a Alligator Bayou Swamp Tours, Bluff Swamp Wildlife Refuge and Botanical Gardens, Inc., and Frank Bonifay v. The PARISH OF ASCENSION, through Tommy MARTINEZ in his Official Capacity as Ascension Parish President, and the Parish of Iberville, through Jessel Mitchell Ourso, Jr. in his Capacity as Iberville Parish President.
    No. 2014-C-0825.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Bluff Swamp Wildlife Refuge & Botanical Gardens, Inc.; Bonifay, Frank; Spanish Lake Wildlife Refuge and Botanical Gardens Inc. d/b/a Alligator Bayou Swamp Tours; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 93,297; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1155.

Denied.


text:
    PUMPKIN MOBILE HOME PARK, LLC v. Henry Frank HARRISON, Phyllis Underwood Harrison, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0828.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Pumpkin Mobile Home Park, LLC; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangi-pahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2013-0000122; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1086.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Floyd P. DONLEY, Sr. v. HUDSON’S SALVAGE LLC & Employees (Lois Peltier, Jerry Hollifield, John Doe, Linda Cox, Velma Elaine Hungle and Alan Spallinger).
    No. 2014-C-0967.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Donley, Sr., Floyd P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2009-4174; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1498.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Quvadris R. RUFFIN.
    No. 2014-KO-0066.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   In re Ruffin, Quvadris R.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/ or Remedial writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 11-3134; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-393.

Denied.


author: JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR., Judge.

text:
    NEW PROGRESSIVE LODGE NO. 262, INC. v. Robert HUTCHESON; C & R Distributing and New Hampshire Insurance Company.
    No. 12-CA-872.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    June 27, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied July 16, 2013.

      Joseph M. Bruno, Jr., Attorney at Law, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    W. Evan Plauehé, Justin E. Alsterberg, Christopher G. Otten, Attorneys at Law, Metairie, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appel-lee.
    Panel composed of Judges JUDE G. GRAVOIS, ROBERT M. MURPHY, and JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR., Ad Hoc.
   JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR., Judge.

| ..Plaintiff, New Progressive Lodge No. 262, Inc., appeals the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants, Robert Hutcheson, C & R Distributing, and New Hampshire Insurance Company. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of an accident that occurred on December 22, 2008, which involved an 18-wheeler being driven by Hutcheson and an automobile being driven by Kenyon Lindsay. On November 17, 2009, New Progressive Lodge No. 262, Inc. filed a Petition for Damages alleging that defendants, Hutcheson, C & R Distributing (Hutcheson’s former employer), and New Hampshire Insurance Company (defendants’ insurance company) were liable for damages to its property and other related damages caused by Hutcheson’s negligence in connection with the December 2008 accident. On May 31, 2012, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment contending that no genuine issues of material fact existed and plaintiffs claims should be dismissed with prejudice. A hearing was held on June [ a29, 2012, and the trial judge took the matter under advisement. On that same date, the trial judge granted the motion, issuing written reasons for judgment. This timely appeal followed.

FACTS

On December 22, 2008, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Hutcheson was traveling southbound on U.S. 61 (Airline Highway) in the right-hand lane while driving a 2007 Peter-built 18-wheeler that contained 7,500 gallons of diesel fuel. Hutcheson was in the process of transporting the diesel fuel from the Marathon Refinery in Garyville to Hammond. At that same time, Lindsay was traveling northbound on U.S. 61 in the continuous left-turn lane while driving a 1996 four-door Cadillac Deville, with a passenger in the vehicle. According to the police report, Lindsay turned left. As he did so, the front bumper of the 18-wheeler hit the passenger side of Lindsay’s vehicle, which was pushed southbound. Lindsay’s vehicle then slid into the left lane and came to a stop facing southwest in both the right and left lanes of U.S. 61 southbound.

The force of the impact caused the 18-wheeler to veer to the right and leave the roadway. It crossed the ditch to the west side of U.S. 61 and hit the two-and-a-half foot ledge of an elevated concrete parking lot with its front tires. The front set of the 18-wheeler’s tires as well as a rear set were sheared off and remained at the edge of the concrete parking lot. The tractor and trailer portions of the 18-wheeler overturned onto the concrete parking lot and came to rest upside down approximately five feet east of a building owned by Progressive Lodge. The 18-wheeler ignited, catching that vehicle and its cargo on fire. The building sustained damage from exposure to the fire.

Lindsay was transported by Acadian Air Ambulance to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital for treatment of his injuries. Blood was taken at the hospital, and 14the results showed that Lindsay had .10 gram percent alcohol in his blood at 6:10 a.m. Defendants’ expert toxicologist determined' that Lindsay was highly intoxicated with alcohol at approximately twice the legal limit at the time of the accident. Lindsay, who was found unconscious and unresponsive at the scene, was highly disoriented when he regained consciousness. He told the officer that he only remembered turning left at the gas station. Lindsay was cited for failure to yield while turning left and driving with a suspended driver’s license.

Meanwhile, Hutcheson was transported to River Parishes Hospital. He voluntarily gave a breath sample, which came back negative. Officer Blake LeMoine of the Louisiana State Police did not suspect that Hutcheson was impaired by alcohol or drugs at the time of the accident. However, a drug test was conducted a couple of hours after the accident, and the results showed the presence of marijuana. Hutcheson denied ingesting marijuana at any time. Defendants’ expert toxicologist explained that Hutcheson’s behavior and physical presentation at the scene of the accident and at the hospital indicated that he could not have been acutely intoxicated with marijuana at the time of the accident.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial judge erred by granting defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude the granting of summary judgment. Plaintiff asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Hutcheson appropriately anticipated and responded to a left-turning motorist, and whether Hutcheson was illegally traveling on U.S. 61. It alleges that Hutcheson was inattentive prior to colliding with the Cadillac, as evidenced by his deposition testimony where he states that the other car ran into him before he had time to think “or look up,” and where Hutcheson states that he could not have gone left around the other car |5because there were more cars to his left than to his right, even though the surveillance video from a neighboring gas station did not show any cars to his left. Plaintiff also contends that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Hutcheson took evasive action, turned his wheel, and maintained control prior to impact. It argues that a trier of fact must be given the opportunity to assess the nature of the conduct of the two drivers and the degree of fault.

Plaintiff further argues that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the weight of Hutcheson’s tractor trailer. It notes that Hutcheson was unsure in his July 21, 2011 deposition of the empty or gross weight of his truck, and that Hutche-son said that nobody weighed and approved the transportation of the load prior to him taking it on the roadway. Plaintiff relies on the affidavit of its expert, John Ramirez, attached to his memorandum in opposition, to prove that the total weight of Hutcheson’s tractor and trailer exceeded the weight limit allowed on U.S. 61.

Additionally, plaintiff asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Hutcheson’s impairment at the time of the accident, as evidenced by his testing positive for marijuana after the accident, his attention to the road, and his speed prior to impact. Again, plaintiff relies on his expert, Ramirez, who attests in his affidavit that Hutcheson should have been able to slow his 18-wheeler after impact. Lastly, plaintiff argues that the sudden emergency doctrine is inapplicable in this case, because Hutcheson brought the emergency on himself since he did not use due care to avoid it.

Defendants respond that the trial judge properly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment as there are no genuine issues of material fact. They contend that the clear and sole cause of the accident was the negligence and gross fault of Lindsay, a severely intoxicated driver who suddenly and without warning turned | ^directly into the path of oncoming traffic and the path of Hutcheson’s truck. They argue that the sudden emergency doctrine absolves Hutcheson of liability, in that there was nothing that Hutcheson could have done to avoid the accident or the damage that ensued.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs exhibits were not introduced into evidence at the hearing and, therefore, they should not be considered on appeal. Alternatively, defendants argue that the affidavit of plaintiffs expert, John Ramirez, is incompetent evidence, as it contains only conclu-sory opinions and allegations that are mere speculation, not based in fact, and not made on personal knowledge. Further, defendants assert that plaintiffs alleged material facts are mere distractions, and that none of these issues, even if supported'by evidence, would constitute material facts precluding summary judgment. They maintain that there was no evidence that Hutcheson’s truck was overweight or that he was not using reasonable care before the accident.

Appellate courts review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Hines v. Garrett, 04-806, p. 1 (La.6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765. A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966.

A material fact is one that potentially insures or prevents recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the lawsuit. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. An issue is a genuine issue if it is such that reasonable persons could disagree; if only |7one conclusion could be reached by reasonable persons, summary judgment is appropriate, as there is no need for trial on that issue. Id. Whether a particular fact is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Hubbard v. Jefferson Parish Parks and Recreation, 10-24, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1106, 1110, writ denied, 10-1486 (La.10/1/10), 45 So.3d 1102.

Summary judgment procedure is intended to make a just and speedy determination of every action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966. It is favored and the procedure shall be construed to achieve this intention. Id. Under LSA-C.C.P. art. 966, the initial burden is on the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the moving party points out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action or defense, the nonmoving party then must produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). If the nonmoving party fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment should be granted. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 966 and 967; Paternostro v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 09-469, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/8/09), 30 So.3d 45, 48.

An oncoming motorist has a right to assume that a left-turning motorist will obey the law and will yield the right-of-way to the oncoming traffic. Anderson v. May, 01-1031, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/13/02), 812 So.2d 81, 84. However, the favored driver can still be found contribu-torily negligent if their substandard conduct contributed to the cause of the accident. Id.

The sudden emergency doctrine is available to a person who finds himself in a position of imminent peril and does not have sufficient time to consider and weigh all of the best means available to avoid that impending danger. Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 262 La. 102, 262 So.2d 385, 389 (La.1972). SuchRa person is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may have been a better means to avoid the peril, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Id.

In the instant case, the trial judge granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that plaintiff had not shown how its expert would be able to prove the weight of defendant’s truck at the time of impact, as most of the diesel fuel was burned as a result of the accident. She also found that plaintiff came forth with no evidence to substantiate its claim that Hutcheson was driving illegally on U.S. 61 in St. John Parish at the time of the subject accident and, therefore, defendant was at a place where he had a right to be. The trial judge further found that defendant’s statement that he “looked up” prior to the impact did not necessarily mean that he was looking down before the accident, and, that it might have been a “figure of speech.” She concluded that plaintiff had failed to show how it would meet its burden of proof in this case.

On appeal, defendants contend that plaintiff’s exhibits were not introduced into evidence at the hearing and, therefore, we should not consider them on appeal.

LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 was amended by Acts 2012, No. 257, § 1, and Acts 2012, No. 741, § 1, with an effective date of August 15, 2012. Prior to these amendments, LSA-C.C.P. art. 966B provided in pertinent part that the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Emphasis added]. The words “on file” were deleted by the 2012 amendments. Additionally, the amendments added a second paragraph to LSA-C.C.P. art. 966E, which provides that only evidence admitted | ¡¡for purposes of the motion for summary judgment shall be considered by the court in its ruling on the motion.

Here, both defendants and plaintiff filed pleadings with attached exhibits into the record. Additionally, defendants introduced exhibits into evidence at the hearing; however, plaintiff did not. Nevertheless, the Motion for Summary Judgment was heard and judgment was rendered on June 29, 2012, which was before the August 15, 2012 effective date of the amendments to LSA-C.C.P. art. 966. Therefore, we have reviewed all pleadings and exhibits filed by both parties, and we have also reviewed the exhibits introduced into evidence at the hearing.

Upon review, we find that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hutcheson bears some negligence in causing the accident and whether he should be assigned some degree of fault. In his July 21, 2011 deposition, Hutcheson testified as to how the accident occurred:

I left Marathon after I loaded. Then I was headed back down Highway 61. I was approaching the first traffic light watching it. I saw a car sitting in the center turning lane. The next thing I know, here he comes.

Hutcheson subsequently explained that he did not recall when he first saw that vehicle sitting in the center lane. Afterward, Hutcheson was asked to complete his version of events. Hutcheson testified:

Well, I was watching the traffic light. Then the next thing I know, here comes this car. He run [sic] into me before I had time to even think or look up. [Emphasis added].

Hutcheson’s testimony that the other car ran into him before he had time to “look up” implies that Hutcheson was looking down at the time of the accident and, therefore, inattentive. There is no evidence to show that Hutcheson’s testimony that he looked up prior to the impact was a “figure of speech.”

[inWe also find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hutcheson was speeding prior to the accident. Officer LeMoine testified in his August 26, 2011 deposition that the speed limit on U.S. 61 where the accident occurred was 55 miles per hour. Hutcheson testified in his July 21, 2011 deposition that he was going 50 to 55 miles per hour as he was traveling down U.S. 61 prior to the accident. However, Lindsay testified in his deposition that Hutcheson was going approximately 60 miles per hour right before the collision. Lindsay based that estimate on the fact that he thought he could make it across U.S. 61, but Hutcheson came upon him “so fast” he was unable to do so. Lindsay indicated that Hutcheson had to be going pretty fast to close the distance.

We further find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the weight of Hutcheson’s tractor trailer at the time of the accident. Both plaintiff and defendants agreed that Hutcheson was carrying 7,500 gallons of diesel fuel; however, the weight of the empty tractor trailer is unclear. In his July 21, 2011 deposition, Hutcheson testified that he did not know the weight of the empty trailer “exactly,” but that the tractor and trailer combined was “weighted for” 80,000 pounds. He later testified that he did not know the weight of the “load itself,” but that the “ball park” weight was 78,000 pounds. Hutcheson subsequently testified that nobody weighed and approved the transportation of the load prior to him taking it on the roadway, thus indicating that his prior testimony as to weight was speculative and conclusory.

In sum, we find that there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Hutcheson was inattentive and/or speeding at the time of the accident, and whether he had sufficient time to consider and weigh the circumstances in order to take action to avoid striking Lindsay’s vehicle. We further find that there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding the weight of Hutcheson’s tractor trailer |nat the time of the accident. These findings pretermit a discussion of plaintiffs remaining assignments of error.

CONCLUSION

Finding that genuine issues of material fact exist, the trial court’s judgment is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED


author: DREW, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Shawn Fitzgerald KENNEDY, Appellant.
    No. 49,036-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 14, 2014.
    Louisiana Appellate Project by Douglas Lee Harville, for Appellant.
    Charles Rex Scott, II, District Attorney, for Appellee.
    Karelia R. Stewart, Jessica Diane Cassi-dy, Cloyce Clark, III, Assistant District Attorneys.
    Before CARAWAY, DREW and PITMAN, JJ.
   DREW, J.

h Shawn Fitzgerald Kennedy urges only one issue in this appeal. He attacks the constitutionality of La. R.S. 14:95.1 as being contrary to Const. Art. I, § 11, which was amended in 2012. Defendant’s challenge to the statute, however, is not properly before us.

The issue was not pled or litigated in the trial court, violating clear precedent. See State v. Hatton, 2007-2377 (La.7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, and Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc., 94-1238 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859.

In addition, the Louisiana Attorney General has never been served and has not yet participated in any way. See La. R.S. 13:4448; La. R.S. 49:257(0; La. C.C.P. art. 1880.

We must remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

DECREE

REMANDED.

      . Possession of firearm or carrying concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies

      . The Louisiana Supreme Court is considering this same issue in the pending writ applications of State v. Taylor, 2014-0209, and State v. Eberhardt, 2013-2306.

      .See also, State in Interest of D.W., 13-114 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/18/13), 125 So.3d 1180, writ denied, 2013-2478 (La.4/4/14), 135 So.3d 639, 2014 WL 1423628.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Curtis D. JONES, Appellant.
    No. 49,297-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 14, 2014.
    Louisiana Appellate Project By: Carey J. Ellis, III, for Appellant.
    Richard Zemry Johnson, Jr., District Attorney, Ron Christopher Stamps, Britney A. Green, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, CARAWAY and DREW, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

hThis appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of the defendant. Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, the trial court is required to rule on a defendant’s motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal prior to sentencing. Failure to do so requires the sentence to be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence is set aside and vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the defendant’s post-verdict motions.


author: GARRETT, J.

text:
    Ronald D. KEITH, Plaintiff-Applicant v. Marjorie M. KEITH, et al., Defendants-Respondents.
    No. 48,919-CW.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2014.

      Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, Shreveport, by Kenneth Mascagni, Robert Kennedy, Jr., for Plaintiff-Applicant.

      Ayres, Warren, Shelton & Williams, L.L.C., Shreveport, by Lee H. Ayres, Curtis R. Shelton, Richie, Richie & Oberle LLP, Shreveport, by Charles Vernon Richie, Margaret Elizabeth Richie, for Defendants-Respondents, Marjorie M. Keith and Donald E. Keith.
    Before MOORE, LOLLEY and GARRETT, JJ.
   GARRETT, J.

|, This writ granted to docket involves a motion to disqualify counsel and a ruling below which required that all evidence be adduced in open court, including evidence which may be protected by attorney-client privilege. Under the very unusual and unique circumstances presented here, we find that the trial court erred in its ruling and in refusing to utilize alternative methods of conducting the hearing to protect matters that may be covered by the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, we make the writ peremptory, reverse the trial court ruling, and remand with instructions.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Ronald Keith, has filed two suits in the 26th Judicial District Court against his mother, Marjorie Matlock Keith, pertaining to her position as trustee of two family trusts. In the first suit, filed on December 5, 2011, the plaintiff sought to remove her as trustee and have himself named as sole trustee. In the second suit, filed on August 1, 2012, he sought damages for alleged violation of fiduciary duties. He also named his twin brother, Donald, as a defendant in both suits as a trust beneficiary.

Several days before the filing of the first suit, a meeting took place between the plaintiffs attorney, Kenneth Mascagni, and another attorney, Lee H. Ayres, at Ayres’ law office. This meeting on December 2, 2011, became the focus of the motion to disqualify filed by the plaintiff after Ayres was hired by the defendants, Mrs. Keith and Donald, in June 2013 to represent them in the suits brought by the plaintiff. Ayres and the attorney then representing the defendants had filed a motion for the latter to withdraw and for the former to enroll as counsel of record.

LThe parties seem to agree that at the meeting Mascagni sought information from Ayres about interdiction, a field in which Ayres was experienced and esteemed. However, they fail to agree on anything else and completely disagree about the legal implications to be drawn from their meeting. Ayres asserts that he generally acquainted Mascagni — his friend, former neighbor, and former law partner — with the basic tenets of interdiction proceedings, as a favor. He did not bill for the appointment. Mascagni, on the other hand, contends that Ayres was engaged to provide legal services on behalf of the plaintiff and that he expected Ayres to bill for the appointment.

In the motion to disqualify filed on July 16, 2013, the plaintiff alleged that, through his attorney, he had consulted with and shared “confidential information” with Ayres at the December 2011 meeting. He maintained that, as a result of this meeting, a conflict of interest existed which prohibited Ayres from representing Mrs. Keith in the instant proceedings. (Mrs. Keith had already had three different attorneys.) The plaintiff stated that he neither consented to nor waived the conflict of interest and that Ayres’ representation of Mrs. Keith violated Rule 1.9(a) and/or 1.18(b) and (c) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. In the motion, the plaintiff alleged that some of the evidence would need to be submitted in camera. A motion to stay proceedings pending resolution of the motion to disqualify was granted on July 22, 2013.

|aOn August 14, 2013, the defendants filed an opposition to the motion to disqualify. Among the attachments to the memorandum were copies of Ayres’ handwritten notes from the December 2011 meeting.

On August 26, 2013, the motion was called in open court following a pretrial conference. Counsel for the plaintiff proposed a modified in camera method whereby the courtroom would be closed; the only non-court personnel allowed to be present would be mover and his counsel. Then mover and mover’s counsel would be excused and the same procedure would be utilized for the defendants. The trial court expressed discomfort with this proposed method, which plaintiffs counsel asserted has been used in federal court. The defendants objected to the proposed procedure. The trial court ordered briefing on the issue and reset the matter for hearing on September 27, 2013.

In a memorandum entitled “Procedure for Consideration of Motion to Disqualify,” the plaintiff stated that the hearing should be limited to an inquiry into matters which are not subject to any privilege. The plaintiff expressed his intention to provide proof of the sequence of events giving rise to the meeting between Mascagni and Ayres and then rely upon a presumption that confidential information was shared. In the event the presumption was not accepted by the trial court, he proposed to file under seal an affidavit by Mascagni. The defendants filed their own memorandum |4on proper procedure in which they urged that the trial court not depart from regular proceedings in open court. They argued that they had the right to hear and cross-examine any witnesses offered by the plaintiff and that their due process rights would be violated by any other procedure.

The parties returned to court on September 27, 2013. The plaintiff immediately moved to file under seal an affidavit from Mascagni detailing the communications he had with Ayres. The plaintiff also objected to introduction of any evidence that delved into attorney-client privileged communications. The trial court denied the motion and then ruled that it would conduct an ordinary, open hearing. However, it directed that any written offerings be placed under seal and that any request for a transcript of the proceedings be approved by the court. The court refused to review Mascagni’s affidavit and allowed it to be filed only under seal as a proffer, subject to review by the court of appeal. The plaintiff objected to the trial court’s proposed procedures. The defendants vehemently objected to the Mascagni affidavit being placed under seal without them having an opportunity to see it and reserved their right to submit a similar in camera affidavit at a later date. The objections were noted and overruled. Against this contentious pretrial bickering, the evidentiary portion of the hearing began.

| r,Plaintiff s counsel elicitéd testimony from the plaintiff that he was aware that Mascagni was going to meet with another attorney to discuss his possible lawsuit against his mother, that Mascagni was authorized to discuss the matter fully with the second lawyer, and that the plaintiff was willing then and now to pay for services rendered by the second lawyer. When counsel for the defendants attempted to cross-examine the plaintiff, he was instructed by his own counsel not to answer the first question asked of him, as it allegedly implicated the attorney-client privilege. As the hearing became more and more contentious and mired in the possibility of the plaintiff and his attorney being held in contempt, the plaintiff requested a stay in order to take writs to this court. The trial court candidly acknowledged on the record that the plaintiff was being placed in a difficult position and requested “guidance” from the appellate court.

We note that, at that juncture, the trial court did not have the benefit of all of the extensive legal research that has now been provided to this court by the parties in both the writ application and in the voluminous briefs filed after the matter was docketed. The trial court was faced with a motion rarely seen by state court judges, coupled with an unusual factual background. Instead of being provided with concrete examples of how different courts have dealt with similar issues well in advance of the hearing, the trial court was basically told that federal courts employed different procedures. Had the trial court and the parties been provided with all of the research that has been provided to this court, along with the additional jurisprudence that we have found from our own research, we believe the hearing below would have been conducted in a different manner and this matter would have been | firesolved by now. Unfortunately, none of this occurred and this matter is before us.

On October 1, 2018, the trial court signed an order staying the hearing on the motion to disqualify pending this court’s ruling on the application for supervisory writs. On November 14, 2013, this court granted the writ to docket.

ARGUMENTS

The plaintiff characterizes the issues before this court as being a dispute over the applicable burden of proof for disqualifying a lawyer under Rule 1.9(a) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and the appropriate manner in which the trial court should receive evidence concerning matters protected by the attorney-client privilege, should the court deem such evidence necessary.

The plaintiff contends that the trial court should utilize a two-step evidentiary process. First, it should receive all non-privileged evidence in open court. The client might be able to carry his burden of proof without revealing privileged information. Second, if nonprivileged evidence is insufficient, the trial court should receive privileged information in camera. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be required either to disclose privileged information to disqualify his former attorney or forgo the disqualification motion altogether.

The defendants, of course, argue that the trial court correctly held that due process required an open court hearing with normal rules and processes to determine whether an attorney should be disqualified under Rule 1.9. According to the defendants, the method suggested by the plaintiff for 17presentation of evidence lacks due process and fairness for the potentially disqualified attorney. They question the plaintiffs rationale of not revealing information in open court because it is confidential when the plaintiff claims that the information has already been divulged to Ayres.

Additionally, the defendants criticize plaintiffs counsel for instructing the plaintiff to disobey the trial court’s order to answer a cross-examination question about a matter already discussed on direct examination, i.e., whether Mascagni told the plaintiff that he was going downstairs to meet with a lawyer. They further contend that the plaintiff waived attorney-client privilege by testifying on direct examination to facts that could have only been relayed to him by Mascagni.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Statutory provisions

Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct states:

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Rule 1.18 of the Rules of Professional Conduct sets forth duties owed to a prospective client and provides:

(a)A person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.
(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.
(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same |sor a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d).
(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if:
(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or:
(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and
(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(ii) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.

La. C.E. art. 506 codifies the attorney-client privilege in Louisiana and it states, in relevant part:

A. Definitions. As used in this Article:
(1) “Client” is a person ... to whom professional legal services are rendered by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from the lawyer.
(2) “Representative of the client” is:
(a) A person having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice so obtained, on behalf of the client.
(3) “Lawyer” is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(4) “Representative of the lawyer” is a person engaged by the lawyer to assist the lawyer in the lawyer’s rendition of professional legal services.
(5) A communication is “confidential” if it is not intended to be disclosed to persons other than:
(a) Those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of obtaining or rendering professional legal services for the client.
B. General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another person from disclosing, a confidential communication, whether oral, written, or otherwise, made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to |9the client, as well as the perceptions, observations, and the like, of the mental, emotional, or physical condition of the client in connection with such a communication, when the communication is:
(1) Between the client or a representative of the client and the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer.
(5) Among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client....
D. Who may claim privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client’s agent or legal representative .... The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client, former client, or deceased client.

Jurisprudence

The attorney-client privilege, one of the oldest and most venerated of the common law privileges of confidential communications, serves important interests in our judicial system. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981); United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir.2002); Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So.2d 1138, 1142 (La.1987). The purpose of the privilege is to encourage the client to confide fully in his counsel without fear that his disclosures could be used against him by his adversaries. State v. Green, 493 So.2d 1178, 1180 (La.1986).

The existence of an attorney-client relationship turns largely on the client’s subjective belief that it exists. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Bosworth, 481 So.2d 567, 571 (La.1986). However, this subjective belief must be a reasonable one. United States v. Edwards, 39 F.Supp.2d 716, 722 (M.D.La.1999). The existence of the attorney-client relationship is a|inquestion of fact subject to manifest error review. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. First Louisiana Const., Inc., 2004-0133 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/6/05), 915 So.2d 841, 844; Barre v. St. Martin, 93-973 (La.App. 5th Cir.4/26/94), 636 So.2d 1061, 1063, writ denied, 94-1358 (La.9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1288.

As astutely noted by a federal district court in Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 571 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.D.C.2008), there is a “paucity of case law” involving motions to disqualify counsel. Our research indicates very few Louisiana state court cases grappling with this difficult issue. See, e.g., Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So.2d 401 (La. App. 3d Cir.1968), writ ref'd, 253 La. 60, 216 So.2d 307 (1968); Farrington v. Law Firm of Sessions, Fishman, 96-1486 (La.2/25/97), 687 So.2d 997; Walker v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 2001-2078, 2001-2079 (La.5/14/02), 817 So.2d 57; Jones v. ABC Ins. Co., 13-167 (La.App. 5th Cir.9/24/13), 122 So.3d 608. Unfortunately, none of the Louisiana cases provide guidance on the procedural issues.

A motion to disqualify counsel requires the court to balance several important factors: (1) the right of a party to retain counsel of his choice; and (2) the substantial hardship which might result from disqualification as against the public perception of and the public trust in the judicial system. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Ciba Seeds, 933 F.Supp. 514, 517 (M.D.N.C.1996).

A party seeking to disqualify opposing counsel on the ground of a former representation must establish two elements: (1) an actual attorney-client relationship between the moving party and the attorney he |n seeks to disqualify; and (2) a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the former and present representations. In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 614 (5th Cir.1992). See Bras-seaux v. Girouard, supra. “Substantially related” has been given a narrow interpretation. Walker v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., supra.

The party seeking to assert the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that the privilege is applicable. State v. Brown, 2012-0626 (La.App. 4th Cir.4/10/13), 115 So.3d 564, 572. The burden of proving disqualification of an attorney rests on the party making the challenge. Walker v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., supra; State v. Craddock, 2010-1473 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/25/11), 62 So.3d 791, 797, writ denied, 2011-0862 (La.10/21/11), 73 So.3d 380.

A disqualification inquiry, particularly when instigated by an opponent, presents a palpable risk of unfairly denying a party the counsel of his choosing. Therefore, notwithstanding the fundamental importance of safeguarding popular confidence in the integrity of the legal system, attorney disqualification is a sanction that should not be imposed cavalierly. United States v. DeCay, 406 F.Supp.2d 679, 683-84 (E.D.La.2005); F.D.I.C. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1316 (5th Cir.1995).

Disqualification issues must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Ciba Seeds, supra.

The right to urge disqualification of an opposing counsel may be waived by failure to raise the issue early in the proceedings. Brasseaux v. Girouard, supra.

I ^DISCUSSION

The merits of the motion to disqualify are not before us. The only issue is the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on how the hearing would be conducted.

The defendants argue that anything less than full proceedings in open court violates their rights to due process. We fully recognize that, as a general proposition, most hearings are to be held in an open, contradictory fashion, with in camera hearings being disfavored. This is a result of the due process guarantee of notice and an opportunity to be heard that is found in both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Art. I, § 22 of the Louisiana Constitution. However, as discussed below, the courts have recognized that in exceptional circumstances ex parte or in camera procedures are warranted.

Various courts — both federal and state — have utilized different procedures in conducting hearings on motions to disqualify counsel. For example, a “closed” hearing was held in United States v. Edwards, 39 F.Supp.2d13 at 738. Other federal courts have used in camera inspection of documents filed under seal. See Rogers v. Pittston Co., supra; U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 605 F.Supp. 1448 (S.D.N.Y.-1985). In the Rogers case, the lawyer whose disqualification was sought objected to the procedure, asserting that he could not adequately respond to the sealed documents. The court found that “because the moving party is not required to publicly reveal actual confidences, in camera submission of documents is a recognized way of establishing that the two matters are substantially related.” In the U.S. Football League case, the court issued a confidentiality order with the consent of the parties. Furthermore, all papers related to the motion to disqualify were filed under seal and reviewed in camera. The actual appellate opinion was also sealed, and an alternate abbreviated version which did not reveal any confidential information was published.

In United States v. Uzzi, 549 F.Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y.1982), the court relied upon affidavits and found in camera testimony unnecessary because the facts were undisputed. In Kaselaan & D’Angelo Assocs., Inc. v. D’Angelo, 144 F.R.D. 235 (D.N.J.1992), submissions by the parties on the motion to disqualify the defendant’s counsel included affidavits filed under seal. In Decora Inc. v. DW Wallcovering, Inc., supra, the court allowed the presentation of ex parte documents and testimony at an in camera hearing to safeguard confidential evidence from disclosure. In weighing the evidence so presented, the court was to take into account the inability of the opposition to challenge it.

14In United States v. DeCay, supra, all of the documents deemed pertinent by the court, including the attorneys’ office files, were ordered to be produced under seal for in camera inspection by the court.

Louisiana courts have held in camera hearings in cases involving privileged communications. See In re Kohn, 357 So.2d 279 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978); Campo v. Dupre, 470 So.2d 234 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1985). In a different context, addressing expert witness funds for indigent defendants, our Louisiana Supreme Court crafted a procedure for an in camera presentation by the defendant. State v. Touchet, 93-2839 (La.9/6/94), 642 So.2d 1213. Thus, there is precedent in our own state to support the submission of matters in a manner designed to preserve confidentiality, albeit not in the context of a motion to disqualify.

The jurisprudence of other states on procedural devices is instructive. In particular, we note Barragree v. Tri-Cnty. Elec. Co-op., Inc., 263 Kan. 446, 950 P.2d 1351 (1997), in which the Kansas Supreme Court held that “[tjools such as conducting a portion of the hearing out of the presence of the party against whom confidentiality is to be protected or an in camera 1 ^inspection are available to the district court to prevent disclosure of the information to adverse parties and counsel.”

It appears to us that in this case the trial court may have to consider the content of the discussion held between Mascagni and Ayres on December 2, 2011, in order to determine whether Rule 1.9 and/or Rule 1.18 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct may apply here. This is an unusual case because of the one meeting at which the plaintiff was not even present. We have reviewed the sealed Mascagni affidavit. It described the communication to Ayres of information which arguably could be construed as being confidential and of importance to the litigation. We realize this is only one side and Ayres’ version of what transpired is, of course, unknown.

We find that the trial court erred in requiring that all evidence on the motion to disqualify be submitted in open court. The jurisprudence reviewed above demonstrates a number of other alternatives and methods by which courts have taken evidence while preserving confidences which may fall under the attorney-client privilege.

It is of vital importance that general rules be firmly established when the hearing resumes and that these rules not penalize the plaintiff for asserting his right to the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, we direct the trial court to take evidence in open court on matters not requiring disclosure of communications arguably protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court is further directed to consider evidence that may be protected launder the attorney-client privilege by methods outlined above, including, but not limited to: (1)sealed affidavits; (2) in camera inspection of documents; (3) conducting portions of the hearing outside the presence of the other side; and (4) sealing the record or portions thereof. In weighing this evidence, the court shall, of course, consider the inability of the opposite side to challenge it. If necessary, the court can question the witnesses and have the attorneys submit questions they believe should be posed to the witnesses in order to produce pertinent information helpful to the court’s determination. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court shall determine whether the plaintiff has carried his burden of proof and rule accordingly.

CONCLUSION

We make the previously granted writ peremptory, reverse the trial court ruling which required that all evidence on the motion to disqualify be presented in open court, and remand the matter to the trial court to resume |17the hearing in accordance with this opinion. Costs are assessed equally to both sides.

WRIT MADE PEREMPTORY; REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

      . Ayres was one of the attorneys in some very protracted litigation described in Skannal v. Bamburg, 44,820 (La.App.2d Cir.1/27/10), 33 So.3d 227, writ denied, 2010-0707 (La.5/28/10), 36 So.3d 254, which was tried over a 16-day period in the 26th Judicial District.

      . The first two pages of Ayres' notes pertain to the law of interdiction. On the third page, he has some very brief information about the Keiths, including statements that the plaintiff does not get along with either his mother or twin brother.

      . Although this memorandum is not found in the appellate record, an unsigned copy of it is contained in the writ application.

      . As potential witnesses, Ayres and Mascagni were each accompanied by another attorney from their respective firms.

      . In his written motion to file under seal, the plaintiff cited Decora Inc. v. DW Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F.Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y.1995), and Rogers v. Pittston Co., 800 F.Supp. 350 (W.D.Va.1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir.1993), which are discussed infra.

      . The article also provides for exceptions to the privilege, none of which are applicable in the instant case.

      . Although scant evidence was adduced before the hearing was terminated, the parties’ briefs contain their diametrically opposed versions of what transpired in the meeting.

        The plaintiff contends that Mascagni informed Ayres of the names of the parties to ensure there was no conflict of interest and quoted him an hourly rate. After Ayres did not object to the parties or the rate, Mascagni proceeded with the understanding that Ayres was providing legal advice to the plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that Mascagni shared with Ayres information received in confidence from his client, as well as Mascagni’s perceptions and general strategy. Due to the legal advice received from Ayres, the plaintiff did not pursue a challenge to his mother’s capacity. Mascagni asked Ayres to send him a bill.
      The defendants assert that Mascagni provided no confidential information to Ayres during the meeting. According to Ayres’ account, Mascagni telephoned him asking for information about interdiction proceedings. They later met for about 30 minutes at which time Ayres gave Mascagni procedural and substantive information about interdiction. While Mascagni mentioned the names of his client and his mother, Ayres did not know them and he had no contact with the client. Ayres contends that he was even unaware that any trust was involved until he was hired by the defendants. Furthermore, Ayres did not open a file or bill anyone in connection with the meeting.
      What the evidence eventually will show is yet to be determined.

      . In Touchet, the court outlined its procedure in detail:
      To recapitulate our holding in this case, an indigent defendant may file a motion for expert funding ex parte. Notice of the filing of the motion should be given to the state, which may file an opposition to the hearing being held ex parte and/or to the request for funding. The trial court should first determine, in camera, either on the face of the allegations of the motion or upon taking evidence at an ex parte hearing, whether the defendant would be prejudiced by a disclosure of his defense at a contradictory hearing. If so, then the hearing on expert funding should continue ex parte. If not, then the hearing should be held contradictorily with the District Attorney. If either side seeks appellate review of a ruling as to the ex parte nature of the hearing, the motion and other proceedings to this point should remain under seal until the appellate review is completed, and thereafter if the ruling is in favor of an ex parte hearing.

      . We find no merit to the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff has somehow irrevocably waived his alleged attorney-client privilege by testifying that Mascagni told him that he was going to the attorney’s office downstairs. This testimony did not pertain to any subject matter of the two suits that were filed. The hearing was recessed at this point.