text:
    In re Andrew C. CHRISTENBERRY.
    No. 2013-B-2461.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 27, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

|! This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Andrew C. Christenberry, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC filed two sets of formal charges against respondent under disciplinary board docket numbers 03-DB-052 and 05-DB-055. Respondent answered both sets of formal charges, and the matters were considered by separate hearing committees. On June 15, 2005, the matters were consolidated by order of this court. In re: Christenberry, 05-0193 (La.6/15/05), 903 So.2d 1128. The disciplinary board then filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing both sets of formal charges.

03-DB-052

The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties.

In July 2001, Norman Hansen hired respondent to represent him in a criminal matter stemming from his arrest for lewd conduct and public drunkenness. Mr. Hansen paid respondent a $500 flat fee, and respondent agreed to attempt to have the charges dismissed, to file an expungement on Mr. Hansen’s behalf, and to | shave Mr. Hansen’s $800 bond money returned. Respondent also informed Mr. Hansen that he would not need to appear at the court hearing on October 4, 2001. On the evening of October 4, 2001, respondent informed Mr. Hansen that the public drunkenness charge had been dropped and the lewd conduct charge had been expunged. Respondent further informed Mr. Hansen that the expungement paperwork would be ready in one week and, after processing by the court, the bond money would be returned. One week later, respondent and Mr. Hansen were to meet at the courthouse to deliver the ex-pungement paperwork, but respondent failed to appear. Mr. Hansen attempted to contact respondent several times but received no response. In February 2002, Mr. Hansen took it upon himself to go to the courthouse to retrieve his bond money and expungement paperwork. Instead, he learned that respondent failed to appear on his behalf on October 4, 2001. Furthermore, the criminal charges against him were still active, and his bond money had been forfeited.

On April 29, 2002, Mr. Hansen filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Respondent received a copy of same via certified mail but failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena. Despite being personally served with the subpoena, respondent faded to appear for the September 4, 2002 sworn statement. However, he did appear the following day ■with a written response to the complaint dated May 31, 2002. Thereafter, on September 19, 2002, respondent sent a letter to Mr. Hansen admitting his failure to represent him and offering to petition the court to reopen the final disposition of the charges and refund the bond money. Despite Mr. Hansen’s acceptance of this offer, respondent failed to petition the court.

13After the filing of formal charges against him on August 18, 2003, respondent filed a motion to set aside Mr. Hansen’s bond forfeiture and had the charges reset for trial on September 30, 2003. At this time, he also refunded the $500 fee Mr. Hansen had paid him and assisted Mr. Hansen in receiving a refund of the bond money.

Thereafter, respondent stipulated that his conduct in this matter violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as those rules were in effect at the time of the misconduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f)(6) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

05-DB-055

The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties.

In December 2001, William Blake was arrested on charges of possession of a controlled dangerous substance. On May 2, 2002, respondent received the final installment payment towards a $2,500 fee to represent Mr. Blake in his criminal matter. Mr. Blake expected respondent to obtain an expungement at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.

Mr. Blake subsequently completed the district attorney’s pre-trial diversion program, and the charges were nolle prose-quied, on June 20, 2002. Upon his completion of the diversion program, Mr. Blake requested that respondent proceed with the expungement. However, respondent agreed to obtain the expungement |4only upon receipt of additional funds to cover the filing fee. Mr. Blake disputed the additional fee because he understood that it had been included in the initial $2,500 fee and had a receipt indicating payment in full for legal services. Nevertheless, respondent failed or refused to pursue Mr. Blake’s expungement during either 2002 or 2003.

In December 2003, Mr. Blake filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. In July 2005, respondent prepared and obtained an order of expungement for Mr. Blake.

Respondent stipulated that his conduct in this matter violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 and 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conducts).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

03-DB-052

As stated above, respondent answered the formal charges, wherein he essentially admitted to the alleged misconduct but insisted he did not act knowingly or intentionally. He further asserted that he mailed his May 31, 2002 response to the ODC and could provide no explanation as to why the ODC did not receive same before he hand-delivered it on September 5, 2002. Thereafter, the parties entered into the above stipulations, and the matter was set for a hearing in mitigation. During the hearing, the ODC pointed out that the response to the complaint was in fact dated before respondent received the complaint via certified mail on July 17, 2002.

Hearing Committee Report

Following the hearing in mitigation, the hearing committee found that respondent failed to handle Mr. Hansen’s legal matter and failed to respond to his requests for information and status updates. Respondent also initially failed toj^cooperate with the ODC. Ultimately, he appeared in response to the ODC’s subpoena and fully cooperated thereafter. Additionally, respondent contacted his client and eventually handled the criminal matter, paying all costs as well as refunding Mr. Hansen’s fee. As such, Mr. Hansen suffered no financial loss or criminal penalty.

Based on these facts, the committee determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges and later stipulated to by the parties.

Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that suspension is the baseline sanction. It found no aggravating factors present. In mitigation, however, the committee recognized the following: (1) respondent freely and fully admitted his actions and his violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, (2) respondent corrected Mr. Hansen’s criminal matter, paying all costs and refunding Mr. Hansen’s fee, (3) as a public defender in Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, respondent is assigned many cases, which often results in confusion and scheduling difficulties, and (4) Mr. Hansen was not harmed by respondent’s conduct and has recovered his entire fee.

Based on the above findings, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days, fully deferred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report or recommendation. However, the ODC argued that an active probationary period should have been recommended with the fully deferred suspension.

After review, the disciplinary board filed its recommendation with this court in docket number 05-B-0193. In its report, the board took issue with respondent’s back-dated response to the Hansen complaint and, thus, found present the aggravating factors of bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 1 ^intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency and submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process. The board then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with three months deferred. However, before we considered the matter, the ODC filed a motion to remand the matter to the board for consolidation with the formal charges in 05-DB-055. As stated above, on June 15, 2005, we granted the motion and consolidated the matters.

05-DB-055

The record indicates that the ODC had some difficulty in serving respondent with the formal charges filed in this matter in May 2005. As such, respondent did not answer the formal charges until November 2007. The matter proceeded to a hearing in November 2012, during which the parties entered into the above stipulations, and the hearing was converted to a hearing in mitigation.

Hearing Committee Report

Following the hearing in mitigation, the hearing committee found that, in May 2002, Mr. Blake hired and paid respondent to represent him in a criminal matter. Their agreement included obtaining an ex-pungement as part of the original fee of $2,500, as documented by the receipt signed by respondent. Despite Mr. Blake’s numerous requests to obtain the expungement between 2002 and 2005, respondent did not adequately respond to his client’s inquiries, did not promptly address the financial issue in dispute, and failed to pursue the matter diligently. While respondent ultimately obtained the expungement and refunded the fee, he did not do so until after Mr. Blake filed a disciplinary complaint against him and |7after formal charges were filed against him. Based on these facts, the committee determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as stipulated to by the parties.

The committee further determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct harmed Mr. Blake by needlessly delaying the resolution of his legal matter. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee concluded that the baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the committee noted respondent’s prior disciplinary record (in the form of the pending sanction in 03-DB-052) and his substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1989). The committee also observed that respondent had failed to provide the ODC with additional information it requested after he replied to Mr. Blake’s disciplinary complaint. The committee found no mitigating factors present.

After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence involving similar misconduct, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to two years of supervised probation.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

03-DB-052 & 05-DB-055

After reviewing the consolidated matters, the disciplinary board determined that both hearing committees were correct in accepting the facts as stipulated to by lathe parties, and the committees’ additional factual findings are not manifestly erroneous. The board further determined that the committees correctly concluded that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as stipulated to by the parties.

The board determined that respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. His misconduct resulted in actual injury to his clients, the public, and the legal system. The board concluded that suspension is the baseline sanction, based upon the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

In aggravation, the board found a prior disciplinary record, a pattern of misconduct, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. The board found no mitigating factors present.

After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence involving similar misconduct, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, with all but three months deferred, followed by a two-year period of supervised probation.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s report and recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and | ^recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

In this matter, the parties have stipulated, and the record supports a finding, that respondent neglected two legal matters, failed to communicate with a client, failed to timely refund unearned fees to a client, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in an investigation. These facts support a finding that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as stipulated to by the parties.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The record also supports a finding that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual harm to his clients, although he did eventually complete both representations. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension.

1 ^Aggravating factors include multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency (respondent’s failure to cooperate with the ODC as noted above), vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. Additionally, the aggravating factor of submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process is present because the record supports a finding that respondent intentionally back-dated his response to Mr. Hansen’s disciplinary complaint. The mitigating factors present are the absence of a prior disciplinary record and the lengthy delay in the disciplinary proceedings.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find guidance from the case of In re: Ford, 09-2524 (La.3/26/10), 30 So.3d 742. In Ford, an attorney with a prior disciplinary record neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with a client, failed to refund a $5,000 unearned fee, made false statements to the disciplinary board and the ODC, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. For this misconduct, we suspended the attorney for one year and one day and ordered her to pay $5,000 in restitution. We find respondent’s misconduct to be similar to the misconduct subject of Ford. However, respondent does not have a prior disciplinary record and does not owe any restitution. As such, imposing a partially deferred suspension is warranted.

Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day, with all but three months deferred, followed by a two-year period of supervised probation.

InDECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Andrew C. Chris-tenberry, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19276, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. It is further ordered that all but three months of the suspension shall be deferred. Following the active portion of the suspension, respondent shall be placed on supervised probation for two years. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the probation monitor, and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension execu-tory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Interestingly, although respondent’s reply to the complaint is dated May 31, 2002, the ODC did not mail notice of the complaint to him until July 11, 2002, and he did not receive same until July 17, 2002.

      . In February 2008, the ODC requested that the formal hearing be continued without date because respondent was out of the state and would not return until March 2008. The hearing committee chair granted the ODC’s request, but the ODC, for some unknown reason, did not file a motion to reschedule the hearing until June 2012, more than four years later.

      . Although the formal charges alleged a violation of Rule 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) based upon respondent’s failure to provide the additional information, the ODC did not pursue the charge when the parties agreed to stipulations of facts and rule violations.

      . With respect to the misconduct subject of 05-DB-055, some clarification of the facts is necessary. The formal charges allege, and the record supports a finding, that respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation by failing to provide additional information upon the ODC's request, in violation of Rule 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Nevertheless, the ODC did not pursue this charge in the stipulations of facts and rule violations. Therefore, we agree with the committee and the disciplinary board's assessment of respondent's failure to cooperate with the ODC as an aggravating factor.

      . Both the hearing committee in 05-DB-055 and the disciplinary board in its consolidated report found that the pending formal charges against respondent in 03-DB-052 amounted to a prior disciplinary record, a factor in aggravation. However, because the disposition of the charges in 03-DB-052 is not yet final, it is improper to consider them as prior discipline.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Robert Wayman TUCKER, Sr.
    No. 2013-B-2820.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 27, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| ;The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent neglected a legal matter, failed to adequately communicate with a client, failed to properly withdraw from a representation, and failed to relinquish an un-negotiated settlement check in a timely manner. Respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Robert Wayman Tucker, Sr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 21920, be publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Jeannie MORRIS.
    No. 2013-B-2829.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 27, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

|, The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent commingled personal funds with client funds in her client trust account and allowed the account to become overdrawn. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rules 1.15 and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Jeannie Morris, Louisiana Bar Roll number 11101, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, fully deferred, subject to a two-year period of probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


author: PER CURIAM. WEIMER, J.,

text:
    Ramanda HOUSTON v. PNK (BOSSIER CITY), INC. d/b/a Boomtown Casino and Hotel and Boomtown Casino.
    No. 2013-CC-1991.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 27, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

|, This application arises from a slip and fall accident which occurred as plaintiff was exiting a bus in the parking lot of Boomtown Casino in Bossier City during rainy weather. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The district court denied summary judgment, and the court of appeal denied writs. This application followed.

To prevail, plaintiff must establish defendant knew or should have known of the defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the use of reasonable care, and that defendant failed to exercise such care. La. Civ.Code art. 2817.1

In its motion for summary judgment, defendant produced evidence establishing the walkway on which plaintiff fell was designed to promote a non-skid surface and to prevent water from pooling in the area. It further submitted evidence indicating no similar accidents occurred in the area in which plaintiff fell.

In opposition to the motion, the sole evidence produced by plaintiff was her own affidavit, which largely reiterated the allegations of her petition. Specifically, she stated the pavement was wet and slippery. She further averred the walkway may have been muddy, because the ground was muddy on either side.

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, the adverse party may not rest on the allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. La.Code Civ. P. art. 967; Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 03-1424 (La.4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002. Once the motion for summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material facts in dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821 (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606.

In the instant case, defendant supported its motion with evidence that the walkway was not defective. Plaintiff presented no evidence establishing any genuine issues of material fact. We are therefore mandated to grant summary judgment in defendant’s favor.

Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of defendant.

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and would deny the writ.

WEIMER, J., dissents and would deny the writ.

HUGHES, J., dissents and would deny the writ.

WEIMER, J.,

dissents and would deny the writ.

hi respectfully dissent and would deny the writ because I believe there remain genuine issues of material fact which preclude the grant of summary judgment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Juan SMITH.
    No. 2014-KK-0141.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 27, 2014.
   In re Smith, Juan; State of Louisiana;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 378-348; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0080.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney FORTENBERRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Fortenberry, Rodney; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 88-CR143187; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0709.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of T.M.
    No. 2013-CJ-2937.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans, No. 2013-227-01-NA-A; None; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1580.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Donna Lasserre SEVERIO v. Mack HILL.
    No. 2013-CJ-2974.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Hill, Mack; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 48,631; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CU 0761.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Cassandra WALLACE, Michael Wallace, Jamone Bradford, Lakosia Fisher and Williams Fisher v. Houston T. PENN, and on Behalf of HOUSTON’S PRIDE AND GLORY HORSE RANCH, and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CC-0243.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Penn, Houston T.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 541,040; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 2085.

Stay denied. Writ denied


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward PROFIT.
    No. 2014-KK-0272.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 10, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 516-275; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0030.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE v. DIXIE BREWING COMPANY, Inc. Dixie Brewing Company, Inc. v. The Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. The Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Dixie Brewing Company, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-0007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2014.
   In re Dixie Brewing Company, Ine.;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2010-04351 C/W 2011-01602 C/W 2011-02122; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0250 C/W 2013-CA-0251 C/W 2013-CA-0252.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sergant CAULFIELD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2014.
   In re Caulfield, Sergant; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 08^671; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-358.

Denied.


text:
    Oscar P. BERTHELOT v. Richard STALDER as Secretary of Louisiana Department of Corrections.
    No. 2013-C-2290.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Berthelot, Nora; — Other; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated January 10, 2014; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 458,174; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1758.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Vincent Mark CASTILLO v. Newell NORMAN, et al.
    No. 2013-CP-2425.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Castillo, Vincent Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 10, 2014, Parish of Jefferson, 24nd Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 710-516, 721-972, 726-005; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-592.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tavares L. HARRELL.
    No. 2013-K-1450.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Harrell, Tavares L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 11-458; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-821.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of F.M.
    No. 2013-CK-1623.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2012-115-01-DQ-F; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1442.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shelby FIELDS.
    No. 2013-KO-1692.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Fields, Shelby; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 500-816; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0674.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Paul Antoine DION, Jr.
    No. 2013-K-1701.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Dion Jr., Paul Antoine; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 571,510; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA1962.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher MARSHALL, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1705.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Marshall Jr., Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. O, No. CR-58-11-1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1189.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James J. KENNY, Jr.
    No. 2013-K-1719.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 486-479; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1819.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky Allen LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1722.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Lewis, Ricky Allen; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 290,060; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00074.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph EDWARDS, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1723.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Edwards III, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 602,488; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0739.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Paul Antoine DION, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Dion Jr., Paul Antoine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 571,510; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1962.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Johnny McINTYRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re McIntyre, Johnny; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 46,207; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-495-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles HENRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1726.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Henry, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 242,742; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-539-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mark SAVOY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1741.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Savoy, Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 07K0206; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00014.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Elton THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Thomas, Elton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 01-1657; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-491.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Peter WEBB Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1745.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Webb Jr., Peter; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07-CR-0481; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0548.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rickey CELESTINE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1746.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Celestine, Rickey; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 43262, 43263; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00036.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John H. SPELLS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Spells, John H.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 508-979; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1148.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Paul ENGLISH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1748.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re English, Paul; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 342-146; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0798.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry L. CLARKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1749.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Clarkson, Terry L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. CR974-2007; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW10-22403.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory Glenn CALDWELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1750.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Caldwell, Gregory Glenn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 285,461; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-569-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Teuna WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1751.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re White, Teuna; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 76,024; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-270-KH.

Denied.

HUGHES, J„ would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kelvin MOSES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1762.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Moses, Kelvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 12-65; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-54.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clarence EDMOND v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Edmond, Clarence; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 96-170312; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00084.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Parker, Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 377-067; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0849.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric Antoine CATES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1768.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Cates, Eric Antoine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 01-09-0202; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA1824.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew HORNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1769.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Horne, Andrew; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 08-4194; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-443.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mozine JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1771.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Mozine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 05-2244; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-517.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert Elijah Lamar MINCEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1774.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Mincey, Robert Elijah Lamar;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, Nos. 18494-06, 5085-08; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH-12-01419.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis Lee MASSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1775.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Massey, Curtis Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 45,356; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-540-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Adrian M. DUNN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1779.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Dunn, Adrian M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 00-148; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2013-KH-496.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Hennessy Richard CHRISTOF.
    No. 2013-KO-1797.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Christof, Hennessy Richard; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07-10-0287; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1995.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roderick CROSSLEY.
    No. 2013-KO-1798.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Crossley, Roderick; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2007-1150F; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,149-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carlton James CHURCH.
    No. 2013-K-1804.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Church, Carlton James; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 277,388; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,809-KA.

Denied.

HUGHES, J„ would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richard R. MILLS.
    No. 2013-K-1813.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 502-749; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0851.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie J. ELLISON, Jr.
    No. 2013-K-1829.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Ellison Jr., Willie J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 07-6289; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-910.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert C. CARTER.
    No. 2013-K-1853.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Carter, Robert C; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-3550; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-932.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Harry Scott HENDERSON and Sherry Lou Talley Henderson v. WINDRUSH OPERATING CO., L.L.C., Thomas S. Gaylord, Mecom Oil, L.L.C., John W. Mecom, III, and John H. Hyatt, Jr.
    No. 2013-C-2502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   In re Henderson, Harry Scott et al; Henderson, Sherry Lou Talley; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 127,384; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,659-CA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


author: BROWN, Chief Judge. CARAWAY, J.,

text:
    Chang Mi Mia CHANDLER, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Christopher N. CHANDLER, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 48,891-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 13, 2013.

      Christopher N. Chandler, In Proper Person, Appellant.
    John N. Bokenfohr, for Appellee.
    Before BROWN, CARAWAY, and MOORE, JJ.
   BROWN, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal by pro se litigant, Christopher Neil Chandler, from an adverse custody ruling made by the trial court on October 19, 2012. These parties have been in court frequently since 2007, operating under an interim custody ruling until the trial court’s October 2012 judgment. Finding no error in the factual findings and determinations made by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Procedural History

Chang Mi Mia Chandler and Christopher Neil Chandler were married on January 10, 2004. Their son, Joshua, was born on January 28, 2004, and their daughter, Isabella, was born on November 4, 2005. Mrs. Chandler filed a petition for legal separation in a covenant marriage pursuant to La. R.S. 9:307 on July 25, 2007. She sought an award of interim spousal support; permanent periodic spousal support; joint custody with her as domiciliary parent and Mr. Chandler with reasonable visitation; child support; use and occupancy of the family home; and an order that Mr. Chandler maintain medical, dental and vision insurance on the children and Mrs. Chandler until further orders of the court.

On August 14, 2007, Mr. Chandler filed an answer and reconventional demand for divorce, making specific allegations of fault on the part of Mrs. Chandler and seeking joint custody with him as domiciliary 12parent; reasonable visitation privileges for Mrs. Chandler; an award of child support; use and occupancy of the family home or fair rental value while Mrs. Chandler lives in the home; and the state and federal tax deductions for both children.

An interim judgment signed on October 22, 2007, provided, inter alia, for joint custody as set forth in a Joint Custody Implementation Plan; and interim spousal/child support in the amount of $1,200 per month to be paid by Mr. Chandler to Mrs. Chandler. Based upon the parties’ agreement that Mr. Chandler, a licensed realtor, would list and sell the family home, Mrs. Chandler gave up her right to use/occupancy of the home and on November 2, 2007, a judgment awarding Mr. Chandler use of the home was signed. This judgment specified that Mr. Chandler was to pay the mortgage, insurance, taxes, and other expenses on the family home until it was sold.

On June 20, 2008, Mrs. Chandler filed the first of three petitions (the others were filed on August 26, 2009, and on April 28, 2011) for issuance of a rule for contempt for past due child support and failure to provide insurance for the children. On July 21, 2009, Mr. Chandler filed a petition for divorce from the parties’ covenant marriage pursuant to La. R.S. 9:307(A)(5). Mrs. Chandler filed an answer on August 6, 2009, admitting all allegations in Mr. Chandler’s petition except for the one stating that all custody and support issues had been determined. The parties were divorced via judgment signed on August 28, 2009.

| ¡¡On November 13, 2009, Mrs. Chandler filed a motion to reset all pending rules. In her motion, Mrs. Chandler asserted that the parties’ custody arrangement under the JCIP was not working because of Mr. Chandler’s unwillingness or inability to abide by its terms and she sought a final judgment of custody with her named as domiciliary parent and Mr. Chandler with specified visitation rights. She also sought the right to re-enter the former matrimonial domicile, alleging that two years after the parties’ agreement that Mr. Chandler would list and sell the home, he had not done so, nor had he paid the mortgage during that time, in spite of the fact that she gave up her right to exclusive use of the parties’ home for that specific purpose. On December 16, 2010, a judgment was signed appointing John Simo-neaux to perform a mental health evaluation of the parties; continuing the custody arrangement as set forth in the JCIP/in-terim judgment of October 22, 2007; ordering Mr. Chandler to pay Mrs. Chandler child support in the amount of $125 per week (a modification of the support amount set forth in the previous judgment but subject to the retroactivity provision set forth in the original judgment). Mr. Chandler’s attorney’s motion to withdraw, which was filed on September 13, 2011, was granted by the trial court on November 15, 2011.

A hearing on the issue of Mr. Chandler’s child support arrearages was held and on October 19, 2012, the parties entered into a consent judgment dismissing all pending contempt matters (there have been three more petitions seeking child support ar-rearages since the consent judgment) and deeming Mr. Chandler’s spousal and child support obligations satisfied as of |4that date. This judgment also dismissed Mrs. Chandler’s claim for permanent spousal support.

The custody hearing was also held and, following two days of trial, the court signed a judgment on October 19, 2012, granting the parties joint custody of the children, naming Mrs. Chandler as domiciliary parent, and awarding physical custody of the children to Mr. Chandler every other weekend and two hours every Tuesday evening. The judgment also set forth a specific custody schedule for holidays and summers. Mr. Chandler was ordered to pay Mrs. Chandler child support in the amount of $752.21 per month effective October 1, 2012. He was also ordered to continue to see his psychiatrist and take his medication and to provide on an annual basis documentation from his treating psychiatrist that he has kept his appointments and taken his medication. Mrs. Chandler was ordered to provide Mr. Chandler with documentation stating that she was no longer required to take medication.

Mr. Chandler has appealed from the October 19, 2012, judgment, urging error in the trial court’s failure to continue the custodial arrangement | fithe parties had enjoyed for five years under an interim consent judgment of equal, shared physical custody of the children.

Discussion

The parties in this case consented to the interim judgment rendered by the court on October 22, 2007. They were awarded joint custody and shared physical custody in alternating seven-day periods with a midweek exchange of the children for approximately five years.

In Lawson v. Lawson, 48,296 (La.App.2d Cir.07/24/13), 121 So.3d 769, 772-773, this court noted that:

In this case, although the 2010 judgment was designated an “interim judgment,” it was a final judgment as to every issue except the choice of school for the child. The 2009 hearing transcript indicates the parties agreed to it; thus, it would be considered a consent judgment and is final until one of the parents sought a modification or they both agreed to a change. Amanda’s contention that the trial court erred in allowing the 2010 judgment to remain in effect is misplaced. The trial court concluded that Berley failed to meet his burden of proof to modify the judgment that was in effect, i.e., the 2010 judgment. Amanda does not argue that the trial court’s substantive finding on that issue was incorrect. Although the 2010 judgment may have been titled “interim,” the record reflects that the parties had reached an agreement as to its terms in court in 2009, and they happily abided by that agreement for basically three years. Thus, when Berley failed to meet his burden of proof (again, finding Amanda does not dispute), the trial court correctly left the 2010 judgment in effect.

As in the Lawson case, the interim judgment in this case was a final judgment as to every issue concerning custody and the parties agreed to its | fiterms which were specifically set forth in a Joint Custody Implementation Plan. It was, in fact, a consent judgment under which the parties operated for five years. To alter the custody arrangement set forth in this initial consent decree, Mrs. Chandler, as the parent who filed seeking a final custody determination, had the burden of showing that there had been a material change in circumstances since the interim decree was entered and that her proposed modification, naming her as domiciliary parent with primary physical custody of the children during the months that they were in school, was in the children’s best interest. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541, 97-0577 (La.02/06/98), 708 So.2d 731; Lawson v. Lawson, supra.

The primary consideration in any child custody determination is the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 131; Atkins v. Atkins, 47,563 (La.App.2d Cir.09/26/12), 106 So.3d 614. The court must consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 134; Atkins, supra. Every child custody case should be decided in light of its own particular set of facts, circumstances and relationships. Atkins, supra; Shivers v. Shivers, 44,596 (La.App.2d Cir.07/01/09), 16 So.3d 500.

A literal articulation of the article 134 factors is not necessary when a trial court reaches a conclusion regarding the best interest of the children. Atkins, supra; Walker v. Walker, 38,982 (La.App.2d Cir.08/18/04), 880 So.2d 956. Furthermore, while helpful, the trial court’s means of weighing and balancing the article 134 factors need not be specifically stated. Atkins, supra.

La. R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b) provides that, to the extent feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody should be shared equally. Yet when the trial court finds that a decree of joint custody is in the best interest of the child, the statute does not necessarily require an equal sharing of physical custody. Chandler v. Chandler, 45,308 (La.App.2d Cir.05/19/10), 37 So.3d 569; Semmes v. Semmes, 45,006 (La.App.2d Cir.12/16/09), 27 So.3d 1024. Substantial time rather than strict equality of time is mandated by the legislative scheme providing for joint custody of children. Id.

Courts have inherent power to determine a child’s best interest and to tailor a custody order that minimizes the risk of harm to the child. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La.1986); Lawson, supra. The trial court has vast discretion in deciding matters of child custody and visitation. Chandler, supra; Slaughter v. Slaughter, 44,056 (La.App.2d Cir.12/30/08), 1 So.3d 788. This discretion is based on the trial court’s opportunity to better evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The trial court’s findings in child custody matters will not be disturbed on review without a showing of clear abuse. Bergeron, supra; Lawson, supra.

According to Mr. Chandler, the trial judge inappropriately limited him in the presentation of his case when, based upon the judge’s announcement at the beginning of the trial that he did not care how many friends or family members the parties brought to testify about their parenting abilities, the parties agreed not to call any character witnesses. Because of the court-appointed expert’s recommendation that 50/50 physical custody be maintained, and the fact that the evidence showed that for five years the | ^custodial arrangement had been in the children’s best interest, Mr. Chandler had no problem dismissing his witnesses. Instead, the trial judge focused on the “biased” testimony of Mr. Chandler’s first ex-wife who “obviously had an ax to grind from previous life circumstances” and inappropriately allowed his opinion of Mr. Chandler, who chose to represent himself and therefore offended the trial court by appearing in his courtroom without an attorney, to taint his view of the evidence and to modify custody contrary to the expert recommendation of the court-appointed expert, Dr. John Simo-neaux.

We construe Mr. Chandler’s assertions about the trial judge’s opening remarks and alleged bias against him as allegations that he did not receive a fair trial. These two issues were also raised by Mr. Chandler in the previous appeal heard by this court in Chandler, 37 So.3d 569, 575. In that case, this court found that the record failed to support Mr. Chandler’s contentions regarding the trial judge’s opening comments and noted that his complaints about the judge’s “bias” against him in that case were simply credibility determinations that unfortunately were not resolved in his favor.

We have reviewed the instant record and find no evidence whatsoever that the trial court limited either party in presenting evidence or calling witnesses. In fact, the record shows just the opposite. There were no limiting remarks by the trial judge, either at the beginning or at any other point in the trial. At the end of Mrs. Chandler’s testimony after her attorney submitted his client’s case, the trial judge gave Mr. Chandler a chance to call witnesses. Specifically, the judge stated, “Call your witness. Who are you going to call?” Mr. Chandler’s response was, “No further witnesses, your honor.” Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence that the trial kludge discriminated against Mr. Chandler as a pro se litigant. The trial judge gave extreme latitude to Mr. Chandler on matters of legal procedure during the hearing in this matter. A comment by the judge about Mr. Chandler being his “own worst enemy” was made directly after Mr. Chandler’s questioning of Mrs. Chandler and was made in conjunction with the judge’s observation that Mr. Chandler came across as controlling, manipulative and hard to deal with as he conversed with Mrs. Chandler — which incidentally gave the court a good representation of how the parties’ interactions typically went.

Addressing Mr. Chandler’s argument that the trial court erred in rejecting the recommendation of Dr. Simoneaux to continue the 50/50 physical custody arrangement and in significantly reducing his time with the children, we note that the trial judge referred to the psychologist’s report throughout the hearing and again during his oral reasons for judgment. The court accepted many of the recommendations and observations made by Dr. Simoneaux, yet when it came to the final determination of custody, the judge stated that it had more information before him to consider, in addition to the psychologist’s report, such as evidence of Mr. Chandler’s lack of financial responsibility and other instances of irresponsibility and bad judgment, together with problems of credibility and several negative personality traits the judge observed which affected Mr. Chandler’s ability and/or willingness to cooperate with Mrs. Chandler in the day-to-day care and raising of the children.

|inIn his report, Dr. Simoneaux observed:

Of course, I have concerns about Chris being less than responsible with regard to child support. If there is evidence that he is not able to pay child support, then this needs to be addressed by the court very firmly. Chris claims that he is very successful with his business. He has so many activities going, that if he cannot pay child support because he is simply not making enough money, then he needs to spend more time directed in this activit[y]. He boasts about his degree of community involvement, and also boasts about his business acumen. I would hope that he could prioritize his children’s financial needs over his commitment to the community. His children should come first. He says his children are a high priority in his life, then he needs to demonstrate that financially. ... If he is not willing to [honor his child support obligations faithfully], or that he holds back on his work voluntarily in order to prevent having to pay child support, then I would suggest that the court deals very forcefully with this. Chris needs to spend that money on his children rather than his girlfriend. Sometimes, he clearly gets his priorities] distorted.

At the custody hearing, held 16 months after Dr. Simoneaux’s evaluation and report, the testimony in this case established that:

*Mr. Chandler was voluntarily underemployed since the parties’ separation and divorce, having reported income of $66,653 in 2007, the year that the parties separated; $21,983 in 2008; $7,810 in 2009; $6,000 in 2010; and $15,600 in 2011.
*Mr. Chandler lived in a small, one-bedroom apartment, for which he paid approximately $1,000 per month; he moved into this apartment after he allowed the marital home to go into foreclosure, having induced Mrs. Chandler to vacate the home and let him live there so he could get the house ready to sell.
*Instead, Mr. Chandler lived in the home for 18 months without ever paying the mortgage note before the bank seized the home and the equity was seized to satisfy a pre-existing child support obligation owed by Mr. Chandler.
*Mr. Chandler filed for bankruptcy and a marital retirement account was seized, also to satisfy child support arrearages. He also allowed mandated health insurance coverage on the children to lapse and they were relegated to Medicaid coverage.
*Mr. Chandler did not take his medication for bipolar disorder as prescribed, which sometimes resulted in unpredictable and irrational behavior.
|,/"There were several occasions on which Mr. Chandler left the two young children unattended or unsupervised.
*Mr. Chandler had his girlfriend and her child, who lived in Texas, spend the night at his one-bedroom apartment when his children were there, and saw nothing wrong with that arrangement, contending that it was good for his kids to see an example of a loving relationship.
*Mr. Chandler was not cooperative with his ex-wife when it came to school and homework assignments for the children; many times that the children were with him, their assignments were not completed or turned in, and he did not keep them current on their reading assignments or studying/preparation for tests.
*Mr. Chandler was not appropriately concerned about the children’s medical and dental needs on a consistent basis as evidenced by his inability or refusal to replace his son’s broken/lost glasses for several months and his failure to keep them covered by medical insurance.

In decreasing the amount ot time physical custody that Mr. Chandler would have, the court stressed that it did not find him to be a bad parent or one who did not love his children. Instead, stressing that the overriding consideration in this case was the best interest of the children, the court determined that the alternating seven-day periods, with midweek exchanges, were no longer working, in light of the above concerns and the fact that the children were now school-age. See, Gaydon v. Gaydon, 45,446 (La.App.2d Cir.05/12/10), 36 So.3d 449; Semmes, supra. The court concluded that Mrs. Chandler could better provide the stability that the two children need during the school year. While the trial judge was not required to do a formal analysis of the factors set forth in La. C.C. art. 134 or to give equal weight to the factors, see, Corral v. Corral, 47,294 (La.App.2d Cir.06/13/12), 93 So.3d 793, we note that the evidence shows that the parties were equal as to factors (1), (2) and (12); factors (4) and (11) favored Mr. Chandler; and factors (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) weighed in favor of Mrs. Chandler. Factor (9) did not come into play in this case.

We find that the record in this case supports the conclusion that Mrs. Chandler established that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the 2007 interim consent decree in that 50/50 shared custody was no longer working because the children were school-age and based upon Mr. Chandler’s demonstrated inability to cooperate in the equal co-parenting of the children with Mrs. Chandler. We further find no error in the trial court’s determination that the best interest of the children would be met by naming Mrs. Chandler as domiciliary parent with primary custody of the children during the time they were in school and giving Mr. Chandler physical custody of the children every other weekend and 5:00-7:00 p.m. every Tuesday and on holidays and during the summer as specified in the trial court’s judgment.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

CARAWAY, J., concurs with written reasons.

CARAWAY, J.,

concurring.

hi concur in the affirmation of the trial court’s custody ruling.

I respectfully disagree that the “material change in circumstances” rule under Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541, 97-0577 (La.2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, has application for any change to a custody arrangement to which the parties consented with an “Interim Judgment.”

In Trettin v. Trettin, 37,260 (La.App.2d Cir.3/17/03), 839 So.2d 1272, this court addressed an “interim” custody judgment. We found that it was a temporary custody ruling with no statutory basis in our existing law. Nevertheless, we compared it to the former “provisional” custody allowed prior to the 1990 changes to our divorce law. To the extent that the parties consent to such interim arrangement and the court issues an interlocutory judgment outside codal authority, such a ruling does not resolve custody in the same manner as the consent judgment addressed in Evans v. Lungrin. The hearing for a final judgment for custody may soon follow on either party’s rule to show cause and the merits of any custody dispute may then be decided. Thus, the interlocutory “interim” judgment in Trettin v. Trettin was found not appealable as either party could return to court without prejudice from that judgment to seek custody under the test of La. C.C. art. 134 for the best interest of the child.

That same type of interim agreement was reached in September 2007 by the Chandlers immediately after their proceedings for divorce had begun. A short time later, if either party had filed a rule urging a change in the interim sharing of custody, that party would not have to show a material [¡.change in circumstances. That’s why they limited their agreement as “interim.”

Yet, this “Interim Judgment” lingered for years, and now change of custody is sought. In such settings, while the application of the multiple factor test of Civil Code Article 134 is the legal measure without the Evans v. Lungrin burden, the party opposing the change of custody may receive a much greater weight for factor 4 — “the length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.” La. C.C. art. 134(4). The party moving for a final custody determination must show that altering an extended interim sharing arrangement weighs in favor of the best interest of the child. Yet, if the interim arrangement lasted truly for a short time, this fourth factor may be inconsequential.

      . Most of the parties' appearances in court have been related to Mr. Chandler’s nonpayment of child support. Mr. Chandler and his first wife, Elizabeth Toups Chandler (now Harrel), also had child support and custody disputes which required court resolution. See, Chandler v. Chandler, 45,308 (La.App.2d Cir.05/19/10), 37 So.3d 569.

      . On August 18, 2007, Mrs. Chandler filed an amending petition seeking an article 102 divorce, alleging that the parties had not obtained the counseling required by La. R.S. 9:307(B).

      . Apparently the JCIP provided for equal shared physical custody of the children; the JCIP is not in the record.

      . Mrs. Chandler also sought an award of attorney fees related to the collection of past due child support.

      . While the parties and the trial court have used the term "visitation” to refer to the Mr. Chandler’s custodial time with the children, we note that "visitation" as provided for in La. C.C. art. 136 applies only when a parent is not awarded custody or joint custody. The time that parents with joint legal custody such as Mr. and Mrs. Chandler share with their children is more accurately described as physical custody allocation pursuant to a joint custody plan. La. R.S. 9:335; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541, 97-0577 (La.02/06/98), 708 So.2d 731; Lunney v. Lunney, 11-1891 (La.App. 1st Cir.02/10/12), 91 So.3d 350, writ denied, 12-0610 (La.04/04/12), 85 So.3d 130.

      . Both parties have a diagnosis of bipolar disorder.

      . There was an issue regarding the timeliness of Mr. Chandler’s appeal which was resolved when this court, in a writ grant on July 11, 2013, reversed a ruling by the trial court which had granted a motion filed by Mrs. Chandler regarding the appeal’s timeliness and remanded the matter to the trial court for perfection of a devolutive appeal. Between the October 19, 2012, judgment and the writ grant, Mrs. Chandler has filed three more petitions in rule for contempt for past due child support and attorney fees. In a judgment signed on March 20, 2013, Mr. Chandler was found to be in contempt and a schedule for the payment of the arrearages was established. The record shows that partial payments have been made.

      . Dr. Simoneaux described this as a "self-absorbed, grandiose, ego-inflation” which tends to distort his judgment and perception of "reality.”

      . Article 134 provides that the court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. Such factors may include: (1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child. (2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child. (3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs. (4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment. (5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. (6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child. (7) The mental and physical health of each party. (8) The home, school, and community history of the child. (9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference. (10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party. (11) The distance ■ between the respective residences of the parties. (12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.


author: KEATY, Judge.

text:
    Kevin W. JONES, Sr. v. TOWN OF WOODWORTH, et al.
    No. 12-1349.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Dec. 26, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied March 19, 2014.
    Edward Larvadain, Jr., Attorney at Law, Alexandria, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Kevin W. Jones, Sr.
    Randall B. Keiser, D. Heath Trahan, Keiser Law Firm, Alexandria, Louisiana, for Defendants/Appellees, Town of Wood-worth, David Sikes.

      Court composed of JIMMIE C. PETERS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.
   KEATY, Judge.

| plaintiff, Kevin Jones, Sr., appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the Town of Woodworth (the Town) and Officer David Sikes. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is reversed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 18, 2009, Jones was traveling north on U.S. Highway 165 when he stopped at a convenience store located in Woodworth, Louisiana. Officer Sikes, who was parked across from the convenience store, ran a license plate check on Jones’ vehicle. The license plate check revealed that the driver’s license registered to the license plate was suspended. After Jones re-entered U.S. Highway 165, Officer Sikes followed him and subsequently pulled him over for suspicion that Jones was driving with a suspended license. Officer Sikes thereafter issued four tickets to Jones for: (1) driving under suspension; (2) unlawful use of a driver’s license; (3) no insurance; and (4) improper muffler/dual pipes.

According to the petition for damages, Officer Sikes told Jones that his vehicle was going to be towed and that he would have to post a cash bond in the total amount of the four tickets to get the hold on his vehicle released. Thereafter, the towing company would return Jones’ vehicle to him after he paid the towing charge and accrued storage fees. Jones explained to Officer Sikes that he worked out of his vehicle for his job with a tire repair service, and he objected to having his vehicle towed because his brother was less than three miles away and available to retrieve Jones’ vehicle. Despite Jones’ request, Officer Sikes had Jones’ vehicle towed from the scene. The tickets totaled in excess of $1,000. Jones was not able 12to afford that amount or the towing charge and accumulated storage fees. As a result, he lost his job, his vehicle, and his ability to provide for his family.

Jones subsequently filed suit against the Town and Officer Sikes alleging that he was stopped without probable cause for the purpose of generating funds for the Town. After the Town and Officer Sikes deposed Jones, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

Jones appealed the trial court’s judgment and asserted for the first time that he was seeking recovery for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Defendants removed this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, and Jones moved for remand. The magistrate judge held that Jones did not plead a federal claim in his state court petition and had not yet technically asserted a federal claim at the time of the removal because the reference to a federal recovery did not come in the form of an amended complaint. The federal district judge adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation, and this case was remanded back to this court.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Jones contends: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that the acts of Officer Sikes, who acted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, did not violate the constitutions of the United States and Louisiana which prohibit unlawful search and seizure; (2) the trial court erred in ruling that Jones, passing through the Town, observing the laws of the town as he passed through, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy on his license plate; and (3) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were genuine issues as to material facts.

1,.¡“Summary judgments are reviewed de novo on appeal, with the reviewing court using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate; whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Louisiana Safety Ass’n. of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass’n., 09-23, p. 5 (La.6/26/09), 17 So.3d 350, 353 (citing Power Mktg. Direct, Inc. v. Foster, 05-2023 (La.9/6/06), 938 So.2d 662).

Expectation of Privacy

In support of his first assignment of error, Jones contends that his constitutional rights were violated when Officer Sikes, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, randomly ran Jones’ license plate to find violations against him in order to generate funds for the Town. In support of his second assignment of error, Jones contends that he had a subjective expectation of privacy on his license plate such that Officer Sikes’ random run of his license plate numbers was an unwarranted intrusion into his privacy.

In opposition, Defendants contend that federal and state courts have held that police officers may run a search on a license plate without implicating constitutional protections. Defendants allege that police officers do not need either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to run a license plate check. Defendants contend that the information police officers gather from those license plate checks can provide them with the reasonable suspicion necessary to make a traffic stop during which they can confirm or dispel their suspicions.

Upon review, we must first determine whether Jones had an expectation of privacy in his license plate before we decide whether Officer Sikes needed probable cause or reasonable suspicion to randomly run Jones’ license plate. In |4that regard, both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. These constitutional provisions, however, apply only if an individual invoking their protection can prove that the government has infringed upon a legitimate expectation of privacy. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). “Federal and state constitutional protections against unreasonable searches exist only when an individual has an actual expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” State v. Skinner, 08-2522, p. 6 (La.5/5/09), 10 So.3d 1212, 1215-16. Absent a legitimate expectation of privacy, there can be no “search” subject to the warrant requirement. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3324, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). Thus, a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy when two requirements are met. State v. Ragsdale, 381 So.2d 492 (La.1980). First, the person must have a “subjective expectation of privacy” in the place searched or item seized. Id. at 497. Second, the expectation of privacy must be one which “society ... is prepared to recognize as being reasonable.” Id.

Jones argues that he has a subjective expectation of privacy in his license plate. He has offered no legal authority, however, showing that society would recognize an expectation of privacy in an automobile’s license plate number. To the contrary, a survey of federal and state cases addressing this issue have concluded that a license plate is an object which is constantly exposed to public view and in which a person, thus, has no reasonable expectation of privacy, and that consequently, conducting a random license plate check is legal.

For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile’s vehicle | ¡identification number. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986). Other jurisdictions have extended this holding and determined that a law enforcement officer can randomly check license plate numbers without intruding on a defendant’s privacy rights. See State v. Myrick, 282 N.J.Super. 285, 659 A.2d 976 (Law Div.1995); see also United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972 (10th Cir.1989). In State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I.1997), the court held that a computer check of the defendant’s license plate was not a Fourth Amendment “search” because license “plates and the information behind them are within the control and custody of the state through the Registry of Motor Vehicles.” The court in Bjerke further held that “there can be no expectation of privacy in one’s license plate when it hangs from the front and the rear of one’s vehicle for all the world to see.” Id.

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has put the matter plainly by holding that “[a] motorist has no privacy interest in her license plate number.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir.1999). The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal has further held that a criminal defendant has no expectation of privacy in a license plate on a stolen vehicle parked in his driveway in plain view of the public. State v. Nicholson, 95-2526 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/15/96), 669 So.2d 1280.

We agree with the reasoning of the foregoing decisions in that an individual has no privacy interest in his or her license plate, and that a random license plate check does not constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth | (Amendment and the Louisiana Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed in this regard.

Probable Cause and/or Reasonable Suspicion

As discussed above, Jones contends that his constitutional rights were violated when Officer Sikes, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, randomly ran Jones’ license plate. Jones assumes that a police officer needs some level of suspicion before he can legally run a check on a license plate number on a vehicle in a public location. As discussed above and because Jones has no expectation of privacy in his license plate number, Officer Sikes could legally run a search on the license plate number without a reasonable suspicion or probable cause that Jones was committing a crime. Thus, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed in this regard.

Genuine Issue of Material Facts

Jones argues that the Town and Officer Sikes gathered evidence from him illegally, i.e., stopped him without probable cause for the purpose of finding violations for which he could be ticketed to generate funds for the Town. In his petition, Jones alleged that Officer Sikes chose to have Jones’ vehicle towed despite Jones’ request that his brother, who was nearby, be allowed to retrieve the vehicle because Jones needed the vehicle in connection with his employment. Jones further alleged that because he was unable to afford to pay the tickets or the towing fee and accrued storage fees, he lost his vehicle and his job and was unable to provide for his family.

In its motion for summary judgment, Defendants cited Hopper v. Bills, 255 La. 628, 232 So.2d 296 (1970), in support of its assertion that Officer Sikes was vested with the authority to have Jones’ vehicle towed.

|7In Hopper, a State Police desk sergeant called a wrecker service to remove a log truck and trailer that was overturned in a ditch. The plaintiff, the truck’s owner, later filed suit against the wrecker sendee seeking damages for what he alleged was the illegal seizure and wrongful detention of his truck and trailer. The trial court found in favor of the defendant, the court of appeal affirmed, and the supreme court granted certiorari. See Hopper v. Bills, 220 So.2d 769 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ issued, 254 La. 281, 223 So.2d 408 (1969). The evidence showed that the overturned truck was located between four and thirteen feet from the blacktopped portion of the roadway on a Saturday afternoon, a time of heavy travel, and that it “was a source of curiosity for passing motorists,” which caused vehicular slowing and traffic congestion in the area. Hopper, 232 So.2d at 299. The evidence further disclosed that the plaintiff was not present when the accident was investigated and there were no license plates on the truck. In affirming the court of appeal, the supreme court held that the State Trooper “did not abuse his discretion in making a judgment to have plaintiffs vehicle removed from the ditch and towed away.” Id. The supreme court rejected, however, the notion that the State Trooper’s actions were authorized because of custom. Instead, the supreme court looked to the facts and circumstances surrounding the towing of plaintiffs truck and determined that “the State Trooper acted with immediate speed in order to eliminate what he thought was a public hazard.” Id. at 300.

In the instant case, Defendants did not present any evidence to dispute Jones’ assertion that his brother was available to pick up his vehicle in lieu of it being towed. In addition, the record fails to disclose any facts regarding the location of Jones’ vehicle when Officer Sikes pulled him over and what effect, if any, Jones’ stopped vehicle had on the flow of traffic and/or the safety of the 18motoring public. More specifically, Officer Sikes’ affidavit is silent regarding his decision to have Jones’ vehicle towed. Thus, genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the Town of Woodworth and Officer David Sikes.

REVERSED.

      . The references to federal law herein are made because federal jurisprudence interpreting the federal constitution are persuasive authority to interpreting our own constitution. See State v. White, 321 So.2d 491 (La.1975).