author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFICATION AND REGULATION OF COURT INTERPRETERS.
    No. SC13-304.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 27, 2014.
    Ronald N. Fiearrotta, Chair, Court Interpreter Certification Board Committee, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

The Court Interpreter Certification Board has filed a petition asking this Court to consider amendments to the Florida Rules for Certification and Regulation of Court Interpreters. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. We adopt the proposed amendments as submitted.

BACKGROUND

This Court adopted the Florida Rules for Certification and Regulation of Court Interpreters in 2006. In adopting the rules, we created the Court Interpreter Certification Board, defined its functions and powers, and established the court interpreter certification program. The purpose of these rules is to provide “a reliable certification program” for the state court system so that persons “who may be disadvantaged by a language barrier” may receive the assistance needed to “fully participative] in the judicial process.”

In its petition, the Court Interpreter Certification Board (Board) states that since its authorization in 2006, the court interpreter program has made substantial progress toward the goal of eliminating language barriers in the courts. However, the Board seeks amendments to the rules to strengthen the program and better equip the courts to provide effective interpreting services and thereby give equal access and full participation to persons affected by language barriers.

As adopted in 2006, the Rules for Certification and Regulation of Court Interpreters (Court Interpreter Rules) established two levels of expertise for foreign language interpreters working in the courts: (1) “certified” interpreters and (2) “duly qualified” interpreters. To become a certified interpreter, an applicant was required to attend a training program offered by the Office of the State Courts Administrator (OSCA); pass a written examination; pass an oral proficiency examination unless the applicant had already passed an equivalent exam in another state or held a certificate from the federal court system; take an oath to uphold the code of conduct for court interpreters; undergo a background check if required by the Board; and comply with continuing education requirements. To be designated a “duly qualified interpreter,” an applicant was required to obtain a passing grade on an examination, attend the OSCA training program, be “familiar with” the court interpreters’ code of conduct, and have “an understanding of basic legal terminology in both languages.”

According to a comprehensive study undertaken by the Supreme Court Commission on Trial Court Performance and Accountability (Commission), the current certification program needs improvement. The Commission’s critique can be summarized as follows: (1) there is inadequate incentive for interpreters to obtain certification; (2) the qualifications needed to be considered “duly qualified” are insufficient; and (3) the differing levels of qualifications needed for the two categories have created a double standard under which certified interpreters are required to meet rigorous standards and “duly qualified” interpreters are not. The Commission recommended that the court interpreter program be modified to (1) encourage court interpreters to become certified; (2) strengthen the provision of interpreting services in the courts; (3) help judges select the most qualified interpreters available for service in court proceedings; and (4) eliminate the disparity in the qualifications interpreters are required to possess to perform interpreting services in the courts.

The Board agrees with the Commission’s critique of the existing court interpreter rules and is proposing the instant amendments in order to strengthen court interpreting services. One specific problem identified by the Board is that too often uncertified interpreters are providing services in the court system under the designation “duly qualified,” and there is no provision by law or court rule that expresses a preference for certified over “duly qualified” interpreters. To remedy this and related deficiencies, the Board proposes that we revamp the certification program.

The centerpiece of the Board’s proposal is the creation of three “designations” of interpreters recognized as qualified to provide interpreting services in the courts instead of the current two-tiered classification system. And instead of the current system in which a “duly qualified” interpreter can keep that designation indefinitely, the proposed new classification system will include the expectation that interpreters will progress from lower to higher levels of expertise so that the overall quality of interpreting services available to the courts will improve. We adopt the amendments as proposed.

AMENDMENTS

The amendments include changing the name of this body of rules to the “Florida Rules for Certification and Regulation of Spoken Language Court Interpreters.” (The emphasized words are being added.) This amendment will limit and clarify the scope of this body of rules.

In part I of the rules, rule 14.100 is amended to provide definitions of the three “designations” or categories of court interpreters recognized under the new rules and also definitions of terms used in the new system of more rigorous testing and qualifications for designated interpreters. Also in part I, rule 14.110 is amended to change the composition of the Board and to revise the provisions on the powers and duties of the Board.

The three “designations” of interpreters are: (1) certified court interpreter; (2) language-skilled interpreter; and (3) provisionally approved interpreter. The certified court interpreter designation signifies the highest level of expertise. The language-skilled interpreter designation signifies an interpreter who has reached the same level of proficiency as a certified interpreter but is expert in a language for which there is no state certification exam. The provisionally approved interpreter designation is for the entry-level, minimally qualified interpreter. Under the amended rules, when a state certification exam for a particular language becomes available, a language-skilled interpreter is required to take and pass the exam to become certified within two years. A provisionally approved interpreter is also required to complete the process of becoming certified within two years. The term “duly qualified interpreter” is redefined to mean a certified court interpreter, a language-skilled interpreter, or, if no certified or language-skilled interpreter is available, a provisionally approved interpreter. Thus the term “duly qualified interpreter” can mean any of the three recognized designations but includes a provisionally approved interpreter only if neither a certified nor a language-skilled interpreter is available.

In part II of the rules, the amendments set out the qualifications required for attaining each of the three designations. Under the amendments to rule 14.200, all applicants for designation must attend a two-day training program presented by OSCA or an approved training provider; pass a written exam; document twenty hours of courtroom observation; take an oath to uphold the court interpreters’ code of conduct; pass a background check administered by the Board under published board operating procedures; agree to earn sixteen credits of continuing education; and pay an application fee.

New rule 14.205 provides the requirements for certified court interpreters. In addition to the basic requirements applicable to all three designations, applicants for the designation of “certified court interpreter” must pass an oral performance exam (unless entitled to a waiver based on certification in the federal courts or passage of an exam in another state with equivalent requirements) or, when a full performance exam is not available in the applicant’s language of expertise, oral proficiency interviews to demonstrate functional speaking ability in English and the applicant’s non-English language, followed by an abbreviated oral exam.

New rule 14.215 provides the criteria for language-skilled interpreters. “Language-skilled” is the designation given to court interpreters who are skilled in a language for which no state certification examination is available. In addition to the basic requirements applicable to all three designations, applicants for the “language-skilled” designation must pass an oral proficiency interview to demonstrate functional speaking ability in English and the applicant’s non-English language. A language-skilled interpreter must pass a state certification exam within two years of the exam becoming available.

Revised rule 14.220 provides the requirements for provisionally approved interpreters. To hold this designation an applicant must meet the general requirements applicable to all interpreters and make an overall score of sixty-five percent on the oral performance exam and no less than sixty percent on each section, and must complete these requirements within two years of the initial OSCA training seminar. Persons holding the “provisionally approved” designation must then complete the requirements for certification within two years of being provisionally approved unless granted an extension by the Board in exceptional circumstances.

The amendments to rule 14.230 address renewal of designations, and amended rule 14.240 addresses the requirements for designated interpreters to maintain their credentials, including continuing education and experience requirements. The rules specify the renewal periods and time limits, but the Board is given discretion to allow extensions of time in special circumstances, which will provide some flexibility in the application of the rules.

Part III of the rules is the Code of Professional Conduct for court interpreters. The code itself is unchanged, but rule 14.800 is amended to recognize that the code obligates not only designated interpreters but also undesignated interpreters working in the courts by court appointment in circumstances where no designated interpreters are available. This new policy is also expressed in an amendment to part IV, which provides disciplinary rules and procedures. Amended rule 14.400 gives the Board the authority to bring disciplinary action in certain circumstances against court-appointed interpreters who hold no designation from the Board if they perform interpreting services in court (due to the unavailability of a designated interpreter) on a regular or recurring basis.

Rule 14.440, which addresses confidentiality in disciplinary proceedings involving court interpreters, is amended to make it consistent with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(3)(B).

The other amendments being adopted are revisions that are necessary to make terminology consistent and otherwise adapt the existing rules to the new classification and regulatory system described above.

CONCLUSION

We express our gratitude to the Court Interpreter Certification Board for its dedication and diligence in formulating the proposals brought to us in this proceeding. We adopt the proposed rule amendments as shown in the appendix to this opinion. Additions are indicated by underlining. Deletions are shown in struck-through type. The amendments will take effect at 12:01 a.m. on May 1, 2014.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFICATION AND REGULATION OF SPOKEN LANGUAGE COURT INTERPRETERS

PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 14.100. Definitions

(a) Certified Court Interpreter. An interpreter who has completed the-manda-teryall requirements as-defined ■ by- these rules- andfor certification in accordance with these rules and holds a valid certificate as a certified court-interpreter- issued by the Office of the State Courts Administrator and is named in the registry of certified-court-interpreters maintained by the Office of 'the State Courts Administra-

(b) Language Skilled. A designation reserved for interpreters who have completed all requirements in accordance with these rules, but who are seeking certification in a spoken language for which there is no state-certifying examination, such persons holding a valid certificate issued by the Office of the State Courts Administrator.

(c) Provisionally Approved. A designation reserved for interpreters of spoken languages for which a state-certifying examination is available, who, although not yet certified, have passed the oral performance exam at a lesser qualifying prescribed level and hold a valid certificate issued by the Office of the State Courts Administrator.

(fed) Duly Qualified Interpreter. An interpreter who has obtained a passing grade on a written examination, who has attended-a two-day-orientation program offered-by the Office-of-the State Courts Administrator-r-who is familiar- with — Past ■III-of-these rules, and-who-has an understanding-of-basie-legal terminology in-bot-h languages is certified or language skilled, or, if a certified or language skilled interpreter is unavailable, a provisionally approved interpreter, as these terms are defined under sections (a) through (c) above.

(ee) Board. The Court Interpreter Certification Board.

(f) Compliance Period. The two-year period beginning upon official designation as a certified, language skilled, or provisionally approved court interpreter.

(dg) Court. Any county, circuit or district court of this state or the Supreme Court of Florida.

(h) State-Certifying Examination. A full or abbreviated board-approved oral performance examination designed to objectively measure whether candidates possess the minimum levels of language knowledge and fluency and interpreting skills required to perform competently during court proceedings.

(i) Written Examination. An initial qualifying or screening examination designed to measure a candidate’s literacy in English, familiarity with, and usage of, court-related terms, and/or knowledge of matters regarding interpreter ethics and related professional conduct.

Ci) Full Oral Performance Examination. An oral examination which measures language knowledge and fluency in both English and non-English languages, as well as the ability to successfully render meaning in target and source languages in simultaneous interpretation, consecutive interpretation, and sight translation of documents.

(k) Abbreviated Oral Performance Examination. An oral examination assessing functional proficiency to competently interpret simultaneously in court from English to a non-English language, and prerequisite to which candidates must satisfy board-approved oral proficiency interviews in both English and non-English languages.

(i) Oral Proficiency Interview. A standardized language proficiency interview assessing functional speaking ability in both English and non-English languages.

(m) Modes of Court Interpretation. Simultaneous interpretation, consecutive interpretation, and sight translation of documents in a court setting.

Rule 14.110. Court Interpreter Certification Board

(a) Board Composition. The Court Interpreter Certification Board is created to supervise the certificationa process by which interpreters may become certified or otherwise duly qualified, and in accordance with which the conduct of all court-appointed persons engaged in foreignspo-ken language interpreting in the courts shall be governed. The board shall be under the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court of Florida. It shall be com-prisedcomposed of ten persons, appointed by the chief justice, as follows:

(1) two county court judges;
(2) three circuit court judges;
(3) three trial court administrators; and
(4) twoone federally certified court interpreters; and
(5) one state certified court interpreter.

(b)-(d) [No Change]

(e) Terms. The initial terms of the board members shall be as follows:'

(1)One year: a judicial member, a trial court administrator and an interpreter member;
(2-) -Two — years;—two judicial — members and-a-trial-cour-t-administratory-and
(3) Three years: two judicial-members? a trial court administrator and an interpreter member.

Following-the-initial-terms, ■ aAll terms shall be three years. Members shall be eligible for reappointment.

(f) Duties. The duties of the board shall include:

(1) thecertification, regulation, discipline, suspension, and revocation of certification of court interpreters;
(2) designation, regulation, and discipline of language skilled and provisionally approved court interpreters,' as well as suspension and revocation of designation upon failure to become certified within prescribed time frames;
(3) regulation and discipline of court-appointed interpreters who, although neither certified nor otherwise qualified in accordance with these rules, are permitted to provide court interpreting services when a certified, language skilled, or provisionally approved interpreter is unavailable;

(24) the authority to periodically review and adopt rules — governing—itsnew or amended board operating procedures consistent with these rules; and

(36) the authority to make recommendations to the supreme court regarding language access issues and the amendment of thesecourt rules relating to provision of spoken language court interpreting services; and

(6)performance of such other assignments relating to provision of spoken language court interpreting services as may be directed by the chief justice of the supreme court.

(g)Fees. The board shall have the authority to recommend to the supreme court such fees as the board may deem necessary to permit it to carry out its duties, including, but not limited to, orientation fees, examination fees, application fees, and renewal fees, and late fees. All such fees shall be made payable to the State of Florida and shall be non-refundable.

(h) Records; Registry. The board shall maintain records and minutes of its meetings and all other official actions. It shall also maintain a record of all continuing education hoar-s-or- credits earned by certified , language skilled, and provisionally approved court interpreters. It shall also maintain &■ registryseparate registries containing the names, addresses,-dates-:of certification,' identificationdesignation number, renewal date, and geographic areas where services are available for each officially designated court interpreter.

(i) [No Change]

PART II. INTERPRETER CERTIFICATIONDESIGNATIONS

Rule 14.200. Qualification

(a) Exclusive Designations. Individuals providing court interpreting services shall be designated certified court interpreters, language skilled, or provisionally approved upon qualifying in accordance with these rules. As a descriptive term employed in relation to the provision of court interpreting services, “duly qualified” refers exclusively to those persons who are certified or language skilled, or, if a certified or language skilled interpreter is unavailable, a provisionally approved interpreter.

(b) General Prerequisites. Unless otherwise provided, Aall applicants completing prerequisites for cerfcifieationany of the three official state-level court interpreter designations must:

(al) as an initial prerequisite, attend a two-day orientation program administered by the Office of the State Courts Administrator or board-approved training provider;

(b2) pass a written examination approved by the board, which shall include an ethics component;

(e3) pass — an—oral proficiency-examination approved by the.board-unless-they qualify- for ■■ waiver--of-the-examination requirement-pursuant to rule 14.210submit an approved reporting form documenting completion of 20 hours of courtroom observation;

(44) take an oath to uphold the Code of Professional Conduct adopted in these rules;

(e5) undergo and pass a background check ifaccording to standards prescribed by the board and published in board operating procedures; -and:

(f6) agree to obtain hours orl6 credits of continuing education as-deter-mined-by the boardfrom a continuing education program approved pursuant- to-these-rulesby the board; and

(7) submit an application for certification, language skilled, or provisionally approved designation and enclose an initial application fee in an amount set by the supreme court.

Rule 14.205. Certified Court Interpreter Designation

(a) Preferred Appointment. The certified court interpreter designation represents the highest qualified state-level interpreter designation and shall be the preferred designation when selecting court-appointed interpreters, arranging for contractual interpreter services, and making staff hiring decisions.

(b) Requirements. Applicants seeking designation as a certified court interpreter must:

(1) pass a full oral performance examination approved by the board, unless qualifying for a waiver of the examination requirement under rule 14.210, or, in the event a full oral performance examination is unavailable, pass a board-approved abbreviated oral examination and demonstrate functional speaking ability in English and non-English languages through oral proficiency interviews as a prerequisite to taking the abbreviated examination and qualifying for certification;

(2) meet all general prerequisites under rule 14.200; and

(3) complete the process leading to designation within two years following the orientation required under rule 14.200(b)(1), unless extended by the board in exceptional circumstances.

(c) Court-Employed Interpreters. Applicants who are selected as employee interpreters, but who are not certified at the time of court employment, shall become certified within one year of being employed in a court interpreting position. The one-year requirement may be modified by the board on a case-by-case basis, if necessary, only in exceptional circumstances.

Rule 14.210. Waiver of Examination Requirement

(a) Federal Certification. Upon presentation of proof satisfactory to the board, the oral proficiencyperformance examination requirement shall be waived for anyone holding a federal courts certifícate which is issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and whose name appears on the registry of federally certified interpreters. No other component of certification is waived by this rule.

(b) Reciprocity. Upon presentation of proof satisfactory to the board, the examination requirement shall be waived for anyone who has passed an equivalent examination in another state, if in accordance with board-approved requisites.

Rule 14.215. Language Skilled Designation

(a) Preferred Appointment. The language skilled designation represents the highest qualified state-level interpreter designation next beneath full certification and shall be the preferred designation over non-designated interpreters when selecting court-appointed interpreters in the area of the language skilled individual’s linguistic expertise.

(b) Requirements. Applicants skilled in a spoken language for which there is no state-certifying examination may seek designation as language skilled interpreters upon:

(1) passing an approved oral proficiency interview in English and the non-English language as an assessment of functional speaking ability; and

(2) meeting all general prerequisites under rule 14.200,

(c) Conditional Designation. In the event a language-specific state-certifying examination becomes available, language skilled interpreters shall be required to take and pass the certifying examination within two years of notice of its availability. Failure to become certified within this two-year period shall result in loss of the language skilled designation, unless the board approves an extension in exceptional circumstances.

Rule 14.220. Issuance of CertificateP-rovisionally Approved Designation

■Upon — satisfactory—completion—of the specified-requirements, the board shall issue-a- certificate which - shall include an identification number- and date of issue. Once-issued, the certificate- shall ■ remain renewable unless suspended or revoked by the board.

(a) Requirements. Individuals not yet certified in spoken languages for which a state-certifying examination is available, but who have taken the oral performance exam, may be designated as provisionally approved upon:

(1) scoring a minimum 60 percent on each section of the oral exam and an overall 65 percent or greater;

(2) meeting all general prerequisites under rule 14.200; and

(3) completing the process leading to designation within two years following the orientation required under rule 14.200(b)(1), unless extended by the board in exceptional circumstances.

(b) Loss of Designation. Following designation as a provisionally approved interpreter, if the interpreter fails to become certified within two years, or within one year if the individual is employed in a court interpreting position, the interpreter will forfeit the designation unless the board approves an extension in exceptional circumstances.

Rule 14.225. Issuance of Certificates

Upon satisfactory completion of the specified requirements, the board shall issue a certifícate for each official designation which shall include a designation number and date of issue.

Rule 14.230. Renewal of Certificates

(a) Renewal. Once issued, the certificate for certified court interpreters shall remain renewable unless suspended or revoked by the board. The, language skilled designation may also be renewed conditioned upon continued unavailability of a state-certifying examination in the language for which this designation has been granted. Absent an extension of time granted only in exceptional circumstances, failure to become certified within two years, or one year for anyone employed in a court interpreting position, will result in forfeiture of a provisionally approved designation.

(ab) Biennial Renewal Fee. Each certified and language skilled court interpreter shall pay a biennial renewal fee in an amount set by the supreme court A certificate shall be suspended automatically upon non-payment, but shall be reinstated upon application to the board, accompanied by payment and made within 60 days of the date of suspension. Upon expiration of the 60-day grace period, any request for reinstatement must be made pursuant toin accordance with rule 14.450.

(be) Notification. The board shall notify all certified, language skilled, and provisionally approved court interpreters in writing of the expiration date of their certificates at least 90 days before such date. Notice shall be given by regular United States mail, directed to the last mailing address on file with the board.

(d) Continued Status in Exceptional Circumstances. If the board determines exceptional circumstances warrant an extension of time within which a language skilled or provisionally approved interpreter may obtain certification, the interpreter will not forfeit the respective designation during the period of extension. A language skilled or provisionally approved interpreter who is granted an extension must, in lieu of a biennial renewal fee and as a condition of maintaining formal designation, pay a fee in an amount proportionate to the time of extension.

Rule 14.240. Continuing — Education-Maintenance of Official Designation

(a) Assignments. Each certified, language skilled, and provisionally approved court interpreter shall complete 20 law-related professional interpreting assignments, or a lesser number of assignments totaling no fewer than 40 hours, every two-year compliance period. Interpreters unable to complete this requirement because of a limited need for interpreting services in their language may be eligible, upon written request and board approval, for an extension of time or exemption. Officially designated state-level court interpreters who are employed by the courts in court interpreting positions may, in lieu of reporting discrete law-related professional assignments, provide proof of court employment and an affidavit averring compliance with this requirement.

(ab) RequirementContinumg Education. Each certified, language skilled, and provisionally approved court interpreter shall earn 16hours or credits of continuing education credits as determined by the board every two-years compliance period. Application for approval of thecontinuing education credit shall be made in writing on a continuing education reporting form approvedfurnished by the board. The form shall be furnished-at-the same time as notification-is-mailed, andCertified and language skilled interpreters renewing official designation shall completed-and returned completed forms to the board with submission ofat-the-same-time-the-renewal fees is-submittedr Provisionally approved interpreters shall submit continuing education reporting forms to the board with applications for certification.

(be) Approved Programs. The board shall keep and maintain a list of approved continuing education programs. Approval of an educational program or activity not listed shall be at the board’s discretion and subject to approval on a case-by-case basis.

PART III. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 14.300. Professional Conduct

Each certified, language skilled, and provisionally approved court interpreter, as well as court-appointed individuals providing interpreting services because of the unavailability of officially designated state-level court interpreters, shall act in a professional manner in keeping with the Code of Professional Conduct as set forth herein. Failure to adhere to the Code may lead to disciplinary action. Disciplinary action is at the discretion of the board.

PART IV. DISCIPLINE

Rule 14.400. Suspension or Revocation of-Ger-tification Application

A — cer-tificate-issued pursuant to these rules.may'be suspended or-revoked-for-any of the following-reasons-:-

(a) conviction of a felony-or-misdemean- or involving — moral—turpitude, dishonesty, or false statementsf

(b) fraud) — dishonesty)—or—corruption which is related to the-functions-and duties of a court interpreter;

(e) continued-false - or deceptive-advertising-after-receipt of a cease and desist ■notice from the board;

(d) gross-incompetence or unprofessional or unethical-conducty

(«) fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining-or- renewing certification;

(f) noncompliance' with continuing- -education-requirements; or

4g) nonpayment of renewal-fees.

Each certified, language skilled, and provisionally approved court interpreter, as well as court-appointed individuals providing spoken language interpreting services on a regular or recurring basis because of the unavailability of officially designated state-level court interpreters, shall be subject to the disciplinary provisions under this part.

Disciplinary action may be undertaken against a court-appointed interpreter holding no official state-level designation only in circumstances suggesting intentional disregard for impartiality or fairness of the proceeding. A presumption of bias arises if, having been apprised of his or her role and having subsequently been cautioned by the court, an interpreter persists in altering or omitting statements made on the record or otherwise acts in a manner potentially prejudicing the proceeding.

Rule 14.405. Suspension or Revocation

A certifícate issued in accordance with these rules may be suspended or revoked for any of the following reasons:

(a) conviction of a felony or misdemean- or involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or false statements;

(b) fraud, dishonesty, or corruption which is related to the functions and duties of a court interpreter;

(c) continued false or deceptive advertising after receipt of a cease and desist notice from the board;

(d) gross incompetence or unprofessional or unethical conduct;

(e) fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining or renewing any state-level court interpreter designation;

(f) noncompliance with rule provisions directing completion of law-related professional interpreting assignments or continuing education requirements; or

(g) nonpayment of renewal or late fees.

Rule 14.410. Disciplinary Procedures

(a) [No Change]

(b) Facial Sufficiency. If a majority of the investigative committee, after an in-person or conference call meeting, finds that the allegations, if true, would constitute a violation of these rules, it shall send a copy of the complaint identifying the rule or rules alleged to have been violated to the court -interpreter by certified United States mail directed to the last mailing address on file with the board. If the complaint is found to be facially insufficient, the complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice and the complainant and interpreter shall be so notified.

(c) Response. Within 30 days of the issuance of a finding of facial sufficiency, the certified-court interpreter shall file a written response with the investigative committee. If no response is filed, the violations identified in the finding of facial sufficiency shall be deemed admitted.

(d)-(e) [No Change]

(f) Hearing Panel Review. Within 60 days after the filing of the formal charges, the hearing panel shall review the complaint, the finding of probable cause, and the response, if any, and decide whether to (i) dismiss the proceeding, (ii) issue a proposed disposition, or (iii) set a hearing. The hearing panel shall promptly send written notice of its decision to the certified-court interpreter and to the complainant by certified United States mail, return receipt requested.

(g) No Hearing Demanded. A proposed disposition issued pursuant to subdivision (f)(ii) shall become final unless the certified court interpreter demands a hearing within 30 days of the date on-which-it was issued.

(h) Hearing Demanded. If the certified-court interpreter demands a hearing in a timely manner, the hearing shall take place no less than 30 days nor more than 90 days from the date of notice pursuant to subdivision (f)(iii) or of the court interpreter’s demand pursuant to subdivision (g).

(i) Legal Representation. The certi-fiedr-court interpreter may be represented by an attorney at any stage of the proceeding. The court interpreter shall be responsible for all of his or her costs and expenses, including attom^ds fees.

Rule 14.420. Disciplinary Hearings

(a)-(c) [No Change]

(d) Hearing Procedure. At the hearing, both the hearing panel and the certified-court interpreter shall be afforded the opportunity to introduce documents and other relevant evidence, and to elicit sworn testimony.

(e) [No change]

(f) Finality of Decision; Rehearing.

Unless the certified-court interpreter files a request for rehearing within 30 days of the date of the decision, the decision shall become final without further action. If a timely request for rehearing is filed, the decision shall not become final until the request has been disposed of by written decision, a copy of which shall be sent to the certified court interpreter by certified United States mail.

Rule 14.430. Disciplinary Dispositions

(a) Burden of Proof. If the hearing panel finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that the certified court interpreter has violated one or more of these rules, it shall impose such discipline as it may deem appropriate, consistent with these rules.

(b) Vote Required; Notification. All decisions of the hearing panel shall be by majority vote, in writing and, if adverse to the certified court interpreter, shall contain factual findings supporting the decision. A copy of the decision shall be sent to the certified court interpreter by certified United States mail.

(c) Sanctions. Sanctions may consist of one or more of the following:

(1) — (4) [No Change]
(5) a requirement that specified continuing education courses and/or additional law-related professional interpreting assignments be-feakea completed within a specified period of time;
(6) — (8) [No Change]
(9) suspension of certification official state-level designation for a period not to exceed done year; or
(10) revocation of certification official state-level designation.

Rule 14.440. Confidentiality of Disciplinary Proceedings

When-mdisclplinary-proceeding -is- either dismissed or results — in-a-private-reprimand, all — records of the proceedingAll complaints alleging misconduct against individuals subject to disciplinary action under these rules, including the interpreter’s response, if any, and all other records made or received as part of the complaint procedure, are exempt from public disclosure under rule 2.420(c)(3)(B), Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, and shall remain confidential until a finding of probable cause or no probable cause is established; — otherwise, all such — records-shall become-public when the hearing-panel’s decision becomes final, regardless of the outcome of any appeal.

Rule 14.450. Reinstatement

A certified court interpreter whose certificate has been suspended or revoked may, at any time, apply in writing for reinstatement. Such request shall explain why the applicant believes that he or she should be reinstated, and shall be accompanied by a renewal fee in an amount set by the board. Whether to grant or to deny such a request shall rest in the sole and absolute discretion of the board. The board may impose such conditions upon reinstatement as it deems appropriate.

      . See In re Petition to Adopt Fla. Rules for Certification & Regulation of Court Interpreters, 933 So.2d 504 (Fla.2006).

      . Id. at 506.

      . Fla. Court Interp. R. 14.100(a) — (b).

      . Fla. Court Interp. R. 14.200.

      . Fla. Court Interp. R. 14.100(b).

      . Supreme Court Comm’n on Trial Court Performance & Accountability, Recommendations for the Provision of Court Interpreting Services in Florida’s Trial Courts (Nov. 2010).

      . See, e.g., Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.560 (describing circumstances in which interpreters are to be appointed); Fla. R. Jud. Admin 2.560(e) ("Whenever possible, a certified or duly qualified interpreter, as defined in the Rules for Certification and Regulation of Court Interpreters, shall be appointed.”)


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jeanne SAUNDERS and George Saunders, Appellants, v. M. Ashley BUTLER, PH.D, as Guardian of Claudine B. O’Connor; Richard S. Scolaro; Michele Mullarney; Scolaro, Shulman, Cohen, Fetter & Bernstein, P.C.; Lutheran Services Florida, Inc., as Emergency Temporary Guardian of Thomas F. O’Connor; and Ernie C. Lisch, as Guardian of the Property of Thomas F. O’Connor, Appellees.
    No. 2D11-4786.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 2, 2013.
   ORDER

Because the named appellants in this appeal are now both deceased, this court withdraws its opinion dated February 13, 2013, and dismisses this appeal as moot.

DAVIS, C.J., and ALTENBERND and KELLY, JJ., concur.


author: CASANUEVA, Judge.

text:
    Paige M. RIVERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D12-2129.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 18, 2013.

      Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Coombs Cline, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.
   CASANUEVA, Judge.

Paige M. Rivera appeals her convictions and sentences imposed after the trial court denied her motion to withdraw her plea before sentencing. Because the trial court erred by summarily denying Ms. Rivera’s oral motion to withdraw her plea before sentencing, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Background

Ms. Rivera was arrested after she sold to an undercover police officer medications that had been fraudulently prescribed. The State charged her with delivering cocaine, possessing cocaine, and trafficking in illegal drugs. She entered an open plea of guilty to the charges, and sentencing was delayed so she could provide substantial assistance to law enforcement, specifically her case agent. However, her case agent directed that she work in the area where she was arrested, and she resisted his request because it was an area of town where she and her drug problems were known. She sought to provide her assistance to nearby law enforcement agencies, but each refused her offer. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel related the above, adding that assisting law enforcement in her own area would, she felt, put her safety and that of her family at risk. Defense counsel argued that Ms. Rivera did not understand at the time of the plea that she would be forced to work in her part of town. Facing sentencing without having provided the agreed substantial assistance, defense counsel moved to withdraw her plea. The trial court denied the motion without inquiring of Ms. Rivera and sentenced her to fifteen years’ incarceration, the minimum mandatory sentence for the trafficking charge, and sixty months’ incarceration each for the delivery and possession charges, concurrent with the trafficking sentence.

Discussion

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f) provides that “[t]he court may in its discretion, and shall on good cause, at any time before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty or no contest to be withdrawn.... ” (Emphasis added.) “Because the law favors a trial on the merits, [rule 3.170(f) ] should be liberally construed in favor of a defendant.” Moraes v. State, 967 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Smith v. State, 840 So.2d 404, 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). And “where a motion presents a sufficient basis for withdrawal of a plea, a trial court commits reversible error if it fails to ‘conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to develop the facts surrounding the entry of the plea.’ ” Crane v. State, 69 So.3d 357, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Caddo v. State, 806 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).

Hughen v. State, 96 So.3d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Molina v. State, 942 So.2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (stating that “if a misunderstanding of the nature and scope of a substantial assistance agreement is found, withdrawal of a defendant’s guilty plea is warranted”).

At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Rivera’s counsel orally moved to withdraw her plea, claiming it was involuntarily made, advising the court that Ms. Rivera had misapprehended the effect of her plea and agreement to provide substantial assistance. It is of no moment that the motion was made orally because a defendant is entitled to be heard on an oral motion to withdraw a plea. Hughen, 96 So.3d at 1115. Ms. Rivera’s misapprehension of the effect of her agreement to provide substantial assistance could be a valid basis for finding good cause. See Arzola v. State, 994 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that the State’s refusal to allow the defendant to provide substantial assistance resulted in a misapprehension sufficient to allow withdrawal of the plea). But the trial court must have evidence to make this determination of good cause. See Baker v. State, 408 So.2d 686, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (holding that the defendant should be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea upon a motion and proof that the plea was entered under a misapprehension); cf. Tanzi v. State, 964 So.2d 106, 114 (Fla.2007) (affirming trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw plea because the trial court’s findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record); Elias v. State, 531 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding that the defendant was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea in light of evidence that he misunderstood the nature and scope of the substantial assistance agreement).

There was no evidence in the record before the trial court to substantiate Ms. Rivera’s misapprehension of the effect of her plea and agreement to provide substantial assistance to law. enforcement. Defense counsel’s statements about Ms. Rivera’s misapprehension do not constitute evidence. As this court explained in Molina:

The record before us does not reveal Molina’s understanding, or lack of understanding, of the terms of the substantial assistance agreement at the time of his plea. Although the court carefully inquired [at the time of the plea colloquy] as to Molina’s understanding of other relevant matters, after Molina’s attorney mentioned that this was a cooperation case, the court did not make any inquiry as to the form or contents of the substantial assistance agreement. Consequently, the record does not conclusively establish that Molina understood the terms of the substantial assistance agreement, and therefore, accepting Molina’s allegations as true, the record does not conclusively refute Molina’s allegations. Because the record does not conclusively refute Molina’s allegations, Molina was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Although the court held a hearing on Molina’s motion, it was not an “evidentiary” hearing as required under the circumstances of this case.

942 So.2d at 1038 (footnote omitted). Thus, the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if Ms. Rivera could establish good cause to withdraw her plea based on her misapprehension.

Conclusion

Ms. Rivera’s motion to withdraw her plea before sentencing was facially sufficient in claiming an involuntary plea due to misapprehension of its scope, and substantial, competent evidence in the record does not refute this allegation. The trial court should have then granted her an evidentia-ry hearing on her motion and erred in summarily denying her motion. We reverse Ms. Rivera’s convictions and sentences and remand for an evidentiary hearing on her motion to withdraw her plea before sentencing.

KELLY and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.

      . See Fla. R.Crim. P.3.170(0-

      . Ms. Rivera in this appeal raises a second issue about the constitutionality of section 893, Florida Statutes (2011), under which she was charged and convicted. Her argument on that issue has been found without merit by State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla.2012), so we see no need to discuss it.

      . We note that not every motion to withdraw a plea will require an evidentiary hearing. See White v. State, 15 So.3d 833, 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that if the defendant presents a facially sufficient motion to withdraw plea and the record does not conclusively refute the defendant’s allegations, the trial court must either grant an evidentiary hearing or accept the defendant’s allegations as true); Thompson v. State, 50 So.3d 1208, 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (affirming the trial court's summary denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea because the record evidence of the defendant’s sworn statements during the plea colloquy refuted his allegation that he did not understand that his sentence included suspension of his driver's license).


author: KHOUZAM, Judge.

text:
    V.A.C., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D12-3409.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 18, 2013.

      Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   KHOUZAM, Judge.

V.A.C. timely appeals an order of restitution. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order, we must quash it.

At an adjudicatory hearing in November 2010, V.A.C., then a juvenile, was found guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence. The juvenile court adjudicated V.A.C. as to the battery count but withheld adjudication on the resisting count. He was placed on juvenile probation for an indeterminate period of time.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge stated that “the other thing I need to do with regard to sentencing is order restitution and reserve on the amount.” The disposition order entered the same day reflected the court’s findings, and the box next to “RESTITUTION ORDERED/RESERVED” was checked. Furthermore, the order placing V.A.C. on probation included another checked box indicating the court had elected to “[r]e-serve on restitution, per order of the Court in the amount.” But no separate restitution order was rendered.

The State filed a motion to establish restitution on December 1, 2010, but did not notice or schedule it for a hearing. On December 10, V.A.C. filed a notice of appeal. This court subsequently issued a per curiam affirmance in December 2011, and the mandate issued in January 2012. During the pendency of the appeal, in October 2011, V.A.C. turned nineteen years of age.

The appeal having been resolved, the State in March 2012 filed a notice of hearing to address its December 1, 2010, motion to establish restitution. The State also filed a second motion to establish restitution on April 4, 2012. V.A.C. filed a written response opposing the motion on the ground that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction. A restitution hearing was held in May 2012. Over V.A.C.’s objections, the court ordered restitution in the amount of $2,312.94. V.A.C. timely appealed.

On appeal, V.A.C. argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enter the restitution order. He contends that because the juvenile court failed to reserve jurisdiction on the issue of restitution by separate order prior to his nineteenth birthday, it lost jurisdiction over him pursuant to the plain language of the juvenile jurisdiction statute. We agree.

Section 985.0301(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), provides in relevant part:

[Wjhen the jurisdiction of any child who is alleged to havé committed a delinquent act or violation of law is obtained, the court shall retain jurisdiction, unless relinquished by its order, until the child reaches 19 years of age, with the same power over the child that the court had prior to the child becoming an adult.

Consequently, a juvenile court’s jurisdiction generally lasts until the court relinquishes it or the child turns nineteen, whichever is first. However, the filing of a notice of appeal also divests the trial court of jurisdiction during the pendency of the appeal. See K.D. v. State, 779 So.2d 468, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

Regarding restitution, section 985.0301(5)(i) specifically instructs:

The court may retain jurisdiction over a child and the child’s ■ parent or legal guardian whom the court has ordered to pay restitution until the restitution order is satisfied. To retain jurisdiction, the court shall enter a restitution order, which is separate from any disposition or order of commitment, on or prior to the date that the court’s jurisdiction would cease under this section.

(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, a juvenile court can reserve jurisdiction to enforce restitution orders until they are satisfied. But to do so, the court must enter a distinct restitution order prior to losing jurisdiction. Otherwise, the juvenile court’s authority to order restitution ends when the child reaches nineteen. See J.D. v. State, 849 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“The court failed to enter a restitution order before J.D’s 19th birthday, and therefore no restitution order can be enforced.”).

Here, the juvenile court erred in ordering restitution after it lost jurisdiction over V.A.C. Even though at the adjudicatory hearing the judge orally stated that he would be ordering restitution, and both the disposition order and the order of probation reflect this, there was no restitution order entered “separate from any disposition or order of commitment, on or prior to the date” V.A.C. turned nineteen. § 985.0301(5)©; see Cesaire v. State, 811 So.2d 816, 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Therefore the juvenile court erred by ordering restitution after it lost jurisdiction and the restitution order is hereby quashed.

Reversed; order quashed.

KELLY and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.

      . V.A.C. argues in the alternative that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it terminated his supervision in April 2011. Although the juvenile court’s docket indicates that the order was issued, it was not included in the appellate record despite this court’s specific request for supplementation. Consequently, we cannot consider the argument.

      . Although the language remains identical, this subsection has since been renumbered to (5)(h).


text:
    Amy CAUDILL-ROSA, Appellant, v. Albert ROSA, Appellee.
    No. 2D12-3954.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 18, 2013.
    Steven E. Martin, Dustin M. Butler, and Liridona Sinani of Martin Law Firm, P.L. Cape Coral, for Appellant.
    James W. Chandler of Law Office of James W. Chandler, P.A., Naples, for Ap-pellee.
   KHOUZAM, Judge.

Amy Caudill-Rosa, the Former Wife, appeals a final judgment dissolving her marriage to Albert Rosa, the Former Husband. Because the trial court failed to support its deviation from the child support guidelines with specific written findings, we reverse and remand for further proceedings addressing the child support award. We affirm as to the remaining issues without comment.

Although the trial court has discretion to deviate from the child support guidelines, where the deviation is greater than five percent of the guideline amount the court must provide written findings supporting the deviation. See § 61.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). The failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Lotz v. Lotz, 686 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

Here, the trial court deviated from the guidelines by more than five percent without written findings in support. Of the three versions of guidelines in the appellate record (two submitted by the Former Wife and one by the Former Husband), none are within five percent of the amount awarded. There may be reasons to support the trial court’s deviation from the guideline amount. However, the trial court did not explain why ordering payment of the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate as required under section 61.30(l)(a), and therefore we are compelled to reverse. On remand, if the trial court again elects to deviate from the guidelines by more than five percent, it must make the requisite findings pursuant to the statute.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded for further proceedings.

DAVIS, C.J., and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


author: SLEET, Judge.

text:
    Giannetta BAILEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 2D13-1732.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 18, 2013.
    Giannetta Bailey, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
   SLEET, Judge.

Giannetta Bailey seeks certiorari review of a circuit court order dismissing as untimely her motion to reduce or modify sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). Because the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in dismissing Ms. Bailey’s motion as untimely, we grant the petition, quash the circuit court’s order, and remand for consideration of Ms. Bailey’s motion on its merits.

Rule 3.800(c) provides that “[a] court may reduce or modify to include any of the provisions of chapter 948, Florida Statutes, a legal sentence imposed by it, sua sponte, or upon motion filed, within [sixty] days after the imposition.” Ms. Bailey’s sentence was entered on January 3, 2013. Accordingly, Ms. Bailey’s sixty-day time period in which to file her rule 3.800(c) motion expired on March 4, 2013. Ms. Bailey’s motion reflects that it was placed in the hands of prison officials on March 3, 2013. The circuit court did not receive the motion, however, until March 6, 2013. As a result, the circuit court dismissed the motion, concluding that it was filed after the sixty-day time limit imposed under rule 3.800(c).

An order dismissing a rule 3.800 motion as untimely is reviewable under this court’s certiorari jurisdiction. See Velazquez v. State, 917 So.2d 306, 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). “A circuit court departs from the essential requirements of the law when it dismisses a timely rule 3.800(c) motion without considering the merits of the motion.” Kwapil v. State, 44 So.3d 229, 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

The mailbox rule applies to motions filed in accordance with rule 3.800(c). See id.; see also Childers v. State, 972 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Thus, a rule 3.800(c) motion is considered filed when entrusted to prison officials for further delivery or processing. See Lawson v. State, 107 So.3d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

Because Ms. Bailey delivered her rule 3.800(c) motion to prison officials before the sixty-day period expired, it was timely filed under the mailbox rule. Kwapil, 44 So.3d at 230. Ergo, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law in failing to consider the timely filed motion on its merits. Thus, we grant Ms. Bailey’s petition, quash the circuit court’s order dismissing her motion as untimely, and remand for the circuit court to consider Ms. Bailey’s rule 3.800(c) motion on its merits.

Petition granted; order quashed; remanded.

NORTHCUTT and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.

      . The State concedes that Ms. Bailey’s motion was timely filed under the mailbox rule.


text:
    In the Interest of G.C., a child. T.C., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Family Services, Appellee.
    No. 2D13-2080.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 18, 2013.
    Ita M. Neymotin, Regional Counsel, Second District, and Joseph Thye Sexton, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Stephanie C. Zimmerman, Tampa, for Appellee.
   SLEET, Judge.

T.C., the father of G.C., appeals the trial court’s order placing minor child in a permanent guardianship and terminating protective supervision, which placed G.C. in a permanent guardianship, and terminated supervision by the Department of Children and Family Services. The Department correctly concedes error because the case plan improperly requires the father to admit to having caused harm to the minor child before reunification can take place in contravention to section 39.6011(1), Florida Statutes (2012).

We also agree with the Department’s concession of error that the trial court’s order was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. See C.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 988 So.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“[P]laeement of a child in a permanent guardianship requires a finding by the trial court that reunification ... is not in the best interests of the child, and that finding must be supported by competent substantial evidence.”) Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

KHOUZAM and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


author: VILLANTI, Judge.

text:
    Ervin BAILEY, a/k/a Earvin R. Bailey, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D12-1341.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 18, 2013.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anne Sheer Weiner, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.
   VILLANTI, Judge.

Ervin Bailey seeks review of the revocation of his probation and the sentence imposed upon revocation. We affirm the revocation and the sentence imposed without further comment. However, because the trial court’s order designating Bailey a violent felony offender of special concern fails to comply with the statutory requirements, we must strike that designation and remand for further proceedings.

At the sentencing hearing following the revocation of Bailey’s probation, the State requested that the court sentence Bailey as a habitual felony offender, and it introduced into evidence a “sentencing packet” to support this request. When the trial court questioned the twelve community sanction points scored on Bailey’s Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet, the State responded that, “He’s a violent felony offender for our [sic] concern.” The court replied, “That’s fine.” Defense counsel did not object or otherwise comment on the State’s response at that time, and no further discussion concerning whether Bailey qualified as a violent felony offender of special concern occurred during the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Bailey as a habitual felony offender to the lowest permissible sentence under his Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet. The trial court subsequently entered a written order designating Bailey as a violent felony offender of special concern, and this designation is also included on the written judgment and sentence. Bailey argues that the trial court’s written order imposing this designation does not satisfy the requirements of section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes (2010), and that this failure requires this court to strike the designation and remand for further proceedings. We agree.

Section 948.06(8) imposes additional requirements on the trial court when a probationer before it on revocation proceedings is a violent felony offender of special concern. The statute first defines who qualifies as a “violent felony offender of special concern”:

(a) In addition to complying with the provisions of subsections (l)-(7), this subsection provides further requirements regarding a probationer or offender in community control who is a violent felony offender of special concern. The provisions of this subsection shall control over any conflicting provisions in subsections (l)-(7). For purposes of this subsection, the term “convicted” means a determination of guilt which is the result of a trial or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.
(b) For purposes of this section and ss. 903.0351, 948.064, and 921.0024, the term “violent felony offender of special concern” means a person who is on:
1. Felony probation or community control related to the commission of a qualifying offense committed on or after the effective date of this act;
2. Felony probation or community control for any offense committed on or after the effective date of this act, and has previously been convicted of a qualifying offense;
3. Felony probation or community control for any offense committed on or after the effective date of this act, and is found to have violated that probation or community control by committing a qualifying offense;
4. Felony probation or community control and has previously been found by a court to be a habitual violent felony offender as defined in s.775.084(l)(b) and has committed a qualifying offense on or after the effective date of this act;
5. Felony probation or community control and has previously been found by a court to be a three-time violent felony offender as defined in s. 775.084(l)(c) and has committed a qualifying offense on or after the effective date of this act; or
6. Felony probation or community control and has previously been found by a court to be a sexual predator under s. 775.21 and has committed a qualifying offense on or after the effective date of this act.

§ 948.06(8). The statute then provides a list of nineteen categories of offenses that are “qualifying offenses” under the statute. § 948.06(8)(c). Subsection (d) then requires that probationers who qualify as violent felony offenders of special concern remain in custody pending a hearing on any alleged violation of probation or community control, and it sets forth specific requirements for the conduct of a revocation hearing involving a violent felony offender of special concern. Finally the statute requires that the trial court shall make certain findings in writing if the court finds that a violent felony offender of special concern has violated probation or community control.

(e) If the court, after conducting the hearing required by paragraph (d), determines that a violent felony offender of special concern has committed a violation of probation or community control other than a failure to pay costs, fines, or restitution, the court shall:
1. Make written findings as to whether or not the violent felony offender of special concern poses a danger to the community. In determining the danger to the community posed by the offender’s release, the court shall base its findings on one or more of the following:
a.The nature and circumstances of the violation and any new offenses charged.
b. The offender’s present conduct, including criminal convictions.
c. The offender’s amenability to non-inearcerative sanctions based on his or her history and conduct during the probation or community control supervision from which the violation hearing arises and any other previous supervisions, including disciplinary records of previous incarcerations.
d. The weight of the evidence against the offender.
e. Any other facts the court considers relevant.
2. Decide whether to revoke the probation or community control.
a. If the court has found that a violent felony offender of special concern poses a danger to the community, the court shall revoke probation and shall sentence the offender up to the statutory maximum, or longer if permitted by law.
b. If the court has found that a violent felony offender of special concern does not pose a danger to the community, the court may revoke, modify, or continue the probation or community control or may place the probationer into community control as provided in this section.

§ 948.06(8)(e) (emphasis added).

In this appeal, Bailey does not argue that he does not qualify as a violent felony offender of special concern under subsections (b) and (c), nor does he argue that the trial court failed to hold the hearing required under subsection (d). Instead, he argues only that the trial court’s written order fails to satisfy the requirements of subsection (e).

The written order rendered in this case is a document entitled “Written Findings Pursuant to Section 948.06(8), Fla. Statutes.” This document is a pre-printed form with blanks for listing the defendant’s name and the applicable case number. The body of the form provides:

NOW on this day, a recorded hearing having been held, and the state and the above-captioned defendant being present and represented by counsel, the Court does find that:
- the defendant has admitted or been found in violation of probation or community control;
-the defendant is a violent felony offender of special concern and — does -does not pose a danger to the community;
- The state has stipulated that the defendant does not pose a danger to the community at this time and the state agrees to the disposition ordered herein;
- the defendant is a violent felony offender of special concern but the violations remaining consist only of a failure to pay costs, fines or restitution.
The Court bases its decision on one or more of the following factors checked and/or explained below:
- the defendant has stipulated that he/she poses a threat to the community;
- the nature and circumstances of the violation and any new criminal offenses charged indicate that the offender poses a threat to the community;
- the offender’s present conduct, including criminal convictions indicate that the offender poses a threat to the community;
- the offender poses a threat to the community due to a lack of amenability to nonincarcerative sanctions based on the following:
- the offender’s history and conduct during the current supervision;
- the offender’s history and conduct during previous supervisions;
- the offender’s disciplinary record from previous incarcerations;
- the weight of the evidence against the offender indicates that the offender poses a threat to the community;
- other facts the Court considers relevant:

Using this form, the trial court is presumably expected to place an “X” in the appropriate blank or blanks based on the findings it makes for the probationer before it.

We are not convinced that, given the intricacies of section 948.06(8), the use of such a pre-printed form is sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court complied with its statutory obligation to make specific findings on the enumerated issues. However, assuming for purposes of this case that the form itself is sufficient, the trial court’s written findings were not. While the trial court did place an “X” on the line indicating that it found Bailey to be a violent felony offender of special concern who posed a danger to the community, the court did not place an “X” in any of the blanks to indicate which specific facts listed in section 948.06(8)(e) it was relying on to find that Bailey qualified as such. Moreover, the trial court did not orally pronounce any findings that were consistent with any of the statutory requirements. Cf. Martin v. State, 87 So.3d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (concluding that because the trial court made oral findings concerning Martin’s qualifications as violent felony offender of special concern, the court could affirm imposition of the designation and simply remand for entry of a written order that comported with the oral ruling). The State concedes in its brief that no oral findings were made and that the written order is facially deficient.

Accordingly, because the written order designating Bailey as a violent felony offender of special concern does not satisfy the requirements of section 948.06(8)(e), we strike that designation and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the court may reimpose the designation if it makes written findings supported by record evidence that establish that Bailey so qualifies.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded for further proceedings.

NORTHCUTT and SLEET, JJ„ Concur.

      . Bailey filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) raising this issue as well as others. The trial court timely denied the motion. To the extent that Bailey’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion raised issues regarding his designation as a violent felony offender of special concern other than the lack of written findings, we find no error.


text:
    In the Interest of G.C., a child. J.C., and Guardian ad Litem Program, Appellants, Department of Children and Family Services, Appellee.
    No. 2D13-2079.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 18, 2013.
    Patrick R. Cunningham, Bradenton, for Appellant J.C.
    Jennifer S. Paullin, Sanford, for Appellant Guardian ad Litem Program.
    Stephanie C. Zimmerman, Tampa, for Appellee.
   SLEET, Judge.

J.C., the mother of G.C., appeals the trial court’s order on permanency review and notice of next hearing, which denied the Guardian ad Litem’s motion for reunification, placed G.C. in a permanent guardianship, and terminated supervision by the Department of Children and Family Services. The Department correctly concedes error because the case plan improperly requires the mother to admit to having caused harm to the minor child before reunification can take place in contravention to section 39.6011(1), Florida Statutes (2012).

We also agree with the Department s concession of error that the trial court’s order was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. See C.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 988 So.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“[Placement of a child in a permanent guardianship requires a finding by the trial court that reunification ... is not in the best interests of the child, and that finding must be supported by competent substantial evidence.”) Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

KHOUZAM and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.

      . The Guardian ad Litem Program filed an initial brief adopting J.C.’s arguments.


text:
    Michael L. HIRSCH, Appellant, v. Lillie Kay HIRSCH, Appellee.
    No. 2D12-360.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
    Andrew B. Greenlee of Brownstone, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellant.
    Stephanie M. Martin of Adams and Reese LLP, Tampa, for Appellee.
   KHOUZAM, Judge.

Michael L. Hirsch, the Former Husband, appeals a final judgment dissolving his marriage to Lillie Kay Hirsch, the Former Wife. Because it is unclear from the record whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to order the Former Husband to change the beneficiary on his life insurance policy, we reverse and remand on that issue only. We affirm the final judgment of dissolution in all other respects.

During trial, the Former Husband testified briefly that he maintains a group life insurance policy acquired through his military service in the Army Reserve. He testified that at the time of trial he had named as the policy’s beneficiaries his children, his parents, and his fiancée. Although the existence, amount, and monthly cost of a life insurance policy were established through testimony, neither the name nor the specific type of policy was provided. Furthermore, the policy was not entered into evidence. Other than this testimony, the only evidence in the record addressing the policy was pay stubs briefly referring to an unspecified military group life insurance policy.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court found that the Former Husband “does have a life insurance policy available to him at an extremely reasonable rate” and explained that it would be ordering him to maintain the policy and name the Former Wife as the beneficiary. The final judgment reflected that this was done pursuant to section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes (2011). The Former Husband neither objected to this order at trial nor moved for rehearing after the final judgment issued. Nevertheless, the Former Husband argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to interfere with his choice of beneficiary. Because it is not clear from the record whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to order the Former Husband to change the beneficiary designation of his life insurance policy, we reverse that portion of the order and remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing addressing the issue and for further proceedings if necessary.

In 1965, Congress enacted the Service-members’ Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA) in response to private commercial insurers restricting coverage for service members due to the Vietnam conflict. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 50, 102 S.Ct. 49, 70 L.Ed.2d 39 (1981). Today, the Act is codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1980A (2012 & Supp.2013). Regarding beneficiaries, the Act provides that following the death of an insured, payment is to be made “[fjirst, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries as the member or former member may have designated by a writing received pri- or to death (1) in the uniformed services if insured under Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance-” 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a).

The SGLIA has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to “bestow upon the service member an absolute right to designate the policy beneficiary.” Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 59, 102 S.Ct. 49. Accordingly, due to the operation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, state laws interfering with the right to designate the beneficiary under a qualifying policy are federally preempted. Id. at 60, 102 S.Ct. 49 (“[T]he controlling provisions of the SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law.”); see also Hillman v. Maretta, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 1951-52, 186 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013) (applying the analysis in Ridgway to the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 because it is “strikingly similar” to the SGLIA). The issue of federal preemption is a question of subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Joe Nagy Towing, Inc. v. Lawless, 101 So.3d 868, 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Our review is de novo. See Sanchez v. Fernandez, 915 So.2d 192, 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

Here, it is undisputed that the trial court directed the Former Husband to change the beneficiary designation of his existing life insurance policy. However, it is unclear from the record whether the policy is one whose beneficiary designation is protected under the SGLIA. The policy was not entered into evidence, nor does the record contain other evidence resolving the issue. We are therefore unable to determine whether this application of section 61.30(3) has been federally preempted by the SGLIA.

Consequently, we remand for an eviden-tiary hearing for the trial court to determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to order the beneficiary designation changed. If the court, after the evidentia-ry hearing, concludes that the existing beneficiary designation is protected by the SGLIA, then it cannot order the change. However, the trial court may nonetheless order the Former Husband to obtain an additional policy pursuant to section 61.08(3) if the trial court deems it appropriate under the circumstances.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded for further proceedings.

ALTENBERND and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

      . As it pertains to life insurance, the Former Husband’s argument on appeal challenges only the trial court’s authority to order the beneficiary designation changed. Consequently, all other challenges to the life insur-anee order are deemed waived. See Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., 743 So.2d 24, 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) ("An error not raised in the brief is waived.”).