author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE.
    No. SC14-236.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Dec. 18, 2014.
    Elizabeth Ann Blackburn, Chair, Family Law Rules Committee, Revis & Blackburn, P.A., Daytona Beach, FL; Mary Louise Miller Wagstaff, Past Chair, Family Law Rules Committee, Wagstaff Law Office, P.A., Largo, FL; John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Ellen H. Sloyer, Bar Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

The Family Law Rules Committee (Committee) has filed its regular-cycle report proposing amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure. The Committee proposes new rules 12.012 (Minimization of Sensitive Information) and 12.364 (Social Investigations). It also proposes amendments to rules 12.070 (Process); 12.200 (Case Management and Pretrial Conferences); 12.363 (Evaluation of Minor Child); 12.490 (General Magistrates); 12.491 (Child Support Enforcement); and 12.560 (Discovery in Aid of Execution); and forms 12.901(a) (Petition for Simplified Dissolution of Marriage); 12.902(b) (Family Law Financial Affidavit (Short Form)); and 12.902(c) (Family Law Financial Affidavit (Long Form)). After submission to the Court, the proposals were published for comment. No comments were received. Upon consideration of the Committee’s report, we adopt the amendments proposed by the Committee as described below.

AMENDMENTS

First, we adopt new rule 12.012 (Minimization of Sensitive Information). This rule is patterned after recently adopted Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.020, which requires pleadings and other papers filed with the court in civil cases to comply with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration rule 2.425 (Minimization of the Filing of Sensitive Information). New rule 12.012 requires the same in family law cases.

Next, rule 12.070 (Process) is amended to inform parties that for constructive service of process in cases involving parental responsibility, custody, or time-sharing, they must file an affidavit that conforms with family law form 12.913(c) (Affidavit of Diligent Search). It is also amended to state that if the responding party cannot be found, he or she must be served as provided in chapter 49, Florida Statutes, which governs constructive service of process, and that the clerk of the circuit court must mail a copy of the notice to the party’s last known address.

Rule 12.200 (Case Management and Pretrial Conferences), is amended to provide for the consideration at the case management conference of “any agreements, objections, or form of production of electronically stored information.” This is meant to allow such issues to be brought to the court’s attention early in the case so that any conflict can be resolved on a timely basis.

Next, we adopt new rule 12.364 (Social Investigations) to specifically address social investigations under section 61.20, Florida Statutes (2014). New rule 12.364 provides the requirements and process for appointment of a social investigator; provides general provisions and content for the order for a social investigation; governs the written study by the social investigator; allows a party to file a motion for an additional social investigation; and provides for production of the investigator’s file to another investigator who may review it and testify.

In conjunction with the adoption of new rule 12.364, we amend current rule 12.363 (Evaluation of Minor Child) to remove references to “social investigations” under section 61.20, Florida Statutes (2014), so as to differentiate social investigations from evaluations of a minor child. Rule 12.363 is also amended as follows: (1) to delete the term “licensed mental health professional” so that the rule refers only to the appointment of an “expert” generally; (2) to require a determination of a need for an expert before one is appointed by the court when the parties cannot agree; (3) to require that an expert’s report be provided to the party, rather than the party’s attorney; (4) to require that prior notice of communication with the court be given to the parties, rather than their attorneys; and (5) to require that an expert’s report be properly admitted into evidence and considered by the court before it is made part of the court file.

Rule 12.490 (General Magistrates) is amended to require appointment of a specific magistrate. This was recommended by the Committee because it was reported to the Committee that despite the requirement in family law form 12.920(b) (Order of Referral to General Magistrate) that the general magistrate appointed be named, some jurisdictions were interpreting a referral to a general magistrate as a referral to any general magistrate in the jurisdiction. The Committee reasoned that the specific magistrate to whom the case is referred should be identified so that parties may determine in a timely manner whether an objection should be raised. Subdivision (d)(3) of this rule is also amended to change the word “papers” to “documents.”

Next, subdivision (e)(2) of rule 12.491 (Child Support Enforcement) is amended to correct a cross-reference to a recently renumbered subdivision of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.535.

Rule 12.560 (Discovery in Aid of Execution) is amended to add the name of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure form 1.977, “Fact Information Sheet” for clarity. Additionally, subdivision (c) of this rule is deleted.

Finally, we amend three family law forms. Form 12.901 ‘(Petition for Simplified Dissolution of Marriage) is amended to remove the requirement of filing a financial affidavit because rule 12.285(c) exempts parties in a simplified dissolution under rule 12.105 from such filing requirement. Section II “Average Monthly Expenses” of form 12.902(b) (Family Law Financial Affidavit (Short Form)) is amended to provide an instruction that if an expense listed by a party is an estimate of what he or she expects it will be post-dissolution, rather than an actual current amount, that should be expressly indicated by writing “estimate” next to the amount. Form 12.902(c) (Family Law Financial Affidavit (Long Form)) currently contains similar language. Other minor changes to clarify insurance amounts and subtotals in section II of both forms 12.902(b) and (c) are also made.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure and forms are amended as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. Language added to the rules is underscored; deleted language is struck through. The committee notes are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules.

The amended forms are fully engrossed and ready for use. The forms may also be accessed and downloaded from the Florida State Courts’ website at www.flcourts.org' resources-and-services/family-courts/ family-law-self-helpinformation/family-law-forms.stml. By adoption of the amended forms, we express no opinion as to their correctness or applicability.

The amended and new rules and the amended forms shall be.come effective at 12:01 a.m., January 1, 2015.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 12,012, MINIMIZATION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Every pleading or other document filed with the court shall comply with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2,425, Minimization of the Filing of Sensitive Information.

RULE 12.070. PROCESS

(a)-(b) [No change]

(c) Constructive Service.

(1) [No change]

(2) For constructive service of process in any case or proceeding involving parental responsibility, custody, or time-sharing with a minor child, the petitioner shall file an affidavit of diligent search and inquiry that conforms with Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.913(c). If the responding party cannot be located, the party shall be served with process by publication in the manner provided by chapter 49, Florida

Statutes. The clerk of the circuit court shall mail a copy of the notice to the party’s last known address.

(23) For constructive service of process in all other cases, an affidavit of diligent search and inquiry in substantial conformity with Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.913(b), must be filed.

(d) [No change]

RULE 12.200. CASE MANAGEMENT AND PRETRIAL CONFERENCES

(a) Case Management Conference.

(1) Family Law Proceedings, Generally. A case management conference may be ordered by the court at any time on the court’s initiative. A party may request a case management conference 30 days after service of a petition or complaint. At such a conference the court may:

(A) schedule or reschedule the service of motions, pleadings, and other documents;
(B) set or reset the time of trials, subject to rule 12.440;
(C) coordinate the progress of the action if complex litigation factors are present;
(D) limit, schedule, order, or expedite discovery;
(E) schedule disclosure of expert witnesses and the discovery of facts known and opinions held by such experts;
(F) schedule or hear motions related to admission or exclusion of evidence;
(G) pursue the possibilities of settlement;
(H) require filing of preliminary stipulations if issues can be narrowed;
(I) refer issues to a magistrate for findings of fact, if consent is obtained as provided in rules 12.490 and 12.492 and if no significant history of domestic, repeat, dating, or sexual violence, or stalking that would compromise the process is involved in the case;
(J) refer the parties to mediation if no significant history of domestic, repeat, dating, or sexual violence, or stalking that would compromise the mediation process is involved in the case and consider allocation of expenses related to the referral; or refer the parties to counseling if no significant history of domestic, repeat, dating, or sexual violence or stalking that would compromise the process is involved in the case and consider allocation of expenses related to the referral;
(K) coordinate voluntary binding arbitration consistent with Florida law if no significant history of domestic, repeat, dating, or sexual violence or stalking that would compromise the process is involved in the case;
(L) appoint court experts and allocate the expenses for the appointments;
(M) refer the cause for a parenting plan recommendation, social investigation and study, home study, or psychological evaluation and allocate the initial expense for that study;
(N) appoint an attorney or guardian ad litem for a minor child or children if required and allocate the expense of the appointment; and
(O) schedule other conferences or determine other matters that may aid in the disposition of the action-;and
(P) consider any agreements, objections, or form of production of electronically stored information.

(2) [No change]

(b)-(d) [No change]

Commentary

[No change]

Committee Note

[No change]

RULE 12.363. EVALUATION OF MINOR CHILD

(a) Appointment of Mental — Health ProfessionaLor-Other Expert.

(1) When the issue-of time sharing, parental-responsibility, ultimate decision making^-or-a-parenting plan for a minor-child — is—in controversy, tThecourt, on motion of any party or the court’s own motion, may appoint a licensed- mental health professional or otheran expert for an examination, evaluation, testing, or interview of any minor child or-to-conduct a social or home study- ■investiga-tiofc The parties may agree on the particular expert to be appointed, subject to approval by the court. If the parties have agreed, they shall submit an order including the name, address, telephone number, area of expertise, and professional qualifications of the expert. If the parties have agreed on-the-■need-fog — an—expert and there has been a determination of the need for the appointment of an expert and the parties cannot agree on the selection of the expert, the court shall appoint an expert.
(2) After the examination, evaluation, or investigation, any party may file a motion for an additional expert examination, evaluation, interview, testing, or investigation by a licensed-mental-health professional — or—otheranother expert. The court upon hearing may permit the additional examination, evaluation, testing, or interview basedonly on a showing of good cause shownand only upon a finding that further examinations, testing, interviews, or evaluations would be in the best interests of the minor child.

(3)-(5) [No change]

(6) A copy of the order of appointment shall be provided immediately to the expert by the court unless otherwise directed by the court. The order shall direct the parties to contact the expert or investigator appointed by the court to establish an appointment schedule to facilitate timely completion of the evaluation.

(b)Providing of Reports.

(1) Unless otherwise ordered, the expert shall prepare and provide a written report to the attorney for- each party or the party, if unrepresented; and the guardian ad litem, if appointed, a reasonable time before any evidentiary hearing on the matter at issue. The expert also shall send written notice to the court that the report has been completed and that a copy of the written report has been provided to fee-attorney for each party or the party, if unrepresented, and the guardian ad litem, if appointed. In any event, the written report shall be prepared and provided no later than 30 days before trial or 75 days from the order of appointment, unless the time is extended by order of the court. The expert shall not send a copy of the report to the court unless the parties and their attorneys have agreed in writing that the report will be considered by the court and filed in the court files as provided in subdivision (e).

(2) On motion of any party, the court may order the expert to produce the expert’s complete file to another qualified -licensed mental health profession-abexpert at the initial cost of the requesting party, for review by such qualified licensed mental-health expert, who may testify.

(c) Testimony of Other Professional-sExperts. Any other expert who has treated, tested, interviewed, examined, or evaluated a child may testify only if the court determines that good cause exists to permit the testimony. The fact that no notice of such treatment, testing, interview, examination, or evaluation of a child was given to both parents shall be considered by the court as a basis for preventing such testimony.

(d) Communications with Court by Expert. No expert may communicate with the court without prior notice to the parties and their attorneys, who shall be afforded the opportunity to be present and heard during any such communication between the expert and the court. A request for communication with the court may be informally conveyed by letter or telephone. Further communication with the court, which may be conducted informally, shall be done only with notice to the parties.

(e) Use of Evidence. An expert appointed by the court shall be subject to the same examination as a privately retained expert and the court shall not entertain any presumption in favor of the appointed expert’s findings. Any finding or report by an expert appointed by the court may be entered into evidence on the court’s own motion or the motion of any party in a manner consistent with the rules of evidence, subject to cross-examination by the parties. The-report shall nob-be- considered by -fee -court befere-it- is properly admitted into evidence. Any report filed with the court shall be in compliance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.425. The report shall not be filed wife the-courtin the court file unless or until it is properly admitted into evidence and considered by the court. The court shall consider whether the report should be sealed as provided by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420.

(f) Limitation of Scope. This rule shall not apply to parenting coordinators or social investigators.

Committee Note

[No change]

RULE 12.364. SOCIAL INVESTIGATIONS

(a) Applicable to Social Investigations. This rule shall apply to the appointment of an investigator to conduct a social investigation and study under section 61.20, Florida Statutes.

(b) Appointment of Social Investigator. When the issue of time-sharing, parental responsibility, ultimate decision-making, or a parenting plan for a minor child is in controversy, the court, on motion of any party or the court’s own motion, may appoint an investigator under section 61.20, Florida Statutes. The parties may agree on the particular investigator to be appointed, subject to approval by the court. If the parties have agreed on the need for a social investigation or the court has determined there is such need, and the parties cannot agree on the selection, the court shall select and appoint an investigator. The social investigator must be qualified as an expert under section 90.702, Florida Statutes, to testify regarding the written study.

(c) Order for Social Investigation. The order for a social investigation shall state whether this is an initial establishment of a parenting plan or a modification of an existing parenting plan. The investigator shall be required to consider the best interests of the child based upon all of factors affecting the welfare and interest of the particular minor child and the circumstances of that family, including, but not limited to the statutory factors set forth in section 61.13, Florida Statutes.

(d) Order Appointing Social Investigator. An order appointing a social investigator shall state that the investigator is being appointed under section 61.20, Florida Statutes, and shall state:

(1) The name, address, and telephone number for each parent.

(2) The name, address, and telephone number of the investigator being appointed.

(3) Any specific issues to be addressed.

(4) An initial allocation of responsibility for payment of the costs for the social investigation. The court may consider taxing the costs at a final hearing.

(5) The order shall direct the parties to contact the investigator appointed by the court to establish an appointment schedule to facilitate timely completion of the investigation. A copy of the order of appointment shall be provided immediately to the investigator by the court, unless otherwise directed by the court.

(e) Written Study with Recommendations. The investigator shall prepare a written study with recommendations regarding a parenting plan, including a written statement of facts found in the social investigation on which the recommendations are based. The written study with recommendations shall be furnished to the court and a copy provided to all parties of record by the investigator at least 30 days before any hearing at which the court is to consider the written study and recommendations, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

(f) Additional Investigation. After the written study is furnished to the court, any party may file a motion for an additional expert examination, evaluation, interview, testing, or investigation. The court upon hearing may order the additional examination, evaluation, testing, or interview of the minor child based on the court finding that the investigation is insufficient and that further examinations, testing, interviews, or evaluations of the minor child would be in the best interests of the minor child.

(g) Production of File. On motion of any party, the court may order the investigator to produce the investigator’s complete file to another qualified investigator for review by such investigator, who may render an opinion and testify.

RULE 12.490. GENERAL MAGISTRATES

(a) [No change]

(b) Reference.

(l)-(2) [No change]

(3) The order of referral shall state with specificity the matter or matters being referred and the name of the specific general magistrate to whom the matter is referred. The order of referral shall also state whether electronic recording or a court reporter is provided by the court, or whether a court reporter, if desired, must be provided by the litigants.

[No change]

(c) [No change]

(d) Hearings.

(l)-(2) [No change]

(3) The general magistrate shall have authority to examine under oath the parties and all witnesses upon all matters contained in the reference, to require production of all books, papersdocu-ments, writings, vouchers, and other documents applicable to it, and to examine on oath orally all witnesses produced by the parties. The general magistrate may take all actions concerning evidence that can be taken by the circuit court and in the same manner. The general magistrate shall have the same powers as a circuit judge to utilize communications equipment as defined and regulated by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.530.

(4) — (5) [No change]

(e)-(g) [No change]

Commentary

[No change]

Committee Notes

2004 Amendment. In accordance with Chapter 2004-11, Laws of Florida, all references to general master were changed to general magistrate.

2015 Amendment. Subdivision (b)(3) has been amended to clarify that the order of referral must include the name of the specific general magistrate to whom the matter is being referred and who will conduct the hearing and that concurrent referrals to multiple general magistrates is inappropriate.

RULE 12.491. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

(a)-(d) [No change] Limited Application. This rule shall be effective only when specifically invoked by administrative order of the chief justice for use in a particular county or circuit.

(e) General Powers and Duties. The support enforcement hearing officer shall be empowered to issue process, administer oaths, require the production of documents, and conduct hearings for the purpose of taking evidence. A support enforcement hearing officer does not have the authority to hear contested paternity cases. Upon the receipt of a support proceeding, the support enforcement hearing officer shall:

(1) assign a time and place for an appropriate hearing and give notice to each of the parties as may be required by law;

(2) take testimony and establish a record, which record may be by electronic means as provided by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.535(g)(8) 2.535(h);

(3) accept voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and support liability and stipulated agreements setting the amount of support to be paid; and

(4) evaluate the evidence and promptly make a recommended order to the court. Such order shall set forth findings of fact.

(f)-(h) [No change]

Commentary

[No change]

Committee Note

[No change]

RULE 12.560. DISCOVERY IN AID OF EXECUTION.

(a) [No change]

(b) Fact Information Sheet. In addition to any other discovery available to a judgment creditor under this rule, the court, at the request of the judgment creditor, shall order the judgment debtor or debtors to complete Florida Rules of Civil Procedure Form 1.977 (Fact Information Sheet), including all required attachments, within 45 days of the order or such other reasonable time as determined by the court.

(c)-(d) [No change]

(e) Notice of Compliance, — The judgment debtor shall file-with — the-cler-k—of court a notice-of-compliance with the order to complete form 1.977, -and- serve-a-copy-of the notice of compliance-on the judgment creditor-or — the-judgment creditor’s attor-eey= — Form 1.977 shall not- be- filed -with the clerk of the court or in any.other-public record, except by order- of-the-court after a notice-and hearing and -for — good cause — shewm—If the-court permits the filing of form 1.977, it-shall be in compliance with the requirements of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.425.

Committee Notes

2000 Amendment. Subdivisions (b)-(e) were added to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and adopted with amendments into the Family Law Rules of Procedure. The amendments to the Civil Rules were patterned after Florida Small Claims Rule 7.221(a) and Form 7.343. Although the judgment creditor is entitled to broad discovery into the judgment debtor’s finances (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b); Jim Appley’s Tru-Arc, Inc. v. Liquid Extraction Systems, 526 So.2d 177, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)), in family law cases inquiry into the individual assets of the judgment debtor’s spouse must be precluded until a proper predicate has been shown. Tru-Arc, Inc., 526 So.2d at 179; Rose Printing Co. v. D’Amato, 338 So.2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)

2015 Amendment. Subdivision (e) was deleted because the filing of a notice of compliance is unnecessary for the judgment creditor to seek relief from the court for noncompliance with this rule and because the Fact Information Sheet should not be filed with the clerk of the court.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE FORM 12.901(a), PETITION FOR SIMPLIFIED DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE (01/15)

When should this form be used?

This form should be used when a husband and wife are filing for a simplified dissolution of marriage. You and/or your spouse must have lived in Florida for at least 6 months before filing for a dissolution in Florida. You may file a simplified dissolution of marriage in Florida if all of the following are true:

• You and your spouse agree that the marriage cannot be saved.
• You and your spouse have no minor or dependent child(ren) together, the wife does not have any minor or dependent children born during the marriage, and the wife is not now pregnant.
• You and your spouse have worked out how the two of you will divide the things that you both own (your assets) and who will pay what part of the money you both owe (your liabilities), and you are both satisfied with this division.
• You are not seeking support (alimony) from your spouse, and vice versa.
• You are willing to give up your right to trial and appeal.
• You and your spouse are both willing to go into the clerk’s office to sign the petition (not necessarily together).
• You and your spouse are both willing to go to the final hearing (at the same time).

If you do not meet the criteria above, you must file a regular petition for dissolution of marriage.

This petition should be typed or printed in black ink. Each of you must sign the petition in the presence of a deputy clerk (in the clerk’s office), although you do not have to go into the clerk’s office at the same time. You will need to provide picture identification (valid driver’s license or official identification card) for the clerk to witness your signatures.

What should I do next?

1.After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where you live and keep a copy for your records.

You may document your agreement by signing a Marital Settlement Agreement, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(f)(3) and filing it with the clerk of the circuit court or you may agree that all of your assets (what you own) and liabilities (what you owe) have been disposed of by oral agreement.

2. You must prove to the court that the husband and/or wife has (have) lived in Florida for more than 6 months before filing the petition for dissolution of marriage. Residence can be proved by:

• a valid Florida driver’s license, Florida identification card, or voter registration card issued to one of you at least 6 months prior to filing for dissolution of marriage; or
• the testimony of another person who knows that either you or your spouse has resided in Florida for more than 6 months and is available to testify in court; or
• an affidavit. To prove residence by affidavit, use an Affidavit of Corroborating Witness, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.902(i). This form must be signed by a person who knows that either you or your spouse has lived in Florida for more than 6 months before the date that you filed the petition for dissolution of marriage. This affidavit may be signed in the presence of the clerk of the court or in the presence of a notary public, who must affix his or her seal at the proper place on the affidavit.

3. You must pay the appropriate filing fees to the clerk of the circuit court. If you and your spouse cannot afford to pay the filing fees, you may fill out an Application for Determination of Civil Indigent Status, and file it with your petition for dissolution of marriage. You may obtain this form from the clerk and he or she will determine whether- you are eligible to have filing fees waived.

4. Either you or the clerk of court will need to complete a Family Court Cover Sheet, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.928. The clerk’s office can provide this form.

5. You must obtain a date and time for a court appearance from the clerk of court. On that date, you and your spouse must appear together before a judge. You should complete a Final Judgment of Simplified Dissolution of Marriage, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.990(a), and bring it with you to the hearing. At that time, if all of the papers are in order, the judge may grant a final judgment dissolving your marriage under simplified dissolution of marriage procedures by signing the final judgment which you have provided.

6.If you fail to complete this procedure, the court may dismiss the case to clear its records.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in “bold underline” in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see chapter 61, Florida Statutes, and Rule 12.105, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.

Special notes ...

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a non-lawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer, helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE FORM 12.902(b), FAMILY LAW FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT (SHORT FORM) (01/15)

When should this form be used?

This form should be used when you are involved in a family law case which requires a financial affidavit and your individual gross income is UNDER $50,000 per year unless:

(1) You are filing a simplified dissolution of marriage under rule 12.105 and both parties have waived the filing of a financial affidavit;
(2) You have no minor children, no support issues, and have filed a written settlement agreement disposing of all financial issues; or
(3) The court lacks jurisdiction to determine any financial issues.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should sign the form before a notary public or deputy clerk. You should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the petition was filed and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

A copy of this form must be served on the other party in your case within 45 days of being served with the petition, if it is not served on him or her with your initial papers. Service must be in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in “bold underline” in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.285.

Special notes ...

If you want to keep your address confidential because you are the victim of sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated stalking, harassment, aggravated battery, or domestic violence, do not enter the address, telephone, and fax information at the bottom of this form. Instead, file Request for Confidential Filing of Address, Florida, Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(h).

The affidavit must be completed using monthly income and expense amounts. If you are paid or your bills are due on a schedule which is not monthly, you must convert those amounts. Hints are provided below for making these conversions.

Hourly - If you are paid by the hour, you may convert your incometo monthly as follows:

Hourly amount x Hours worked per week = Weekly amount

Weekly amount x 52 Weeks per year = Yearly amount

Yearly amount * 12 Months per year = Monthly Amount

Daily - If you are paid by the day, you may convert your income to monthly as follows:

Daily amount x Days worked per week = Weekly amount

Weekly amount x 52 Weeks per year = Yearly amount

Yearly amount ⅜ 12 Months per year = Monthly Amount

Weekly - If you are paid by the week, you may convert your income to monthly as follows:

Weekly amount x 52 Weeks per year = Yearly amount

Yearly amount * 12 Months per year = Monthly Amount

Bi-weekly - If you are paid every two weeks, you may convert your income to monthly as follows:

Bi-weekly amount x 26 = Yearly amount

Yearly amount * 12 Months per year = Monthly Amount

Semi-monthly - If you are paid twice per month, you may convert your incometo monthly as follows: Semi-monthly amount x 2 = Monthly Amount

Expenses may be converted in the same manner.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

Instructions to Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(b), Family Law Financial Affidavit (Short Form) (01/15)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULE OF PROCEDURE FORM 12.902(c), FAMILY LAW FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT (LONG FORM)(01/15)

When should this form be used?

This form should be used when you are involved in a family law case which requires a financial affidavit and your individual gross income is $50,000 OR MORE per year unless:

(1) You are filing a simplified dissolution of marriage under rule 12.105 and both parties have waived the filing of financial affidavits;
(2) you have no minor children, no support issues, and have filed a written settlement agreement disposing of all financial issues; or
(3) the court lacks jurisdiction to determine any financial issues.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should sign the form before a notary public or deputy clerk. You should then file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the petition was filed and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

A copy of this form must be served on the other party in your case within 45 days of being served with the petition, if it is not served on him or her with your initial papers. Service must be in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in “bold underline” in these instructions are defined there. For further information, see Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.285.

Special notes ...

If you want to keep your address confidential because you are the victim of sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated stalking, harassment, aggravated battery, or domestic violence do not enter the address, telephone, and fax information at the bottom of this form. Instead, file Request for Confidential Filing of Address, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(h).

The affidavit must be completed using monthly income and expense amounts. If you are paid or your bills are due on a schedule which is not monthly, you must convert those amounts. Hints are provided below for making these conversions.

Hourly - If you are paid by the hour, you may convert your income to monthly as follows:

Hourly amount x Hours worked per week = Weekly amount

Weekly amount x 52 Weeks per year = Yearly amount

Yearly amount * 12 Months per year = Monthly Amount

Daily - If you are paid by the day, you may convert your income to monthly as follows:

Daily amount x Days worked per week = Weekly amount

Weekly amount x 52 Weeks per year = Yearly amount

Yearly amount ■* 12 Months per year = Monthly Amount

Weekly - If you are paid by the week, you may convert your income to monthly as follows: Weekly amount x 52 Weeks per year = Yearly amount

Yearly amount *■ 12 Months per year = Monthly Amount

Bi-weekly - If you are paid every two weeks, you may convert your incometo monthly as follows: Bi-weekly amount x 26 = Yearly amount

Yearly amount * 12 Months per year = Monthly Amount

Semi-monthly - If you are paid twice per month, you may convert your income to monthly as follows:

Semi-monthly amount x 2 = Monthly Amount

Expenses may be converted in the same manner.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

Instructions for Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(c), Family Law Financial Affidavit (Long Form) (01/15)

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re CERTIFICATION OF NEED FOR ADDITIONAL JUDGES.
    No. SC14-2350.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Dec. 22, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

This opinion fulfills our constitutional obligation to determine the State’s need for additional judges in Fiscal Year 2015/2016 and to certify our “findings and recommendations concerning such need” to the Legislature. Certification is “the sole mechanism established by our constitution for a systematic and uniform assessment of this need.” In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 889 So.2d 734, 735 (Fla.2004). In this opinion we are certifying a need for thirty-five trial court judges and none in the district courts of appeal as further elaborated below.

TRIAL COURTS

The Florida Supreme Court continues to use a weighted caseload system as a primary basis for assessing judicial need for the trial courts. Using objective standards, this Court has examined case filing and disposition data, analyzed various judicial workload indicators, applied a three-year average net need, and considered judgeship requests submitted by the lower courts. Applying this methodology, this Court certifies the need for thirty-five judgeships statewide, three of which are in circuit court and thirty-two in county court as detailed in the attached appendix.

As the state economy continues to steadily improve, we recognize that in a post-recessionary period competing demands for state funding persist across state government. We also note that, due in large .part to the recession, the judicial branch has had no increase in trial court judges since 2007, despite a documented need. Nonetheless, our judges and court staff continue to work diligently to administer justice, promptly resolve disputes, and ensure that children, families, and businesses receive the proper amount of judicial attention to their cases.

Our most recent analysis of circuit court statistics from Fiscal Year 2012/2013 to preliminary Fiscal Year 2013/2014 indicates a six percent increase in probate filings, a nine percent increase in dependency filings, and a circuit civil filing (excluding real property/mortgage foreclosures) increase of one percent. Conversely, domestic relations filings declined by three percent, while felony and juvenile delinquency filings experienced a seven percent decline. Similar downward filing trends are occurring nationally, and we continue to closely monitor and analyze filing trends throughout the state as filings and case type filing trends relate to judicial case weights and influence workload analysis. We also continue to control for the foreclosure crisis in our judicial workload forecasts and certification requests, which currently suggest that this crisis will taper off with possible pre-recessionary filing normalization occurring in the summer of 2015, barring any unforeseen circumstances.

Notwithstanding decreased filings in some filing categories, our three-year average net need analysis continues to indicate that additional judgeships are necessary in the First (one judge) and Fifth (two judges) judicial circuits. This three-year average net need reflects sustained workload over a multi-year period.

The First Judicial Circuit continues to experience a heavy criminal workload as well as a steady number of tobacco cases, which frequently go to trial and thus require significant judicial labor. The Fifth Judicial Circuit continues to be one of the fastest growing areas of the state with a corresponding workload increase. Within the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Sumter and Lake counties are experiencing significant increases in Hispanic and Asian demographics. These demographics, in turn, have created a surge in court interpreting events which results in additional judicial workload. The circuit is also geographically large requiring circuit judges to spend time traveling between counties, which impacts their availability.

Several chief judges reference high jury trial rates, increases in motions and hearings, and the emergence of more complex civil cases as factors that continue to increase trial court workload. In addition, several chief judges throughout the state continue to advise the Court that statutory requirements for additional hearings for certain case types contribute to case complexity and judicial workload. Two recent examples of requirements that add to case complexity are the Timely Justice Act of 2013, Ch.2013-216, Laws of Florida, and changes to Jimmy Ryce Act proceedings, Ch.2014-2 and 2014-3, Laws of Florida. The Timely Justice Act legislation requires additional judicial resources to timely handle post-conviction proceedings for persons sentenced to death. Often, post-conviction motions are complex, involving multiple issues and requiring lengthy evidentiary hearings. The 2014 changes to the Jimmy Ryce Act created a number of procedures, referral processes, and notice requirements that may result in more people being evaluated for commitment and more petitions being filed.

Many of our chief judges express concern about delay associated with obtaining hearing times. In some circuits, dockets are so full that it takes several weeks to schedule a hearing. Similarly, lengthy hearings and jury trials must be scheduled months in advance. Judges continue to report to their chief judges that they are increasingly challenged to devote adequate time to hearings due to increased volume. Case complexity, more and lengthier hearings, and crowded dockets all contribute to court delay.

Our judges also continue to absorb the work previously performed by case managers, law clerks, magistrates, and other supplemental support staff lost in the budget reductions of recent years. Most of these positions provided direct case management, legal research, and adjudicatory support to our judges. The consensus among chief judges is that loss of support staff translates into slower case processing times, congested dockets, and long waits to access judicial calendars.

Despite these identified workload challenges, our trial courts continue to make significant headway towards reducing the overall backlog of foreclosure cases associated with the mortgage foreclosure crisis. For example, from Fiscal Year 2012/2018 to Fiscal Year 2013/2014, the foreclosure backlog was reduced by over fifty percent. In recognition of this protracted crisis the Legislature, using monies from the national mortgage foreclosure settlement, provided dedicated funding for Fiscal Year 2013/2014 and Fiscal Year 2014/2015 that has enabled the court system to secure the services of additional senior judges, magistrates, and case managers. This Court is grateful for that funding. The case managers, magistrates, and senior judges made available through this appropriation are making a difference in reducing the foreclosure backlog throughout the state. We continue to monitor the progress of this backlog for each circuit and regularly communicate with the chief judges to identify issues that might be increasing disposition times.

As with circuit court work, county court workload remains high with unmet judicial need holding steady. In some counties, chief judges report that misdemeanor, domestic, and stalking violence cases are increasing county court workload. Additionally, the passage of new laws each year contributes to the increased workload. For example, in October 2013, the texting while driving law went into effect. This law creates a new infraction that, although a secondary offense, is nonetheless likely to increase judicial caseloads. The loss of civil traffic infraction hearing officers in county court, coupled with added workload associated with new legislation, continues to increase county judge workload. These factors, among others, contribute to such a high county court judicial need.

Additionally, self-represented litigants who are frequently unprepared for the rigors of presenting evidence, following rules of procedure, and generally representing themselves in court also create additional work for trial judges. Increased judicial involvement in these cases where one or more parties represent themselves, entails lengthier hearings, rescheduled hearings, and court delay. The impact of self-represented litigants occurs in both circuit and county courts.

JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STUDY

We are now seven years removed from updating the case weights used by this Court to evaluate judicial workload in the trial courts. Consistent with the original recommendations of the 1999 Workload Study, judicial case weights should ideally be updated every five years. Accordingly, the Office of the State Courts Administrator will be updating all of the trial court case weights beginning in early 2015.

As with previous studies, the assessment of workload will be comprehensive and carefully validated and we will keep the Legislature fully apprised through its Office of Program Policy and Government Accountability. Oversight of this initiative will be conducted by the Court Statistics and Workload Committee of the Commission on Trial Court Performance and Accountability. The entire multi-phase study will take approximately sixteen months, with completion expected in the summer of 2016.

DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL

We are not certifying a need for district court judges during this certification cycle. As part of our five-year review cycle for the district courts, all district court judges are providing direct feedback on the relative case weights used by this Court to evaluate district court judicial need. Once approved, we anticipate using the revised weights during next year’s judicial certification process. The Court thanks the Legislature for funding the three district court judges certified in last year’s opinion and for its continued support to upgrade district court facilities across the state.

CONCLUSION

We have conducted both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of judicial workload. Using the case-weighted methodology and the application of other factors identified in Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.240, we certify the need for thirty-five additional trial court judge-ships in Florida, consisting of three circuit court judgeships and thirty-two county court judgeships, as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. This certification request is conservative in that we are requesting the minimum number of trial judges necessary to address sustained documented workload.

We continue to closely monitor the downward filing trends for multiple trial court divisions. These factors and others will be carefully documented in the upcoming Judicial Workload Study. We appreciate the legislative appropriation to address the backlog of foreclosure cases throughout the state. The monies provided for senior judges, magistrates, case management, and technology have made a tremendous difference in the court system’s ability to reduce the overall backlog of pending foreclosure cases.

Although constitutionally required to certify judicial need, we are mindful of competing funding needs both elsewhere in state government and within the judicial branch. On balance, we have determined that highest priority should go to those critical issues included in the Judicial Branch’s Fiscal Year 2015/2016 Legislative Budget Request.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

Trial Court Need

      . Article V, section 9, of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part:
      Determination of number of judges.— The supreme court shall establish by rule uniform criteria for the determination of the need for additional judges except supreme court justices, the necessity for decreasing the number of judges and for increasing, decreasing or redefining appellate districts and judicial circuits. If the supreme court finds that a need exists for increasing or decreasing the number of judges or increasing, decreasing or redefining appellate districts and judicial circuits, it shall, prior to the next regular session of the legislature, certify to the legislature its findings and recommendations concerning such need.

      . Our certification methodology relies primarily on case weights and calculations of available judge time to determine the need for additional trial court judges. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.240.

      . When the case weights were originally developed in 1999 and updated in 2007, they incorporated the availability of supplemental resources to assist judges with case processing matters. It is reasonable to conclude that the loss of these supplemental positions (i.e., case managers, law clerks, and magistrates) may increase the case weights if not restored prior to the next case-weight update.

      . This program is commonly known as the Foreclosure Backlog Reduction Initiative.

      . See Judicial Resource Study conducted in Fiscal Year 2006/2007, available at http:// www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/260/urlt/ JRSReport_final.pdf.


text:
    Johnny Shane KORMONDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC14-2428.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 5, 2015.

      Michael Paul Reiter, Ocala, FL, for Appellant. '
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Carolyn Marie Snurkowski, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Johnny Shane Kormondy, a prisoner under sentence of death and under an active death warrant, appeals from an order denying his first successive motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 after his death warrant was signed. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. In this motion, Kormondy once again claims that he was not the shooter and that his codefendant, Curtis Buffkin, who received a life sentence, was the shooter and therefore more culpable. We have previously rejected alleged newly discovered evidence óf Buffkin’s testimony that he was the shooter of the victim in this case. Kormondy v. State (Kormondy III), 983 So.2d 418, 438-40 (Fla.2007). In this successive motion, Kormondy primarily reargues that newly discovered evidence, consisting of affidavits from prison inmates that Buffkin told them he was the shooter, supports a finding that he did not shoot the victim. Because Kormondy claims he is less culpable, he contends that his death sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment. We conclude that the affidavits from the prison inmates do not meet the test for newly discovered evidence as they are not of such nature that they would probably yield a life sentence. Kormondy is therefore not entitled to relief. '

In addition to the claim of newly discovered evidence, Kormondy raises a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, which we reject as not cognizable in this state court proceeding. Banks v. State, 150 So.3d 797 (Fla.2014), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 511, 190 L.Ed.2d 386 (2014). Accordingly, for the reasons we more fully explain below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Kor-mondy postconviction relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case are set forth in Kormondy’s direct appeal:

The victim Gary McAdams was murdered, with a single gunshot wound to the back of his head, in the early morning of July 11, 1993 [in Pensacola, Florida]. He and his wife, Cecilia McAdams, had returned home from Mrs. Mc-Adams’ twenty-year high-school reunion. They heard a knock at the door. When Mr. McAdams opened the door, Curtis Buffkin was there holding a gun. He forced himself into the house. He ordered the couple to get on the kitchen floor and keep their heads down. James Hazen and Johnny Kormondy then entered the house. They both had socks on their hands. The three intruders took personal valuables from the couple. The blinds were closed and phone cords disconnected.
At this point, one of the intruders took Mrs. McAdams to a bedroom in the back. He forced her to remove her dress. He then forced her to perform oral sex on him. She was being held at gun point.
Another of the intruders then entered the room. He was described as having sandy-colored hair that hung down to the collarbone. This intruder proceeded to rape Mrs. McAdams while the first intruder again forced her to perform oral sex on him.
She was taken back to the kitchen, naked, and placed with her husband. Subsequently, one of the intruders took Mrs. McAdams to the bedroom and raped her. While he was raping her, a gunshot was fired in the front of the house. Mrs. McAdams heard someone yell for “Bubba” or “Buff’ and the man stopped raping her and ran from the bedroom. Mrs. McAdams then left the bedroom and was going towards the front of the house when she heard a gunshot come from the bedroom. When she arrived at the kitchen, she found her husband on the floor with blood coming from the back of his head. The medical examiner testified that Mr. McAdams’ death was caused by a contact gunshot wound. This means that the barrel of the gun was held to Mr. McAdams’ head.
Kormondy was married to Valerie Kormondy. They have one child. After the murder, Mrs. Kormondy asked Kor-mondy to leave the family home. He left and stayed with Willie Long. Kor-mondy told Long about the murder and admitted that he had shot Mr. Mc-Adams. He explained, though, that the gun had gone off accidentally. Long went to the police because of the $50,000 reward for information.
A grand jury indicted Kormondy, Buffkin, and Hazen on July 27, 1993. Each was ultimately tried separately. Buffkin was offered a plea bargain by the State in return for assistance in the prosecution of Kormondy and Hazen.

Kormondy v. State (Kormondy I), 703 So.2d 454, 456-57 (Fla.1997) (footnote omitted).

Buffkin pled guilty to first-degree murder and received a life sentence. Hazen v. State, 700 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla.1997). Buffkin did not testify at Kormondy’s trial. In addition to implicating Kormondy as the shooter in his statement to the police and in his deposition, Buffkin testified during Hazen’s trial that Kormondy was the shooter. Kormondy III, 983 So.2d at 426 n. 1, 439. It was “clear from Buffkin’s own testimony that he and Kormondy were the instigators of this criminal episode” and that “[o]nce inside the home, the events proceeded as ‘[Buffkin] and Kormondy had talked about it.’ ” Hazen, 700 So.2d at 1214. Hazen testified at his own trial that Buffkin admitted to killing Mr. McAdams. Kormondy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs. (Kormondy V), 688 F.3d 1244, 1269 (Fla. 11th Cir.2012), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 764, 184 L.Ed.2d 505 (2012). Hazen was convicted of first-degree murder, three counts of sexual battery with the use of a deadly weapon or physical force, burglary of a dwelling with an assault or while armed, and robbery while armed. Hazen, 700 So.2d at 1208. The jury recommended a death sentence for Hazen by a vote of seven-to-five, which the trial court followed. Id. In Hazen’s direct appeal, we determined that Buffkin’s life sentence precluded a death sentence for Hazen. Id. at 1214. Because Buffkin was “a prime instigator” and more culpable than Hazen, we determined that Hazen’s death sentence was disproportional. Id. at 1211, 1214. Accordingly, we vacated Hazen’s death sentence and remanded for the imposition of a life sentence on his murder conviction without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Id. at 1215.

Kormondy has never denied being a participant in the criminal episode but denied he was responsible for the murder or rape and claimed that Buffkin was responsible. As this Court stated in Kormondy III, “Kormondy had continually admitted his participation in the burglary and robbery. In fact, in the statement made to law enforcement officers, which was presented to the jury by the State, Kormondy admitted his involvement in both crimes.” 983 So.2d at 431. “Officer Hall testified that Kormondy told him in an unrecorded statement that Buffkin fired the fatal shot and Hazen was in the back of the house with Mrs. McAdams. In a tape-recorded confession played for the jury, Kormondy again said that Buffkin shot the victim.” Kormondy I, 703 So.2d at 456 n. 1.

In July 1994, Kormondy was found guilty of first-degree murder, three counts of sexual battery with the use of a deadly weapon or physical force, burglary of a dwelling with an assault or while armed, and robbery while armed. Id. at 457. At the penalty phase, the jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four. Id. The trial court ultimately followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Kor-mondy to death. Id. at 458.

On direct appeal, Kormondy raised the following six claims: (1) the trial court erred in allowing Deputy Allen Cotton to bolster Willie Long’s testimony; (2) the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal as to the charge of premeditated murder because the State’s own evidence failed to discount the reasonable hypothesis that the shooting was accidental; (3) the trial court erred in admitting bad character evidence in the form of un-convicted crimes or nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; (4) the trial court erred in its treatment of aggravating circumstances; (5) the trial court erred in its treatment of mitigation; and (6) Kormon-dy’s death sentence was disproportionate. Id. at 458-60.

While we determined that the evidence could not support a finding of premeditation as to the unlawful killing of Mr. Mc-Adams, we affirmed Kormondy’s conviction for first-degree murder because the record supported a first-degree felony murder conviction. Id. at 460. Because we concluded that it was reversible error for the jury to have heard that Kormondy said he would kill William Long and Mrs. McAdams if he ever got out of jail, we vacated Kormondy’s death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase. Id. at 460, 463. Although we stated that “we need not address the remaining [penalty-phase] issues,” we noted “certain other errors that should be avoided in the new penalty-phase proceeding.” Id. at 460.

On remand, Kormondy “knowing[ly] and voluntarily waived his right to present mitigation evidence.” Kormondy III, 983 So.2d at 436. The new sentencing jury recommended a sentence of death — again by an eight-to-four vote — which the trial court again followed. Kormondy v. State CKormondy II), 845 So.2d 41, 46 (Fla. 2003). The trial court found that the following two aggravators were established: (1) previous conviction of a felony involving the use of threat or violence, namely, the robbery of Mr. and Mrs. McAdams or the sexual battery of Mrs. McAdams; and (2) the crime for which Kormondy was being sentenced was committed while he was engaged in or an accomplice in the commission of an attempt to commit a crime of burglary. Id. at 48. The trial court gave great weight to both aggravators. Id. In its sentencing order, the trial court expressly found that “[t]he evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Gary McAdams was killed by the discharge of a .38 caliber bullet fired at point blank range by Defendant Kormondy from a pistol held to the head of Gary McAdams.” State v. Kormondy, No. 93-3302 (Fla. 1st Cir.Ct. July 7, 1999) (Sentencing Order, at 4). The trial court found no statutory mitigation and considered and rejected several nonstatutory mitigators. Kormondy II, 845 So.2d at 48. The trial court “reject[ed] Kormondy’s argument that he was a minor participant and less culpable than his accomplices.” Id. Having rejected all of Kormondy’s claims, we affirmed Kormondy’s death sentence in the appeal of his resentencing. Id. at 54. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Kormondy v. Florida, 540 U.S. 950, 124 S.Ct. 392, 157 L.Ed.2d 283 (2003).

In August 2004, Kormondy filed an initial motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851, which was subsequently amended. Kormondy alleged a claim of newly discovered evidence which consisted of Hazen claiming that he saw Buffkin holding a pistol against the head of Mr. McAdams before he heard the gunshot and that Buffkin said it was an accident. Kor-mondy also alleged newly discovered evidence that Buffkin stated that he, not Kor-mondy, shot Mr. McAdams. In support, Kormondy attached an affidavit from Buff-kin.

At the evidentiary hearing, which took place in 2005, Buffkin testified that he accidentally killed Mr. McAdams. As this Court explained Buffkin’s testimony, “Kor-mondy was in the kitchen with him searching Mrs. McAdams’ purse while Buffkin held the gun at Mr. McAdams’ head. Buffkin said that he bumped Mr. Mc-Adams in the head with the gun and the gun fired.” Kormondy III, 983 So.2d at 439.

The trial court denied Kormondy post-conviction relief. Id. at 427. As to Kor-mondy’s claim of newly discovered evidence, the trial court found that Buffkin’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was not credible, after comparing the statement with all of the circumstances of the case, which consisted of testimony from both William Long and Cecilia McAdams. Id. at 439. The trial court therefore concluded that Buffkin’s evidentiary hearing testimony did not warrant a new trial for Kormondy:

Mrs. McAdams’s testimony, and Mr. Long’s testimony regarding the crimes in question carry far more weight than that of Buffkin. [B]oth Mrs. McAdams and Long provided unwavering, credible testimony regarding the crimes in question. Buffkin’s most recent testimony, claiming that he threatened and kidnapped Hazen and [Kormondy] so that they would participate in the crimes, and which contains inherent contradictions, is simply unbelievable and of little weight. Buffkin’s testimony, when weighed with the other evidence adduced at [Kormondy’s] trial, would not have changed the outcome of [Kormon-dy’s] trial.

State v. Kormondy, No. 93-3302 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. June 20, 2005) (Order Denying Defendant’s Amended Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, at 43). The trial court additionally found that Hazen’s recent statement was not credible and that such evidence would not have led to an acquittal or resulted in a different sentence for Kormondy. Kor-mondy III, 983 So.2d at 439.

On appeal of the denial of relief, Kor-mondy argued that the trial court erred by determining that the newly discovered evidence was not credible and that it would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Id. at 437. We first noted that “[o]n three occasions Buffkin said Kormondy shot Mr. McAdams — in his statement to law enforcement officers, at his deposition, and at Hazen’s trial.” Id. at 439. This Court concluded, “Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the evidence presented at trial, and the circumstances presented, the trial court properly found that Buffkin’s recent statement was not credible and it would not have changed the outcome of Kormondy’s trial or penalty phase.” Id. at 440. In addition, we determined that the evidence supported the trial court’s denial of relief on the claim as it related to Hazen’s recent statement. Id. at 439. We also explained that “there is corroborating evidence to demonstrate that Kormondy was the shooter”:

The evidence concerning the identity of the shooter comes from both the testimony of Mrs. McAdams and William Long. Long testified that Kormondy confessed to shooting Mr. McAdams on two separate occasions — once when they saw a reward poster about the crimes and again when they returned home from drinking. Additionally, Mrs. Mc-Adams testified that Buffkin was in the bedroom with her when Mr. McAdams was shot. She testified that she recognized the voice of the man who was in the bedroom with her as the man who first entered the McAdams’ home with the gun; that man was Buffkin. Thus, if Buffkin was the only man in the bedroom with her when Mr. McAdams was shot, the shooter had to be either Hazen or Kormondy. However, there is no evidence pointing to Hazen as the shooter. Therefore, even if Mrs. McAdams had been impeached with this inconsistent statement about the number of men in the bedroom when Mr. McAdams was shot, there is other evidence to show that Kormondy was in fact the shooter.

Id. at 433. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of Kormondy’s initial motion for postconviction relief. Id. at 443. We also denied Kormondy’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. Thereafter, we denied Kormondy’s motion for rehearing.

In July 2008, Kormondy filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida in which he maintained that he was “actually innocent” of the circumstances warranting the death penalty because he was not the shooter. Kormondy v. Tucker (Kormondy IV), No. 3:08cv316-RH, 2011 WL 9933762, at *20 (N.D.Fla. Sept. 29, 2011). In addressing this claim, the federal district court determined that Kormondy failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he was not the shooter:

The evidence that Mr. Kormondy was the shooter included — and still includes — Mr. Long’s testimony that Mr. Kormondy admitted it. The evidence included — and still includes — Mrs. Mc-Adams’ testimony that Mr. Buffkin was not the shooter. It is still true that nobody says Mr. Hazen was the shooter. And other evidence — though not introduced in Mr. Kormondy’s trial — also supports the conclusion that Mr. Kor-mondy was the shooter. Mr. Buffkin originally said Mr. Kormondy was the shooter. And for all the controversy over who was with Mrs. McAdams when the shot was fired, everyone who was at the house has consistently said that Mr. Kormondy was not in the back room; he was in the kitchen with Mr. McAdams. Mr. Buffkin now says that he, not Mr. Kormondy, was the shooter, and Mr. Hazen says that before going into the back room, he saw Mr. Buffkin holding a gun to Mr. McAdams’ head. But Mr. Buffkin and Mr. Hazen originally gave different accounts. There are good grounds to doubt that they are now telling the truth. These were participants in a horrific crime who have demonstrated a willingness to lie about what happened. They are serving life sentences and have little to lose by trying to help a confederate get off death row. Clear and convincing evidence this is not.

Id. at *20 (emphasis added). Finding that Kormondy was not entitled to relief on his claims, the district court denied the petition, id. at *22, which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, Kormondy V, 688 F.3d at 1285.

Kormondy’s Current Motion

On December 4, 2014, after his death warrant was signed, Kormondy filed a Successive Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence with Special Request for Leave to Amend pursuant to rule 8.851, asserting (1) a claim of newly discovered evidence; and (2) that he “is entitled to equitable relief and consideration of the merits regarding his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and/or the State violated Brady v. Maryland[, 873 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963),] and Giglio v. United States[, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) ].” With regard to his first claim, Kormondy alleged that in 1993, Buffkin told inmate Enoch Hall that he was attempting to escape and that he had no problem shooting people to effectuate his escape as he had just “blew McAdams mother f* * *ing brains out.” Kormondy further alleged that Hall relayed Buffkin’s statement to Kormondy in August 2014. To support Kormondy’s claim that Buffkin was the person who shot Mr. McAdams, Kormondy attached to his motion affidavits from inmates Christopher Michelson, Russell Bin-stead, Roger Livingston, and John Turner. On December 10, 2014, the trial court denied an evidentiary hearing on Kormon-dy’s claims. On December 15, 2014, the trial court denied Kormondy’s successive motion for postconviction relief. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Kormondy claims that the trial court erred in (1) summarily denying his claim of newly discovered evidence; and (2) summarily denying his claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. We address these claims in turn.

Claim of Newly Discovered Evidence

Kormondy contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim of newly discovered evidence, which consisted of five individuals stating that Buffkin made certain incriminating statements to each of them in prison, establishing that Buffkin — and not Kormondy — was the person who shot Mr. McAdams. Kormondy asserts that this newly discovered evidence demonstrates that his death sentence is constitutionally unreliable and would probably result in Kormondy receiving a life sentence. According to Kormondy, this newly discovered evidence establishes that he was not more culpable than his codefen-dants and provides credibility to Buffkin’s prior evidentiary hearing testimony that he was the shooter. Additionally, Kor-mondy contends that the trial court’s basis for denying Kormondy’s initial motion for postconviction relief was erroneous. We disagree.

According to Kormondy’s motion, Buff-kin told inmate Hall in 1993, that he had just “blew McAdams mother f* * *ing brains out.” The substance of the affidavits are as follows. In his December 5, 2014, affidavit, Christopher Michelson provided that he was in prison with Buffkin or “Buffy.” Between 1996 and 1998, Michelson maintained that:

Buffy told me that he was the one that shot, and killed the victim. He stated that he put the shooting on Kormondy because he knew if he didn’t put it on one of his co-defendants he was going to get sentenced to death. He chose to put it [on] Kormondy because he blamed Kormondy for the threesome getting caught. Buffy stated that if Kormondy kept his mouth shut none of them would have been apprehended.

Russell Binstead stated in his December 5, 2014, affidavit, that in approximately 2011, Buffkin told him in prison that he was the person who killed the victim in his case, that he should be on death row, and that he felt guilty that one of his codefendants had a death sentence for a murder he committed. According to Roger Livingston’s December 5, 2014, affidavit, after meeting Buffkin in prison in roughly 2012, Buffkin told him “that his co-defendant who was on death row was not the one that killed the victim. He told me that he was going to try to free the man and that one day he would end up on death row himself.” In John Turner’s December 9, 2014, affidavit, Turner stated that while in prison in 2012 Buffkin told him that “he put his co-defendant on death row and felt bad .about it. He told me he was the ring leader and responsible for the murder. He stated that his co-defendant who was on death row was there wrongfully.” Thus, Buffkin’s statements were reportedly made to inmates in prison around 2011 and 2012, with the exception of Buffkin’s remarks to Christopher Michelson, which occurred between 1996 and 1998, and Enoch Hall, which occurred in 1993.

The trial court found that Kormondy’s claim was procedurally barred because Kormondy was re-litigating a prior claim raised in his initial motion for postconviction relief. With regard to the information provided by Hall and Michelson, the trial court found that in light of Buffkin’s 2005 evidentiary hearing testimony, Kormondy was unable to show that the defense could not have known of the evidence by the use of diligence as Buffkin confessed to both Hall and Michelson before 2005. The trial court further found that the proposed newly discovered evidence was inadmissible hearsay and cumulative to prior testimony from Buffkin and Bazen. Moreover, the trial court concluded that “Buffkin’s confession as told through the five inmates would not have produced an acquittal or yielded a less severe sentence for [Kor-mondy].” Finally, the trial court found that Buffkin “could not have been the person who shot and killed Mr. McAdams” based on the totality of the evidence submitted at trial.

The standard of review of a summarily denied successive postconviction motion is as follows:

A successive rule B.851 motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing if the records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). This Court reviews the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny a successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the mov-ant is entitled to no relief.

Walton v. State, 3 So.3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2009). “A postconviction court’s decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.850 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court. Thus, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law,.subject to de novo review.” Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82, 95 (Fla.2011) (footnote omitted).

This Court has set forth a two-prong test that a defendant must satisfy in order to obtain relief in cases involving newly discovered evidence:

To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must meet two requirements. First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at file time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. See Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998) (Jones II). Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones II test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.” Jones II, 709 So.2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)). If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence. See Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) {Jones I).

Marek v. State, 14 So.3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009). The postconviction court must consider the effect of the newly discovered evidence, in addition to all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial. Swafford v. State, 125 So.3d 760, 775-76 (Fla.2013).

Relying on his assertion that Kor-mondy’s counsel first learned of Enoch Hall in August 2014, Kormondy claims that the trial court erred in finding that he was unable to show that the defense could not have known of the evidence by the use of diligence. We disagree. The trial court properly determined that Kormondy failed to show that the defense could not have known about Hall and Michelson — as to the alleged confessions made by Buffkin to each of them in the 1990s — by the use of diligence. In 2005, Buffkin testified during Kormondy’s evidentiary hearing on his initial postconviction motion that “[t]here was [sic] a few other inmates that knew that I was the triggerman.” Therefore, counsel could have sought out Hall and Michelson after Buffkin’s evidentiary hearing testimony.

In addition, the newly discovered evidence offered by Kormondy, as to what Buffkin reportedly said, constitutes hearsay. See § 90.801(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2014); see also Wyatt v. State, 71 So.3d 86, 104 n. 15 (Fla.2011) (agreeing that an inmate’s affidavit used for a claim of newly discovered evidence was inadmissible hearsay). In other words, all of the inmates’ statements consist of relating that Buffkin told them at various times that he was the shooter.

Even if Kormondy satisfies the first prong of Jones II as to all of the alleged inculpatory statements Buffkin made, as presented by Kormondy, and even if such evidence is admissible in the guilt phase or in the penalty phase, we conclude that the newly discovered evidence is not of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe sentence. This Court previously concluded that the trial evidence demonstrated that Kormondy was the shooter separate from any testimony from Buffkin, consisting of both Kormon-dy’s admissions to William Long and the observations of Cecilia McAdams, the surviving victim.

In Kormondy’s original direct appeal, we observed that Kormondy admitted to William Long that he had shot Mr. McAdams, explaining to him that the gun had gone off accidentally. Kormondy I, 703 So.2d at 457. In the appeal of Kormondy’s re-sentencing, Kormondy claimed that his death sentence was disproportionate to the life sentences Buffkin and Hazen received. Kormondy II, 845 So.2d at 47. Kormondy argued that Buffkin was “the leader,” and a “prime instigator,” Hazen, 700 So.2d at 1214, and that Hazen was “the lead rapist,” Kormondy II, 845 So.2d at 47. We concluded that the record evidence refuted Kormondy’s claim: “[t]he evidence from trial and the resentencing demonstrates that Kormondy committed the homicide and is more culpable than his codefen-dants; therefore, his sentence of death is not disproportional on this basis.” Id. Further, we reasoned:

Although Kormondy, in a taped statement ... contended that Buffkin was the trigger man, the evidence in this case demonstrates otherwise. Mrs. Mc-Adams, decedent’s wife, who was sexually assaulted during the robbery, testified that the second person who raped her had shoulder-length hair. She also stated that while the first person who entered the home, Buffkin, was assaulting her, the shortest person (Hazen) and the long-haired one, Kormondy, were in the kitchen with her husband Gary when he was shot.
Mrs. McAdams’ description of Kor-mondy was supported by the testimony of several other witnesses as well as inconsistencies in Kormondy’s taped statement. Allen Cotton also testified that Kormondy had longer hair than the others on the day he was arrested and that Hazen was shorter than Kormondy. Terri Kilgore, the officer who pursued Kormondy on foot, also described Kor-mondy as having long hair at the time of his arrest. This testimony tends to place Kormondy, not Buffkin, in the kitchen with the victim and Hazen when the fatal shot was fired.
Kormondy’s confession to Will Long also belies Kormondy’s version of events. According to Long, he and Kor-mondy went to a convenience store the day after the murders and Kormondy commented, upon seeing a reward poster related to the murders, that the only way the police would find the killer would be if they were walking behind him and Long at that moment. Later that day, Kormondy admitted killing the victim and tearfully explained that it was an accident. The testimony presented at trial tends to prove that Kormondy was the triggerman, and therefore his sentence of death is not disproportionate to the life sentences received by his codefendants.

Id. at 48 (emphasis added).

The newly discovered evidence now offered by Kormondy in the form of the affidavits is not of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe sentence. As noted above, Buffkin alleged that he shot Mr. McAdams during his testimony at Kormondy’s evidentiary hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence brought in his initial motion for postconviction relief. This claim was rejected by the trial court, which we affirmed on appeal. While it is true that in denying Kormon-dy’s initial motion for postconviction relief the trial court found that “the sole reason Buffkin claimed that he shot Mr. Mc-Adams was to afford Buffkin an opportunity to come to court and to escape” and that “Buffkin fabricated his most recent statement in an attempt to escape again,” the trial court properly determined that Buff-kin was not credible based on Buffkin’s evidentiary hearing testimony along with its review of Buffkiris prior inconsistent statements. Kormondy III, 988 So.2d at 440. On appeal, we considered all of the circumstances of the case, including the fact that Buffkin had previously told law enforcement officers and testified at deposition and Hazeris trial that Kormondy was the shooter. Id. at 489. As the federal district court observed in rejecting a similar claim regarding the credibility of Buffkin and Hazen:

There are good grounds to doubt that they are now telling the truth. These were participants in a horrific crime who have demonstrated a willingness to lie about what happened. They are serving life sentences and have little to lose by trying to help a confederate get off death row.

Kormondy IV, 2011 WL 9933762, at *20.

The presentation of statements from a number of fellow inmates who maintain that they also heard Buffkin confess to being the shooter does not change this picture, does not change the corroborating evidence, and would not probably produce a life sentence. The testimony from Long and Mrs. McAdams at Kormondy’s trial-establishing that Kormondy shot and killed Mr. McAdams — has remained unrefuted in postconviction proceedings. Thus, the record conclusively shows that Kormondy is entitled to no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of this claim.

Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel

Kormondy asserts that during the proceedings on his initial motion for postcon-viction relief, postconviction counsel was deficient in arguing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), as well as Brady and Giglio relating to trial witness William Long. For this claim, Kormondy relies on Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S.-, 182 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013), and this Court’s equitable powers. The trial court denied this claim, concluding that neither Martinez nor Trevino is applicable and that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claims are not cognizable in a rule 3.851 motion.

In Banks, we recently denied Banks’ claim of ineffective assistance of postcon-viction counsel. 150 So.3d 797. We explained that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claims are not cognizable. Id.; see also Moore v. State, 132 So.3d 718, 724 (Fla.2013); Chavez v. State, 129 So.3d 1067, 1067 (Fla.2013) (table); Atwater v. State, 118 So.3d 219 (Fla.2013) (table); Mann v. State, 112 So.3d 1158, 1164 (Fla.2013); Howell v. State, 109 So.3d 763, 774 (Fla.2013); Gore v. State, 91 So.3d 769, 778 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1904, 182 L.Ed.2d 661 (2012). Furthermore, we reasoned that neither Martinez nor Trevino supports an independent basis for relief in state court proceedings. Banks, 150 So.3d 797; see also Zakrzewski v. State, 147 So.3d 531 (Fla.2014) (table); Howell, 109 So.3d at 774; Chavez, 129 So.3d at 1067; Gore, 91 So.3d at 778. We decline Kormondy’s invitation to reconsider our previous rulings on this issue. Accordingly, Kormondy is not entitled to relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Kormondy post-conviction relief. No rehearing will be entertained by this Court and the mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

      . On November 24, 2014, Governor Rick Scott issued Kormondy’s death warrant. Kormondy’s execution is scheduled for Thursday, January 15, 2015, at 6:00 p.m.

      . This Court also affirmed Kormondy’s convictions for three counts of armed sexual battery, one count of burglary of a dwelling with an assault and an intent to commit a theft, and one count of armed robbery. Id. at 463.

      . We cautioned the trial court that (1) the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator cannot be found if premeditation is not established; and (2) a sentencing order must reflect only facts from the record in the particular case. Id. at 463.

      . Kormondy set forth the following seven issues:
      (1) whether the death penalty is constitutional and whether this sentence was proportional in this case given that (a) the codefendants, Curtis Buffkin and James Hazen, were given life sentences and (b) the death was caused by an accidental firing of the weapon; (2) whether the resen-tencing trial and order violated this Court’s mandate from the first appeal, violated principles of law protecting the accused from having questions of ultimate fact relit-igated against him, and violated Kormon-dy's rights by finding aggravators not tried or argued; (3) whether the trial court reversibly erred in its mitigation findings because the trial court defied this court’s mandate, committed legal and factual errors, and contradicted itself; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to present irrelevant, cumulative, and unduly prejudicial collateral crime and nonstatu-tory aggravating evidence about Kormon-dy's capture by a canine unit more than a week after the crime took place; (5) whether Kormondy was denied his right to cross-examine and confront state witness Cecilia McAdams concerning her ability to identify and distinguish the perpetrators; (6) whether the introduction of compound victim impact evidence, much of which was inadmissible, was fundamental error that undermined the reliability of the jury's recommendation; and (7) whether the imposition of death in the absence of notice of the aggravators sought or found, or of jury findings of the aggravators and death eligibility, offends due process and the protection against cruel and unusual punishment under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

        Id. at 46-47.

      . Buffkin’s March 30, 2005, affidavit, stated as follows:
      On July 11, 1993, I Curtis Buffkin was holding the gun when Gary got shot in the head. I didn't try to kill him. It was an accident. I said it was Shane Kormondy who kill[ed] Gary, but the truth was I was the man who was with the gun when it went off. Shane Kormondy didn’t kill Gary.

      6. We note that Kormondy himself affirmed in open court during the new penalty-phase proceeding that he and his counsel agreed that it “is not the case” that Kormondy "acted under the extreme influence, dominion, duress, or control of another.” Kormondy V, 688 F.3d at 1267.

      . Kormondy raised the following eleven issues on appeal:
      (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial by failing to require Kormondy's presence at pretrial conferences; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing Kormondy’s statements to law enforcement officers to be introduced into evidence; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by conceding Kormondy’s guilt for burglary and robbery; (4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach the State's witnesses; (5) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for the disqualification of Judge Ku-der and failing to withdraw from representation before the first trial; (6) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the second penalty phase; (7) [the] trial court erred by finding that the newly discovered evidence of recanted testimony was not credible; (8) rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, which prevents counsel from contacting jurors, is unconstitutional; (9) execution by electrocution and lethal injection are cruel or unusual punishment or both; (10) his constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated as he may be incompetent at the time of execution; and (11) the cumulative effect of errors deprived Kormondy of a fair trial. '

        Id. at 427-28.

      . In his habeas petition, Kormondy raised the following three claims:
      (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to this Court that the trial court's order failed to consider record mitigation in violation of Farr v. State, 621 So.2d 1368 (Fla. 1993); (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for not presenting Mrs. McAdams' prior deposition testimony on direct appeal to this Court in order to establish that the trial court erred by not allowing Kormondy to confront Mrs. McAdams; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Kormondy's waiver of mitigation was invalid because the trial court did not ask trial counsel what investigation for mitigation was done and what mitigation was available in violation of Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1993).

        Id. at 441.

      . Kormondy argued the following claims in the federal district court:
      (1) at the penalty-phase retrial, the court deprived Mr. Kormondy of the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when the court sustained the objection to the question the defense attempted to ask Mrs. McAdams about her prior deposition testimony; (2) the penalty-phase-retrial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence; (3) the attorney in the second direct appeal rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting that the resentencing court should have considered the mitigation evidence from the first penalty-phase trial; (4) the original attorney or the penalty-phase-retrial attorney ... rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach Mr. Long and Mrs. McAdams; (5) the original attorney had constitutionally impermissible conflicts of interest; (6) Mr. Kormondy is "actually innocent” of the death penalty; and (7) Florida's method for administering lethal injection is unconstitutional.

        Id. at *8.

      . On December 7, 2014, Kormondy filed a motion to disqualify the trial court, which it denied the following day. Because Kormon-dy does not claim in his initial brief that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify, we do not consider whether his motion was properly denied.

      . Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2014), provides, in pertinent part, that in a separate sentencing proceeding
      evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6). Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionaiy mies of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements.
      § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). Although the statute "relaxes the eviden-tiary rules during the penalty phase of a capital trial, the statute clearly states that the defendant must have an opportunity to fairly rebut the hearsay evidence in order for it to be admissible. This rule applies to the State as well.” Blackwood v. State, 111 So.2d 399, 411-12 (Fla.2000) (citation omitted).

      . In addressing one of Kormondy's guilt-phase claims raised on direct appeal, we observed that "Long was subjected to extensive cross-examination by the defense [and that] [t]he jury was given ample opportunity to assess Long’s credibility.” Kormondy I, 703 So.2d at 459. In Kormondy III, Kormondy claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach William Long as to "his prior felony conviction, the benefits he received from the State in exchange for his testimony against Kormondy, and the inconsistency between Long’s deposition statements and his trial testimony.” 983 So.2d at 432. We concluded that Kormondy failed to establish prejudice regarding trial counsel’s failure to specifically question Long about his felony conviction. Id. Because Kormondy did not argue in the trial court the other areas of impeachment which Kormondy complained of on appeal, we determined that those sub-claims were not properly before us. Id. at 432 & n. 4. We note that the federal district court found that Kormondy "ha[dj shown no prejudice at all from the failure to impeach Mr. Long on the additional grounds now proposed.” Kormondy IV, 2011 WL 9933762, at *17.