author: VICTORY, J.

text:
    Gloria TURNER v. WILLIS KNIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER, Venkateswara Rao, M.D., Navadeep Samra, M.D. and Gazi Zibari, M.D.
    Nos. 2012-C-0703, 2012-C-0742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 4, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 2013.
    Watson, Blanche, Wilson & Posner, Randall Louis Champagne, J. Jacob Chapman, for applicant. (No. 2012-C-0703)
    Louisiana Department of Justice, Laurie R. Wilson, John F. Frederickson, for application. (No. 2012-C-0742)
    James David Caldwell, for respondent. (Nos. 2012-C-0703, 2012-C-0742)
   VICTORY, J.

J^This writ application involves the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), specifically, whether the running of the statutory ninety (90) day grace period in which prescription is suspended in a medical malpractice case begins when a plaintiffs medical malpractice complaint is dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman, or when plaintiff is notified that his complaint has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and find that the 90 day grace period begins to run from the date of dismissal. Because plaintiff failed to file her petition for damages within this 90 day period, her claim is prescribed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts are not in dispute. James Turner was admitted to Willis Knighton Medical Center (“Willis Knighton”) on August 14, 2008, for a kidney transplant. He was treated by Dr. Venkateswara Rao, Dr. Gazi Zibari, and Dr. Navdeep Samra |2(coIIectively “the doctors”). Six days later, on August 20, 2008, he died, allegedly from the negligent treatment of the doctors while at Willis Knighton. On August 20, 2009, his wife, Gloria Turner, filed a medical malpractice complaint with the Division of Administration requesting a medical review panel and naming Willis Knigh-ton and the doctors as defendants.

On August 27, 2009, the Patient’s Compensation Fund (the “PCF”) acknowledged by letter to Mrs. Turner that it received her claim filed on August 20, 2009. It was given PCF File No. 2009-00977. The PCF noted that Willis Knighton was a qualified healthcare provider under the provisions of La. R.S. 40:1299.41, but stated that it could not qualify the doctors as healthcare providers for medical malpractice purposes because it had no record of them. The PCF reserved its right to qualify them upon the receipt of additional information. On April 1, 2010, the Division of Administration acknowledged by letter that the doctors were qualified as healthcare providers under the provisions of La. R.S. 40:1299.39.1, the Medical Malpractice Act for State Services. This letter referenced the claim as 09 MR 166.

On May 24, 2010, the PCF mailed notice to Mrs. Turner in Docket No. 2009-00977 that her malpractice panel request would be dismissed if the parties failed to appoint an attorney chairperson “within one year from the date of filing as indicated above.” The date of filing was indicated at the top of the letter as: “Date Filed: 8/20/2009.” The letter stated that if she wished to continue pursuit of the panel request, she should “[njotify this office immediately if you are unable to agree on an attorney chairman and wish to request the strike process to be initiated,” and explained this was urgent because “the attorney chairman must still be chosen and appointed prior to the one year from file date as allowed by [the MMA].” The letter concluded by stating “[a]gain, this office will close the claim |3if no notice is received stating an attorney chairperson has been selected by the due date above.” The “due date above” was noted at the top of the letter as “AC Appointment Due Date: 8/20/2010.”

On July 14, 2010, new counsel enrolled for Mrs. Turner and notified the PCF that “pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1299.39.2,” No. 09 MR 166 and PCF File No.2009-00977 should proceed as a joint medical panel. By August 20, 2010, no attorney chairman had been appointed. Accordingly, on August 25, 2010, the PCF sent a certified letter to Mrs. Turner’s new counsel, stating the following:

Under the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), as amended by Act’ 435 of the 1984 Regular Session, our office has closed the above referenced matter due to failure to appoint an attorney chairman within the one year time-frame which ended on 8/20/2010. Therefore the claim has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman and the parties shall be deemed to have- waived the use of the medical review panel.
[/The filing of a request for a medical review panel shall suspend the time for within which suit must be filed until 90 days after the claim has been dismissed in accordance with the Act.

As did the first letter, this letter referenced “PCF File No.: 2009-00977,” “File Date: 8/20/2009,” and “AC Appointment Due Date: 8/20/2010.” Mrs. Turner’s counsel received this letter on August 27, 2010.

On November 23, 2010, Mrs. Turner filed this lawsuit alleging medical malpractice against Willis Knighton and the doctors. Willis Knighton filed an exception of prescription, claiming that the suit was filed beyond the one year anniversary of the filing of the initial complaint and the additional 90 day statutory grace period suspending prescription. The doctors filed an exception of prescription and, alternatively, an exception of prematurity. The defendants argued that Mrs. Turner’s medical malpractice action had prescribed because it was not filed within 90 days of her claim being dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairperson, the date of dismissal being August 20, 2009. Mrs. Turner argued that the claim was timely because it was filed within 90 days after the PCF notified her that her claim had been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairperson, the date of the notification letter being August 25, 2009. The trial court agreed with defendants and granted their exceptions of prescription. The doctors withdrew their exception of prematurity. The court of appeal reversed. Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center, 46,988 (La.App. 2 Cir. 02/29/12), 87 So.3d 209. We granted and consolidated defendants’ writ applications to consider the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c). Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center, 12-0703 (La.5/28/2012), 89 So.3d 1206, 12-0742 (La.5/25/12), 89 So.3d 1201.

| .DISCUSSION

As the facts in this matter are not in dispute and the issue is purely one of statutory interpretation, we review this matter de novo, without deference to the legal conclusions of the courts below. Thibodeaux v. Donnell, 08-2436 (La.5/5/09), 9 So.3d 120, 122 (citing Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-0582 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037).

A medical malpractice action must be filed “within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.” La. R.S. 9:5628(A). La. R.S. 40:1299(B)(l)(a)(i) provides that “[n]o action against a health care provider covered under by this Part, or his insurer, may be commenced in any court before the claimant’s proposed complaint has been pre: sented to a medical review panel established pursuant to this Section.” There is no dispute that Mrs. Turner’s complaint requesting a medical review panel was timely filed on the last allowable day, exactly one year from Mr. Turner’s death. The filing of such a complaint suspends the prescriptive period for filing a medical malpractice claim in a district court.

The statute at issue is La. R.S. 40:1299.47(2), which provides:

(c) An attorney chairman for the medical review panel shall be appointed within one year from the date the request for review of the claim was filed. Upon appointment of the attorney chairman, the parties shall notify the board of the name and address of the attorney chairman. If the board has not received notice of the appointment of an attorney chairman within nine months from the date the request for review of the claim was filed, then the board shall send notice to the parties by certified or registered mail that the claim will be dismissed in ninety days unless an attorney chairman is appointed within one year from the date the request for review of the claim was filed. If the board has not received notice of the appointment of an attorney chairman within one year from the date the request for review of the claim was filed, then the board shall promptly send notice to the parties by certified or registered mail that the claim has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman and the parties | 6shall be deemed to have waived the use of the medical review panel. The filing of a request for a medical review panel shall suspend the time within which suit must be filed until ninety days after the claim has been dismissed in accordance with this Section.

The above statute requires the parties to select and appoint an attorney chairman within one year from the date the request for review of the claim was filed. Here, the request for review was filed on August 20, 2009, so the attorney chairman needed to be appointed by August 20, 2010. The statute also provides two separate notice provisions. First, if the board has not received notice of the appointment of an attorney chairman within nine months from the date the request for review was filed, the board must notify the parties by certified or registered mail that the claim will be dismissed in 90 days unless an attorney chairman is appointed within one year from the date the request for review of the claim was filed. This is sometimes referred to as the “nine month letter.” Here, the PCF sent Mrs. Turner a letter on May 24, 2010, notifying her that under La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), “the referenced medical malpractice panel request will be dismissed due to your failure to appoint an attorney chairperson within one year from the date of filing as indicated above.” The date of filing “indicated above” was “8/20/2009.” The letter went on to state that if she desired to continue to pursue this claim, “an attorney chairperson must be appointed by agreement of all parties or through the striking process” and that she should notice the PCF “immediately” if the parties could not agree on a chairperson and requested the strike process. However, the PCF stressed that “if the strike process is used, the attorney chairman must still be chosen and appointed prior to the one year from file date;” therefore, “a request for a strike list must be made immediately so the process can be completed and an attorney chairman selected within the time allowed.” Finally, the PCF stressed, “[a]gain, this office will close the claim if no 17notice is received stating an attorney chairperson has been selected by the due date above.” The “due date above” was listed as “8/20/2010.”

The second notice provision requires that “if the board has not received notice of the appointment of an attorney chairman within one year from the date the request for review of the claim was filed, then the board shall promptly send notice to the parties by certified or registered mail that the claim has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman and the parties shall be deemed to have waived the use of the medical review panel.” After no attorney chairman had been appointed by August 20, 2010, the PCF “promptly” sent a letter to Mrs. Turner’s attorney, dated August 25, 2010, stating that “[u]nder the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), ..., our office has closed the above referenced matter due to the failure to appoint an attorney chairman within the one year timeframe which ended on 8/20/2010.” The letter further stated that “[tjherefore the claim has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman and the parties shall be deemed to have waived the use of the medical review panel.”

Finally, the letter concluded by stating “[t]he filing of a request for a medical review panel shall suspend the time for within which suit must be filed until 90 days after the claim has been dismissed in accordance with the Act.” This is consistent with the last sentence of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c) which provides that “[t]he filing of a request for a medical review panel shall suspend the time within which suit must be filed until ninety days after the claim has been dismissed in accordance with this Section.” Thus, the issue in this case centers around the date “the claim has been dismissed in accordance with this Section,” because that is what statutorily commences the statutory 90 day grace period, the completion of which recommences the running of prescription.

| ^Defendants argue, and the trial court found, that the date the claim was dismissed was August 20, 2010, because dismissal occurs by operation of law one year from the date the request for review by a medical review panel is filed where no attorney chairperson is ever appointed. They argue that because prescription is suspended until 90 days after the claim has been dismissed, and the claim was dismissed on August 20, 2010, Mrs. Turner’s suit is prescribed because it was not filed by November 19, 2010. Mrs. Turner argues, and the court of appeal agreed, that the statutory 90 day grace period continuing the suspension of prescription did not begin to run until August 25, 2010, the date of the letter notifying her that her claim had been dismissed. Therefore, according to Mrs. Turner, the last day to file suit was November 23, 2010, the date the suit was filed.

We recognize that where there are two permissible interpretations of a prescriptive statute, the courts must adopt the one that favors maintaining rather than barring the action. Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So.2d 532 (La.1992). However, that does not mean that every prescriptive statute must be interpreted in order to avoid prescription. Here, the statute provides a clear date by which an attorney chairperson must be appointed — one year from the date the request for a medical review panel is filed. The statute further provides that the claim will be dismissed if an attorney chairperson is not appointed by that date. That date certain, as provided in the statute and in the letters to plaintiff, was August 20, 2010. Corresponding to this date is the requirement that if the board has not received notice of the appointment within nine months of the date of the filing, the 1 flboard must send notice that “the claim will be dismissed in ninety days unless an attorney chairman is appointed within one year from the date the request was filed.” La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(e). In accordance with this provision, the dismissal of the complaint will occur 90 days from the nine-month mark. Clearly, this is meant to correspond to one year from the time request for the panel is filed, as nine months plus 90 days basically equals one year. We recognize that there may be instances where 90 days from the date of the nine month letter is a longer period than one year from the date of the request for a panel, i.e., where the letter is not sent, as required, nine months from the date of the request for a panel. For instance, here, the date of the nine month letter was May 24, 2010, and 90 days from that date was August 22, 2010. However, even if the statutory 90 day grace period began on that date, this suit would still be prescribed as it was filed after November 20, 2010, (90 days from August 22, 2010). We also recognize that there may be instances where 90 days from the date of a timely sent nine month letter will be shorter than the one year period, i.e., where those months include months with 31 days. In our view, in accordance with rules of statutory construction, in the few instances where the one year period and the ninety days from nine months period are different and one would maintain the action, that interpretation must be followed. However, either interpretation bars this action, and thus this issue is irrelevant for purposes of this case. The real question for our review is whether notice of dismissal or actual dismissal commences the statutory 90 day grace period continuing suspension of the prescriptive period.

| inThe court of appeal determined that notice of dismissal triggered the statutory 90 day grace period relying on our holding in Thibodeaux, supra. However, other provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act were at issue in Thibodeaux, one of which was La. R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(l)(a)(i), which provides:

The filing of the request for a review of a claim shall suspend the time within which suit must be instituted, in accordance with this Part, until ninety days following notification, by certified mail, as provided in Subsection J of this Section, to the claimant or his attorney of the issuance of the opinion by the medi cal review panel, in the case of those health care providers covered by this Part, or in the case of a health care provider against whom a claim has been filed under the provisions of this Part, but who has not qualified under this Part, until ninety days following notification by certified mail to the claimant or his attorney by the board that the health care provider is not covered by this Part. (Emphasis added.)

La. R.S. 40:1299.47(L) likewise provides that “[w]here the medical review panel issues its opinion required by this Section, the suspension of the running of prescription shall not cease until ninety days following notification by certified mail ... of the issuance of the opinion ...” As can be seen, both these statutes begin the statutory 90 day grace period with actual notification. In Thibodeaux, no opinion was issued, in which case La. R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(l)(b) provides that if an opinion is not rendered within twelve months of notice of the appointment of an attorney chairperson, a party may institute a malpractice suit. The court may also grant a request from a party that the twelve month period be extended. After the twelve month period or any court-ordered extension has expired, the medical review panel will be dissolved. La. R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(3) further provided:

Ninety days after notification to all parties by certified mail by the attorney chairman of the board of the dissolution of the medical review panel or ninety days after the expiration of any court-ordered extension as authorized by Paragraph (1) of this Subsection, the suspension of the running of prescription with respect to a qualified health care provider shall cease. (Emphasis added.)

The parties were not notified that the panel was dissolved and no court-ordered extension was requested. A majority of the Court determined that the language of |nthe statute required that where an opinion is not rendered with one year, in cases where there was no court-ordered extension, “notification to the parties is necessary for the suspension of the running of prescription to cease after the dissolution of the medical review panel.” Thibodeaux, supra at 126.

Thibodeaux is distinguishable, in that La. R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(3) specifically provided for the suspension of prescription to end 90 days after notification by certified mail that the panel was dissolved. The same can be said of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(1)(a)(i) and La. R.S. 40:1299.47(L), which suspend prescription until 90 days following “notification” of the issuance of the panel’s opinion. The statute at issue here, La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c) has no such provision commencing the statutory 90 day grace period at notification. Under La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), “the filing of a request for a medical review panel shall suspend the time within which suit must be filed until ninety days after the claim has been dismissed in accordance with this Section.” Under the clear wording of the statute, dismissal, not notification, starts the statutory 90 day grace period. If the Legislature had intended for notice of dismissal to trigger this 90 day period they would have said so, as they did in these other statutes. Instead, the date certain for the appointment of an attorney chairman is one year from the date of the filing of the request for review of a claim by a panel. If an attorney chairman is not appointed by that date, the claim will be dismissed. Plaintiff was specifically notified of this in the May 24, 2010, letter. While prompt notice that the claim has 112been dismissed is required, that notice does not commence the 90 day period; dismissal commences the 90 day period. The August 25, 2010, letter told plaintiffs counsel that the claim had been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairperson and that the date to have done so was August 20, 2010. The letter also put the plaintiff on notice that she had 90 days from the date the claim was dismissed in which to file suit. This letter served the important purpose of notifying Mrs. Turner,- not only that her claim had been dismissed and use of the medical review panel deemed waived, but also that she still had 90 days from dismissal to file suit. Although there may be some confusion over whether dismissal actually occurs 90 days after the nine month letter, or one year after the request for review is filed, there is no question that dismissal, not notification, triggers the statutory 90 day grace period in which prescription continues to be interrupted. Here, whether dismissal occurred on August 20, 2010; or August 22, 2010, plaintiffs suit filed on November 23, 2010, has prescribed.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), an attorney chairperson must be appointed one year from the date a request for review by a medical review panel is filed. If this is not done, the claim is dismissed, use of the panel is deemed waived, and the plaintiff has 90 days, plus any time remaining on the one-year prescription period of La. R.S. 9:5628(A), in which to file suit. While the parties must be notified nine months after the request for review is filed of the consequences of the failure to appoint an attorney chairperson, and must be “promptly” notified after the claim has been dismissed, these notifications do not serve to initiate the running of the statutory 90 grace period provided in La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) during which time prescription continues to be suspended. As clearly stated in the statute, “the filing of a request for a medical review panel shall suspend the time | ^within which suit must be filed until ninety days after the claim has been dismissed in accordance with this Section.” As dismissal, not notification, begins the 90 day grace period, Mrs. Turner’s suit, filed more than 90 days after the suit was dismissed, has prescribed.

DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the trial court judgment, granting the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of prescription, is reinstated.

REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

      . La. R.S. 40:1299.39.2 provides:
      The following provisions shall apply when, for the same injury to or death of a patient, a malpractice claim alleges liability of both a state health care provider under the provisions of this Part and a health care provider under the provisions of Part XXIII of this Chapter:
      (1) Unless all parties have agreed otherwise, only one medical review panel shall be convened in such instance to review the claims under this Part and Part XXIII of this Chapter.
      (2) The panel shall consist of a single attorney chairperson and three health care providers who hold unlimited licenses to practice their profession in Louisiana.
      (3) The panel shall be considered a joint medical review panel, and its actions shall be deemed to have the same force and effect as if a separate medical review panel had been convened under each of the respective Parts.
      (4) The panel shall be governed by the law applicable under both Parts. In the event of a procedural conflict between the provisions of the Parts, the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.47 shall govern.

      . On July 21, 2010, the Division of Administration acknowledged receipt of the filing fee in 09 MR 166 and told Mrs. Turner’s attorney that failure to select an attorney chairperson within one year of the request for review would result in dismissal of the claim. On February 11, 2011, the Division of Administration notified Judge Frank Thaxton that he had been selected by mutual agreement of counsel as the attorney chairperson in 09 MR 166. The letter included a copy of the malpractice complaint filed on August 20, 2009. According to the parties at oral argument before this Court, this proceeding is still pending.

      . The doctors’ alternative argument of prematurity was that Mrs. Turner's claim had not yet been reviewed by a state medical review panel.

      . As stated, a medical malpractice claim must be filed within one year, and the filing of a request for a medical review panel suspends the running of that one year prescriptive period. When the medical review panel process comes to an end, the plaintiff has 90 days plus whatever time remains on the one year period in which to file suit. Because Mrs. Turner waited until the last day of the one year period to file the request for the medical review panel, prescription was suspended, but she had no time remaining on that one year period to add to the statutory 90 day grace period after the malpractice complaint was dismissed.

      . We note that the nine month letter in this case did not mention this period, but only stated that pursuant to the terms of the statute, her claim would be dismissed unless she appointed an attorney chairperson within one year of August 20, 2009, and that the PCF would “close the claim” if they did not receive notice of the selection by August 20, 2010. No party has argued that the 90 grace period begins 90 days after the nine month letter.

      . Until Acts 2003, No. 1263, Sec. 1, eff. July 7, 2003, La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), the section of the statute in dispute read, ‘‘[t]he board shall dismiss a claim ninety days after giving notice by certified mail to the claimant or the claimant’s attorney if no action has been taken by the claimant ... to secure the appointment of an attorney chairman for the medical review panel within two years from the date the request for review of the claim was filed.” Thus, in addition to extending the one year period to two years, the statute provided the board must dismiss the claim 90 days after giving notice that the two year period has passed. This provides more support that notice is not the triggering factor for dismissal as it is no longer mentioned.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. KNOLL, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Owen J. TRAHANT, Jr.
    No. 2012-B-1435.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 14, 2012.

      Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Charles Bennet Plattsmier, Damon Shawn Manning, for applicant.
    Owen J. Trahant, Jr., Schiff, Scheckman & White, Leslie J. Schiff, for respondent.
   | ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Owen J. Trahant, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

At all times relevant to these proceedings, respondent confined his law practice to the handling of real estate closings. In the mid-1990’s, the volume of respondent’s business increased substantially. At that time, O’Neal Jones, Jr., a lawyer who shared office space with respondent, agreed to assist by performing title examinations and notarial services for some of the closings that were assigned to respondent’s office for handling. This arrangement continued until April 2001, when Mr. Jones moved out of respondent’s office. The ODC alleges that respondent engaged in the following instances of misconduct during the period of his association with Mr. Jones:

Count I — The Thomas Matter

In July 2000, Youlanda Thomas entered into a written purchase agreement with Jose Vasquez to buy a home on River Ridge Drive in Lake Charles for |⅞$135,000. Ms. Thomas applied to a mortgage broker, Infinity Mortgage Services, Inc. (“Infinity”), to obtain financing in connection with the purchase. Infinity secured funding for Ms. Thomas’s mortgage from American Fidelity, Inc. (“American Fidelity”) and retained respondent’s law office to handle the closing. The title examination and the closing were actually performed by Mr. Jones. !

Prior to Ms. Thomas’s closing, First Premier Financial Services, Inc. (“First Premier”) was inserted into the transaction without her knowledge or consent. Mr. Jones and Anthony Grishby were directors and incorporators of First Premier; Mr. Grishby was also a director and incorporator of Infinity. On August 22, 2000, First Premier purchased the River Ridge Drive property from Mr. Vasquez for $135,000, the true sales price. Mr. Grishby executed the Cash Sale on behalf of First Premier, and Mr. Jones notarized his signature. The sales price was then increased by $20,000, and by Cash Sale dated August 22, 2000, First Premier sold the River Ridge Drive property to Ms. Thomas for the inflated price of $155,000. Mr. Jones also notarized the Cash Sale documenting this transaction. Mr. Jones then notarized a $170,000 mortgage and related loan closing documents between Ms. Thomas, as the borrower, and American Fidelity, as the lender, for the River Ridge Drive property. In this transaction, the loan closing was designated as a “refinance” rather than a new purchase. The HUD-1 settlement statement prepared by respondent’s office falsely reported that First Premier held a $155,000 mortgage on the property.

Respondent was the title insurance agent for Ms. Thomas’s loan closing and had access to the title examination performed by Mr. Jones; therefore, he should have known that Ms. Thomas did not own the River Ridge Drive property prior to the closing in August 2000. Respondent also should have known that First Premier |sdid not have a mortgage on the property. Nevertheless, respondent’s staff prepared the HUD-1 settlement statement and other documents that allowed the property to be sold from Mr. Vasquez to First Premier and then “flipped” to Ms. Thomas as a refinance for an inflated price. Furthermore, respondent’s stamped signature appears on the title insurance policy which contains false information about the First Premier “mortgage” on the River Ridge Drive property.

Count II — The Randell Matter

On August 29, 2000, Shawnette Randell entered into a written purchase agreement with Pledged Property II, LLC to buy a home on English Drive in Lafayette for $82,000. Ms. Randell applied to Infinity to provide financing in connection with the purchase. Infinity approved Ms. Randell’s application and retained respondent’s law office to handle the closing.

Respondent or his office staff performed the title examination on the English Drive property. Having done so, respondent should have known that Ms. Randell was not the current owner of the property. Nonetheless, respondent or his staff caused or allowed Ms. Randell’s purchase of the property to be falsely structured as a “refinance” rather than a new purchase. On August 31, 2000, Paul Champagne, a non-attorney notary public employed by respondent, closed a “refinance” loan for Ms. Randell on the English Drive property in the amount of $55,200. Of this amount, First Premier received $10,000, and Infinity received $1,387.82.

On September 7, 2000, after the rescission period elapsed on the “refinance” loan, $32,000 of the proceeds from the “refinancing” were used to actually acquire the English Drive property from the seller, Pledged Property II, LLC. Respondent’s staff prepared the HUD-1 settlement statement and the Cash Sale in connection with Ms. Randell’s “new purchase” closing. Although Ms. Randell did |4not own the English Drive property until the date of the closing, respondent nevertheless issued a title insurance policy dated August 31, 2000, falsely listing Ms. Randell as the owner of the property as of that date.

In both Counts I and II, the ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct) and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count III — The Landry Matter

Alton Landry, Sr. and his wife, Gloria Landry, had six children. After Mrs. Landry died, Mr. Landry and one of his daughters, Reggie Landry, applied for a loan using the family home as collateral. The lender retained respondent’s law office to handle the closing, which required the opening of a succession for Mrs. Landry, as well as the execution of an act of donation by which the Landry children would donate their interests in the home to their father. Respondent’s office staff prepared the necessary documents; Mr. Jones was assigned to handle the loan closing and the succession and donation matters.

In April 2000, Mr. Jones closed Mr. Landry’s loan and notarized the act of donation, which had been executed outside of his presence. The act of donation was then filed into the public record. Because of tax issues relating to the succession, no succession documents were filed at that time. It was later alleged that the signatures of some of the Landry children were forged on the act of donation.

Respondent charged $750 to handle Mrs. Landry’s succession, which included $150 for court costs. This sum was withheld from the proceeds of Mr. Landry’s loan, as evidenced by the HUD-1 settlement statement. Respondent admits that he received $750 and that he deposited the funds into his operating | .^account, rather than his client trust account. However, as a result of the forgery allegations, respondent did not file Mrs. Landry’s succession documents and did not obtain a judgment of possession. Nevertheless, respondent failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee he was paid and failed to refund the $150 intended for court costs.

In Count III, the ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.5(f)(6) (failure to refund an unearned fee) and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In March 2002, Ms. Thomas filed a complaint with the ODC against respondent and Mr. Jones. In 2004, the ODC opened an investigation into the Randell matter. During this time, the ODC learned that a federal criminal probe was ongoing into the fraudulent real estate scheme perpetrated by Mr. Grishby. As a result, the ODC delayed taking any further action pending the conclusion of the federal investigation. In July 2005, a grand jury in the Western District of Louisiana handed up a 65-count indictment against Mr. Grishby and others. Neither respondent nor Mr. Jones was named in the indictment. When it became clear that the United States Attorney was not pursuing criminal charges against respondent or Mr. Jones, the ODC concluded its investigation and filed separate sets of formal charges against respondent and Mr. Jones in March 2011. The ODC | fimoved to consolidate the formal charges for hearing, but the motion was opposed by both respondent and Mr. Jones and was subsequently denied.

Respondent, through counsel, answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct. Alternatively, respondent asserted the affirmative defense of liberative prescription pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 31. This matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the committee made the following factual findings:

Respondent engaged in a law practice that included real estate closings. He employed several individuals who assisted him with his practice, including his daughter, Renee Trahant, who served as the office manager; O’Neal Jones, Jr., an attorney; and Paul Champagne, a non-attorney notary. During the pertinent times outlined in the formal charges, respondent received business and assignments from multiple title insurance companies and then, through his daughter, assigned certain title examinations and closing services to Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones received a portion of the fees collected at closing as part of his fee from respondent. Respondent needed Mr. Jones’s assistance because his real estate practice had “exploded.” Respondent trusted Mr. Jones and allowed him to work unsupervised. There was no review by respondent of Mr. Jones’s work or files. Respondent also did not | supervise his other employees, Ms. Tra-hant and Mr. Champagne, or his supervision of them was inadequate, due either to a lack of diligence or because of the volume of the law practice.

Respondent was the only licensed title insurance agent at the time of the closings at issue in the formal charges. Mr. Jones did not have a separate office because most of his work was conducted on the road. It is clear from the evidence submitted that respondent ran an extremely loose ship of an office, entrusting the directing of the assignments and most of the paperwork to his daughter.

The loose running of the office, the manner in which the assignments were made, the lack of supervision and control over the employees, and the high volume of business were all factors that resulted in Youlanda Thomas (Count I) and Shaw-nette Randell (Count II) becoming victims of the “house flipping” scheme that was perpetrated by Infinity, First Premier, and other entities with the help of respondent’s office. Respondent had no ownership or financial interest in Infinity or First Premier, nor did he have a relationship with director/owner Anthony Grishby. Mr. Jones did have a business relationship with Mr. Grishby and was at least a listed director on corporate documents of First Premier. Respondent had no knowledge of the type of relationship Mr. Jones had with the various financial institutions owned and/or operated by Mr. Grishby.

The committee observed that although numerous documents were introduced into evidence by both respondent and the ODC, none were the “smoking gun” that proved respondent’s direct dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. No evidence supported a finding that respondent was complicit in the fraudulent activities. However, the committee found that respondent’s failure to supervise his staff allowed the fraudulent loans to be processed.

Additionally, the committee made the following findings specifically relating to each count of the formal charges:

1 ¡¡Count I — Jose Vasquez reached an agreement to sell his home to Youlanda Thomas. Despite his intention, Mr. Vasquez actually sold the property to First Premier, who in turn sold it to Ms. Thomas for a price that had been increased by $20,000. Mr. Vazquez did not ask any questions at the closing. He later discovered the improprieties of these transactions and reported them accordingly, which resulted in the filing of formal charges against respondent and Mr. Jones.

Respondent’s firm was assigned to do the closing for the Thomas property. Mr. Jones handled the title examination with no oversight or review by respondent, and he notarized both of the questionable cash sale documents. Respondent was not present at the closing, but he did collect a fee.

The committee found that the Thomas closing should have been an outright new home purchase for the price Ms. Thomas originally agreed to, but it was not. Instead, the transaction was listed on the closing paperwork as a “refinance,” which it should not have been since Ms. Thomas did not own the property before the actual cash sale. Respondent acknowledged that this was an illegal “house flipping” scheme. There was no proof provided at the hearing that respondent was aware of the “house flipping” scheme or any problems specifically related to the Thomas closing, and of the parties involved in the scheme, only Mr. Grishby was formally prosecuted by federal authorities.

Count II — Shawnette Randell was another innocent victim of the “house flipping” scheme. She agreed to purchase a house for $32,000, but she ended up paying $55,000 because she was duped into believing that she owed money for a credit card bill that did not exist. This deception was perpetrated by Infinity and its owner/employees. Ms. Randell never met respondent, nor was respondent present at her closing. Respondent’s employee, Paul Champagne, notarized the closing documents without any knowledge that he was doing anything wrong; he simply followed the instructions of the office manager to close the Randell loan.

|flWhen the title commitment request was faxed to respondent’s office from Infinity, it showed that First Premier had a mortgage on the property Ms. Randell was acquiring. Respondent did not learn until after the closing that First Premier had no mortgage and that the title commitment request was a fraudulent document. As in Count I, Ms. Randell’s closing was set up as a refinancing, though she did not own the property before the cash sale. Respondent confirmed that his office staff did the title work and should have known there was no prior First Premier mortgage; however, the red flags did not alert respondent’s staff that there was a problem. The HUD-1 settlement statement for the first transaction, which lists no seller, was prepared by Equicredit and was set up as a refinancing. The second HUD-1 settlement statement was prepared by respondent’s staff with the proper contract sales price of $32,000.

Based on these factual findings, the committee determined that respondent failed to supervise his office staff, in violation of Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(c), as well as Rules 5.1 (responsibilities of partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers) and 5.3 (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants). Respondent had a very busy, overwhelming, and voluminous real estate closing practice. He entrusted an associate, Mr. Jones, and nonlawyers, including his daughter and Mr. Champagne, to keep the practice afloat. These employees did not act in an ethical manner, whether intentionally or negligently, and their conduct led to fraudulent loans. Respondent’s negligent supervision facilitated this behavior.

Count III — Respondent was hired to complete the succession of Gloria Landry in connection with a loan application by her husband, Alton Landry, Sr., and her daughter, Ms. Reggie Landry. Respondent assigned the matter to Mr. |10Jones for handling. It was later learned that the signatures of certain necessary family members were forged on an act of donation. Because of the forgeries, the succession was not completed or filed by respondent or his staff. The committee found credible respondent’s testimony that he did not know about the forgeries and did not participate in procuring the forged signatures on the act of donation.

Respondent charged and collected a $600 fee to handle Mrs. Landry’s succession, as well as a $150 filing fee, for a total of $750. Respondent admitted that he received the fee on or about April 19, 2000. He deposited the funds into his account and spent the money, but the succession was never completed. Respondent claims that until he gave a sworn statement to the ODC in May 2006, he did not even think about refunding the money, nor did he consider the impropriety of collecting the entire fee without having completed the work. Nevertheless, even after the sworn statement and being put on notice of the need to make at least a partial refund to the Landrys, respondent made no attempts to refund any part of the fee. Furthermore, respondent did not put any amount into his trust account while the dispute was ongoing for the uncompleted work.

Based on these factual findings, the committee determined that respondent violated Rule 1.5(f)(6) in Count III. While respondent may have earned a portion of the $750 he collected by preparing some of the succession documents, he was hired to actually complete the succession through filing, which he clearly never did. Therefore, respondent was required to promptly refund all or a portion of the fee and all of the court costs directly to the Landry family. Respondent failed to do so. Whether respondent ultimately paid the $750 to anyone else, and whether the succession was actually filed later, are all immaterial as to the specific violation of failure to refund the fees.

The committee determined that respondent’s misconduct was negligent, but that the applicable baseline sanction is suspension. In mitigation, the committee | n found the following factors: absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, delay in the disciplinary proceedings, and remorse. The committee also cited in mitigation the fact that no criminal charges were brought against respondent in the “house flipping” scheme, and that there have been no disciplinary proceedings against him since the events at issue here. The committee found the following aggravating factors: a prior disciplinary record (a 1998 admonition for neglecting a legal matter), vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1974).

For the foregoing reasons, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days, fully deferred, subject to conditions specified in its report. Both respondent and the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

At the outset, the disciplinary board rejected respondent’s affirmative defense of liberative prescription, noting that more than ten years did not elapse between the alleged misconduct and the filing of the complaints in Counts I and II. Respondent’s mental state is not a factor in this determination.

Turning to the merits, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same. The board also determined the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The board found respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal profession when he delegated his professional responsibilities to nonlaw-yer personnel and an associate lawyer who acted in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent acted knowingly, which caused substantial financial harm to his clients and tarnished the image of the legal profession. After | ^considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the board found the following factors: a prior disciplinary record, ■vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law. In mitigation, the board found the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and remorse.

Considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing a lawyer’s failure to supervise, the board determined that the fully deferred suspension recommended by the committee is too lenient, and that an actual period of suspension is necessary. Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for ninety days, followed by a one-year period of supervised probation to include Ethics School.

Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

As a procedural matter, we reject respondent’s argument that Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 31 applies in this case and that Counts I and II of the formal charges are prescribed. For liberative prescription to apply, two elements must be established: (1) the disciplinary complaint or investigation must involve conduct which took place more than ten years ago, and (2) the lawyer must have acted | ^negligently. In re: Stanford, 10-1547 (La.12/17/10), 50 So.3d 151. Here, the complaints were lodged against respondent in 2002 and 2004, less than ten years after the alleged misconduct, which occurred in 2000. Furthermore, we do not find that respondent’s misconduct was negligent. Therefore, Rule XIX, § 31 is inapplicable.

Turning to the merits, the record of this matter supports the hearing committee’s factual findings. Essentially, respondent abdicated his professional responsibilities to others in his law office, which in turn facilitated a pattern of fraudulent real estate closings. Importantly, however, respondent did not originate the fraudulent scheme and was not an active participant in it. He also failed to refund an unearned legal fee. Based on these facts, respondent has violated Rules 1.5(f)(6), 5.1, and 5.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. His misconduct caused actual harm to his clients and to the legal profession. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension.

In mitigation, we agree with the committee and the board that respondent is remorseful for his misconduct and that he has displayed a cooperative attitude | ^toward these proceedings. The following aggravating factors are present: a pri- or disciplinary record, a selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law.

Under these circumstances, we find respondent’s misconduct warrants an actual period of suspension of six months. Following his suspension, respondent shall be placed on supervised probation for a period of one year. During the period of probation, respondent shall attend the Ethics School program offered by the Louisiana State Bar Association and make restitution of $750 plus legal interest to the Alton Landry, Sr. family.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Owen J. Trahant, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 12890, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for six months, followed by a one-year period of supervised probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in this opinion. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

KNOLL, Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part with reason.

KNOLL, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

|, While I agree that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, I disagree that his violation warrants a six-month suspension from the practice of law. I find that respondent’s conduct was more in the nature of a negligent failure to supervise his staff, rather than knowing or intentional. Therefore, I would impose a less significant sanction than the majority imposes.

      . Respondent’s office was closing an average of 100 loans per month and performing in the range of 300-400 title examinations per month.

      . Youlanda Thomas died prior to the hearing in this matter.

      . In 2009, more than eight years after respondent collected the fee in the Landry matter, another attorney was hired to complete Mrs. Landry’s succession in connection with a bank foreclosure against the property. Respondent paid the attorney $750 to compensate him for his work, but he now acknowledges that he should have made a refund to the Landry family, not a third party.

      . At the time of the alleged misconduct in Count III, an attorney’s duty to refund unearned fees was set forth in Rule 1.5(f)(6). Rule 1.5(f)(5) is the current version of the rule.

      . In 2006, Mr. Grishby pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud arising out of what the factual basis described as "an elaborate scheme to obtain loans for unqualified borrowers and to falsely inflate fees and commissions for loans brokered by his mortgage brokerage company, Infinity Mortgage Services, Inc.” Mr. Grishby was sentenced to serve 36 months in federal prison.

      . After the motion to consolidate was denied, respondent’s case and Mr. Jones’s case were tried separately before different hearing committees.

      . Respondent asserted that Rule XIX, § 31 was applicable because the conduct at issue in the formal charges (specifically Counts I and II) occurred more than ten years prior to the date on which the formal charges were filed. Section 31 provides:
      A disciplinary complaint, or the initiation of a disciplinary investigation with regard to allegations of attorney misconduct, where the mental element is merely negligence, shall be subject to a prescriptive period of ten years from the date of the alleged offense.

      . The violations of Rules 5.1 and 5.3 were not charged in the formal charges; however, the committee found respondent had fair and adequate notice that he was being charged either for his misconduct or that of his staff. Respondent has raised no objection to the committee’s finding in this regard.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Herbert EVERETT.
    No. 2012-KO-1593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Everett, Herbert; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 473-056; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0714.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robae Earvon AUSTIN.
    No. 2012-KO-1595.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Austin, Robae Earvon; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 24666; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 2150.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Herbert EVERETT & Tyrone Crump.
    No. 2012-K-1610.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Crump, Tyrone; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 473-056; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0714.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joshua M. PASSMAN.
    No. 2012-KO-1622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Passman, Joshua M.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 503879; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 2241.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas HERBERT.
    No. 2012-K-1641.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Herbert, Thomas; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 09-1492; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-228.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky L. BROWN.
    No. 2012-K-1661.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Brown, Ricky L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 80111; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,174-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Damon WILLIAMS.
    No. 2012-K-1672.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Williams, Damon; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 487-625; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1298.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carlos A. BONILLA.
    No. 2012-C-1714.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Continental Heritage Insurance Company; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 361-416, 361-417, 361-418; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1376, 2011-KA-1377, 2011-KA-1378.

Denied.

VICTORY, WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Douglas HUME v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1950.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Hume, Douglas; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 21172; to the Court of Appeal,. First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 0874.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald Limond KYLES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1965.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Kyles, Ronald Limond; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06-CR-94491; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2012 KW 1004, 2012 KW 1755.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Preston CORKERN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Corkern, Preston; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 00-CR2-80439; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1105.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ashley POSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2074.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Posey, Ashley; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 19709; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012-KW-1095.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles HOLCOMBE, Jr.
    No. 2012-KH-2077.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Holcombe Jr., Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 417104; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1106.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith D. KIRK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Kirk, Keith D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 491-743; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1218.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joshua FLEETWOOD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Fleetwood, Joshua; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 10-1278; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-601.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney WASHINGTON, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2089.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Washington Sr., Rodney; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 12-WCR-263; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW1256.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stephen HARRINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2090.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Harrington, Stephen; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 117043; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-01344.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry LEWIS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2092.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Lewis Jr., Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 70,970-F; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1078.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Johnny Dekeon EDWARDS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2111.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Edwards, Johnny Dekeon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 292620; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-711-KH.

Denied on the showing made.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rogers ATKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2112.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Atkins, Rogers; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 82,384-F; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,675-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard LAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2113.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Lay, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 383759-F; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1066.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lyndon B. JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Johnson, Lyndon B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 08-1774; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-430.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Deedrick JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Jackson, Deedrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 182,247; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-717-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael CLENNON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2133.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Clennon, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 97-1136; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-566.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Felton THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2136.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Thompson, Felton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 320-729; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1146.

Denied. See State ex rel. Brown v. State, 03-2568 (La.3/26/04), 870 So.2d 976; State ex rel. Degreat v. State, 98-0690 (La.7/2/98), 724 So.2d 205; State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    Larry ROBERTS v. DOLLAR GENERAL UNKNOWN SALES ASSOCIATE.
    No. 2012-CC-2418.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Dolgencorp, LLC; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 39589; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1508.

Denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Kirk JANNECK v. LWCC and Chalmette Electric Company.
    No. 2012-C-2454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Chalmette Electric Company; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 7, No. 2007-05258; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0316.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Theresa WILLIAMS v. Mona A. NELSON, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-2471.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Progressive Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 71333; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW12-00813.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    Maurice VILLAR v. INDUSTRIAL METAL RECYCLERS and the Gray Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-2585.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Industrial Metal Recyclers; The Gray Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, Office of Worker’s Compensation, District 5, No. 10-09966; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0319.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Dawn Jordan MOULEDOUX v. Ramsey F. SKIPPER, Jr. Dawn Jordan Mouledoux v. Ramsey F. Skipper, Jr.
    No. 2012-C-2610.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Mouledoux, Dawn Jordan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2011-03147; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2012-CA-0212, 2012-CA-0598.

Denied.


text:
    Dawn Jordan MOULEDOUX v. Ramsey F. SKIPPER, Jr.
    No. 2012-C-2632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Skipper, Ramsey F.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2011-03147; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0212.

Denied.


text:
    Nolan BENSON, Sr. v. ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2012-C-2650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Benson, Sr., Nolan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2011-6929-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-517 C/W12-385.

Denied.


text:
    Kayla SCHEXNAYDER and Emily Lagarde v. STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 2012-C-2659.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 31,002; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0324.

Denied.


text:
    Gina SWIFT v. EAST BATON ROUGE JUVENILE COURT, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-2660.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Swift, Gina; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 545665; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1156.

Denied.

HUGHES, J„ recused.


text:
    Lorise M. NAQUIN and Lucy Nguyen Naquin and Grantly, LLC v. BOLLINGER SHIPYARDS, INC., formerly Bollinger Machine Shop and Shipyard, Inc.
    No. 2012-C-2676.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Grantly, LLC; Naquin, Lorise M.; Naquin, Lucy Nguyen; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 101102; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1217.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Judy N. BROWN and John W. Brown v. AMAR OIL COMPANY d/b/a Swifty’s Food Mart No. 15 and First Financial Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-2678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Brown, John W.; Brown, Judy N. et a!.; — Plaintiff»; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 561,016; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 1631.

Denied.


text:
    BARBER BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, LLC v. STATE of Louisiana, through DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 2012-C-2680.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Eaton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 576,072; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA2305.

Denied.


text:
    Mildred M. BOUGERE, Vicki Bougere Fleming, William R.E. Bougere and Gary Bougere v. NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION (Successor to Avondale Shipyards, Inc.) Avondale Shipyards Inc., Kemper Insurance Group, Travelers Insurance Company and Commercial Union Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-2682.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Bougere, Gary et al.; Bougere, Mildred M.; Bougere, William R.E.; Fleming, Vicki Bougere; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 703-412; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-181.

Denied.


text:
    Juanita MAHONEY v. EAST CARROLL PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 2012-C-2684.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Mahoney, Juanita; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 21,252; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-494-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Mary MAYFIELD and Charles Mayfield v. HOSPITAL HOUSEKEEPING SYSTEMS, LLC and Lafayette General Medical Center, Inc.
    No. 2012-CC-2686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Hospital Housekeeping Systems, LLC; Lafayette General Medical Center, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 604,252; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1358.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Angela LEONARDS v. SUMMIT CLAIMS, et al.
    No. 2012-C-2687.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Leonards, Angela; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Worker’s Comp. Dist. # 04, No. 07-05204; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-255.

Denied.


text:
    Donnie THOMAS, Sr. v. ARDENWOOD PROPERTIES and Scottsdale Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-CC-2697.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Ardenwood Properties, et al.; Scottsdale Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 535970; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1453.

Denied.

VICTORY, J!, would grant.


text:
    Beverly FARMER, Individually as the Provisional Tutrix of Virginia Martin, et al. v. WILLIS-KNIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER.
    No. 2012-C-2698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Willis-Knighton Medical Center;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 521,823; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,530-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Lynn WAGUESPACK, Wife of/and Timothy Waguespack, individually and on behalf of his minor child, Timothy Waguespack v. SENTRY SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, Frazier Trucking, Inc. and Cody King.
    No. 2012-C-2700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Waguespack, Lynn; Waguespack, Timothy; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 675-880; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-280.

Denied.


text:
    Diane R. SCHNELL v. Anthony MENDOZA, Hilman Mendoza and Jane Mendoza.
    No. 2012-C-2702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Schnell, Diane R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 681 — 472; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-272.

Denied.


text:
    Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary, Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana v. LEBEOUF BROS. TOWING, INC.
    No. 2012-CC-2703.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Cynthia Bridges, Secretary, Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terre-bonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 147121; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1247.

Denied.


text:
    Dalbert FONTENOT and Catherine Ann Fontenot v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2012-C-2704.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Fontenot, Dalbert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, No. 150,146; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0243.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Ms. Dottie ADAMS, Mr. Herbert Adams, Mr. Joseph Adams, Mr. Lawrence Adams, et al. v. Joseph GREFER, Camille Grefer, Rose Marie Grefer Hassi, Henry Grefer, et al.
    No. 2012-C-2707.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re ConocoPhillips Company f/k/a Phillips Petroleum Company; Shell Offshore Inc.; Shell Oil Company; SWEPI LP; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 624-278; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-CA-1157.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Galyn and James MONTGOMERY v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY.
    No. 2012-C-2711.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re State Farm Fire & Casualty Company; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2007-4660; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-320.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


author: VICTORY, J.,

text:
    Timothy E. KELLEY v. GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-2722.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Skinner, Katherine; USAA-CIC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 25, No. 576336; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1402.

Denied.

VICTORY, J.,

concurs in the denial.

Defendant may re-raise this matter after trial in the event of an adverse judgment.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    A & A CONSTRUCTION, LLC v. Edward Donovan GUTIERREZ. Edward D. Gutierrez v. David M. Baldridge, et al.
    No. 2012-C-2730.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re A & A Construction, LLC; Bal-dridge, David M. et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. C-20092962 C/W C-20091819; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 12-131 C/W 12-139.

Deniéd.


text:
    Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary, Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana v. GLOBAL INDUSTRIES OFFSHORE, LLC.
    No. 2012-CC-2733.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Cynthia Bridges, Secretary of the Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. C607684; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1514.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Theresa ROSHTO v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY and Monica Helmer.
    No. 2012-CC-2739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Roshto, Theresa; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 239,108; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-00928.

Denied.


text:
    ON-GRADE CONSTRUCTION, LLC v. The OLYMPIC GROUP, LLC, 84 Lumber Company, Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, and Paincourtville Volunteer Fire Department.
    No. 2012-CC-2740.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 33,574; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1257.

Denied. Adequate remedy on appeal.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Lorise M. NAQUIN and Lucy Nguyen Naquin and Grantly, LLC v. BOLLINGER SHIPYARDS, INC., Formerly Bollinger Machine Shop and Shipyard, Inc.
    No. 2012-C-2754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re Bollinger Machine Shop and Shipyard, Inc.; Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. formerly; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of La-fourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 101102; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1217.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Norman P. FRUGE v. UNION TEXAS NATURAL GAS CORPORATION, et al. Joseph Benoit and Francis Benoit v. Union Texas International Corporation, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0128.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality; State of Louisiana Department of Natural Resource; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. O, No. C-323-12 C/W C-324-12; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01272 C/W CW 12-01273.

Denied.


author: DAVID E. CHATELAIN, Judge.

text:
    LAKE CHARLES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL (Stephen BABIN) v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC.
    No. 10-261.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Nov. 24, 2010.

      Thomas A. Filo, Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, L.L.C., Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiff/App ellant Lake Charles Memorial Hospital.
    John V. Quaglino, Denis P. Juge, Juge, Napolitano, Guilbeau, Ruli, Frieman & Whiteley, Metairie, LA, for Defendant/Ap-pellee Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
    Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, J. DAVID PAINTER, and DAVID E. CHATELAIN, Judges.
   DAVID E. CHATELAIN, Judge.

|Jn these consolidated cases, a health care provider appeals the denial of its claims that the employer of three workers’ compensation claimants underpaid charges for medical treatment the health care provider rendered to the claimants and that the underpayment was arbitrary and capricious, entitling it to penalties and attorney fees. For the following reasons, we reverse the denial of the health care provider’s claims and award penalties and attorney fees for the underpayment. We also affirm the award of penalties and attorney fees for late reimbursement of the claims.

FACTS

In 2002 and 2003, three employees of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby Lobby) in Lake Charles were injured in the course and scope of their employment and sought treatment for their injuries at Lake Charles Memorial Hospital (LCMH). LCMH submitted bills for services it rendered to the employees of Hobby Lobby; Hobby Lobby remitted payments which were less than the amounts set forth in the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Schedule (Reimbursement Schedule), as provided in La.R.S. 23:1034.2, and more than sixty days after receiving notice of the bills in derogation of La.R.S. 23:1201(E).

The reimbursement payments Hobby Lobby remitted were calculated pursuant to the provisions of a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) Hospital Agreement LCMH had with CorVel Corporation (CorVel) and a Workers’ Compensation Managed Care Service Agreement Hobby Lobby had with CorVel. In the PPO agreement, LCMH agreed to provide hospital and physician services to CorVel beneficiaries, such as Hobby Lobby’s employees, at “85% of billed charges,” “85% of usual and customary rates,” or “85% of any applicable maximum allowable rate as 1 ^specified by the State, whichever is less.” Following receipt of Hobby Lobby’s payments, LCMH filed disputed claims to recover “[u]nderpayment and/or late payment of medical bills” and “penalties and attorney fees for arbitrary and capricious handling” of each of the three employees’ claims.

The three claims were consolidated and tried. With regard to each of the three claims, the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) denied LCMH’s claims for underpayment and penalties and attorney fees for Hobby Lobby’s arbitrary and capricious handling of the claims but awarded $2000 in penalties and attorney fees of $1000 because the reimbursement payments were “late.”

LCMH appealed, seeking reversal of the denial of its claims and an award of penalties and attorney fees for Hobby Lobby’s failure to pay the full amount of its claims. Hobby Lobby answered the appeal, seeking reversal of the penalties and attorney fees for the late payment of LCMH’s claims.

ISSUES PRESENTED

LCMH’s assignments of error and Hobby Lobby’s answer present the following issues for our consideration: (1) Did the WCJ err in dismissing LCMH’s claims for underpayment? (2) If the WCJ erred in dismissing LCMH’s claims for underpayment, was Hobby Lobby’s underpayment arbitrary and capricious, entitling LCMH to penalties and attorney fees? and (3) Does a health care provider have a claim for penalties and attorney fees for late payment of a claim for services rendered?

I ¿DISCUSSION

PPO Discount

LCMH asserts that the WCJ erred in concluding that Hobby Lobby “made a prima, facie showing of a defense” to its claim of underpayment because LCMH agreed in its PPO agreement with CorVel to accept “85% of any applicable maximum allowable rate as specified by the state.” We agree.

This court has recently held that a PPO agreement, such as the one between LCMH and CorVel, does not relieve an employer that has a separate agreement with a disability management and cost containment service of its obligation to reimburse health care providers in accordance with the Reimbursement Schedule in La. R.S. 23:1034.2. See Cent. La. Ambulatory Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 10-86, 10-91, 10-92, 10-96, 10-97, 10-99, 10-100, 10-115, 10-117, 10-118 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/28/10), 46 So.3d 689; Agilus Health v. Accor Lodging N.A., 09-1049 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/10/10), 32 So.3d 1120, writ granted, 10-800 (La.6/18/10), 38 So.3d 312. In Payless, 46 So.3d at 695, this court determined that a PPO contract which “purports to reduce or relieve the employer’s liability for workers’ compensation medical payments from the full amount of the Fee Schedule ... flies in the face of the language and purpose of the Act” because such reductions fail to consider the interrelationship of the pertinent sections of the workers’ compensation statute and the overall social legislative purpose of the act.

The interrelationship of La.R.S. 23:1033 and La.R.S. 23:1203 was considered important in Payless and Agilus. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1033 provides that: “No contract, rule, regulation or device whatsoever shall operate to relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by this Chapter except as Rherein provided.” Thereafter, Section 1203(B) outlines the workers’ compensation employer’s obligation to pay medical expenses; it states in pertinent part:

The obligation of the employer to furnish such care, services, treatment, drugs, and supplies, whether in state or out of state, is limited to the reimbursement determined to be the mean of the usual and customary charges for such care, services, treatment, drugs, and supplies, as determined under the reimbursement schedule annually published pursuant to R.S. 23:1034.2 or the actual charge made for the service, whichever is less.

In Payless, 46 So.3d at 694, a panel of this court found that Sections 1033 and 1203(B) and the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (LWCA) “as a whole, prohibit any contracts that would operate to relieve an employer of liability created by the LWCA.” Agilus also determined that La.R.S. 23:1033 prohibits a PPO contract from reducing an employer’s liability under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act below what is provided in the Reimbursement Schedule.

Hobby Lobby urges that it is illogical to conclude that a health care provider can reduce an employer’s reimbursement by charging the employer less than the reimbursement schedule provides pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1203(B) but cannot achieve the same end by agreeing to accept less by entering a PPO contract which does so. Payless addresses this argument, finding that health care providers can agree to accept “pre-negotiated” reduced rates; however, the reduced rates must be negotiated by the health care provider and the employer, not by the health care provider and a third party. We agree with this conclusion and find it dispositive of Hobby Lobby’s argument in the present case.

For these reasons, we reverse the WCJ’s denial of LCMH’s claims that it was underpaid by Hobby Lobby for the services it rendered to Hobby Lobby’s employees Land order that Hobby Lobby pay the amounts provided in the Reimbursement Schedule, as LCMH billed.

Penalties and Attorney Fees

Underpayment of LCMH’s Claims

LCMH urges that Hobby Lobby’s underpayment of its claims was arbitrary and capricious, entitling it to penalties and attorney fees as provided in La.R.S. 23:1201(F)(4) and for failing to provide either a benefit card or other written notice of Hobby Lobby’s intent to access the PPO network discounts. Hobby Lobby counters that it reasonably controverted LCMH’s claims for underpayment, asserting that its belief that a health care provider can contract to accept payments for services rendered below payments set forth in the Reimbursement Schedule was reasonable and that PPO contracts are not subject to the notice provisions of La.R.S. 40:2203.1(B). As support for Hobby Lobby’s position, it cites holdings by other tribunals in this state that through the execution of PPO agreements, health care providers agreed to accept payments for their services that are less than the amounts set forth in the Reimbursement Schedule, as support for its position. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dr. Clark Gunder- son, 2006 WL 367700 (W.D.La. February 15, 2006); Lake Charles Mem’l Hosp., Docket Number 05-1318, Office of Workers’ Compensation District 3; St. Tammany Parish Hosp. v. Chick-fil-A, Docket Numbers 08-4486, 08-5060, Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 6. Hobby Lobby also | (¡contends that this case presents novel issues of law for which there is no consensus among the courts of this state; therefore, it argues that its reliance on Hobby Lobby’s PPO agreement does not warrant the imposition of penalties and attorney fees. With regard to its second defense, Hobby Lobby urges that pursuant to the clear language of La.R.S. 40:2203.1(A), the notice requirements therein do not apply to LCMH’s claims.

The panel in Agilus, 32 So.3d 1120, determined that reliance on a PPO agreement did not present a close factual question and that an employer’s reliance on a PPO agreement to reduce its reimbursement of the health care provider’s charges did not reasonably controvert the health care provider’s claim for payment. Accordingly, penalties and attorney fees were awarded. Id. The panel in Payless, 46 So.3d 689, originally concluded that while the PPO agreements were invalid, the employer’s reliance on them as the basis for underpaying the health care provider’s claims was reasonable and found the WCJ’s award of penalties and attorney fees were improper because the claims were reasonably controverted, as provided in La.R.S. 23:1202(F)(2).

On rehearing, however, the panel in Payless reversed itself on this issue and affirmed the WCJ’s awards of $2000 in penalties and $1500 in attorney fees, finding: 1) that for reasons set forth in Gunderson v. F.A. Richard & Associates, Inc., 09-1498 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/30/10), 44 So.3d 779, the employer’s failure to comply with the notice provisions of La.R.S. 40:2203.1 warranted the imposition of penalties and 2) 17“once a health care provider prevails on an underpayment claim, the award of attorney fees is discretionary and is not subject to the ‘reasonably controverted’ limitation.” In Gunderson, 44 So.3d at 786-87, this court determined that alternative rates of payment provided in a PPO agreement are not binding unless a benefit card is issued and presented to the health care provider when treatment is sought or the health care provider is given thirty-day written notice of an entity’s intent to access services under the agreement. In making this determination, the panel held that the phrase “all preferred provider organization agreements” in Section 2203.1 includes workers’ compensation claims, finding the legislature’s use of the word “all” includes every type of claim.

For these reasons, we reverse the WCJ’s denial of penalties and award penalties to LCMH in the amount of $2000 each for Hobby Lobby’s three underpayments of LCMH’s charges.

Payless, 46 So.3d at 701, noted on rehearing the award of attorney fees is not restricted by the “reasonably controverted” standard of La.R.S. 23:1201(F)(2). We further observe that with regard to the award of attorney fees, the language of La.R.S. 23:1201(F)(2) differs from that utilized in La.R.S. 23:1201(F)(4) — whereas the former states “together with reasonable attorney fees” the latter provides for “reasonable attorney fees based upon actual hours worked.” Accordingly, we must determine whether this difference in language means that the award of attorney fees is to be assessed differently. For reasons that follow, we think not.

It has long been held that the fee an attorney receives may not exceed a “reasonable” fee. See, e.g. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., 373 So.2d 102 (La. 1978); Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 378 So.2d 423 (La.1979); Pharis & Pharis v. Rayner, 397 So.2d 1295 (La.1981), on remand, 406 So.2d 723 (La.App. 3 Cir.1981). In Rivet v. State, 90-145 (La.9/5/96), 680 So.2d 1154, an inverse condemnation suit, the court was faced with three statutes that seemingly applied to the question of attorney fees; in its simplest form the question was whether the formulation should be based on “attorney fees actually incurred,” La. R.S. 13:5111(A), “reasonable attorney fees,” La.R.S. 19:8, or an attorney fee which shall not “exceed twenty-five percent of the difference between the award and the amount deposited in the registry of the court,” La.R.S. 48:453(E). In its resolution of the case, the Court stated:

Regardless of the language of the statutory authorization for an award of attorney fees or the method employed by a trial court in making an award of attorney fees, courts may inquire as to the reasonableness of attorney fees as part of their prevailing, inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. This court has previously noted that factors to be taken into consideration in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees include: (1) the ultimate result obtained; (2) the responsibility incurred; (3) the importance of the litigation; (4) the amount of money involved; (5) the extent and character of the work performed; (6) the legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the attorneys; (7) the number of appearances involved; (8) the intricacies of the facts involved; (9) the diligence and skill of counsel; and (10) the court’s own knowledge. We have further noted that these factors are | aderived from Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides:

(a) A lawyer’s fees shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Rivet, 680 So.2d at 1161-62 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).

We agree with Rivet’s analysis and find that our duty in the assessment of a reasonable attorney fee, regardless of the statutory authorization, requires us to look beyond the actual hours worked. Certainly, it is important to consider that element, but it is only one of several factors relevant to the issue before us. To limit our inquiry to the actual hours worked would skew the well-established concept of reasonableness and upset a well-understood jurisprudential concept.

Counsel for Hobby Lobby submitted affidavits itemizing his services in each of the three consolidated matters as follows: Stephen Babin claim — 9.5 hours; Janet |10Hines claim — 29.29 hours; and Dustin Hebert claim — 16.5 hours. Counsel’s hourly rate is $200 per hour, resulting in fees sought being $1900; $8300; and $5858, respectively. As noted by counsel in his briefs before this court and the WCJ, there are no disputed facts herein and only legal issues are presented for consideration. The same legal issues presented herein have been presented in other cases, some of which have been decided and some of which are pending. Our consideration of the factors outlined in Rivet in the context of the facts of these cases and in light of counsel having presented the same legal issue previously lead us to conclude that $1900 in the Babin case and $2000 in the Hines and Hebert cases are fair awards for attorney fees for counsel’s work performed in these consolidated cases before the WCJ and award an additional $1500 for work performed on each appeal.

Late Payment of LCMH’s Claims

Hobby Lobby answered LCMH’s appeal, asserting that the WCJ’s award of penalties of $2000.00 and attorney fees of $1000.00 for its failure to pay LCMH’s claims within sixty days as provided in La.R.S. 23:1201(E) constitutes error and should be reversed. Citing Roque v. Shell Beach Trucking, 02-1305 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/03), 844 So.2d 1111, as support for its argument, it contends that only a workers’ compensation claimant has the right to claim penalties and attorney fees for late payment of a medical claim. We disagree.

Contrary to Hobby Lobby’s claims, the Workers’ Compensation Act specifically addresses this issue. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1201(F)(4) provides: “[i]n the event that the health care provider prevails on a claim for payment of his fee, penalties as provided in this Section and reasonable attorney fees based upon actual hours worked may be awarded and paid directly to the health care provider.” | nFurthermore, we find Roque factually distinguishable because that case awarded penalties and attorney fees only because the employee, not the health care provider, filed a claim for payment of the health care provider’s fee. Therefore, we find no merit to the argument Hobby Lobby advances in its answer to this appeal.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons discussed, we reverse the WCJ’s denial of LCMH’s claims that Hobby Lobby underpaid it for the services it rendered to Hobby Lobby’s employees and order that Hobby Lobby reimburse LCMH in accordance with the Reimbursement Schedule, as well as the WCJ’s denial of LCMH’s claims for penalties and attorney fees for Hobby Lobby’s failure to reimburse it according to the Reimbursement Schedule. Further, we award $2000 in penalties with regard to each claim and award attorney fees in the amount of $1900 in the Babin case and $2000 in the Hines and Hebert cases for work performed before the WCJ; we award $1500 in attorney fees with regard to each claim for work performed on this appeal. We affirm the WCJ’s award of penalties and attorney fees for Hobby Lobby’s late reimbursement of LCMH’s claims. All costs are assessed to Hobby Lobby.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; RENDERED.

       Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

      . LCMH assigned as error the WCJ’s dismissal of its claims, asserting that the claims were dismissed on the basis that the Office of Workers' Compensation does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims. In our view, the WCJ determined that the Office of Workers' Compensation does not have jurisdiction to determine whether Hobby Lobby paid LCMH in accordance with the terms of the PPO agreement. Regardless of the WCJ’s basis for dismissing LCMH's claims, our reversal of the WCJ’s dismissal of LCMH’s claims and award of judgment in favor of LCMH against Hobby Lobby for the amount of its claims renders this assignment of error moot; therefore, it will not be addressed.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:2203.1 provides in pertinent part that:
      A. Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, the requirements of this Section shall apply to all preferred provider organization agreements that are applicable to medical services rendered in this state and to group purchasers as defined in this Part. The provisions of this Section shall not apply to a group purchaser when providing health benefits through its own network or direct provider agreements or to such agreements of a group purchaser.
      B. A preferred provider organization’s alternative rates of payment shall not be enforceable or binding upon any provider unless such organization is clearly identified on the benefit card issued by the group purchaser or other entity accessing a group purchaser's contractual agreement or agreements and presented to the participating provider when medical care is provided....

      (5) When no benefit card is issued or utilized by a group purchaser or other entity, written notification shall be required of any entity accessing an existing group purchaser’s contractual agreement or agreements at least thirty days prior to accessing services through a participating provider under such agreement or agreements.