text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE.
    No. SC13-2385.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 20, 2014.

      Whitney M. Untiedt, Chair, Juvenile Court Rules Committee, Gainesville, FL; John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Ellen H. Sloyer, Staff Liáison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

The Florida Bar’s Juvenile Court Rules Committee (Committee) has filed a “fast-track” out-of-cycle report proposing amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure in response to recent statutory changes. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.140(e). We have jurisdiction.

The Committee proposes amendments to current Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.415 and form 8.973, and the deletion of forms 8.971 and 8.972. The Committee also proposes new rules 8.401 and 8.435, and several new forms. The amended and new rules and forms are in response to the passage of the Nancy C. Detert Common Sense and Compassion Independent Living Act, chapter 2013-178, Laws of Florida. This act amended provisions of chapters 39 and 409, Florida Statutes. As pertinent here, this legislation enables young adults between eighteen and twenty-one years of age to remain in foster care and sets forth eligibility, case planning, and judicial review requirements for such young adults. The legislation also provides new judicial review requirements for dependent children who are seventeen years of age. The new statutory provisions became effective on January 1, 2014. Ch.2013-178, § 14, Laws of Fla. The proposed amendments were unanimously approved by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar.

After considering the proposed amendments and reviewing the relevant legislation, we amend the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and forms as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The amendments shall take effect immediately upon the release of this opinion. Because the amendments were not published for comment prior to adoption, interested persons shall have sixty days from the date of this opinion in which to file comments with the Court.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

RULE 8.401. CASE PLAN DEVELOPMENT FOR YOUNG ADULTS

(a) Case Planning Conference. The case plan must be developed in a face-to-face conference with the young adult, the guardian ad litem, attorney ad litem and, when appropriate, the legal guardian of the young adult, if the young adult is not of the capacity to participate in the case planning process.

(b) Contents. The case plan must be written simply and clearly in English and the principal language of the young adult. Each case plan must contain

(1) A description of the services, including independent living services,. to be provided to the young adult;

(2) A copy of the young adult’s transition plan;

(3) The permanency goal of transition from licensed care to independent living; and

(4) The date the compliance period expires.

(c) Department Responsibility.

(1) After the case plan has been developed, the department t must prepare the written case plan for each young adult receiving services under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes.

(2) After the case plan has been developed, and before acceptance by the court, the department must make the appropriate referrals for services that will allow the young adult to begin receiving the agreed-upon services immediately.

(3) The department must immediately provide the young adult a signed copy of the agreed-upon case plan.

(4) Not less than 3 business days before a .judicial review or permanency hearing, the department must file the case plan with the court.

(d) Signature. The case plan must be signed by the young adult, all parties and, when appropriate, the legal guardian if the young adult is not of the capacity to participate in the case planning process.

(e) Service. Each party must be served with a copy of the case plan not less than 3 business days before the .judicial review hearing. If the location of the young adult is unknown, this fact must be documented in writing and filed with the court.

(f) Re-admitted to Care. If the department petitions the court for reinstatement of jurisdiction after a young adult has been re-admitted to care under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, the department must file an updated case plan.

RULE 8.415. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DEPENDENCY CASES

(a) Required Review. All dependent children shallmust have their status reviewed as provided by law. Any party may petition the court for a judicial review as provided by law.
(b) Scheduling Hearings.
(1) Initial Review Hearing. The court shallmust determine when the first review hearing shallmust be held and the clerk of the court shallmust immediately schedule the review hearing. In no case shallmay the hearing be scheduled for later than 6 months from the date of removal from the home or 90 days from the disposition or case plan approval hearing, whichever comes first. In every case, the court must conduct a judicial review at least every 6 months.
(2) Subsequent Review Hearings. At each judicial review hearing, the court shallmust schedule the next judicial review hearing which shallmust be conducted within 6 months. The clerk of the court, at the judicial review hearing, shallmust provide the parties, the social service agency charged with the supervision of care, custody, or guardianship of the child, the foster parent or legal custodian in whose home the child resides, any preadoptive parent, and such other persons as the court may direct with written notice of the date, time, and location of the next judicial review hearing.
(3) Review Hearings for Children 17 Years of Age. The court must hold a judicial review hearing within 90 days after a child’s 17th birthday. The court must also issue an order, separate from the order on judicial review, that the disability of nonage of the child has been removed and must continue to hold timely judicial review hearings. If necessary, the court may review the status of the child more frequently during the year before the child’s 18th birthday. At the last review hearing before the child reaches 18 years of age, the court must also address whether the child plans to remain in foster care, and, if so, ensure that the child’s transition plan complies with the law.
(4) Review Hearings for Young Adults in Foster Care. The court must review the status of a young adult at least every six months and must hold a permanency review hearing at least annually while the young adult remains in foster care. The young adult or any other party to the dependency case may request an additional hearing or judicial review.

(c)Report. In all cases, the department or its agent shallmust prepare a report to the court. The report shallmust contain facts showing the court to have jurisdiction of the cause as a dependency case. It shallmust contain information as to the identity and residence of the parent, if known, and the legal custodian, the dates of the original dependency adjudication and any subsequent .judicial review proceedings, the results of any safe-harbor placement assessment including the status of the child’s placement, and a request for one or more of the following forms of relief:

(1) that the child’s placement be changed;
(2) that the case plan be continued to permit the parents or social service agency to complete the tasks assigned to them in the agreement; or
(3) that proceedings be instituted to terminate parental rights and legally free the child for adoption.

(d) Service. A copy of the report containing recommendations and, if not previously provided by the court, a notice of review hearing shallmust be served on all persons who are required by law to be served at least 72 hours before the judicial review hearing.

(e) Information Available to Court. At the judicial review hearing the court may receive any relevant and material evidence pertinent to the cause. This shall-must — include-written reports required by law and may include, but shallmust not be limited to, any psychiatric or psychological evaluations of the child or parent, caregiver, or legal custodian that may be obtained and that are material and relevant. This evidence may be received by the court and relied on to the extent of its probative value, even though it may not be competent in an adjudicatory hearing.

(f) Court Action.

(1) The court shallmust hold a hearing to review the compliance of the parties with the case plan and to determine what assigned tasks were and were not accomplished and the reasons for any nonachievementnoncompliance.
(2) If the court finds that the parents have substantially complied with the case plan, the court shalimust return the child to the custody of the parents if the court is satisfied that reunification will not be detrimental to the child’s safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health.
(3) If the court finds that the social service agency has not complied with its obligations, the court may find the social service agency to be in contempt, shali-must order the social service agency to submit its plan for compliance with the case plan, and shalimust require the social service agency to show why the child could not be safely returned to the home of the parents. If the court finds that the child could not be safely returned to the parents, it shalimust extend the case plan for a period of not more than 6 months to allow the social service agency to comply with its obligations under the case plan.
(4) At any judicial review held under section 39.701(g)(3), Florida Statutes, if, in the opinion of the court, the department has not complied withmet its obligations to the child as specifiedstated in the written case plan or in the provision of independent living services — as—required — by—sections—39.701(6)—and 409.1451, Florida.Statutes, the court shallmay a show cause order--issue an order directing the department to show cause as to why it has not done so. If caase-is-shown for failure-to-comply the department cannot justify its noncompliance, the court shallmay give the department 30 days within which to comply and, on failure to comply with this-or any-subsequent order, the court may hold the department in contempt.
(5) The court must enter a written order on the conclusion of the review hearing including a statement of the facts, those findings it was directed to determine by law, a determination of the future course of the proceedings, and the date, time, and place of the next hearing.
(g) Jurisdiction.
(g)(1) When a child is returned to the parents, the court shalimust not terminate its jurisdiction over the child until 6 months after the return. Based on a report of the department and any other relevant factors, the court shalimust then determine whether jurisdiction should be continued or terminated. If its jurisdiction is to be terminated, it shalimust enter an order to that effect.
(g)(2) When a child has not been returned to the parent, but has been permanently committed to the department for subsequent adoption, the court shali-must continue to hold--judicial review hearings on the status of the child at least every 6 months until the adoption is finalized. These hearings shalimust be held in accordance with these rules.
(7)(3) If a youth in -the-legal-c-ustody of the -department immediately-before his or her.18th-bir-thday-young adult petitions the court at any time before his or her 19th birthday requesting the court’s continued jurisdiction, the court may retain or reinstate jurisdiction for a period of time not to continue beyond the date of the youthyoung adult’s 19th birthday, — This-continued jurisdiction is for the purpose of determining whether appropriate aftercare support, -Boad-to-Independence — Scholarship, transitional support, mental health^and-developmental disability services that were required to be provided to the young adult before reaching 18 years of age have been provided to the youth.
(4) If a young adult has chosen to remain in extended foster care after he or she has reached 18 years of age, the department may not close a case and the court may not terminate .jurisdiction until the court finds, following a hearing, that the appropriate statutory criteria have been met.
(g)(5) If a petition for special immigrant juvenile status and an application for adjustment of status have been filed on behalf of a foster child and the petition and application have not been granted by the time the child reaches 18 years of age, the court may retain jurisdiction solely for the purpose of allowing the continued consideration of the petition and application by federal authorities. Review hearings shallmust be set solely for the purpose of determining the status of the petition and application. The court’s jurisdiction shallmust terminate on the final decision of the federal authorities, or on the immigrant child’s 22nd birthday, whichever occurs first.
(9) The court shall enter -a written order on the conclusion of the review hearing — ■including—a—statement—of—the facts, those findings it was directed to determine by law, a determination of the future course of the proceedings, and the -date,-time,-and■■-place-of -the-next hearing

(gh) Administrative Review. The department, under a formal agreement with the court in particular cases, may conduct administrative reviews instead of judicial reviews for children in out-of-home placement. Notice must be provided to all parties. An administrative review may not be substituted for the first judicial review or any subsequent 6-month review. Any party may petition the court for a judicial review as provided by law.

(hi) Concurrent Planning.

(1)At the initial judicial review hearing, the court shallmust make findings regarding the likelihood of the child’s reunification with the parent or legal custodian within 12 months after the removal of the child from the home.
(2) If the court makes a written finding that it is not likely that the child will be reunified with the parent or legal custodian within 12 months after the child was removed from the home, the department must file a motion to amend the case plan and declare that it will use concurrent planning for the case plan.
(3) The department must file the motion to amend the case plan no later than 10 business days after receiving the written finding of the court and attach the proposed amended case plan to the motion.
(4) If concurrent planning is already being used, the case plan must document the efforts the department is making to complete the concurrent goal.

RULE 8.435. REINSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION FOR YOUNG ADULT

(a) Petition for Reinstatement of Jurisdiction.

(1) If a young adult who is between the ages of 18 and 21 is re-admitted to foster care, the department shall petition the court to reinstate jurisdiction over the young adult.
(2) The petition for reinstatement of jurisdiction must be in n writing and specify that the young adult meets the eligibility requirements for readmission to foster care as provided by law. The petition is not required to be sworn and notarized.
(3) The department shall serve the young adult and any party a copy of the petition for reinstatement of jurisdiction.

(b) Hearing on Petition for Reinstatement of Jurisdiction.

(1) Upon filing of the petition for reinstatement of .jurisdiction, the court shall schedule and conduct a hearing on the petition for reinstatement of jurisdiction.
(2) The department shall serve the young adult and any party a notice of the hearing on the petition for reinstatement of jurisdiction.

(c) Order on Petition for Reinstatement of Jurisdiction.

(1) If the department establishes that the young adult meets the eligibility requirements for readmission to foster care as provided by law, the court shall enter an order reinstating jurisdiction over the young adult.
(2) In the order reinstating jurisdiction, the court shall schedule a judicial review hearing to take place within 6 months.

FORM — —MOTION TO-TERMINATE-JURISDICTION

MOTION TO TERMINATE JU-R-ISDI-GTION-

The Department of Children and-Family Services, by and through-its-undersigned-counsel,' moves — this—court for an order ■terminating the court’s jurisdiction - and el-osing — the file in the above-styled cause, and-as-grounds-states^

⅛ — The ehild(ren) was/were -previously adjudicated dependent and placed into foster care by order of this-court.

⅜ — The child(ren) has/have reached the age of majority and under chapter 39, Florida Statutes, is no longer a child-and no longer subject to the jurisdiction -of the juvenile court. — July-R-2013 Florida Rules of Juvenile P-rocedure-gQ3

WHEREFORE, — the—department—requests -that this court terminate-jurisdiction in the above cause and that the case file be-closedr

.(attorney’s name)-.-.--.-— .(address-and — telephone-number) . -.-.--■-(-Florida Bar number).

Certificate-of-Serviee

FORM 8,972, ORDER TERMINATING JURISDICTION

ORDER TERMINATING JURISDICTION

THIS CAUSE having-come before the court on motion -to-ter-minate jurisdiction filed by-the-Depar-tment-of Children and ■Family-Sendees and the court -being-advised-in-the premises finds the following-:-

⅛ — The child(ren) -was/were-pr-eviou-sly adjudicated dependent -and-placed-in-to foster care by order of this court-

⅛ — The—child(ren-)—has/have reached the age of majority and under-chapter-39, Florida Statutes,-is/are no longer a child (children)-and no longer subject to the jurisdiction.of — the- juvenile court.

THEREFORE, based-on- these-findings of -fact, — it—is—ORDERED—AND—ADJUDGED that this court’s -jurisdiction-is terminated;

Circuit Judge

Copies furnished-tm

FORM 8.973A. ORDER ON JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR CHILD AGE 17 OR OLDER

ORDER ON JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR CHILD OVER AGE 17 AND NOTICE OF NEXT HEARING

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on.(date).for Judicial Review on the report filed by the Department of Children and Family SorviooaFamilies in this cause under chapter 39, Florida Statutes.

The following persons appeared before the court:

.(Name)., Child

.(Name).Attomey/Attomey ad Litem for the Child

.(Name)., Petitioner

..... .....(Name)., Attorney for the petitioner

.(Name)., Attorney for the department

.(Name)., Department caseworker

.(Name)., Mother

.(Name)., Attorney for mother

.(Name)., Father of.(child).

.(Name).Attorney for father

.(Name)., Guardian ad litem

.(Name)., Attorney for guardian ad litem

.(Name)., Legal custodian

.(Name)., Attorney for legal custodian

.(Name)., Other:.

and the court having considered:

. Judicial Review Social Study Report filed by the Department; . Because#the child tes reached the age of 17 within the oast 90 days, written verification that the child:

. Has been provided with a current Medicaid card and has been provided all necessary information concerning the Medicaid program;

. Has been provided with a certified copy of his or her birth certificatenand htias a valid Florida driver's license or has been provided with a Florida identification card;

. Has a social security card and has been provided information relating to Social Security Insurance benefits, if the child is believed to be eligible;

. Has received a full accounting if there is a Master Trust for the child and has been informed as to how to access those funds:

. Has boon provlded-wlth-informntion-and training related to budgoting, interviewing, and parcntmg-slc-ill-st

. Has been provided with information related to the Road-to-Tndependence ■ScholarshipProgram, including eligibility requirements, information on participation, and assistance in gaining admission to the program-: including applications forms; If the child is eligible for the Road-to-Independence Program, hHas been informed that-tf he or she is oligiblo for tho-Rond-to-Indopcndonoo Scholarship-program, he or she may reside with the licensed foster family or group care provider with whom the child was residing at the time of attaining his or her 18th birthday or may reside in another licensed foster home or with a group care provider arranged by the department;

. Has an open bank account or the identification necessary to open a bank account and the information necessary to acquire essential has bcon-provid-ed-wi-t-h banking and budgeting skills:

. Has been provided with information on public assistance and how to apply;

. Has been provided a clear understanding of where he or she will be living on his or her 18th birthday, how living expenses will be paid, and what educational program the child will be enrolled in.

. Has been provided with information as to the child’s ability to remain in care until he reaches 21 years of age:

■rrrr.-Has been-provided with notice of his-or her-right-to petition for the-court's continuingjurisdiction for-one-year after his or her ISth birthdayT-and-with information on-how to obtain acceso to the court;-and

. Has been provided with a letter stating the dates that the child is under the jurisdiction of the court:

. Has been provided with a letter stating that the child is in compliance with financial aid documentation requirements:

. Has been provided his or her educational records:

. I-Ias been provided his or her entire health and mental health records:

. Has been provided with infonnation concerning the process for accessing his or her case file: and

. Has been provided with a statement encouraging the child encouraged to attend all judicial review hearings occurring after his or her 17th birthday.

. Statement/homestudy filed by the Department;

. Report of the Guardian Ad Litem;

. A case plan, dated., filed by the Department that includes information related to independent living services that have been provided since the child's 13th birthday or since the date the child came into foster care, whichever came later;

. Statement by the child's caretaker on the progress the child has made in acquiring independent living skills:

. Whether or not the child is a citizen and, if the child is not a citizen, the steps that have been taken to address the citizenship or residency status of the child;

. Other.

AND THE COURT having heard testimony and argument, and having been otherwise duly advised in the premises finds:

1. That the minor child(ren) who is/are the subject matter of these proceedings was/were adjudicated dependent, continue to be dependent, is/are of an age subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and is/are resident(s) of the state of Florida.

2. The following parties were notified of this hearing and provided a copy of the documents filed for this hearing:

.(Name)., Child

.(Name)., Attomey/Attomey ad Litem for the Child

.(Name)., Petitioner

.(Name)., Attorney for the petitioner

.(Name)., Attorney for the department

.(Name)., Department caseworker

.(Name)., Mother

.(Name)., Attorney for mother

.(Name)., Father of.(child).

.(Name)., Attorney for father

.(Name)., Guardian ad litem

.(Name)., Attorney for guardian ad litem

.(Name)., Legal custodian

.(Name)., Attorney for legal custodian

.(Name)., Other:.

3. The child has been given the opportunity to address the court with any information relevant to the child's best interests.

4. The mother, (name).:

.did not appear and.was.was not represented by legal counsel;

.appeared.with.without legal counsel and.was.was not advised of her right to legal counsel;

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. waived. did not waive her right to legal counsel; and

.was.was not determined to qualify as indigent and

.was.was not appointed an attorney.

5. The father, (name).:

.did not appear and.was.was not represented by legal counsel;

.appeared.with.without legal counsel and.was.was not advised of his right to legal counsel;

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.waived.did not waive his right to legal counsel; and

.was.was not determined to qualify as indigent and

.was.was not appointed an attorney. COMMENT: Repeat above for each father. • '

6. The department filed a judicial review report with the court on.(date). This judicial review report.is.is not in compliance with the statutory requirements.

7. The following parents/lcgal custodians were notified of their right to participate in the preparation of the case plan and to receive assistance from any other person in the . preparation of the case plan: .(names of those notified).

8. The mother has complied with the following tasks in the case plan:.(list tasks complied with).

9. The mother has not complied with the following tasks in the case plan: .(list tasks not complied with).

10. The father,.(father’s name) ....., has complied with the following tasks in the case plan:.(list tasks complied with).

11. The father,.(father’s name).. has not complied with the following tasks in the case plan:.(list tasks not complied with).

12. The mother.has.has not complied with court ordered visitation as follows: .(explanation of visitation compliance).

13. The father,.(father’s name) , has has not complied with court ordered visitation as follows:.(explanation of visitation compliance).

14. The department.has.has not complied with court ordered visitation as follows:.(explanation of visitation compliance).

15. The mother.has has not complied with court ordered financial support for the child as follows:.(explanation of financial compliance).

16. The father,.(father’s name).has.has not complied with court ordered financial support for the child as follows:.(explanation of financial compliance).

17. The mother.has has not complied with court ordered meetings with the department as follows:.(explanation of meetings compliance).

18. The father,.(father’s name) , has has not complied with court ordered meetings with the department as follows:.(explanation of meetings compliance).

19. The department.has.has not complied with court ordered meetings with the parents as follows:.(explanation of meetings compliance).

COMMENT: Use 20, 21, 22 & 23 if child(ren) is/are not placed in the home of a parent. . 20. It is in the best interest of the minor children) to be placed in the care and custody of.(placement ordered).

. 21. Placement of the minor children) in the care and custody of.(placement ordered). is in a setting which is as family like and as close to the home as possible, consistent with the child(ren)’s best interests and special needs.

. 22. Return of the minor children) to the custody of.(person(s) from whom children) was/were originally removed).would be contrary to the best interest and welfare of the minor children). The child(ren) cannot safely.remain.return home with services and removal of the children) is necessary to protect the children).

. 23. Prevention or reunification services.were not.were indicated and are as follows:.(services indicated).Further efforts could not have shortened separation of this family because.

COMMENT: Use 24 if children) remain(s) or is/are returned to the parent(s).

. 24. The children) can safely.remain with.be returned to.(parent(’s)(s’) name(s)).as long as he/she/they comply(ies) with the following:.The safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the children) are not endangered by allowing the children) to.remain.return home.

. 25. The child’s petition and application for special immigrant juvenile status or other immigration decision remains pending.

. 26. The department.has has not complied with its obligation as specified in the written case plan or in the provision of independent living services as required by Florida Statutes.

THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing findings, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. The minor children),.name(s)).be placed in the custody of .(name)., under supervision of the department.

2. The j udicial review report filed by the department is:

. not accepted and a continuance was requested.

. accepted by the court.

3. Other:.

4. All prior orders not inconsistent with the present order shall remain in full force and effect.

5. This court, shall retain jurisdiction over this cause to enter any such further orders as may be deemed necessary for the best interest and welfare of the minor children).

6. This court shall retain jurisdiction until the final decision is rendered by the federal immigration authorities, or upon the immigrant child's 22nd birthday, whichever shall first occur.

7. This court shall retain jurisdiction until the child's 19th birthday for the purpose of determining whether appropriate services that were required to be provided to the young adult before reaching 18 years of age aftercare sut>port.-Road-to Independence Scholarship^ transitional support, mental health, and-developmental disability services have been provided to the youth.

8. This court shall retain jurisdiction until the child’s 21⅛| birthday, unless the young adult chooses to leave foster care upon reaching 18 years of age, or if the young adult does not meet the eligibility requirements to remain in foster care or chooses to leave care at any time prior to the 21s1 birthday.

⅜9. This matter is scheduled for Judicial Review on.(date).at.(time).

DONE AND ORDERED in., Florida, on.(date).

Circuit Judge

NOTICE OF HEARING

The Juvenile Court hereby gives notice of hearing in the above-styled cause on .(date).at.a.m./p.m., before.(judge).. at.(location).. or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

COMMENT: The following paragraph must be in bold, 14 pt. Times New Roman or Courier font.

If you are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, you are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact.(name, address, and telephone number).at least 7 days before your scheduled court appearance, or immediately upon receiving this notification if the time before the scheduled appearance is less than 7 days. If yon are hearing or voice impaired, call 711.

PLEASE BE GOVERNED ACCORDINGLY.

Copies furnished to.

FORM 8.973B. ORDER ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

ORDER ON LAST JUDICIAL REVIEW BEFORE CHILD REACHES AGE 18 AND NOTICE OF NEXT HEARING

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on Idatel for Judicial Review on the report filed bv the Department of Children and Families in this cause under chapter 39. Florida Statutes.

The following persons appeared before the court:

.(Name).Child

.(Name).Attomev/Attomev ad Litem for the Child

.(Name).Petitioner

.(Name).Attorney for the petitioner

.(Name!.. Attorney for the department

.(Ñame).Department caseworker

.(Name).Mother

.(Name).Attorney for mother

.(Name-).Father of (child)

..(Name).Attorney for father

.(Name1).Guardian ad litem

.(Namel.Attorney for guardian ad litem

.(Name").Legal custodian

.(Name-).Attorney for legal custodian

.(Namel.Other:.

and the court having considered:

Judicial Review Social Study Report filed bv the Department:

Statement/homestudv filed bv the Department:

Report of the Guardian Ad Litem:

A case plan, dated.filed bv the Department that includes information related to independent living services that have been, provided since the child’s 13th birthday or since the date the child came into foster care, whichever came later:

Statement bv the child's caretaker on the progress the child has made in acquiring independent living skills:

Whether or not the child is a citizen and, if the child is not a citizen, the steps that have been taken to address the citizenship or residency status of the child:

Other:.

AND THE COURT having heard testimony and argument, and having been otherwise duly advised in the premises finds:

1. That the minor childfrenl who.is/are.the subject matter of these •proceedings.was/were.adjudicated dependent continue to be dependent, is/are of an age subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and.is/are.residentfsl of the state of Florida,

2. The following parties were notified of this hearing and provided a copy of the documents fded for this hearing:

.fNamel.Child

.(Namel.Attorney/Attorney ad Litem for the Child

.(Namel.Petitioner

.(Namel.Attorney for the petitioner

.(Namel.Attorney for the department

.(Namel.Department caseworker

.(Namel.Mother

.(Name!.Attorney for mother

.(Namel.Father of.fchildl.

.(Namel.Attorney for father

.(Namel.Guardian ad litem

.(Namel.Attorney for guardian ad litem

.(Namel.Legal custodian

.(Namel.Attorney for legal custodian

.(Namel.Other:

3. The child has been given the opportunity to address the court with any information, relevant to the child’s best interests.

4. The mother..(namel.:

.did not appear and.was.was not represented by legal counsel:

.appeared.with.without legal counsel and.was.was not advised of her right to legal counsel:

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. waived. did not waive her right to legal counsel: and

.was.was not determined to qualify as indigent and

.was.was not appointed an attorney.

5. The father..(namel.:

.did not appear and.was.was not represented bv legal counsel:

.appeared.with.without legal counsel and.was.was not advised of his right to legal counsel:

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.waived.did not waive his right to legal counsel: and

.was.was not determined to qualify as indigent: and

.was.was not appointed an attorney,

COMMENT: Repeat above for each father.

6. The department filed a judicial review report with the court on.idatei. This judicial review report.is.is not in compliance with the statutory requirements.

7. The following oarents/legal custodians were notified of their right to participate in the preparation of the case plan and to receive assistance from any other person in the preparation of the case plan:.(names of those notified).

8. The mother has complied with the following tasks in the case plan: .(list tasks complied with).

9. The mother has not complied with the following tasks in the case plan:.(list tasks not complied with!.

10. The father.("father's name).has complied with the following tasks in the case plan:.Hist tasks complied with1).

11. The father.(father’s name!.has not complied with the following tasks in the case plan:.(list tasks not complied with).

12. The mother.has.has not complied with court ordered visitation as follows: .(explanation of visitation compliance').

13. The father.(father’s name').has.has not complied with court ordered visitation as follows:.(explanation of visitation compliance!.

14. The department.has.has not complied with court ordered visitation as follows:.(explanation of visitation compliance!.

15. The mother.has.has not complied with court ordered financial support for the child as follows:.(explanation of financial compliance).

16. The father.(father’s name).has.has not complied with court ordered financial support for the child as follows:.Íexplanation of financial compliance!.

17. The mother.has.has not complied with court ordered meetings with the department as follows:.(explanation of meetings compliance!.

18. The father.ffather’s name).has.has not complied with court ordered meetings with the department as follows:.(explanation of meetings compliance).

19. The department.has.has not complied with court ordered meetings with the parents as follows:.fexplanation of meetings compliance!.

COMMENT: Use 20. 21. 22 & 23 if childfren) is/are not placed in the home of a parent.

20. It is in the best interest of the minor childfren) to be placed in the care and custody of.(placement ordered!.

21. Placement of the minor childfren) in the care and custody of.(placement ordered).is in a setting which is as family like and as close to the home as possible-consistent with the childfren Vs best interests and special needs.

22. Return of the minor chi Id tren) to the custody of.fnersonfs) from whom childfren) was/were originally removed).would be contrary to the best interest and welfare of the minor childfren). The childfren) cannot safely.remain.return home with services and removal of the childfren) is necessary to protect the childfren).

23. Prevention or reunification services.were not.were indicated and are as follows:.fservices indicated).Further efforts could not have shortened separation of this family because.

COMMENT: Use 24 if childfren) remainfs) or is/are returned to the parentfs).

24. The childfren) can safely.remain with.be returned to.fparentf’s)fs’) namefs)).as long as he/she/thev complvfies) with the following:.The safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the childfren) are not endangered bv allowing the childfren) to.remain .return home.

25. The child’s petition and application for special immigrant juvenile status or other immigration decision remains pending.

26. The department.has.has not complied with its obligation as specified in the written case plan or in the provision of independent living services as required bv Florida Statutes.

. 27 The child does plan on remaining in foster care.

a, the child will meet the requirements bv.

b_the supervised living arrangement will be.

c. the child has been informed of

. m the right to continued support and services:

. (2) the right to request termination of this court’s jurisdiction and to be discharged from foster care:

. Í3) the opportunity to reenter foster care pursuant to Florida law.

28, The child does not plan on remaining in foster care. The child has been informed of:

. a. services of benefits for which the child may be eligible based upon the child’s placement and length of time spent in licensed foster care:

. b. sendees or benefits that may be lost through a termination of the court’s jurisdiction: and

. c. other federal, state, local, or community-based services or supports available to the child.

THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing findings, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. The minor childtren).CnameisY).be placed in the custody of (name).under supervision of the department,

2. The judicial review report filed bv the department is:

. not accepted and a continuance was requested.

. accepted bv the court.

3. Other:.

4.All prior orders not inconsistent with the present order shall remain in full force and effect.

5. This court shall retain jurisdiction over this cause to enter any such further orders as may be deemed necessary for the best interest and welfare of the minor children).

6. This court shall retain jurisdiction until the final decision is rendered bv the federal immigration authorities, or upon the immigrant child's 22nd birthday, whichever shall first occur.

7.This court shall retain jurisdiction until the child’s 19th birthday for the purpose of determining whether appropriate services that were required to be provided to the voung adult before reaching 18 years of age have been provided to the youth.

8. This court shall retain, jurisdiction until the child’s 21st birthday, unless the voting adult chooses to leave foster care upon reaching 18 years of age, or if the voung adult does not meet the eligibility requirements to remain in foster care or chooses to leave care at any lime prior to the 21 st birthday.

9. This matter is scheduled for Judicial Review on.fdatei.at ('time').

DONE AND ORDERED in.Florida, on.fdatel.

Circuit Judge

NOTICE OF HEARING

The Juvenile Court hereby gives notice of hearing in the above-styled cause on .(date! at.a.m./p.m.. before .....(iiidgel.at.(location!.or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

COMMENT: The following paragraph must be in hold. 14 nt. Times New Roman or Courier font.

If von are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, you are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact.(name, address, and telephone number).at least 7 days before your scheduled court appearance, or immediately upon receiving this notification if the time before the scheduled appearance is less than 7 days. If von are hearing or voice impaired, call 711.

PLEASE BE GOVERNED ACCORDINGLY.

Conies furnished to.

FORM 8.973C. ORDER ON JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR YOUNG ADULTS IN EXTENDED FOSTER CARE

ORDER ON JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR YOUNG ADULTS IN EXTENDED FOSTER CARE AND NOTICE OF NEXT HEARING

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on.('date').for Judicial Review on the report filed bv tlie Department of Children and Families in this cause under chapter 39, Florida Statutes.

The following persons appeared before the court:

.(Name).Young Adult

.(Name).Attorney for the Young Adult

.fNamel.Petitioner

.(Namel.Attorney for the petitioner

.(Name').Attorney for the department

.(Name').Department caseworker

.(Name).Guardian ad litem

.(Name').Attorney for guardian, ad litem

.(Namel.Other:.

and the court having considered:

Judicial Review Social Study Report filed bv the Department:

Case Plan filed bv the Department:

Report of the Guardian Ad Litem:

Other:.

AND THE COURT having heard testimony and argument, and having been otherwise duly advised in the premises finds:

1. The voune adult .is .is not making progress in meeting the case plan goals, as follows:.

2. The case plan and/or the young adult’s transition plan shall be amended as follows:.

3.The Department and all services providers.have.have not provided the appropriate services listed in the case plan.The Department must take the following action to ensure the young adult receives identified services that have not been provided:.

. 4, Jurisdiction in this case should be terminated based on the following facts:

. a. The young adult has requested termination of jurisdiction: or

. b. The vouna adult has been informed bv the department of his or her right to attend this hearing and has provided written consent to waive this right, and

c,_The voung adult has been informed of the'potential negative effects of early termination of care, the option to reenter care before reaching 21 years of age, the procedure for and the limitations on reentering care, and the availability of alternative services. and has sinned a document attesting that he or she has been so informed and understands these provisions: or

. d._The voung adult has voluntarily left the program, has not signed the document indicated above, and is unwilling to participate in any further court proceeding: or

. 4, The voung adult has been involuntarily discharged from the program bv written notification dated . and the voung adult has not appealed the discharge decision.

THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing findings, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. The judicial review report filed bv the department is:

. not accepted and a continuance was reciuested.

. accepted bv the court.

2. All prior orders not inconsistent with the present order shall remain in full force and effect.

. 3. This court shall retain jurisdiction until the voung adult’s 19th birthday for the purpose of determining whether appropriate services that were required to be provided to the voung adult before reaching 18 years of age have been provided to the youth, or

. 3. This court shall retain jurisdiction until the voung adult’s 21 st birthday, unless the voung adult chooses to leave foster care upon reaching 18 years of age, or if the voung adult does not, meet the eligibility requirements to remain in foster care or chooses to leave care at any time prior to the 21st birthday, or

. 3. Jurisdiction over this cause is hereby terminated.

4. Other:.

5. This matter is scheduled for Judicial Review on.Ídate!.at.ftimet

DONE AND ORDERED in . Florida, on.fdatel

Circuit Judge

NOTICE OF HEARING

The Juvenile Court hereby gives notice of hearing in the above-stvied cause on .(date!.at.a.m./p.m.. before.Budget.at.(location').or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

COMMENT: The following paragraph must be in bold. 14 nt. Times New Roman or Courier font.

If you are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, von are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact.(name, address, and telephone number).at least 7 days before vour scheduled court appearance, or immediately upon receiving this notification if the time before the scheduled appearance is less than 7 days. If von are hearing or voice impaired, call 711.

PLEASE BE GOVERNED ACCORDINGLY.

Copies furnished to

      . Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

      . All comments must be filed with the Court on or before May 19, 2014, with a certificate of service verifying that a copy has been served on the Committee Chair, Whitney Marie Untiedt, Office of the Public Defender, 35 N. Main Street, Gainesville, Florida 32601-5323, untiedtw@pdo8.org, and on the Bar Staff Liaison to the Committee, Ellen Sloyer, 651 E. Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, esloyer@flabar.org, as well as a separate request for oral argument if the person filing the comment wishes to participate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case. The Committee Chair has until June 9, 2014, to file a response to any comments filed with the Court. If filed by an attorney in good standing with The Florida Bar, the comment must be electronically filed via the Portal in accordance with In re Electronic Filing in the Supreme Court of Florida via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC13-7 (Feb. 18, 2013). If filed by a non-lawyer or a lawyer not licensed to practice in Florida, the comment must be electronically filed via e-mail in accordance with In re Mandatory Submission of Electronic Copies of Documents, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC04-84 (Sept. 13, 2004). Electronically filed documents must be submitted in Microsoft Word 97 or higher. Any person unable to submit a comment electronically must mail or hand-deliver the originally signed comment to the Florida Supreme Court, Office of the Clerk, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927; no additional copies are required or will be accepted.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LABARGA, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Rene RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC11-1788.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 27, 2014.
    Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL; and Consiglia Terenzio and Heidi Lynn Bettendorf, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   LABARGA, J.

We have for review Rodriguez v. State, 65 So.3d 1133, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal cited as authority its decision in Williams v. State, 40 So.3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), quashed, 123 So.3d 23 (Fla. 2013). At the time the Fourth District issued its decision in Rodriguez, Williams was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981).

We stayed proceedings in this case pending our disposition of Williams v. State, 123 So.3d 23 (Fla.2013), in which we ultimately quashed the Fourth District’s underlying Williams decision. We then issued an order directing the Respondent to show cause why this Court should not accept jurisdiction, summarily quash the Fourth District’s decision in Rodriguez, and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Williams.

Upon consideration of the response, in which the Respondent agrees with the disposition set forth in the order to show cause, and upon consideration of the reply of the Petitioner, we grant the petition for review, quash the Fourth District’s decision in Rodriguez, and remand this case to the Fourth District for further proceedings consistent with our decision in Williams.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, JJ„ concur.

PARIENTE, J., recused.


author: QUINCE, J. PARIENTE, J.,

text:
    James Michael ALDRICH, Petitioner, v. Laurie BASILE, et al., Respondent.
    No. SC11-2147.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 27, 2014.

      James Jack Taylor, Jr. of Taylor & Taylor P.A., Keystone Heights, FL, for Petitioner.
    Jonathan Dennis Kaney, III and Jonathan D. Kaney, Jr. of Kaney & Olivari, P.L., Ormond Beach, FL, for Respondents.
    Kenneth Bradley Bell of Clark Parting-ton Hart Larry Bond & Stackhouse, Pensacola, FL; Gerald Barnette Cope, Jr. of Akerman Senterfitt, Miami, FL; and Robert W. Goldman of Goldman Felcoski & Stone, Naples, FL, for Amicus Curiae The Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar.
   QUINCE, J.

This ease is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Basile v. Aldrich, 70 So.3d 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), where the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance:

WHETHER SECTION 732.6005, FLORIDA STATUTES (2004) REQUIRES CONSTRUING A WILL AS DISPOSING OF PROPERTY NOT NAMED OR IN ANY WAY DESCRIBED IN THE WILL, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY RESIDUARY CLAUSE, OR ANY OTHER CLAUSE DISPOSING OF THE PROPERTY, WHERE THE DECEDENT ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION AFTER THE WILL WAS EXECUTED?

Id. at 688. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons stated below, we approve the decision of the First District and answer the certified question in the negative.

Facts and Procedural History
On April 5, 2004, Ms. [Ann] Aldrich wrote her will on an “E-Z Legal Form.” In Article III, entitled “Bequests,” just after the form’s pre-printed language “directing] that after payment of all my just debts, my property be bequeathed in the manner following,” she hand wrote instructions directing that all of the following “possessions listed” go to her sister, Mary Jane Eaton:
— House, contents, lot at 150 SW Garden Street, Keystone Heights FL 32656
— Fidelity Rollover IRA 162-583405 (800-544-6565)
— United Defense Life Insurance (800-247-2196)
— Automobile Chevy Tracker, 2CNBE 13c916952909
— All bank accounts at M & S Bank 2226448, 264679, 0900020314 (352-473-7275).
Ann also wrote: “If Mary Jane Eaton dies before I do, I leave all listed to James Michael Aldrich, 2250 S. Palmetto 114 S Daytona FL 32119.” Containing no other distributive provisions, the will was duly signed and witnessed.
Three years later, Ms. Eaton did die before Ann, becoming her benefactor instead of her beneficiary. Ms. Eaton left cash and land in Putnam County to Ms. Aldrich, who deposited the cash she inherited from Ms. Eaton in an account she opened for the purpose with Fidelity Investments. On October 9, 2009, Ann Dunn Aldrich herself passed away, never having revised her will to dispose of the inheritance she had received from her sister.

Aldrich, 70 So.3d at 683. After being appointed as personal representative of Ms. Aldrich’s estate, Mr. Aldrich sought to have a court determine who would inherit the property that Ms. Aldrich acquired after the execution of her will. Id. at 684. Laurie Basile and Leanne Krajewski, Ms. Aldrich’s nieces from a predeceased brother, asserted an interest in the probate action. Id. Mr. Aldrich initiated an adversary proceeding in the probate case and argued that the most reasonable and appropriate construction of the will was that Ms. Aldrich intended for her entire estate, including what she had acquired from her sister, to pass to him. Id. at 683-84. As support for this assertion, Mr. Aldrich cited: (1) the language of the will that only named Ms. Aldrich’s predeceased sister and Mr. Aldrich as beneficiaries and disposed of all of the property then owned by the decedent; (2) section 732.6005(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that a will shall be construed to pass all property that the testator owned at death, including property acquired after the will is executed; and (3) the legal presumptions against a construction that results in partial intestacy and that, in making a will, a testator intends to dispose of his or her entire estate. Id. at 684.

The nieces argued that without any general devises and in the absence of a residuary clause, Ms. Aldrich’s will contained no mechanism to dispose of the after-acquired property or any other property not mentioned in the will, so that she died intestate as to the Putnam County property and the cash in the non-IRA Fidelity Investments account. Id. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mr. Aldrich on the purported authority of section 732.6005(2). Id.

The First District reversed the decision of the trial court, concluding that section 732.6005(2) does not control the question presented by these facts because the disputed property was not alluded to in the will and, therefore, it is irrelevant whether it was acquired before or after the will was executed. Id. The First District determined that only subsection (1), not (2), of section 732.6005 applies to the instant case. Id. at 686. Section 732.6005(1) provides: “The intention of the testator as expressed in the will controls the legal effect of the testator’s dispositions.” § 732.6005(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). The court explained that Ms. Aldrich devised her property with “painstaking specificity. Her will plainly evinces an intent to dispose of each particular item of property the will names. Equally plainly, the will manifests no intent to dispose of the disputed property, property the will does not allude to in any way.” Aldrich, 70 So.3d at 686. The First District reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Mr. Aldrich and remanded the case with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of the decedent’s nieces. Id. at 688.

Analysis

The events that led to this case were based on the following timeline: Ann Aid-rich executed her will on April 12, 2004. Ms. Aldrich’s sister, Ms. Eaton, died on November 10, 2007. Administration of Ms. Eaton’s estate was concluded and an Order of Discharge was entered on July 28, 2008, leaving Ann Aldrich personal and real property. Two days later, Ann Aid-rich opened an investment account to deposit the inherited money. Evidence in the record suggests that, later that year, Ms. Aldrich attempted to draft a codicil to her original will. Along with the original will was a piece of paper bearing the printed title “Just a Note” and dated November 18, 2008, below Ms. Aldrich’s handwriting and signature. The handwritten note read as follows:

This is an addendum to my will dated April 5, 2004. Since my sister Mary jean' Eaton has passed away, I reiterate that all my worldly possessions pass to my brother James Michael Aldrich, 2250 S. Palmetto, S. Daytona FL 32119.
With her agreement I name Sheila Aid-rich Schuh, my niece, as my personal representative, and have assigned certain bank accounts to her to be transferred on my death for her use as she seems [sic] fit.

Although Ms. Aldrich signed the “addendum,” the signature of Sheila Schuh, Mr. Aldrich’s daughter, was the only other signature that appeared, on the face of the document; therefore, the document was not an enforceable testamentary instrument under the Florida Probate Code. In October 2009, Ann Aldrich passed away. Aldrich, 70 So.3d at 683.

Mr. Aldrich essentially argues that the testator’s intent to dispose of her entire estate should lead this Court to construe her will as devising all of her property to the sole heir in the will, including the property not mentioned in the will. The testator’s nieces argue that the property that the testator acquired after the execution of the will should pass through intestacy, since the testator did not mention the property in the will and, therefore, had no clear intention as to the property. A similar view is expressed in an amicus brief filed by the Real Property Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar, which found no general bequest in the will that would indicate the testator’s intent for the after-acquired property to pass under the will.

The legislative history of Florida law regarding wills and after-acquired property supports the conclusion and reasoning of the First District below. Prior to June 13, 1892, a will was ineffective to devise real property in Florida that the testator had no interest in at the time the will was executed. See Frazier v. Boggs, 37 Fla. 307, 20 So. 245, 248 (1896) (citing Ch. 200, § 1, McClellan’s Digest at 985-86 (1881)). Upon the effectuation of the Revised Statutes of 1892, any will containing a residuary clause has been effective to transfer property acquired after the execution of the will, if the testator has an interest in the property at the time of death, unless the testator expressly states in the will that such is not his or her intention. § 1794, Fla.Rev.Stat. (1892); see also De-Pass v. Kan. Masonic Home, 132 Fla. 455, 181 So. 410, 413 (1938). The Legislature used similar language when it enacted the Probate Act of 1933. See § 5477(2)(b), Compiled General Laws of Fla. (Supp. 1933) (subsequently renumbered section 731.05(2)).

In In re Vail’s Estate, 67 So.2d 665 (Fla.1953), this Court explained that the primary purpose of this section “was to permit transmissal of after-acquired property by will rather than by intestacy.” Id. at 670. Additionally, the Legislature amended the 1974 Uniform Probate Code to clarify that a residuary clause in a will may pass property acquired by the testator’s estate after the testator’s death. See § 732.602, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1974). The staff analysis conducted in conjunction with the amendment indicates that the amendment was not intended to substantively change section 5477(2) of the Probate Act of 1933.

In 1975, former section 732.602 was repealed, and section 732.6005 was created. Ch. 75-220, §§ 33, 35, at 519-20, Laws, of Fla. The original version of section 732.6005 has never been amended. Section 732.6005, Florida Statutes (2004), provides:

(1) The intention of the testator as expressed in the will controls the legal effect of the testator’s dispositions. The rules of construction expressed in this part shall apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will.
(2) Subject to the foregoing, a will is construed to pass all property which the testator owns at death, including property acquired after the execution of the will.

(Emphasis added).

As a note to the First District’s assertion that “the 1974 amendment, effected by Chapter 74-106, § 1, at 227, Laws of Florida, was largely housecleaning not intended to effect substantive changes to section 5477(2) of the Probate Act of 1933,” id. at 685, the legislative analysis for Chapter 74-106 contains a diagram entitled “Analysis of Major Changes-Florida Probate Code” which delineates then current laws and the proposed changes that would occur under the Florida Probate Code; former section 732.602 (currently section 732.6005(2)) was not listed as a “major change,” nor was any other statute related to property acquired after the execution of a will. Fla. H.R. Comm, on Judiciary, Proposed Comm. Bill Relating to Probate Reform 4050 (Apr. 30, 1974) Staff Analysis (available from Fla. Dep’t of State, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). This supports the First District’s conclusion that the removal of the explicit requirement for a residuary clause to transmit after-acquired property was not actually meant to be a substantial change in the law. It further supports the Respondents’ assertion that the Legislature changed the language of the statute to clarify its original intention, and not to change the law. See Respondent’s Brief, at 21-2 (citing State ex rel. Szabo Food Servs., Inc. of N. Carolina v. Dickinson, 286 So.2d 529, 531 (Fla.1973)).

Also important in this analysis is how Florida’s intestacy statute relates to section 732.6005. When the Florida Legislature adopted the Uniform Probate Code, it enacted section 732.101 entitled “Intestate Estate,” which provided:

Any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of by will passes to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in the following sections of this code.

Ch. 74-106, § 1; § 732.101, Fla. Stat. (2004). The legislature adopted section 732.602 (currently section 732.6005(2)) in the same chapter. Id. Section 732.6005(2) provides:

... a will is construed to pass all property which the testator owns at death, including property acquired after the execution of the will.

§ 732.6005(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). The Legislature did not limit the application of the intestacy statute for estates containing after-acquired property. And so it appears that the Legislature intended for after-acquired property to also be subject to the intestacy statute in the event it is “not effectively disposed of by will.” Therefore, Mr. Aldrich’s assertion that after-acquired property which is not effectively disposed of by will, either by a specific, general or residuary devise, should nonetheless avoid the intestacy statute and instead be distributed under the will is not supported by Florida law.

It has been well established that “in construing a will the intention of the testator is the controlling factor and it should be gleaned from the four corners of the will unless the language employed by the testator is ambiguous, in which case the testimony of competent witnesses may be received and considered as an aid to the court in its quest for the testator’s intent.” Adams v. Vidal, 60 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla.1952). The testator’s intention as expressed in the will controls, not that which she may have had in her mind. See Estate of Murphy, 340 So.2d 107, 109 (Fla.1976) (“A will speaks as of the time of the death of the testator. ‘In construing a will, it is the intention which the testator expresses in the will that controls and not that which he might have had in mind when the will was executed.’ ”) (quoting lies v. lies, 158 Fla. 493, 29 So.2d 21, 22 (1947) (citation omitted)).

It is clear from the language of Ms. Aldrich’s will that she intended to leave all of the property listed to her brother, Mr. Aldrich, in the event her sister, Ms. Eaton, predeceased her. Ms. Aldrich expressed no intent as to any property that she may have acquired after the execution of her will, as the document did not include a residuary clause, nor did it include any general bequests that could encompass the inherited property. Mr. Aldrich is asking this Court to infer from the four corners of the will that the testator intended to devise all of her property to the sole person mentioned in the will, including the inherited property which was not mentioned in the will, based on the assertion that the testator did not intend to die intestate as to any of her property. This conclusion is simply not supported by the four corners of the document.

Ms. Aldrich’s will states that she intended for all of the property that she listed to pass to her brother. Although it was not disputed that the property listed in the will was substantially all, if not completely all, of the property owned by the decedent at the time she executed the will, Ms. Aldrich did not explicitly state that her identified beneficiaries were to receive all of the property that she owned at her death, only the property that she listed in her will. If Ms. Aldrich did in fact intend to devise all of the property she owned at death to her named devisee, her intent would have been better served through the use of a residuary clause or general devises of personal and real property in the will. See Murphy, 340 So.2d at 109 (Testator could not be said to have intentions as to after-acquired property except as indicated in a residuary clause).

The testator had nearly two years to decide how the after-acquired property would be distributed. She inherited approximately $122,000 in cash, which she deposited into an account she opened with Fidelity Investments days after she received it. At the time of her death, the investment account containing the after-acquired money had an approximate balance of $87,000. The decedent did not “effectively dispose of’ the Fidelity Investments account as she had done with the accounts listed in the will. It is possible that in the years that passed between executing the first will and receiving the inheritance from Ms. Eaton, that Ms. Ald-rich’s testamentary intent may have changed and that she became less eager to disinherit any additional heirs. Or, perhaps, Ms. Aldrich intended to sell the land and spend or gift all the inherited money during her lifetime, leaving none of this money to be disposed of by will. If Ms. Aldrich intended for the inherited money to pass to her named beneficiaries through the will, she could have simply deposited said money into one of the already-existing accounts that were expressly disposed of in her will. Instead, she chose to deposit the after-acquired money into a new investment account, which would seem to indicate that she intended for that property to be separate from the money that she had already mentioned in her will.

The law does not preclude Ms. Aldrich from partially devising her estate and allowing the balance of the estate to be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession. In construing a will, this court determines a testator’s intent by looking to the language of the will, unless the face of the will contains ambiguous language, contradictory provisions or a mistake. See Perkins v. O’Donald, 77 Fla. 710, 82 So. 401, 404 (1919); Adams, 60 So.2d at 547 (Testator’s intention should be gleaned from four corners of will, unless language employed is ambiguous, in which case competent witnesses’ testimony may be received and considered as aid to court in determining such intention.); see also § 732.6005(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).

The will in the instant case does not result in a contradiction or ambiguous language. It is only upon the entertaining of extrinsic evidence that the testator’s true intent is debatable. Without the use of the extrinsic evidence, the testator’s will is clear as to its meaning and needs no interpretation in order to be implemented. “The inquiry is, not what the testator meant to express, but what the words which [s]he has used do express.” Perkins, 82 So. at 404.

Ms. Aldrich’s will is not ambiguous. There are no provisions in the will that are “difficult to reconcile.” See Marshall v. Hewett, 156 Fla. 645, 24 So.2d 1, 4 (1945) (“If there are expressions in the will which are difficult to reconcile, then the situation of the testator at the time he made his will, the ties that bound him to the objects of his beneficence, the motives that prompted him to make the will he did make, and the influences that wrought on him at the time, will be considered in arriving at the purpose of the testator.”) (citations omitted). The will is not ambiguous as to the question of whether Ms. Aldrich intended to dispose of after-acquired property. The will did not have a residuary clause or any general devises which could be interpreted as disposing of any of the inherited property. This court cannot infer from the four corners of the will, without adding words to the document, that in making provision for the property she owned on that day that she also intended to make provision for any property that she stood to gain in the future.

A similar issue was addressed by the First District in In re Barker, 448 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), where a personal representative sought to have a residuary clause from a prior will admitted into the probate action, claiming that the clause was inadvertently omitted from the later probated will. Id. at 30. In determining that the will needed no interpretation in order to be implemented, the court explained:

[I]t is the intention of the testator as expressed in the will that the court should carry into effect, and where the meaning of the words used by the testator is clear, it must be adopted, whatever the inclination of the court may be. The court may not alter or reconstruct a will according to its notion of what the testator would or should have done. Moreover, in the absence of clear legislative intent, the courts will not create or destroy testamentary disposition on the theory that the result accords with the natural desires of the deceased. The court must assume that the testator meant what was said in his will. It is not the purpose of the court to make a will or to attempt to improve on one that the testator has made. Nor may the court produce a distribution that it may think equal or more equitable.

Id. at 31-2 (quoting 18 Fla.Jur.2d Decedent’s Property § 358 at p. 216). A court’s role is to enforce the stated intentions of the testator, not to discern the reasonableness of one potential devise over another.

To apply the construction of the will asserted by Mr. Aldrich “would be in effect to reform the will of [Ms. Aldrich], to supply what we might suppose to have been her intention for that which is expressed by the language of the will, to import into the will an intention not there expressed ... and by such so-called construction set aside the long-established principle embodied in the laws of the land.... ” Perkins, 82 So. at 406. There must be a clause in a will that alludes to the after-acquired property in order to avoid distribution of that property through the intestacy statute. Although Mr. Aid-rich was the sole devisee under the will, without a residuary clause or general devises, only the property specifically referenced passes to him under the will. Further, if a testator does not allude to after-acquired property in any way, a court would have difficulty deciding how to divide the after-acquired property between multiple beneficiaries. In that instance, the court would be required to equitably distribute the testator’s property. This is a task that has been reserved for the Legislature and has been accomplished through the intestacy statute. See §§ 732.102, 732.103, Fla. Stat.

Further, section 732.6005(2) states that “[t]he rules of construction expressed in this part shall apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will.” § 732.6005(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The will in the instant case does in fact indicate a contrary intention to that proposed by Mr. Aldrich. The testator’s will specifically devised all possessions “listed,” to Mr. Aldrich. Therefore, it is clear that the testator did not intend for any property not listed to be distributed by the will. Any other interpretation of the testator’s actions would require this Court to rewrite the will to include provisions regarding property for which the testator made none. In the present case, this Court would be forced to speculate that the testator intended for her sole devisee to have more than she specifically listed in her will, despite language in the will indicating the opposite. A will shall be construed to pass all property that the testator owns at death, including property acquired after the execution of the will, subject to the language of the will regarding that property, not despite the language of the will which makes no mention of that property.

Conclusion

We therefore approve the reasoning and the decision of the First District below and answer the certified question in the negative.

PARIENTE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.

POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, J., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring.

Ms. Aldrich’s failure to include a residuary clause within her self-drafted will, which she created using a commercially available form, compels the result reached by the majority and urged by the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar. Unfortunately, I surmise that, although this is the correct re-suit under Florida’s probate law, this result does not effectuate Ms. Aldrich’s true intent. While we are unable to legally consider Ms. Aldrich’s unenforceable handwritten note that was found attached to her previously drafted will, this note clearly demonstrates that Ms. Aldrich’s true intent was to pass all of her “worldly possessions” to her brother, James Michael Aldrich. As the majority states, however, although this note may represent Ms. Ald-rich’s true intent, it was not her stated intent in the will to which this Court is confined in determining Ms. Aldrich’s testamentary intent. Thus, Florida probate law dictates that Ms. Aldrich’s after-acquired property pass by intestacy, and in this case, ultimately be inherited by two nieces to whom she made no specific or general bequests.

This unfortunate result stems not from this Court’s interpretation of Florida’s probate law, but from the fact that Ms. Aid-rich wrote her will using a commercially available form, an “E-Z Legal Form,” which did not adequately address her specific needs — apparently without obtaining any legal assistance. This form, which is in the record, did not have space to include a residuary clause or pre-printed language that would allow a testator to elect to use such a clause. Because Ms. Aldrich’s will devised all of her currently held property, this omission was not initially problematic. However, when Ms. Aldrich later acquired property from her sister, who pre-de-ceased her, the absence of a residuary clause frustrated Ms. Aldrich’s testamentary intent because, without such a clause, Ms. Aldrich’s self-drafted will expressed no intent as to this after-acquired property. Apparently, Ms. Aldrich at some point recognized that her acquisition of this property needed to be addressed, but her attempts to amend her will to account for this after-acquired property, although logical, were legally ineffective.

While I appreciate that there are many individuals in this state who might have difficulty affording a lawyer, this case does remind me of the old adage “penny-wise and pound-foolish.” Obviously, the cost of drafting a will through the use of a pre-printed form is likely substantially lower than the cost of hiring a knowledgeable lawyer. However, as illustrated by this case, the ultimate cost of utilizing such a form to draft one’s will has the potential to far surpass the cost of hiring a lawyer at the outset. In a case such as this, which involved a substantial sum of money, the time, effort, and expense of extensive litigation undertaken in order to prove a testator’s true intent after the testator’s death can necessitate the expenditure of much more substantial amounts in attorney’s fees than was avoided during the testator’s life by the use of a pre-printed form.

I therefore take this opportunity to highlight a cautionary tale of the potential dangers of utilizing pre-printed forms and drafting a will without legal assistance. As this case illustrates, that decision can ultimately result in the frustration of the testator’s intent, in addition to the payment of extensive attorney’s fees — the precise results the testator sought to avoid in the first place.

      . Ms. Aldrich "left neither spouse nor child. Id. at 683 n. 1. Nor did any other sibling or any other offspring of predeceased siblings survive her.” Id.

      . See §§ 732.502(l)(b) Fla. Stat. (2004) (requiring signature of the testator along with two attesting witnesses); 732.502(5), Fla. Stat. (2004) (codicil must be executed with the same formalities as a will).

      . The record indicates that Ms. Aldrich’s brother sought to admit testimony that shortly before her death, Ms. Aldrich had consulted with an attorney who was to draft a will for her, but that she died just days before she was to review the newly drafted will. This testimony was declared inadmissible hearsay. Nevertheless, it appears that Ms. Aldrich may have finally realized that she needed legal assistance, but, unfortunately, that realization came too late.