text:
    Reuben SLOAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-1769.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 14, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Trisha Meggs Pate, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Reuben Sloan was charged with aggravated battery causing great bodily harm with a deadly weapon (count I) and false imprisonment (count II). He was acquitted of count II, but convicted of the lesser-included offense of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon in count I. The weapon used was a baseball bat, which Sloan wrestled away from and used to injure his brother. At trial, Sloan testified that his brother came at him with a bat after Sloan flushed his brother’s drugs down the toilet. His brother swung the bat at him, but Sloan was able to wrestle it away, using it on his brother to stop him from continuing the fight.

During the charge conference, Sloan sought instructions on both the justifiable use of deadly force and non-deadly force; the trial court refused and insisted that Sloan choose one or the other. Sloan, noting his continued objection and thus preserving the issue, chose the instruction on justifiable use of non-deadly force. Over Sloan’s continued objection, the jury was instructed accordingly.

The State properly concedes error based on this Court’s precedents holding that a defendant is entitled to instructions on both justifiable use of deadly and non-deadly force where the “evidence fails to establish as a matter of law whether the type of force used was deadly or non-deadly,” the “only type of force that has been determined to be deadly as a matter of a law is discharging a firearm.” Mathis v. State, 863 So.2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (citations omitted); see also Mathis v. State, 973 So.2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Here, no firearm use is at issue. Based on Sloan’s theory of defense, the absence of a firearm in the fight, and the request to be instructed on both justifiable use of deadly and non-deadly force, he was entitled to the requested instruction; the trial court’s error in failing to give the requested instruction was not harmless. See Caruthers v. State, 721 So.2d 371, 371-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“[I]t is not harmless error where the court fails to instruct the jury on non-deadly force in an aggravated battery case involving a weapon that is not deadly as a matter of law.”) Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

LEWIS, C.J., WOLF, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Nathan JENNINGS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-2408.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 14, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richard M. Summa, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Lauren Brudnicki, Trisha Meggs Pate, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant appeals his conviction for one count of domestic battery by strangulation, arguing that the State failed to produce any evidence regarding the nature of his relationship with the victim. The State concedes that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the domestic battery by strangulation charge. Accordingly, we reverse the appellant’s conviction for domestic battery by strangulation and remand for resentencing under a corrected scoresheet. The appellant’s judgment and sentence is otherwise affirmed.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.

ROBERTS, WETHERELL, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sharon Gail LORD and Darryl James McGlamry, Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4267.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 14, 2014.
    Sharon Gail Lord and Darryl James McGlamry, pro se, Appellants.
    Jessica D. Morrow, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Raysor v. Raysor, 706 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The dismissal is without prejudice to appellants’ right to seek relief in the trial court. Brigham v. State, 769 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Williams v. Roundtree, 464 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

LEWIS, C. J., PADOVANO and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    SOUTHEAST MILK/ZURICH NORTH AMERICA, Appellants, v. Guy W. FISHER, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4411.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 14, 2014.
    H. George Kagan of Miller, Kagan, Rodriguez & Silver, P.L., West Palm Beach, for Appellants.
    Bill McCabe, Longwood, and Richard J. Manno, Winter Park, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) to the extent it awards temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits for the period of May 3, 2013, through July 2, 2013. Because the Employer had fired Claimant on December 19, 2012, the E/C argues that the JCC erred in, inter alia, declining to determine whether Claimant had been discharged for misconduct, given that section 440.15(4)(e), Florida Statutes (2012), unequivocally provides that TPD benefits are not payable if termination is based on misconduct. We agree with the E/C here and remand for a finding on whether Claimant was terminated for misconduct.

As background, Claimant, a driver, suffered a compensable injury on November 9, 2012, when the door of his truck cab slammed into his left side. Subsequently he was restricted to light duty work, and to accommodate his work restrictions, the Employer offered him his regular hours and regular rate of pay to come in to the office to watch safety training videos. Claimant watched the videos for part of two nonconsecutive days and then stopped coming to work. On at least one day of absence, he did not call in as required by a company policy that indicated “no-call no show” could result in termination. The Employer considered Claimant’s absences to be unauthorized and terminated him for that reason.

The JCC stated in the final order that his award of TPD benefits “would be the same [even] if [he] determined the claimant was terminated for ‘misconduct’ as defined by section 440.02(18).” This statement is not accurate, because, again, termination for misconduct statutorily precludes an award of TPD benefits. Given that the B/C raised a dispositive defense based on an allegation of statutory misconduct, the JCC erred in not reaching the issue of whether Claimant’s conduct rose to the level of misconduct as defined by section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (2012). Thus, we REVERSE and REMAND for a finding of whether Claimant was discharged for statutory misconduct and entry of an order accordingly.

LEWIS, C.J., WOLF and MAEAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    P.W., A Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4696.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 14, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Archie F. Gardner, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief of Criminal Appeals; and Kristen Bonjour, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of the amended disposition order adjudicating her delinquent and committing her to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice for placement in a moderate-risk residential program. Appellant does not challenge— and, thus, we affirm — the adjudication of delinquency. Appellant raises two issues concerning her commitment: (1) the trial court failed to comply with E.A.R. v. State, 4 So.3d 614 (Fla.2009), when departing from the recommendation of probation in the predisposition report; and (2) the trial court failed to make written findings to support placement at the moderate-risk residential restrictiveness level as required by section 985.441(2)(d), Florida Statutes. We affirm the first issue based upon B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), and J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). We reverse the second issue based upon the State’s confession of error, and we remand for the trial court to make written findings in compliance with section 985.441(2)(d). See K.M.H. v. State, 91 So.3d 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012),

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with directions.

ROBERTS, WETHERELL, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    George LANDGRAFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-0109.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 14, 2014.
    Matt Shirk, Public Defender, Jacksonville; W. Charles Fletcher, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. This dismissal is without prejudice to appellant’s right to file a petition for belated appeal. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c).

LEWIS, C. J., PADOVANO and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


author: VAN NORTWICK, J.

text:
    Kenneth Ellis WETHERINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-1327.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 16, 2014.
    Emily A. Snider and Nick G. Zissimopu-los, Gainesville, for Appellant.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Wesley Paxon III, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   VAN NORTWICK, J.

Kenneth Ellis Wetherington appeals his judgment and sentence for felony driving under the influence (DUI) following his bifurcated jury trial. Wetherington raises six issues on appeal. As correctly conceded by the State, the testimony of a police officer concerning statements made by Wetherington was erroneously admitted into evidence in contravention of the accident report privilege. Contrary to the argument of the State, we cannot find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We affirm without comment the other issues raised on appeal.

Wetherington was charged with felony driving under the influence based on his involvement in a single vehicle accident in which a vehicle occupied by him and his fiancée, Mitra Snyder, crashed onto a culvert in a ditch shortly after leaving the premises of the Eagle’s Landing, an establishment known to serve alcohol. At trial, the State presented the testimony of Ernest Aviles, who testified that he was driving home on the evening in question when he noticed a set of vehicle headlights approximately 1,000 feet away swerving and making a motion in a manner consistent with being involved in an impact. Aviles testified that it took him ten to fifteen seconds to drive close enough to the vehicle so that he could see the occupants, and that upon reaching the vehicle he saw Wetherington in the driver’s seat and Snyder in the passenger seat.

The State also presented Sergeant Scott Ulrich, Alachua County Sheriffs Office, who testified that he spoke with Wether-ington in the course of investigating the traffic accident, and that Wetherington identified himself as the driver of the crashed vehicle. Defense counsel objected that this testimony was inadmissible pursuant to the accident report privilege; the trial court overruled the objection. Additionally, the State entered in evidence and published to the jury a recording of a telephone call Wetherington made while in jail subsequent to his arrest. From the court reporter’s transcription of the call as played for the jury, it is difficult to identify exactly who was speaking during certain portions of the call. Nevertheless, it appears that at one point Wetherington stated “Oh, my God. I might have just f— ruined my life, man,” and also expressed concern about the impact the news of his arrest would have on his family. The State contended that Wetherington’s statements on the jail phone calls were evidence of his consciousness of guilt for the charged offense.

During its case-in-chief, Wetherington called Snyder, who testified that she was driving the vehicle when it crashed into the culvert and that she and Wetherington switched positions inside the vehicle so that Wetherington could attempt to restart it. Snyder stated that, following the unsuccessful attempts to crank the vehicle, she and Wetherington proceeded to walk back to the Eagle’s Landing parking lot to obtain better cellphone reception and call a tow truck.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty of DUI in the first phase of the trial, and, based on Wetherington’s two prior DUI convictions, found him guilty of felony DUI following the second phase of the trial. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty-six months’ imprisonment, followed by two years’ probation. This appeal ensued.

In Florida, the accident report privilege is a creature of statute. Under Florida law:

[E]ach crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting. Such report or statement may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal.

§ 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2012); see Vedner v. State, 849 So.2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[Statements made pursuant to the requirement to give information for a crash report required by section 316.066 may not be used as evidence in civil, criminal or administrative proceedings.”). As Professor Ehrhardt explains:

The purpose of the accident report privilege is to encourage people to make an accurate report of the circumstances surrounding an accident so that the state can use the information to make the highways safer. The legislature has made the decision that in both criminal and civil actions, it is better that statements made by a defendant not be introduced before the jury than to restrict the goal of safer highways for society. Section 316.066 compels a report when there is total apparent damage of at least five hundred dollars or if a person dies or suffers bodily injury or death. The Florida legislature has recognized the constitutional mandate against self-incrimination and immunized the report and any accompanying statements from use against the person making them.

Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 501.2 (West 2012 ed.).

On appeal, the State conceded that Sergeant Ulrich’s testimony that Wethering-ton stated he was the driver of the crashed vehicle was inadmissible in light of the accident report privilege. The State maintains, however, that the error in admitting evidence of Wetherington’s statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because evidence that he was the driver was introduced through the recorded jail telephone calls, which were admitted independently of his erroneously admitted statement to Sergeant Ulrich. The State further contends that Aviles’ testimony was valid, direct evidence that Wetherington was the driver of the vehicle. We cannot agree.

The harmless error analysis is well-recognized: “[i]f the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful. Critically, the test is not whether there is other evidence, or even overwhelming evidence, of guilt.” Gregory v. State, 118 So.3d 770, 782 (Fla.2013) (citations omitted).

The record here reflects that the only direct evidence that Wetherington was the driver of the vehicle is the statement he gave to Sergeant Ulrich during the accident investigation. Although Aviles testified that he saw the vehicle swerve and come to a stop, that he never lost sight of the vehicle, and that he saw Wetherington in the driver’s seat of the crashed vehicle, Aviles conceded that he could not tell anything about the occupants of the vehicle until he drove up to it, which was approximately ten to fifteen seconds from the time he saw it crash. Because one must infer that Wetherington was driving based on Aviles’ having seen him in the driver’s seat after the crash, Aviles’ testimony is not direct evidence that Weth-erington was in control of the vehicle when it crashed.

Moreover, while the jail phone call could be interpreted as evidence of consciousness of guilt on Wetherington’s part, the recording is also susceptible of other interpretations. For example, at one point someone, it is not clear who based on the transcript, said the charges were not true. In any event, Wetherington does not state during the recording that he was the driver.

Even if these phone calls are evidence of Wetherington’s guilt, the law is clear that the existence of other evidence of guilt, even when that other evidence is overwhelming, is not determinative in a harmless error analysis. Gregory, 118 So.3d at 782. Had Wetherington’s statement to Sergeant Ulrich been properly excluded, it is quite possible that the jury could have still found him guilty based on the other evidence, including Aviles’ and the law enforcement officers’ testimony, as well as the phone call recording from the jail, which the jury could reasonably have interpreted as evidence of consciousness of guilt, as suggested by the State. However, one would be hard-pressed to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Wether-ington’s erroneously admitted statement that he was driving the vehicle did not affect the verdict in this case, especially when that is the only direct evidence that he was the driver.

Accordingly, because the State has failed to establish that the erroneous admission of Wetherington’s privileged statement was harmless, we REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial.

THOMAS, J., and NORTON,VIRGINIA B., Associate Judge, concur.

      . The accident report privilege is "fully operative, unless the statement made by the reporting person during the accident investigation is made after a waiver of Miranda rights or is otherwise not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.” State v. Marshall, 695 So.2d 719, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), aff'd, 695 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1997). The record here does not indicate that Wetherington waived his Miranda rights.


text:
    SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD/Optacomp, Appellants, v. Kathryn ROBERSON, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4087.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 16, 2014.

      Ben H. Cristal and Kyle M. Kennelly of the Cristal Law Group, Tampa, for Appellants.
    Alex Lancaster and Amy Dickinson of Lancaster & Eure, P.A., Sarasota, for Ap-pellee.
   VAN NORTWICK, J.

In this workers’ compensation matter, Sarasota County School Board and Opta-comp, jointly the Employer/Carrier (E/C), argue that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred for multiple reasons in awarding Kathryn Roberson, Claimant, permanent total disability benefits (PTD) benefits. Finding no error, we affirm the JCC’s order. We write, however, to address one of the E/C’s arguments — that the JCC erred in considering Claimant’s psychiatric limitations in assessing Claimant’s entitlement to PTD benefits.

Claimant, a teacher’s aide, injured her right wrist on October 7, 2009, when she attempted to assist co-workers in restraining a violent child. The wrist injury required two surgical procedures. Claimant’s authorized orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Klein, opined that she reached a point of orthopedic maximum medical improvement on February 22, 2011, and assigned a 9% permanent impairment rating.

In May 2010, Dr. Klein recommended a psychological evaluation. The E/C accepted as compensable Claimant’s psychiatric condition and, in August 2010, authorized care with a psychiatrist and a mental health counselor. Claimant was placed at psychiatric maximum medical improvement in July 2012. Claimant filed a petition for benefits in August 2012 seeking entitlement to PTD benefits. In February 2013, the E/C filed a motion asking to amend its defenses to now deny compensa-bility of Claimant’s psychiatric condition based on the opinion of its independent medical examiner. By order signed February 22, 2013, the JCC granted the motion and permitted the amendment. In the appealed order, the JCC found Claimant’s psychiatric condition remained com-pensable and found Claimant entitled to PTD benefits.

The E/C argued below, and now argues on appeal, that Claimant was required to prove her entitlement to PTD benefits based solely on her physical limitations, relying on the following language found in section 440.15(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2009):

In all other cases [cases in which the injury is not one of the injuries presumed to be totally disabling], in order to obtain permanent total disability benefits, the employee must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50-mile radius of the employee’s residence, due to his or her physical limitation.

The JCC rejected the E/C’s argument, reasoning that this statutory provision was sufficiently similar to the 1980 version of the statute which this Court, in Public Gas Co. v. Shaw, 464 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), determined did not preclude an award of PTD benefits when the psychiatric condition was related to the compensa-ble physical injury. Further, the JCC explained, the Legislature in 2003 took the opportunity to address psychiatric injuries at some length and limited the duration of temporary benefits paid for psychiatric injuries, but did not similarly limit PTD benefits. See § 440.093(3), Fla. Stat (2003). The JCC’s reasoning is sound.

Prior to 1994, a claimant who did not have a listed injury was required “to establish that he is not able uninterruptedly to do even light work available within a 100-mile radius of the injured employee’s residence due to physical limitation.” § 440.15(l)(b), Fla. Sta. (1993). In Shaw, 464 So.2d at 1243, this Court addressed whether the statutory reference to “physical limitation” precluded consideration of “psychiatric” limitations. This Court held that “[sjection 440.15(l)(b)[, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980),] does not preclude PTD benefits when a claimant is unable to work because of a psychiatric disorder related to a compensable physical injury.” Id. at 1244. The Shaw Court’s conclusion was based on “well settled [case law] that, where there has been a physical accident and claimant’s disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis or conversion hysteria, the claimant’s full disability, including the effects of the neurosis, is compensable.” Racz v. Chennault, Inc., 418 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

The requirement that there be a physical injury is the constant in these cases and, in fact, was expounded on in the 2003 amendments to chapter 440. Section 440.093 was enacted to specifically address “Mental and Nervous Injuries.” See Ch. 03-412, § 18, at 3916, Laws of Fla. In McKenzie v. Mental Health Care, Inc., 43 So.3d 767, 769-70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), this Court, at length, discussed section 440.093 and concluded that the Legislature described four situations in which mental or nervous injuries may arise in the workplace, two of which would be compensable and two of which were not. In both instances where the mental or nervous injury is compensable, a compensable physical injury is required. Id. It is only when there is no compensable physical injury arising out of the accident that a mental or nervous injury that may otherwise be associated with the accident is not compensa-ble. Id.

In reaching the conclusion that the current statute’s use of the term “physical limitation” does not preclude consideration of psychiatric limitations, we are mindful of the canon of statutory construction that presumes the Legislature is aware of case law. See City of Hollywood v. Lombardi 770 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Fla.2000) (noting that “the legislature is presumed to know the judicial constructions of a law when enacting a new version of that law” and “[fjurthemore, the legislature is presumed to have adopted prior judicial construction of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed in the new version”) (citations omitted). Here, there appears to be no such contrary intention expressed because, in the same round of amendments that produced section 440.093, the Legislature opted to place a limit on the duration of temporary disability benefits payable in association with a compensable psychiatric injury. See § 440.093(3), Fla. Stat. (2003) (“in no event shall temporary benefits for a compensable mental or nervous injury be paid for more than 6 months after the date of maximum medical improvement for the injured employee’s physical injury or injuries”). There is no similar limitation placed on the payment of PTD benefits.

Our reliance here on pre-1994 case law is in keeping with our determination in Ferrell Gas v. Childers, 982 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), that a claimant’s vocational abilities are relevant in determining whether an award of PTD benefits is appropriate. Specifically, the Childers Court stated that “[ujnder the pre-1994 version of section 440.15(l)(b), [PTD] benefits may be based on physical restrictions and vocational factors which combine to preclude the level of work provided in the statute. The pertinent language in the current version of section 440.15(l)(b)[, Florida Statutes (2004),] is similar to the language under which this court has recognized that it is appropriate to consider both physical and vocational factors.” Id. (citations omitted).

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, J„ and NORTON, VIRGINIA B., Associate Judge, concur.

      . We find it somewhat incongruous, given the E/C's focus on this issue at oral argument, that it was the E/C who sought appointment of an expert medical advisor based on a disagreement in the medical opinions as to Claimant's ability to work from a psychiatric standpoint.

      . The statutory language in 1980 was, in relevant part, substantially similar to the 1993 language — -"In such other cases, no compensation is payable ... if the employee is engaged in, or is physically capable of engaging in, gainful employment; and the burden shall be upon the employee to establish that he is not able uninterruptedly to do even light work due to physical limitation.” § 440.15(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980).


author: PER CURIAM. OSTERHAUS, J.,

text:
    Markeil Deshon THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-2718.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 16, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Milsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

This case involves another in the string of recent sentencing eases arising from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Appellant, Markeil Deshon Thomas, challenges his concurrent thirty and forty year sentences for armed robbery and first-degree murder, respectively, imposed after we remanded this case for resentencing pursuant to Washington v. State, 103 So.3d 917 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). See Thomas v. State, 110 So.3d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Thomas I). We affirm Mr. Thomas’s thirty-year armed robbery sentence. See Thomas v. State, 78 So.3d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Gridine v. State, 89 So.3d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), rev. granted, 103 So.3d 139 (Fla.2012). We also affirm Mr. Thomas’s forty-year sentence for first-degree murder. But see Horsley v. State, 121 So.3d 1130, 1131 (5th DCA 2013), rev: granted,-So.3d-, 2013 WL 6224657 (Fla.2013) (holding “the only sentence now available in Florida for a charge of capital murder committed by a juvenile is life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.”).

AFFIRMED.

BENTON, and SWANSON, JJ„ concur.

OSTERHAUS, Specially Concurring.

OSTERHAUS, J.,

specially concurring.

In the wake of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), I think the trial judge’s decision to resentence the juvenile defendant in this case to forty years without parole on the murder charge finds express statutory support in Florida’s sentencing statute, section 775.082, Florida Statutes. In short, while federal caselaw has eviscerated Florida’s ability to sentence juveniles as “capital” felons under § 775.082(1) and (2), Mr. Thomas may be sentenced as a “life” felon under § 775.082(3)(a)3 because his crime is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment for life. And because his forty-year sentence squarely comports with § 775.082(3)(a)3’s sentencing provision for life felonies, it can be affirmed.

A.

Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, this Court has not fully addressed the resentencing options available to Florida’s trial courts in murder cases involving juvenile offenders, even as case after case has been remanded for resentencing. But two primary views of resentencing have emerged. One view would have trial courts sentence juvenile offenders in Miller-related cases to a substantial term of years without parole eligibility. See Washington v. State, 103 So.3d 917, 920-22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Wolf, J., concurring). Judge Wolfs concurrence in Washington analyzed the available sentencing options and concluded that resen-tencing to a term of years without the possibility of parole “is the closest to the legislative expression of intent and involves the least rewriting of the statute[.]” Id. at 922.

The other view would require trial courts to grant parole when resentencing juvenile offenders under Miller. See Partlow v. State, 134 So.3d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan.4, 2013) (Makar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Makar concluded that the 1993 version of § 775.082(1) should be revived and juvenile offenders afforded the possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years of their sentence. In Horsley v. State, the Fifth District Court of Appeal adopted Judge Makar’s statutory revival perspective. 121 So.3d 1130 (5th DCA 2013), rev. granted, — So.3d-, 2013 WL 6224657 (Fla. 2013). It held that “the only sentence now available in Florida for a charge of capital murder committed by a juvenile is life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.” Id. at 1131 (emphasis added). In taking the parole-reviving route, Horsley leaned heavily on a perception of legislative hostility toward “judicial discretion in sentencing in homicide cases” and leniency in sentencing, but at the same time acknowledged the legislature’s dim view of parole: “[W]e are certainly cognizant of the fact that the legislature of late appears to be less than enamored with the concept of parole[.]” Id. at 1132.

B.

Which brings us to this case. After conducting an individualized assessment, the trial court here resentenced Mr. Thomas to forty years without parole for first degree murder. I think this is a permissible sentence not only for purposes of Miller; but because it finds express support in what is left of Florida’s sentencing statute as applied to juveniles after Roper and Miller.

Mr. Thomas’s first-degree murder offense can now only be considered an “other ... life felony” for purposes of § 775.082(3) because federal caselaw has abrogated both possible “capital felony” sentences for juvenile offenders-death and mandatory life without parole. First, Roper foreclosed the imposition of a capital sentence in cases involving juveniles, effectively invalidating subsection (1) of § 775.082. The maximum penalty in cases like this one is life, not death. And “capital” offenses are defined by their penalty; they are offenses punishable by death. See Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499, 501-02 (Fla.1972).

Second, by insisting that life sentences for homicide offenses should be “uncommon” for juvenile offenders, Miller foreclosed Florida from universally applying the only default sentence provided for capital felonies in § 775.082(1) and (2) — mandatory life imprisonment without parole. See Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407. This case differs from Rusaw v. State, 429 So.2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) approved by 451 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1984), where child sexual battery was held to remain a “capital” crime after the death penalty was declared unconstitutional. The court in Rusaw determined that child sexual battery remained a capital crime because the alternative mandatory life sentence for capital crimes under § 775.082(2) was still applicable. That is not the case here. Under Miller, Florida’s alternative mandatory life sentence is not automatically available for juvenile offenders. And so, Miller has effectively unraveled § 775.082’s entire capital felony sentencing regime by foreclosing the imposition of either death or alternative mandatory life sentences in cases like this one.

What is left of § 775.082 for juvenile offenders in Mr. Thomas’s position in the wake of Roper and Miller is the provision addressing life felonies in § 775.082(3). While his offense can no longer be considered a “capital felony” for purposes of the sentencing statute, it remains potentially punishable by life imprisonment — a “life felony.” In § 775.082(3)(a)3, the legislature has established two penalty options for life felonies committed on or after July 1, 1995: “imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a terms of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” Because Mr. Thomas’s forty-year sentence comports with one of the sentencing options provided for by the legislature in § 775.082(3)(a)3 — a term of years not exceeding life — his sentence comports with law.

Finally, the fact that Thomas’s forty-year sentence excludes the possibility of parole is fully consistent with the legislature’s decision many years ago to eliminate parole. Florida law makes no provision for parole in the circumstances involved here. As Judge Wolf noted in Washington: “Our Legislature has repeatedly, arguably unwisely, eschewed the alternative of parole.” 103 So.3d at 921 (citing §§ 921.001(4), (8), Fla. Stat. (1985) (abolishing parole for noncapital felonies); § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1997) (abolishing parole for capital felonies); § 921.002(l)(a)(5), Fla. Stat. (1997) (stating chapter 947, which relates to parole, shall not apply to those sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code)). Of course, this conflicts with the Fifth District’s holding in Horsley that “the only sentence now available in Florida for a charge of capital murder committed by a juvenile is life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.” 121 So.3d at 1131. But because the “life felony” provision in § 775.082(3)(a)3 now applies to Mr. Thomas’s circumstances post Roper and Miller, and the legislature has expressly disapproved of parole, I cannot conclude that the trial court erred by resentencing him to a substantial term of years without parole.

      . It bears repeating that the courts have struggled diligently since Miller trying to harmonize Florida's sentencing provisions with the decision, "("attempting to fill a statutory gap while remaining as faithful as possible to expressed legislative intent [and] to avoid judicial intermeddling by crafting our own statute to address the issue with original language”).” Horsley, 121 So.3d at 1132.

      . The sentence does not run afoul of Miller because (1) Mr. Thomas’s sentence is now just forty years (whereas Miller addressed only life sentences), cf. Thomas v. State, 78 So.3d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that a fifty-year sentence did not violate the life-without-parole dictates of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)); and (2) a Miller-required individualized assessment was completed in this case, which allows for even a life sentence without parole to be imposed. See, e.g., Washington, 103 So.3d at 919-20 (affirming that life without the possibility of parole remains a permissible sentence as long as the trial court examines the mitigating factors); Copeland v. State, 129 So.3d 508, 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Hernandez v. State, 117 So.3d 778, 783-84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

      . The trial court’s decision to impose a substantial term of years sentence instead of life imprisonment takes account of Miller’s directive that life should be uncommonly imposed. Record support for the lesser sentence includes: (1) the jury’s finding that Mr. Thomas did not possess or use the firearm that killed the victim; and (2) the trial court’s observation that a term of years sentence was appropriate because Mr. Thomas "was not a major participant of what was going on.”


text:
    MIDTOWN MEDICAL, LLC v. The DEPARMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS.
    No. 2014-C-0005.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

|tWe granted the writ application of the Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”) in this civil matter to review whether DHH had the authority under La.Rev.Stat. § 40:2199 to impose two civil fines against Midtown Medical, LLC (“Midtown”) based on DHH’s determination Midtown was out of compliance with “federal and/or state rules for abortion clinics.” An administrative hearing officer affirmed DHH’s assessment of fines in this matter. Likewise, the District Court affirmed, holding DHH had the authority to impose the instant fines. The Court of Appeal reversed. After reviewing both La. Rev.Stat. § 40:2199 and La. Admin. Code tit. 50, pt. I, § 5501 (repealed 2013), the administrative rules DHH enacted pursuant to this enabling statute, we conclude DHH clearly had the statutory authority to impose the fines at issue. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, reinstate the District Court’s judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeal for consideration of Midtown’s unaddressed assignment of error.

In La.Rev.Stat. § 40:2199, the Legislature laid out a scheme for licensure enforcement applicable to certain health care facilities. This issue arises because, although this statute enabling the enforcement of these licensure violations includes an “outpatient abortion facility” within the scope of health care facilities |2over which DHH has enforcement authority, see La. Rev.Stat. § 40:2199(A)(1), the since-repealed rules which were enacted pursuant to this statute do not include outpatient abortion facilities within the definition of “facility.” See La. Admin. Code tit. 50, pt. I, § 5501. It is a fundamental rule of administrative law that if the Legislature has directly spoken on a specific question at issue, the court as well as the agency must give effect to the Legislature’s unambiguously expressed intent. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).

In the instant case, the Legislature made clear the scope of DHH’s enforcement authority when it provided a mandatory definition for the word “facility” in the first paragraph of the statute:

For purposes of this Part, ‘facility’ shall mean any one or more of the following: an adult day health care facility, substance abuse/addiction treatment facility, ambulatory surgery center, case management facility, urine drug screening facility, mobile cholesterol screening facility, end stage renal disease facility, supplier of portable X-ray services, home health agency, hospice, hospital, ICF/DD facility, outpatient abortion facility, or any other health care provider licensed or certified by the Departs ment of Health and Hospitals.

La.Rev.Stat. § 40:2199(A)(1) (emphasis added). By using the mandatory “shall,” the Legislature left DHH no room to interpret or to narrow the meaning of the term “facility.” La.Rev.Stat. § 1:3 (“The word ‘shall’ is mandatory....”)., Together, the words “shall mean any one or more of the following” indicate DHH has enforcement authority not only over those facilities which .serve one of these | functions but also over those which serve multiple functions. In other words, this language covers facilities which function only as outpatient abortion facilities, for instance, and those which operate as both outpatient abortion facilities and adult day health care facilities. Because the Legislature defined “facility” in this enabling statute, the absence of “outpatient abortion facility” in the definition promulgated by DHH in La. Admin. Code tit. 50, pt. I, § 5501, is of no consequence. For persuasive authority for this statutory interpretation, see Ooida Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Williams, 579 F.3d 469, 474-75 (5th Cir.2009) (“We apply the statutory definition of employee in this instance, as any inconsistency between the statutory language and the language contained in the regulations must be resolved in favor of the statute.”). Because the statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court is required to give effect to its provisions alone. See State v. Oliphant, 12-1176, p. 5 (La.3/19/13), 113 So.3d 165, 168 (“When the provision is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect, and its provisions must be construed so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used. Unequivocal provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their generally understood meaning.”) (internal citations omitted); La. Civ.Code art. 11; La.Rev.Stat. § 1:3.

Midtown argues DHH has no authority to assess these civil fines because “DHH must adopt rules in order to implement the civil fine provisions of the statutes” and the rules do not include “outpatient abortion facilities” in its definition of “facility.” Section 40:2199 does direct DHH to adopt rules “which define specific classifications of violations, articulate factors in assessing civil fines including mitigating circumstances such as an effective corporate compliance program, and explain the treatment of continuing and repeat deficiencies.” La.Rev.Stat. § 40:2199(B)(1). However, nowhere in the statute is DHH authorized either |4explicitly or implicitly to alter the definition of “facility” provided in § 40:2199(A)(1). Because all of DHH’s power comes from the enabling statute and the statute does not explicitly or implicitly give DHH the authority to alter the definition of “facility,” the definition promulgated in DHH’s rules is surplusage and the statutory definition controls. Therefore, DHH did have the power to assess the fines at issue in this case.

We granted this writ only to address the issue of DHH’s authority to impose these fines. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and reinstate the judgment of the District Court. We further remand this matter to the Court of Appeal for consideration of Midtown’s unaddressed assignment of error.

COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT REVERSED; JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REINSTATED; CASE REMANDED TO COURT OF APPEAL.

      . La. Admin. Code tit. 50, pt. I, § 5501(B) provides: “For purposes of this rule, facility refers to any agency licensed by the Department of Health and Hospitals as an adult day health care center, substance abuse/addiction treatment facility, ambulatory surgical center, case management agency, urine drug screening clinic, supplier of portable x-ray services, home health agency, hospice, hospital, or intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded.”


text:
    In re Mack Arthur HOLLIS.
    No. 2013-B-2568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

_JjThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Mack Arthur Hollis, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC initially filed formal charges against respondent on May 21, 2010, which charges addressed only the alleged misconduct set forth in Count I below. Respondent answered the charges, and the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits conducted by the hearing committee on October 6, 2010. During the hearing, respondent admitted to engaging in conduct related to the misconduct in Count I that might constitute additional attorney misconduct. Nevertheless, the ODC did not amend the formal charges at that time.

Upon consideration of the charged misconduct only, the hearing committee and the disciplinary board both recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months, fully deferred, subject to two years of supervised probation with conditions. Respondent objected to the board’s recommendation, and the matter was set on this court’s docket for oral argument.

Following oral argument and upon further review of the record, we deferred consideration of the charged misconduct pending the ODC’s investigation of the additional conduct to which respondent testified during the October 6, 2010 formal | shearing. Accordingly, we remanded the matter to the ODC for additional investigation and the institution of amended formal charges. In re: Hollis, 11-1387 (La.12/14/11), 76 So.3d 415.

The ODC amended the formal charges on February 16, 2012. Thus, the instant matter addresses the alleged misconduct subject of the initial formal charges (Count I) and the additional alleged misconduct discovered during the initial formal hearing (Count II).

Count I

In the summer of 2004, Ameshila Alfred, her mother, and her stepfather hired respondent to represent them in a personal injury matter stemming from a June 7, 2004 automobile accident. Respondent received the related accident report in October 2004. He encountered some difficulties in obtaining an in forma pauperis affidavit (hereinafter referred to as a “pauper affidavit”) from his clients. However, he ultimately received Ms. Alfred’s pauper affidavit and purportedly notarized same on February 10, 2005.

Respondent filed a petition for damages on behalf of his clients on May 3, 2006, nearly two years after the June 7, 2004 accident. The defendants filed an exception of prescription, and the trial court signed a judgment dismissing the lawsuit on November 27, 2006. Respondent subsequently informed his clients that the dismissal of their lawsuit was based upon his failure to timely file the petition.

Count II

As stated above, on October 6, 2010, the hearing committee conducted a formal hearing to address the alleged misconduct in Count I. During the hearing, respondent testified about Ms. Alfred’s pauper affidavit. Specifically, respondent admitted that he notarized the affidavit in August or September 2005 (after the ^prescription date) and not on February 10, 2005 as indicated on the affidavit. In his testimony, he claimed that he “didn’t want to put a prescribed date on there.” Respondent further testified that he notarized the affidavit outside of the presence of the affiant. Furthermore, he acknowledged that he is not, in fact, registered as a notary public in the State of Louisiana.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

As stated above, the ODC filed amended formal charges against respondent on February 16, 2012. The amended charges alleged that respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), and 8.4.

Respondent answered the amended formal charges, essentially denying any misconduct. Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings:

In his testimony, respondent acknowledged his representation of Ms. Alfred and her mother and stepfather in connection with injuries they sustained in an automobile accident on June 7, 2004. This fact is further evidenced by respondent’s August 23, 2004 letter to the defendant, which he attached to his initial reply to the disciplinary complaint. Between October 2004, when respondent initially communicated with the defendant insurer, and August or 14September 2005, which was after the one-year anniversary of the automobile accident, respondent took no significant steps to advance the claim or preserve his clients’ legal interests. Additionally, respondent filed the petition for damages on behalf of his clients on May 3, 2006, nearly two years after the accident date. His clients’ lawsuit was ultimately dismissed as prescribed. Respondent attempted to excuse his untimely filing of the lawsuit by explaining that he had relied on a piece of proposed legislation that was never enacted. However, he admitted that he never inquired further about the legislation.

Although Ms. Alfred’s pauper affidavit is dated February 10, 2005, respondent testified that he actually notarized it in August or September 2005. Respondent backdated the affidavit so it would not appear to have been notarized outside of the applicable prescriptive period. Additionally, respondent notarized the affidavit despite not being a registered notary, and did so outside the presence of the affiant. He indicated that he notarized the affidavit when he was not a notary because he relied on a judge’s statement to him that all Louisiana attorneys are notariés. He misunderstood and believed that, as an attorney, he did not need to register as a notary. However, he also admitted that he did not inquire further about his need to register as a notary, which the committee determined was more than mere negligence. The committee also determined that respondent acted intentionally and dishonestly in backdating the affidavit to help his argument that the claim was not prescribed and in notarizing the affidavit outside of the presence of the affiant.

Based on these facts, the committee determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the amended formal charges. The committee further determined that respondent negligently violated a duty owed to his clients, causing them actual harm. Additionally, the committee concluded that respondent intentionally violated duties owed to the public and the legal system Rwhen he notarized Ms. Alfred’s pauper affidavit, which caused actual harm to the integrity of notarial acts. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the committee recognized respondent’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. In mitigation, the committee recognized the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, followed by a period of probation with conditions.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation. However, in his pre-argument brief to the disciplinary board, respondent indicated that he disagreed with all of the allegations in the committee’s report and indicated that he was offended at the committee’s “unsavory characterizations” of his actions and the performance of his legal work.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the record and are not manifestly erroneous. The board further determined that the committee correctly applied the facts to the Rules of Professional Conduct to conclude respondent violated the rules as alleged in the amended formal charges.

| fiBased on these findings, the board concluded that respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct was mostly negligent but, at times, was knowing and intentional. He caused significant actual injury to his clients in that they were barred from pursuing their personal injury claim. Furthermore, the potential for even greater harm exists as a result of respondent’s notarial misconduct should the documents he improperly notarized be rendered void. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that the baseline sanction is suspension. The board agreed with the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the committee.

After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. The board also recommended that respondent make restitution to his clients in the amount of $7,000, the estimated value of their claim had it not prescribed.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed a timely objection in this court to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. However, after the expiration of the time for filing objections under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1), respondent sought to file a “late” objection. On January 10, 2014, we issued an order rejecting respondent’s objection as untimely and, therefore, procedurally improper but permitting the filing of briefs, without oral argument. Respondent and the ODC both filed briefs in response to the court’s order.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has |7been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.l1/25/96), 688 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

In this matter, respondent neglected his clients’ legal matter, causing their personal injury claim to prescribe. Additionally, he backdated Ms. Alfred’s pauper affidavit and improperly notarized the affidavit by (1) notarizing same outside of the presence of the affiant and (2) notarizing same when he was not a duly-commissioned notary. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the amended formal charges.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

We agree with the disciplinary board that respondent acted negligently, knowingly, and intentionally. He violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing actual and potential harm. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension. The record supports the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the hearing committee and the board.

| ¡/Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find guidance from the case of In re: Porter, 05-1736 (La.3/10/06), 980 So.2d 875. In Porter, the attorney neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with a client, and notarized an affidavit containing a forged signature. Noting the attorney’s remorse for his misconduct, we suspended him from the practice of law for one year. In the instant matter, respondent has engaged in similar misconduct. However, respondent has expressed no remorse and does not appear to recognize the wrongful nature of his conduct. Under these circumstances, we find respondent should be required to prove he has met the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E), before being allowed to return to the practice of law following his period of suspension.

Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day. We will further order respondent to make restitution to his clients in the amount of $7,000.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record and the briefs filed by the parties, it is ordered that Mack Arthur Hollis, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27240, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. It is further ordered that respondent shall make restitution to his clients in the amount of $7,000. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Although the ODC does not reference any subsections of Rule 8.4, the language in the formal charges appears to indicate the ODC alleged that respondent specifically violated Rules 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonest, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

      . We have typically declined to impose probationary periods or conditions in cases in which the sanction will require application for and reinstatement to the practice of law. See In re: Welcome, 02-2662 (La. 1/24/03), 840 So.2d 519 (imposing an eighteen-month suspension from the practice of law, but declining to impose a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions because "such issues, along with any other relevant factors, may be addressed if and when respondent applies for reinstatement”).


author: HUGHES, J.,

text:
    Elizabeth KORTZ v. SYSCO NEW ORLEANS, LLC.
    No. 2014-CC-0022.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re: Kortz, Elizabeth; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation, No. 09-05591; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-966.

II Denied.

HUGHES, J., would dissent and grant the writ.

HUGHES, J.,

dissenting.

III respectfully dissent and would grant the writ. I would find that the provisions of La.Code. Evid. Art. 612(A), addressing the specific use of a report in a deposition, are more specific than the general discovery provisions of 1424(A).


text:
    Roderick Christopher PATRICK v. LOWE’S HOME CENTERS, INC., Lowe’s Companies Inc. Dale Bruce, and Unknown Insurer(s).
    No. 2014-CC-0100.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re: Patrick, Roderick Christopher;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 682-664; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-294.

| TPenied.

HUGHES, J., dissents and would grant the writ.

HUGHES, J.,

dissenting.

|,I respectfully dissent and would grant the writ. The court of appeal cites “discussions about settling the matter” in ordering that each party would bear its own costs, rather than awarding costs to the prevailing plaintiff. Settlement discussions are not admissible evidence, LSA-C.E. art 408. I would award all costs to the prevailing party.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael LOUDING.
    No. 2013-KK-2813.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 06-10-0234; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW1911.

Denied.


text:
    J.C. WILLIAMS, et al. v. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0017.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re J.C. Williams, et al.; Williams, Betty; Williams, Cerrone A.; Williams, Pricilla; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H-12, No. 2008-05652; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1308.

Denied.


text:
    Keith and Jeanine MASON v. A. Remy FRANSEN, Jr. et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0053.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re A. Remy Fransen, Jr., et al.; Fransen & Hardin, APLC; Fransen Jr., A. Remy; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2011-12233; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1477.

Denied.


text:
    Keith L. MAGNESS and Dionne O. Magness v. UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS, London Syndicate # 2987.
    No. 2014-CC-0054.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Magness, Dionne O.; Magness, Keith I. et al.; — Plaintiffs) Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 727-890; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-926.

Denied.


text:
    Christy ROGEL v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORP.
    No. 2014-C-0058.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Dollar General Corp.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, Office Of Workers’ Compensation, No. 11-03785; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCA 13-792.

Denied.


text:
    Linda ANDERSON v. KROGER # 747, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0064.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Sedgwick CMS; The Kroger Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District # 8, No. 10-05875; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 18-259.

Denied.

VICTORY, J„ would grant.


text:
    WILLIS-KNIGHTON HEALTH SYSTEM, et al. v. NORTHWEST LOUISIANA COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Finish 3132 Coalition, LLC; Wells, Karen; Willis-Knighton Health System, et al.; Willis-Knighton Medical Center;— Plaintiffs); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 562337; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48831-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Ananias JOHNSON, et al. v. Robert L. JOHNSON, Jr., et al.
    No. 2014-C-0076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Ananias et al.; Johnson, Theresa; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 107,769; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-719.

Denied.


text:
    Samuel BANKS, et al. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON and B & K Construction Company, L.L.C.
    No. 2014-CC-0079.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Beverly Industries, L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 550-277; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-912.

Denied.


text:
    Richard L. RUBIN and Mary Rubin, Alan Rubin v. The AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Paramount Remodeling & Roofing Corporation, First Financial Insurance Company, C & G Construction of Louisiana, Inc.
    No. 2014-CC-0087.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re C & G Construction of Louisiana, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 577-750; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-834.

Denied.


text:
    Roy MARKS v. THIRD DISTRICT VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT.
    No. 2014-C-0088.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Marks, Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 718-990; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-383.

Denied.


text:
    Ricky FONTENOT v. LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INS. CO., et al.
    No. 2014-C-0089.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Fontenot, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 20101868; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-769.

Denied.


text:
    STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY and Carroll Thorguson v. BARNETT, INC., Interline Brands, Inc., Watts Plumbing Technologies, ABC Component Parts Manufacturer, and XYZ Insurance Seller.
    No. 2014-CC-0092.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Watts Water Technologies, Inc.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court, No. 122717; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1745.

Denied.


text:
    CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR the CITY OF OPELOUSAS v. CITY OF OPELOUSAS, through its Mayor, Donald CRAVINS, Sr., and the Appointing Authority, the Board of Aldermen, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0095.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Brown, Roger et al.; Gennuso, George; Guillory, Delores; Noel, Eva;— Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 11-C-5722-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-701.

Denied.


text:
    Herschel CARTER v. TURNER INDUSTRIES.
    No. 2014-C-0096.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Turner Industries Group, LLC;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 1-East, No. 11-04267; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-643.

Denied.


text:
    James LONG v. BENGAL TRANSPORTATION.
    No. 2014-C-0098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Bengal Transportation Services, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation #2, No. 12-06213; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCA 13-793.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Georval LEWIS.
    No. 2014-KK-0101.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 516-460; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-R-1288.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    Christopher M. BAGWELL v. Brittany O. BAGWELL.
    No. 2014-CJ-0356.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2014.
   In re Bagwell, Brittany 0.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 127827; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-913-CA.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Muntaser S. AKROUSH v. Don Paul J. HARGRODER, Jr. et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0528.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2014.
   In re Hargroder Jr., Don Paul J.; Tower National Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2012-6621; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00279.

Granted. We find there are genuine issues of material fact as to medical causation. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in plaintiffs favor is reversed. Case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would deny.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of J.P.
    No. 2014-CK-0567.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 19, 2014.
   In re P., J.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2014-049-01-DQ-E; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0265.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jarrin R. GAYDEN.
    No. 2014-K-0370.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 20, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 512-339; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0105.

Denied.


text:
    Terry CAMPBELL, Individually, and on Behalf of all those Similarly Situated Tax Payers v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR the AMITE RIVER BASIN DRAINAGE AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT; Assessor and Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish; Assessor and Sheriff of Ascension Parish; Assessor and Sheriff of Livingston Parish; the Louisiana Tax Commission; and the State of Louisiana.
    No. 2014-CC-0532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 20, 2014.
   In re Campbell, Terry et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 597072; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0343.

Denied.


text:
    Thomas HARRISON v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, Office of Probation and Parole.
    No. 2013-C-2816.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Harrison, Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated February 14, 2014; Louisiana Civil Service Commission, Nos. 17161, 17218; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2013 CA 0380, 2013 CA 0381.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Matthew Wayne MORGAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1674.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Morgan, Matthew Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated January 27, 2014; Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 246165; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00034.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Steven CAMPBELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1339.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Campbell, Steven; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 457 — 460; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0598.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Moses BUCHANAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Buchanan, Moses; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06-K-4526; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00841.

Denied.


text:
    Kip LONDON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-CI-1922.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re London, Kip; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 599,361; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1718.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James PENDLETON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1954.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Pendleton, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-630; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-514.

Denied. La.CCr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.CCr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clifford Earl TYSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1955.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Tyson, Clifford Earl; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 498,257; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0590.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1956.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Jones, Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B No. 284,907; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-543-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Reginald HARRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1960.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Harris, Reginald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div., No. 02-04-0569; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0707.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Fate Vincent WINSLOW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1962.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Winslow, Fate Vincent; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 271,588; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-684-KH.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Davidson LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1963.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Lewis, Davidson; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 04-98-0407; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0940.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry CALLAHAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1964.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Callahan, Terry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 11-02-0341; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0805.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Chad ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1967.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Anderson, Chad; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 1140-03; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0890.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Davidson LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1969.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Lewis, Davidson; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 4-98-407; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0789.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kerwin MARIGNY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1971.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Marigny, Kerwin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 474-063; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0902.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    Allen SIMPSON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-CI-1973.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Simpson, Allen; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 605847; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 0816.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael LOTT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1979.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Lott, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 97-229; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-551.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin ALEXANDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1981.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Alexander, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 11-107; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-836.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jesse James CASTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1984.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Caston, Jesse James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 10-8550; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-566-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy ARNAUD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1985.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Arnaud, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 11-721; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-899.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bruce BOSLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1986.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Bosley, Bruce; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 1819-94; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0985.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Oscar Cleoffice BALENTINE.
    No. 2013-K-1989.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 192,393; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-858-KA.

Denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1996.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Carter, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 89-1756; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-512.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tony MARCANTEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1998.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Marcantel, Tony; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 6738-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-01399.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Calvin DONALD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1999.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Donald, Calvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Div., No. 25,105; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-682-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alonzo E. ALLEN.
    No. 2013-KO-2086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Allen, Alonzo E.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 11-22437 C/W 12-023365; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,324-KA C/W 48,328-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronnie YORK.
    No. 2013-K-2154.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re York, Ronnie; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div, 5, No. 265,544; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,230-KA.

Denied.


text:
    ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD v. Paul G. PASTOREK, in his Capacity as State Superintendent of Education, the Louisiana Department of Education and the Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education.
    No. 2013-C-2207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Orleans Parish School Board;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 601037; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1174.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Troy GREENUP.
    No. 2013-KO-2300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Greenup, Troy; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 11-810; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-881.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William Anthony HENDERSON.
    No. 2013-K-2327.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Henderson, William Anthony;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 557,867; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0074.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Barry D. McQUEEN.
    No. 2013-KO-2366.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re McQueen, Barry D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 518156; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0073.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Casey ASTON.
    No. 2013-K-2374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Aston, Casey; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 08-5595; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-955.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry COVINGTON.
    No. 2013-K-2375.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Covington, Larry; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 1200991; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0098.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerelle D. CALISTE.
    No. 2013-K-2377.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Caliste, Gerelle D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 504-409; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0533.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mohammed COLLINS.
    No. 2013-KO-2384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Collins, Mohammed; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06-11-0189; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 2048.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael VARNADO.
    No. 2013-KO-2385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Varnado, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 701216; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0705.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Joseph HEBERT.
    No. 2013-KO-2418.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Hebert, James Joseph; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 603328; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0172.

Denied.


text:
    THOMAS GORMAN v. Lieutenant Austin MILLER, Deputy Andrew, Deputy Tom Floyd and Deputy Robert Redmond.
    No. 2013-C-2909.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Gorman, Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 41,248; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0412.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Jason HART v. HIGHLINES CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., et al.
    No. 2014-C-0020.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Gray Insurance Company; High-lines Construction Co. Inc. et al.; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 02, No. 13-01320; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-624.

Denied.


text:
    Susan SICARD v. TOURO INFIRMARY.
    No. 2014-C-0123.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Touro Infirmary; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District #7, No. 12-03217, 12-03219; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-544.

Denied.


text:
    Michelle DOMINGUE, Wife of, and Brian Domingue v. IMPERIAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION d/b/a Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance.
    No. 2014-CC-0124.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Michelle Domingue, wife of, and Brian Domingue; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2010-14538; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 2081.

Denied.


text:
    Nicole CHARBONNET v. Michael S. MARTIN.
    No. 2014-CC-0125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Charbonnet, Nicole; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 727-176; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-913.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marie LANDRY.
    No. 2014-KK-0126.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Landry, Marie; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 516-290; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1307.

Denied.


text:
    Gregory Milton GRAUGNARD v. The CAPITAL AREA TRANSIT SYSTEM.
    No. 2014-CC-0128.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Graugnard, Gregory Milton et al.; Smith Jr., William L.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 614,152; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 2025.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph R. McMAHON, III, et al. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2014-C-0134.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re City of New Orleans; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2010-02196; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0771.

Denied.


text:
    Andre J. ROBERT, Marketfare, L.L.C., et al. v. ROBERT MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0136.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Charbonnet, Storey; Mourot, Randall; Robert, Andre J.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, Nos. 2010-4150, 2011-2488; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1241.

Denied.


text:
    Andre J. ROBERT, Marketfare, L.L.C., et al. v. ROBERT MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Robert Resources, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2010-04150, 2011-02488; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1043.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher PRIMEAUX.
    No. 2014-KK-0139.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Primeaux, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 139739; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 13-01248.

Denied.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS FIRE FIGHTERS PENSION AND RELIEF FUND, et al. v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0142.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re City of New Orleans, et al.;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2012-7061; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0873.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., recused.

VICTORY and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Carolyn MORRISON and Carolyn Hall v. STATE of Louisiana through the DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES.
    No. 2014-CC-0143.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Carolyn Morrison and Carolyn Hall; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 621,041; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1688.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Joe S. WILSON v. McGUIRE CONSTRUCTION, LLC d/b/a Shoreline Services and Argonaut Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CC-0160.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Wilson, Joe S.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Worker’s Compensation, District 9, No. 10-11117; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1329.

Denied.


text:
    TRPLT UNSECURED CREDITORS’ TRUST v. REDC, INC. d/b/a Rock & Roll Wrecker Service.
    No. 2014-CC-0165.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Trplt Unsecured Creditors’ Trust; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 611923; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1784.

Denied.


text:
    Cheryl Lee Hughes JACKS v. Barry Edwin JACKS.
    No. 2014-CJ-0437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Jacks, Barry Edwin; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 79,883; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 2028.

Denied.


text:
    Nikia ADAMS v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2014-C-0140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied May 2, 2014.
   In re Adams, Nikia; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, City Civil Service Commission, No. 7796; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0200.

Writ granted. Under the totality of the established facts, the appointing authority abused its discretion in terminating the plaintiffs employment. Regis v. Department of Police, 13-1124, p. 2 (La.6/28/13), 121 So.3d 665. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the Civil Service Commission to impose a more appropriate penalty than dismissal from service.

GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ„ would deny.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Antywane Eric WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-K-2346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Williams, Antywane Eric; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 192,617; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,416-KA.

Granted. The decision of the court of appeal is vacated to the extent that it purports to affirm defendant’s convictions while setting aside his sentences and remanding the case for a ruling on the pending motion for a new trial and for resen-tencing. In the event that the trial court denies the motion for a new trial and resentences defendant, he may appeal again to the court of appeal from his convictions as well as sentences, and from the denial of his motion for a new trial.


text:
    MAW ENTERPRISES L.L.C., et al. v. CITY OF MARKSVILLE, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0090.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re City of Marksville; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2010-5073-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13^56.

Granted.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leonard CARDENAS, III.
    No. 2013-C-2982.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 8-06-006; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0509.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph PERKINS.
    No. 2013-K-1917.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 497-485; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0662.

Granted.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of K.K.
    No. 2014-CK-0424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   K.K. applying for Reconsideration to this court’s action dated March 12, 2014, from the Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E., No. 2013-JC1110; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit No. JWK 14-00202.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, Section 6.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Bessie Lee Thurmond MOORE.
    No. 2014-CC-0564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2014.
   In re Moore, Gail; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No 2012-7420; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0273.

Stay denied. Writ denied on showing made.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Emile MURRAY and Michael Jones.
    No. 2014-KK-0347.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 25, 2014.
   In re Jones, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 13-5145; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-K-51.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Emile MURRAY and Michael Jones.
    No. 2014-KK-0372.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 25, 2014.
   In re Murray, Emile; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 13-5145; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-K-51.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J„ would grant.


text:
    Vicky EDLER v. SOUTH BATON ROUGE HOTEL, LLC d/b/a Hampton Inn & Suites et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 26, 2014.
   In re Edler, Vicky; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 580743; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2014 CW 0388, 2014 CW 0388.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant and reinstate the trial court’s ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph HUMBLES.
    No. 2014-KK-0650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-5492; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-K-218.

GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Leonard ABADIE, Jr. v. CBS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, f/k/a Viacom, Inc., Successor by Merger to CBS, a Pennsylvania Corporation, f/k/a Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
    No. 2014-CC-0546.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2014.
   In re CBS Corporation, A Delaware Corporation, F/K/A Viacom, Inc., Sucees-sor by merger to CBS, A Pennsylvania Corporation, F/K/A Westinghouse Electric Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 686-964; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-964.

Denied.


text:
    Michael ANDREWS, et al v. SMG, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2014.
   In re SMG, et al.; State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Office of Risk Management; State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2009-1318; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0176.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mark ROBINSON.
    No. 2014-KK-0653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2014.
   In re Robinson, Mark; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 517-820; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0083.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James HINES.
    No. 2014-KK-0690.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 517-445; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0092.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melvin Lee JOSEPH.
    No. 2014-KK-0234.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 2014.
   In re Joseph, Melvin Lee; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 00-CR-052819; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 13-01139.

Not considered; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.

WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derek HUDSON.
    No. 2014-KK-0286.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 2014.
   In re Hudson, Derek; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 12-10-0C87; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1553.

Not considered; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).


text:
    In re Jean-Marie LACOBEE.
    No. 2014-OB-0373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 2014.
   In re Lacobee, Jean-Marie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Reinstatement Readmission Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-DB-014.

Reinstatement denied. Petitioner may not reapply for reinstatement until she has paid restitution to her clients and the costs of her prior disciplinary proceedings, or made good faith efforts to do so, but in no event until two years have passed from the date of this judgment. Supreme Court Rule XIX, Section 24(1).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Henry WRIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1247.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 2014.
   In re Wright, Henry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Enforce of this Court’s Order dated July 29, 2013; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 242-149.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted