author: JAMES, J., IRVING, P.J.,

text:
    Keith CURRY, Appellant v. Sharlene FRAZIER, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CA-00533-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    July 16, 2013.

      John R. Reeves, John Justin King, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
    Sharlene Frazier, appellee, pro se.
    Before LEE, C.J., FAIR and JAMES, JJ.
   JAMES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Keith Curry appeals the Coahoma County Chancery Court’s order modifying child support. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the chancery court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter an order modifying child support; (2) whether the chancery court erred in modifying child support where neither party requested such modification; and (3) whether the modification of child support was supported by substantial evidence. Upon review, we are compelled to reverse the order modifying child support and remand the case to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Keith and Sharlene Frazier were never married, but they had one female child together out of wedlock, who was born June 3, 1999. On May 19, 2000, the parties entered into a stipulated agreement on the issues of child support, visitation, and paternity. On May 26, 2000, the chancery court entered an order establishing paternity, child support, and visitation. The chancery court ordered Keith to pay Sharlene $154.79 per month, beginning April 5, 2000, and continuing until the emancipation of the minor child.

¶ 3. On October 25, 2011, Keith filed a complaint for a name change and other relief. Keith did not request a modification of his child-support obligation. A Rule 4 summons was issued to Sharlene, and she was served with process on October 27, 2011. No Rule 81 summons was ever issued. On November 22, 2011, Sharlene filed an answer to the complaint for a name change and other relief, and she requested a “revaluation of [the] current ehild[-]support order of $155.00[,] being that it has [been] 12 years.”

¶ 4. On December 7, 2011, a notice of hearing was entered, setting a hearing on Keith’s complaint for a name change and other relief for January 6, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. A statement from the court reporter noted that this was an ex parte day for the court, and she had no record of a hearing.

¶ 5. On January 27, 2012, the chancery court entered an order, which stated that both parties were present, and the court had heard “testimony and argument.” The order further stated that Keith shall “provide wage information to the [c]ourt within 45 days so that his child support payments can be adjusted accordingly.”

¶ 6. On February 24, 2012, the chancery court entered an order modifying child support as follows:

THIS CAUSE came before the [c]ourt on the [c]ourt’s previous [o]rder dated January 27, 2012[,] requiring [Keith] to provide to the [c]ourt his financial information so that the [c]ourt can reevaluate child support[,] and being fully advised in the premises[,] the [e]ourt finds and orders as follows:
1. This [c]ourt has jurisdiction over the parties herein and the subject matter hereof.
2. The [c]ourt has reviewed the financial information!] of [Keith,] and based on the financial information, orders that he pay child support in the amount of $350.00 each month beginning April 1, 2012[,] and continuing thereafter until the child reaches the age of majority or otherwise becomes emancipated.

In response to the dissenting opinion, we note that Keith is only appealing the modification of child support. It appears that Keith and Sharlene were present in court on January 6, 2012, for the name-change issue, but there is no record of a hearing. Keith was represented by a different attorney, and his attorney prepared the order dated January 27, 2012. After the chancery court gave forty-five days for Keith to supply additional information, approximately forty-nine days later, the chancery court entered an order modifying child support. The chancery court’s order of February 24, 2012, only refers to the order of January 27, 2012, which relates back to January 6, 2012, when the parties appeared in court. The order does not state that the case was set for a hearing on the modification-of-child-support issue. Since the case was not continued to a date and time certain, a Rule 81 summons needed to be issued identifying a date and time certain for a hearing on the modification after the financial information was submitted.

¶ 7. On March 26, 2012, Keith filed his notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8. “This Court’s scope of review in domestic-relations matters is strictly limited.” Pritchard v. Pritchard, 99 So.3d 1174, 1177 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Brawdy v. Howell, 841 So,2d 1175, 1178 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2003)). A “chancellor’s findings will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Id.

I. Whether the chancery court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter an order modifying child support.

¶ 9. Keith argues that the chancery court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Keith filed a complaint for a name change and other relief in the Coahoma County Chancery Court. Sharlene filed an answer to the complaint, which included a counterclaim to modify child support in the same court. The name change granted by the chancery court is not an issue on appeal.

¶ 10. A notice of hearing was sent to Sharlene on the name-change petition only. It appears that the parties appeared in court for the name-change issue. In its order regarding the name change, the chancery court ordered Keith to provide wage information within forty-five days from the child-support-modification order.

¶ 11. There is no record of what happened in the name-change proceeding. Keith alleges that jurisdiction over the modification issue was lost because the case was not continued to a day certain. The record shows that Keith issued a Rule 4 (thirty-day) summons to Sharlene. M.R.C.P. 4. However, a Rule 4 summons is insufficient to notify a party of a Rule 81(d)(2) petition. See Powell v. Powell, 644 So.2d 269, 274 (Miss.1994); see also Caples v. Caples, 686 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Miss.1996). At the hearing of January 6, 2012 on the name-change issue, Curry did not raise any objection to the defective process, and this issue is not on appeal. All parties were present and waived all objections to defective process by their appearance. The hearing of January 6, 2012, was, by statute, a Rule 81 hearing. Rule 81(d)(1) lists name change and child support actions as Rule 81 proceedings. Rule 81(d)(5) mandates that “[i]f such action or matter is not heard on the day set for hearing, it may by order signed on that day be continued to a later day for hearing without additional summons on the defendant or respondent.” (Emphasis added). No order was signed on the day of January 6, 2012 continuing the hearing to a date and time certain. Therefore, the court lost its jurisdiction over the parties. A Rule 81 summons needed to be issued for the modification issue. No Rule 81 summons was ever issued for the modification-of-child-support issue. Without the issuance of a proper Rule 81 summons, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Accordingly, we find reversible error due to insufficient process.

¶ 12. Hearings on petitions for a name change and petitions for modification of child support are governed by Rule 81 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. M.R.C.P. 81(d)(l)-(2). Rule 81(d)(3) states that “[c]omplaints and petitions filed in the actions and matters enumerated in subpar-agraphs (1) and (2) above shall not be taken as confessed.” A statement from the court reporter, Delores Weaver, shows that no hearing was held on the modification action. Since a hearing is required under Rule 81(d)(3) to modify child support, this is reversible error.

II. Whether the chancery court erred in modifying child support where neither party requested such modification.

¶ 13. Keith argues that the chancery court erred in modifying his child-support obligation because neither party requested such relief. However, we find that Keith’s assertion is factually untrue. On November 22, 2011, Sharlene filed an answer to the complaint for a name change and other relief, and she requested a “revaluation of [the] current child [-Jsupport order of $155.00[,] being that it has [been] 12 years.” We find no merit to this issue.

III. Whether the modification of child support was supported by substantial evidence.

¶ 14. “In child[-]support[-]modification proceedings!,] the [c]hancellor is accorded substantial discretion and is charged to consider all relevant facts and equities to the end that a decree serving the best interest of the child may be fashioned.” Moulds v. Bradley, 791 So.2d 220, 226 (¶ 14) (Miss.2001). We review a chancellor’s modification of child support under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Id.

¶ 15. In Mississippi, an award of child support is governed by Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101 (Supp. 2012). The guidelines establish that there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of child support should be fourteen percent of the noncustodial parent’s adjusted gross income where one child is due support. Id. A chancery court may deviate from the statutory guidelines if it makes “an on-the-record finding that it would be unjust or inappropriate to apply the guidelines in the instant case.” Garcia v. Garcia, 97 So.3d 109, 112 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Chesney v. Chesney, 910 So.2d 1057, 1061 (¶ 7) (Miss.2005)). A chancellor may modify child support if there has been “a substantial or material change in the circumstances of one or more of the interested parties: the father, the mother, and the child or children, arising subsequent to the entry of the decree to be modified.” Id. (quoting Edmonds v. Edmonds, 935 So.2d 980, 987 (¶ 19) (Miss.2006)).

¶ 16. We note that no appel-lee’s brief was filed in this case. “Generally, an appellee’s failure to file a brief with the appellate court ‘is tantamount to confession of error and will be accepted as such unless the reviewing court can say with confidence, after considering the record and the brief of the appealing party, that there was no error.’ ” In re Estate of Dabney, 69 So.3d 71, 73 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Taylor v. Kennedy, 914 So.2d 1260, 1261-62 (¶ 2) (Miss.Ct.App.2005)). “In order to merit reversal, the appellant’s argument should at least create enough doubt in the judiciousness of the trial court’s judgment that this Court cannot say with confidence that the case should be affirmed.” Id.

¶ 17. In the case before us, we have no way of knowing whether the chancellor abused her discretion in modifying child support because there is no evidence in the record on appeal of what “financial information” she considered. In fact, we do not even know what Keith’s income was or whether he was even employed because nothing regarding financial information was admitted into evidence or made part of the record on appeal. Keith asserts that no hearing was ever held, and there is no transcript of a hearing in the record before this Court. Keith also asserts that no financial information was admitted into evidence or made part of the record. Various circumstances justifying modification include showing a material change in circumstances of the father, mother, or children, which have arisen subsequent to the original decree. McEachern v. McEachern, 605 So.2d 809, 813 (Miss.1992); Cox v. Moulds, 490 So.2d 866, 869 (Miss.1986); see also Adams v. Adams, 467 So.2d 211, 215 (Miss.1985). The factors to be considered include:

1) increased needs of children due to advanced age and maturity; 2) increase in expenses, 3) inflation; 4) relative financial condition and earning capacity of the parties; 5) health and special medical needs of the child, both physical and psychological; 6) health and special medical needs of the parents, both physical and psychological; 7) necessary living expenses of the father; 8) estimated amount of income taxes each party must pay; 9) free use of [a] residence, furnishings, and [an] automobile; and 10) other facts and circumstances bearing on the support as shown by the evidence.

Powell, 644 So.2d at 275. Without any information to determine what the chancery court considered in modifying Keith’s child-support obligation, this Court is unable to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion. This is reversible error. Therefore, we are compelled to reverse the chancellor’s order modifying child support and remand the case to the chancery court.

¶ 18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COAHOMA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE AP-PELLEE.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ.

IRVING, P.J.,

dissenting:

¶ 19. I cannot agree that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to modify the twelve-year-old child-support order. In my opinion, the Rule 4 summons was sufficient to empower the court to hear all matters emanating out of the subject matter of the complaint attached to the Rule 4 summons, or any counterclaim that was filed in response to the complaint. Because the issue of modification of child support was asserted in what can only be termed a counterclaim in response to the complaint, the court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to address the modification at the time it considered the subject matter of the complaint. Moreover, even if a Rule 81(d) summons was required to be issued, I find the court’s failure to issue it was effectively waived as a result of Keith’s participation in the modification proceeding without objection, which I discuss later. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

¶ 20. I agree with the majority that a Rule 81(d) summons is necessary to confer personal jurisdiction upon a respondent in a child-support-modification matter when the modification is initiated by complaint or petition. Powell says as much. Powell v. Powell, 644 So.2d 269, 274 (Miss.1994). However, we have a set of facts that are quite different from the facts in those cases that address or lay down the bright-line rule that a Rule 81(d) summons is indispensable to the lawful adjudication of child-support-modification matters. Our facts differ from those in Powell in a material way. Here, there is no separate complaint or petition for a modification. The Rule 4 summons was not issued at the behest of the proponent of the modification, nor was the notice of hearing that followed the summons. However, the notice provided a specific time and place for the hearing of the complaint, and by virtue of the provisions of Rule 13(c) of Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, any counterclaims arising out of the complaint. Since Sharlene had requested, in her answer to Keith’s complaint, a reconsideration of the existing child-support amount, Keith was aware that the matter of the child-support modification would be considered at the noticed hearing, as he had not pleaded or suggested in any manner that the court lacked jurisdiction or that the issue of child-support modification had been improperly pleaded and should not, or could not legally, be considered by the court at that time. Even if he had, it is doubtful that that would have been a tenable position, as Rule 13(c) permits a counterclaim that seeks relief “different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.” Sharlene proceeded pro se in the trial court. Our supreme court has instructed that, in the case of pro se litigants, the courts “credit not so well pleaded allegations so that ... meritorious [claims] may not be lost because inartfully drafted.” Ivy v. Merchant, 666 So.2d 445, 449 (Miss.1995). While Sharlene did not file a motion for modification of child support, it is clear that she was seeking such modification and made her request in the form of a counterclaim to Keith’s complaint.

¶ 21. Assuming a Rule 81 summons was required, I would find that Keith waived the requirement when he participated in the hearing where the modification was addressed. See Isom v. Jernigan, 840 So.2d 104, 106-07 (¶¶ 7-9) (Miss.2003) (holding that the appellant who had not been served with a Rule 81 summons waived the requirement when her attorney appeared on her behalf and failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction while proceeding with the hearing and introducing evidence on the appellant’s behalf). I am mindful of the fact that we have no record of the hearing held on January 6 in which I find that Keith participated. However, it is clear that a hearing was held and testimony adduced, as the chancellor stated the following in her order:

This cause came before the Court on the Complaint for Name Change and Other Relief filed herein by Keith Curry and an Answer to Complaint for Name Change and Other Relief filed here by Sharlene Frazier [,] and the parties both being in Court and Keith Curry being represented by counsel and Sharlene Frazier not being represented by counsel but advising the Court that she would represent herself[,] and the Court hearing testimony and argument [,] ... finds as follows:
Further, the Court [ojrders that Keith Curry provide wage information to the Court within 45 days so that his child support payments can be adjusted accordingly.

¶ 22. That a transcript of the hearing was not made does not, in my judgment, require a finding that a hearing was not held or that insufficient evidence was adduced at the hearing to support the chancellor’s implicit determination that a material change in circumstances had occurred, justifying an adjustment in the amount of child support that Keith should pay. In my opinion, the majority erroneously relies on a letter from the chancellor’s court reporter — stating that no official record was made by her on January 6, 2012, as that date “was an ex parte day for our courts” — to find that no hearing was held on January 6. The letter does not say that a hearing was not held on January 6 or that testimony is never given during hearings that may be held on days set aside for ex parte matters. And more specifically, the letter does not purport to state what did or did not occur on January 6 between the chancellor and others.

¶ 23. To the extent that the majority finds or implies that a hearing was required to be held on February 24, 2012, the date of the order requiring Keith to pay an increased amount of child support, suffice it to say that if that were the case, every order would have to be entered on the date of the hearing. Otherwise, a new hearing would always have to be held just so a court could perform a ministerial act of entering an order covering matters that it had already decided. Clearly, at the conclusion of the hearing on January 6, the chancellor had decided that the twelve-year-old child-support order should be modified based on the evidence adduced at that hearing. The only remaining question was in what amount, and Keith was asked to submit his financial information, so the chancellor could calculate the amount consistent with the statutory guidelines. That is all that occurred on February 24.

¶24. Finally, the majority states: “Without any information to determine what the chancery court considered in modifying Keith’s child-support obligation, this Court is unable to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion. This is reversible error.” Maj. Op. at (¶ 17). With respect, I disagree. First, it should be noted that Keith was represented by counsel. It was incumbent upon counsel to make sure a record was made of any proceeding out of which could come a judgment that he may want to appeal. Second, our jurisprudence is clear that it is incumbent upon the appellant to supply the appellate court with a record that supports his issues on appeal. See Cosentino v. Cosentino, 986 So.2d 1065, 1067 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2008). Keith has failed to do so and should not' benefit from his own failures.

¶ 25. For the reasons presented, I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

BARNES and CARLTON, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . This was the amount the parties agreed upon in the stipulated agreement, and it was based on Keith’s adjusted gross income of $2,110.78. Keith was also paying child support for two other minor children.

      . There is no financial information contained in the record other than Keith’s military-benefits statements, which were attached to Keith’s complaint for a name change and other relief. It is unclear what financial information the chancery court considered in modifying Keith's child-support obligation.

      . We note that Sharlene never filed an appel-lee's brief. Therefore, we are limited to Keith's appellant’s brief and the record. We address the lack of an appellee’s brief under Issue III of this opinion.

      . We note that Keith's amended designation of the record included "[a]ll pleadings, orders, judgments!,] and clerk[']s papers in the court file[;][t]ranscript of the January 6, 2012[] hearing, and any exhibits offered into evidence!;] and [t]ranscript of the hearing, and any exhibits offered into evidence, which resulted in the February 24, 2012 judgment.” According to Keith, he asked for these hearing transcripts to show that no hearings were ever held.

      . I note that Keith provided the data without objection.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GRIFFIS, P.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Harrison BANKS, Appellant v. Brandon LOCKHART, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CA-00241-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    July 23, 2013.

      Joshua A. Turner, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    Leroy Davis Percy, Oxford, attorney for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES and MAXWELL, JJ.
   GRIFFIS, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Brandon Lockhart filed a civil complaint against Harrison Banks for damages for battery. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Lockhart and awarded $300,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, Banks argues that: (1) the jury’s verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to consider punitive damages; and (3) the trial court erred when it did not grant a remittitur on compensatory and punitive damages. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. Lockhart and his friend, Lindsay Gibson, went out in Oxford for drinks the night of July 17, 2009. The pair visited several bars that evening. While at the Library Bar & Grill, Lockhart and Gibson encountered Banks. For reasons unknown, Gibson slapped Banks several times. A brief altercation between Banks and Gibson ensued, but the two were quickly separated. After this altercation, Lockhart and Gibson left the Library and headed home.

¶ 3. While walking in an alleyway near Taylor’s Pub, another altercation between Gibson and a “third party” occurred. During this altercation the third party-knocked Gibson to the ground. Lockhart knelt down to assist Gibson and was struck in the face, which knocked him to the ground as well. Lockhart testified at trial that when he looked up, he saw Banks fleeing the scene. However, Banks testified that he was not present in the alleyway and did not see Lockhart or Gibson after they left the Library.

¶ 4. After this second altercation, the owner of Taylor’s Pub came out of the bar to assist the injured Lockhart and Gibson until police officers arrived. Oxford Police Officers David Aim and Hildon Sessums arrived shortly thereafter. The officers assessed the scene and inquired about the altercation. Once this process was complete, and upon seeing the injury to Lock-hart’s face, the officers convinced Lockhart to go to the hospital. Lockhart testified at trial that several hospital exams showed that the blow shattered a sinus bone in his face. Furthermore, Lockhart testified he underwent several steroid injections and one invasive surgery to remove scar tissue from the side of his face, with the possibility of further treatments.

¶ 5. Eventually, Lockhart filed suit against Banks for damages stemming from the battery that occurred outside of Taylor’s Pub. After a brief jury trial, the jury reached a verdict in favor of Lockhart and awarded him $300,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. Banks filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding a verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial or, in the alternative, a motion for remittitur, all of which were denied. Banks now appeals.

ANALYSIS

1. Whether the jury’s verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

¶ 6. Banks’s first assignment of error is that the jury’s verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, that Lockhart’s testimony was not credible, and that the jury’s verdict was clearly the result of bias, passion, or prejudice.

¶ 7. In Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So.2d 737, 739 (Miss.1997) (citations omitted), the supreme court held:

The standard of review for jury verdicts in this state is well established. Once the jury has returned a verdict in a civil case, we are not at liberty to direct that judgment be entered contrary to that verdict short of a conclusion on our part that, given the evidence as a whole, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror could have found as the jury found.

¶ 8. The jury found Banks liable for the battery committed against Lock-hart and awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Lockhart. To determine whether the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we must examine the elements of the intentional tort of battery and whether the evidence supports the verdict. The elements of the intentional tort of battery require:

An assault occurs where a person “(1) acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (2) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” A battery goes one step beyond an assault in that a harmful contact actually occurs.

Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 8 (¶ 7) (Miss.2000) (citations omitted)(quoting Webb v. Jackson, 583 So.2d 946, 950-51 (Miss.1991)). A battery, therefore, occurs when a person intends to cause a harmful or offensive contact to another person and such contact actually occurs.

¶ 9. To determine whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we look at the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 844 (¶ 18) (Miss.2005). It is undisputed in the record that Lockhart suffered a harmful or offensive contact the night of July 17, 2009. Thus, the central elements of battery that Lock-hart had to prove to the jury were that: (1) Banks intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact, and (2) Banks was responsible for the harmful or offensive contact.

¶ 10. Both parties agree that at least one altercation took place that evening in the Library between Gibson and Banks. While Banks claims he was not a party, it is undisputed that a second altercation took place in the alleyway near Taylor’s Pub, where Lockhart was struck in the face. Lockhart claims that after he was struck, he observed Banks fleeing from the scene. Additionally, the testimonies of Officers Aim and Sessums were consistent that an altercation took place in the alleyway between Gibson and another party, and that while assisting Gibson after he was knocked to the ground, Lockhart was struck in the face. Banks’s only response to these assertions is that he simply was not present and, therefore, did not strike Lockhart. A reasonable, hypothetical juror could make inferences and conclude that, based on the testimony of the witnesses and the fact that a previous altercation had occurred, Banks was a party to the second altercation in the alleyway. As for Banks’s intent, a reasonable, hypothetical juror could have concluded that, based on Banks’s own statements, involvement in the previous altercation, and involvement in the alleyway altercation, he intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact when he struck Lockhart. Given this scenario, we cannot conclude that the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

¶ 11. Next, Banks argues that Lockhart’s testimony lacked credibility. Determining the credibility of a witness or the weight of their testimony is not the province of this Court. “This Court, of course, is not the jury. The weight and credibility of the witnesses ... was for the jury, who were free to accept or reject whatever part of their testimony they chose.” Fleming v. Floyd, 969 So.2d 868, 878 (¶ 25) (Miss.2007) (citation omitted). The jury, in this case, determined that Lockhart was a more credible witness than Banks. Furthermore, when applying the standard of review to jury verdicts in civil cases, “[bjecause of the jury verdict in favor of the appellee, this Court resolves all conflicts in the evidence in his favor.” Bobby Kitchens, Inc. v. Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 560 So.2d 129, 131 (Miss.1989).

¶ 12. Banks makes the assertion that Lockhart’s testimony is not credible because he lied to Officers Sessums and Aim about not knowing the name of his alleged assailant. In fact, Banks testified that Lockhart knew who he was and the two men were, at a minimum, acquaintances. Additionally, at trial Lockhart testified that all along he knew the name of the person who struck him in the face. However, Lockhart’s justification for this discrepancy is that he did not know how significant his injuries were that night and did not want to “tattle” on Banks unnecessarily. While Banks’s argument is well taken that a credibility issue exists with Lockhart’s testimony, such an issue is for the jury to consider, not this Court. The jury found Lockhart to be a credible witness and believed his testimony. Based on the standard of review, this Court must show deference to the jury’s determination and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the appellee, as we assume this is the conclusion the jury made as well. Id.

¶ 13. Finally, Banks claims that the jury based the verdict on bias, passion, and prejudice, stemming from the following colloquy during Banks’s cross-examination:

Q: You have given a pretty detailed account various times you testified in this case whether a deposition or criminal case or today regarding what you did, when you left the bar, who you left with but your memory regarding that time is not too good is it?
A: I’m sorry, I don’t follow.
Q: Well, one thing that I have asked you before you ultimately would end up that night at your girlfriend’s house?
A: I stayed with my girlfriend that evening.
Q: And you remembered all these names and times and places but you couldn’t tell me who your girlfriend was; correct?
A: Yes, sir, I did struggle with that.
Q: You told me you couldn’t put a face to her?
A: I believe I said I couldn’t put a name with the face.
Q: Well, I have a copy of your deposition. Let me show you the question I asked you. Page 20, line 20. Your answer, and then I went to my girlfriend’s house at the time and I asked who is that and what was your answer?
A: I can not put a face with her name right now.
Q: I’m sorry can you read that again?
A: I can not put a face with her name right now.
Q: Are you reading that correctly?
A: I can not put a face with her right now.
Q: Thank you. The deposition went on for a while and you couldn’t recall her name; correct?
A: Yes, sir, I eventually did. I believe.
Q: That didn’t have anything to do with your habitual mixing of Xanax and alcohol?
A: No sir.

¶ 14. Banks argues that this exchange, before an all-female jury, was prejudicial and resulted in a verdict that reflected the jury was biased. First, we note that Banks did not object during this colloquy, and no objections were made related to this testimony. Second, “the only evidence of corruption, passion, prejudice or bias on the part of the jury is an inference, if any, to be drawn from contrasting the amount of the verdict with the amount of damages.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1144 (¶ 21) (Miss.2002) (quoting Biloxi Elec. Co. v. Thorn, 264 So.2d 404, 406 (Miss.1972)). Lockhart stipulated that his medical expenses were $11,654.64. Banks claims that the difference between an award of $350,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and medical expenses of $11,654.64 clearly evidences bias on the part of the jury. However, medical expenses are not the only damages claimed by Lockhart. He also claims past, present, and future physical pain and suffering, and resulting mental anguish.

¶ 15. Banks’s argument of prejudice or bias is not well taken. Banks raised no objections during cross-examination regarding the allegedly prejudicial colloquy. Banks submitted no special interrogatory jury instructions regarding the specific allotment of damages. In addition, where an intentional tort is claimed, “[d'jamages are recoverable for mental anguish and suffering caused by a willful, wanton, malicious, or intentional wrong, even though no bodily injury is sustained or other pecuniary damage alleged or proved.” Whitten, 799 So.2d at 13 (¶ 25) (citation omitted).

¶ 16. It is clear from the record that Lockhart sustained an actual injury and incurred damages as a result. However, this Court cannot assume the reason for the difference between the damages claimed by Lockhart and the jury’s specific allotment of the award. As such, this Court cannot say that a reasonable juror would have concluded otherwise. Thus, taking the evidence in this matter as a whole, we find that a reasonable, hypothetical juror could have found as the jury here found. We do not consider the jury’s verdict against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and find that this issue has no merit. We find no error.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to consider punitive damages.

¶ 17. Banks’s second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider punitive damages. The supreme court has held that the standard of review for consideration of punitive damages is as follows:

When deciding whether to submit the issue of punitive damages to a trier of fact, the trial court looks at the totality of the circumstances, as revealed in the record, to determine if a reasonable, hypothetical trier of fact could find either malice or gross neglect/reckless disregard. An abuse of discretion standard is used when this Court reviews the trial court’s decision on whether a case warrants punitive damages be considered by the trier of fact.

Bradfield v. Schwartz, 936 So.2d 931, 936 (¶ 15) (Miss.2006) (internal citations omitted). Under this assignment of error, Banks asserts that Lockhart failed to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Banks] acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” See Miss.Code Ann. § ll-l-65(l)(a) (Rev. 2002).

¶ 18. Whether Lockhart proved punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence has no bearing on whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider punitive damages. In submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury, the trial court concerns itself with whether the jury could find malice, gross negligence, or reckless disregard, not whether it did.

¶ 19. However, the supreme court has stated that even in situations where an assault occurred from sudden passion, malice on the part of the assailant may still be present in the case. Anderson v. Jenkins, 220 Miss. 145, 155, 70 So.2d 535, 540 (1954). Even in cases involving sudden passion, “[m]aliee may be presumed from the manner in which an assault is made when considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances as shown by all of the evidence in the case.” Id. In Anderson, the supreme court considered whether an assailant possessed malice when using a weapon to defend property. Id. While the facts in this case are different from Anderson, the presumption of malice still applies. In Anderson, the assailant fired a shotgun, twice, at a vehicle filled with teenage trespassers and one of the teens was struck in the eye with a shotgun pellet. Id. at 149-50, 70 So.2d at 537. The assailant in Anderson had the requisite intent to cause an offensive or harmful contact and that contact actually occurred. Id. at 154, 70 So.2d at 539-40. This Court cannot say that simply because fists instead of firearms were used to cause the battery here, that the supreme court’s presumption no longer applies. Given the facts of this case, such a presumption can be made with respect to Banks’s intent when the jury considered punitive damages.

¶ 20. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to consider the issue of punitive damages. The jury found Banks responsible for the battery to Lockhart. The jury awarded compensatory damages. Taking the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable, hypothetical trier of fact could have found that Banks acted with malice, gross negligence, or reckless disregard by striking Lockhart. We find no error.

3. Whether the trial court en~ed when it did not grant a remittitur on compensatory and punitive damages.

¶ 21. Banks’s final assignment of error is that the trial court erred in denying a motion for remittitur of the compensatory and punitive damages. In Dedeaux v. Pellerin Laundry, Inc., 947 So.2d 900, 908 (¶ 16) (Miss.2007), the supreme court held:

If the trial judge grants a motion for an additur or remittitur, such grant of an additur or remittur shall take effect only if accepted by all the parties. If all the parties do not agree to the additur or the remittitur, then each party shall have the right to either demand a new trial on damages, or appeal the order asserting an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.

Also, in Pellenn Laundry the supreme court specifically addressed a trial court’s denial of an additur or remittur motion. Id. at n. 4. The supreme court noted that “[c]ertainly, on the other hand, the trial court’s denial of an additur or remittitur would be subject to appellate review via an assignment of error asserting that the jury verdict (including the verdict as to damages) was contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence.” Id.

¶ 22. Therefore, in the case before us, we apply the standard from Pellenn Laundry and review the trial court’s denial of Banks’s motion for remittitur for abuse of discretion. If the overwhelming weight of the evidence is against the verdict, then the trial court abused its discretion in denying Banks’s remittitur motion.

¶ 23. From the discussion of Banks’s first assignment of error above, a reasonable, hypothetical juror could have found as the jury here found; thus, this Court finds the overwhelming weight of the evidence is not against the verdict. Banks’s assignment of error that denying a motion for remittitur was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is without merit. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Banks’s motion for remittitur.

¶ 24. Furthermore, “[a] jury award should not be disturbed ‘unless its size, in comparison to the actual amount of damage, shocks the conscience.’ ” U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. of Miss. v. Martin, 998 So.2d 956, 969 (¶ 44) (Miss.2008) (quoting Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So.2d 1051, 1058 (¶ 20) (Miss.2003)). Regardless, we find that it is prudent to address, notwithstanding the trial court’s discretion, whether the award in the case before us shocks the conscience. The award of $300,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages does appear rather substantial, given the totality of the case before the trial court and the record before us. However, this Court cannot say that such an award shocks the conscience, such that remittitur would have been proper.

¶ 25. Given that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Banks’s motion for a remittitur and that, while significant, the award does not shock the conscience, this Court finds no merit in Banks’s argument. We find no error.

¶ 26. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAFAYETTE COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.


author: FAIR, J.,

text:
    Tony STATHOS and Mary Stathos, Appellants. v. LEE COUNTY RENTALS, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CA-00062-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    July 23, 2013.

      Gregory Moreau Johnston, attorney for appellants.
    Eddie Jacob Abdeen, attorney for appel-lee.
    Before LEE, C.J., FAIR and JAMES, JJ.
   FAIR, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. In December 2008, Tony and Mary Stathos entered into a lease/purchase agreement with Lee County Rentals (LCR) for a mobile home park called “Garrison Estates,” located in Lee County near Tupelo. The total purchase price was $1,150,000, with the agreement calling for a nonrefundable option payment of $350,000 and monthly payments of approximately $8,000 that would be credited to the purchase price upon exercise of the purchase option. The purchase option was exercisable for two years by a balloon payment of the balance. A one-time, two-year extension of the purchase option could be acquired for an additional $25,000. On failure to pay, the contract provided for forfeiture of the deposit and other payments as rent and liquidated damages.

¶ 2. Two years came and went, and the Stathoses did not make the balloon payment or exercise the extension option; in fact, they had failed to make many of the monthly payments in full over the course of the lease. LCR brought the instant lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to reenter the property and be awarded damages for unpaid rent and breach of contract.

¶ 3. The Stathoses initially filed a motion to transfer venue, which was ultimately denied and is not a subject of this appeal. Before the Stathoses filed their answer, LCR filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending among other things that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was entitled to reenter and take possession of the property. With their answer the Stathoses counterclaimed, contending LCR had failed to meet its obligations under the agreement to make the mobile homes ready for rental within a certain period after the execution of the agreement, as well as seeking damages for fraud and breach of contract.

¶4. The circuit court entered an order styled a “partial judgment and certification pursuant to [Mississippi] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 54(b),” dismissing the Stathos-es’ fraud claim as a matter of law and granting summary judgment to LCR on its declaratory judgment claims. The circuit court found a genuine issue of material fact on the remaining claims. It granted a Rule 54(b) certification on the partial judgment, and this appeal was taken.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. “We employ a de novo standard of review of a trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment and examine all the evidentiary matters before it....” Davis v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397, 401 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2004). Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c).

¶ 6. “The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Davis, 869 So.2d at 401 (¶ 10). “[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” M.R.C.P. 56(e). Furthermore:

[W]hen a party, opposing summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So.2d 678, 684 (Miss.1987).

DISCUSSION

1. Summary Judgment

¶ 7. The circuit court granted summary judgment to LCR on the declaratory relief it sought — i.e., that the Stathoses had breached the lease contract and that LCR was entitled to reenter and retake possession. The Stathoses admit they failed to make the payments required under the contract, but they assert LCR also failed to meet its obligation under the contract to make many of the trailers rent-ready. The Stathoses contend this entitles them to continue possessing the trailer park without paying.

¶ 8. We find no merit to this issue because of the paucity of authority presented. The Stathoses contend they were justified in terminating the lease, and present authority discussing when a party might be justified in terminating a contract; their brief cites Warwick v. Matheney, 603 So.2d 330, 337 (Miss.1992), overruled on other grounds by Business Communications, Inc. v. Banks, 90 So.3d 1221 (Miss.2012), for the proposition that “when a contract is procured through material misrepresentations, or when there is a total breach of the contract, a party may be justified in terminating the contract.” Warwick does briefly discuss those concepts, but it is simply not a fit for the present case, where the Stathoses do not actually want to terminate the lease — because if the lease were terminated, they would not be entitled to continue to possess the trailer park. What the Stathoses really want to show is that their breach was excused because of LCR’s own alleged breach of the rent-ready provision of the contract. Whatever the merits of that argument, Warwick provides no support.

¶ 9. “There is a presumption that the judgment of the trial court is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate some reversible error to the appellate court.” Cobb v. Cobb, 29 So.3d 145, 152 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.2010). Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(6) requires the appellant’s brief to contain “the contentions of appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” The Rule requires more than the mere mention of authority; the authority must be used to develop the argument in a meaningful way. Patton v. State, 109 So.3d 66, 75 (¶ 22) (Miss.2012). A reviewing court is not required to scour the law to find support for the assertions of an appellant; to do so would put the Court in the position of an advocate and would deny the appellee a fair opportunity to respond. See Rhoda v. Weathers, 87 So.3d 1067, 1071-72 (¶¶ 21-22) (Miss.Ct.App.2011), rev’d in part on other grounds, Rhoda v. Weathers, 87 So.3d 1036, 1037 (¶ 1) (Miss.2012).

¶ 10. Because the Stathoses have failed to show error, this issue is without merit.

2. Due Process

¶ 11. The Stathoses’ second issue concerns the trial court’s dismissal of their counterclaim for fraud. Their argument is procedural rather than substantive; they contend the trial court granted summary judgment on the fraud claim without allowing them an opportunity to present evidence in support.

¶ 12. The procedural posture of this case is somewhat unusual. LCR filed its motion for summary judgment before the Stathoses’ answer and counterclaim, where the fraud counterclaim was first introduced. LCR both moved for summary judgment on the fraud claim (in its reply to the Stathoses’ response to its summary judgment motion) and for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (in its answer to the counterclaim). Both of these pleadings were actually filed the day after the hearing on the summary judgment motion.

¶ 13. A motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing.” M.R.C.P. 56(c). This is a due process requirement that must be strictly enforced by the courts. Palmer v. Biloxi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 649 So.2d 179, 183-84 (Miss.1994).

¶ 14. Nonetheless, it seems apparent that the trial court’s dismissal of the fraud claims was on the face of the pleadings, and not based on insufficiency of supporting evidence. Fraud must be pleaded with particularity. M.R.C.P. 9(b). “Fraud will not be inferred or presumed and may not be charged in general terms. The circumstances of the alleged fraud such as the time, place and contents of any false representations or conduct must be stated.” Howard v. Estate of Harper ex. rel. Harper, 947 So.2d 854, 861 (¶ 20) (Miss.2006) (quoting Allen v. Mac Tools, Inc., 671 So.2d 636, 642 (Miss.1996)).

¶ 15. The Stathoses’ countercomplaint plainly failed to plead fraud with the required particularity, and it is equally clear that the trial court, despite some ambiguity in its order, dismissed the claims on their face and not based on a lack of supporting evidence. There is no merit to this issue.

3. Rule 54(b) Certification

¶ 16. Finally, the Stathoses contend the trial court erred in granting a Rule 54(b) certification on the issue of possession of the trailer park. They make the inexplicable assertion that “[the Rule 54(b) certification] creates the possibility that [the Stathoses] may have to go to trial on the remaining issues presently in the trial court before ... a decision on this appeal. As a result, the summary judgment of the trial court should be reversed.”

¶ 17. Rule 54(b) states in relevant part: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action ... the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment.

¶ 18. A Rule 54(b) judgment should only be granted where “the remainder of the case is going to be inordinately delayed, and it would be especially inequitable to require a party to wait until the entire case is tried before permitting him to appeal.” Cox v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 512 So.2d 897, 900 (Miss.1987). A Rule 54(b) judgment should not be granted where it would result in piecemeal litigation or multiple appeals of the same issue. Reeves Constr. & Supply, Inc. v. Corrigan, 24 So.3d 1077, 1083 (¶¶ 16-17) (Miss.Ct.App.2010). “Rule 54(b) may be invoked only in a relatively select group of cases and applied to an even more limited category of decisions.” M.R.C.P. 54 cmt. Nonetheless, whether to grant a Rule 54(b) certification is entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge. Cox, 512 So.2d at 900.

¶ 19. The trial court in this case made a clear and unambiguous Rule 54(b) certification, finding “no just reason for delay” of a final judgment on LCR’s claim to repossess the trailer park. Possession is a sev-erable issue from the claims by both parties for damages under the contract, which remain to be tried; and the prejudice that could result from not immediately issuing a final judgment on possession of the park is obvious and has not been seriously called into question by the Stathoses’ brief. We find no abuse of discretion.

¶ 20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J„ CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . The agreement states both sixty and ninety days.

      . The pleadings are actually dated three days before the hearing, and the Stathoses claim in their brief that they were received on that day; but the court clerk's "filed” stamp is from the day after the hearing. There is no transcript of the hearing in the record, so we do not know exactly what was argued there.

      . The order recites in its opening paragraph that the issues it addresses are “before the Court on [LCR's motion for partial summary judgment]/' but it is quite clear that the fraud claim was dismissed because it "fails as a matter of law.”


author: ROBERTS, J.,

text:
    Dave LITTLE, Tabitha Little, and Marie Little, Appellants v. Richard NORMAN, Jane Norman, and Mississippi Department of Human Services, Appellees.
    No. 2011-CP-01301-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    July 23, 2013.

      Dave Little, appellant, pro se.
    Tabitha Little, appellant, pro se.
    Marie Little, appellant, pro se.
    Mark R. Holmes, attorney for appellees.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. This case centers on Richard and Jane Norman’s adoption of Kate Johnson and Nicole Little. At the time of adoption, Kate was seven-years old. Kate’s biological parents are Bill and Amy Johnson. Nicole was three years old. Nicole’s biological mother is Marie Little. Amy and Marie’s parents, Dave and Tabitha Little (the Littles), and Marie appeal pro se. Bill and Amy have not filed a brief. They are not parties to this appeal. Dave, Tabitha, and Marie raise no specific issues, but we interpret their argument to be that the Franklin County Chancery Court erred when it granted the Normans’ petition to adopt Kate and Nicole. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. The Littles had three children: Amy, Marie, and Mike. Amy and Marie each had daughters. Amy’s daughter, Kate, was born in March 2004. Marie’s daughter, Nicole, was born in 2007.

¶ 3. The record reveals ongoing issues with substance abuse in the Littles’ home in Roxie, Mississippi. Tabitha was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) during 2004. Amy’s daughter, Kate, was born with marijuana and opiates in her system. During August 2005, the Littles were arrested for growing marijuana at their home. A drug test revealed that Amy also tested positive for marijuana. The Franklin County Department of Human Services (DHS) helped Amy enter a treatment facility, but Amy quit the program. Tabitha picked up Amy after Amy quit the program. Amy later moved to Louisiana so she could work part-time in a bar and live with a man whom she was dating. Amy left Kate, who was one year old at the time, with the Littles. The Littles later obtained custody of Kate after Bill and Amy failed to appear at a hearing on the Littles’ petition for custody. During 2007, Marie gave birth to Nicole. Marie and Nicole lived with the Littles or they lived with Tabitha’s mother, who lived immediately next door to the Littles.

¶ 4. A significant portion of the Little family’s substance abuse was related to prescription medication. Tabitha obtained numerous prescriptions that she related to a back injury. Tabitha had prescriptions for approximately 150 tablets per month of the pain reliever Opana. Within a two-year period, Tabitha also received prescriptions for other pain relievers, muscle relaxers, anti-depressants, and anti-anxiety medications.

¶ 5. Amy moved back into the Littles’ home during 2007. After Amy moved back to the Littles’ home, she and Bill began dating. Bill eventually moved into the Littles’ home. After Bill and Amy got married, they continued to live with the Littles.

¶ 6. It was not uncommon for people in the Littles’ home to lose consciousness because of drug use. Shortly after Nicole was born, Marie lost consciousness because she ingested morphine. There was evidence that Tabitha, Amy, Bill, and Marie had all “passed out” multiple times because of their intake of Tabitha’s prescription medication. Amy, Bill, and Marie also bought pills from other people. Tabitha occasionally gave some of her pain medication to Bill, while Amy and Marie stole pain medication from Tabitha. Amy testified that she stole approximately forty of Tabitha’s Opana pills each month. Marie also stole some of Tabitha’s Opana pills each month. Dave and Tabitha made Bill and Amy move out after Bill was caught rummaging through Tabitha’s purse.

¶ 7. On May 2, 2010, the Littles’ twenty-year-old son, Mike, was pronounced dead. He was found unresponsive in the Littles’ home. Dave told Percy Peeler, the Franklin County Coroner, that Mike had taken Opana the night before he was found dead. Mike’s pockets also contained tablets that were consistent with the description of Xa-nax tablets. Mike’s death certificate indicates that the cause of his death was an accidental drug overdose. However, Tabitha adamantly refused to believe that Mike died from an accidental drug overdose, and the Littles declined to have an autopsy of Mike’s body.

¶ 8. Having personally witnessed Tabitha in an impaired state numerous times, the Normans filed a petition to have Tabitha involuntarily committed. Tabitha was ordered to receive outpatient counseling with Rose Marie Newsom, a certified clinical addiction professional. Tabitha was impaired during her first two sessions with Newsom. After a few sessions with New-som, Tabitha failed to report to any further appointments. On July 1, 2010, the Normans filed a petition for custody of Kate.

¶ 9. DHS made an unannounced visit to the Littles’ home on July 16, 2010. Dave admitted he had been smoking marijuana. A drug test revealed that Dave also had Xanax in his system. Tabitha tested positive for her prescription medications, but three observers opined that Tabitha had taken more than the recommended dosages because Tabitha was impaired. Marie claimed that she could not urinate for a drug test. After drinking a substantial volume of water, she maintained that she could not urinate even after more than an hour. Marie also refused to provide hair for a hair-follicle drug test.

¶ 10. As a result, DHS removed Kate and Nicole from the Littles’ home. Because the Normans had become certified foster parents, the Normans took custody of Kate and Nicole. Edwin L. Bean Jr. was appointed as the guardian ad litem for Kate and Nicole.

¶ 11. On March 1, 2011, the Normans filed an amended petition to terminate Bill and Amy’s parental rights to Kate and Marie’s parental rights to Nicole. The Normans also sought to adopt Kate and Nicole. The chancellor heard the Normans’ petition on August 2-3, 2011. Ultimately, the chancellor terminated Bill and Amy’s parental rights to Kate and Marie’s parental rights to Nicole. The chancellor also granted the Normans’ request to adopt Kate and Nicole. Dave, Tabitha, and Marie appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12. The standard of review in this appeal is as follows:

In cases where parental rights have been terminated, our scope of review is limited. We review the chancellor’s factual findings under the manifest error/substantial credible evidence test. This Court will not overturn a chancellor’s findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence unless an erroneous legal standard is applied or is manifestly wrong. Under this standard, the court asks not how we would have decided the case ab initio but whether there [is] credible proof to support the chancellor’s findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence.

In re Adoption of M.C., 92 So.3d 1283, 1286-87 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citations and quotations omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶ 13. Bill and Amy filed a notice of appeal, but they never filed a brief. They are not parties to this appeal. The only brief before us is Dave, Tabitha, and Marie’s six-page, pro se brief.

¶ 14. Essentially, Dave, Tabitha, and Marie seem to claim that the Franklin County judicial system treated them unfairly. They also claim that their attorney “failed [them] completely.” To the extent that Dave, Tabitha, and Marie claim that the chancellor erred when he granted the Normans’ petition, Dave, Tabitha, and Marie cite no authority to support that claim. The failure to cite authority in support of arguments operates as a procedural bar on appeal. M.R.A.P. 28(a)(6). Parties on appeal have a duty “to provide authority in support of an assignment of error.” Davis-Everett v. Dale, 926 So.2d 279, 281 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (citation omitted). “Failure to provide authority for an assignment of error operates as a procedural bar, and this Court will consider those unsupported issues to be abandoned.” Id. at 281-82 (¶ 5). We have held that we “will not discard a meritorious complaint simply because it is inartfully drafted.” Id. at 281 (¶ 5) (citation omitted). But we have also held that “[p]ro se parties should be held to the same rules of procedure and substantive law as represented parties.” Id. (citation omitted). Procedural bar notwithstanding, we would still find that there is sufficient evidence to support the chancellor’s decision.

¶ 15. The determination of whether one should be allowed to adopt of a child is a two-step process. In re M.C., 92 So.3d at 1287 (¶ 21). First, a chancellor must “find that one of the grounds for adoption is present: desertion or abandonment, or moral unfitness.” Id. at 1287-88 (¶ 21) (citing Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So.2d 614, 618 (Miss.1991)). The Normans bore the burden of proving the first ground by clear and convincing evidence. Natural Mother, 583 So.2d at 619-20. Second, the chancellor must definitively adjudicate that the proposed adoption promotes or enhances the child’s best interest. In re M.C., 92 So.3d at 1288 (¶ 21) (citing Ainsworth v. Natural Father, 414 So.2d 417, 420-21 (Miss.1982)). We will address each child separately.

I. KATE

THE LITTLES

¶ 16. As previously mentioned, Kate’s parents are Bill and Amy. Bill and Amy have not filed a brief, and they are not parties to this appeal. Dave and Tabitha received custody of Kate during September 2006. Mississippi Code Annotated section 93 — 17—5(l)(ii) (Rev.2004) provides that certain people “shall be made parties to [an adoption] proceeding[,]” including “[a]ny person to whom custody of such child may have been awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction of the State of Mississippi.” Even so, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that although a grandfather who was the legal custodian of a child was a necessary party to an adoption, his status did not provide him with “the prerogative of consenting to the adoption and by corollary, withholding consent and thereby thwarting the adoption.” Martin v. Putnam, 427 So.2d 1373, 1376 (Miss.1983). And because the Littles had no parental rights to Kate or Nicole, it follows that the Littles have no standing to appeal the chancellor’s decision to terminate Bill and Amy’s parental rights to Kate or Marie’s parental rights to Nicole. However, the Littles have had a substantial impact on the other parties involved in this case.

¶ 17. The Littles both have criminal records that are indicative of their history with drugs and alcohol. Dave testified that he had been to an unspecified program related to his consumption of alcohol. But the record does not specify exactly when Dave went through that program. On October 6, 2004, Tabitha pled guilty to DUI, first offense. Her blood-alcohol content was .225%. On August 11, 2005, DHS received a report related to Amy after the Littles were arrested for growing marijuana at their home. On August 25, 2005, Tabitha was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. Dave pled guilty to manufacturing marijuana on April 25, 2006. He was sentenced to five years of probation. According to Dave, he never stopped smoking marijuana during his probation, but he somehow avoided testing positive for marijuana when he was tested by his probation officer. And on January 29, 2009, Tabitha was arrested for “DUI other,” meaning that she had been driving while impaired by some substance other than alcohol. The disposition of that charge is unclear.

¶ 18. The Littles obtained custody of Kate during 2006. They retained custody of Kate until DHS removed her from their home during July 2010. During September 2009, Jane persuaded Tabitha that Kate needed significant restorative dental care. Kate required antibiotics because of infections related to her dental health. It took multiple appointments to repair Kate’s teeth. The Normans paid for Kate’s appointments. During one of Kate’s 9:30 a.m. appointments, Tabitha lost consciousness at the dentist’s office. Despite shouting and shaking Tabitha, it took Amy approximately fifteen to twenty minutes to get a response from Tabitha.

¶ 19. The Littles’ twenty-year-old son, Mike, was pronounced dead on May 2, 2010. Peeler, the Franklin County Coroner, testified that the cause of Mike’s death was an accidental overdose. Dave told Peeler that Mike had taken Opana the night before Mike was found dead. According to Peeler, he recalled that Mike had died after taking medicine that belonged to an unspecified family member. The Littles did not want an autopsy to be performed on Mike’s body. And Tabitha adamantly refused to believe that Mike had died from an accidental drug overdose. The Littles asked Peeler to change the cause of Mike’s death.

¶20. Not long after Mike died, DHS received a report that all of the adults in the Littles’ home appeared to be high during the weekend that Mike had died. DHS arranged an evaluation of Tabitha by Newsom. Newsom concluded that Tabitha was addicted to her medication. Meanwhile, the Normans filed an involuntary commitment petition to address Tabitha’s prescription-drug abuse. Jane testified that she was concerned that Tabitha would overdose. On May 13, 2010, DHS presented Newsom’s report during Tabitha’s commitment hearing. A DHS report indicates that Tabitha “was adjudicated to be a drug abuser and ordered to comply with [New-som’s] counseling.”

¶ 21. On May 18, 2010, Newsom saw the Littles family as part of the court-ordered counseling schedule and treatment plan. According to Newsom, Tabitha’s illness was “most apparent.” Newsom explained that Tabitha’s speech was slurred, and that she would “go off on tangents.” During Tabitha’s second appointment with Newsom, Tabitha was “extremely impaired.” Tabitha had trouble navigating stairs, she “nodded off’ during their session, and her speech was slurred. New-som had to ask Tabitha not to take any medication prior to future appointments. Newsom’s last appointment with Tabitha was during June 2010. And Tabitha failed to appear for her appointment with New-som on August 20, 2010. According to Tabitha, she stopped going to her appointments with Newsom because Newsom was not helping her.

¶ 22. On July 16, 2010, DHS made its unannounced visit to the Littles’ home. Dave tested positive for marijuana and Xanax, which Dave had obtained from Tabitha. Having recently had back surgery, Tabitha tested positive for her prescription medication. However, three observers opined that Tabitha had taken more than her recommended dosage because Tabitha was lethargic and her speech was “somewhat incoherent.”

¶ 23. During August 2010, Robert Pee-ples, the Meadville Chief of Police, twice responded to reports that Tabitha and Marie were causing a disturbance at a pharmacy. Chief Peeples discovered that Tabitha and Marie were causing the disturbance because Tabitha wanted the pharmacy to fill one of Tabitha’s prescriptions. According to Chief Peeples, Tabitha’s speech was slurred, and her facial expression “was dropped.” Chief Peeples opined that Tabitha was “heavily medicated.”

¶ 24. That same month, DHS tried to convince the Littles to enter service agreements related to regaining custody of Kate. According to DHS, the Littles were “uncooperative,” and they “expressed [no] interest” in the service agreements. Approximately a week later, DHS took draft service agreements to the Littles. They still refused to sign them. In September 2010, DHS reported that the Littles had “shown no progress in understanding — or wanting to understand — how their behavior could seriously harm their grandchildren.”

¶25. Tabitha refused to believe that she was addicted to her medications. She testified that she had never been an addict. Newsom explained that Tabitha’s “addictive disease had escalated to such a high point that it was hard for [Tabitha] to accept that she was an addict.” According to Newsom, Tabitha needed “long-term” inpatient treatment, followed by “aftercare” treatment. Unfortunately, based on the contents of Dave, Tabitha, and Marie’s brief, Tabitha interprets the events that led to Kate’s and Nicole’s adoption as the product of (1) the Normans’ opportunistic timing, (2) the failure of the Littles’ attorney, and (8) the failure of the Franklin County judicial system. Cognizant of the sensitive nature of these proceedings and the circumstances that surround them, we disagree with Tabitha’s interpretation.

¶ 26. The chancellor found that the Lit-tles were “part of ... a permissive environment about everything.” The chancellor elaborated that Tabitha had failed to discipline Amy and Marie, and Mike had died due in part to taking Tabitha’s prescription medication. Tabitha picked up Amy when Amy quit her rehabilitation program with just three days remaining. Tabitha testified that she had seen her children lose consciousness. However, Tabitha attempted to deflect her responsibility by testifying that she thought “alcohol was involved.” Although Marie testified that she lost consciousness in 2007 because she had taken morphine orally, Tabitha testified that Marie merely had an allergic reaction to prescription medication.

¶ 27. Furthermore, Tabitha’s intake of prescription medication negatively impacted the people closest to her. Dave tested positive for medicine that had been prescribed to Tabitha. Whether intentionally or negligently, Tabitha had provided Amy, Marie, and Bill with a significant amount of the drugs that they had been abusing. The chancellor noted that Tabitha had enough medication each month to provide approximately fifty Opana pills to Amy, Bill, and Marie — either by giving pills away or allowing them to be stolen. And Tabitha adamantly refused to believe that Mike died of an accidental overdose, despite having no other explanation for Mike’s death. We do not interpret the chancellor as having concluded that Tabitha caused Mike’s death, or having weighed Mike’s death against Tabitha in and of itself. Rather, we interpret the chancellor as having found that Tabitha was clearly in adamant denial of her own addiction and her effect on the people closest to her. We find that there was substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s decision.

BILL AND AMY

¶ 28. As previously mentioned, Bill and Amy are Kate’s biological parents. Although Bill and Amy are not parties to this appeal, we address their part in Kate’s life to highlight the propriety of the chancellor’s decision. Amy was twenty-eight years old at the time of the hearing on the Normans’ petition to adopt Kate. Bill was thirty-one years old. Amy testified that she and Bill had been involved in an “off- and-on” relationship for approximately twelve years, during which they had “always” used drugs together. As of the hearing on the Normans’ petition to adopt Kate and Nicole, Bill and Amy had been married for approximately four years.

¶ 29. Amy dropped out of school when she was in the tenth grade, and Bill dropped out when he was in the eleventh grade. Later, they both obtained General Equivalency Degrees (GEDs). At the time of the trial, Amy had completed three years of community college, although she had not attended classes since 2009. According to Amy, she had to stop taking classes “[bjecause [she] got back on drugs real bad and [she] could not do it.” Amy testified that she had to take another year of classes before she could receive her associate’s degree.

¶ 30. Despite her doctor’s warning, Amy smoked marijuana throughout her entire pregnancy. When Kate was born during March 2004, Kate had marijuana and opiates in her system. Bill and Amy were not together when Kate was born. Bill did not visit Amy or Kate in the hospital because he was on house arrest related to an auto-burglary conviction. According to Bill, he committed auto burglary because he needed money for drugs. Bill’s house arrest was later revoked because he drank alcohol while he was on house arrest. Amy and Kate lived with the Littles after Kate was born.

¶ 31. During August 2005, DHS received a report that Amy had tested positive for marijuana. It was around that time that the Littles had been arrested for growing marijuana at their home. As a result, DHS helped Amy get admitted to Fairchild Treatment Center in Clarksdale, Mississippi. The program was scheduled to last twenty-five days. Amy quit the program after twenty-two days. According to Amy, she “hated [the program] ... because they were telling [her] that [she] was always going to be an addict, and [she] would never be able to get over it, and [she] didn’t believe that.” Tabitha drove to Clarksdale and picked up Amy. Two days later, Amy used crystal meth.

¶ 32. Later that year, Amy moved to Louisiana, where she worked part-time in a bar and lived with a man that she was dating. Amy left Kate with the Littles. During June 2006, the Littles received temporary custody of Kate. Three months later, the Littles received permanent custody of Kate after Bill and Amy failed to appear at the hearing on the Littles’ petition for custody.

¶33. Amy left Louisiana and moved back in with the Littles during July 2007. Later, Bill also moved in with the Littles. During May 2008, Bill was arrested for petit larceny after he drove away from a gas station without paying for gas that he had pumped. Amy and Bill got married dui'ing August 2008. Amy testified that she and Bill continued to live with the Littles for “a few months.” Amy and Bill moved to Ruth, Mississippi. The Littles still had permanent custody of Kate, so Amy and Bill did not take Kate with them. According to Amy, she and Bill did fewer drugs while they lived in Ruth than they did while they lived with the Littles. At approximately 4:30 p.m. on July 17, 2009, Bill was arrested for public intoxication.

¶ 34. Amy and Bill later moved back into the Littles’ house. Amy testified that she stole approximately forty Opana pills from Tabitha each month. According to Amy, because Tabitha had prescriptions for such a significant number of pills each month, Tabitha did not notice that some of them were missing. Even so, it appears Tabitha noticed that she was missing pills because Tabitha accused people of taking them. But no one ever admitted that they had stolen any of Tabitha’s medication. Tabitha attempted to prevent further theft of her medication by keeping her pills in one or more safes. Despite Tabitha’s precautions, Amy testified, “[W]e found out how to get in them.” Bill testified that Tabitha had given him Opana pills. According to Bill, Tabitha had sometimes put pills directly in his hand, or she had left them on a table for him to pick up later.

¶ 35. As best we can tell, shortly before Mike died on May 2, 2010, Amy and Bill were told to leave the Littles’ home after Bill was caught rummaging through Tabitha’s purse. Bill and Amy moved in a home with one of Amy’s relatives. According to Bill, during that time, he and Amy “both decided that [they] wanted to stop doing drugs[,] and [they] just couldn’t [stop]. [They] just couldn’t get around to doing it.” Partly in retaliation for being told to leave the Littles’ home, Bill and Amy approached Jane and told her that they were concerned for Kate’s and Nicole’s safety due to Marie’s and Tabitha’s abuse of prescription drugs. Jane took Bill and Amy to DHS, where Amy and Bill filed a report.

¶ 36. Mike died in Dave and Tabitha’s home sometime between the night of May 1, 2010, and the morning of May 2, 2010. Three days later, Jane went to the home where Bill and Amy were living. Jane took Bill from the home. She took him to live with Juanita Smith, who ran an uncer-tified church ministry that focuses on addiction. Because Bill had taken Xanax and pain medication the previous day, he only vaguely recalled leaving with Jane. Bill continued to live with Smith until February 2011, when he began renting a room from one of his friends.

¶ 37. On July 2, 2010, Amy went to “Jacob’s Well.” She completed the program on December 26, 2010. From there, Amy went to an extension of Jacob’s Well called “Lighthouse.” Amy remained at Lighthouse until April or May 2011. When Amy left Lighthouse, which Bill described as a “half-way” house, Amy moved in with Bill. At the time of trial, Amy and Bill had been renting a home for approximately one month.

¶ 38. Neither Bill nor Amy sought follow-up care after they left the treatment programs. As of the hearing on the Normans’ petition, neither Bill nor Amy had attended any support-group meetings, such as Alcoholics Anonymous or similar programs. According to Amy, regardless of the fact that she had unsuccessfully tried to quit using drugs “five or six times,” she was adamant that she was not an addict. Amy testified that she had recovered from her addiction. Bill also testified that he was not an addict, although he had been an addict before his mother made him go live with Smith. According to Bill, he had “been delivered from addiction.”

¶ 39. Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-17-7(2)(c) (Rev.2004) allows adoption of a child over a parent’s objection when “[t]he parent suffers from ... substance abuse or chemical dependency which makes him [or her] unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time or in the reasonably near future based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.” This Court has upheld a chancellor’s decision to grant a petition for adoption where there was evidence that a father admitted to drug use and tested positive for drugs “throughout his children’s lives and within the time period of [the adoption] proceedings.” In re M.C., 92 So.3d at 1289 (¶ 26).

¶ 40. Amy testified that she had used every drug but heroin. Bill had used cocaine, Percocet, Opana, Xanax, marijuana, and other pain killers. Bill also had a history of alcohol use. His house arrest was revoked because he had been drinking. Bill and Amy both admitted that they suffered from memory loss due to their drug use. They had both lost consciousness at times due to their abuse of medication. Bill testified that there were times when he was afraid for Amy’s life. Amy was not sure how many times she had tried to stop taking drugs, but she estimated that it was five or six times, and she relapsed each time. Bill testified that his and Amy’s drug use was “out of control.” Amy testified that she once “took so many pills [that she] lost a whole weekend.” Specifically, she testified that she “started taking pills on Friday[,] and [she didn’t] remember anything until the middle of the next week.” According to Bill, he and Amy had always used drugs together. And even after Bill went to live with Smith, he somehow managed to take Lor-tab that he had not been prescribed.

¶ 41. Additionally, neither Bill nor Amy considered themselves to be addicts. Newsom, an expert in counseling and addiction, testified that people who had been addicted to using a substance will not necessarily always continue to use that substance, “but ... they will always be predisposed to use [that substance] as a crutch.” It would be reasonable to conclude that Bill’s and Amy’s refusal to accept that possibility makes them more likely to relapse. Bill represented himself, and while he was cross-examining Jim O’Brien, a social worker who had been employed with DHS, Bill asked whether O’Brien thought that Bill had “conquered [his] drug addiction.” O’Brien responded:

[N]o, and the reason I say that, with your language of substance abuse, as a social worker, I ... have ... a sufficient understanding and professional knowledge of substance abuse. It’s not something you have ever[] worked with; you’ve never worked in a treatment facility; and I have participated in a lot of addiction problems by people, and it’s not been in the classroom. But you say, [“] I’m recovered,[”] instead of saying, [“]I am recovering.[”] ... [I]t’s a lifelong process.... [I]t is something that you need to get real about.

¶42. There was substantial evidence that Bill and Amy suffered from chemical dependency. There was also substantial evidence that their chemical dependency made them unable to provide an adequate permanent home for Kate at the time of the hearing or in the reasonably near future. And the chancellor’s decision was supported by both expert opinion and Bill’s and Amy’s established pattern of behavior.

¶ 43. Furthermore, Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-17-7(2)(b) allows the adoption of a child over the objection of a parent when “[t]he parent has not consistently offered to provide reasonably necessary food, clothing, appropriate shelter and treatment for the child.” Amy admitted that she had never bought any food or clothes for Kate. Bill paid monthly child support between the time he began working during February 2011 and the time of the hearing on August 2, 2011. But the chancellor could reasonably find that the brief period that Bill paid child support did not qualify as consistent provision of the necessities addressed in section 93-17-7(2)(b). Moreover, Bill and Amy had never provided consistent individual care of Kate. There is no indication that Bill was involved in Kate’s life for years after Kate was born. And when Kate was one year old, Amy moved and left Kate with the Littles. One year later, the Littles obtained custody of Kate after Bill and Amy failed to appear at a hearing on Dave and Tabitha’s petition for custody. Amy had no plan to obtain custody of Kate. Despite the guardian ad litem’s request for a plan, Amy never provided one because she “got busy.” The Normans were the catalyst that led to Kate receiving significant restorative dental care. And the Normans paid for Kate’s treatments. It was reasonable for the chancellor to describe Bill and Amy as “occasional visitors in Kate’s life.” There was substantial evidence for the chancellor to conclude that it was in Kate’s best interest to grant the Normans’ petition to adopt her. Consequently, we find the chancellor did not err when he terminated Bill and Amy’s parental rights and allowed the Normans to adopt Kate.

II. NICOLE

¶ 44. Marie is Nicole’s biological mother. Nicole’s biological father is unknown. Marie was twenty-four years old at the time of the trial. She dropped out of high school in the ninth grade, but she later obtained a GED. She testified that she had enrolled in community college, but she had not begun taking classes. As best we can determine from the record, for her entire life, Marie lived with either the Littles or her grandmother, who lived directly next door to the Littles. According to Dave, while Marie and Nicole were living with him and Tabitha, Marie would occasionally leave for days at a time with no explanation regarding where she had been.

¶ 45. Marie’s employment history is very limited. During 2008, she worked at a gas station for thirty days, and she testified that she “sat with a lady” for “[t]wo and a half years.” Marie admitted that she had never been able to provide for Nicole’s financial needs, and Dave testified that Marie had never provided a “clean, loving, and drug[-]free home” for Nicole. According to Marie, she had applied for a job at a convenience store, a grocery store, and Walmart, but she had not attempted to find a job through other resources, such as one of the Mississippi Department of Employment Security’s WIN Job Centers or classified ads in the newspaper.

¶ 46. Marie has an extensive history of drug involvement. She testified that she had tried “every drug but heroin.” Amy testified that she had seen Marie “crush pills and snort them.” Amy also had seen Marie lose consciousness because of drugs — “usually at night.” Dave also saw Marie lose consciousness, but he assumed that she did so because of alcohol. Bill testified that Marie’s life was “out of control” because of drugs. And Jane testified that more often than not, she had seen Marie while Marie was impaired.

¶ 47. On January 24, 2005, Marie was found guilty of possession of marijuana. Two months after Nicole was born, Marie lost consciousness after she ingested morphine. She had to be rushed to an emergency room and then transferred to a hospital in Jackson, Mississippi. The record contains a copy of a clipping from the January 21, 2010 issue of “The Daily Leader,” a newspaper that covers Brookhaven, Mississippi, and other areas in southwest Mississippi. According to that clipping, Marie had recently been arrested for driving under the influence. The record does not indicate the resolution of that charge.

¶ 48. During DHS’s unannounced July 2010 visit, Marie told a social worker that she could not urinate for a drug test, despite the fact that Marie drank “an extensive amount of water” during the visit and DHS waited for more than an hour. Marie also refused to provide hair for a hair-follicle test. Nicole was subsequently placed in DHS custody.

¶ 49. Marie was scheduled to provide hair for a hair-follicle test on August 11, 2010, but she did not appear for the test. The next month, Marie was charged with DUI. On November 2, 2010, Marie failed a drug test. She claimed that her positive test resulted from prescribed medication, but she never provided documentation to corroborate her claim. Marie subsequently entered a service agreement with DHS.

¶ 50. As part of her service agreement, on December 28, 2010, Marie began treatment with Newhaven Recovery Center in Brookhaven. Marie remained in treatment through February 12, 2011. As an additional part of her service agreement, Marie was to “become active in After Care Services that include individual and group counseling and random drug screening.” Marie did not comply with that portion of her service agreement.

¶ 51. DHS helped Marie participate in “Born Free,” a program administered by Catholic Charities in Jackson, Mississippi. Marie and Nicole arrived at Born Free on Tuesday, March 8, 2011. Three days later, Marie quit, despite being warned that her decision could result in the termination of her parental rights. Additionally, Marie left without Nicole, and Marie did not inform Nicole that she was leaving. Nicole first discovered that Marie had left without her when the Normans arrived to pick up Nicole. Afterward, DHS requested that Marie enter a subsequent service agreement or write her own plan regarding her intent to regain custody of Nicole. Marie refused.

¶ 52. During the first day of trial, Marie appeared to be impaired. The record indicates that her speech was slurred, and she had trouble understanding and answering questions. But Marie testified that she had not taken any medication. Marie agreed to take a drug test. The drug test revealed that Marie had barbitu-ates in her system. Marie claimed she had been prescribed that medication, but she could not provide any documentation to corroborate her claim. And Marie testified that she could not remember the physician’s name who had prescribed the barbituates. When confronted with her earlier testimony that she had not taken any medication, Marie said that she “didn’t think of those.”

¶ 53. As stated above, section 93-17-7(2)(c) allows the adoption of a child over a parent’s objection when “[t]he parent suffers from ... substance abuse or chemical dependency which makes him [or her] unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time or in the reasonably near future based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.” This Court has upheld a chancellor’s decision to grant a petition for adoption where there was evidence that a parent admitted to drug use and tested positive for drugs “throughout [the] children’s lives and within the time period of [the adoption] proceedings.” In re M.C., 92 So.3d at 1289 (¶ 26). There was substantial evidence that Marie suffered from substance abuse and chemical dependency. Marie’s history of substance abuse speaks for itself. New-som, an expert witness on addiction and counseling, testified that Marie was “definitely an addict.” Bean, the guardian ad litem, testified that Marie was “in denial.” And it was reasonable for the guardian ad litem to conclude that “from day one[, Marie] has been defiant.” Newsom opined that Marie needed inpatient treatment and follow-up care. The guardian ad litem testified that he had “firm convictions that Marie’s parental rights should be terminated.” Leigh Kirkland, a social worker employed by DHS, testified regarding the basis of DHS’s recommendation to terminate Marie’s parental rights. Kirkland testified:

[F]irst, [Marie] did not complete the service agreement; she did not maintain a stable environment; and she was repeatedly asked to contact the [a]gency. She was instructed by the [c]ourt to participate in a treatment center after she completed New Haven [sic]. She did not comply with that. She was admitted [to Born Free] on March 8, 2011, and [she] left on March 11, 20[1]1.... I actually turned to [Marie] in [c]ourt last year and explained how important it was to follow through with treatment and complete it, and I remember saying, [“T]his is most probably your last chance. If you don’t do this, and [you] leave [Born Free], it will be hard [for you] to get [Nicole] back.[”]

¶ 54. Additionally, there was substantial evidence that Marie’s substance abuse made her unable to provide an adequate permanent home for Nicole at the time of the hearing or in the reasonably near future. Marie had custody of Nicole from the time that Nicole was born until DHS removed Nicole from Dave, Tabitha, and Marie’s home. But Marie never had to care for Nicole on an ongoing, consistent basis without assistance from her parents. Dave testified that Marie had never provided a “clean, loving, and drug[-]free home” for Nicole. Marie occasionally lost consciousness due to her substance abuse. Dave testified that Marie would sometimes leave for days at a time with no explanation as to where she had been. Marie had no home of her own. She testified that she was moving out of her parents’ house, and moving into her grandmother’s house. But Marie’s grandmother’s house was next door to her parents’ house. Thus, Marie would not have placed any distance between herself and what the chancellor characterized as the “permissive drug culture” that existed at her parents’ house. Marie conceded that she was not able to provide for Nicole financially.

¶ 55. There was substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s decision to terminate Marie’s parental rights. Marie was provided with numerous opportunities to address her substance-abuse problem. She chose not to seek follow-up care after she left Newhaven. She failed or refused to take multiple drug tests. She chose to leave Born Free just three days after she arrived. She chose to leave Nicole behind. And although she testified that she had not taken any medication, she was under the influence of barbituates during the first day of the hearing. There was substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s decision that it was in Nicole’s best interest to grant the Normans’ petition to adopt her. We find no merit to Marie’s claim that the chancellor erred when he terminated her parental rights and allowed the Normans to adopt Nicole.

¶ 56. THE JUDGMENT OF THE FRANKLIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. JAMES, J„ DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . Based on the sensitive and confidential nature of these proceedings, we have substituted fictitious names for all parties.

      . The identity of Nicole’s father is unknown.

      . Bill is Kate’s father. Bill is also related to the appellees in that he is Jane’s son and Richard’s stepson. Amy and Bill were not in a relationship when Kate was born, but they eventually married during August 2008.

      . Dave later pled guilty to manufacturing marijuana. He was sentenced to five years of probation.

      .Based on documentary evidence and Tabitha’s testimony, during the two years prior to trial, she had received prescriptions for Opa-na, oxycodone, hydrocodone, Flexeril, tizani-dine, Remeron, Zoloft, Valium, Klonopin, and Xanax. She did not take all of those medications at the same time. For example, when she began taking Klonopin, she stopped taking Xanax. And she stopped taking Opana when she began taking oxycodone.

      . The supreme court went on to hold:
      What purpose did the legislature intend by designating parties to an adoption proceeding whose consent was not necessary to its validity? We are of the opinion the legislature’s intention was to bring into the suit those persons most likely to be familiar with the background and needs of the person sought to be adopted so they could give testimony concerning his or her best interest.... This of course, accords with our many decisions concerning children wherein we have stated that the best interest of the child is paramount. The designated parties thus become witnesses concerning the facts known to them to aid the trial court in its solemn determination of whether to grant or deny an adoption. We think the testimony from those who are close kin to a child is most significant because, in theory, they love the child best and would give truthful testimony as to the child's best and enduring interest.

        Martin, 427 So.2d at 1376-77.

      .According to Amy, her part-time work in a bar was the only job that she had ever had, aside from her participation in a work-study program while she was enrolled at Pearl River Community College. Amy testified that she had applied for jobs at local retail businesses, but she had not pursued other employment resources, such as the WIN Job Center.

      . Bill’s first public-intoxication conviction was on May 30, 2001. During July 2001, Bill was convicted of possession of marijuana.

      . According to Jim O’Brien, a DHS social worker, DHS received a report regarding drug abuse in Dave and Tabitha’s home shortly after Mike died. The record does not corroborate the testimony that Amy and Bill filed a report shortly before Mike died.

      . The record contains a copy of a pamphlet from Jacob's Well. The pamphlet describes the facility as an “inter-denominational, six-month, resident, Bible[-]based, worship and work[-]recovery program.” Jacob’s Well claims that it “treat[s] addiction NOT as addiction but as SIN." Furthermore, Jacob’s Well's stated philosophy is that “men and women can be completely healed of and set free from destructive behaviors such as alco-hoi, drug, sexual, pomo-graphic[,] and gambling addictions

      . Amy consistently bristled when she was challenged with the “once-an-addict-always-an-addict” philosophy. Years earlier, she had left the Fairchild Treatment Center because she disagreed that she would always be an addict. And she declined to attend any more of Tabitha's meetings with Newsom after Newsom said Amy was a "certified addict.”

      . The record indicates that during a July 2010 shelter hearing before the Franklin County Youth Court, Marie said she was moving out of her parents' home and moving into a house with a married couple. It is unclear whether she actually did so. When Marie testified during the hearing on the Normans' petition to adopt Kate and Nicole, Marie said she was living with her parents.

      . Newhaven Recovery Center is a division of the Southwest Mississippi Mental Health Complex. However, according to Newsom, Newhaven did not offer the level of treatment that Marie required.

      . Arcine Ellison, an employee of Born Free, testified that "Born Free is a residential treatment center for pregnant women or women with small children under the age of five."

      .Newsom testified that "[a] barbituate is a psychotropic drag” that "causes mental changes.”