author: ROWE, J.

text:
    Warren Lee EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-624.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied June 11, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Courtenay H. Miller, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brittany Ann Rhodaback, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   On Motion for Clarification or Certification and Motion for Rehearing

ROWE, J.

We grant the appellant’s Motion for Clarification or Certification and Motion for Rehearing, withdraw our previous opinion filed on April 14, 2014, and substitute the following in its place.

After entering a guilty plea, Warren Lee Edwards was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated battery, and aggravated battery upon a pregnant victim and was sentenced to 19 years’ imprisonment for attempted murder and to concurrent terms of 15 years’ imprisonment on the remaining counts. Edwards appeals his judgment and sentence, raising two issues. We affirm the first issue without discussion and write only to address Edwards’ argument that his convictions for aggravated battery and aggravated battery upon a pregnant victim violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Edwards’ judgment and sentence.

Facts

The factual basis for the plea for which Edwards was sentenced states that between June 16, 1997, and June 17, 1997, Edwards beat the pregnant victim, D.N., with a table leg with a screw attached to it, that Edwards told D.N. during the beating that he intended to kill her that night, and that as a result of the beating, D.N.’s jaw was broken in two places, and D.N. suffered injuries to her eyes, face, scalp, and foot. At the time of the beating, Edwards knew D.N. was pregnant with his child.

Analysis

In Partch v. State, 48 So.3d 758, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), this Court set forth a three-step inquiry to be applied when evaluating a double jeopardy claim. First, the Court must determine whether the charged offenses occurred within the same criminal episode; second, the Court must to determine whether there was more than one distinct act upon which the offenses were predicated. Id. at 760. If the Court finds that the charges arose from the same criminal episode and were not predicated on distinct acts, then the third step is to determine whether each offense has an element the other does not, i.e., the Blockburger same-elements test as codified in section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes, to determine whether separate offenses exist. Partch, 43 So.3d at 760. The third step will be necessary only if the court determines that the charged offenses occurred in the same criminal episode or in the same act. Id. at 762. If there were different acts or different episodes of battery giving rise to the two aggravated battery charges, there is no double jeopardy violation. Id. at 759-60; see also Hayes v. State, 803 So.2d 695, 699 (Fla.2001).

Edwards asserts that his dual convictions arose during the same criminal episode and from “a single act of battery.” However, Edwards fails to cite any portion of the record to support his assertion that there was but “a single act of battery.” Further, based upon our review of the record, it is not at all clear whether the two aggravated battery convictions arose during a single criminal episode or whether the convictions were predicated on distinct acts. The factual basis of the plea entered in the record is not specific with regard to the precise timing of the offenses, providing only that the acts occurred “between June 16th and June 17th of 1997.” There is no indication whether or not a temporal break occurred between the acts giving rise to the victim’s multiple injuries. Nor does the factual basis of the plea indicate whether the battery convictions arose from distinct acts; instead the record reflects that the victim was beaten with a table leg with a screw, and that the victim sustained multiple injuries: her jaw was broken in two places, and she suffered injuries to her eyes, face, scalp, and foot. The multiple injuries could very well have arisen from two or more distinct criminal acts. Based on the limited record available to this Court, we are unable to determine whether the offenses that formed the basis for the plea occurred during a single criminal episode or whether the convictions were based on distinct acts. The burden of proof was Edwards’ to demonstrate error in this case. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Combee, 883 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Because Edwards has failed to demonstrate from the record that his two aggravated battery charges were based on a single act, he has failed to meet his burden to support a finding of double jeopardy. See Hayes, 803 So.2d at 699; Partch, 43 So.3d at 760-61.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, C.J., and WETHERELL, J., concur.

      . The procedural history leading to Edwards' convictions and sentences in this case spans a number of years, involving numerous motions and court proceedings from July 6, 1998, to Edwards’ sentencing on February 1, 2013. The procedural history in this case directly relates to the first issue raised by Edwards, which we are affirming without further discussion.

      . Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

      . We note that to support his double jeopardy argument, Edwards cites, without discussion, Simmons v. State, 554 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), in which this court held that reversal was required where "[a] single battery gave rise to two separate charges, one under section 784.045(1)(a) and the other under section 784.045(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987).” However, Simmons dealt with the 1987 version of section 784.045(1), which refers to use of a deadly weapon. Under the 1987 version of the statute, sections 784.045(1)(a) and (b) read,
      (1) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:
      (a) Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or
      (b) Uses a deadly weapon.
      In 1988, new language was added to the statute, creating subsection (b) as the crime of aggravated battery on a pregnant victim, and designating the former subsections (a) and (b) as subparagraphs 1. and 2. under subsection (1)(a). Ch. 88-344, § 3, at 1825, Laws of Fla. (effective October 1, 1988). Because the crime of aggravated battery on a pregnant victim was not created until 1988, the 1987 version of the statute at issue in Simmons could not support Edwards’ argument for error.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STEVENSON, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    C.J.T., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D12-4628.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ellen Griffin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cynthia L. Comras, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   STEVENSON, J.

C.J.T. appeals from a final order of disposition. Because the disposition of forty-five days in secure detention was unauthorized, we reverse. Moreover, because this is “an issue capable of repetition and tending to evade review,” we write briefly to address why section 985.26(3), Florida Statutes (2012), is not a sentencing alternative. K.P. v. State, 952 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

C.J.T. was simultaneously on probation for four separate eases. The State filed a petition for violation of probation in each case, and, at Defendant’s VOP hearing, the trial judge adjudicated him guilty of the underlying offense for each petition filed. At the disposition hearing, for three of the cases, the trial court ordered that Defendant spend fifteen days in secure detention, with the fifteen-day periods to run consecutively. Defendant would then be placed in a level six moderate-risk commitment program for the fourth case.

To support the forty-five-day secure detention disposition, the trial court relied on section 985.26(3). In part, section 985.26 provides:

(2) A child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court. However, upon good cause being shown that the nature of the charge requires additional time for the prosecution or defense of the case, the court may extend the length of detention for an additional 9 days if the child is charged with an offense that would be, if committed by an adult, a capital felony, a life felony, a felony of the first degree, or a felony of the second degree involving violence against any individual.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (2), a child may not be held in secure, nonse-cure, or home detention care for more than 15 days following the entry of an order of adjudication.

§ 985.26(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2012). When read in conjunction with section 985.27(1)(b) (“Postcommitment detention while awaiting placement”), it appears that section 985.26(3) applies when an order of adjudication has been entered but the trial court determines that continued secure detention is necessary for logistical reasons, such as keeping the child and public safe while awaiting space in a selected program. Section 985.26(3) does not, however, provide a disposition alternative. Instead, the trial court should have relied upon section 985.433, Florida Statutes (2012), which sets forth disposition alternatives for juvenile offenders, but, notably, does not include ordering that the child be held in secure detention. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s disposition that C.J.T. spend forty-five consecutive days in secure detention.

Reversed.

TAYLOR and CONNER, JJ., concur.

      . For instance, section 985.27(1)(b) provides that the department may seek an order from the court authorizing continued detention of a child awaiting placement in a moderate-risk residential program; "[hjowever, such continued detention in secure detention care may not exceed 15 days after entry of the commitment order” with certain exceptions not applicable to the instant case. Juveniles awaiting placement in a high or maximum risk facility, however, must be detained. § 985.27(1)(c)-(d), Fla. Stat. (2012).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Jeremy Marquise CARTER, Appellant, v. Luis MENDEZ, Doris Mendez, Eladio Armesto-Garcia, Pablo Beades Torres, Lesly Torres, Manuel A. Cordova, Miriam Ortega, Carlos Eduardo Acosta, Douglas Mercado, and Oscar Suarez, Appellees.
    No. 4D13-1668.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Jeremy Marquise Carter, Jesup, pro se.

      No brief filed on behalf of appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Jeremy Marquise Carter appeals the trial court’s sua sponte order dismissing his complaint against the appellees. Carter argues that he was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the complaint being dismissed and that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice. We agree.

On July 20, 2012, Carter filed a complaint against the appellees alleging a breach of contract and unjust enrichment based on written loan agreements executed by the appellees.

On October 5, 2012, the trial court entered an order dismissing the complaint as legally insufficient. The trial court then vacated this order, pursuant to a motion for reconsideration filed by Carter. Within the order granting reconsideration, the trial court ordered that “[Carter] shall serve all of the [appellees] within 120 days of the rendition of this order,” citing to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j).

Several of the appellees filed affidavits or letters with the court denying ever having entered into such a loan agreement or claiming that he or she was not the correct person sought to be served with the complaint.

On April 2, 2013, the trial court entered an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice for failure to serve. The trial court, sua sponte, reviewed the court file, and stated that:

Of the ten (10) named defendants, seven (7) have communicated to the Court that they are not the right party and have never heard of the Plaintiff and have no knowledge any [sic] of his allegations. The remaining three (3) named defendants have not responded. Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Carter filed a motion for rehearing, which the trial court denied.

Carter appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint. We agree that the trial court erred in dismissing Carter’s complaint without notice and an opportunity to be heard, and in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

“The propriety of the trial court’s dismissal is a pure question of law as to which our standard of review is de novo. Todd v. Johnson, 965 So.2d 255, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (quoting Sumner v. Gros, 958 So.2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)).

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j) states:

If service of the initial process and initial pleading is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after filing of the initial pleading directed to that defendant the court, on its own initiative after notice or on motion, shall direct that service be effected within a specified time or shall dismiss the action without prejudice or drop that defendant as a party; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070(j). (emphasis added).

The trial court erred in dismissing Carter’s complaint without giving him notice or the opportunity to be heard. Rule 1.070(j) states that a trial court may act on its own initiative; however, the court may only act “on its own initiative after notice.” Likewise, the First District, in Lenoir v. Jones, held that “[a] plaintiff is entitled to both notice and the opportunity to show good cause why process has not been served prior to a trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of his or her case.” 979 So.2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citations omitted).

We have also held that notice and an opportunity to be heard are necessary due process requirements before a court can dismiss a case, sua sponte, for failure to serve. See Connelly v. Crown Cruise Line, Inc. S.A., 636 So.2d 886, 887 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In Connelly, we stated:

Appellant correctly argues that the trial court had no authority to dismiss the instant case without giving him an opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he might have regarding the reasons he did not serve the defendants within the required time frame. Based on Rule 1.070(i)[] and fundamental requirements of due process, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs case without giving him an opportunity to show good cause why service was not made within the required time.

Id.; see also Fed. Home Loan Mortg., Corp. v. Lascio, 653 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

The trial court also erred in dismissing Carter’s complaint with prejudice. That action was not one of the options available to it under rule 1.070(j). See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070(j) (emphasis added) (“[T]he court ... shall dismiss the action without prejudice or drop that defendant.”); Miranda v. Young, 19 So.3d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“We conclude in the case before us that the circuit court erred in dismissing [the plaintiffl’s complaint with prejudice. First, dismissal with prejudice was not one of the options available to the court under rule 1.070(j). The court could have directed that service be perfected within a certain amount of time, it could have dismissed the action without prejudice, or it could have dismissed the defendants who had not been served.”).

We therefore reverse the trial court’s order dismissing Carter’s complaint and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and Remanded.

STEVENSON, CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

      . In 1996, subdivision (i) of rule i.070 was redesignated as subdivision (j). Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070 committee notes, 1996 amendment.


text:
    Ronald B. LOSNER, unknown heir of Shirley Losner, Appellant, v. The AUSTRALIAN OF PALM BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D13-1669.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Andrea H. Dueñas of Law Office of A. Dueñas, P.A., Lantana, for appellant.
    Daniel L. Wallach and K. Joy Mattingly of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Miramar, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this foreclosure action, Appellant Ronald Losner, as an heir of the deceased owner of a unit in Appellee The Australian of Palm Beach Condominium Association’s (“Association”) property, appeals the trial court’s order of final summary judgment of foreclosure on the unit for unpaid condominium assessments. Appellant’s first two challenges concern the sufficiency of the service by publication and the content of the amended claim of lien under section 718.116(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2012). We find these first two challenges without merit and affirm the judgment of foreclosure for the unpaid quarterly assessments without further comment.

Appellant’s last challenge is to whether it was error for the trial court to find in favor of the Association on two special assessments in addition to the quarterly assessments when the special assessments were not contained in any pleading. We agree with this challenge, reverse the final judgment in part, and remand for correction.

We review an order granting final summary judgment de novo. Wadsworth v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 128 So.3d 688, 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). “Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).

Section 718.116(5)(b), Florida Statutes, states that a claim of lien by a condominium association for unpaid assessments “secures all unpaid assessments that are due and that may accrue after the claim of lien is recorded and through the entry of final judgment.” (emphasis added). However, the “word ‘accrue’ references assessments already made before a claim of lien is filed, but coming due afterwards[,]” but it does not refer to additional assessments for other purposes, such as separate assessments that are assessed against an owner after the time the complaint to foreclose on a claim of lien is filed. George v. Beach Club Villas Condo. Ass’n, 833 So.2d 816, 819-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). In George, the Third District reversed an award of additional assessments that were not contained in the association’s pleadings, concluding that litigating these additional assessments violated the owner’s due process rights. Id. at 820. Adding assessments not naturally accruing from assessments pled in the complaint violates due process because the owner does not have notice to prepare a defense, including alleging separate defenses in regards to the later added assessments. See id. We have previously cited to George with approval for the proposition that “it is improper to ‘piggyback’ unpled claimed assessments on top of those claimed in the claim of lien and the foreclosure complaint.” Saar v. Wellesley at Lake Clarke Shores Homeowners Ass’n, 68 So.3d 417, 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); see also Miller v. Evergreen Lakes Homeowners Ass’n, 19 So.3d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding a final judgment of foreclosure for unpaid condominium assessments only as to two unpled special assessments improperly awarded to the association).

The trial court erred in the instant case in awarding the Association its claims of two special assessments in the final judgment where those claims were not found in a proper pleading. Thus, we reverse the portion of the final judgment awarding the Association two special assessments, as well as any interest, fees, and costs associated with that award, where the Association was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to these assessments. We also remand for the trial court to correct the final judgment in accordance with this opinion.

Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Remanded.

GROSS, GERBER and FORST, JJ„ concur.


text:
    Octavia MATHIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-170.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    June 17, 2014.
    Octavia Mathis, Quincy, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Angela E. Noble, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Octavia Mathis appeals a circuit court order that summarily denied her motion for jail time credit filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The September 2013 motion should have been filed under the newly-enacted Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801, which became effective on July 1, 2013. Considering rule 3.801, appellant’s motion is timely and it contains the requisite oath. However, it did not comply with the requirements of rule 3.801. Notably, appellant failed to address whether she waived any jail credit at sentencing, particularly in light of her plea. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(c)(5). See also Johnson v. State, 60 So.3d 1045, 1051 (Fla.2011).

Consequently, we affirm without prejudice for appellant to file a sworn and legally sufficient rule 3.801 motion within the time remaining under the rule. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(b) (“For sentences imposed prior to July 1, 2013, a motion under this rule may be filed on or before July 1, 2014.”).

Affirmed without prejudice.

WARNER, CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Barry S. RANSHI.
    No. 2014-B-0767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 13, 2014.
   ORDER

| Considering the Motion to Revoke Conditional Admission filed jointly by respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent’s conditional admission to the practice of law in the State of Louisiana be revoked, effective immediately. Respondent may not reapply for admission until he can demonstrate at least a one-year period of sobriety and compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract with the Lawyers Assistance Program. In the event respondent chooses to submit an application for readmission, it shall be filed with the Disciplinary Board, which shall appoint a hearing committee to take evidence and report to this court whether respondent should be readmitted to the bar and allowed to practice law in Louisiana. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel shall participate in the hearing and provide such information, evidence, and recommendations to the hearing committee as may be appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall pay all costs associated with these proceedings.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Bernette J. Johnson

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Devin W. MORRIS.
    No. 2014-B-0730.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| Respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which the parties agreed that respondent has engaged in conduct that violated Rules 1.3,1.4(a)(3)(4), 1.5(f)(3), 1.16, 8.1(c), and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Devin W. Morris, Louisiana Bar Roll number 30162, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a one-year period of unsupervised probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Craig Alan DAVIS.
    No. 2014-B-0749.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

|/The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent failed to timely remit funds to a third party and failed to provide full disclosure to a court about the disbursal of the funds. Following the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Craig Alan Davis, Louisiana Bar Roll number 28024, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for six months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a one-year period of unsupervised probation. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re James L. HILBURN.
    No. 2014-B-0763.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

It The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent filed a petition for damages for defamation against a defendant based on the defendant’s filing of a disciplinary complaint with the ODC. Respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that James L. Hilburn, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20221, be and he hereby is publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


author: FOR THE COURT: /s/ Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana KNOLL, J., WEIMER, J., HUGHES, J.,

text:
    In re Johnny S. ANZALONE.
    No. 2014-B-0812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   ORDER

| Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the response thereto filed by respondent,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Johnny S. Anzalone, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22723, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.

KNOLL, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Weimer.

WEIMER, J., dissents with reasons.

HUGHES, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Weimer.

FOR THE COURT: /s/ Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana

KNOLL, J.,

dissenting.

|2I dissent for the reasons assigned by Justice Weimer.

WEIMER, J.,

dissenting.

|SI would order a hearing prior to a determination of whether or not interim suspension should be imposed on the respondent.

HUGHES, J.,

dissenting.

|4I respectfully dissent for the reasons assigned by Justice Weimer.


text:
    DISHMAN & BENNETT SPECIALTY CO., INC. v. QUALITY PRODUCTION SERVICES, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0389.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

hThe district court did not err in concluding that under the unique facts and circumstances presented in this case, relator did not intend to abandon its claims in the eoncursus action, as shown by its continuous litigation of the closely-related lien action. See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 00-3010 (La.5/15/01), 785 So.2d 779 (explaining that the abandonment article was not intended to dismiss those cases in which a plaintiff has clearly demonstrated before the court during the prescribed period that he does not intend to abandon the action).

Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the district court is reinstated. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    In re James H. CARTER, Jr.
    No. 2013-B-2005.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

Lin 2009, respondent practiced law while he was ineligible to do so. For this misconduct, the court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months, fully deferred, subject to a two-year period of probation with the condition that he attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School. In re: Carter, 13-2005 (La.10/11/13), 128 So.3d 990.

The ODC now files a “Motion to Defer Probation,” representing that on July 1, 2013, respondent, at his request, became an inactive member of the Louisiana State Bar Association. In light of respondent’s change in bar membership status, the ODC requests that the two-year period of probation be deferred and held in abeyance until respondent returns to active membership status. We agree that the requested deferral is appropriate.

DECREE

Considering the Motion to Defer Probation filed by the ODC, it is ordered that the two-year period of probation imposed against respondent in In re: Carter, 13-2005 (La.10/11/13), 128 So.3d 990, be deferred and held in abeyance until respondent returns to active membership status with the Louisiana State Bar Association. It is further ordered that respondent shall immediately notify the ODC upon his request to return to active status.

VICTORY, J., recused.


text:
    In re Amanda LUNA.
    No. 2014-OB-0791.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   ORDER

11 Considering the Petition for Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by petitioner, Amanda Renee Luna,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Amanda Renee Luna, Louisiana Bar Roll number 28953, seeking to voluntarily resign from the practice of law in the State of Louisiana pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVIII, § 5 be and is hereby granted. FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Kenner O. MILLER, Jr.
    No. 2014-B-0538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Kenner 0. Miller, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently suspended from practice.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history.

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1983. In September 2007, the ODC filed three counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging that he neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to properly withdraw from the representation of his clients, engaged in dishonest conduct, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Prior to the formal hearing, respondent and the ODC stipulated to the allegations of the formal charges. The matter then proceeded to a hearing in mitigation. During the hearing, respondent presented evidence suggesting that his misconduct was caused by cocaine abuse, for which he had been treated. Respondent also claimed that he had abstained from the use of cocaine for more than one year prior to the hearing. However, the ODC received information from the Lawyers Assistance Program that respondent’s January 27, 2009 drug screen [2was positive for cocaine. Consequently, the ODC filed with this court a petition seeking respondent’s immediate interim suspension from the practice of law. Respondent filed a response to the ODC’s petition agreeing to the entry of an order of interim suspension. Accordingly, we ordered that respondent be placed on interim suspension. In re: Miller, 09-0271 (La.2/11/09), 2 So.3d 418.

Thereafter, the ODC proceeded with the prosecution of the formal charges originally filed against respondent in September 2007. In May 2010, after considering the charges, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for eighteen months, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension. In re: Miller, 09-2680 (La.5/21/10), 34 So.3d 839 (“Miller I”). Respondent has not been reinstated from this suspension and, thus, remains suspended from the practice of law.

Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at issue in the instant proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES

Between December 1, 2005 and February 27, 2009, respondent commingled, converted, and/or misappropriated to his own use the sum of $208,260.83. This amount consisted of funds due to various clients and third-party medical providers from the proceeds of settlements in personal injury cases.

The ODC’s auditor documented the details of respondent’s commingling, conversion, and/or misappropriation of the funds in a report dated March 20, 2012. Specifically, the report indicated that respondent deposited $13,100 of his personal funds into his client trust account. He also paid certain operating expenses, such as payroll and rent, directly from the trust account. Additionally, he overpaid his attorney’s fees and costs from settlement funds in several client matters, resulting in deficient funds to pay clients and third-party medical providers their portions of lathe settlements. Finally, respondent’s trust account was overdrawn in July 2007 and January 2008.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In January 2013, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15(a)(b) (safekeeping property of clients or third parties), 1.15(d) (failure to timely remit funds to a client or third person), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After reviewing the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee found that, between December 1, 2005 and February 27, 2009, respondent commingled, converted, and/or misappropriated $208,260.83. The funds were owed to various clients and third-party medical providers as a result of settlements obtained during this time period in personal injury cases. The committee further found a factual basis for the report prepared by the ODC’s | ¿auditor. Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee considered the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the ease of Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), wherein the court set forth guidelines for sanctions in cases involving an attorney’s conversion of client funds. The committee found no mitigating factors present and did not address the presence of any aggravating factors. However, it did determine, based on the serious nature of the misconduct and respondent’s failure to answer the formal charges, that permanent disbarment was the only viable sanction.

Accordingly, the committee recommended respondent be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the factual allegations of the formal charges were deemed admitted and have been conclusively established. The board also found that the hearing committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct to determine respondent violated the rules as alleged in the formal charges. Accordingly, the board adopted the committee’s findings of fact and law.

The board determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients and the legal profession. His conduct caused harm to his clients and third-party medical providers by depriving them of their funds. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that the baseline sanction is disbarment.

|fiIn aggravation, the board found the following factors: a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1983), and indifference to making restitution. The board determined that no mitigating factors are supported by the record.

After considering respondent’s conduct in light of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E, as well as this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended he be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s report and recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal | ficonclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The record in this deemed admitted matter indicates that respondent commingled, converted, and/or misappropriated $208,260.83 in client and third-party funds over a period of approximately three years. As such, he has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

We agree with the disciplinary board’s assessment that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients and the legal profession. He also violated duties owed to the public and caused significant, actual harm to several clients and third-party medical providers. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is disbarment. However, in their respective reports, the hearing committee and the disciplinary board have concluded that respondent’s offenses are so egregious that he should be permanently prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar. We agree.

|7In Appendix E to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we set forth guidelines illustrating the types of conduct which might warrant permanent disbarment. While these guidelines are not intended to bind this court in its decision-making process, they present useful information concerning the types of conduct which we might consider worthy of permanent disbarment.

For purposes of the instant case, Guidelines 1 and 9 are relevant. Those guidelines detail the following conduct:

GUIDELINE 1. Repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm.
GUIDELINE 9. Instances of serious attorney misconduct or conviction of a serious crime, when the misconduct or conviction is preceded by suspension or disbarment for prior instances of serious attorney misconduct or conviction of a serious crime. Serious crime is defined in Rule XIX, Section 19. Serious attorney misconduct is defined for purposes of these guidelines as any misconduct which results in a suspension of more than one year.

Guideline 1 is clearly implicated by respondent’s knowing and intentional commingling, conversion, and/or misappropriation of $208,260.83 from several clients and third-party medical providers over a period of approximately three years. Likewise, Guideline 9 is applicable, as respondent’s current misconduct is serious attorney misconduct and was preceded by his eighteen-month suspension in Miller I for prior instances of serious attorney misconduct.

Respondent’s conduct demonstrates a disregard for his clients and for his duties as an attorney. In order to protect the public and maintain the high standards of the legal profession in this state, we find respondent should not be allowed the opportunity to return to the practice of law in the future.

Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and permanently disbar respondent.

_yDECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Kenner 0. Miller, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 1963, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Without explanation, the board stated that respondent had refused to cooperate with the ODC's investigation of this matter. We note that respondent is not charged with a failure to cooperate.


author: PER CURIAM. CLARK, J.,

text:
    In re Craig T. BROUSSARD.
    No. 2014-OB-0545.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ON APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT

PER CURIAM.

11 This proceeding arises out of an application for reinstatement filed by petitioner, Craig T. Broussard, an attorney currently suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In In re: Broussard, 12-0749 (La.5/04/12), 88 So.3d 443, we accepted a joint petition for consent discipline filed by petitioner and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”). Pursuant to the petition for consent discipline, we suspended petitioner from the practice of law for three years, with all but one year and one day deferred, for creating a false document and providing it to his client without advising that it was a fabrication.

Petitioner subsequently filed an application for reinstatement with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The ODC took no position regarding the application for reinstatement. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

Following the hearing, both the hearing committee and the disciplinary board recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law, subject to conditions. Neither petitioner nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation; however, on April 30, 2014, we ordered the parties to submit [2briefs addressing the issue of whether petitioner’s reinstatement to the practice of law should be conditioned upon medical monitoring by the Lawyers Assistance Program (“LAP”). In response to our order, both parties filed briefs acknowledging that such monitoring was appropriate.

After considering the record in its entirety, we find petitioner has met his burden of proving that he is entitled to be reinstated to the practice of law. Nevertheless, as recognized by the disciplinary board and agreed to by the parties, further precautions are warranted to insure that the public will be protected upon petitioner’s return to practice. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(J).

Accordingly, we will order that petitioner be conditionally reinstated to the practice of law, subject to a five-year period of probation governed by the following conditions:

1. Petitioner shall request that the ODC appoint a practice monitor to supervise his professional activities during the probationary period, including his compliance with trust account rules, accounting procedures, and office management procedures. Petitioner shall comply with all reasonable requests of his practice monitor.
2. Petitioner shall cooperate with the ODC, and shall comply with any and all requirements imposed upon him by the ODC.
3. Petitioner shall continue medication management and supportive counseling with his treating physician for a five-year period.
4. Petitioner shall enter into a five-year mental health monitoring contract with LAP. A report prepared by petitioner’s treating physician certifying petitioner’s continued compliance with his treatment plan shall be submitted to LAP on a quarterly basis.
5. Upon the expiration of the current conditional reinstatement period, the ODC, after appropriate consultation with the Director of LAP, shall file a ^report in this court in which it shall recommend whether the conditional reinstatement shall be allowed to terminate or shall be extended.

Should petitioner fail to comply with these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated immediately, or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record and the briefs filed by the parties, it is ordered that Craig Thomas Brous-sard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 26217, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to the conditions set forth herein. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.

CLARK, J., dissents with reasons.

CLARK, J.,

dissenting.

|4The majority errs in reinstating petitioner following his suspension for creating a false document with forged signatures and providing it to his client. Petitioner’s knowing deception is conduct we likely would not accept from a new applicant for admission, and it demonstrates that petitioner is not entitled to the privilege of practicing law in Louisiana.

By reinstating petitioner, this court fails to uphold the high standards demanded of those engaged in the legal profession. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.


author: PER CURIAM. HUGHES, J.,

text:
    Virgil MASON, et al. v. EXCO OPERATING COMPANY, LP and Ozark Properties, LLC.
    No. 2014-C-0426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

| ^RANTED. At issue is the proper interpretation of language contained in a cash sale deed. For the following reasons, we find the court of appeal erred in holding that all of the vendor’s interest in the property was conveyed to the vendee in the sale.

Virgil Mason inherited from his father, Willis Mason, a 1/125 interest and a 1/880 interest in a piece of immovable property. Virgil Mason also inherited from his sister, Mary Mason, a 3/880 interest in this property. Virgil Mason conveyed the following property to the Leonards in 1988:

all of Virgil Mason’s undivided interest in and to the following described property, to wit:
East ten (10) acres of SE of SW, SW of SE, Section 28, Township 16 North, Range 3 West, Less undivided 1/11 Interest to Morgan R. And Mrs. Vi-dell Robinson, Less fifteen (15) acres to V.C. Harvey for 1968, Less and undivided two (2) acres sold to V.C. Harvey for 1970, Less an undivided two (2) acres sold to V.C. Harvey for 1971, Less two (2) acres to V.C. Harvey for 1969.
This is the separate property of Virgil Mason inherited from, Willis Mason’s Estate.

(Emphasis added).

^Thereafter, R. Kenneth Jeane and Suzanne W. Jeane (“the Jeanes”) purchased the Leonards’ interest in the property.

A concursus proceeding ultimately ensued, wherein Exco Operating Company, LP (“Exco”) sought to have the dispute resolved as to who was the proper owner of the 3/880 interest Virgil Mason inherited from his sister, Mary Mason. The Masons filed a motion for summary judgment, contending the cash sale deed clearly conveyed to the Leonards only the property inherited by Virgil Mason from his father, Willis Mason. The Jeanes filed their own motion for summary judgment, arguing, to the contrary, the cash sale deed unambiguously conveyed all of Virgil Mason’s interest in the property to the Leonards, including that inherited from Mary Mason. Thus, when the Leonards sold their interest in the property to the Jeanes, the Jeanes became owners of all the interests at issue.

The trial court granted the Masons’ motion and denied the Jeanes’ motion, finding the deed’s language to be “neither unclear nor unambiguous.” Specifically, the trial court found “the concluding phrase, that it is the interest the seller inherited from the father, limits the undivided interest conveyed to that which the seller inherited from his father, the 1/125 and 1/880 interest.” It held the undivided 3/880 interest inherited by Virgil Mason from his sister, Mary Mason, was not contemplated by the cash sale deed.

The Jeanes appealed. The court of appeal reversed, finding the trial court erred in its determination that the cash sale deed did not convey all of Virgil Mason’s undivided interest in and to the property to the Leonards. The court of appeal reasoned that the provision “[tjhis is the separate property of Virgil Mason inherited |3from Willis Mason’s Estate” was intended solely to clarify that Virgil Mason was conveying his separate property only, as opposed to conveying his interest in community property shared with his wife, Mattie Mason.

In reviewing this matter, we are mindful of the rules regarding interpretation of contracts. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La.Civ.Code art. 2046. Each provision of a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. Civ.Code art. 2050. The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning. La.Civ. Code art. 2047.

Based on the foregoing rules and a clear reading of the contract, we find the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment. The cash sale deed provides for a transfer of “all of Virgil Mason’s undivided interest in and to the following described property ... [tjhis is the separate property of Virgil Mason inherited from Willis Mason’s Estate.” The latter phrase clearly clarifies that the property being sold is Virgil Mason’s undivided interest in the property he inherited from his father, Willis Mason. To hold, as the court of appeal did, that the concluding phrase only distinguishes the property as separate property, as opposed to community property, ignores the mandates of the Civil Code and the clear intent that only a portion of Virgil Mason’s interest in the property was being conveyed. The language “inherited from Willis Mason’s Estate” must be given meaning. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeal and reinstate the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

REVERSED AND REINSTATED TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.

HUGHES, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

HUGHES, J.,

dissenting.

hi am concerned that the majority misinterprets established real estate practice by giving dispositive effect to acquisition information provided only to assist the title examiner in ascertaining the nature and source of the property conveyed.

Virgil and Mary Mason acquired small interests in immovable property from the estate of Willis Mason; Virgil then acquired Mary’s interest. When Virgil sold “all” his interest in the property, the acquisition information following the property description indicated it was separate property derived from the Estate of Willis Mason.

Because community property cannot be sold or mortgaged without the signature of both spouses, it is always helpful to know whether the property conveyed is separate or community and indicating ancestors-in-title, or prior recording information, is likewise a boon to subsequent title examiners.

The majority reaches the conclusion that the acquisition language by implication excludes from the sale the interest derived from Mary Mason.

|2The acquisition information indicates the property was “inherited from Willis Mason’s Estate”; it does not specify that both Vernon and Mary inherited from that estate and that subsequently Vernon inherited Mary’s portion. However, the property is separate, and it was inherited from the Estate of Willis Mason.

Lack of precision in the acquisition information does not evidence a positive intent on the part of the vendor to reserve a portion of all the property conveyed. Such intent is usually and easily shown by simply stating “less and except the portion inherited from Mary” or “This sale does not include the portion of the above described property acquired from Mary.” No such language is found in this sale. With respect, the majority reaches greatly to reach its conclusion based on what was not said.

Acquisition information following the legal description in a deed is not part of the legal description proper, but rather is used as a means of facilitating research on the land specifically in the deed. Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Switzer, 111 So.2d 518 (La.App. 1 Cir.1959).

The court of appeal correctly determined that the words at issue were simply informative, and did not by implication contravene the stated intent of the vendor to sell all of his interest in the property. There is no language in the Cash Sale Deed that reserves or excludes from the sale the interest derived from Mary.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

      . The Mason plaintiffs filed a petition against Exco, arguing breach of contract and seeking payment for royalties for their mineral interests in the property. Exco filed a peremptory exception of nonjoinder, arguing the Jeanes could have interests in the property as well due to a 2008 title opinion. Additionally, Exco filed a reconventional demand for con-curcus, naming the Masons and the Jeanes as defendants.


text:
    In re Michael Kevin POWELL.
    No. 2014-OB-0829.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ON APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT

PER CURIAM.

11 This proceeding arises out of an application for reinstatement to the practice of law filed by petitioner, Michael Kevin Powell, an attorney currently suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was arrested at his law office in January 2012 and charged with three counts of possession of a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance. Thereafter, petitioner contacted the Lawyers Assistance Program (“LAP”) and enrolled in an inpatient substance abuse treatment program at the Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center in Rayville, Louisiana. Petitioner was diagnosed as chemically dependent at Palmetto and successfully completed its treatment program in April 2012. He was discharged with the recommendation that he sign a LAP recovery agreement incorporating aftercare requirements. Petitioner executed a five-year LAP agreement on May 2, 2012.

In April 2012, petitioner and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) filed with this court a joint petition for interim suspension based upon petitioner’s arrest. The court accepted the joint petition and interimly suspended petitioner from the practice of law on April 25, 2012. In re: Powell, 12-0874 (La.4/25/12), 87 So.3d 853.

| ¡.On May 31, 2013, petitioner and the ODC filed a joint petition for consent discipline in this court, proposing that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension. The court accepted the petition for consent discipline and imposed the proposed sanction on June 21, 2013. In re: Powell, 13-1264 (La.6/21/13), 117 So.3d 504.

In September 2013, petitioner filed an application for reinstatement with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) took no position regarding the application for reinstatement. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

Following the hearing, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law with the following conditions:

1. Petitioner shall be subject to random drug tests;
2. Petitioner shall actively participate in weekly Alcoholics Anonymous meetings;
3. Petitioner shall continue individual or group therapy for his addictions; and
4. Petitioner shall execute a new five-year LAP contract, from the date of reinstatement, to include the above conditions and any additional and necessary terms and conditions.

Neither petitioner nor the ODC objected to the committee’s recommendation.

After considering the record in its entirety, we agree with the committee that there is clear and convincing evidence of petitioner’s compliance with the reinstatement criteria. Accordingly, we will reinstate petitioner to the practice of law, subject to the conditions set forth above.

| .DECREE

Upon review of the recommendation of the hearing committee, and considering the record, it is ordered that Michael Kevin Powell, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25324, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to the conditions set forth in the hearing committee’s report. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.


text:
    In re C. Hearn TAYLOR.
    No. 2014-B-0646.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

|) This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, C. Hearn Taylor, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently ineligible to practice.

FORMAL CHARGES

In April 2010, Karen Hyorth consulted with respondent about filing an application for post-conviction relief on behalf of Phillip Schane. During the meeting, Ms. Hyorth paid respondent’s $2,500 fee in full and provided him with Mr. Schane’s legal documents to review and prepare the application. Thereafter, Ms. Hyorth made numerous attempts to contact respondent but was unsuccessful in reaching him. Several months later, respondent finally returned a call to Ms. Hyorth. Mr. Schane then learned respondent had taken no action with regard to the application for post-conviction relief.

In August 2010, Mr. Schane sent a letter to respondent in an effort to provide him with information regarding his case. Respondent failed to respond. In January 2011, Mr. Schane sent a second letter to respondent requesting that his file be returned to his sister, but again, there was no response. In May 2011, Mr. | ¡¡Schane sent a third letter to respondent requesting the return of his legal documents and the $2,500 fee. Once again, respondent failed to respond.

In October 2011, Mr. Schane filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. After receiving notice of the complaint, respondent delivered to the ODC what purported to be complainant’s file; however, the file consisted solely of documents compiled by Mr. Schane, with no indication that respondent had ever taken any action in the matter. In January 2012, the ODC instructed respondent to provide proof of any steps he had taken on Mr. Sehane’s behalf and evidence of communication or attempts to communicate with Mr. Schane. Respondent did not respond to the ODC’s request.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In December 2012, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information), 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable fee), 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.2 (failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal | shearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee made factual findings consistent with the factual allegations set forth above. Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The committee further determined that respondent violated a duty owed to his client, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent acted negligently, at best. In light of the lack of cooperation exhibited, he acted intentionally and knowingly, as well. The committee found it incredible that in spite of facing a disciplinary complaint, respondent has refused to explain his conduct.

The committee did not recognize any aggravating factors. In mitigation, the committee found the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

Considering the foregoing, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with all but sixty days deferred. The committee also recommended that respondent be ordered to refund the $2,500 fee to Mr. Schane.

The ODC objected to the recommended sanction as too lenient.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the record, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges, which were deemed admitted, and/or by the evidence submitted in | ^support of the allegations. The board also determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The board further determined that respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated a duty owed to his client. His conduct caused substantial harm to Mr. Schane, who paid respondent $2,500 to complete a specific legal matter, which was not completed. Respondent also refused to communicate with Mr. Schane, failed to do any work on his behalf, and refused to return any portion of the unearned fee. Mr. Schane is incarcerated and is unable to hire another attorney until he and Ms. Hyorth receive a refund from respondent. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that suspension is the baseline sanction.

In aggravation, the board found the following factors: a dishonest or selfish motive, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1983), and indifference to making restitution. The board found no mitigating factors are present.

Considering the facts of this case, as well as the jurisprudence of the court, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. The board also recommended that respondent be ordered to refund the $2,500 fee to Mr. Schane. Finally, the board recommended that respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an | .^independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. ■

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/08), 838 So.2d 715.

The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with a client, failed to refund an unearned fee, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged by the ODC.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987).

Respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to his client, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual harm. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension. The record | (¡supports the aggravating factors found by the board, and the only mitigating factor present is the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

In cases of misconduct involving one count of neglect, failure to communicate, and failure to cooperate with the ODC, we have typically imposed a one year and one day suspension. Based on these cases, we agree that the one year and one day suspension recommended by the board is appropriate.

Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day. We will also order respondent to repay the $2,500 fee to Ms. Hyorth on behalf of Mr. Schane, plus legal interest.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that C. Hearn Taylor, Louisiana Bar Roll number 2140, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. It is further ordered that respondent shall make restitution of $2,500 plus legal interest to Karen Hyorth on behalf of Phillip Schane. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . On September 19, 2012, respondent was declared ineligible to practice law for failure to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment. He is also ineligible for failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements.

      . See, e.g., In re: Kurzweg, 03-2902 (La.4/2/04), 870 So.2d 978 (attorney neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with his clients, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation; no ” mitigating factors were present, and the aggravating factors included the attorney’s ineligibility to practice law); In re: Turnage, 01-1240 (La.6/22/01), 790 So.2d 620 (attorney neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with her client, failed to return her client’s file, failed to refund an unearned fee, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in two separate investigations; numerous aggravating factors present but no mitigating factors); In re: Bergeron, 00-1386 (La.9/15/00), 768 So.2d 595 (attorney knowingly and intentionally neglected his client's legal matter, failed to communicate with his client, failed to return his client's file, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).


text:
    In re David P. BUEHLER.
    No. 2014-B-0619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent, David P. Buehler, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, Maryland, and Virginia, based upon discipline imposed in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By way of background, respondent represented Jill Sozio, d/b/a Jill’s Deli, Bakery & Grill, in several legal matters arising from Ms. Sozio’s lease of a premises located within a shopping center in Norfolk, Virginia for the operation of a business. In June 2011, an unlawful detainer action was filed against Ms. Sozio seeking $1,257.54 in unpaid rent and possession of the premises. Before the unlawful detain-er action was heard, respondent filed two actions on behalf of Ms. Sozio for alleged unlawful termination of the lease and wrongful eviction from the premises. One action was initiated with the filing of a petition for temporary injunction in which Ms. Sozio requested injunctive relief in the form of an order allowing her access to the premises to retrieve her personal property. The second action was brought in the form of a complaint requesting $1.55 million in damages for alleged breach of the lease, wrongful eviction, conversion of Ms. Sozio’s personal property, tortious interference with business relationships, and lost profits. | ¡Attorney Shane Smith represented SEI Realty, LLC and other parties adverse to Ms. Sozio (collectively referred to as “SEI”) in each of the legal proceedings.

Injunction Case

On July 19, 2011, an Agreed Order was entered in the injunction case. The Agreed Order, inter alia, allowed Ms. So-zio access to the premises for the sole purpose of retrieving her personal property, and ordered her to surrender possession of the premises no later than July 31, 2011 and sign and deliver an order dismissing her injunction action. In August 2011, Mr. Smith filed a motion requesting entry of an order requiring Ms. Sozio to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for violating the Agreed Order. When respondent failed to appear for a September 1, 2011 hearing on the motion, an order was entered ordering Ms. Sozio to show cause why she should not be held in contempt; dismissing the injunction action with prejudice; granting SEI leave to proceed to trial on the unlawful detainer action; and awarding SEI attorney’s fees and costs in connection with the motion.

On September 29, 2011, respondent filed a motion requesting that the September 1, 2011 order be vacated. In support of his request, respondent represented that he had not received the order until September 27, 2011. Respondent did not disclose the fact that Mr. Smith had sent the order to him by both mail and email on September 1st.

In October 2011, an order was entered awarding SEI $2,135 in attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion. Respondent filed a pleading asking that the show cause order be vacated or modified and the request for attorney’s fees be denied. In a letter to the trial court dated October 26, 2011, ^respondent stated that he had not received a copy of the July 19, 2011 Agreed Order until September, and that in the interim, he had provided Mr. Smith with a signed sketch order dismissing the injunction case. He then attributed the issuance of the show cause order to the sketch order having never been submitted for entry. Mr. Smith never received such an order from respondent. By email dated October 28, 2011, Mr. Smith requested that respondent provide proof he had sent the order. Respondent did not comply.

Damages Case

In response to the complaint for damages filed by respondent on behalf of Ms. Sozio, Mr. Smith filed a motion to dismiss, motion to quash service of process, and demurrer. Respondent sought an extension of time to respond to that filing in which he stated that he was “seeking to determine if counsel for Defendants will oppose this extension, but has not as of yet received a response.” However, when respondent made this representation, he had not requested an extension of time from Mr. Smith.

By order issued on September 22, 2011, counsel for the parties were ordered to appear at a scheduling conference on November 10, 2011, unless a scheduling order was filed prior to that date. Following the issuance of the September 22nd order, Mr. Smith attempted to obtain available trial dates from respondent so that a scheduling order could be submitted in lieu of attending the scheduling conference. Respondent failed to provide his available dates, and Mr. Smith filed a motion to set a trial date and enter a scheduling order.

On October 21, 2011, respondent filed a memorandum of lis pendens in the damages case, which operated as a prejudgment lien against the premises. Mr. Smith then filed a motion for leave to intervene, to quash lis pendens, and for |4sanctions, asserting that the lis pendens was improperly filed. Respondent did not file a written opposition to the motion.

On November 10, 2011, a hearing was conducted on motions Mr. Smith had filed in the case, including the motion to set a trial date and enter a scheduling order and the motion to quash lis pendens and for sanctions. Respondent and Mr. Smith appeared at the hearing. Following arguments, the court, inter alia, granted the motion to quash lis pendens and awarded SEI attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion.

Mr. Smith prepared and sent to respondent an order setting out the rulings made on the various motions and a scheduling order setting out the trial dates selected during the hearing. On November 18, 2011, respondent returned to Mr. Smith facsimile copies of both orders bearing his signature. Despite requests from Mr. Smith to return orders bearing respondent’s original signature, respondent failed to do so, resulting in delays in the entry of the orders.

On December 12, 2011, Mr. Smith sent to respondent via mail and email a copy of the order entered on that date granting the motion to quash lis pendens and for sanctions. Pursuant to the order, SEI was given twenty days to submit a bill and affidavit in support of its attorney’s fees award and Ms. Sozio was given twenty days to file an affidavit in opposition. Mr. Smith filed a billing statement and invoice and provided same to respondent well in advance of the twenty-day deadline, but respondent never filed an opposition on behalf of Ms. Sozio. In January 2012, Ms. Sozio was ordered to pay $4,239.50 in attorney’s fees incurred by SEI in connection with the motion to quash lis pendens.

In February 2012, respondent filed a motion for nonsuit. A week later, he filed a motion to withdraw as Ms. Sozio’s counsel. On March 13, 2012, the | ¿¡damages case filed by respondent was nonsuited and respondent was granted leave to withdraw.

Unlawful Detainer Case

Following a contested trial of the unlawful detainer action in September 2011, a judgment was entered in favor of SEI and against Ms. Sozio for both unpaid rent and possession of the premises. Respondent appealed. By email dated November 21, 2011, Mr. Smith tried to obtain respondent’s availability for the setting of an appeal trial date, but respondent failed to respond. Thereafter, Mr. Smith filed a motion to set a trial date and for entry of a scheduling order. Mr. Smith noticed a hearing on the motion for December 12, 2011. Respondent did not appear at the hearing, despite notice via mail and email to his last known mailing address and email address.

Multiple orders were entered during the December 12th hearing, including a scheduling order setting the case for trial on February 2, 2012. On the same day as the hearing, Mr. Smith’s administrative assistant sent respondent copies of these orders via mail and email to his last known mailing address and email address.

By letters to Mr. Smith and the clerk of the trial court dated January 26, 2012, respondent stated he had just discovered the unlawful detainer case was set for trial on February 2nd, was not aware a scheduling conference had taken place, and had not received the scheduling order. He then filed a motion for continuance in which he asserted his recent discovery of the February 2nd trial date.

On February 2, 2012, the court denied the request for continuance and granted Mr. Smith’s motion to exclude Ms. Sozio from presenting testimony or evidence other than for rebuttal or impeachment for non-compliance with the filing deadlines in the scheduling order. Following trial, judgment was entered for SEI for both unpaid rent and possession of the premises.

| (¿Thereafter, respondent filed a motion to withdraw as Ms. Sozio’s counsel. The motion was granted on March 13, 2012.

Virginia Discipline

In February 2014, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months for violating the following provisions of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3(a) (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 3.8(a)(1) (knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), 3.4(g) (a lawyer shall not intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence, where such conduct is disruptive of the proceedings), 4.4 (in representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). In the Matter of David Peter Buehler, VSB Docket No.: 12-021-090634.

After receiving notice of the Virginia order of discipline, the ODC filed a motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. A certified copy of the decision and order of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board was attached to the motion. On March 26, 2014, we rendered an order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response in this court.

DISCUSSION

The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis is set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D). That rule provides:

| yDiscipline to be Imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical discipline ... unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:
(1)The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that imposed the discipline, there was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; ...
If this court determines that any of those elements exists, this court shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

In the instant case, respondent has made no showing of infirmities in the Virginia proceeding, nor do we discern any from our review of the record. Furthermore, there is no reason to deviate from the sanction imposed in Virginia. Although the sanction does appear somewhat lenient considering the numerous misrepresentations made by respondent in connection with his client’s legal matters, and the resulting harm to his client, nevertheless, only under extraordinary circumstances should there be a significant variance from the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction. In re: Aulston, 05-1546 (La.1/13/06), 918 So.2d 461. See also In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968-69 (D.C.2003) (“there is merit in according deference, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority”).

IsUnder these circumstances, we find it is appropriate to defer to the Virginia judgment imposing discipline upon respondent. Accordingly, we will impose the same discipline against respondent as was imposed in Virginia.

DECREE

Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and -the record filed herein, it is ordered that respondent, David P. Buehler, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17927, be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

      . Respondent did not set his pleading for a hearing, despite being requested to do so by Mr. Smith, who himself noticed it for hearing on January 31, 2012. Respondent did not appear at the hearing, and in his absence, an order was entered denying the relief respondent had requested.

      . Prior to filing this motion, Mr. Smith had asked respondent to withdraw the memorandum of lis pendens for the reasons that Mr. Smith would later set out in his motion to quash. Respondent did not withdraw it.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank GEISLER.
    No. 2013-KP-1951.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2001.
   In re Geisler, Frank; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 05-02-0011; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0729.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Henry Lee ALFRED v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Alfred, Henry Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 41,851.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Harold HILL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1844.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Hill, Harold; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 33,377, 33,778.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art 930.4(D).


text:
    Miguel ROSALES v. Burl CAIN, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 2013-KP-1522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 2014.
   In re Rosales, Miguel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 85-1964; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-418.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rickey Lionel LAURANT.
    No. 2013-K-2323.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 11, 2014.
   In re Laurant, Rickey Lionel; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 517140; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1705.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie O. COUSIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2284.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re Cousin, Willie O.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 504,642; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1079.

Denied.


text:
    Michael Wayne FOX v. Harriet Mae FOX, Nee Wadley.
    No. 2014-CC-0970.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2014.
   In re I.C.C.D. Fox, L.L.C.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 11-2101; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49390-CW.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of G.A. et al.
    No. 2014-CK-0975.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 9, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2014-191-02-DQ-C; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0454.

Granted. The ruling of the juvenile court finding no probable cause for the arrest of G.A. and K.H. is reversed, and the juvenile court is ordered to remand them into continued custody.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Juan SMITH.
    No. 2014-KD-0986.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 9, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 378-343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-466.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.

CLARK, J., would grant and reverse the trial court’s ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Juan A. SMITH.
    No. 2014-KK-0991.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 12, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 378-343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0475.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory REESE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2100.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Reese, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, Mo. 401-985; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0960.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert E. JACKSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Jackson Jr., Robert E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 96,366; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-633-KH.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis DILLON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Dillon, Curtis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 95-CR-83,903-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00478.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alonzo AMBO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2225.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Ambo, Alonzo; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 306632; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0963.

„ . , Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roderick K. GODBOLT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Godbolt, Roderick K; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 04-CR-089607; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1207.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy HOPKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2301.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Hopkins, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 190,230; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-754-KH.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antonio SEWELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Sewell, Antonio; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 199-992; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-729-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael WALDEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2339.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Walden, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 06-F-00415-1; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,730-KH.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Freddie LEWIS v. SECRETARY, LOUISIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-CI-2350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Lewis, Freddie R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 605,605; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1890.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alexander SURRY, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 14, 2014.
   In re Surry Jr., Alexander; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 212,499; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-464-KH.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald Lee LEGER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1961.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Leger, Jr., Donald Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 4, 2014, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 158,807.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick PIERRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Pierre, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated November 1, 2013; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D. No. 356-886; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0436.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Douglas ROBERTSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Robertson, Douglas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 10, 2014, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 07-03-0089; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0471.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Kip LONDON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-CI-1922.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re London, Kip; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated March 21, 2014, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 599,361; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1718.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel T. IRISH.
    No. 2013-KP-1483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Irish, Daniel T.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 186,209.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric John ANDERSON.
    No. 2013-KO-1806.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Anderson, Eric John; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 302703; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-42.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jamie SIMMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2044.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Simmons, Jamie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 0(M095; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-579.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Henry FISHER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2052.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Fisher, Henry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 00-1073; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-523.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian GUMTO.
    No. 2013-KP-2062.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Gumto, Brian; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 478-453; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0153.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tony Lavelle HUNTER.
    No. 2013-KP-2063.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Hunter, Tony Lavelle; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 02-F-2021; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48661-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Chadwick DENNIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Dennis, Chadwick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 98-6886; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-560.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren L. DICKERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2162.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Dickerson, Warren. L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 179,306; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-308-KH.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gerald ROSS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Ross, Gerald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 382-739; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1129.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keenan TEMPLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2254.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Temple, Keenan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 99-7528; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-630.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donnell COLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2285.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Coleman, Donnell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 403-657; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1157.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael Kevin HAILEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2340.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Hailey, Michael Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 234,728; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-565-KH.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James SIMMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Simmons, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 281702; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1279.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.