author: LOGUE, J.

text:
    Pierre ST. LOUIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D13-1151.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 12, 2014.

      Pierre St. Louis, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, FERNANDEZ, and LOGUE, JJ.
   LOGUE, J.

Pierre St. Louis appeals the order summarily denying his petition for writ of co-ram nobis, arguing that he involuntarily entered his guilty plea due to his attorney’s alleged failure to advise him of mandatory deportation consequences. He further contends that the trial court’s equivocal warning of immigration consequences could not cure any prejudice resulting from counsel’s ineffectiveness. We affirm because the transcript of the plea colloquy demonstrates that St. Louis would have entered the plea even if it subjected him to deportation.

On January 9, 2012, pursuant to plea negotiations, St. Louis entered a guilty plea to reduced charges of felony battery and simple battery. As to possible immigration consequences of his plea, the trial court’s colloquy with St. Louis reflected the following:

THE COURT: Do you understand, sir, that if you are not a United States citizen, this plea may subject you to deportation?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you had enough time to discuss any possible immigration consequences and all possible legal defenses to this case with your attorney, Mr. Lucas?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with his representation?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.
THE COURT: Even if this plea were to subject you to deportation, would you still wish to enter into it to close out these charges today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(emphasis added). The trial court thereafter adjudicated St. Louis guilty of the charges and sentenced him to 364 days in jail followed by one year of reporting probation, with the special condition that he stay away from the minor victim.

St. Louis contends that the trial court’s use of “may” in the deportation warning required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8) did not cure his counsel’s alleged failure to advise him of mandatory deportation consequences. It is true, of course, that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), requires defense counsel to “provide more than equivocal advice” concerning deportation consequences of a guilty plea where such consequences are “truly clear.” Hernandez v. State, 124 So.3d 757, 763 (Fla.2012). In such circumstances, “an equivocal warning from the trial court ... cannot, by itself, remove prejudice resulting from counsel’s deficiency.” Id. (emphasis added).

St. Louis, however, received more than an equivocal deportation warning during the plea colloquy. After providing a “may” deportation warning, the trial court continued, inquiring whether St. Louis would still enter a guilty plea “[e]ven if this plea were to subject you to deportation.” St. Louis responded in the affirmative. This sworn statement conclusively refutes the gravamen of St. Louis’s claim: that he would not have entered his guilty plea if he had been advised that his plea would subject him to deportation. Thus, St. Louis did not and cannot state a claim for relief under Padilla. See Cano v. State, 112 So.3d 646, 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“Where a movant has received the standard ‘may’ or ‘could’ deportation warning required by rule 3.172(c)(8), to state a claim for relief under Padilla, a movant must establish ... that, if the movant had been accurately advised, he or she would not have entered the plea.”); see also Hernandez, 124 So.3d at 763 (recognizing that a plea colloquy is not meaningless); Smith v. State, 21 So.3d 72, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“It is well-settled that when a court determines whether an allegation is conclusively refuted by the record, it may rely on the sworn testimony the defendant has given in a plea colloquy. Any allegations that contradict those answers should not be entertained.”) (internal citation omitted). In other words, St. Louis’s admission under oath that he would enter the plea even if it subjected him to deportation demonstrates that he cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding, in the context of a plea, that the Strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”).

Affirmed.

      . Because St. Louis admitted under oath that he would enter the plea even if it subjected him to deportation, we need not address the issue of whether the deportation consequences of his plea were "truly clear.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WELLS, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Miguel ROBERTSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-1408.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 12, 2014.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, LAGOA and SCALES, JJ.
   WELLS, Judge.

Affirmed without prejudice to the filing of a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.800(a) motion to correct the sentence imposed to accurately reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement. See Scott v. State, 109 So.3d 866, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“The oral pronouncement of sentence prevails over a subsequent and conflicting written sentencing order.”); Wright v. State, 98 So.3d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“[A]ny discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written sentence requires the written sentence to be corrected to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement.”); see also Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562, 569, 572 (Fla.2008) (recognizing that claims that a defendant’s written order deviated from the oral pronouncement is subject to rule 3.800(b), whereby the failure to either object during the sentencing hearing or by rule 3.800(b) motion forecloses the issue from being raised on direct appeal); Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2003) (“[W]e hold that for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing forecloses them from raising the error on direct appeal.”); Sanders-Bashui v. State, 124 So.3d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (same).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Rhonda DIAMOND, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF FLORIDA CITY, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-2260.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 12, 2014.
    Stok Folk + Kon and Robert A. Stok and Josh R. Dell (Aventura), for appellants.
    Wicker, Smith, O’Hara, McCoy & Ford and Shelley H. Leinicke (Ft.Lauderdale), for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ, EMAS, and LOGUE, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(1).


text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Eduardo CASTILLO, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-2353.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 12, 2014.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Nicholas A. Merlin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Kathryn J. Strobach, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State v. Delgado, 92 So.3d 314, 316 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“[When] reviewing] the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress ... the appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings regarding the facts.”).


text:
    MIAMI HORIZON GROUP, LLC, Appellant, v. NOVA CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 3D13-804.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 12, 2014.
    David J. Schottenfeld, P.A., and David J. Schottenfeld (Plantation), for appellant.
    DeMahy, Labrador, Drake, Victor & Cabeza, and Gregory A. Victor and Mark R. Boyd (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and LOGUE, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm on the basis that the insured failed to present substantial, competent evidence establishing that the portion of the claim not paid by the insurance company was caused' by the incident giving rise to the claim. See generally U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bove, 347 So.2d 678, 680 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (“A person seeking to recover on an insurance policy has the burden of proving a loss from causes within the terms of the policy.”); Fla. Home Ins. Co. v. Braverman, 163 So.2d 512, 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (holding that insureds have “the burden of establishing by competent evidence the amount of damage they have sustained”). Because we affirm on this basis, we do not reach the other issues raised on appeal.

Affirmed.


author: PALMER, J.

text:
    AIRAMID HEALTH SERVICES, LLC, etc., Appellant, v. The ANITA SECHLER PERSONAL, etc., et al., Appellee.
    No. 5D12-4621.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 14, 2014.

      Cory L. Chandler, Bruce Bellingham and George M. Vinci, Jr., of Spector Gadon & Rosen, LLP, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
    Isaac R. Ruiz-Carus and Megan L. Gisc-lar, of Wilkes & McHugh, P. A., Tampa, for Appellee.
   PALMER, J.

Airamid Health Services, LLC n/k/a/ Airamid Health Consulting, LLC (Airamid Health) timely appeals the non-final order entered by the trial court summarily denying its motion to quash service and/or dismiss The Anita Sechler Family Trust’s (Trust) complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we reverse.

Trust filed a lawsuit against several defendants, alleging that Anita Sechler sustained injuries during her residency at Evergreen Woods (Nursing Home). Airamid Health, a Delaware limited liability company, is the only defendant involved in this appeal. In its complaint, Trust alleged the following jurisdictional facts:

[Airamid Health] is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal place of business at 1765 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., Suite 900, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401, which is doing business in Florida.
[Airamid Health] owns and operates Air-amid Florida, LLC.
[Airamid Health] conducted and engaged in business activities within the State of Florida; engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within the State of Florida; and purposely availed itself of the privileges of the State of Florida, through its ownership of, and/or consultation with nursing homes, including [Nursing Home], within the State of Florida. Accordingly, pursuant to Florida Statute Section 48.193, [Airamid Health] is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Florida.
[Airamid Health] committed tortious acts against Anita D. Sechler in the State of Florida. Each tortious act is specifically alleged in the subsequent counts, which include violations of Chapter 400, common law, and Chapter 415. Accordingly, pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.193(l)(b), [Airamid Health] is subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Florida.

Airamid Health moved to quash service and/or dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. To support the motion, Airamid Health submitted an affidavit by Debra Howe, an officer of Airamid Health. The affidavit states, in relevant part, the following:

[Airamid Health] is a Delaware limited liability company.
[Airamid Health] does not have a principal place of business in Florida.
[Airamid Heath] is not doing business in Florida and is not qualified to do business in Florida.
[Airamid Health] is not a managing member of Airamid Florida, LLC.
[Airamid Health] does not own, lease, operate, manage, or consult with nursing homes, including [Nursing Home], in Florida.
[Airamid Health] did not operate [Nursing Home] during Anita Sechler’s residency or at any time.

In response, Trust submitted deposition testimony of Howe (which had been submitted in other nursing home actions), as well as Airamid Health’s corporate filings in Florida. These documents indicated that Howe provided testimony in her affidavit which contradicted her deposition testimony since, in her deposition, Howe stated that Airamid Health is the managing member or manager of two resident subsidiaries, Airamid Health maintains its principal place of business in Florida, and Airamid Health applied for and received authorization to transact business in Florida.

The trial court summarily denied Airam-id Health’s motion to quash service and/or dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This appeal timely followed.

Airamid Health contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to quash service and/or dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because Trust has not sufficiently established that personal jurisdiction is proper over Airam-id Health. We agree.

A ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Clement v. Lipson, 999 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citing Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Fla.2002)); Extendicare, Inc. v. Estate of McGillen, 957 So.2d 58 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989)).

Establishing jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a two-part process. First, the complaint must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the nonresident defendant within the ambit of Florida’s long arm statute. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, provides the following ways to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident person:

48.193 Acts Subjecting Person to Jurisdiction of Courts of State
(l)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts:
1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.
2. Committing a tortious act within this state.
(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.

§ 48.193(l)(a)l.-2.; (2), Fla. Stat. (2012).

Second, the court must determine whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida in order to satisfy constitutional due process. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Clement, 999 So.2d at 1074. Due process is satisfied where the foreign defendant would reasonably anticipate being haled into a Florida court. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Doe v. Thompson, 620 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.1993). If the defendant’s activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), the due process requirement of minimum contacts is fulfilled. See Schwartzberg v. Knobloch, 98 So.3d 173, 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

A defendant challenging the jurisdictional allegations in a complaint or raising a contention of insufficient minimum contacts must file an affidavit in support of his position. Clement, 999 So.2d at 1075; Doe, 620 So.2d at 1005 (citing Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 500). If the affidavit fully refutes the complaint’s jurisdictional allegations, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show, by counter-affidavit or other evidence, the basis upon which jurisdiction is proper. Clement, 999 So.2d at 1075. If the facts cannot be harmonized, then the trial court must hold a limited evidentiary hearing on the issue of jurisdiction. Id.

In the instant case, Airamid Health does not argue that Trust failed to allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring Airamid Health within the ambit of the long arm statute, but instead, argues that Trust failed to refute the jurisdictional challenge presented in its affidavit. However, the certified transcripts of Howe’s deposition testimony in the other nursing home actions directly contradicted the statements that Howe made in Airamid Health’s affidavit. Additionally, Trust submitted two sets of corporate documents that Howe filed in Florida on behalf of Airamid Health. Trust noted that all state business filings are filed under penalty of perjury pursuant to section 608.408, Florida Statutes. The first set of corporate filings showed that Airamid Health applied to transact business in Florida and that Air-amid Health is the “managing member or manager” of a resident subsidiary, Airamid Health Management, LLC. In each of these filings, Airamid Health listed a Florida address as its “principal office” and “usual place of business.” The second set of filings showed that Airamid Health is the managing member or manager of another resident subsidiary, Airamid Financial Services, LLC, and that the resident subsidiary was authorized to transact business in Florida. These filings show not only that the resident subsidiaries maintain their “usual place of business” in Florida, but also that the address for the resident subsidiaries is the same address as the nonresident parent, Airamid Health.

Trust concedes that Howe submitted an errata sheet, in which she stated that the information that she received from corporate counsel made it necessary for her to change her deposition answers. Consequently, those changes contradicted her sworn testimony. Howe also stated that the Florida business addresses for Airamid Health were inaccurate and the corporate documents were inadvertently filed. Trust notes that, in spite of Howe’s assertion that the Florida addresses were inadvertently filed, Airamid Health’s Florida address is currently reported as “active” by the Florida State Division of Corporations.

Given the contradictory evidence existing in the record, the trial court was required to conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to determine whether Trust met its burden of proving jurisdiction over Air-amid Health. See Shoppers Online Inc. v. E-Pawn, 792 So.2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that a trial judge should hold a limited evidentiary hearing on the issue of jurisdiction if the facts in the respective affidavits cannot be harmonized). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Airamid Health’s motion to quash process and/or dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and remand to the trial court to conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to determine whether jurisdiction over Airamid Health is proper.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

EVANDER and BERGER, JJ., concur.

      . Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).

      . Other evidence may include deposition transcripts or any other sworn proof. See Clement, 999 So.2d at 1075; Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1255; Instrumentacion, Ltda. v. Philips Electronics N. Am. Corp., 951 So.2d 1001, 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).


text:
    Marco SIMPLICE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D12-4371.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 14, 2014.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Eliza Puchalski and James R. Wulchak, Assistant Public Defenders, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Marco Simplice appeals from his convictions and sentences on four counts of robbery with a weapon (lesser-included offenses of robbery with a firearm, charged in the information), and one count of grand theft. The jury returned not guilty verdicts on four counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated battery. Simplice raises three issues relating to his convictions, and one relating to his sentencing. We agree with Simplice as to the sentencing issue, but see no other issue that merits discussion. Relevant to the sentencing issue, the trial judge in this case initiated plea discussions with Simpl-ice and made two plea offers to him. Before jury selection, the trial judge reviewed the potential minimum mandatory and maximum penalties on each charge, and asked if there had been any plea discussions. It was revealed that Simplice faced a minimum sentence of 15.25 years in prison (with all charges scored), with a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence (day for day). It was also revealed that the State had essentially offered this minimum sentence prior to trial, but that Simplice had rejected the offer and that the State had withdrawn it. The.State’s new day-of-trial offer was twenty years in prison, with the ten-year minimum mandatory. At that point, the trial judge informed Simplice that she was offering to sentence Simplice to 15.25 years in prison, with a ten-year minimum mandatory, in exchange for a plea prior to jury selection. Simplice rejected the offer and jury selection began.

As the State neared the end of its case, having presented all but two of its witnesses, the trial court once again initiated plea discussions directly with Simplice, offering the same minimum sentence she had previously offered in exchange for a plea, explaining that this would allow the court to move on to another trial. Simpl-ice also rejected this second offer. The trial court ultimately imposed consecutive ten-year sentences on each of the four robbery charges and a five-year concurrent sentence on the grand theft charge, for a cumulative sentence of forty years in prison. The judge offered no explanation for this 262% increase from the sentences she offered before jury selection and mid-trial. And, no explanation can by gleaned from the record, especially in light of the fact that Simplice was convicted of fewer and less serious offenses than those charged, and that nothing new was revealed after the court’s second offer regarding the nature of the crimes or Simpl-ice’s involvement in them, other than Simplice’s testimony that he did not commit them.

The issue of whether a defendant’s sentence is vindictive is a question of law subject to de novo review. Baxter v. State, 127 So.3d 726, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). When a trial court imposes a harsher sentence after participating in plea negotiations, the appellate court must review the totality of the circumstances to determine if the sentence is vindictive. Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 142, 156 (Fla.2003). Those circumstances include:

(1) whether the trial judge initiated the plea discussions with the defendant in violation of Warner; (2) whether the trial judge, through his or her comments on the record, appears to have departed from his or her role as an impartial arbiter by either urging the defendant to accept a plea, or by implying or stating that the sentence imposed would hinge on future procedural choices, such as exercising the right to trial; (3) the disparity between the plea offer and the ultimate sentence imposed; and (4) the lack of any facts on the record that explain the reason for the increased sentence other than that the defendant exercised his or her right to a trial or hearing.

Id. (footnotes omitted). If either of the first two circumstances is present, “these actions alone may give rise to a presumption of judicial vindictiveness that would shift the burden to the State to produce affirmative evidence on the record to dispel the presumption.” Id.; see also Rosado v. State, 129 So.3d 1104, 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (noting that if either of the first two circumstances are present, a harsher sentence following trial “is presumed to be vindictive”).

The first circumstance is present in this case. The trial court twice initiated plea negotiations during trial and offered Simplice a sentence substantially lower than the one it later imposed. Consequently, a presumption of vindictiveness arises, shifting the burden to the State to dispel the presumption, id., which it has not done. As such, we affirm Simplice’s convictions but vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing before a different judge. See id.

AFFIRMED, VACATED and REMANDED with INSTRUCTIONS.

TORPY, C.J., LAWSON and SAWAYA, JJ., concur.

      . Although the State initially argued that Simplice did not preserve this issue for appellate review, it promptly and properly filed a notice of supplemental authority after our issuance of Rosado, 129 So.3d at 1109, which holds that imposition of a vindictive sentence constitutes fundamental error.


author: ORFINGER, J.

text:
    Dora HARPER, Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., Appellee.
    No. 5D13-1085.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 14, 2014.

      Danilo Cruz Carino, of The Pendás Law Firm, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Sam-óle, and Jay A. Yagoda, of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.
   ORFINGER, J.

Dora Harper appeals an adverse summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. Harper argues that the trial court erred by entering the summary judgment because discovery was still ongoing and material issues of fact existed. We agree that summary judgment was prematurely entered and reverse.

Harper fell at a Wal-Mart store, and subsequently brought a suit against Wal-Mart. After Harper’s suit against Wal-Mart had been pending for just over one year, Wal-Mart filed a motion for summary judgment supported by two affidavits. Harper deposed the two affiants. Shortly thereafter, Wal-Mart withdrew one of the affidavits because, as was shown at the deposition, the affiant had no relevant personal knowledge of the issues in dispute. Wal-Mart then filed a new affidavit from a witness to the incident who was employed by a Wal-Mart contractor. Wal-Mart had earlier disclosed that a Wal-Mart contractor’s employee might have witnessed the incident, but did not reveal the witness’s identity until it filed its motion for summary judgment, supplemented later by the new affidavit. Harper’s counsel promptly attempted to arrange the deposition of the newly-disclosed witness and told Wal-Mart’s attorney that he would seek to continue the summary judgment hearing if the deposition could not be arranged. The deposition could not be arranged at a mutually convenient time and, as promised, Harper’s counsel filed a motion to continue the hearing. The court denied the motion without elaboration.

The question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Harper’s motion to continue the summary judgment hearing in order to allow Harper to depose the newly-disclosed witness. A trial court’s decision to grant a continuance of a summary judgment hearing is discretionary. However, that discretion is tempered if discovery is not completed and is necessary for the disposition of the case. Smith v. Smith, 734 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). We agree with Wal-Mart that after a motion for summary judgment is filed and scheduled, the non-moving party cannot thwart the summary judgment hearing by initiating discovery. See Vills. at Mango Key Homeowners Ass’n v. Hunter Dev., Inc., 699 So.2d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). That general rule notwithstanding, under the facts of this case, it does not appear that the pending discovery was scheduled to thwart the summary judgment hearing. Thus, we conclude that entry of summary judgment in this case was premature. See Arguelles v. City of Orlando, 855 So.2d 1202, 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Because Harper was entitled to complete her discovery before the trial court considered Wal-Mart’s motion for summary judgment, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we express no opinion on the merit of Wal-Mart’s summary judgment motion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

GRIFFIN and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Thomas MacDONALD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D13-4487.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 14, 2014.
    Thomas MacDonald, Malone, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Thomas MacDonald’s motion seeking additional jail credit filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Our affir-mance is without prejudice for MacDonald to file a motion complying with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801. If MacDonald chooses to file a rule 3.801 motion, it must comply with the requirements outlined in rule 3.801(b), (c) and (e) as well as rule 3.850(n). Upon receipt of a rule 3.801 motion, the trial court must follow the procedure outlined in rule 3.850(f). See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(e) (effective July 1, 2013). MacDonald must file his motion on or before July 1, 2014. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(b) (effective December 5, 2013).

AFFIRMED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

TORPY, C.J., ORFINGER and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kerry D. CLARK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D14-128.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 14, 2014.
    Kerry D. Clark, Orlando, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the petitioner’s March 4, 2013, judgment and sentence, imposed in Case No. 48-2011-CF-004811-0, Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

SAWAYA, PALMER, COHEN, JJ., concur.


author: LAWSON, J.

text:
    Amy BADGLEY a/k/a Amy-Jo Badgley, Individually, Appellants, v. SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC., et al., Appellees.
    No. 5D13-2500.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 14, 2014.

      Kelley A. Boseeker, St. Petersburg, for Appellants.
    Nancy M. Wallace, Tallahassee, and William P. Heller and Tracy T. Segal, of Akerman Senterfitt, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellees.
   LAWSON, J.

Amy Badgley appeals from an order dismissing her quiet title action and imposing attorneys’ fees against her and her attorney, Kelley Boseeker, under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes. Her arguments on appeal are just as frivolous as her quiet title claim. In her first issue, she baldly asserts that dismissing a complaint prior to discovery violates due process of law. The law is to the contrary. See, e.g., LatAm Investments, LLC v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 88 So.3d 240, 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (rejecting argument that dismissal for failure to state a claim prior to discovery denied plaintiff due process and access to courts because trial court must assume all facts alleged in the complaint to be true in determining motion to dismiss).

In her second and third issues, Badgley argues that the dismissal of her complaint with prejudice was error even though she had already amended the complaint once as a matter of right and her quiet title theory was legally unsupportable based on the alleged facts. She claimed her lenders created a cloud on her title by refusing to respond to her absurd demand of them to “prove” that she owed them money. Not only is there no legal basis to support such a claim, the attachments to the complaint clearly demonstrate, as Badgley later admitted, that she “took a mortgage and got the money.” See Fladell v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 772 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Fla.2000)

(“If an exhibit facially negates the cause of action asserted, the document attached as an exhibit controls and must be considered in determining a motion to dismiss.”); Appel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 29 So.3d 377, 379 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (“Where a document on which the pleader relies in the complaint directly conflicts with the allegations of the complaint, the variance is fatal and the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.”).

In her fourth issue, Badgley claims Ap-pellees’ fee motion below was untimely filed after the dismissal judgment even though Appellees’ motion for sanctions was timely filed before the judgment awarding fees. See, e.g., Frosti v. Creel, 979 So.2d 912, 916 (Fla.2008) (holding that rule 1.525 does not create a thirty-day window, but rather an outside limit, thus fee motion filed pre-judgment was timely).

Finally, Badgley disputes the sanction award even though similar complaints by plaintiffs represented by her attorney have been dismissed and have been the basis for sanctions. See Fitzgerald v. Regions Bank, No. 5:13-CV-36-OC-10PRL, 2014 WL 129066 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 14, 2014); Calderon v. Merck & S. Bank, No. 5:13-CV-85-OC-22PRL, 2013 WL 5798565 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 28, 2013); Huff v. Regions Bank, No. 5:13-CV-63-OC-22, 2013 WL 5651807 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 15, 2013); Barrios v. Regions Bank, No. 5:13-CV-29-OC-22PRL, 2013 WL 5230653 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 16, 2013); Gonzalez v. GMAC Mortg., No. 5:13-CV-72-OC-22PRL, 2013 WL 4767872 (M.D.Fla. Aug. 23, 2013); Lehrer v. Regions Bank, No. 5:13-CV-30-OC-PRL, 2013 WL 2371192 (M.D.Fla. May 30, 2013). The trial court properly awarded section 57.105(1) fees based on its findings that Badgley and her attorney knew or should have known that Badgley’s claim was “not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense” and “[wjould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.”

Accordingly, we affirm the order on appeal and sua sponte order Badgley and her attorney to pay, in equal amounts, the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Appellees in this appeal, pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes. We remand the matter to the trial court to determine the amount of fees.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED.

TORPY, C.J., and SAWAYA, J., concur.

      . Badgley sent Appellees a written demand to "validate that an actual debt exists” by producing twenty-three separate categories of documents. The demand stated that if Appel-lees failed to produce the information requested in their next correspondence, they would “be accepting my offer to provide pen pal services at $100,000.00 per correspondence.” It further notified Appellees that by "failure to validate the alleged debt,” as demanded, they would tacitly agree to waive any and all claims against Badgley, would release her from any encumbrances clouding title to her property, and would be subject to a quiet title action.


text:
    Wardell F. BROWN, Appellant, v. Michael D. CREWS, SECRETARY, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee. and Wardell F. Brown, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 1D12-4831, 1D12-5453.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 18, 2014.

      Wardell F. Brown, pro se, Appellant.
    Jennifer Parker, General Counsel; Beverly Brewster and Sheron Wells, Assistant Generals Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appel-lee Michael D. Crews, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for Appellee State of Florida.
   PER CURIAM.

We sua sponte consolidate these cases for disposition, as both involve appeals of orders dismissing petitions for writ of ha-beas corpus in which petitioner asserted that he was being held in the custody of the Department of Corrections beyond the lawful expiration of his sentence. Brown has now been released from the custody of the Department of Corrections and his conditional release supervision has been terminated. As such, any claim for habeas corpus relief on the grounds asserted by petitioner has been rendered moot. We therefore conclude that these appeals have likewise been rendered moot, and DISMISS them on that basis.

WOLF, VAN NORTWICK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Rodney ANDERSON, Petitioner, v. Theresa McMILLAN, et al., Respondents.
    No. 1D13-5969.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 18, 2014.
    Rodney Anderson, pro se, Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

By petition for writ of mandamus, Rodney Anderson seeks an order compelling the Clerk of Courts in Jackson County to execute summons for service of process of his civil complaint. Such a request is properly directed to the circuit court, but in this instance, any request for relief has been rendered moot by the circuit court’s rendition of an order dismissing Anderson’s complaint below. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED as moot.

WOLF, VAN NORTWICK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Rontarian WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-6067.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 18, 2014.
    Rontarian Wright, pro se, Appellant.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.800(a) motion seeking additional jail credit in a case that became final in 2007. Because the appellant filed the motion after July 1, 2013, the trial court properly treated the motion as having been filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801, but it denied the motion as untimely.

Subsection (b) of the rule initially stated that “[n]o motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 1 year after the sentence becomes final.” However, the rule was later amended and now states that “[f]or sentences imposed prior to July 1, 2013, a motion under this rule may be filed on or before July 1, 2014.” The appellant’s motion is therefore timely. See In re Amendments to Fla. R.Crim. P. and the Fla. R. of App. P., 132 So.3d 734, (Fla.2013) (Appendix); In re Amendments to Fla. R. of Crim. P. & the Fla. R. of App. P., 132 So.3d 734 (Fla.2013) (Revised Opinion).

We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to address the appellant’s rule 3.801 motion and provide him an opportunity to amend if required. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(c).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

ROBERTS, WETHERELL, and OSTERHAUS, JJ„ concur.


author: ROTHENBERG, J.

text:
    John SPIPNIEWSKI, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-2064.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 19, 2014.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and James Moody, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Keri T. Joseph, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, J.

The defendant, John Spipniewski, appeals his conviction and sentence for simple stalking. We affirm.

The defendant was charged by information with the following counts involving the same victim: aggravated stalking for incidents occurring between January 1, 2011, and December 16, 2011, by making a specific verbal threat of harm to the victim and by threatening the victim with a baseball bat (Count 1); aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by approaching the victim while swinging a baseball bat on December 15, 2011'(Count 2); harassing the victim (Count 3); and misdemeanor battery that occurred on December 16, 2011 (Count 4). The State nolle prossed Count 3, and the defendant proceeded to trial on the remaining counts.

The defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the State from introducing certain uncharged or prior bad acts. The trial court ruled that it would allow reference to acts that were relevant to the aggravated stalking charge, which included all acts committed by the defendant against the victim during the time period charged in Count 1 of the information — January 1, 2011, to December 16, 2011.

At trial, the evidence demonstrated that the victim and the defendant each lived in one of the four homes located on a five-acre grove in Homestead. Although the victim had helped the defendant for a period of time by giving him rides, food, and money, in 2011 she refused to continue providing these services to the defendant. The victim testified that within two days of discontinuing her services to the defendant, the victim’s husband’s truck was vandalized. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the testimony violated the motion in limine because there was no evidence of a connection between the defendant and the vandalism. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, but sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement because the defendant had not been charged with vandalism. The jurors agreed that they would disregard the victim’s statement.

The victim also testified that the defendant yelled obscenities at her and made violent threats to her at various times in 2011. When asked whether the obscenities and threats “ever escalated to anything more than just words,” the victim responded that the defendant punched her on November 25, 2011, approached her swinging a baseball bat, on December 15, 2011, and pulled her hair and bit her on December 16, 2011. The December 15 and 16 incidents were charged in the information in Counts 2 and 4, respectively. Defense counsel, however, timely objected and moved for a mistrial based on the victim’s testimony regarding the alleged November 25, 2011, punching incident because that alleged incident was a separately charged offense pending in county court. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion for a mistrial.

The jury found the defendant guilty of stalking, as a lesser included offense of aggravated stalking, and not guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 2) or simple battery (Count 4).

On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions for a mistrial based upon the evidence introduced regarding the uncharged crimes of: (1) vandalism to the victim’s husband’s vehicle, and (2) the punching incident that occurred on November 25, 2011. We disagree. A motion for a mistrial should “be granted only ‘when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.’” Gosciminski v. State, 132 So.3d 678, 696 (Fla.2013) (quoting England v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 401-02 (Fla.2006)); see also Hamilton v. State, 703 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1997).

Although we agree with the defendant that the victim’s testimony regarding the vandalism was improper, as there was no evidence that the defendant committed that crime, we nonetheless conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial because the victim’s single and brief comment was not solicited by the State; the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and subsequently gave a curative instruction; and the jurors agreed that they would disregard the objected-to testimony. See Hamilton v. State, 703 So.2d at 1041 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial where the improper comment was brief and unanticipated by the State, and where the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction).

As to the victim’s testimony regarding the punching incident on November 25, 2011, we conclude this collateral crimes evidence was properly admitted under section 90.402, Florida Statutes (2012), because it was relevant and material to establish the charged offense of aggravated stalking, see § 90.401 (“Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact.”); § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2012) (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law.”), and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2012) (“Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... ”); see also Dorsett v. State, 944 So.2d 1207,1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (finding that collateral crimes evidence-admitted under section 90.402 is admitted based on its relevance, and the admissibility of collateral crimes evidence under section 90.402 does not require notice).

■ In the instant case, to establish the offense of aggravated stalking as charged in Count 1 of the information, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that between January 1, 2011, and December 16, 2011: (1) the defendant willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly, followed, harassed, or cyberstalked the victim; and (2) the defendant made a credible threat to the victim with the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. § 784.048(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). “Harass” is defined as “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). “Course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose ....” § 784.048(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). A “credible threat” includes a “verbal or nonverbal threat, or a combination of the two, ... which places the person who is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety ... , and which is made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat to cause such harm ....” § 784.048(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2011).

Reading these statutes together, the State was required to prove that the defendant engaged in a series of wrongful or threatening acts that contributed to the victim’s reasonable fear. Therefore, the victim’s testimony regarding the punching incident that occurred on November 25, 2011, was relevant to show a course of conduct and a credible threat to inflict violence upon the victim, which placed the victim in reasonable fear for her safety. Lastly, we find that based on the record and the jury’s verdict, if the admission of this one uncharged battery was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Affirmed.

      . Although defense counsel argued for the first time at oral argument before this Court that the failure to list the punching incident as a predicate act when charging the defendant with aggravated stalking did not put the defendant on notice that this particular collateral crime would be relied on by the State at trial, we note that this argument was not raised below and was therefore not preserved for appellate review. See Saka v. Saka, 831 So.2d 709, 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that appellate courts cannot review an issue for the first time on appeal absent fundamental error). The objection raised at trial was simply that the punching incident was a separately charged offense pending in county court.

      . We disagree with the State’s argument that the punching incident was relevant to prove aggravated assault as charged in Count 2. The act specifically charged in Count 2 involved an incident on December 15, 2011, where the defendant approached the victim swinging a baseball bat, not the punching incident that occurred on November 25, 2011.


text:
    The ESTATE OF Idelle STERN, etc., et al., Appellants, v. OPPENHEIMER TRUST COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 3D13-688.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 19, 2014.

      Stok Folk + Kon, and Robert A. Stok and Daniel Brennan, Aventura, for appellants.
    Wintter & Associates, P.A., and Christopher Q. Wintter and Max G. Soren, Hollywood, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, J.

The appellants challenge the trial court’s order dismissing the portions of their counterclaim against Oppenheimer Trust Company (“Oppenheimer”) relating to the Stern Charitable Remainder Unitrust (“CRUT”) due to a forum selection clause in an agency investment agreement governing that trust. We agree that the agency agreement is the sole document governing the relationship and duties between the parties as to the CRUT, and therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The appeal before us stems from a highly contentious and complicated guardianship proceeding regarding the now-deceased Idelle Stern (“Mrs.Stern”). The facts of the underlying proceeding are myriad, but the relevant considerations for our decision are as follows. As part of his estate plan, Rabbi Tibor H. Stern (“Rabbi Stern”), also deceased, established two separate trusts to provide for his family and other charitable interests. One trust, the CRUT, named Mrs. Stern as the sole lifetime income beneficiary, with a remainder interest in several charities. The other trust, the Reformed Stern Living Trust (“Stern Living Trust”), comprised three separate sub-trusts, and provided income interests for Mrs. Stern and remainder interests for the Sterns’ four daughters, Rochelle Kevelson, Tikvah Lyons, Joyce Genauer, and Judy Sugar.

The CRUT and the Stern Living Trust have different trustees, beneficiaries, and trust documents, and are also funded and managed entirely separately. Importantly, although Oppenheimer is involved in the management of both trusts, it is the co-trustee of the Stern Living Trust, while it is merely an investment agent of the CRUT pursuant to a separate written contract entitled “Discretionary Agency/Investment Management Account Agreement” (“the Agency Agreement”). The Agency Agreement contains a forum selection clause that clearly specifies: “Any proceeding of any nature out of this Agreement shall be instituted only in the courts by the State of New Jersey.”

During the pendency of the underlying guardianship action, Oppenheimer filed an action seeking court approval of its accounting of the Stern Living Trust, and the appellants counterclaimed for thirteen separate causes of action alleging various types of fraud, mismanagement, violations of Florida’s Blue Sky Laws, and breaches of fiduciary duty. Oppenheimer moved to dismiss the causes of action based on the mandatory forum selection clause in the Agency Agreement and the trial court, after hearing two days of argument, granted that motion with respect to all claims relating to the CRUT, but left the claims concerning the Stern Living Trust pending in Miami-Dade Circuit Court. This appeal followed.

Although the appellants raise several points of error on appeal, all of these arguments appear to confuse Oppenheimer’s duties and obligations as co-trustee of the Stern Living Trust with Oppenheimer’s duties and obligations as the investment agent of the CRUT pursuant to the Agency Agreement. Most of the appellants’ arguments rely on the faulty premise that the heightened duties imposed on trustees by the Florida Trust Code necessarily apply to Oppenheimer as the investment agent of the CRUT as well. For that reason, appellants’ arguments are unavailing, and we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Agency Agreement is the only connection between the parties, and any duties owed to the appellants necessarily stem from that contract. Although the appellants have tried to frame this case as a trust dispute, the CRUT portion of this litigation against Oppenheimer is nothing more than a commercial dispute over an investment agreement, which is governed by the Agency Agreement. As such, we are guided by the principles of general contract law in interpreting the forum selection clause in the Agency Agreement.

Florida law is well-settled that mandatory forum selection clauses “should be enforced in the absence of a showing that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust.” Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So.2d 437, 440 (Fla.1986). A party seeking to avoid enforcement of a mandatory forum selection clause bears a heavy burden of establishing that the enforcement is unjust or unreasonable and must demonstrate that the contractually designated forum essentially amounts to “no forum at all,” thereby depriving the party of its day in court. Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mijares Holding Co., LLC, 76 So.3d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (quoting Corsee, S.L. v. VMC Int’l Franchising, LLC, 909 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)).

The appellants in this matter do not contest that the forum selection clause at issue is mandatory. Furthermore, the appellants’ only reasons why the CRUT litigation should not take place in New Jersey are inconvenience and additional costs to themselves, neither of which is sufficient to refuse to enforce a forum selection clause. See Manrique, 493 So.2d at 440 n. 4 (“We emphasize that the test of unreasonableness is not mere inconvenience or additional expense.”). We accordingly affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the CRUT claims without prejudice to the appellants to file their action in the New Jersey courts as the Agency Agreement dictates.

Affirmed.

      . Mrs. Stern was alive for the majority of the litigation, but passed away on July 11, 2013, after this appeal was filed. Her estate was substituted as the party in interest.


text:
    Vicenzo GUERRA and Kimberly Guerra, Appellants, v. SOUTHERN HOMES OF PALM BEACH, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 3D13-2238.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 19, 2014.
    Civil Justice Advocates, P.L., and Kunal A. Mirchandani (Fort Lauderdale), for appellants.
    Law Offices of Michael J. Yates, P.L., and Michael J. Yates, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, J.

Vicenzo Guerra and Kimberly Guerra (collectively, “the plaintiffs”) appeal from an order dismissing their action filed against Southern Homes of Palm Beach, LLC (“the defendant”). The trial court’s order specifically provides that “the Court finds that ... there was no record activity during 60 days immediately following service of the [Notice of Lack of Prosecution],” and therefore, “this action is dismissed for lack of prosecution.” However, because the record reflects that there was record activity during the sixty days immediately following the service of the Notice of Lack of Prosecution, we reverse the order under review and remand with directions to reinstate the plaintiffs’ action filed against the defendant.

Reversed and remanded.


author: PADOVANO, J.

text:
    CENTENNIAL BANK, Petitioner, v. NFP 1, LLC, an administratively dissolved Florida limited liability company, Walter J. Armistead, James Barrs Floyd, and Heron Walk Harbor Homeowners Association, Inc., Respondents.
    No. 1D13-4421.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 24, 2014.

      Kenneth B. Bell of Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry, Bond & Stackhouse, Pensacola; Trevor A. Thompson of Clark, Parting-ton, Hart, Larry, Bond & Stackhouse, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    Nicholas Yonclas, Eastpoint, for Respondents NFP 1, LLC and Walter J. Armi-stead; James Barrs Floyd, pro se, Respondent.
    No appearance for Respondent Heron Walk Harbor Homeowners Association, Inc.
   PADOVANO, J.

The petitioner, Centennial Bank, filed suit against the respondents to foreclose a mortgage on real property and to recover damages for failure to make payment on the underlying promissory note. The trial court ruled in the bank’s favor on the foreclosure claim but deferred consideration of the related action on the note. The bank now seeks review by certiorari, contending that the judgment contains adverse findings that may ultimately preclude recovery on the note.

The scope of review on a petition for writ of certiorari is limited to the correctness of the order to which the petition is directed and does not bring up for consideration any other matter decided in the trial court. See Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 525 (Fla.1995) (articulating the characteristics that distinguish certiorari from an appeal). The sole point adjudicated in the judgment to be reviewed in this case is that the bank is entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. Because that decision is not in any respect adverse to the bank, it cannot be said that the bank has suffered an injury that could justify appellate review. As we have held in other cases, a party lacks standing to seek review of an order that is entirely favorable to its own interests. See Dep’t of Health v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., 935 So.2d 636, 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology v. State Dep’t of Ins., 716 So.2d 345, 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). That is precisely the situation here.

It is true, as the bank argues, that the judgment contains certain adverse findings relating to the bank’s right to recover on the note, but the trial court has not yet acted on those findings. The bank contends that it will suffer irreparable harm if the judgment is not reviewed by certiorari, yet it is clear that the bank has not yet suffered any harm at all. Perhaps it is fair to say that the findings in the judgment do not bode well for the bank in its effort to recover damages under the note, but the judgment now before the court does not actually dispose of that claim.

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari on the ground that the bank lacks standing to seek review of the judgment.

Dismissed.

CLARK and SWANSON, JJ„ concur.


author: SCALES, J.

text:
    OCEAN BANK, Appellant, v. CARIBBEAN TOWERS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
    No. 3D13-776.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 26, 2014.
    Weissman & Dervishi, P.A., and Brian S. Dervishi, John Borgo, Peter A. Tappert, and Beshoy Rizk; Bruce M. Bounds, for appellant.
    Seipp, Flick & Hosley, LLP and Douglas H. Stein, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, FERNANDEZ and SCALES, JJ.
   ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

SCALES, J.

Upon Appellee’s confession of error, this case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with our decision in Ocean Bank v. Caribbean Towers Condominium Ass’n, 121 So.3d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).


text:
    Emily Chancy WALKER, Trustee of the Thomas Walker Irrevocable Trust, John Floyd Walker, T.B. Walker, Jr., T. Butler Walker, Sr., a/k/a Thomas Butler Walker, Sr., and Emily Walker, a/k/a Emily C. Walker, Appellants, v. FLORIDA GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Alan Brown Whitehouse, et al., Appellee.
    No. 1D13-3271.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 27, 2014.

      John Beranek and J. Marshall Conrad of Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee; Joe W. Fixel, William A. Fixel of Fixel & Willis, Tallahassee and Paula Sparkman of Bird & Sparkman, P.L., Monticello, for Appellant.
    Kenneth B. Bell of Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry, Bond & Stackhouse, Pensacola; Trevor A. Thompson of Clark, Part-ington, Hart, Larry, Bond & Stackhouse, Tallahassee; Kurt T. Bauerle of Harris, Harris, Bauerle, Sharma, Orlando and Brian Bolves, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellants, property owners, appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to enforce an order of taking. The court denied their motion to enforce a provision in the order of taking that required Appel-lee to replace, among other things, “trees, landscaping, grasses, shrubbery, [and] crops” (the tree-replacement obligation). Appellants claim the denial of the motion to enforce the tree-replacement obligation, contained within a schedule attached to the order of taking, was an order determining “the right to immediate possession of property.” They therefore assert the denial was appealable via Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii). We disagree.

Our supreme court has “carefully created” each category of non-final order subject to interlocutory review after input and weighing various policy considerations, “such as increased appellate workload and concomitant delay in ... resolution.” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, Inc., 104 So.3d 344, 348 (Fla.2012). Accordingly, the categories of non-final orders subject to interlocutory appeal are narrowly construed. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So.2d 959, 961 (Fla.1984) (“The thrust of rule 9.130 is to restrict the number of appealable nonfinal orders.”).

Here, quite simply, no trees/shrubs/grasses exist. Appellee clear cut them. Thus, instead of the right to immediate possession of the property (i.e., trees), Appellants seek enforcement of a contractual right to replacement of unspecified property. They do not claim a right to possession of identifiable property as required by Rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii). In addition, the trial court granted Appellants’ alternative request to amend their answer below to assert claims regarding the tree-replacement obligation. The trial court’s order leaves pending the replacement issue. Thus, the court has not determined the immediate right to the replacement trees/shrubs/grasses as it has simply postponed or deferred ruling. Appellants have not met the immediacy requirement under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii). See Naghtin v. Jones, 680 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Accordingly, the order on appeal is non-final and non-appealable. This court does not have jurisdiction to review it. Appellants’ appeal is DISMISSED.

CLARK, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

      . By concession, in both its brief and at oral argument, and enforceable on remand, Appel-lee has explained that it "has an obligation.” The extent of Appellee’s obligation is a matter for the trial court to address via Appellants’ counterclaims.


text:
    Domingo A. CABRERA, Appellant, v. OUTDOOR EMPIRE INC. and FCCI Insurance Company, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-5235.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 27, 2014.
    Opinion filed March 27, 2014.

      Domingo A. Cabrera, pro se, Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant, appearing pro se, challenges three orders of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that conclude Claimant has fully settled his two workers’ compensation claims with the Employer/Carrier (E/C) and is, therefore, entitled to no further benefits under chapter 440 for these accidents and injuries. Because the record evidence supports the JCC’s finding that Claimant indeed settled his claims, we affirm. We deny Claimant’s constitutional challenges for reasons explained below.

Background

This is the second time this workers’ compensation matter — which comprises two distinct dates of accidents (allegedly) suffered by Claimant while employed with the Employer herein — has come before this court. In Cabrera v. Outdoor Empire (Cabrera /), 108 So.Bd 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), we concluded that the parties’ first putative settlement agreement, reached when Claimant was not represented by counsel, was neither binding nor enforceable, because Claimant permissibly withdrew from the settlement before it was approved by the JCC as required by section 440.20(ll)(a), Florida Statutes — which applies to workers’ compensation settlement agreements involving unrepresented claimants. See 108 So.Bd. at 694. After this court’s reversal in Cabrera I, the parties attended a six hour mediation, at which Claimant was represented by counsel. An interpreter was present at the mediation to assist Claimant, whose primary language is Spanish. At the conclusion of mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby Claimant was to receive a total sum of $165,000, payable by the E/C, out of which he was to pay his attorney $10,000 for attorney’s fees and costs. This settlement agreement was memorialized by written documents, each of which bears Claimant’s signature. Shortly after this second settlement agreement was reached, and after the documents memorializing same were signed, Claimant expressed displeasure with, inter alia, the amount of the settlement, the manner in which it was negotiated, and the means by which the settlement checks would be processed.

Several evidentiary hearings were held regarding Claimant’s multiple post-settlement grievances, resulting in the orders on appeal. Significantly, at the evidentiary hearing held to determine whether Claimant in fact settled his workers’ compensation claims, the mediator, the interpreter, and Claimant’s counsel (who had by then withdrawn from representation of Claimant) testified. Each of the foregoing witnesses, testified (with all relevant privileges being waived on the record) that the negotiations at mediation and the resulting settlement included both dates of accidents; according to these witnesses, this fact was discussed with Claimant repeatedly. The E/C introduced the settlement documents into evidence, which show an agreement whereby the E/C promised to pay Claimant $165,000 (out of which Claimant was to pay his attorney $10,000 for fees and costs) to completely settle and extinguish “all” and “any” workers’ compensation claims based on accidents and injuries suffered by Claimant while working for the Employer. Claimant testified that he signed these documents, and this fact was verified by Claimant’s counsel and the interpreter. Nevertheless, Claimant alleged that he was a victim of a “dirty trick,” because he did not intend to settle both dates of his accident.

After considering the testimony and the documentary evidence introduced at hearing, the JCC entered an order that concludes Claimant fully and completely settled his January 30, 2007, accident (involving an alleged vision injury), his February 12, 2010, accident (involving “multiple injuries”), and “any and all” dates of accidents Claimant suffered while employed by the Employer, in exchange for $165,000, payable by the E/C. The JCC further found no indicia of overreaching or fraud committed against Claimant, as was inferentially argued by Claimant. After the JCC issued the order finding a full and complete settlement of all dates of accident, Claimant then alleged — for the first time — that the signatures appearing on the operative settlement documents were not his own. The JCC advised Claimant that the time to have raised this issue was during the eviden-tiary hearing on the issue of settlement. This appeal followed.

In his brief, Claimant asserts that his constitutional rights have been violated and that he did not settle both dates of accident, only the February 12, 2010, date of accident. Upon receipt of Claimant’s brief, this court entered an order advising the parties that this appeal is being considered for summary affirmance under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a). Accordingly, the parties were directed to refrain from further briefing.

Analysis

Summary affirmance is appropriate where the initial brief fails to present a “preliminary basis for reversal,” regardless of the good-faith intentions and beliefs of the filing party. See Spencer v. Fla. Power Light, — So.3d -, 2013 WL 5848468, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D2270 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 31, 2013). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that this case is appropriate for disposition by summary affir-mance.

Relative to the issue of settlement, Claimant argues, in essence, that evidence supports his argument that he did not intend to settle both dates of accident with the E/C. This court has stated on many occasions that we will never reverse an order of lower tribunal merely because evidence supports the losing party’s view of the case. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Manning, 685 So.2d 64, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Once again we remind counsel of the basic premise that the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases is whether competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments rejected below.” (citing Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996))). Rather, the relevant inquiry pertaining to issues of fact challenged on appeal is whether competent substantial evidence supports the findings reached by the JCC. See Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Here, an abundance of evidence, including the testimony of the interpreter and the mediator, which was accepted as credible by the JCC to the exclusion of Claimant’s testimony, establishes that the settlement reached at mediation was intended to resolve all workplace accidents that Claimant suffered or allegedly suffered while working for the Employer. Further, the written settlement agreement documents introduced into evidence contain express language resolving with finality “any” and “all” workers’ compensation accidents suffered by Claimant while working for the Employer.

Relative to Claimant’s assertions that he did not actually sign the operative settlement agreement documents, Claimant did not timely raise this argument below, but to the contrary testified under oath that he signed these agreement documents. For an issue to be preserved for appeal, it must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation. See Anderson v. Wagner, DPM, 955 So.2d 586, 590 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Further, to properly preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely, contemporaneous objection. See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So.3d 1105, 1108 (Fla.2010). In Florida, pro se litigants are bound by the same rules that apply to counsel. See Stueber v. Gallagher, 812 So.2d 454, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding pro se litigant waived relief requested on appeal by not preserving claimed error below). Because Claimant’s assertion regarding the alleged forgery of his signatures was not preserved, the issue need not be addressed by this court. Notwithstanding the lack of preservation, however, Claimant’s own testimony, along with that of his attorney, the mediator, and the translator, establishes Claimant signed the settlement documents in question. Thus, this court can grant no relief based on Claimant’s bare allegation that his signature on the operative settlement agreement documents was affixed by someone other than himself.

Relative to the issue of whether Claimant was tricked into settling both cases, the formation of a contract “depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs — not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.” Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So.2d 404, 407 (Fla.1974) (quoting Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So.2d 604, 608 (Fla.1957)). Here, in addition to the testimony of Claimant’s attorney, the mediator, and the translator, which established the terms of the parties’ negotiations and the resulting agreement, the settlement agreement documents relied upon by the JCC also support her finding that Claimant voluntarily entered into an agreement that expressly settles and extinguishes Claimant’s entitlement to any and all workers’ compensation benefits for any workers’ compensation injuries Claimant suffered while employed by the Employer, in exchange for valuable consideration. Thus, Claimant’s subjective belief as to whether both accidents were settled is irrelevant to the legal issue at hand. Further, in his brief, Claimant cites no evidence or legal authority that would compel a conclusion that the settlement agreement was invalid or voidable. Based on the foregoing, Claimant’s arguments on this issue are unavailing and otherwise fail to raise a preliminary basis for reversal.

We now turn to Claimant’s arguments premised on the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. In this point on appeal, Claimant makes only a conclusory argument regarding the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Claimant does not refer to any specific constitutional guarantees or provisions that have been allegedly transgressed, and, in light of the fact that Claimant voluntarily settled his workers’ compensation claims for $165,000 (an amount already received by Claimant), no constitutional violations are readily apparent under the circumstances. Rather than raising specific constitutional arguments and explaining why the case should be decided in his favor, Claimant encourages this court to thoroughly examine his case, with the assurances that once the court does so, it will understand the harms visited upon Claimant during the pendency of his workers’ compensation claims. Claimant’s argument in this regard misapprehends the role of this court, and his role as a litigant seeking relief therefrom. See Lynn v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 81 So.2d 511, 518 (Fla.1955) (explaining that party bringing appeal has duty to “make error clearly appear,” and court has no duty to answer questions raised in a “perfunctory” manner). Claimant has failed to demonstrate error on this record as is his burden, and this court is under no obligation to construct or answer a legal question not properly argued by Claimant himself. See id. at 513 (explaining litigant does not fulfill duty of demonstrating reversible error by merely posing question and then “dumping the matter into the lap of the appellate court for decision”). For the foregoing reasons, Claimant fails to demonstrate a preliminary basis for reversal. Thus, the orders on appeal are AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, C.J., WOLF and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Samantha Renee ACKERS.
    No. 2014-B-0075.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent negligently commingled and converted client funds and charged her client legal fees for nonlegal services. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rules 1.5(a) and 1.15(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Samantha R. Ackers, Louisiana Bar Roll number 32086, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, subject to the conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Francis C. BROUSSARD.
    No. 2014-B-0386.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2014.
   ORDER

1 iConsidering the Joint Petition for Interim Suspension filed by respondent, Francis C. Broussard, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Francis C. Broussard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17259, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately-

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Greg Gerard Guidry Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Alphonse M. THOMPSON, Jr.
    No. 2014-B-0210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

1 )The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent failed to properly supervise a non-lawyer assistant and mishandled his client trust account. Following the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rules 1.15(a)(f), 5.3, and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and that the misconduct was negligent. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Alphonse M. Thompson, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 17169, be and he hereby is publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule. XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court's judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Ryan Andrew BEASON.
    No. 2014-B-0205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

11 Respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which respondent acknowledges that he practiced law while ineligible to do so. Having re-’ viewed the petition,

IT. IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Ryan Andrew Beason, Louisiana Bar Roll number 30129, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, with all but ninety days deferred, followed by a two-year period of unsupervised probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension execu-tory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    Jacob Lee ADAMS and Paula Kimes, Kenneth Simmons, Mary Simmons v. Heather Corinne Taylor SMARTT.
    No. 2013-CJ-2841.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Smartt, Heather Corinne Taylor; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 116,667; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,895-CW.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Amanda POUSSON v. BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF LOUISIANA.
    No. 2013-C-2843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Blue Cross/ Blue Shield of Louisiana; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, Lake Charles City Court, No. 12-1468; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-481.

Denied.


text:
    Jauve COLLINS v. Doug WELBORN, East Baton Rouge Parish Clerk , of Court, Criminal Records.
    No. 2013-CP-2852.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Collins, Jauve; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 602,889; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0018.

Denied.


text:
    Richard L. REYNOLDS v. Robert BORDELON III, Robert Bordelon Jr., USAgencies Casualty Insurance Company, Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange, and/or Called Auto Club Family Insurance d/b/a “Triple A Insurance,” Nissan North America, with Nissan being a Parent Company of Infinity Division of Nissan North America Inc., a Luxury Car Division of Nissan Motors, Insurance Auto Auctions Corp., ABC Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-CC-2860.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Reynolds, Richard L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2009-11451; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1718.

Denied.


text:
    Paris MADISON v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, Richard Stalder, Ronnie Futrell, T.W. Thompson, et al.
    No. 2013-C-2862.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Madison, Paris; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 218-252; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-389.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    John WILTZ v. TODD’S CAR WASH.
    No. 2013-C-2863.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Wiltz, John; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District #4, No. 0907802; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13^148.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT v. James Hilary DECUIR, Jr., et ux. and all Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2013-CC-2864.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 2010-4704 C/W 2010-4884 C/W 2010-4911 C/W 2010-5242 C/W 2010-5243 C/W 2010-5244 C/W 2010-5477, 2010-5478 C/W 2010-5588 C/W 2010-5913 C/W 2011-6161 C/W 2011-6227 C/W 2011-6478 C/W 2011-6585, 2011-7064 C/W 2011-7316 C/W 2011-7407 C/W 2011-7434 C/W 2012-7534 C/W 2012-7773; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-01008.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher Damone DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2865.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Davis, Christopher Damone;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 12F02951, 12F07732; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,908-KH.

Denied.


text:
    Vanessa DAVIS v. ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and Jennifer Webb.
    No. 2013-C-2881.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Davis, Vanessa; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2011-02708; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0244.

Denied.


text:
    John Barron SKANNAL, Individually, as Testamentary Executor of the Succession of John C. Skannal and as Trustee of the John C. Skannal Trust, and A.C. Skannal, III v. JONES ODOM DAVIS & POLITZ, L.L.P.
    No. 2013-C-2887.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Jones Odom Davis & Politz, L.L.P.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court, No. 130,-863 C/W 135,805; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,016-CW, 48,017-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Arthur L. GIBSON, Jr. v. LOUISIANA RICE MILL, L.L.C.
    No. 2013-C-2899.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Gibson, Jr., Arthur L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 20053514; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-265.

Denied.


text:
    David HARTER and Jan Harter Pipkin v. Earl M. HARTER, III and Harter Oil Company.
    No. 2013-C-2900.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Harter III, Earl M. et al.; Harter Oil Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 545,775; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,426-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Byron POWELL v. Jacques D. DERR & Tommy A. Milam.
    No. 2013-C-2911.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Powell, Byron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-228; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,405-CA.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wesley GUILLARD.
    No. 2013-KK-2916.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Guillard, Wesley; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 96-5735; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-799.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Jack DUTY, et al. v. LOUISIANA FIREFIGHTERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2930.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Firefighters’ Retirement System; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 81,283-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00916.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick FAGAN.
    No. 2013-KK-2934.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Fagan, Patrick; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 501227; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW1755.

Denied.


text:
    Rosie Rouzan JONES v. James David HAMMOND, M.D. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-CC-2935.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Jones, Rosie Rouzan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 607,804; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1403.

Denied.


text:
    Letitia A. MOTT v. EASY MONEY, INC. Betty Ann Porche, Wife of/and Stanley P. Stewart v. Letitia A. Mott and Easy Money, Inc.
    No. 2013-C-2942.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Porche, Betty Ann et al.; Stewart, Stanley P.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, Nos. 2011-07907, 2012-12135; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2013-CA-1017, 2013-CA-1018.

Denied.


text:
    Fannie Clyde BARHAM and Gary Barham v. ST. MARY LAND & EXPLORATION CO. and Cypress Operating, Inc.
    No. 2013-C-2943.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Barham, Gary; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 39-693; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,603-CA.

Denied.