text:
    STATE ex rel. Kelly BARNES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Barnes, Kelly;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 08 CR3 99918; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0615.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. Floyd NICHOLSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Nicholson, Floyd;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 348-379; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0187.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rondy VERNON, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0663.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Vernon Sr., Rondy;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 9-CR4-67763; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0121.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur RHODES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0665.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Rhodes, Arthur;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 94-1357; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 13-KH-147,13-KH-174.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    John DOE v. LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS. Jane Doe v. Louisiana Board of Ethics.
    No. 2013-C-0782.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Louisiana Board of Ethics; Louisiana Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2011-12685 C/W 2011-12754; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2012-CA-1169, 2012-CA-1170.

Denied.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrell James SUGGS.
    No. 2013-KP-0943.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Suggs, Terrell James;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 09-2841; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-109.

Denied.


text:
    Marion L. ALLRED, et al. v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION.
    No. 2013-C-1109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Georgia-Pacific Corporation;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 540,397; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0424.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Daffanie BURAS Wife of/and Richard Buras v. Betty DeLOACH, M.D. and Suzette Cullins, M.D. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company v. Suzette L. Cullins, M.D. Daffanie Buras, et al. v. Betty DeLoach, M.D., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-1138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund; Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2005-10476; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2012-CA-1511, 2012-CA-1512, 2012-C-1664.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John POULLARD v. M. PITMAN, M.D., LSU Medical Center and E.A. Conway Hospital.
    No. 2013-CP-1153.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Poullard, John; Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. C-04-0796; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47900-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Milton HOLT, Individually and on Behalf of his Minor Children, Ciara Holt and Jase Holt, and Amy Holt, Individually and on Behalf of her Minor Children, Mariah Miller and Tristan Miller v. Tammy M. TORINO and Direct General Insurance Company of Louisiana and RPM Pizza, LLC and Domino’s Pizza, LLC.
    No. 2013-C-1161.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Holt, Amy; Holt, Milton et al.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 597170; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1579.

Denied.


text:
    T.C., C.B. and R.B. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS FOR the STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-CC-1162.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re C.B.; R.B.; T.C., et al.;—Plaintiffs); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 452839; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 0633.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dean KELLY.
    No. 2013-KK-1166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Kelly, Dean;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 508-984; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0679.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jamal CLAY.
    No. 2013-KK-1167.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Clay, Jamal;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 489-791; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0619.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Wayne M. ROUSSEAU, II v. ACADIANA DIRT RIDERS, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-1168.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Acadiana Dirt Riders, Inc., et al; Ace American Insurance Company; American Motorcycle Association; Southern Enduro Riders Association;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 237,995; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01451.

Denied.


text:
    Carl GABRIEL v. Dr. Rashid J. TAMIMIE and Dr. Donald Faust.
    No. 2013-C-1169.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Gabriel, Carl;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 700-678; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-584.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richmond HAMILTON.
    No. 2013-KK-1173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Hamilton, Richmond;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 12-5607, 12-5609, 12-5973, 12-5974; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-K-348.

Denied.


text:
    Byard EDWARDS, JR. v. LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2013-C-1175.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Edwards Jr., Byard;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2007-750; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1495.

Denied.


text:
    Wanda FRANK v. Roy MAUGHAN, Maughan Law Firm and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-1182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Frank, Wanda;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 607577; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1159.

Denied.


text:
    James E. RAMER, Jr. v. EVANGELINE MAID BAKERY d/b/a Flowers Baking Company of Lafayette, LLC.
    No. 2013-C-1184.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Ramer, Jr., James E.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 122803; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1583.

Denied.


text:
    Randy ST. BLANC and Amy Harrison St. Blanc v. Sidney A. STABILE, John H. Burelle, and BBI, L.L.C.
    No. 2013-C-1185.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re St. Blanc, Amy Harrison; St. Blanc, Randy et al.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 67,871; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-677.

Denied.


text:
    Gabrielle Marie Louisa CHATAGNIER v. 1ST A SOUTHEAST INCS., L.L.C.
    No. 2013-C-1186.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re 1st A Southeast Incs., L.L.C.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist. 09, No. 11-03353; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1314.

Denied.


text:
    McLANE SOUTHERN, INC. v. Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary of the Department of Revenue of the State of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-C-1187.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re McLane Southern, Inc.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 550358; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA1259R.

Denied.


text:
    Kathleen M. BILBE v. Norman S. FOSTER, Director of Finance, City of New Orleans.
    No. 2013-CC-1188.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Bilbe, Kathleen M.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 12-7378; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0472.

Denied.


text:
    MABILE’S TRUCKING, INC., Blaine Mabile and Ryan Mabile v. STALLION OILFIELD SERVICES, LTD., and A. Wilbert’s Sons, L.L.C.
    No. 2013-CC-1190.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Shelter Mutual Insurance Company;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 39,193; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 0257.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Peter R. LAFURIA.
    No. 2013-KK-1280.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Lafuria, Peter R.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 16823-07; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW-13-00061. •

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant in part.


text:
    In re Herman J. MOUTON, Jr.
    No. 2013-OB-1229.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 30, 2013.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel;—Other; Applying For Findings and Recommendations (Readmission) Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-DB-019.

Readmission denied. Petitioner may not reapply for readmission until at least three years have passed from the date of this judgment. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(1).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roosevelt McGEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2054.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 3, 2013.
   In re McGee, Roosevelt;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 253297; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on an application/memorandum in support for post-conviction relief he submitted on or about February 18, 2013. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. If realtor’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roxanne RIVERS.
    No. 2013-KK-2077.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 6, 2013.
   In re Rivers, Roxanne;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 12-189140; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0982.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Juan SMITH.
    No. 2013-KK-2121.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 6, 2013.
   In re Smith, Juan;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 378-343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1160.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jason ELLIOT.
    No. 2013-KK-2159.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 10, 2013.
   In re Elliot, Jason;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-6247; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-K-751.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry SEATON.
    No. 2013-KK-2067.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 11, 2013.
   In re Seaton, Henry;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 511-378; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1044.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jamal CLAUDE.
    No. 2013-KK-2141.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 11, 2013.
   In re Claude, Jamal;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 512-625; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0858.

Stay denied; writ denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ray BOUDREAUX.
    No. 2013-KP-1687.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 11, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 476-062; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0808.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Chelsea THORNTON.
    No. 2013-KK-2010.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 11, 2013.
   In re Thornton, Chelsea;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 514-926; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0907.

Denied. This matter is remanded to the District Court to comply with the ruling of the Court of Appeal and for further proceedings.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Damian JACKSON.
    No. 2013-OK-2085.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 11, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 507-586; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0967.

Denied.


text:
    Joanell M. DARNELL, M.D., Allen Staton and Joanell M. Darnell, M.D., APMC v. LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE & INDEMNITY COMPANY d/b/a Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana & Zola B. Trascher.
    No. 2013-OC-2136.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 11, 2013.
   In re Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company d/b/a Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana; Trascher, Zola B.;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 614-556; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-688.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick WOODBERRY.
    No. 2013-KD-2160.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 11, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 512-931; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2018 K 1232.

Denied.


text:
    Tina Lynette WATKINS, et al. v. LAKE CHARLES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, et al.
    No. 2013-C-1137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 94-596; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1320.

Granted.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF James Jason HOLBROOK, Sr.
    No. 2013-C-1181.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Holbrook, Llevonne;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2010-30525; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1655.

Granted.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 0030036.
    No. 2013-OB-1685.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Noel, Reginald;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 0030086.

Granted for the sole purpose of remanding this matter to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which shall transfer it to the hearing committee for its consideration pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(B)(3).


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-PDB-138.
    No. 2013-OB-1371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Walker, Mark;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-PDB-138.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 30(C).


text:
    Kelvin WELLS v. Tunya HARRIS and 23rd Judicial District Court.
    No. 2013-OC-1733.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Wells, Kelvin;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00102073; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 0327.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-PDB-133.
    No. 2013-OB-1457.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Wiley, Christopher G.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-PDB-133-338.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-PDB-048.
    No. 2013-OB-1467.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Karon, Michael;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-PDB-048.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David BOUDREAUX v. STATE Of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Boudreaux, David;—Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Enforce this Court’s action dated January 18, 2013, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 93-1435, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1055.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roland Damond FOSTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1887.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Foster, Roland Damond;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 233868; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-608-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin WALKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2573.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Walker, Kevin;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 17545; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2012 KW 1379, 2012 KW 1379.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jace C. WASHINGTON v. STATE Of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Washington, Jace C.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 431086-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW1364.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brittany ROGERS.
    No. 2013-KP-0150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Rogers, Brittany;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 08-0709; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-886.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph W. NEATHERY.
    No. 2013-K-0218.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Neathery, Joseph W.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 03-01-0494; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0162.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant with reasons.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Lee CAMPBELL.
    No. 2013-K-0281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 12-M1523; to the Court- of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48005-KW.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James E. MASON, Jr.
    No. 2013-K-0300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Mason Jr., James E.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 265,550; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-642-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John SYLVA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0310.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Sylva, John;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 374,851; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW1938.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie GEORGE.
    No. 2013-K-0317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re George, Willie;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 481-923; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0204.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry FOSTER.
    No. 2013-KO-0323.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Foster, Henry;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 497-456; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0295.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth Ray DUNCAN.
    No. 2013-KO-0324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Duncan, Kenneth Ray;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 10-F-0450; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,697-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marvin SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0333.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Smith, Marvin;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 95-5072; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-580.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bruce Edward ROBINSON.
    No. 2013-KO-0355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
   In re Robinson, Bruce Edward;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 275,278; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,597-KA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


author: STEWART, J. BROWN, Chief Judge,

text:
    Larry CARRIERE, II, Plaintiff-Respondent v. BODENHEIMER, JONES, SZWAK, & WINCHELL, L.L.P., David Szwak, and Professional Risk Specialty Group, Defendants-Applicants.
    No. 47,186-CW.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 22, 2012.

      Allen & Gooch, Lafayette, LA, by Charles M. Kreamer, for Applicants David A. Szwak, Westport Ins. Co., and Boden-heimer, Jones, Szwak & Winchell, L.L.P.
    Andrea L. Albert, Mandeville, LA, for Respondent Larry Carriere, II.
    Before BROWN, WILLIAMS, STEWART, CARAWAY and SEXTON (Pro Tempore), JJ.
   STEWART, J.

|TIn this legal malpractice action, the defendants, David Szwak (“Szwak”), his law firm Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, and Winchell, L.L.P., and his insurer, seek supervisory review of the trial court’s denial of their exception of peremption. Because the plaintiff, Larry Carriere, II (“Carri-ere”), did not timely file his legal malpractice action in the proper venue as required by La. R.S. 9:5605, the trial court erred in denying the exception. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s ruling, grant Szwak’s exception of peremption, and dismiss the plaintiffs action with prejudice.

FACTS

In July of 2003, Carriere, then a resident of Lafayette Parish, hired Szwak, a Shreveport attorney, to represent him in a suit against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”). Szwak filed suit against Experian in the federal district court in Shreveport. On February 21, 2006, Carriere filed a legal malpractice suit in Lafayette Parish against Szwak.

Carriere alleges in his petition that on November 19, 2004, he authorized Szwak to solicit offers from Experian, but he did not authorize Szwak to settle the case. On February 22, 2005, Szwak faxed a settlement and release document to Carriere at his in-laws’ residence. Carriere claims that when he learned of the settlement, he sent an email to Szwak seeking an explanation, but Szwak did not respond. Carri-ere alleges that he subsequently made it clear to Szwak that he had not authorized or agreed to a settlement. Carriere claims that Szwak then “engaged in an elaborate campaign to obscure the truth suggesting that he had emails from [Carriere] grant-tag authority to settle.” Carriere further alleges that his case against | {¡Experian was dismissed in April of 2005 without notice to him due to Szwak’s failure to file for an extension to prevent dismissal when the settlement was not consummated. Carriere claims that he did not learn of the dismissal until June of 2005.

In response to Carriere’s suit, Szwak filed an exception of improper venue on June 12, 2006. Because he practiced in Shreveport, filed suit against Experian in federal district court in Shreveport, and did all the work on the case there, Szwak asserted that venue was proper in Caddo Parish, not Lafayette Parish.

The exception languished due to continuances of hearing dates, a discovery dispute that led Szwak to move for a protective order, and the withdrawal of Carriere’s attorney. Before a hearing date in July of 2008, the parties agreed to a consent judgment, which states in relevant part:

The parties agreed to remove the hearing from the docket. Plaintiff agrees to the granting of this Consent Judgment, maintaining the Exception of Improper Venue due to this action being filed in a parish of improper venue, and the transferring of this suit to Caddo Parish.

The trial judge signed the consent judgment on July 21, 2010. The matter was transferred to the First Judicial District Court in Caddo Parish in August of 2010, and Carriere’s petition was filed on February 8, 2011.

Szwak answered the petition and filed a peremptory exception. He asserted that the action was perempted on the face of the petition and that the burden was on Carriere to show why his claim was not perempted.

The trial court heard Szwak’s peremptory exception on February 13, 2012. At the hearing, Carriere, through his wife who enrolled as counsel, Largued that his malpractice claim is not perempted because his petition alleges fraud by Szwak. The trial court was not persuaded by this argument. Instead, the pertinent issue for the trial court was whether the action should be viewed as a new filing to which the peremptive period would apply or whether, since the peremptive period had lapsed, the parties agreed to transfer the action to Caddo to continue litigation. Szwak asserted that peremption did not become a viable defense until the consent judgment resolved the pending venue exception. Carriere asserted that the consent judgment merely effected a transfer to Caddo and did not state that venue was improper in Lafayette.

After arguments, the trial court stated that “had the parties not agreed to transfer to Caddo, I would say, yes, exception granted.” However, the trial court denied the exception upon concluding “that the parties agreed to transfer the case to this jurisdiction for litigation because at the time of the agreement ... the principles of peremption, the one or the three-year, would have already been in effect.”

Szwak filed a writ with this court seeking supervisory review of the trial court’s ruling. We granted his writ, and the matter is now before us for review.

DISCUSSION

Applicable Law

An objection of peremption is raised by the peremptory exception. La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(2). The rules that govern the burden of proof as to prescription likewise govern peremption. Rando v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 2008-1163 (La.5/22/09), 16 So.3d 1065. As such, the party who raises an exception of peremption ordinarily bears the burden of proof at trial on the exception. Id.; Hunter v. Jindal, 45,130 (La.App.2d Cir.10/13/09), 20 So.3d 592, writ denied, 2009-2237 (La.10/15/09), 18 So.3d 1292. However, when peremption is evident on the face of the petition, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that his action is not perempted. Hunter, supra.

When a peremptory exception is pleaded prior to trial, the parties may introduce evidence to support or controvert the objection pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. La. C.C.P. art. 932. When evidence is introduced, the trial court’s factual conclusions are reviewed under the manifest error / clearly wrong standard. Smith v. Slattery, 38,693 (La.App.2d Cir.6/23/04), 877 So.2d 244, writ denied, 2004-1860 (La.10/29/04), 885 So.2d 592. However, when no evidence is introduced at the hearing on the exception of peremption (prescription), all allegations of the petition are to be accepted as true. Cichirillo v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 2004-2894 (La.11/29/05), 917 So.2d 424; Sanders Family, LLC No. 1 v. Sanders, 46,476 (La.App.2d Cir.12/14/11), 82 So.3d 434, writ denied, 2012-0414 (La.4/9/12), 85 So.3d 702.

Actions for legal malpractice are governed by La. R.S. 9:5605, which provides, in relevant part:

A.No action for damages against any attorney at law duly admitted to practice in this state, any partnership of such attorneys at law, or any professional corporation, company, organization, association, enterprise, or other commercial business or professional combination authorized by the laws of this state to engage in the practice of law, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of an engagement to provide legal services shall be brought unless filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and [fiproper venue within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date that the alleged act, omission, or neglect is discovered or should have been discovered; however, even as to actions filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such actions shall be filed at the latest within three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
B. The provisions of this Section are remedial and apply to all causes of action without regard to the date when the alleged act, omission, or neglect occurred.
The one-year and three-year periods of limitation provided in Subsection A of this Section are peremptive periods within the meaning of Civil Code Article 3458 and, in accordance with Civil Code Article 3461, may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.
C. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, in all actions brought in this state against any attorney at law duly admitted to practice in this state, ... the prescriptive and peremptive period shall be governed exclusively by this Section.
E. The peremptive period provided in Subsection A of this Section shall not apply in cases of fraud, as defined in Civil Code Article 1953.

When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written with no further interpretation made in search of the legislature’s intent. La. C.C. art. 9. The clear and unambiguous language of La. R.S. 9:5605(A) provides that no legal malpractice action “shall be brought unless filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue” within the periods of limitation set forth in the statute. As expressly stated in the statute, both the one-year and three-year periods of limitation for filing a legal malpractice action are peremptive. Jenkins v. Starns, 2011-1170 (La.1/24/12), 85 So.3d 612; Naghi v. Brener, 2008-2527 (La.6/26/09), 17 So.3d 919; Reeder v. North, 97-0239 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291. Moreover, the statute expressly provides that the one-year and three-year peremptive periods may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended. Jenkins, supra; Reeder, supra.

Analysis:

The initial burden of proof was on Szwak to prove the grounds of the exception. Szwak admitted the entire suit record into evidence. The record includes the initial pleadings, the exception of improper venue, and the consent judgment from the proceedings in Lafayette Parish, as well as the transfer notices, pleadings, and peremptory exception filed in Caddo Parish.

The record shows that peremption is evident on the face of Carriere’s petition. The petition alleges that Carriere learned of the unauthorized settlement on February 22, 2005, and that he learned in June of 2005 that his case against Experian had been dismissed. Though Carriere filed suit in Lafayette Parish on February 21, 2006, within one year of his learning of the allegedly unauthorized settlement, his action was met with Szwak’s exception of improper venue. Szwak’s exception to venue was not resolved until the parties agreed to the consent judgment, which was signed by the trial judge on July 21, 2010. After transfer of the action, Carriere’s petition was filed in Caddo Parish on February 8, 2011, years after the one-year and three-year peremptive periods provided in La. R.S. 9:5605 lapsed. Because peremption is evident on the face of the petition, the burden was on Carriere to prove that his action had not perempted. Carriere did not introduce any evidence.

|7Review of the hearing transcript shows that the trial court would have granted the exception of peremption but for the fact that the parties entered a consent judgment. Because the parties agreed to the consent judgment at a time when the per-emptive period would bar Carriere’s action, the trial court interpreted the consent judgment as an agreement to transfer Carriere’s action to Caddo for litigation and for that reason denied the exception of peremption.

A consent judgment is a bilateral contract between the parties that is accepted by the court. Gray v. Gray, 37,884 (La.App.2d Cir.12/12/03), 862 So.2d 1097. Its binding force derives from the voluntary acquiescence of the parties rather than from the court’s adjudication. Id.; Smith v. Holtzclaw, 46,278 (La.App.2d Cir.4/13/11), 62 So.3d 345. A judgment that results from the assent of the parties should be accorded sanctity under the law. Plaquemines Parish Government v. Getty Oil Co., 95-2452 (La.5/21/96), 673 So.2d 1002. As a contract, a consent judgment is to be interpreted in accordance with the common intent of the parties. La. C.C. art. 2045; Sutherlin v. Sutherlin, 05-535 (La.App.5th Cir.2/3/06), 930 So.2d 51. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. C.C. art. 2046; Gray, supra. When a contract can be interpreted within its four corners, its interpretation presents a question of law, and appellate review is limited to whether the trial court was legally correct or incorrect. Green Clinic, L.L.C. v. Finley, 45,141 (La.App.2d Cir.1/27/10), 30 So.3d 1094.

|sWe find that the trial court’s interpretation was legally incorrect. Under the consent judgment, Carriere agreed to “maintaining the Exception of Improper Venue due to this action being filed in a parish of improper venue, and the transferring of this suit to Caddo Parish.” The consent judgment states that the exception of improper venue is “granted.” The language of the consent judgment is clear, explicit and leads to no absurd consequences. The consent judgment is a determination that venue was improper in Lafayette Parish and an agreement to transfer the action to Caddo Parish. Transfer to a court of proper venue is appropriate when an action is brought in a court of improper venue. La. C.C.P. art. 121. The parties did not merely agree to move venue; they agreed that the action had been filed in an improper venue and therefore agreed to the transfer to Caddo. Nothing in the consent judgment precluded Szwak from filing the exception of per-emption upon the filing of Carriere’s action in Caddo Parish.

As argued by Szwak, the effect of the trial court’s ruling is that he renounced peremption by entering the consent judgment. This result is prohibited by La. R.S. 9:5605(B), which provides that per-emption may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended. Additionally, no legal malpractice action may be brought unless timely filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue. La. R.S. 9:5605(A). By the consent agreement, Carriere admitted that venue was improper in Lafayette Parish.

In Burns v. Goudeau, 2004-821 (La.App. 3d Cir.11/10/04), 888 So.2d 1031, the third circuit affirmed the trial court’s granting of an exception |flof peremption under facts similar to those here. The action was filed in Bossier Parish on October 5, 2001, within one year of discovery of the legal malpractice on October 14, 2000. However, the district court granted the defendant’s exception of improper venue and transferred the matter to St. Landry Parish on December 20, 2001, where the plaintiffs action was filed on February 2, 2002. The defendant then filed the exception of peremption. It was granted due to the action not being timely filed in the proper venue, St. Landry Palish.

The Burns decision supports a finding here that Carriere’s action is perempted. The action was not filed in a proper venue until after the expiration of the peremptive periods. However, Carriere makes three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that he timely exercised his right thereby interrupting peremption. Second, he argues that he has pled fraud to which the peremptive periods do not apply. Alternatively, he asserts that the matter should be remanded to the district court for reconsideration of the exception of peremption under Land v. Vidrine, 2010-1342 (La.3/15/11), 62 So.3d 36. We will address these three arguments to determine whether they have merit.

Citing La. C.C. arts. 3458, 3461, and 3462, Carriere argues that, even though he commenced the action in an improper venue, he timely exercised his right and thereby interrupted the peremptive period by serving Szwak. Article 3458 defines per-emption as “a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right” and provides that “[ujnless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon the expiration of the peremptive period.” While La. CjC.10 art. 3461 provides that peremption may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended, Revision Comment (c) states:

Nevertheless, when an action asserting a right subject to peremption has been commenced or served as provided in Article 3462, the right has been exercised and so long as the action is pending the lapse of the period of peremption does not extinguish the right.

Finally, La. C.C.P. art. 3462, which addresses the interruption of prescription, provides that an action commenced in an incompetent court or improper venue interrupts prescription as to a defendant served with process within the prescriptive period.

We find that Carriere’s argument is not persuasive under the explicit provisions of La. R.S. 9:5605 and the repeated pronouncements of the supreme court that the one-year and three-year periods are per-emptive and may not be renounced, suspended, or interrupted. Jenkins, supra; Naghi supra; Reeder, supra. Moreover, La. R.S. 9:5605(C) states:

C. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, in all actions brought in this state against any attorney at law duly admitted to practice in this state ... the prescriptive and peremptive period shall be governed exclusively by this Section.

Applying this provision, nothing in the statute provides for the interruption of the peremptive periods by service when the action is brought in an improper venue. In fact, a legal malpractice action may be brought only by filing timely in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue. Accordingly, we find no merit to this argument.

Next, Carriere argues that the per-emptive periods do not apply because his petition alleges fraud. La. R.S. 9:5605(E) provides that the peremptive periods shall not apply in cases of fraud as defined by La. C.C. Inart. 1953. Carriere asserts that his petition alleges that Szwak settled his case without authority and that he “engaged in an elaborate campaign to obscure the truth[.]” Carriere asserts that these are sufficient facts to constitute an allegation of fraud.

Jurisprudence applies the fraud exception under La. R.S. 9:5605(E) in cases where it was the fraudulent act itself that constituted the alleged malpractice; it is not applied where fraud is alleged in the actions taken after the malpractice has occurred. Smith v. Slattery, supra; Broadscape.com, Inc. v. Matthews, 2007-0545 (La.App.4th Cir.3/5/08), 980 So.2d 140; Brumfield v. McElwee, 2007-0548 (La.App.4th Cir.1/16/08), 976 So.2d 234. Also, this court has followed the third circuit in holding that only the three-year peremptive period is inapplicable to claims of fraud. An action for fraud must be brought within one year of the discovery of the allegedly fraudulent acts. Orea v. Bryant, 43,229 (La.App.2d Cir.4/2/08), 979 So.2d 687, citing Dauterive Contractors, Inc. v. Landry & Watkins, 2001-1112 (La.App.3d Cir.3/13/02), 811 So.2d 1242.

Applying the above principles, we find that Carriere’s allegations do not preclude application of the peremptive periods. First the alleged malpractice is the settlement without authorization. The allegation that Szwak engaged in a campaign to obscure the truth pertains to efforts to cover up the alleged malpractice. Additionally, the action was not properly filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue until February 8, 2011, several years after Carriere’s discovery of the allegedly fraudulent acts. For these reasons, we find no merit to Carriere’s argument.

|12In the event that this court would reverse the trial court’s ruling, Car-riere argues that we must remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the exception of peremption in light of Land, supra, which holds that “a trial court considering an exception of peremption must make an independent venue ruling for the limited purpose of deciding the exception of per-emption.” Carriere asserts that the trial court must make an independent determination of whether venue was proper in Lafayette in order to determine whether his action is perempted.

The Land case arose from a succession proceeding that had been filed in East Baton Rouge Parish. A dispute among the decedents’ children led to the filing of a legal malpractice action in East Baton Rouge Parish. The defendant filed an exception of improper venue contending that venue was proper in Lafayette Parish where he was domiciled, where his law practice was located, and where he had drafted the legal documents. The trial court granted the exception and transferred the case to Lafayette Parish. The defendant then filed an exception of per-emption, which was granted. The Lafayette Parish trial court believed that the law of the case doctrine applied to the venue ruling of the East Baton Rouge Parish court.

On appeal to the third circuit, the plaintiffs continued to assert that venue had been proper in East Baton Rouge Parish and that the trial courts erred in granting the exceptions of improper venue and per-emption. Affirming the granting of the exception of peremption, the third circuit found that the plaintiffs had waived their objection to the East Baton Rouge Parish trial court’s venue ruling by not applying for supervisory writs.

11sThe supreme court agreed that the plaintiffs had waived their right to challenge the venue ruling, but the court concluded that the transferee court could consider the venue issue for purposes of peremption. This consideration of venue would not affect the choice of forum, but would assist in deciding whether the action is still viable. The supreme court explained that the law of the case doctrine did not apply “in the context of a trial court ruling on interlocutory issues or a transferee court being asked to consider a ruling of the transferor court.” Id., 2010-1342, p. 9, 62 So.3d at 41. Instead, a trial court “must consider all the grounds for peremption, including whether the case was timely filed in a court of proper venue.” Id. The court concluded, “[i]n the absence of a legal barrier precluding consideration of the issue,” the ruling on the exception of improper venue should have been presented as evidence in support of the exception of peremption rather than as conclusion of law.

Szwak argues that the consent judgment is a legal barrier that precludes consideration of the venue issue in this case. We agree. This is not a situation as in Land, supra, where a trial court ruled venue to be improper and where the plaintiffs still maintained upon transfer that venue was proper in the original parish of filing. Here, Carriere entered a consent judgment granting Szwak’s exception of improper venue. Carriere agreed that he filed the action in a parish of improper venue and agreed to a transfer to Caddo. A review by the trial court of whether venue was proper in Lafayette would be inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous consent judgment by which the parties settled the issue of venue. Carriere, who has h4not asserted any error, fraud, or other grounds for rescinding the consent judgment as provided in La. C.C. art. 3082, would have “another bite at the apple.” He would have the opportunity to argue, contrary to the consent judgment he freely entered, that venue was proper in Lafayette. While Carriere may have made a bad bargain by agreeing to the consent judgment and, consequently, subjecting his action to the exception of per-emption, it is not for the courts to undermine the consent judgment and save him from the effects of his bargain. Martin Forest Products v. Grantadams, 616 So.2d 251 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 619 So.2d 580 (La.1993).

Carriere does not even argue specifically that venue was proper in Lafayette Parish. He merely points out that he resided there when he hired Szwak and signed the retainer agreement. These facts do not support venue in Lafayette Parish. It is undisputed that Szwak filed Carriere’s suit against Experian in federal district court in Caddo Parish and that Szwak’s practice is in Caddo. The Code of Civil Procedure venue provisions provide that an action against an individual is brought in the parish of his domicile and that actions for damages may also be brought in the parish where the wrongful conduct occurred or where the damages were sustained. La. C.C.P. art. 42(1) and La. C.C.P. art. 74. For purposes of legal malpractice actions, where the wrongful conduct occurred or where damages were sustained is generally the parish where the defendant’s law office is located, Clarendon National Ins. Co. v. Carter, 39,622 (La.App.2d Cir.5/11/05), 902 So.2d 1142, writ denied, 2005-1567 (La.1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544, or the parish of the underlying litigation when the wrongful conduct occurred there or | ir,damages were sustained there, Chumley v. White, 46,479 (La.App.2d Cir.11/9/11), 80 So.3d 39, writ denied, 2011-2741 (La.2/17/12), 82 So.3d 288. Under either case, Caddo Parish, not Lafayette Parish, is a proper venue as agreed to by the parties.

For these reasons, we find no merit to Carriere’s argument that Land, supra, requires remand of this case. Because Car-riere did not file this legal malpractice action in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue within the peremptive periods provided in La. R.S. 9:5605(A), we find that his action is perempted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained, we reverse the trial court’s overruling of the exception of peremption. We hereby maintain the exception and dismiss Carriere’s action with prejudice. Costs of appeal are assessed against Carriere.

WRIT GRANTED.

JUDGMENT REVERSED and RENDERED.

BROWN, C.J., dissents with written reasons.

BROWN, Chief Judge,

dissents.

liThe supreme court stated in Land v. Vidrine, 10-1342 (La.03/15/11), 62 So.3d 36, 42:

La. R.S. 9:5605 provides that no action for damages against attorneys “shall be brought unless filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect....” The trial court that is tasked with determining whether the case is perempted must consider all the grounds for peremption, including whether the case was timely filed in a court of proper venue. As we previously stated, the “law of the case doctrine” is not applicable in the instant situation. In the absence of a legal barrier precluding consideration of the issue, we find the East Baton Rouge Parish trial court’s venue ruling should have been merely presented as evidence in support of the defendant’s exception of peremption, not as a conclusion of law. The Lafayette Parish trial court is required to rule on venue only for purposes of deciding whether the cause of action is still viable; the determination, however, has no practical bearing on the actual choice of forum. In other words, the venue decision, when considered in the context of an exception of peremption, does not alter the location of the current and/or future proceedings of the case. If the Lafayette Parish trial court finds that venue was proper in East Baton Rouge Parish, then it is required to deny the defendant’s exception of per-emption and proceed with the trial in Lafayette Parish. Alternatively, if the Lafayette Parish trial court finds that venue was improper in East Baton Rouge, then it is required to continue its analysis of whether the filing in Lafayette Parish was timely. If the case was not timely filed in Lafayette Parish, the exception of peremption must be granted and the case dismissed. Thus, the only venue ruling in this case that is subject to review by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal is the venue finding that is incorporated into the per-emption ruling by the Lafayette Parish trial court. This procedure ensures that the appellate courts are only considering judgments within their jurisdiction.

The allegation that plaintiff consented to the venue change because venue was improper does not change the transferee (Caddo Parish) court’s obligation to examine venue. The Caddo Parish court found that venue was |2changed by consent — not because of improper venue. I would affirm or at least remand for the Caddo Parish court to examine whether the Lafayette Parish court was a court of proper venue.

The case where the alleged malpractice occurred was filed within the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, and specifically with the clerk at the federal courthouse in Shreveport. I note that another case for Carriere was filed by the same attorney with the clerk at the federal courthouse in Lafayette. Divisions in U.S. District Court are created for the convenience of the court in administration of cases. 28 U.S.C. 987(C). This federal action could have been filed with the clerk of court in either Lafayette or Shreveport.

Judge Caraway, in his concurrence in Chumley v. White, 46,479 (La.App.2d Cir.11/09/11), 80 So.3d 39, 47, writ denied, 11-2741 (La.02/17/12), 82 So.3d 288, stated:

Despite the fact that we have come to view legal malpractice as a matter in tort with its special peremption statute for the institution of the action, there is still a contractual agreement underlying the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., State Bar Articles of Incorporation, Art. 16, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5, and La. R.S. 37:218. The analogous principle for venue in contract disputes allows a party to the contract to be sued in “the parish where any work or services were performed” under the contract. La. C.C.P. art. 76.1. With this broad allowance for alternate venues under Article 76.1 in contract cases, I would give special application to the express language of Article 74 and allow a venue for legal malpractice “in the parish where the damages were sustained.”

The petition states that the retainer agreement with defendant attorneys was executed in Lafayette and set forth the scope and terms of their relationship. The petition states that work was done in Lafayette and |sdamages occurred in Lafayette where plaintiff resided. As noted supra, I would affirm or remand the matter for the Caddo Parish court to examine whether the Lafayette Parish court was one of proper venue.


author: THERIOT, J. CRAIN, J.,

text:
    James E. RAMER, Jr. v. EVANGELINE MAID BAKERY d/b/a Flowers Baking Company of Lafayette, LLC.
    No. 2012 CA 1583.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    April 26, 2013.
    Thomas J. DeJean, Opelousas, LA, for Plaintiff/App ellant James E. Ramer, Jr.
    Kenneth H. Laborde, Brendan P. Do-herty, Matthew F. Morgan, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee Evangeline Maid Bakery d/b/a Flowers Baking Company of Lafayette, LLC.
    Before GUIDRY, GRAIN, and THERIOT, JJ.
   THERIOT, J.

|2In this slip and fall case, the plaintiff appeals a summary judgment dismissing his suit. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

James E. Ramer, Jr. was employed by SNL Distribution Services Corporation as a bread delivery driver. On January 29, 2010, Mr. Ramer was unloading a truckload of bread inside Evangeline Maid Bakery d/b/a Flowers Baking Company of Lafayette, LLC’s (“Flowers”) warehouse in Morgan City when he slipped in a puddle on the warehouse floor and fell onto the floor. Mr. Ramer filed a petition for damages against Flowers, alleging that Flowers was liable for his injuries because they knew or should have known of the unsafe and hazardous condition. Flowers filed a third party demand against Bayou Estate Development, Inc. (“Bayou”), the owner of the warehouse leased by Flowers in which Mr. Ramer fell, and Mr. Ramer then amended his petition to make Bayou a defendant as well.

Flowers and Bayou (collectively referred to hereafter as “defendants”) filed motions for summary judgment on Mr. Ramer’s claims, which were granted by the court, and this appeal by Mr. Ramer followed.

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant, All Crane Rental of Georgia, Inc. v. Vincent, 10-0116, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/10/10), 47 So.3d 1024, 1027, writ denied, 10-2227 (La.11/19/10), 49 So.3d 387. A motion for summary judgment should only be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 13show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. 966(B).

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment remains with the mov-ant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). Once the motion for summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Pugh v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 07-1856, p. 2 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/21/08), 994 So.2d 95, 97 (on rehearing), writ denied, 08-2316 (La.l 1/21/08), 996 So.2d 1113; see also La. C.C.P. art. 967(B).

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Sanders v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 96-1751, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97), 696 So.2d 1031, 1035, writ denied, 97-1911 (La.10/31/97), 703 So.2d 29. Because it is the |4applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to this case. Walker v. Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity (Rho Chapter), 96-2345, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97), 706 So.2d 525, 528.

We are responsible for the damage occasioned by things which we have in our custody. La. C.C. art. 2317. However, the owner or custodian of a thing is only answerable for the damage caused by its ruin, vice, or defect upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. La. C.C. art. 2317.1.

In their motions for summary judgment, the defendants pointed out that Mr. Ram-er had no factual support for an essential element of his claim, i.e., that the defendants knew or should have known of the condition which caused the damage. In support of the motion, the defendants offered Mr. Ramer’s deposition testimony, as well as the deposition testimony of Fred Newby, Flowers’ warehouseman, and Norman Williams, Flowers’ sales manager. Mr. Ramer testified that he had never seen water on the warehouse floor before his accident. Mr. Newby, who is at the warehouse daily and is responsible for cleaning up the warehouse, testified that he had never seen water on the floor anywhere in the warehouse, nor had he ever observed any leaks in the warehouse roof. Mr. Williams testified that he goes to the warehouse approximately five times per week to ensure that the warehouse is clean, and he has never seen water in the area where Mr. Ramer fell. He also testified that he has never heard of anyone slipping and falling anywhere in the warehouse. Flowers also filed a drawing of the | ¿accident scene made by Mr. Ramer during his deposition, which showed the location of Mr. Ramer’s fall within the warehouse.

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Ramer filed his deposition and affidavit, as well as the depositions of Mr. Newby and Mr. Williams and an affidavit by Warren Prudhomme. Mr. Ramer testified in his deposition that after he fell, he looked up and noticed daylight coming in through the ceiling, but was unsure whether the opening was pinhole-sized or larger. Although he testified that he did not remember seeing any water dripping through the hole, he thought that the puddle on the floor could possibly have come from that hole. Mr. Ramer also introduced Mr. Williams’ deposition testimony that sometimes when it rains, water drips on the floor right near the office or is blown in through an open door. However, according to Mr. Williams’ testimony and the drawing of the accident scene, the area where Mr. Williams recalled seeing water in the past was not near the location of Mr. Ramer’s fall. Mr. Williams testified that he had never seen any water on the floor in the area where Mr. Ramer fell. Furthermore, there was no testimony that it rained on or around the day of the accident. Mr. Ramer also offered the affidavit of Warren Prudhomme, a contractor who inspected the warehouse roof over two years after the accident and noted that it appeared that the roof vents had been very recently painted and caulked to prevent leaks.

Defendants pointed out an absence of factual support for an essential element of Mr. Ramer’s claim, ie., that defendants knew or should have known of a dangerous condition, and Mr. Ramer offered no evidence in response to show that he could carry his burden of proof on that element of his claim. Considering the evidence before the court, summary judgment dismissing Mr. Ramer’s claim is appropriate.

| fiCONCLUSION

The summary judgment dismissing Mr. Ramer’s claims against Flowers and Bayou is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, James E. Ramer, Jr.

AFFIRMED.

CRAIN, J., concurs in the result with reasons.

CRAIN, J.,

concurring in the result.

1H concur in the result reached by the majority for the following reasons.

The plaintiff claims that vents in the building roof were defective because they contained openings that permitted water to enter the building during rain events. Although the plaintiff presented evidence of these alleged defects, he presented no evidence that it rained on or around the day of the accident. Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish that he would be able to meet his burden of proving at trial that the allegedly defective vents were a cause-in-fact of the accident. When the undisputed facts disclose that the alleged defect is not the cause-in-fact of the injury to the plaintiff, the trial court can decide this issue on summary judgment. Coates v. Nettles, 563 So.2d 1257, 1259 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990).

The plaintiffs alternative theory is that the puddle was caused by a third person, such as another deliveryman. That claim does not involve a defect in the premises, but involves a defect on the premises and is subject to a duty-risk analysis under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. See, Bridgefield Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.E.S., Inc., 09-0725 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/23/09), 29 So.3d 570, 573. The defendant owes a duty to its visitors to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a safe condition commensurate with the particular circumstances involved. See, Parfait v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 93-1504 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/24/94), 638 So.2d 1140, 1142; Holden v. Louisiana State Univ. Med. Ctr. in Shreveport, 29,268 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/28/97), 690 So.2d 958, 961-62, writ denied, 97-0797 (La.5/1/97), 693 So.2d 730. In the absence of proof that the spill was caused by the defendant’s own actions, the duty to keep the premises in a safe condition must be shown to have been breached by some proof of inadequate inspection procedures. Holden, 690 So.2d at 964. The undisputed facts establish daily inspections and sweeping of the warehouse. The plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to prove either the source of the puddle or the length of time it had been on the floor. Under these undisputed facts, the plaintiff failed to prove that alternative inspection procedures would likely have prevented the accident.

      . Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 967(B) provides:
      When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided above, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided above, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him.


author: DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge.

text:
    THE GRILL HOLDINGS, L.L.C. v. CAMELLIA GRILL HOLDINGS, INC. Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc. v. The Grill Holdings, L.L.C.
    Nos. 2012-CA-1642, 2012-CA-1643.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    May 8, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied June 19, 2013.

      Kathy Lee Torregano, E. John Litch-field, Karen B. Sher, Berrigan, Litchfield, Schonekas, Mann & Traína, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Appellant, The Grill Holdings, LLC.
    Irl R. Silverstein, David A. Silverstein, The Silverstein Law Firm, APLC, Gretna, LA, for Appellee, Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc.
    Court composed of Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU.
   DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge.

It This matter arises out of the execution of a License Agreement between Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc. (“Camellia Grill”), as licensor, and The Grill Holdings, L.L.C. (“Grill Holdings”,) as licensee. Grill Holdings appeals a trial court judgment, which granted Camellia Grill’s motion for summary judgment and declared “the License Agreement entered into between the parties on August 27, 2006 to be terminated effective May 25, 2012, restoring all rights to the licenses marks to the mover, CAMELLIA GRILL HOLDINGS, INC.” Camellia Grill also appealed arguing that the trial court erred in determining that May 25, 2012, was the effective date of the termination of the parties’ agreement and that June 1, 2011 should be the effective date of termination. Camellia Grill also filed an answer to Grill Holdings’ appeal requesting additional attorney’s fees for the work done on the appeal. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Camellia Grill, we reverse that part of the judgment that determined the effective date of termination of the License Agreement to be May 25, 2012, and we amend the judgment to find that the | ¡¡effective date of termination of the License Agreement was June 1, 2011, and to include additional attorney’s fees of $3,222.00 for Camellia Grill’s work on this appeal.

FACTS

On June 6, 2011, Camellia Grill filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a judicial determination that a License Agreement it had with Grill Holdings had been breached . Specifically, Camellia Grill alleged the following in its petition and first amended and supplemental petition:

1. The defendant altered the marks subject to the Agreement without first obtaining the written consent of plaintiff, as licensor, and has continued to do so despite written notice from plaintiffilicensor to cease the unauthorized use of the altered marks.
2. The defendant has allowed the improper and unauthorized use of the mark, in violation of Sections 6, 7, 10.3 & 11, by the operation of two units, as sub-licensees, in Destín, Florida and on Chartres Street in New Orleans, without first providing written notice of the sub-license to plaintiff/licensor regarding Chartres Street location as well as not having in place proper sub-license agreements for either location upon commencement of operations.
3. The defendant failed to send to plaintiff/licensor the royalty check due for the fourth quarter, 2008, having been due on or before January 10, 2009, in violation of Sections 4.2 & 4.8 of the Agreement.
4. The defendant failed to timely provide the annual financial statement due for 2007, and failed to comply with plaintiffs request for an audit authorized by Sec. 4.8.4 of the Agreement, until it was judicially required to do so by Judgments rendered January 22, 2009, October 2, 2009 and submitted to the mandated audit, only after being held in Contempt of Court by a Judgment rendered |aDecember 29, 2010, Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans Proceedings No. 2008-8236.

On June 24, 2011, Grill Holdings filed an answer that made a general denial and argued that there had been no ill practice nor breach of the License Agreement between the parties. Thereafter, on February 24, 2012, Camellia Grill filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the License Agreement be terminated retroactively to May 31, 2011, and requested attorney’s fees and costs. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Camellia Grill attached the following exhibits: (1) a copy of the License Agreement; (2) a copy of all the licensed marks; (3) photographs depicting the use of “altered marks” by Grill Holdings; (4) Grill Holdings’ answers to all interrogatories; (5) Grill Holdings’ responses to request for admissions of fact; (6) an April 15, 2008 letter to Grill Holdings putting them on written notice of defaults and requesting that the defaults be cured within fifteen days; (7) a copy of the sublicense agreement between Grill Holdings and Uptown Grill of Destín, L.L.C. executed on May 7, 2009; (8) correspondence from Camellia Grill to Grill Holding, dated April 22, 2009 and May 14, 2009, regarding Grill Holdings’ defaults of the License Agreement; (9) a copy of the sublicense agreement between Grill Holdings and Chartres Grill, L.L.C. executed on January 18, 2011; and (10) a copy of a novelty royalty check in the amount of $197.73 that was never negotiated.

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Grill Holdings argues that “the parties tacitly modified the License Agreement when CGH [Camellia Grill] began routinely accepting royalty payments for the years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and half of 2011, including a $75,000 cheek on October 8, 2009 for the opening of a new restaurant unit in Destín, Florida.” Grill Holdings argues that |4 Camellia Grill’s allegations of violations are made in bad faith and that the purported violations of the contract are minor technicalities that do not rise to the level of a material breach. Further, Grill Holdings opposed the motion for summary judgment arguing that it is entitled to have its day in court to prove its affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, acquiescence, modification of the contract, accord and satisfaction, payment, and ratification. In support of its opposition to summary judgment, Grill Holdings attached as exhibits: (1) a copy of Camellia Grill’s complaint and amended complaint filed in Mississippi, which Camellia Grill dismissed without prejudice; (2) various correspondence between Camellia Grill and Grill Holdings regarding the License Agreement, the trademarks, service marks and the “altered marks,” and the alleged defaults; (3) the deposition of Michael Shwartz; (4) an amended affidavit of Michael Shwartz; (5) a copy of the trademarked logos and dates of renewal; (6) Grill Holdings’ answers to interrogatories, request for production and requests for admission; and (7) an affidavit of Kathie Houte, Grill Holdings’ bookkeeper.

In its reply to the opposition to motion for summary judgment, Camellia Grill argues that the License Agreement is clear and unambiguous and that Grill Holdings failed to provide credible evidence of any factual dispute which would require a trial. Thereafter, Grill Holdings filed a supplement to its opposition to motion for summary judgment and attached as exhibits (1) the May 22, 2012 affidavit of Hichan Khord, and (2) the September 14, 2011 affidavit of Mark Stein.

After a hearing on May 25, 2012, the trial court granted Camellia Grill’s motion for summary judgment, which terminated the License Agreement, effective May 25, 2012, and granted reasonable attorney’s fees, to be determined at a later date, pursuant to the License Agreement.

|5On July 27, 2012, Grill Holdings filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on August 1, 2012. Thereafter, on September 21, 2012, the trial court granted Camellia Grill’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs and awarded it $160,176.84. Grill Holdings now appeals this final judgment.

DISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we will address Grill Holdings’ argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for new trial. The applicable standard of review in ruling on a motion for new trial is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Guillory v. Lee, 2009-0075, p. 38 (La.6/26/09), 16 So.3d 1104, 1131. A party seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence must demonstrate that it has done all that is reasonable to lead to timely discovery of the evidence. McGhee v. Wallace Drennan, Inc., 2004-0950, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05), 904 So.2d 3, 9, citing Barker v. Rust Engineering Co., 428 So.2d 391 (La.1983). Newly discovered evidence justifies a new trial only if evidence: (1) is discovered after trial; (2) could not, with due diligence, have been discovered before or during the trial; and (3) is not merely cumulative, but instead would tend to change the result of the case. Turner v. Dameron-Pierson Co., Ltd., 95-0143, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/16/95), 664 So.2d 739, 740.

After reviewing the motion for new trial, along with the exhibits, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying Grill Holdings’ motion for new trial. Grill Holdings has not demonstrated that any of the new evidence submitted with the motion for new trial could not have been discovered prior to the hearing and/or | fithat the new evidence would have changed the trial court’s finding that Grill Holdings breached the written License Agreement.

On appeal, Grill Holdings argues that the trial court erred in granting Camellia Grill’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Grill Holdings argues that: (1) Camellia Grill failed to perform its contractual obligations in good faith; (2) there are genuine issue of material fact as to whether it [Grill Holding] substantially performed the contract; (3) paragraph three of the contract is ambiguous and requires the court to look beyond the contract to determine the parties’ intent; (4) it [Grill Holdings] is entitled to prove its affirmative defenses of waiver, acquiescence, modification, ratification, and payment; (5) two of the breaches alleged by Camellia Grill [for failure to timely notify of sub-licensees and failure to pay the fourth quarter of 2008 royalty payment of $197.73] are not genuine breaches; (6) Camellia Grill should be estopped from the termination of the contract since Camellia Grill allowed it to make a substantial investment and open two additional Camellia Grills; (7) this case is appropriate for the court to apply the doctrine of judicial control; and (8) the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees.

Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181, p. 7 (La.2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, 230. A summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is enti-tied to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). A fact is material when its existence or 17nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiffs cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). Summary judgments are favored, and the summary judgment procedure shall be construed to accomplish those ends. Id. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2) provides that where, as in the instant case, the party moving for summary judgment will not bear the burden of proof at trial, their burden does not require them to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that it will be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

According to La. C.C. art. 2045, “[ijnter-pretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties.” When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. C.C. art. 2046. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions. La. C.C. art. 2050. |sIn the event of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a provision in a contract must be interpreted against the party who furnished its text. La. C.C. art. 2056.

The License Agreement, signed on August 27, 2006, by Camellia Grill, the li-censor, and Grill Holdings, the licensee, provides in pertinent part:

1. RECITALS.
1.1 Licensor owns the intellectual property, trademarks and service marks (“Marks”)....
1.2 Licensee desires to obtain the exclusive license to the Marks for the purposes set forth herein.
1.3 The Parties enter into this Agreement to state the terms and conditions upon which Licensee may open, operate, franchise and/or subli-cense restaurants bearing the Marks and to sell ancillary products bearing the Marks.
2. TERM AND TERMINATION. This Agreement shall commence as of the date first set forth above and shall continue until December 31, 2157, unless sooner terminated as set forth below.
2.1 Termination will be effective immediately upon written notice from Licensor to Licensee when Licensee: (i) fails to comply with any provision of this Agreement, or (ii) becomes insolvent, files for bankruptcy or dissolves. (Emphasis added)
2.2 Licensee may terminate this Agreement upon one (1) year’s written notice to Licensor provided that (i) Licensee is not in default hereunder, (ii) Licensor shall not owe Licensee any rebate, refund, return or repayment of any amounts paid hereunder, (iii) Licensee immediately surrenders all right whatsoever Licensee may have in the- Marks and assigns all franchise or sublicense agreements then in effect to Licensor, and (iv) Sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 shall survive such termination.
3. CAMELLIA GRILL TRADEMARK LICENSE. Licensor grants to the Licensee for the duration of this Agreement an exclusive license to use the Marks in connection with Licensee’s restaurant operations and the marketing and distribution of t-shirts, aprons, sweatshirts, caps, mugs, cups, posters, coffee, golf shirts, and dress shirts bearing the Marks within the United States (the “Territory”). Licensee agrees not to change any aspect of the Marks in color, design or presentation, without the prior written consent of Licensor. Licensee may sub-sublicense the Marks, provided that all sublicensees agree in writing that the Marks shall be used only as specified in this Agreement. Licensee shall submit all products bearing the Marks in advance to Licensor prior to marketing them to |9enable Licensor to approve the quality of the goods, which approval will not unreasonably be refused and shall be communicated by Licensor within 30 days of submission by Licensee of goods of appropriate quality. From time to time, Licensor may visit the restaurants and sample the food items on the menu and observe the provision of services by Licensee, franchisees and/or sublicensees; as a result of such a visit, Licensor may request Licensee to alter menu items or alter its services, but Licensor shall not make such request unreasonably.
$ $ $
5. OWNERSHIP. Licensee acknowledges and agrees that all of the Li-censor’s right, title and interest in and to the Marks shall remain the property of Licensor. Where appropriate, Licensee agrees to use the designations m, ® or © with respect to its use of the Marks.
6. USE OF TRADEMARKS. Licensee will: (i) use the Marks only as set forth herein; (ii) refrain from use of the Marks except under the terms of this Agreement; (iii) notify Licensor in writing of any conflicting uses, applications for registration or registrations of the Mark or Marks similar thereto of which it has actual knowledge; and (iv) execute any documentation requested by Licensor relating to the Marks.
6.1 Licensee shall not use any part of the Marks in combination with any other trademark, word, symbol, letter or design. Licensee shall not use any of the Marks as a part of its company name, but Licensee shall use “Camel-ha Grill” as the name of each of its restaurants in which the marks are used. Licensee agrees not to adopt any trademark, tradename, design, logo or symbol, which, is similar to or likely to be confused with any of the Marks.
6.2 Licensor makes no representation or warranty as to the viability of Licensee’s operation nor as to the marketability of the Marks or of products or restaurants bearing the Marks. Licensor will not be liable for any actions or claims by third parties, or any expenses, costs or damages related thereto or resulting therefrom, arising in connection with Licensee’s use of the Marks.
6.3 Licensee shall provide to Li-censor a copy of any franchise agreement, license, sub-license or any other agreement with respect to the use, transfer, assignment, franchise, or alienation of all or any of the Marks within two (2) business days of the execution of any such agreement.
6.4 Licensee shall cause any franchisee, licensee, transferee, assignee or sublicense of any or all of the Marks to abide by all of the provisions of this Agreement, and in particular, with the provisions of Articles 4, 5 and 6.
Jail. SUBLICENSING. Licensee may sublicense the Marks to any third party upon prior written notice to Li-censor. Licensor may assign this Agreement without the prior approval of Licensee.
12. EFFECT OF TERMINATION.
12.1 Licensee to Prevent Consumer Confusion. Upon termination of this Agreement, Licensee shall avoid any action or the continuance of any condition which might suggest to the public that Licensee has any right to the Marks, or that Licensee continues to be associated with Licensor.
12.2 Effect of Termination. Upon termination of this Agreement for any reason, all rights and privileges granted to Licensee hereunder will immediately cease and will revert to Li-censor. Licensee will discontinue use of all Marks.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜
16. DEFAULT. Licensor may, in its sole discretion, terminate all or part of this Agreement in the event that:
16.1 If Licensee at any time after January 1, 2007 fails to continue active marketing of the Marks and fails to cure such default within fifteen (15) days after written notice from Li-censor. For purposes hereof, maintaining restaurant operations at normal times during normal business hours, except for holidays, acts of God, governmental action, terrorism and other events of force majeure shall constitute “active marketing.”
* ⅜ *
16.3Licensee defaults under any of its obligations hereunder and fails to cure such default within fifteen (15) days after written notice from Licensor. (Emphasis added)
17. MISCELLANEOUS.
17.1 Amendment. This Agreement may not be amended, modified or supplemented except by a written agreement executed by all the Parties.
17.2 Attorneys’ Fees. In the event any Party hereto institutes an action or proceeding to enforce any rights arising under this Agreement, the Party prevailing in such action or proceeding shall be paid all reasonable attorney’ fees and costs. These costs include, without limitation, expert witness fees, investigation costs, costs of tests and analysis, travel and accommodation ^expenses, deposition and trial transcript costs and court costs. A court, and not a jury, will set all such fees and costs, all of which will be included in the judgment entered in such proceeding.

After reviewing the record, as well as Grill Holdings’ arguments on appeal, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment, which granted Camellia Grill’s motion for summary judgment. The record is devoid of any evidence that Camellia Grill acted in bad faith in its dealings with Grill Holdings; rather, we find that Camellia Grill provided many opportunities for Grill Holdings to cure the defaults before taking legal action. We also agree with Camellia Grill that section 3 of the License Agreement is not ambiguous and that it clearly prohibits any change in the marks without the prior written consent of the Licensor [Camellia Grill]. The License Agreement is also very clear in section 16.3 when it authorizes Camellia Grill to terminate the License Agreement in the event that “licensee defaults under any of its obligations hereunder and fails to cure such default within fifteen (15) days after written notice from Licensor.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the arguments made by Grill Holdings that the breaches were not “genuine” and/or that Grill Holdings had substantially performed the contract in good faith are irrelevant and have no merit. Further, not only did Grill Holdings fail to support any of its alleged affirmative defenses of waiver, acquiescence, modification of the contract, ratification, and payment, but the License Agreement clearly provides in section 17.1 that the License Agreement “may not be amended, modified or supplemented except by a written agreement executed by all the Parties.” Because we find that the License Agreement is clear and explicit and thus should not be | ^subject to any further interpretation by the court, and because Grill Holdings was in default of the License Agreement and failed to cure the breaches within the periods set forth in the agreement, we find that the trial court properly granted Camellia Grill’s motion for summary judgment.

Additionally, we find no error in the trial court judgment awarding attorney’s fees at a later date (judgment signed on October 9, 2012) since the July 19, 2012 judgment granted “reasonable attorney’s fees and all costs of these proceedings pursuant to Section 17.2 of the License Agreement, with the amounts to be determined by further proceedings herein.” As stated by the trial court in her reasons for judgment regarding the attorney’s fees, “[a]s the prevailing party in the audit dispute and the summary judgment, Camellia Grill is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs incurred. Camellia Grill has provided the Court with evidence supporting the attorney’s fees and costs associated with the litigation.” The License Agreement clearly provides for an award of attorney’s fees under section 17.2, which states:

17.2 Attorneys’ Fees. In the event any Party hereto institutes an action or proceeding to enforce any rights arising under this Agreement, the Party prevailing in such action or proceeding shall be paid all reasonable attorney’ fees and costs. These costs include, without limitation, expert witness fees, investigation costs, costs of tests and analysis, travel and accommodation expenses, deposition and trial transcript costs and court costs. A court, and not a jury, will set all such fees and costs, all of which will be included in the judgment entered in such proceeding.

After reviewing the record, we find that the attorney’s fees are supported by the record and are reasonable.

Camellia Grill answered the appeal for the purpose of seeking additional attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. Although Grill Holdings filed a motion to strike the answer, we find no merit in this motion as this Court, on March 8, 2013, 11sallowed the filing of both the late request for oral argument filed by Grill Holdings and the late request to file an answer by Camellia Grill. Further, this Court has authority to make such an award pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2164 and may “render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.” Accordingly, we hereby amend the judgment to include additional attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal in the amount of $3,222.00.

Camellia Grill also appealed the July 19, 2012 judgment but only insofar as the trial court’s determination of the effective date of termination being May 25, 2012, rather than the date prayed for in the petition, June 1, 2011. Camellia Grill argues that the License Agreement is controlling and that according to section 2.1, termination became effective immediately upon the issuance of written notice on May 81, 2011. We agree.

2.1 Termination will be effective immediately upon written notice from Li-censor to Licensee when Licensee: (i) fails to comply with any provision of this Agreement, or (ii) becomes insolvent, files for bankruptcy or dissolves.

Camellia Grill issued written notice to Grill Holdings on May 31, 2011, “terminating the License ... effective immediately for Grill’s failure to comply with four critical provisions of the License.” Specifically, Camellia Grill listed two defaults which remained uncured on that date: (1) Grill Holdings was using “an altered version of the fork/flower logo Mark” and (2) Grill Holdings failed to send a 2008 Royalty check which was originally due by January 10, 2009. The License Agreement is clear and explicit that termination is effective immediately upon written notice from the Licensor [Camellia Grill] to Licensee [Grill Holdings] when Licensee “fails to comply with any provision of this Agreement.” Thus, it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that the effective date of | ^termination was May 25, 2012, that being the date of the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, rather than the contractually agreed upon date as set forth in the License Agreement. Accordingly, we hereby reverse that part of the trial court judgment and amend the judgment to find the effective date of termination was June 1, 2011.

For these reasons, we hereby affirm the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Camellia Grill, we reverse that part of the judgment that determined the effective date of termination of the License Agreement to be May 25, 2012, and we amend the judgment to find that the effective date of termination of the License Agreement was June 1, 2011, and to include additional attorney’s fees of $3,222.00 for Camellia Grill’s work on this appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AMENDED; MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER DENIED.

      . A motion to transfer and consolidate the new petition with a previously filed pleading [No. 2008-8236] was filed on July 7, 2011, and granted on September 9, 2011.

      . The hearing on the rule to fix attorney's fees was held before Honorable Nadine Ramsey, sitting ad hoc for Judge Giarrusso.

      . Section 3 provides, in pertinent part: "Licensee agrees not to change any aspect of the Marks in color, design or presentation, without the prior written consent of Licensor."