author: WALLER, Chief Justice,

text:
    Felicia Rogers JOHNSON and Thomas Johnson, Jr. v. William PACE, M.D.
    No. 2012-CA-01732-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Sept. 26, 2013.
    Alfreda T. Bester, Alvin Armistad, Vicksburg, attorneys for Appellants.

      Rex M. Shannon, III, Gaye Nell Currie, Jackson, attorneys for Appellee.
    Before WALLER, C.J., CHANDLER and KING, JJ.
   WALLER, Chief Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Johnsons appeal from summary-judgment dismissal of their medical-malpractice suit against William Pace, M.D. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On September 19, 2011, the John-sons filed a complaint against Dr. Pace, alleging a claim of medical malpractice arising from a surgical procedure Dr. Pace had performed on Felicia Johnson. On October 31, 2011, Dr. Pace filed his Answer and Defenses, denying any negligence in his treatment of Felicia Johnson. On the same day, Dr. Pace served his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to the Johnsons. One interrogatory requested that the Johnsons identify any medical experts they intended to call as witnesses at trial, along with the proposed opinions of those experts. In their response, the Johnsons stated .that they had not yet identified an expert to be called as a witness at trial. On December 20, 2011, Dr. Pace served his first requests for admission and second requests for production of documents to the Johnsons. In response, the Johnsons admitted that they did not have a report from a qualified medical expert stating that Dr. Pace had breached the standard of care applicable to him in any way in his care and treatment of Felicia.

¶ 3. On May 14, 2012, eight months after the complaint was filed, Dr. Pace filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Johnsons had failed to produce any expert testimony to support their claim. The Johnsons responded by filing a motion to quash Dr. Pace’s motion for summary judgment. The Johnsons argued that Dr. Pace’s motion was premature, because no scheduling order had been entered in the case and no deadline for designating an expert witness had been established. The Johnsons did not respond to the substantive allegations of Dr. Pace’s motion for summary judgment.

¶ 4. On September 7, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The Johnsons argued that Dr. Pace’s motion for summary judgment was merely a “Draconian method” to punish them for being uncooperative during discovery. The trial court asked the Johnsons why they were unable to produce an expert witness when they were required to consult with one prior to commencing the suit. The Johnsons responded that the expert with whom they initially had consulted subsequently refused to testify for undisclosed reasons. The Johnsons claimed that they had found an expert who would testify on their behalf and asked the court to allow them extra time to supplement their discovery responses. They did not identify the expert or make a proffer of the expert’s proposed testimony. On September 14, 2012, the trial court entered its order, granting Dr. Pace’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the Johnsons had had ample time to produce an expert to support their claims, and in the absence of any such expert testimony, that Dr. Pace was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

¶ 5. The Johnsons now appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, raising the following issues:

I. Whether Dr. Pace’s motion for summary judgment, based solely on his assertion that the Johnsons had not yet named an expert, was premature.
II. Whether Dr. Pace’s supplemental affidavit supporting his motion for summary judgment was properly before the trial court.

¶ 6. We address only the first issue, finding it to be dispositive.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. City of Jackson v. Shavers, 97 So.3d 686 (Miss.2012) (citing Arcadia Farms P’ship v. Audubon Ins. Co., 77 So.3d 100, 104 (Miss.2012)). Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Davis v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397, 401 (Miss.2004). Only when the moving party has met its burden by demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact exist should summary judgment be granted. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss.1990).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Dr. Pace’s motion for summary judgment, based solely on his assertion that the Johnsons had not yet named an expert, was premature.

¶ 8. The law of summary judgment is well-settled. “A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (emphasis added). In a medical-malpractice action, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof at trial and, thus, the burden of production on summary judgment. Palmer v. Biloxi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1355 (Miss.1990). A plaintiff in a medical-malpractice case has the burden of proving “(1) the existence of a duty by the defendant to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of injury; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach of such duty by the defendant.” Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956-957 (Miss.2007) (citations omitted). Expert testimony establishing these elements generally is required for the nonmoving party to survive summary judgment. Smith v. Gilmore Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 952 So.2d 177, 180 (Miss.2007) (citing Sheffield v. Goodwin, 740 So.2d 854, 856 (Miss.1999). “Not only must this expert identify and articulate the requisite standard that was not complied with, the expert must also establish that the failure was the proximate cause, or proximate contributing cause, of the alleged injuries.” Barner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805, 809 (Miss.1992) (citing Latham v. Hayes, 495 So.2d 453 (Miss.1986)).

¶ 9. Aside from the bare assertion in their brief that “genuine issues of material fact remain herein,” the Johnsons have not pointed to any specific factual dispute that would warrant reversal of summary judgment. Instead, they argue that Dr. Pace’s motion for summary judgment should not have been considered because they were not yet required to designate an expert witness at the time the motion was filed. The Johnsons cite Rule 4.04(A) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court to support their proposition. The rule provides:

All discovery must be completed within ninety days from service of the answer by the applicable defendant. Additional discovery time may be allowed with leave of court upon written motion setting forth good cause for the extension. Absent special circumstances the court will not allow the testimony at trial of an expert witness who was not designated as an expert witness to all attorneys of record at least sixty days before trial.

URCCC 4.04(A) (emphasis added). The Johnsons argue that, because no trial date had been set in the case, the sixty-day deadline for designating an expert never expired.

¶ 10. This Court previously has rejected a similar argument and affirmed summary judgment in a case where the Rule 4.04(A) expert-designation deadline had not yet passed. In Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Maranatha Faith Center, Inc., 873 So.2d 103, 105 (Miss.2004), the plaintiff sued Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., and Kerr-McGee Chemical, LLC, for property contamination allegedly caused by chemicals used by the defendants. Kerr-McGee and Sanderson filed cross-claims against each other for indemnity or contribution. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to Sanderson and dismissed all claims against it, including the cross-claims by Kerr-McGee. Id. Kerr-McGee then appealed, arguing that summary judgment was premature because the expert-designation deadline under Rule 4.04(A) had not yet passed. Id. at 106. Relying on the Rule 4.04(A) deadline, Kerr-McGee argued that it was not prepared to rebut Sander-son’s expert testimony in support of summary judgment. Id. This Court rejected Kerr-McGee’s argument. Id. at 107. Because Kerr-McGee’s response in opposition to summary judgment did not request additional time for discovery and was not accompanied by substantive evidence in opposition of summary judgment, this Court held that the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. Id.

¶ 11. The Johnsons’ argument is the same as the defendant’s in Kerr-McGee. Rule 4.04(A) provides that an expert witness must be designated no later than sixty days prior to trial. There is no authority for the Johnsons’ proposition that a party need not produce an expert witness until that time. The Johnsons were required to support their claim with expert testimony in order to prevail against Dr. Pace. In fact, the Johnsons were required to consult with a medical expert before filing suit. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-58 (Supp.2012). The John-sons also were under a continuing duty to update their responses to Dr. Pace’s discovery requests regarding potential expert witnesses. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1)(B). In light of the Johnsons’ admission that they did not have the requisite expert opinion supporting their claims, Dr. Pace properly moved for summary judgment. See Smith, 952 So.2d at 180. With no supporting medical-expert testimony, the Johnsons were unable to carry the required burden of proof in this case. “[I]t is our general rule that in a medical-malpractice action!,] negligence cannot be established without medical testimony that the defendant failed to use ordinary skill and care.” Brooks v. Roberts, 882 So.2d 229, 232 (Miss.2004) (emphasis in original) (citing Sheffield v. Goodwin, 740 So.2d 854, 858 (Miss.1999)). Accordingly, we find that Dr. Pace’s motion for summary judgment was not premature.

CONCLUSION

¶ 12. A year after filing their complaint, faced with a motion for summary judgment, the Johnsons failed to present any medical-expert testimony establishing the elements of a medical-malpractice claim. In the absence of any expert testimony to support the Johnsons’ claim, Dr. Pace was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Pace.

¶ 13. AFFIRMED.

DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . The Johnsons later moved to amend their response to substitute the word "strike” in place of "quash.” However, the substance of their argument remained the same. They requested the court to dismiss the motion for summary judgment as untimely.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: COLEMAN, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    George Waddell NEVILLE v. Tina Foley (Neville) BLITZ.
    No. 2011-CA-01613-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Sept. 26, 2013.

      George W. Neville, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    Michael J. Malouf, attorney for appellee.
    Before DICKINSON, P.J., PIERCE and COLEMAN, JJ.
   COLEMAN, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. George Neville filed a petition for modification of a final judgment of divorce seeking to have his ex-wife, Tina Blitz, pay their daughter’s college expenses. The chancellor ordered the parties to divide the college expenses equally, after scholarships and a monthly housing stipend from the Post-9/11 GI Bill were deducted. George, who had assigned his Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits to his daughter, appealed and asserted that the chancellor had erred by dividing the monthly housing stipend between Tina and himself.

Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2. George Neville and Tina Blitz divorced in 1996. Their only child, Joyce, was five years old at that time, and the final judgment of divorce did not make provisions for her college expenses. George serves as a member of the Army Reserve and was mobilized in 2005. Because of his active duty, George became eligible for educational assistance through the Post-9/11 GI Bill, which included payment of college tuition, fees, books, and a monthly housing allowance. Having the option of transferring his benefits to a family member, George transferred his benefits to Joyce.

¶ 3. Joyce graduated from high school in 2010. Tina preferred that Joyce attend a state university, where she would have been eligible for in-state tuition. George encouraged Joyce to attend Southern Methodist University in Texas, where she could maximize the benefits from the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Joyce chose SMU and began college in August 2010. George and Joyce agreed to save the $1,200 monthly housing allowance provided by the GI Bill so Joyce could use the money to pay for school in the future when the benefits ceased. Tina did not refuse to pay for Joyce’s college entirely, but she committed to paying only half of what it would have cost for Joyce to attend a state university.

¶ 4. In October 2010, George filed a petition for modification of the final judgment of divorce, asking the court to order Tina to pay half of Joyce’s college expenses at SMU. Later, it became evident that George wanted Tina to pay all expenses that were not covered by the GI Bill, which he estimated to be $19,000 per semester. After a hearing, the chancellor entered a final judgment of modification on July 21, 2011. Therein, he held that, for the remaining three semesters before Joyce turned twenty-one (at which time neither party would be obligated to support Joyce or pay college expenses), her college expenses should be split equally between Tina and George, after Joyce’s scholarship was applied. George was allowed to take full credit for the GI Bill benefits and to consider the benefits as payment for his half of Joyce’s expenses. The chancellor held that they should continue to deposit the $1,200 monthly stipend into a savings account as they had been doing.

¶ 5. George filed a motion for reconsideration and for clarification, claiming that the chancellor’s restriction on how the GI Bill benefits were used was a violation of federal law. The chancellor entered an amended final judgment of modification on September 22, 2011. He held that Joyce’s expenses should be reduced by her scholarships, any loans or work-study aid that she might receive, and the $1,200 monthly stipend; then the remaining expenses were to be divided equally between George and Tina, with George taking full credit for all GI Bill benefits except the monthly housing allowance. George appealed, taking issue with the chancellor’s appropriation of the $1,200 monthly housing stipend. George asserts that, by taking the monthly stipend off the top of Joyce’s college expenses, the chancellor shared George’s GI Bill benefits with Tina.

Analysis

¶ 6. George contends that federal law preempts state law with regard to the appropriation of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits, and he asserts that the chancellor violated federal law by dividing George’s GI Bill benefits. A chancellor’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed “unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous[,] or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Rogillio v. Rogillio, 101 So.3d 150, 153 (¶ 11) (Miss.2012) (quoting Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So.2d 623, 625-26 (¶ 8) (Miss.2002)). “A chancellor’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So.3d 274, 285 (¶ 26) (Miss.2009) (citing Chesney v. Chesney, 910 So.2d 1057, 1060 (¶ 5) (Miss.2005)).

¶ 7. The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, known as the Post-9/11 GI Bill, went into effect August 1, 2009. See 38 U.S.C. § 3301, et seq. (2011) The benefits provided by the Post-9/11 GI Bill include the cost of college tuition and fees, a stipend for books each semester, and a monthly housing stipend. 38 U.S.C. § 3313(c)(1) (2011). The service member entitled to the benefits is allowed to transfer a maximum of thirty-six months of benefits to a spouse or child. 38 U.S.C. § 3319(a)-(d) (2011). If a service member elects to transfer his or her benefits, the “[e]ntitlement transferred ... may not be treated as marital property, or the asset of a marital estate, subject to division in a divorce or other civil proceeding.” 38 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(3) (2011).

A. Federal-Law Preemption

¶ 8. George argues that federal law preempts state law as to the transfer and division of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. In the field of domestic relations, federal law preempts state law only if: “(1) Congress has positively expressed its intent to preempt the state law and (2) the state law does major damage to a clear and substantial federal interest.” In re Guardianship of Holmes, 965 So.2d 662, 665 (V 9) (Miss.2007) (quoting Clardy v. ATS, Inc. Employee Welfare Benefit Plan, 921 F.Supp. 394, 398 (N.D.Miss.1996)). For the doctrine of preemption to be applied, a state law must exist to actually be preempted. George has not cited a relevant state law that should be preempted by the federal law pertaining to Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. As the Post-9/11 GI Bill and benefits therefrom are a wholly federal issue, there are not any related state laws. Therefore, preemption is not an issue; rather, we must simply apply federal law. George’s claim that federal law preempts state law regarding Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits is without merit.

B. Division of Post-9/11 GI Bill Benefits

¶ 9. We previously have considered distribution of military disability benefits and military retirement pay in domestic relations cases. See Mallard v. Burkart, 95 So.3d 1264, 1272 (¶ 21) (Miss.2012); Rennie v. Rennie, 718 So.2d 1091, 1095 (¶ 13) (Miss.1998); Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 913 (Miss.1994); Newman v. Neuman, 558 So.2d 821, 823 (Miss.1990). But those cases dealt with the application of other federal laws pertaining to military benefits, such as the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, not the Post-9/11 GI Bill. The instant issue is one of first impression for the Court, and we have not found any cases from any jurisdiction directly addressing the specific issue at hand.

¶ 10. In the instant case, the chancellor held that Joyce’s college expenses should be reduced by her scholarships and the $1,200 monthly housing stipend; then Tina and George were to split the remaining amount equally, with George taking full credit for all Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits except the housing stipend. George asserts that the chancellor’s treatment of the monthly housing stipend violated Section 3319, which provides that benefits transferred to a spouse or child “may not be treated as marital property, or the asset of a marital estate, subject to division in a divorce or other civil proceeding.” 38 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(3) (2011). Tina maintains that the prohibition on treating transferred benefits as marital property is inapplicable, because the chancellor did not classify the stipend as marital property; thus, she. maintains that the chancellor’s decision did not constitute a division of the benefits. Tina also argues that, because George transferred the benefits to Joyce, the benefits belong to Joyce much like her scholarships; therefore, Tina asserts that taking the benefits off the top before dividing the remainder between the parents was appropriate.

¶ 11. George earned the benefits at issue here long after the parties divorced, and neither party claims that the benefits are marital property. We agree that George’s Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits were not marital property because they were not earned during the marriage; thus, they were not subject to division. See Wheat v. Wheat, 37 So.3d 632, 637 (¶¶ 14-15) (Miss.2010); Hemsley, 639 So.2d at 915 (Miss.1994). While the chancellor did not label the benefits as marital property, his instruction to take the benefits off the top of Joyce’s expenses gave Tina a credit that she otherwise would not have had and resulted in George not getting full credit for all of the Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. We find that the chancellor’s decision effectively acted as a “division” of the benefits. Although the proceeding was not an original divorce proceeding, it was a “civil proceeding” pertaining to modification of a divorce decree. Therefore, we conclude that the chancellor’s allocation of the housing stipend amounted to a division of the benefits in a civil proceeding, which is prohibited by Section 3319(f)(3).

¶ 12. Tina’s argument that the GI Bill benefits belonged to Joyce lacks merit. When benefits are transferred, the service member has the option to revoke the transfer at anytime. 38 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(2) (2011). Thus, the service member remains in control of the transferred benefits, and they still belong to him. The chancellor held that George was entitled to credit for the rest of the benefits — the payments for tuition, fees, and books — but the $1,200 monthly stipend was taken off the top of the expenses and not credited to George. All of the benefits should be treated equally. Because the GI Bill benefits still belong to George, he should be credited with all of them, and none of the benefits should be divided between George and Tina.

¶ 13. We act in concert with the purpose of the Post-9/11 GI Bill by giving George credit for all of the benefits. In enacting the bill, Congress stated that service in the “Armed Forces ha[d] been especially arduous” since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Congress explained the need for the bill as follows:

(3) The United States has a proud history of offering educational assistance to millions of veterans, as demonstrated by the many G.I. Bills enacted since World War II. Educational assistance for veterans helps reduce the costs of war, assist veterans in readjusting to civilian life after wartime service, and boost the United States economy, and has a positive effect on recruitment for the Armed Forces.
(5) The people of the United States greatly value military service and recognize the difficult challenges involved in readjusting to civilian life after wartime service in the Armed Forces.
(6) It is in the national interest for the United States to provide veterans who serve on active duty in the Armed Forces after September 11, 2001, with enhanced educational assistance benefits that are worthy of such service and are commensurate with the educational assistance benefits provided by a grateful Nation to veterans of World War II.

Pub. L. No. 110-252, Title V, § 5002 (June 30, 2008). The educational benefits provided by the Post-9/11 GI Bill aid in recruitment and rewarding service members for active duty. The ability to transfer the benefits is an additional incentive meant “to promote recruitment and retention of members of the uniformed services.” 38 U.S.C. § 3319(a)(2) (2011). Further, a service member who transfers the benefits must generally agree to continued years of service. See 38 U.S.C. § 3319(b)(1) (2011). The chancellor’s allocation of the housing stipend failed to accord with the spirit and purpose of the Post-9/11 GI Bill.

¶ 14. George earned the GI Bill educational benefits through active-duty service in the Army Reserve, which occurred long after he and Tina divorced. The chancellor’s allocation of the monthly housing stipend violated 38 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(3), because it constituted a division of the benefit between parties in a civil proceeding.

Conclusion

¶ 15. The chancellor found that George should take credit for the payment of Joyce’s tuition, fees, and books from the Post-9/11 GI Bill, but not the monthly housing stipend. He ordered that the housing stipend be taken off the top, along with Joyce’s scholarships, before' the remaining expenses were divided between George and Tina. We hold that the chancellor’s allocation of the monthly housing stipend was a violation of 38 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(3) because it constituted division of the benefit between parties in a civil proceeding. We reverse and remand for the chancellor to modify the order to give George credit for all benefits from the Post-9/11 GI Bill.

¶ 16. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, AND KING, JJ., CONCUR.

      . The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 ("Post-9/11 GI Bill”) went into effect August 1, 2009. See Pub.L. No. 110-252, Title V, § 5001 (June 30, 2008) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3301, et seq.).

      . When Joyce started college in 2010, students attending private schools in several states, including Texas, were eligible for higher rates of tuition reimbursement. That discrepancy was remedied later, but students who had started college with the higher rates of reimbursement were "grandfathered” in at those higher rates. See Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Improvements Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-377 (Jan. 4, 2011); Restoring GI Bill Fairness Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 122-26 (Aug. 3, 2011). See also Congressional Research Service, The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill): Primer and Issues 9-10 (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ misc/R42755.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).


author: CARLTON, J.,

text:
    Dempsey SULLIVAN and Terrell Stubbs, Appellants v. Samuel MADDOX and Steve Maddox, Appellees.
    No. 2011-CA-00820-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Jan. 22, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied May 28, 2013.
    Certiorari Denied Aug. 29, 2013.

      W. Terrell Stubbs, attorney for appellants.
    James Burvon Sykes III, Jackson, L. Wesley Broadhead, Mendenhall, attorneys for appellees.
    Before IRVING, P.J., CARLTON and MAXWELL, JJ.
   CARLTON, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Dempsey Sullivan and Terrell Stubbs (collectively, Sullivan) appeal the Simpson County Chancery Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Samuel Maddox and Steve Maddox (collectively, the Maddoxes). Sullivan also appeals the chancellor’s imposition of sanctions against Sullivan pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and also the chancellor’s denial of Sullivan’s motion to recuse. This case concerns Sullivan’s attempt to confirm and quiet title, by adverse possession, to property with a title vested in the United States. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On August 26, 2005, Sullivan filed a complaint in the Simpson County Chancery Court seeking to confirm and quiet his title to approximately eleven acres of real property in Simpson County, Mississippi. Sullivan filed his complaint in response to the Maddoxes’ claim to the same parcel of land. In his complaint, Sullivan claimed that he possessed the subject property by virtue of actual possession, thus fulfilling the adverse-possession requirements set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-13 (Rev.2012). Sullivan acknowledged that no accurate description of the real property existed, asserting no survey had been made or could be made prior to the filing of his complaint. Sullivan also requested and received a temporary injunction requiring the Maddoxes to remain on their side of the fence on the property.

¶ 8. In response to the injunction, the Maddoxes filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint on October 7, 2005. The Maddoxes later filed a joint motion for summary judgment on April 6, 2011, asserting that title to the subject property was vested in the United States, and therefore, neither Sullivan nor the Mad-doxes could make a claim to the property. In support of their argument, the Maddox-es provided an affidavit from Charles Hugh Craft, a licensed professional surveyor (PLS), who opined that the United States had never issued a patent conveying the property out of the public domain. Sullivan responded to this allegation by maintaining that he had possessed the property exclusively for thirty-nine years.

¶4. Then, on April 12, 2011, Sullivan filed a motion for the chancellor’s recusal. The Maddoxes responded by asserting that the motion for recusal had fatal defects because it failed to comply with the express dictates of Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11. Specifically, the Mad-doxes alleged that Sullivan had failed to timely file the motion and that the motion did not include the mandatory affidavit “setting forth the factual basis underlying the asserted grounds for recusal.” See UCCR 1.11.

¶5. On May 3, 2011, the parties appeared in the Simpson County Chancery Court for a hearing. The chancellor heard Sullivan’s motion for recusal first. The motion for recusal alleged that Wesley Broadhead, one of the attorneys representing the Maddoxes, had previously represented the husband of the chancery court administrator in a criminal appeal pending in the Simpson County Circuit Court. The chancellor took judicial notice of this fact, and the chancellor also acknowledged to both parties in open court that Sullivan’s counsel, Terrell Stubbs, had previously represented the chancery court administrator in a divorce action. The chancellor noted that Stubbs had failed to disclose this prior relationship. In ruling on the motion for recusal, the record shows the chancellor acknowledged “the question posed by the motion to recuse was if a reasonable person would doubt the court’s impartiality to the litigants in this case because an attorney for the litigants represented the husband of the court administrator” in a pending criminal appeal. The chancellor denied the motion to recuse, finding that the motion for recusal failed to comply with Rule 1.11. The chancellor also held that the basis stated in the motion for recusal constituted insufficient grounds for recusal under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

¶ 6. The chancellor’s order granting summary judgment reflects that on the morning of trial, Sullivan’s counsel attempted to make a proffer alleging an unreported campaign contribution to the chancellor, without providing a motion for recusal on this basis or a supporting affidavit setting forth any facts underlying the allegation. The chancellor determined that the unsubstantiated accusation directed at the chancellor constituted a derogatory remark alleging misconduct, and -he determined that Sullivan’s counsel asserted the remark as a threat.

¶ 7. After hearing oral argument on the Maddoxes’ joint motion for summary judgment, the chancellor determined that title to the subject property had indeed previously vested in the United States, and thus held that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n), the parties could not adversely possess sovereign property. The chancellor also explained that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to award title to real property if that property still constituted part of the public domain and still vested in the United States.

¶ 8. In his May 25, 2011 judgment, the chancellor noted that after the hearing on May 3, 2011, Sullivan’s counsel, Stubbs, informed the chancellor of the following:

Prior to the filing of the complaint ... on or about August 26, 2005, [Stubbs] had informed [Sullivan] that he had a poor or weak case against the [Maddox-es] due to the fact that there was no government survey, [that] no patent issued out of the United States of America, that he had no description of the boundaries of the land in dispute!, that] he had no color of title and that he could not deraign title in the pleadings....

The record further reflects that Stubbs informed the chancellor that he had required Sullivan to sign a waiver acknowledging that Stubbs had advised him of the problems with Sullivan’s claim. The chancellor acknowledged that Sullivan’s expert witness, Bill Miller, PLS, confirmed in his deposition testimony that the United States had issued no patent conveying the subject real property.

¶ 9. Based on these findings, the chancellor entered an order granting summary judgment on May 25, 2011, dismissing the claims of all parties with prejudice. The chancellor ordered that sanctions would be assessed on May 31, 2011. On May 19, 2011, the Maddoxes filed a motion for sanctions against Sullivan and Stubbs, alleging that both Sullivan and Stubbs were aware prior to the commencement of the suit that the lawsuit “was without hope of success” and requesting sanctions under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act.

¶ 10. On May 31, 2011, the parties appeared before the chancellor on the Mad-doxes’ motion for sanctions. The Maddox-es filed the sanctions motion after the chancellor had determined Sullivan’s complaint and motion for recusal were frivolous. The Maddoxes called Steven Maddox and two practicing attorneys, Wayne Easterling and Robert Germany, as witnesses in support of the motion for sanctions. On direct examination, Steven’s counsel moved to admit the following: a letter from the office of Attorney R.K. Houston; statements from the office of Attorney David Ringer; and invoices from the Maddoxes’ attorney, Russ Sykes. The chancellor admitted this evidence over the objection of Sullivan’s counsel.

¶ 11. On June 15, 2011, the chancellor entered a final judgment imposing sanctions by awarding the Maddoxes attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs in the amount of $42,922.91, to be paid jointly by Sullivan and his counsel, Stubbs. In sanctioning Sullivan and Stubbs, the chancellor specifically found that the following actions demonstrated frivolous pleadings had been filed and frivolous arguments had been made for the purposes of harassment and delay, without substantial justification, and with disrespect for the integrity of the court: (1) Stubbs’s admission that before commencement of the action he had advised Sullivan of the weakness of his claim to confirm and quiet title; (2) Sullivan and Stubbs’s failure to abandon the claim after their expert witness testified in his deposition that the United States had issued no patent for the subject property; (3) Sullivan and Stubbs’s failure to make any effort to determine the validity of the claim before raising it; and (4) the filing of an improper motion for recusal and false allegations against the court. The chancellor held that these various actions constituted a willful violation of Rule 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act, as well as Rule 8.2(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (prohibiting a lawyer from making a statement that he knows to be false or making a statement with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge).

¶ 12. On July 8, 2011, Sullivan appealed the final judgment, asserting seven assignments of error, which are listed in his brief as follows:

I. Whether the chancellor erred in precluding [Sullivan from having] a fair opportunity to present evidence on his motion for recusal or make a proffer on the record, in considering ex parte communications, and [in] testifying against [Sullivan] and his counsel in denying said motion.
II. Whether the chancellor erred by granting the [Maddoxes’] joint motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist and the Maddoxes did not have standing to assert the interests of the United States of America.
III. Whether the chancellor erred in precluding [Sullivan from receiving] a fair opportunity to present evidence on his motion for recusal on May 4, 2011[,] and denying said motion.
IV. Whether the chancellor erred by denying [Sullivan] and his counsel due process of law when the chancellor found [Sullivan’s] complaint and motion for recusal to be frivolous.
V. Whether the chancellor’s finding that [Sullivan’s] complaint and motion for recusal were frivolous is not supported by the evidence and is prejudicial, unreasonable, arbitrary, and inconsistent with substantial justice.
VI. Whether the attorneys’ fees awarded to the Maddoxes are supported by the evidence and [whether they are] excessive, if this [C]ourt finds the chancellor did not err in finding said action to be frivolous.
VII. Whether the chancellor improperly injected himself into the proceedings, advocated for the Mad-doxes, and was partial to the Maddoxes and their counsel and violated various canons of judicial conduct.

For purposes of clarity in our discussion, we have combined several of Sullivan’s issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 13. The determination of whether jurisdiction over a particular matter is proper is a question of law; therefore, this Court must apply a de novo standard of review to this issue. Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gatlin, 848 So.2d 828, 841 (¶38) (Miss.2003) (citing Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So.2d 1202, 1204-05 (¶ 5) (Miss.1998)).

¶ 14. Similarly, this Court employs a de novo standard of review for a trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment. Butler v. Upchurch Telecomms. & Alarms, Inc., 946 So.2d 387, 389 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2006). Our review involves examining all the evidentiary matters before the trial court “in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made.” Id.; see also M.R.C.P. 56(c). In the event that no genuine issue of material fact appears, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, then the trial court should enter summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Butler, 946 So.2d at 389 (¶ 8). “Otherwise, the motion should be denied.” Id. Additionally, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists. Id. “We have also held that the non-moving party must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 390 (¶ 8).

¶ 15. Regarding motions for recu-sal, the supreme court has clarified that appellate court must apply the manifest-error standard when reviewing a judge’s refusal to recuse himself. Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 774 (Miss.1997) (citing Davis v. Neshoba Cnty. Gen. Hosp., 611 So.2d 904, 905 (Miss.1992)). In applying this standard of review to a denial of a recusal motion, we acknowledge that the law presumes the impartiality of the trial judge. Bredemeier, 689 So.2d at 774.

¶ 16. The supreme court has clearly stated that the proper standard of review for the question of whether to apply sanctions is an abuse-of-discretion standard. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Broussard, 19 So.3d 821, 823 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2009). “Rule 11 states ... that the decision to award sanctions is within the discretion of the trial court.” Broussard, 19 So.3d at 823 (¶ 8). In addition, “[wjhen reviewing a decision regarding the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Litigation Accountability Act, this Court is limited to a consideration of whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment

¶ 17. Sullivan argues that the Maddox-es failed to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact existed, and that the chancellor erred in granting summary judgment. Sullivan further asserts that the Maddoxes lacked proper standing to assert that title to the property at issue was vested in the United States. Sullivan also submits that “all of the parties to this action were properly before the court[,] and all parties were claiming title to the subject property.”

¶ 18. The moving party shall be granted summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c). “Otherwise, the motion should be denied.” Butler, 946 So.2d at 389 (¶ 8). Additionally, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists. Id.

¶ 19. The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, establishes a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity for action to acquire title from the federal government. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has explained that “[ejxclusive jurisdiction in quiet[-]title actions against the United States is vested in federal courts.A state court does not have jurisdiction to decide quiet[-]title actions against the United States.” McClellan v. Kimball, 623 F.2d 83, 86 (9th Cir.1980) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f)); see also Brown v. Johnson, 373 F.Supp. 973, 974-75 (S.D.Tex.1974).

¶ 20. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n) provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession.” In following federal statutory law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that “[tjitle by adverse possession ... may not be asserted against the [United States].” United States v. Denby, 522 F.2d 1358, 1364 (5th Cir.1975). In United States v. Lemon, 632 F.Supp. 431, 435 (D.Colo.1986), a party sued the United States and claimed title to real property by virtue of adverse possession. The Lemon court dismissed the claim, explaining: “Although Congress has waived sovereign immunity in suits against the United States to quiet title, see 28 U.S.C. 2409a(a), Congress expressly conditioned that waiver to preclude a claim based upon adverse possession.” Lemon, 632 F.Supp. at 435.

¶ 21. In addressing whether the circuit court possessed jurisdiction to hear the present matter, we note that our supreme court has previously stated that “[s]ubject[-]matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry which must be determined before a court may proceed to the merits.” Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So.3d 814, 821 (¶ 13) (Miss.2009). “When a plaintiffs allegations of jurisdiction are questioned, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 822 (¶ 14) (citations omitted).

¶ 22. Upon review and in light of 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n), we find that Sullivan provided no proof that the Simpson County Chancery Court possessed sub-jeet[-]matter jurisdiction to hear Sullivan’s claim to quiet title against the United States by virtue of adverse possession. We thus affirm the chancellor’s grant of summary judgment because the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, and no factual grounds supported the claims raised by Sullivan.

II. Motion for Recusal

¶ 23. Sullivan next claims that the chancellor erred in denying him an opportunity to present any evidence in support of his motion for recusal. Sullivan also argues that the chancellor erred in refusing to allow Sullivan to present what he claims as “new evidence of unreported campaign contributions” to the chancellor by the opposing party, the Maddoxes.

.¶ 24. Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11 allows a party to move for the recusal of a chancellor “if it appears that the judge’s impartially might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances, or for other grounds provided in the Code of Judicial Conduct or otherwise as provided by law.” Rule 1.11 mandates that a motion for recusal must be filed with an affidavit “setting forth the factual basis underlying the asserted grounds for recusal and declaring that the motion is filed in good faith and that the affiant truly believes the facts underlying the grounds stated to be true.” Additionally, the motion must “be filed with the judge who is the subject of the motion within 30 days following notification ... of the judge assigned to the case” or “within 30 days after the filing party could reasonably discover the facts underlying the grounds asserted.”

¶ 25. As stated, the Mississippi Supreme Court has established that the manifest-error standard of review applies to the appeal of the denial by a trial judge of a motion to recuse. Bredemeier, 689 So.2d at 774. Pursuant to the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must disqualify himself when that judge’s “impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances ... including but not limited to instances where: ... the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding!.]” See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1)(a). The supreme court has established the test for recusal as follows: Would “a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, ... harbor doubts about [the judge’s] impartiality?” In re Conservatorship of Bardwell, 849 So.2d 1240, 1247 (¶ 20) (Miss.2003) (citations omitted). An appellate court must presume a judge to be qualified and unbiased, and that presumption must be overcome by evidence producing a “reasonable doubt ... about the validity of the presumption[.]” Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 678 (Miss.1990).

¶ 26. The record shows that the chancellor denied Sullivan’s motion for re-cusal after ruling that the motion failed to comply with Rule 1.11 due to its untimely filing and because it did not contain the requisite supporting affidavit. Sullivan has provided no explanation on appeal for this defect in the record. During the hearing on the motion for recusal, the chancellor referenced the Canons of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3(E), and the chancellor stated: “I don’t find the fact that Mr. Broadhead represented ... the husband of the court administrator ] falls within the purview of Canon 3(E).” The chancellor acknowledged Sullivan’s failure to attach the requisite Rule 1.11 supporting affidavit to his motion, stating the following:

All I can gather from the motion is that Mr. Broadhead represented ... the husband of the court administrator.... And I don’t see that that is any evidence of bias or impartiality on the court’s part. So based on the motion, based on the failure to file the an affidavit setting forth grounds; I’m not going to entertain testimony from witnesses or any other facts not alleged in that motion. The purpose of the affidavit is to place the court on notice of the facts and to place opposing counsel and parties on notice of the facts so that a determination can be made before trial on what to do. Here there are not any facts. No affidavit. This is the day of trial. So I’m not going to take up the court’s time by taking testimony[,] and I’m going to enter an order denying [Sullivan’s] motion for recusal.

In his order denying the motion for recu-sal, the chancellor reiterated that he:

ha[d] no personal bias or prejudice concerning any part of this action nor any personal knowledge of the disputed evi-dentiary facts concerning the proceeding. The motion alleged that Wesley Broadhead, one of the attorneys of record, represented the court’s administrator’s husband in a criminal proceeding. The husband is not a party to this proceeding[.]

¶ 27. Sullivan based his motion for re-cusal on the professional relationship of the Maddoxes’ attorney in the representation of the husband’ of the court administrator in a sepárate and distinct criminal proceeding. The chancellor acknowledged these facts and reminded Sullivan that the husband of the court administrator was not a party to the present proceeding. See Murphree v. Cook, 822 So.2d 1092, 1100 (¶ 29) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (This Court found no abuse of discretion where the chancellor failed to recuse himself after the chancery clerk of the county testified as a witness in the trial.). Regarding the assertions raised in the recusal motion, the chancellor also specifically stated on the record that he possessed no bias or prejudice concerning the parties or the proceedings. Upon review of the record, we find that Sullivan failed to present evidence in support of his motion for recusal raising a question as to the chancellor’s impartiality. We therefore find that Sullivan failed to provide any proof to show reasonable doubt as to the presumption that the chancellor was unbiased and qualified. We also note that the record contains no second motion for recusal filed by Sullivan to address the “new evidence” of an alleged campaign contribution.

¶ 28. Therefore, based on the record before us and the applicable law, we find no manifest error in the chancellor’s denial of the motion to recuse.

III. Sanctions

¶ 29. Sullivan also argues that the chancellor erred in finding Sullivan’s complaint and motion for recusal frivolous, resulting in sanctions imposed on Sullivan and his legal counsel, Stubbs, with an award of attorneys’ fees to the Maddoxes pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-55-5 (Rev.2012) (Litigation Accountability Act) and Rule 11. Sullivan argues that the award of attorneys’ fees and sanctions denied Stubbs and him due process of law. As previously stated, this Court reviews the chancellor’s award of sanctions under Rule 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act (the Act) for an abuse of discretion. Broussard, 19 So.3d at 823 (¶ 8); Choctaw, Inc. v. Campbell-Cherry-Harrison-Davis and Dove, 965 So.2d 1041, 1045 n. 6. (Miss.2007).

¶ 30. In identifying the factual basis supporting the imposition of sanctions in this case, the chancellor specifically found that the following actions evidenced that frivolous pleadings had been filed and frivolous arguments had been made for the purposes of harassment and delay, without substantial justification, and with disrespect for the integrity of the court: (1) Stubbs’s admission that he had advised Sullivan of the weakness of his claim prior to commencing the action; (2) Sullivan and Stubbs’s continued pursuit of the claim after their expert witness testified in his deposition that the United States had issued no patent for the subject property; (3) Sullivan and Stubbs’s failure to make any effort to determine the validity of ■ the claim before commencing the action; and (4) the filing of an improper motion for recusal and false allegations against the court. The chancellor held that these actions constituted a willful violation of Rule 11 and the Act, as well as Rule 8.2(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. The chancellor awarded attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs in the amount of $42,922.91 to the Maddoxes. The chancellor clarified that the award should be a judgment against Sullivan and his attorney, Stubbs, jointly.

¶ 31. Both Rule 11 and the Act authorize an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses as a sanction for certain filings. According to Rule 11(b), the trial court may award expenses or attorneys’ fees “[i]f any party files a motion or pleading which, in the opinion of the court, is frivolous or is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay-” M.R.C.P. 11(b). Similarly, the Act states in part:

in any civil action commenced or appealed in any court of record in this state, the court shall award ... reasonable attorney’s fees and costs against any party or attorney if the court, upon the motion of any party or on its own motion, finds that an attorney or party brought an action ... that is without substantial justification, or that the action, or any claim or defense asserted, was interposed for delay or harassment. ...

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-55-5(1).

¶ 32. The Act defines a claim brought “without substantial justification” to be one that is “frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious, as determined by the court.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-55-3(a) (Rev.2012). This Court employs the same test to determine whether a filing is frivolous under both Rule 11 and the Act. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Deakle, 661 So.2d 188, 197 (Miss.1995). A claim is frivolous when “objectively speaking, the pleader or movant has no hope of success.” Id. at 195 (citation omitted); see also Broussard, 19 So.3d at 823-24 (¶¶ 10-11).

¶ 33. We find the record reflects uncon-tradicted and clear evidence showing that Sullivan and Stubbs were aware before commencing the action that their claim had no hope of success. Specifically, we note the chancellor’s order granting summary judgment reflects that Stubbs admitted to the chancellor that he had informed Sullivan the case against the Maddoxes was weak due to the lack of the following: a government survey; a patent issued by the United States; or a description of the boundaries of the land in dispute. The chancellor also acknowledged that Sullivan’s expert witness, Bill Miller, PLS, testified in his deposition and confirmed that the United States had issued no patent conveying the subject real property. The record similarly provides no evidentiary support for Sullivan’s allegations of unreported campaign contributions to the chancellor from the Maddoxes, which Sullivan alleged on the day of the summary-judgment and motion-for-recusal hearings in an attempt to delay the case or have the chancellor recuse himself. We thus find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s finding that Sullivan’s complaint and motion for recusal constituted frivolous filings made for the purposes of harassment and delay. Accordingly, we find that the chancellor was within his discretion to impose sanctions against Sullivan and Stubbs and to award attorneys’ fees to the Mad-doxes.

¶ 34. Sullivan also asserts that the chancellor’s award of sanctions deprived him of his property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Sullivan claims that the chancellor ruled on the issue of sanctions while all of the parties to the present case stood before the chancellor on an unrelated matter. Sullivan argues that the chancellor failed to provide the parties with proper notice of the chancellor’s intention to “reopen the case sua sponte” and rule on the issue of sanctions.

¶ 35. The record reflects that both parties received notice of a May 31, 2011 hearing regarding the Maddoxes’ motion for sanctions. The record also reflects that the chancellor’s May 25, 2011 order granting summary judgment provided that a hearing would be held on May 31, 2011, to address the matter of sanctions. The order further stated that the chancellor would retain jurisdiction over the matter for the consideration of sanctions. The transcript reflects that on May 31, 2011, the date set forth in the order granting summary judgment, the chancellor rendered his opinion from the bench on the issue of sanctions and attorneys’ fees in the present matter. The record also reflects that the chancellor rendered this opinion after the conclusion of a different and unrelated case involving the same parties to the present action.

¶ 36. Stubbs objected to proceeding with the matter of sanctions until the parties had time to conduct discovery. The record reflects that the chancellor agreed repeatedly to give Sullivan and Stubbs thirty days to conduct discovery regarding attorneys’ fees, stating at one point on the record: ‘Tour request for thirty days to do discovery is granted.” However, after further discussion, Stubbs responded, “Judge, if we’re going — going to [be] pinned down with any more costs, we’d just [as] soon go ahead today. Let’s just get it done today. I’d rather just withdraw that, and get it done today.” The chancellor then proceeded with the hearing on the matter of sanctions.

¶ 37. During the hearing, • the chancellor heard testimony from Steven Maddox. The Maddoxes also presented expert testimony from Robert Germany and Wayne Easterling regarding the reasonableness and necessity of attorneys’ fees. The chancellor proceeded to make findings on the record and impose sanctions against Sullivan and Stubbs based on the frivolous suit pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act. The chancellor acknowledged, “[I]f the court awards attorney[s’] fees as part of the sanctions, I think I’m required to go through certain factors to determine the amount and the reason behind the amount.” In his final judgment entered June 13; 2011, the chancellor stated:

The exhibits and testimony of the witnesses, who were subject to cross[-]examination, satisfies the court that the [attorneys^] fees are reasonable as required by Rule 1.5 of the [Mississippi] Rules of Professional Conduct in that the fees were charged by the hour, the fees and expenses were within the range customarily charged within the locality, services were rendered by one attorney at a time, the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the claims involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly.

The supreme court stated in Mabus v. Mabus, 910 So.2d 486, 489 (¶ 9) (Miss.2005), that where a trial judge relies “on substantial credible evidence in the record regarding attorney’s fees,” the trial judge has not abused his discretion. We thus find that the chancellor in this case did not abuse his discretion in awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees to the Maddoxes. See McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982).

¶ 38. After reviewing the record, we find that Sullivan and Stubbs were presented with sufficient notice that the chancellor would make his findings regarding sanctions on May 31, 2011. See M.R.C.P. 6(d). Additionally, the transcript reflects that although the chancellor agreed to Stubbs’s request for additional time to conduct discovery, Stubbs then requested to proceed with the matter as scheduled. This issue lacks merit.

¶ 39. In affirming the judgment imposing sanctions against Sullivan and Stubbs, we deny the motion Sullivan and Stubbs filed with this Court on May 17, 2012, seeking an injunction to remove the trial court’s judgment from the judgment roll and also seeking sanctions.

¶ 40. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SIMPSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . With respect to the Maddoxes’ motion to correct the record and supplement the record with the deposition of Bill Miller, a licensed professional surveyor, we find that Miller’s deposition testimony that is the subject of the motion to supplement was attached to the Maddoxes’ original motion for summary judgment as an exhibit and is therefore appropriate to include in the record. Evidencing its inclusion as an exhibit to the original summary-judgment motion, the trial judge referred to Miller's deposition testimony in finding that the United States had issued no patent conveying the property at issue out of the public domain. The Maddoxes' motion to supplement the record is therefore granted.

      . The record reflects that Sullivan previously believed the subject property to be located in Smith County, Mississippi. However, in 2005 the Simpson County Tax Assessor’s Office determined that the property was located within the boundaries of Simpson County, Mississippi.

      . Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11 provides, in pertinent part:
      Such motion [for recusal] shall, in the first instance, be filed with die judge who is the subject of the motion within 30 days following notification to the parties of the name of the judge assigned to the case; or, if it is based upon facts which could not reasonably have been known to the filing party within such time, it shall be filed within 30 days after the filing party could reasonably discover the facts underlying the grounds asserted.

      . "Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n).

      . Broussard, 19 So.3d at 823-24 (¶¶ 10-11).

      . As stated, Sullivan objected to the expert witnesses’ testimony, arguing that the Mad-doxes had failed to designate the experts within the sixty days required by the Uniform Chancery Court Rules. The chancellor overruled the objection, stating:
      [The Maddoxes are] calling witnesses to offer evidence as required by ... McKee v. McKee, [418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982) ]. And I think this is a ... situation ... where attorney [s'] fees is an issue after a case comes on for trial. So, I’m going to allow these witnesses to testify about attorney[s’] fees. They're not normal expert witnesses designated [in] anticipation of trial.

      . Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) provides:
      A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof, shall be served not later than five days before the time fixed for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court.

      . See Swington v. State, 742 So.2d 1106, 1112 (¶ 14) (Miss.1999) ("Failure to make a contemporaneous objection waives the issue on appeal.”).


author: ROBERTS, J.,

text:
    MURPHY & SONS, INC. and Panola Construction Co., Inc., Appellants v. DESOTO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Appellee.
    No. 2011-CA-01899-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Feb. 12, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied June 25, 2013.
    Certiorari Denied Sept. 26, 2013.

      E. Stephen Williams, Jackson, Benjamin David Murphy, John Scott Magee, Jackson, attorneys for appellants.
    Anthony E. Nowak, Robert E. Quimby, attorneys for appellee.
    Before ROBERTS, MAXWELL and FAIR, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Today’s case requires us to carefully consider the distinction between responsible bidders and responsive bids in the public-construction-contract arena. In general parlance, a responsible bidder is one who meets the appropriate and lawful qualifications to bid on the invitation. A responsive bid, on the other hand, is a bid that appropriately responds to the specifications of the invitation. Panola Construction Co., Inc. (Panola) and Murphy & Sons, Inc. (Murphy) claim the DeSoto County Board of Supervisors (Board) impermissi-bly and unlawfully combined these two competing concepts.

¶ 2. In response to the Board request for bids on the construction of a new jail facility, Panola and Murphy submitted the two lowest bids, with Murphy’s bid being the lowest. However, the Board voted to award the contract to Flintco, LLC (Flint-co), the third lowest bid submitted. Murphy and Panola filed an appeal in the DeSoto County Circuit Court of the Board’s decision to award Flintco the contract. They filed a bill of exceptions with the circuit court on July 20, 2011. On November 16, 2011, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Murphy and Pa-nola’s appeal and affirming the Board’s decision. The current appeal ensued.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. In April 2011, the DeSoto County Board of Supervisors published an advertisement seeking bids for construction of a new jail facility. Seven companies submitted bids, and all bids were presented to the Board. Of the seven bids, Murphy had the lowest bid at $13,563,900, followed by Panola at $13,718,000, and then Flintco at $13,847,000. Murphy’s bid was $283,100 less than Flintco’s bid. The remaining bids exceeded Flintco’s bid. Flintco protested Murphy’s and Panola’s bids because their bids did not conform to the bid specifications. Specifically, Flintco argued that both Murphy’s and Panola’s bids did not contain two separate successful correctional-facility projects valued at a minimum of eight million dollars and completed within the last five years as explicitly required in the bid specifications.

¶ 4. At its June 6, 2011 meeting, the Board heard from Vanessa Lynchard, the director of administration and procurement, regarding the jail-facility bids. Lynchard presented the bids and informed the Board of Flintco’s protest. According to Lynchard, Flintco’s protest had merit, and it was her recommendation “that the bids of [Murphy] and [Panola] be considered as non-responsive and not eligible for a bid award.” She added that “in her opinion, if [DeSoto] County [was] to accept the bid of a company that did not meet the bid specifications, it would be unfair to the companies that did not bid because of the bid requirements and to those bidders who did qualify by having the required experience.” Ultimately, the Board awarded Flintco the contract because Murphy’s and Panola’s bids “were not in compliance with the bid specifications and [could not] be considered for failing to meet the jail specifications[,]” and Flintco’s bid was “the lowest and best bid for the construction of the DeSoto County Jail Facility.”

¶ 5. Murphy and Panola appealed the Board’s decision to the circuit court. After reviewing the entire record and briefs and hearing arguments from counsel, the circuit court found “that the decisions of the [Board] to award the contract to build the DeSoto County Jail Facility to [Flint-co], and to consider the bids of Murphy and Panola as non-responsive, were not arbitrary, caprieious[,] or unreasonable, and are supported by substantial evidence.” The circuit court dismissed Murphy and Panola’s appeal and affirmed the Board’s decision.

¶ 6. Feeling aggrieved, Murphy and Pa-nola executed the current appeal. They raise the following four issues:

I. Whether, in the absence of enabling legislation, Mississippi state agencies and local governments can mandate particular prior construction experience in order for a contractor to be eligible to bid on public works.
II. Whether, in the absence of statutory authority, Mississippi state agencies and local governments have the legal authority to pre-qualify public works contractors to bid on public projects.
III. Whether Mississippi state agencies and local governments can substitute their judgment concerning qualification of public works contractors when contractors have already been certified as to qualifications by the Mississippi State Board of Contractors.
IV. Whether Mississippi state agencies and local governments can substitute their judgment concerning the “responsibility” of public works contractors where contractors have already been certified as “responsible” by the Mississippi State Board of Contractors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. When reviewing a decision of a county board of supervisors, this Court applies the same standard of review that is applied in appeals from the decisions of an administrative agency. Ryals v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pike County, 48 So.3d 444, 447 (¶ 11) (Miss.2010) (citing A & F Props., LLC v. Madison County Bd. of Supervisors, 983 So.2d 296, 299-300 (¶ 6) (Miss.2006)). A county board of supervisors decision relating to questions of law or statutory interpretation receive a de novo review. Id. at 448 (¶ 11). However, a county board of supervisors decision will not be disturbed unless it “was unsupported by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the board’s scope or powers; or violated constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party.” Id. at 447-48 (¶ 11).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. This case requires us to determine whether the Board’s request that bidders provide a list of prior jail-construction experience amounted to an impermissible prequalification of bidders and whether the Board found Murphy’s and Panola’s bids to be non-responsive.

I. Prequalification of Bids

¶ 9. Murphy and Panola first argue that the Board included a prior-experience requirement in its bid specifications that amounted to an unreasonable prequalification of bidders. At issue is the following language requiring bidders to “[pjrovide [a] listing of prior construction experience with references on successful correctional facilities projects within the last [five] years having a minimum construction contract amount of eight[-]million dollars ... each for no less than two ... separate projects.... Failure to do so may be cause for rejection.”

¶ 10. Murphy and Panola acknowledge that Mississippi Code Annotated section 31-7-13 (Supp.2012) governs the bidding requirements and process for awarding public contracts. The competitive bidding process for public contracts is in place for the following purposes:

to secure economy in the construction of public works and the expenditures of public funds for materials and supplies needed by public bodies; to protect the public from collusive contracts; to prevent favoritism, fraud, extravagance, and improvidence in the procurement^] and to promote actual, honest, and effective competition to the end that each proposal or bid received and considered for the construction of public improvement may be in competition with all other bids upon the same basis, so that all such public contracts may be secured at the lowest cost to taxpayers.

J.H. Parker Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Aidermen of Natchez, 721 So.2d 671, 677 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (quoting Telcom, Sys., Inc. v. Lauderdale County Bd. of Supervisors, 405 So.2d 119, 120 (Miss.1981)). Murphy and Panola further agree that the Board has discretion to consider the following factors, in addition to money, when determining the lowest and best bid: the honesty and integrity of the bidder; the skill and business judgment of the bidder under section 31-7-13; the experience and the facilities of the bidder; previous conduct of the bidder under other contracts; the quality of previous works of the bidder; and the pecuniary ability of the bidder. Parker Bros. v. Crawford, 219 Miss. 199, 209, 68 So.2d 281, 285 (1953).

¶ 11. While recognizing these factors are permissible to consider, Murphy and Panola submit that section 31-7-13 “does not allow for prequalifying bidders based on arbitrary levels of prior experience.” According to them, possessing a certificate of responsibility from the Mississippi Board of Contractors sufficiently prequali-fies bidders to assuage the Board’s fear of awarding the contract to an unqualified bidder. Additionally, Murphy and Panola argue that the prior-experience requirement violated the purposes of the compete tive bidding process by significantly narrowing the pool of qualified bidders, which ultimately led to increasing the cost of the project for the taxpayers. Lastly, Murphy and Panola cite to a recent amendment to section 31 — 7—13(d)(iii) allowing prequalifi-cation of bids on restoration projects of Mississippi landmarks to argue that pre-qualification of bids in other projects is not authorized by statute.

¶ 12. We conclude that the prior-experience requirement in the bid solicitation, under the facts of this case, was not an impermissible prequalification, and the Board’s decision to include the requirement was neither arbitrary or capricious nor violated a statutory right of Murphy or Panola. Therefore, this issue is without merit.

¶ 13. First, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Board’s decision to include a prior-experience requirement violated any of the purposes of the competitive bidding process. Before drafting the bid specifications and issuing a request for bids, the Board thoroughly researched jail construction through the DeSoto County Jail Committee and an independent jail consultant. It was at the recommendation of the Jail Committee and jail consultant that the Board included the prior-experience requirement. The requirement also requested experience in the construction of jails exactly half as expensive as the jail project was expected to be. It is apparent from the record that the Board was keenly interested in bidders who had recently demonstrated a clear ability to properly and successfully construct a complex, mul-ti-million dollar adult jail facility. The decision to" include this requirement was clearly not arbitrarily done, but was thoughtfully researched. Additionally, the prior-experience requirement was not unreasonably restrictive to bidders, since four of seven bidders qualified under the requirement. The Board received all the bids submitted, including Murphy’s and Panola’s bids, opened and presented the bids, and clearly considered the bids before awarding the contract to Flintco. There was no evidence presented that any other bids were refused on the basis that they did not meet the prior-experience requirement. ■ Each bid that was submitted, regardless of prior experience, was presented for consideration. Lastly, the record indicates that Flintco’s bid was $283,100 more than Murphy’s bid, but this amount was only two percent different based on the total project. There is not a significant enough difference between the bids for this Court to determine that the acceptance of Flintco’s bid destroyed the competitive bidding purpose of not unnecessarily increasing the cost on the taxpayers. Thus, the requirement did not act as a prequalifier as Murphy and Panola assert.

¶ 14. Further, the language of the pri- or-experience requirement left discretion to the Board to consider bids that did not conform to the bid specifications. The requirement stated that “[fjailure to [include prior experience] may be cause for rejection.” (emphasis added). In J.H. Parker Construction Co., 721 So.2d at 675 (¶ 19), this Court was asked to determine whether the Natchez Board of Aldermen improperly awarded a public construction contract to a bidder who failed to comply fully with the bid specifications. This Court found that the aldermen’s waiver of the bid specifications did not destroy the competitive bidding process and that the aldermen had discretion to determine whether the bidder’s proposal sufficiently complied with the bid specifications. Id. at 677 (¶ 25). The decision to waive the bidder’s failure to include a prequalification statement with the bid was within the aldermen’s discretion. Id. at (¶ 26). Just as the aldermen in J.H. Parker Construction Co. had discretion to waive the requirement in the bid specifications and accept a bid not in total conformity with the bid specifications, so does the Board, in the current case, have discretion to enforce the bid specifications as written.

¶ 15. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Board’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious, and that it did not violate a statutory right of Murphy or Panola. This issue is without merit.

II. Responsive or Responsible Bids

¶ 16. Murphy and Panola next argue that Mississippi Code Annotated section 19-18-11 (Rev.2012) required the Board to accept the lowest responsible bid. Therefore, they argue the Board’s decision to award the contract to Flintco was unlawful because Murphy’s bid was the lowest bid that fully complied with the bid specifications. In their brief, the primary argument on this issue is that “an honest determination that a bidder’s bid, though the lowest, is not the best, will ordinarily control, [but] the law does not permit the arbitrary rejection of bids for public work nor arbitrary preference of one bid over another which is lower, or an arbitrary classification of bidders.” They submit that the main reason the Board rejected their bids was that both bids were non-responsive to the bid specifications. They argue that there is an important distinction between the terms “responsiveness” and “responsibility,” and the Board’s issue was not with their responsiveness to the bid specifications as much as their responsibility as contractors to properly complete the project.

¶ 17. First, we find that section 19-13-11 is not applicable because it was enacted to guide how a Board may award contracts during a vacation or recess. Fúrther, as we stated above, Murphy and Panola conceded that section 31-7-13 governs the bidding requirements and process for awarding public contracts. Section 31-7-13 more aptly addresses the bidding process and procedures for public construction contracts; therefore, we will apply the language from this statute, which requires the contract to be awarded to the “lowest and best bidder,” and not the language from section 19-13-11, which states the Board shall accept “the lowest responsible bid.” Also described above, Murphy and Panola concede that the Board had discretion to consider other factors when determining the lowest and best bid and that one of these factors is the prior experience of the bidder. Under section 31-7-13, the Board had the discretion to consider prior experience when awarding the contract, and the Board used its discretion in awarding the contract to Flintco.

¶ 18. After a thorough review of the record, including a reading of the minutes from the Board’s meeting, we do not find that the Board primarily rejected Murphy’s and Panola’s bids due to them being non-responsive. During its June 6, 2011 meeting, the sole mention of Murphy’s and Panola’s bids being non-responsive was made by Director of Administration and Procurement Vanessa Lynchard when she recommended “to the Board that the bids of [Murphy and Panola] be considered as non-responsive and not eligible for a bid award.”

¶ 19. When making its decision to accept Flintco’s bid, the Board stated: “[B]ased upon the recommendation of the DeSoto County Jail Committee and the Director of Procurement to find that based on the reasons discussed, and due to the failure of [Murphy and Panola] to meet important and material bid specifications, the lowest and best bid for the construction of the DeSoto County Jail Facility was the bid submitted by Flintco.... ” We read this to mean that the Board considered a variety of factors, including that Murphy never submitted any documentation of pri- or experience and that Panola’s documentation of prior experience did not meet the prior-experience requirement, when making the decision to award the contract to Flintco.

¶ 20. We disagree with Murphy and Panola’s assertion that the Board’s decision was based on their non-responsiveness, and we find that it was primarily based on prior experience of the bidders. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the Board’s decision to award the contract to Flintco was arbitrary or capricious or that it violated a statutory right of Murphy and Panola. This issue is without merit.

¶ 21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE DE-SOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ„ CONCUR. BARNES AND JAMES, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . Murphy and Panola assert that the de novo standard is the appropriate standard of review for this Court to apply because whether the Board may prequalify bidders by requiring certain prior experience is a question of law.