author: CLARK, Justice.

text:
    C.M.J. v. L.M.C., wife of C.M.J.
    No. 2014-CJ-1119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 2014.

      Lowe, Stein, Hoffman, Allweiss & Hau-ver, Robert Charles Lowe, Suzette Marie Smith, New Orleans, LA, for Applicant.
    Richard Ducote, PC, Richard Lynn Du-cote, Metairie, LA, for Respondent.
   CLARK, Justice.

1 t This case concerns a highly contested custody dispute over three minor children. After an eleven-day trial and extensive written reasons for judgment, the trial court awarded sole custody of the children to the father and conditionally reserved visitation privileges to the mother. The First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial. The main issue before us is whether the court of appeal erred in finding the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting the children from testifying at trial and not relying on a sexual abuse evaluation. After careful consideration of the record before us, we find no abuse of the trial court’s great discretion nor do we find any manifest error by the trial court in this fact intensive controversy. We reverse the court of appeal’s judgment and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

C.M.J., (hereinafter, “the father”), and L.M.C., (hereinafter, “the mother”), were married in 1996. They had three children: C.T.J., a son, born in 1998; J.A.J., a son, born in 2001; and J.T.J., a daughter, born in 2007. The father filed for divorce |2in May 2011.

Incidental to his divorce petition, the father sought sole custody of the three minor children. The father alleged that the mother (1) removed the children from the family home for extended periods of time on multiple occasions without giving notice to him; (2) kept the boys out of school for fifteen days straight; (3) refused the father access to his children; (4) falsely accused him in two different criminal jurisdictions of sexually abusing his then three-year old daughter, and kept those allegations a secret from him; (5) unnecessarily subjected the daughter to an intimate physical examination and forensic interview; (6) falsely accused the father of drugging both the mother and the children; (7) engaged in questionable parenting practices, including paying the older brothers to bathe their younger sister; (8) believed a medical conspiracy existed wherein medical professionals intended to hurt the daughter; and (9) acted with the intent of alienating the children from the father.

What followed were several months of highly contentious litigation, during which the mother filed several petitions for protection from abuse, averring physical and sexual abuse, only to voluntarily dismiss them herself. Further, at a pre-trial hearing, amidst these allegations, the mother stipulated to joint custody of the children. Also at this pre-trial hearing, the parties stipulated that they and the minor children would undergo a sexual abuse evaluation and a mental health evaluation by Dr. Alicia Pellegrin, a clinical psychologist, pursuant to La.R.S. 9:381.

The parties shared equal physical custody of the children until October 2011. On October 25, 2011, the mother filed a motion for emergency ex parte custody and injunction based on the recommendation of a Children’s Hospital nurse, Ann Troy, that the three children receive “protective placement” away from their father, the [^“alleged perpetrator.” The circumstances of this recommendation are as follows: the mother alleged that the daughter complained to her that the father hurt her rear end. Based on this alleged complaint, the mother brought the daughter to Children’s Hospital in New Orleans, where she was examined by Nurse Troy. Nurse Troy referred the children to a social worker employed by the Department of Children and Family Services, Ashleigh Stevens. Ultimately, based on communication to the trial court by the Department of Children and Family Services, the motion for emergency custody was signed by the duty judge in favor of the mother.

The father later discovered that a videotape was made by the mother on October 4, 2011 — predating the visit to Children’s Hospital and the subsequently filed motion for emergency custody. The videotape showed the mother discussing the sexual abuse allegations with the daughter. Further, the mother allowed her sister to record a conversation with the middle son concerning the allegations. Because these recordings violated a court order which prohibited the parties from discussing the case or allegations with the children or allowing family members to discuss the case or allegations with the children, the father filed a rule for contempt and a motion in limine, seeking to prohibit the videotape’s introduction into evidence, the use of any testimony influenced by such tapes, and the children’s testimony. The father contended that the mother coached the daughter into falsely accusing him of inappropriate behavior and that the tape and the daughter’s tainted statements were then used to garner the negative reports and testimony of Nurse Troy, Ashleigh Stevens, and anyone else who subsequently interviewed the child. Further, it was the father’s position that the children’s testimony would be contaminated due to the suggestability of the alleged coaching.

A hearing on the rule for contempt was conducted, and the trial court found the j ¿mother guilty of two counts of contempt of court. The mother was fined a total of $500 and sentenced to sixty days imprisonment, which was suspended in favor of unsupervised probation for sixty days.

The trial court next considered the father’s motion in limine. The court-appointed expert in clinical psychology, Dr. Pellegrin, testified at the hearing, as well as Nurse Troy. In open court on June 7, 2012, the trial court partially ruled on the motion in limine, prohibiting the mother from introducing into evidence or using in any manner the recordings of the children. The trial court referred to the merits the remaining subjects of the motion in limine, including the children’s testimony and the testimony of others who may be influenced by the recordings.

An eleven-day trial, spanning the course of several months, ensued. The trial court heard testimony from the parties; Dr. Pel-legrin; Lewis Eaton, an expert in licensed professional counseling and a licensed family therapist who counseled the parties; Nurse Ann Troy; Detective Scott Davis, a detective with the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Department who investigated the sexual abuse allegations; and Ashleigh Stevens.

The trial court also considered numerous reports, records, interviews and Dr. Pellegrin’s evaluation for custody. By judgment dated December 26, 2012, the trial court prohibited the children from testifying, finding the testimony concerning any alleged abuse was tainted by the mother’s manipulation. In oral reasons for ruling, the trial court explained that it was her belief the children were contaminated and were subject to such suggesta-bility that any testimony from them would be unreliable and untrustworthy.

Additionally, once the trial court determined that the daughter was an unavailable witness, it heard the testimony of the maternal grandmother, who was | ¿testifying regarding the daughter’s initial disclosure of sexual abuse. La.Code Evid. Art. 804(B)(5) excepts from the hearsay rule a “statement made by a person under the age of twelve years and the statement is one of initial or otherwise trustworthy complaint of sexually assaultive behavior,” if the child is unavailable to testify. The record shows the trial court limited the grandmother’s testimony to the recitation that the daughter fearfully exclaimed “the bleed, the bleed” when the grandmother attempted to tickle her thighs during playtime. The trial court found this proclamation to be the initial disclosure by the daughter and that any testimony elicited afterward would be inadmissible hearsay. The mother objected and later proffered the grandmother’s testimony.

Ultimately, on February 8, 2013, the trial court awarded sole custody of the minor children to the father, providing twenty-six pages of written reasons. In pertinent part, the trial court stated:

In reaching an opinion in this case, the Court considered all relevant factors, including the twelve non-exclusive factors contained in La. C.C. Art. 134 and makes the following findings on those factors to which there was testimony and evidence placed on the record.
(2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.
While both parents demonstrate ability to give the children love and affection, the testimony at trial hereof establishes that the father has the greater ability to give the children beneficial spiritual guidance grounded in traditional values and to continue their education and rearing. Religion has played a prominent role in both parents’ lives of late, however, [the mother’s] “religious” practices at some point became |fibizarre and obsessive. Some of her activities that were proven at trial, involved placing salt on the baseboards of the family home and crosses in oil on the doors to keep out the evil spirits and examining [the father] upon his arrival at home after work to see if his eyes had black circles under them, in order to determine if the “devil” was in him. If so, she commanded the devil, in “Jesus’ name,” to come out of him. [The mother]’s behavior, which often occurred in front of the children, included calling the father various names meaning “devil,” locking herself in closets to “pray,” locking the children’s doors at night to keep out evil spirits, allegedly taking her sister to an exorcist to get the devil out of her sister, putting written prayers under beds and chair cushions to “knock” the devil out of the person using the furniture, and mumbling unintelligible languages at home and in public places, often swaying while doing so, and on one occasion, falling out on the floor in a convulsive fit in church, but not before looking behind her to see if her mother and sister were watching. The Court observed her during the last days of trial, while court was in session and also in recess, with her chin resting on her chest in a trance-like state for long periods of time.
(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
The record reflects that, insofar as financial ability to care for the children is concerned, [the father] is gainfully employed at this time. He maintains substantial income handling administration and sales for Medical Corp. Management. [The mother] has not been employed since she owned and worked pri- or to and early in the marriage in a “lingerie modeling” business. Her income at the time of trial was derived solely from [the father], from whom she received in excess of $90,000.00 per year in child support and spousal support. In the event [the father] is awarded custody of the children and/or [the mother] does not prevail in her claim for final spousal support from [the father], the fault trial being currently set before the Court on March 11, 2013, her ability to provide the children with material needs would be adversely affected, and presumably she would have to seek employment to maintain an income and provide for a home and for her needs as well as those of the children. There was no evidence offered at trial that she has the education or ability at this time to independently support herself and the children through available employment.
There was credible evidence adduced at trial that [the mother]’s motivation for making the allegations of sexual abuse against [the father], was, at least partially, monetary in nature. If successful in gaining sole custody of the children, she would maintain a substantial monthly amount of child support and spousal support from [the father], possibly supplemented by a money judgment in the civil suit she filed against [the father] in Jefferson Parish. The testimony and evidence established that she frequently held out to the children and her relatives, that [the father], post-separation, did not support them and give them 17enough money to live, which was not based on fact, as was established at trial hereof. [The father] testified that, in September 2011, some months after [the mother] made the second set of sexual abuse allegations against him, she offered him a “deal” in a telephone conversation, to settle for “money” — that if he gave her one-half of his salary for the rest of his life, she would make him a “better” custody arrangement, consisting of alternating weekends and one day per week custody of the children. The Court finds this testimony to be credible, despite [the motherj’s denial of same, and this conversation between the parties most significant, as [the mother's escalation in pursuing previous abuse allegations she had made against [the father], including her recording of [the daughter], and her sister’s recording of [the middle son], occurred soon after his rejection of the “deal.”
On the issue of medical care of the children, the record reflects, and the Court finds, that [the mother]’s unfounded skepticism and paranoia about the medical profession and use of medication, has resulted in her medical neglect of her children. The children have not been vaccinated as recommended, their dental hygiene and care is abysmal, and [the mother] has jeopardized their access to health care by unjustly accusing their doctors and dentist, and/or their staffs, of attempting to harm or even “kill” her children. The Court finds [the father] to have the far greater capacity to understand and handle the children’s medical needs.
(4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.
The children have lived for the last year and one-half in [the motherjs care, due to her allegations and the ensuing investigations and litigation. For the reasons listed herein, the Court finds, to maintain the children in that environment, removed from their father, is not in their best interest, and any benefit to the children in maintain [sic] the continuity of that environment is outweighed by the dangers posed to their mental and physical well-being if they were to remain in the current environment.
(7) The mental and physical health of each party.
Both parents appear to be in good physical health, however, the mental health of the parents is a factor the Court finds must be attributed great weight in reaching a decision in the children’s best interest.
Dr. Allicia Pellegrin, a clinical psychologist, who had been practicing for over fifteen years at the time of trial, was appointed by the Court as an expert and ordered to conduct a sexual abuse evaluation, and mental health evaluations of the parties, specifically addressing the issues presented in this case. She was appointed on August 15, 2011, after the Court held a conference with counsel to discuss the substitution of an expert, as the previously appointed expert, Dr. John Simoneaux, was | sunavailable. There was no objection by counsel to her appointment, and she thereafter conducted an extensive mental health evaluation of the parties and made recommendations to the Court.
Dr. Pellegrin’s testimony was taken over a period of four days at trial. On June 7, 2012, she testified in connection with the Motion in Limine, and also testified in the custody trial on September 7, 2012, September 10, 2012 and December 5, 2012.
She testified she conducted a custody evaluation and not a child sexual abuse evaluation in this case, because by the time she saw [the daughter], the child had been inappropriately “interviewed” by the mother on videotape, and any subsequent information that she could get from the child would, in her, opinion, be highly suspect. She also testified that [the mother] admitted to her she had questioned [the daughter] repeatedly since the year 2010 about alleged sexual abuse by her father. She testified that the history revealed that the child had been taken to Children’s Hospital at least four different times, and that the mother made a complaint of sexual abuse in late 2010 in Jefferson Parish which was investigated, but [the mother] did not follow up with the evaluation there after the child was interviewed and never told [the father] about the allegations or investigation. Dr. Pellegrin saw the parties on at least twelve occasions, over a six month period of time.
She testified that the “videotape” made by the mother of her interview with the child, [the daughter] [sic] was disturbing, stressful to the child, and pressured the child to respond in a certain way. She testified that [the mother] believes [the father] sexually abused her daughter and that the information that the interviewer believes is the information that comes out in the interview.
She testified that the fact that [the mother] allowed her young son, who was 12 or 13 years old at the time, the right to “interview” his younger sister who was 4 or 5 years old about the alleged sexual abuse allegation involving their father, was very concerning, disturbing and showed a total lack of judgment on [the mother’s behalf. Dr. Pellegrin stated the two boys presented to her in a way that suggested the mother had negatively stereotyped the father to them, and that the fact that the mother and her sister engaged in behaviors (the “interviewing” and taping of the children) “blatantly flying in the face” of court orders suggests there is a problem with abiding by authority and the rules. Her opinion was that because the mother had custody of the children with no access to the father for an extended length of time, the children have had no choice but to align themselves with her. In her opinion, there was probably never a properly conducted interview of the child, [the daughter], since [the mother] told her she spoke to the child numerous times before she took the child to Children’s Hospital lathe first time. She testified that all the major protocols recognized by experts in the field, require that an interview of a child be audio recorded and, preferably, video recorded in order to evaluate the interview properly. Only the two “interviews” [the mother] and her sister personally had with the children were taped and subsequently presented to the Court.
In questioning Dr. Pellegrin, [the mother’s own legal counsel effectively agreed with Dr. Pellegrin’s ultimate assessment of his client’s “interview” with her child, prefacing a question to Dr. Pellegrin concerning the videotape made by [the mother] with the comment, “[w]ould you agree, as bad as that interview was on October 4, 2011 ...” (T.p. 94, 6.7.12). Dr. Pellegrin further stated that, if the “tape made by the mother is a sample of the kind of questioning the child was subjected to, ... then I think it is reasonable to assume that prior questioning of the child went along similar lines.” (T.p. 130, 6/7/12).
She testified about serious concerns she had with the interviews of the child and findings made at Children’s Hospital by the nurse practitioner, Ann Troy, stating that Ms. Troy’s opinion relied on outdated, inaccurate data, that does not take high conflict custody cases into account, that the personnel at Children’s Hospital have a bias that “context does not matter,” that the interview Ms. Troy conducted was not a forensic interview following any established protocol, that Ms. Troy’s testimony that she could tell that there is a difference in the way a child presents information when they have been coached versus when they are telling the truth, is patently false, that she believes Ann Troy is an “advocate” and therefore biased.
Dr. Pellegrin testified that she told [the mother] that she recommended the children be immediately enrolled in therapy and [the mother] also enroll in therapy and that it was of great concern that she had not done so, and that it shows very little insight and judgment on [the mother] [sic] part.
Dr. Pellegrin diagnosed [the mother] with a mixed personality disorder, Axis II Cluster B, with three traits being present, that being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic traits, and she stated that these traits are not amenable to therapy as people who have this diagnosis have almost complete lack of insight. She testified that [the mother] admitted to her that she had earlier stated the belief she was pregnant and the doctors hid this from her, that the doctors gave her “drugs” to possibly cause her a miscarriage and hid this from her. When asked by Dr. Pellegrin to explain these actions, she blamed it all on [the father]. [The mother] also admitted to her that she thought there was a “conspiracy” to kill the daughter. Dr. Pellegrin opined that these thoughts and beliefs of [the mother] are evidence of a |inspecific delusion and are classified as psychotic in nature.
She testified she believes [the mother] has serious anger issues and that the children are not safe with her.
She testified that [the daughter] was contaminated by the mother and that for the child to testify to the Court would be traumatizing at this point, and that it would be impossible not to be concerned about suggestibility for all three of the children, and further that it was not in their best interest to testify.
She testified that [the mother] telling the children she was worried they didn’t have enough money and that’s why she left the dad was “horrendous” and that [the mother] telling [the daughter] when [the daughter] was approximately 3-years-old, that her father “really slammed her mother into a wall,” was “heinous and indescribable.”
She opined that, if the allegations made by [the mother] were proven false, it would not be unreasonable for the Court to make a determination that [the mother] should have no contact with [the daughter] and any contact, if allowed, should be “limited and supervised, if any.”
She further testified she had no concerns about the safety of the children with [the father]. Dr. Pellegrin’s mental health examination of [the father], showed he did not exhibit any psychopathology and that he essentially tested “normal” for a parent involved in a high conflict custody case.
(13) Allegations of Abuse
The final and most important factor in this case, which the Court finds relevant and considered in addition to those cited in Art. 134, are the abuse allegations [the mother] made against [the father]. She alleged that [the father] had sexually abused their minor child, [the daughter], and had physically abused [the mother] and [their minor sons].
The evidence reflects that when [the mother] was unable to get the relief she believed she was entitled to after making her allegation to the authorities that [the father] was an abuser, she in desperation decided to take matters into her own hands and videotaped an “interview” she arranged with the child, [the daughter], who was then 4 years-old. Instead of proving abuse by the father, the tape stands as definitive proof of [the mother’s mental abuse of the child including her exerting pressure, and using guilt and coaching techniques to manipulate the child into making false allegations. She concludes her “interview” by making the child promise to lié to her teacher as per her instructions, the next day. That [the mother] believed this tape would help her case is the |nbest proof of the lack of insight Dr. Pellegrin addresses in making her diagnosis of [the mother]. The “videotape” was entered into evidence in the Motion in Limine. Any review of this case should necessarily start with examination of the videotape made by [the mother] and the equally flawed “interview” her sister orchestrates with [the middle son]. How any expert who purports to understand how suggestible and vulnerable children, when subjected to this type of “interview” by a parent or relative they are obviously seeking to please, could be anything but contaminated thereafter, is incredible.
Detective Scott Davis, an investigator with the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office Criminal Investigations Division, who has ten years experience in sexual abuse investigations, testified at trial. Detective Davis handled the investigation of sexual abuse allegations against [the father] made by [the mother]. He stated he has handled between 500-1000 sexual abuse cases in multiple parishes in the state, and had 23 years total experience in law enforcement. He initially received the complaint made in St. Tammany Parish from [the mother] in April 2011. Detective Davis has testified before the Court on numerous occasions and his vast experience with sexual abuse investigations is well known to the Court.
Detective Davis testified that [the mother] made “the videotape” of [the daughter] after he specifically requested her not to do so and after she had been court ordered not to do so. She also told him that she and the two boys had been drugged by [the father], but he found it significant that she waited two months to report this, and never had the medical tests which would have provided proof of same.
Detective Davis testified he conducted a thorough investigation, and the end result was that he was greatly concerned about [the mother’s motivations, that there was no evidence or witnesses to support her allegations, and that when he would not subsequently arrest [the father], she and her family became very upset. Dr. Pellegrin testified Detective Davis told her that at this point [the mother] became “belligerent.”
[The mother] testified she subsequently made a complaint against Detective Davis for not interviewing her “witnesses.” Detective Davis testified that there was ultimately determined by the authorities involved, to be a lack of evidence to pursue criminal charges against [the father], both in St. Tammany Parish and in Jefferson Parish. The Court found Detective Davis’ testimony to be credible and supported by the record. Louis Eaton, who was qualified by the Court as an expert in licensed professional counseling and as a licensed family therapist, testified that both [the father] and [the mother] saw him for several sessions of family counseling beginning in 2007 and that he continued to see [the father] until February 2012.
|12He testified that, during the session he conducted with the couple, the physical abuse of each other and/or the children was not an issue, and that the main issue was [the mother’s obsessive accusations of [the father]’s infidelity, despite the fact that there was no evidence of same. He stated that she was aggressive, angry and insecure, and [the father] was generally passive, and that when Mr. Eaton suggested that [the mother] needed to examine herself and her past — she discontinued counseling.
Mr. Eaton diagnosed [the mother] as having borderline personality disorder, with histrionic and narcissistic traits, and also having dependent personality traits. He described her moods as labile and excessive. His diagnosis was remarkably similar to Dr. Pellegrin’s diagnosis of [the mother].
After [the mother] ended her counseling with Mr. Eaton, he testified that she and her family members filed several complaints against him with his State Board and also with the pastor at the church he was connected with in his counseling practice, all of which complaints were unfounded and untrue. At the time of trial there was some indication made on the record by counsel, that the State Board complaints had been dismissed.
Mr. Eaton stated that he had seen [the father] in counseling sessions over many years — at least 60 — 70 times — and had no concerns about his ability to parent his children.
The Court found Mr. Eaton to be objective, unbiased, highly experienced in the matters to which he testified, and credible.
Ann Troy, was qualified by the Court as an expert nurse practitioner with expertise in medical exams of children suspected of being abused. She was employed at the time of trial with Children’s Hospital in New Orleans and performed a medical exam and interviewed all three children in October 2011, upon [the mother]’s presenting with the children to the hospital. [Ms. Troy] testified on two different days of trial.
Ms. Troy testified concerning the history she took came from the mother and the children. She testified she assumed they were all telling the truth. Her interview was not a “forensic interview,” and although she testified she uses interviewing techniques that “come from forensic interviewing,” the evidence established her interviews with all of the children clearly do not follow any standard accepted protocol for “forensic interviews.” She performed physical exams on all three children which were normal and she admitted that she performed no investigation of the case.
She stated she was never told a custody case was pending or that an evaluator had been appointed by the Court, and that if she had known those things, she would have only included it in her report, but this liswould not have been significant to her.
Her interviews of [the daughter] and the boys, which she termed “medical incident histories,” were subsequent to multiple interviews of the children by many parties, over two years time in duration, none of which “interviews” have been established as a true “forensic interview.” The worst examples of these prior “interviews” were the mother’s videotaped interview of the child, [the daughter], and her sister’s audiotape of [the middle son]. Ms. Troy admitted she “blew it” by asking one inappropriate question of [the daughter] during her interview, however, the record reflects the entire interview is rife with inappropriate technique and questioning, as fully detailed in Dr. Pellegrin’s testimony and supported by established and recognized standards and protocols.
It is deeply concerning to the Court that, based solely upon a self-serving history given by the mother; medical exams and “medical history” non-forensic interviews of the children, after they were brought by the mother to the hospital, which interviews meet no standards or protocols established for forensic interviews upon which some reliability may be placed; and all of this accomplished without the benefit of a thorough, objective investigation to establish any context, that a conclusion is made by a medical professional that a father has sexually abused his now 5-year-old daughter. That Ms. Troy’s opinion was apparently made without any reference to, but with full knowledge of the “videotape” the mother had made of herself and the daughter, is remarkable.
The Court therefore attributes no weight to Ms. Troy’s findings in this case, as the evidence and testimony elicited at trial established that the history given to her by the mother was inaccurate and the children’s interviews were flawed and occurred long after the children were contaminated in this case. There was not even a cursory objective investigation or inquiry that would lead a reliable result in reaching any conclusion about whether or not these children had been abused and if so, by whom, and while the process at Children’s Hospital may be adequate and in fact, designed, to determine the children’s immediate medical needs and acknowledging their desire to advocate for children who have been abused is indeed laudable, it does not result in reliable evidence in this particular case that can be used in determining the ultimate issue before this Court.
For the same reasons, the testimony and conclusions drawn by Ashleigh Stevens, an employee of the State of Louisiana, DCFS, the Court finds to be based partially upon her misconception that the interview at Children’s Hospital was “forensic interview” and that Ann Troy’s conclusion that the child had been sexually abused by [the father] was based upon reliable evidence. Ms. Stevens further based her individual findings upon the videotape and audiotape of the children, presented to her by [the mother], which contained statements by the children 114obviously manipulated and orchestrated by [the mother] and her sister, against specific court orders. That Ms. Stevens has minimal experience is no excuse for training so faulty that she would not recognize the significance and implications of what is contained on the tapes made by the mother and her sister. Despite her admission that it was difficult to determine who was telling the truth in this high conflict case and that she never did manage to speak to Dr. Pellegrin, the Court’s appointed evaluator, prior to reaching her conclusion, she made a valid finding for sexual manipulation and fondling of [the daughter] by her father. Since the information and history she received has been proven inaccurate, no weight can be given her testimony or that of any of the thereafter referred mental health experts who provided subsequent therapy or treatment for the children.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, based upon the overwhelming evidence in this matter, it has been proven to the Court by clear and convincing evidence that the mother has mentally and physically abused these children by making false allegations of sexual and physical abuse against their father and manipulating the children to make false allegations against their father over a long period of time, while using a most cautious court and medical system to her advantage, in an effort to align the children with her and alienate them from their father. The damage she has done to the children and [the father] is incomprehensible and can only be explained by her mental health diagnosis. There is no credible evidence that [the father] ever sexually abused [the daughter] or physically abused [the daughter], [the oldest son], [the middle son] or [the mother], [The father] is therefore awarded sole custody of the three minor children, [the daughter], [the oldest son] and [the middle son]. Due to grave concerns the Court has about [the mother]’s deteriorating mental health, her failure to seek therapy as recommended by the evaluator and the distinct possibility that she is untreatable even if she enters therapy, her continued position that the [sic] [the father] is a sexual and physical abuser, and the possibility that unmonitored contact with their mother will further damage the already fragile children, no visitation with the children by the mother is ordered at this time.
In the event the mother enters treatment and cooperates and takes all recommendations of appropriately qualified mental health professionals, who are to be recommended by Dr. Pellegrin and appointed by the Court, and are to be provided with this opinion and have access to the entire record of this matter, in order to obtain a thorough history of this case, the Court will then allow monitored telephone and/or internet communication on a reasonable basis between the mother and the children. Thereafter, after a period of three months has passed after the mother enters into treatment, which period will allow the children time to reacquaint themselves with the father, whose love and affection they have been deprived of for over a year and a half, which will allow the father and the children to make up some of the lost time and repair the | ^relationship, and will allow the children some time to engage in therapy, the Court will consider closely monitored supervised visitation of the mother with the children after an updated evaluation by Dr. Pellegrin, after she has communicated with [the mother]’s doctor, therapist or treatment providers and Dr. Pellegrin makes recommendations to the Court for visitation, with such restrictions and conditions as she deems necessary.

The mother appealed the trial court’s rulings. The court of appeal reversed and remanded with instructions, with one judge concurring. Jones v. Jones, 13-1270 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/29/14), 148 So.3d 576, 2014 WL 3672112. The court of appeal found the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing the children to testify and that the reasons provided by the trial court were insufficient as a matter of law. The trial court, in the view of the court of appeal, erred in not personally observing the demeanor of the children to determine their competency to testify; instead, the court of appeal held that the trial court improperly deferred to Dr. Pellegrin’s opinion that the children had been contaminated. Also, the court of appeal found fault in Dr. Pellegrin’s refusal to perform a sexual abuse evaluation despite being tasked by the court with the role of performing one. The court of appeal found the trial court’s reliance on Dr. Pellegrin’s opinion, “which was not supported by the appropriate court-ordered evaluation,” was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court of appeal remanded for a new trial with a new court-appointed sexual abuse evaluator and for a determination of whether the children are allowed to testify. Finally, in its analysis, the court of appeal held that the initial disclosure exception to the hearsay rule allowed more testimony by the grandmother than what was admitted by the trial court; thus, it found the trial court erred on this ground as well.

The father filed a writ application with this court. The father also sought to stay the execution of the court of appeal’s judgment. By order dated May 30, 2014, we denied the stay as unnecessary, citing La. Code Civ.P. art. 2166. Accordingly, the | ^children have been in the care of their father since the trial court ruling in February 2013. We granted the writ to determine whether the court of appeal erred in reversing and remanding the matter for a new trial. Jones v. Jones, 14-1119 (La.6/30/14), 148 So.3d 185, 2014 WL 4548631.

APPLICABLE LAW

The paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. La. Civ.Code art. 131; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La.2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731. La. Civ.Code art. 134 sets forth the factors a court is to consider in determining a child’s best interest:

(1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.
(2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.
(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
(4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.
(5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
(6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.
(7) The mental and physical health of each party.
(8) The home, school, and community history of the child.
(9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
(10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party.
(11) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.

This court in Turner v. Turner, 455 So.2d 1374, 1378 (La.1984), stated the best interest of the child is the sole criterion to be met in making a custody award, 117noting:

The trial judge sits as a sort of fiduciary on behalf of the child, and must pursue actively that course of conduct which will be of the greatest benefit to the child. It is the child’s emotional, physical, material and social well-being and health which are the judge’s very purpose in child custody cases. He must protect the child from the harsh realities of the parents’ often bitter, vengeful, and typically highly emotional conflict. The legislature has mandated that the judge shall look only to the child’s interests.
In furtherance of this important goal, the court has been vested with broad and independent powers. It may, for example, order that an investigation be conducted into the home lives of the parties, the psychological health of the child, or into any other factor which the judge deems to be important in his determination of the child’s best interest. [Civ.Code art. 131]. In this way, the court can fulfill its obligations to the child.

The court of appeal cannot simply substitute its own findings for that of the trial court. Mulkey v. Mulkey, 12-2709, p.16 (La.5/7/13), 118 So.3d 357, 368. The determination of the trial court in child custody matters is entitled to great weight, and its discretion will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. Id.

DISCUSSION

We begin our discussion with reiterating that the best interest of the child standard is the fundamental inquiry in child custody matters. La. Civ.Code art. 131. To promote this end, the legislature has expressly allowed for relaxed evidentiary rules in child custody cases. La.Code Evid. Art. 1101(B) states:

[I]n the following proceedings, the principles underlying this Code shall serve as guides to the admissibility of evidence. The specific exclusionary rules and other provisions, however, shall be applied only to the extent that they tend to promote the purposes of the proceeding.
(2) Child custody cases.

We held in Folse v. Folse, 98-1976, p. 11 (La.6/29/99), 738 So.2d 1040, 1046 |isthat the legislature did not “remove any gate-keeping discretion from the judge regarding admissibility of evidence” in cases where sexual abuse is alleged. Thus, while the standard of proving the sexual abuse was elevated from the ordinary “preponderance” standard to “clear and convincing,” the evidentiary rules did not get stricter. Id.

The trial court in the instant matter found no credible evidence that the father ever sexually abused the daughter or physically abused any of the children or the mother. Instead, it found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother “mentally and physically abused these children by making false allegations of sexual and physical abuse and manipulating the children to make false allegations against their father over a long period of time.” These were findings of fact made by a trial court that should not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. “It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s or a jury’s finding of fact in the absence of ‘manifest error’ or unless it is ‘clearly wrong’.... ” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989).

The court of appeal found three errors by the trial court that warranted a reversal: (1) the trial court’s refusal to allow the children to testify; (2) the trial court’s reliance on Dr. Pellegrin’s testimony despite her failure to perform the court-ordered sexual abuse evaluation; and (3) the trial court’s limiting of the grandmother’s testimony. We will review each of these assigned errors to determine whether there was manifest error in the factual findings or any legal error to justify a reversal of the trial court’s judgment.

First, the court of appeal found the trial court abdicated her role in determining the admissibility of the children’s testimony. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeal found that the trial court “relied exclusively on the observations and | ^evaluations of Dr. Pellegrin in determining that the children’s testimony had been contaminated” and did not independently observe the minor children’s demeanor. After a close review of the record, we find there was ample evidence beyond the opinion rendered by Dr. Pellegrin to support the trial court’s decision to prohibit the children from testifying.

While the trial court had the benefit of Dr. Pellegrin’s testimony — an expert who was appointed by the court and had only the children’s best interest in mind — it also had other evidence to show the presence of false allegations and contamination, rendering any testimony by the children unreliable:

(1) The timing of the filing of the mother’s petition was suspect. Just four days after the father was awarded temporary custody on June 17, 2011, the mother filed a petition for protection from abuse and a reconventional demand, alleging specific incidents of abuse that did not immediately precede the filing of the petition. Indeed, some of the incidents alleged predated the petition for protection from abuse by almost a decade, giving cause for a court to determine that these allegations may not have been motivated by truth but by desperation. Furthermore, the mother voluntarily dismissed the petition for protection from abuse. Again, this fact brings into question the validity of the claims. (2) Significantly, the mother filed yet another petition for protection from abuse, which she again voluntarily dismissed. (3) After making these heinous allegations of abuse, the mother stipulated to equal physical custody of the children. A mother’s voluntary agreement to share custody with the man she believes harmed her children evidences a likelihood that abuse at the hands of the father did not occur. (4) The mother dropped the criminal charges she instigated against the father in Jefferson Parish, claiming her sister fabricated the allegations. Notably, the mother never told the father she pressed criminal charges against him. (5) There was ¡ 9nno physical evidence of abuse. (6) After a thorough criminal investigation, the father was never arrested or prosecuted due to a lack of probable cause. (7) The primary evidence, if not the only evidence, against the father was testimony by Nurse Troy and Ashleigh Stevens, which was based on interviews of the daughter that occurred after her exposure to the alleged coaching by the mother and without the proper protocol to render them forensic interviews.

Therefore, even without reference to the video tape that is the subject of much argument, we find abundant support in the record to support the conclusion that the mother fabricated the sexual abuse allegations. The trial court considered all evidence and testimony before she ruled on the admissibility of the children’s testimony. Having concluded that sexual abuse did not occur based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court found (1) the likely contaminated testimony of the children would serve no purpose in aiding it to make a fact-based determination and (2) that testifying would not be in the children’s best interest.

We are ever mindful of the trial court’s important role as the child’s fiduciary and cannot underscore enough the overriding standard in custody cases: the best interest of the child. The trial court had the advantage of Dr. Pellegrin’s extensive report which summarized every interview with every party and witness, including the children. In comparing the proffered testimony of the children to that summarized by Dr. Pellegrin in her report, we cannot say the trial court failed to benefit from any testimony the children would have provided. Instead, what was before the trial court in the form of Dr. Pellegrin’s summary of the children’s interviews is remarkably similar to what was proffered. If anything, a comparison reveals the summary that the |g1 trial court did review was more prejudicial to the father than the proffered testimony. Accordingly, we find no crucial evidence was overlooked due to the trial court disallowing the children to testify.

Moreover, we find the trial court’s determination that testifying would not be in the children’s best interest, coupled with the relaxed evidentiary rules in custody cases, serve as added support for the exclusion of the children’s testimony. Accordingly, the court of appeal’s reversal on this ground was not warranted.

Next, we address the court of appeal’s contention that a new expert should be appointed to perform a sexual abuse evaluation in light of Dr. Pellegrin’s failure to do so. Pursuant to La. R.S.9:331, “[t]he court may order an evaluation of a party or the child in a custody or visitation proceeding for good cause shown.” The statute further instructs that the evaluation shall be performed “by a mental health professional selected by the parties or by the court.” The trial court appointed Dr. Pellegrin to perform a sexual abuse evaluation and mental health evaluation. Neither party objected to the appointment.

We note that whether sexual abuse occurred is a factual finding that belongs within the province of the trial court’s decision-making function. Expert witnesses are intended to “assist the trier of fact” in understanding the evidence or in the determination of a fact in issue. La.Code Evid. art. 702. Without question, the opinion of an expert may be given great weight by a trial court in its determination of the psychological well-being of a child or parent. However, this does not mean that the expert has usurped the authority of the trial court in determining the key issue of “best interest of the child.” As we stated in our discussion of the exclusion of the children’s testimony, this decision is based on all the evidence and testimony presented to the fact-finder. It is well settled in Louisiana that the trial court is not|22bound by the testimony of an expert, but such testimony is to be weighed the same as any other evidence. Green v. K-Mart Corp., 03-2495, p. 5 (La.5/25/04), 874 So.2d 838, 843. A trial court may accept or reject in whole or in part the opinion expressed by an expert. Id. Further, a trial judge may substitute his/her own common sense and judgment for that of an expert witness when such a substitution appears warranted on the record as a whole. Id.

Importantly, the trial court found Dr. Pellegrin to be a reliable witness. As evidenced in the reasons for judgment, the trial court explained:

Dr. Pellegrin’s qualifications and expertise in performing child custody, sexual abuse and mental health evaluations are well established with the court. She testified that she has conducted nearly 500 custody evaluations throughout the State of Louisiana and over 90 of those contained sexual abuse allegations.
Dr. Pellegrin attended every custody hearing in this matter over the six-month period of time it took to try this case. In addition to the time she spent with the parties, collaterals, and the children, while conducting interviews for preparation of her evaluation prior to giving her testimony, she also had the benefit of personally observing over 50 hours of additional testimony offered by the parties and their witnesses at trial. She was called back to the stand and testified at the end of trial after all the testimony and exhibits had come into the record.
The Court found Dr. Pellegrin’s testimony and opinion in its entirety to be extensively researched and thoroughly supported by the record.

It was Dr. Pellegrin’s professional opinion, in her capacity as a clinical psychologist, that the children’s testimony would be contaminated and inherently suspect due to suggestability. Dr. Pellegrin explained:

I did a custody evaluation. I did not perform a child sexual abuse evaluation. I did not because by the time I was able to get to the child[,] the child had already been interviewed by the mother with what we saw on that tape. And any subsequent information that I could get from that child, in my opinion, would be highly suspect.

Accordingly, Dr. Pellegrin, using her professional insight, chose not to conduct 123a sexual abuse evaluation. Nothing in the law requires that a sexual abuse evaluation be performed by a mental health professional when sexual abuse allegations are made; in fact, La. R.S. 9:331 makes evaluations subject to the trial court’s discretion, as evidenced by use of the word “may.” (“The trial court may order an evaluation ...”) Id. Thus, whether a sexual abuse evaluation was done is not dispositive of the issue when such an evaluation would be only one piece of evidence for the trial court to consider. Furthermore, Dr. Pellegrin repeatedly testified that she was not giving an opinion as to whether sexual abuse occurred; rather, she gathered information in the form of interviews, records, and psychological observations to aid in the trial court’s ultimate determination.

The trial court, in looking at the totality of the evidence, found no sexual abuse occurred. Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reliance on Dr. Pellegrin’s professional opinion that a sexual abuse evaluation could not be performed under the circumstances. Nor do we find any manifest error in the factual finding regarding the alleged abuse or in the factual findings that support the underlying custody judgment, which were so carefully and extensively justified in the trial court’s reasons for judgment. Thus, this assigned error is meritless.

Last, we address the court of appeal’s holding that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of the maternal grandmother, who was the person to whom the daughter allegedly first disclosed the sexual abuse. Upon finding the daughter to be an unavailable witness by virtue of prohibiting the children’s testimony, the trial court allowed the grandmother to be questioned about the daughter’s first report of sexual abuse pursuant to the hearsay exception contained in La.Code Evid. Art. 804(b)(5). 124The grandmother testified that while the daughter was in her care, the grandmother was “swinging her” and “playing with her in the den.” The grandmother explained that she was tickling the daughter and when she “got to the thigh area she curled up. She had fear on her face and she said, ‘The bleed. The bleed.’ ” The trial court limited the grandmother’s testimony to this expression, qualifying it as the initial disclosure. The mother objected, arguing the testimony only set up the context of the initial disclosure and not the complaint itself. The court of appeal agreed, finding the trial court did not allow the grandmother to testify to the complete complaint of sexually assaultive behavior.

According to the grandmother’s proffered deposition, after the incident where the daughter said “[t]he bleed. [t]he bleed,” the daughter clearly complained of sexually assaultive behavior to her grandmother. As with the children’s testimony, we compared the grandmother’s proffered testimony to that contained in Dr. Pelleg-rin’s evaluation, which was reviewed by the trial court, and found a virtually identical recitation of the incident as told by the grandmother. Regardless of whether testimony about this complaint should have been allowed pursuant to La.Code Evid. Art. 804(B)(5), we find the information was reviewed by the trial court in the form of Dr. Pellegrin’s custody report. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court’s review of the evidence was lacking for want of this testimony, and any reliance by the court of appeal on this alleged error as a basis for reversal was improper.

CONCLUSION

The best interest of the child standard is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires the weighing and balancing of factors favoring or opposing custody in the competing parties on the basis of the evidence presented. La.Code Evid. Art. 134. The trial | ^court is in the best position to ascertain the best interest of the child and any findings made in furtherance of that best interest should not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Thompson, 532 So.2d 101 (La.1988). Having found no legal or manifest error, we defer to the trial court’s well-reasoned ruling.

DECREE

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstate the trial court’s custody judgment, as well as the trial court’s second judgment, containing the protective order and conditions concerning the mother’s visitation privileges.

REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENTS REINSTATED.

Retired Judge THOMAS C. WICKER, JR., assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for HUGHES, J., recused.

       Retired Judge Thomas C. Wicker, Jr., assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Hughes, J., re-cused.

      . The father alternatively sought to be named the domiciliary parent in the event joint custody was awarded.

      . The judgment reflecting these reasons was signed on February 19, 2013. Additionally, a second judgment provided for no visitation with the children by the mother until or unless certain conditions were met, namely therapy approved by the court, upon which time, the mother would be allowed communication with her children via the internet and telephone. Upon three months of treatment satisfying the Court's conditions and upon an updated recommendation by Dr. Pellegrin, supervised visitation would be considered by the court. Further, the judgment issued a protective order prohibiting the disclosure and/or dissemination of the judgment and the written reasons for judgment except to appropriately qualified mental health professionals approved by the court.

      . This record is inundated with references to and conclusions made regarding the video tape of the mother questioning the daughter. We expressly decline to comment on the video-tape’s admissibility into evidence, and we limit our discussion to a review of all other record evidence.

      . La.Code Evid. Art. 804(b)(5) provides as an exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
      A statement made by a person under the age of twelve years and the statement is one of initial or otherwise trustworthy complaint of sexually assaultive behavior.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WEIMER, Justice. JOHNSON, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jerry Lee BALDWIN v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR the UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM, the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, and Nelson Schexnayder, Individually, and in his Capacity as Director of Athletics for the University of Louisiana at Lafayette.
    No. 2014-C-0827.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 2014.

      James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Oats & Marino, Stephen J. Oats, Lawrence Edward Marino, Lafayette, LA, George Orvis Luce, New Orleans, LA, for Applicant.
    Marshall Joseph Simien, Jr., Lakes Charles, LA, G. Karl Bernard & Associates, G. Karl Bernard, New Orleans, LA, for Respondent.
   WEIMER, Justice.

| T This matter involves a breach of contract claim by a head football coach who was relieved of his head coaching responsibilities at a state university, yet was paid the full contractual amount plus benefits. Defendants seek review of the court of appeal’s determination that the coach’s contract had been terminated, which triggered the contractual obligation to provide notice. Interpreting the contract in its entirety, we find that the appellate court erred in finding that the failure of notice constituted a breach of contract under the facts of this ease. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court’s decision and reinstate the summary judgment rendered by the trial court, which dismissed the coach’s breach of contract claim against defendants.

[¡.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 11, 1998, Jerry Lee Baldwin (Baldwin) entered into a written agreement with the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System (Board). Pursuant to the contract, the Board employed Baldwin as the head football coach at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, now University of Louisiana at Lafayette (UL). The contract provided that Baldwin’s employment with UL would last until January 31, 2003. By letter dated November 27, 2001, Baldwin was “relieved of [his] duties” as UL’s head coach effective November 26, 2001, after winning only six of twenty-seven games, a win record of 18 percent. Afterwards, Baldwin continued to receive his full monthly salary and other employee benefits from UL including health insurance, accrual of leave time, and accrual of retirement credits for the remainder of the contract term.

On July 21, 2003, Baldwin filed a petition for damages for breach of contract against the Board and UL (collectively defendants), alleging, in pertinent part, that his termination was in violation of his contract as he was not given the notice required by Section 11 of the contract. Section 11 of the contract governs termination and provides:

11. TERMINATION
Either party may terminate this agreement without just cause prior to the expiration of its terms by giving thirty (30) days written notice to the other party. Should the University terminate this agreement without just cause, it shall be liable to Jerry Lee Baldwin for liquidated damages |sin the amount of the remaining base salary at the time of termination under the terms of the agreement. Liquidated damages shall be computed as the number of months remaining under the terms of the agreement as specified in Section 2, times the amount of the monthly installments specified in Section 3. The University shall not be liable for any payment of contingent premium benefits or car allowance past the effective date of termination. Payments for liquidated damages shall be made monthly by the University.
Should Jerry Lee Baldwin’s appointment as Head Football Coach at [UL] be terminated during the terms of this agreement, he shall make reasonable efforts to obtain suitable full time gainful employment in the Division I-A coaching profession. Should Jerry Lee Baldwin secure full time employment of any type, the liquidated damages described in this agreement shall be reduced by the amount of income received by him from said employment. Failure by Jerry Lee Baldwin to make reasonable efforts to secure full-time employment as described above shall be cause for the release of the University from any obligation to make further payments.
Should Jerry Lee Baldwin’s employment be terminated for just cause, the University shall not be liable for any payment or benefits specified in this agreement past the effective date of termination. Just cause for termination shall include but not be limited to arrest or charges for violations of Federal, State or local laws, sanctions for violations of NCAA or Conference regulations, or violations of University policies and regulations. Just cause shall not include misdemeanor traffic tickets.

Notably, Section 11 references termination of the contract in paragraph one, termination of his appointment as head football coach in paragraph three, and termination of employment in paragraph four.

Section 2 of the contract provides the term, and Section 3 sets forth Baldwin’s base salary — an annual salary to be paid by UL in equal monthly installments. Baldwin’s entitlement to employee benefits is addressed in Section 4, which provides: “Jerry Lee Baldwin shall participate in the mandatory benefit plan and be eligible for optional employee plans as would any other University unclassified employee.” Additional benefits and compensation are addressed in Sections 5 through 8 of the | contract, which govern contingent premium benefits, incentive compensation, outside income, and apparel/equipment endorsements.

Following the court of appeal’s vacatur of a sizable jury verdict in favor of Baldwin due to “more than one consequential error that interdicted the fact finding process,” defendants, on remand, filed a motion for summary judgment on Baldwin’s breach of contract claim. In their supporting memorandum, defendants set forth the following alternative arguments to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law:

• it is undisputed that Baldwin received the stipulated damages provided for in the contract (even though UL could have legitimately contested its obligation to pay stipulated damages), so Baldwin cannot be entitled to any additional contract damages;
• the notice provision doesn’t apply when the contract is not terminated, and Baldwin’s contract was never terminated because he admits he received full employee benefits including his salary throughout the entire term of his contract;
• the “notice” provision doesn’t apply if the termination was for “just cause,” • and the cases hold that Baldwin’s 18% winning percentage constitutes just cause for terminating a coach’s contract;
• even if the notice provision applied, an employee’s sole remedy under a notice provision is payment for the term of the notice period, and it is undisputed that Baldwin was paid for the notice period (and 13 months beyond that);
• neither the notice provision nor any other provision in the contract governs the timing of UL’s announcement of its decision to replace Baldwin; and
• there is no evidence that Baldwin was damaged by the timing of UL’s announcement.

| ..¡Initially, defendants urged that, because Baldwin was paid in full pursuant to the terms of the contract, defendants fully performed their contractual obligations, and Baldwin is not entitled to damages under the contract. In other words, because he received what he would have been entitled to as stipulated or liquidated damages in the event the contract had been breached, Baldwin does not have a basis for a contract claim. Alternatively, defendants submitted that the notice provision was never triggered because the contract with Baldwin had never been terminated. Although UL removed Baldwin from the position of head coach, UL retained him as a payroll employee. Undis-putedly, defendants paid Baldwin’s salary and employment benefits (health insurance, accrual of leave time, and accrual of retirement credits) for the entire term of the contract.

After a hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Baldwin’s breach of contract claim, the trial court found that the terms of the contract were unambiguous. The trial court further found that upon being relieved of his head coaching duties, Baldwin remained an employee of UL. Therefore, “defendants did not terminate plaintiffs contract.” Absent a termination of the contract, defendants were not contractually obligated to provide notice. The trial court further found that there was “no material evidence in dispute concerning plaintiffs damages,” as the record “clearly shows that the plaintiff was paid and/or compensated every dime he was owed in accordance with the terms of his contract.” Accordingly, the trial court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Baldwin could “prove the essential elements of his breach of contract claim.” Baldwin’s claim for breach of contract was dismissed with prejudice via summary judgment in favor of defendants.

[fiOn appeal of that summary judgment, the court of appeal found that Baldwin had set forth a legitimate claim for breach of contract based on defendants’ failure to adhere to the notice provision in Baldwin’s employment contract. Baldwin v. Board of Sup’rs for University of Louisiana System, 13-0602, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/7/14), 138 So.3d 650, 654. This finding was based on the appellate court’s conclusion that defendants’ payment of liquidated damages to Baldwin was an acknowledgement that it terminated Baldwin’s contract without just cause. Id. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was reversed, Baldwin was awarded appeal costs, and the matter was remanded for a determination of the amount of damages, if any, owed to Baldwin for the breach of contract claim. Id., 13-0602 at 7, 138 So.3d at 655. Defendants sought review by this court, which was granted. Baldwin v. Board of Sup’rs for University of Louisiana System, 14-0827 (La.6/20/14), 141 So.3d 275.

DISCUSSION

To succeed, Baldwin must show that there has been a breach of the terms of the contract. The term allegedly breached was the thirty-day notice provision. For the notice obligation in Section 11 (quoted supra) to have been triggered, UL must have terminated the “agreement without just cause.” As a result of being relieved of his duties as head football coach, Bald-' win urges that his employment with UL and the contract were terminated giving rise to UL’s notice obligation under Section 11.

The resolution of the merits of Baldwin’s argument involves an interpretation of the contract, which has the effect of law between the parties. See La. C.C. art. 1983. The responsibility of the judiciary in interpreting contracts is to determine the common intent of the parties. See La. C.C. art. 2045. Courts begin their analysis of the parties’ common intent by examining the words of the contract itself. See La. |7C.C. art. 2046 (“When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.”). Furthermore, a contract is to be construed as a whole and each provision in the contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions. See La. C.C. art. 2050. One provision of the contract should not be construed separately at the expense of disregarding other provisions. Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 07-0054, p. 8 (La.5/22/07), 956 So.2d 583, 589, citing La. C.C. art. 2050.

Reading the provisions of the contract in its entirety, we, like the trial court, reject the idea that UL’s release of Baldwin from his duties as head coach resulted in a termination of the contract. Section 12 of the contract, titled “ACKNOWL-EDGEMENTS,” provides:

The parties specifically agree that the obligations assumed herein relate only to the obligations regarding payment and there is no guarantee or promise of continued employment for Jerry Lee Baldwin at the University of Southwestern Louisiana whether as head football coach or in any other employment capacity.

Based on the parties’ “acknowledgements” in Section 12, UL was “obligat[ed] regarding payment,” but there was no “guarantee or promise of continued employment” as head coach for the term of the contract. Consistent with Section 12, paragraphs three and four of Section 11 of the contract contemplate a distinction between the termination of his appointment as head coach and the termination of employment. Consequently, UL was free to relieve Baldwin of his head coaching duties without terminating the contract, so long as UL fulfilled its “obligations regarding payment.” Absent a termination of the contract, the trial court correctly found that the notice provision found in paragraph one of Section 11 of the contract |Kwas never triggered. In finding that UL’s fulfillment of the payment obligation constituted an acknowl-edgement of its breach, the appellate court focused on Section 11 of the contract and disregarded the clear terms of Section 12.

Furthermore, UL’s continued payment of Baldwin’s salary was also accompanied with other benefits of employment, such as health insurance, accrual of leave time, and accrual of retirement credits in accordance with Section 4 of the contract. Thus, Baldwin remained a paid employee of UL in a capacity other than as head coach as contemplated by Section 12. Had the contract been completely terminated, Baldwin would not have been entitled to receive employee benefits. By continuing to pay Baldwin as an employee of UL, defendants fulfilled the obligations under the contract.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the appellate court erred as a matter of law in failing to give effect to Section 12 of the contract, in concluding that the contract had been terminated based on its finding that an alternative argument presented by defendants constituted an ac-knowledgement of payment of liquidated damages, and in holding that defendants breached the contract by failing to give the notice required by Section 11. Since the contract did not guarantee Baldwin continued employment as UL’s head football coach for the duration of the term of the 19contract, defendants acted within then-contractual rights in relieving Baldwin of his coaching duties, while maintaining him as a payroll employee. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Baldwin’s breach of contract claim on the basis of the clear and unambiguous language of the contract.

Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed and vacated, and the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment, in favor of defendants and dismissing Baldwin’s claim for breach of contract is reinstated. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND VACATED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED; REMANDED.

JOHNSON, Chief Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

JOHNSON, C.J.,

dissents and assigns reasons.

hln my view, the court of appeal correctly determined that Mr. Baldwin has set forth a valid claim for breach of contract based on defendants’ failure to adhere to the notice provision in the employment contract.

The majority suggests breach of the thirty-day notice requirement is of no moment, finding that because salary and benefits were paid for the contacted term, there was no termination of the contract. I disagree. The employment contract set forth the terms under which Mr. Baldwin would perform the duties and services of head football coach. To relieve Mr. Baldwin of all duties under the employment contract cannot be characterized as anything other than termination. The majority’s conclusion that payment of salary and benefits under the contract prohibits a finding that Mr. Baldwin was terminated presumes there are no other damages attendant to loss of employment.

I would affirm the decision of the court of appeal which reversed the summary ^judgment, and remand the matter to the trial court to allow Mr. Baldwin to present evidence to support his claim for any additional damages caused by defendants’ breach of the notice provision, such as loss of future employment opportunities, or damage to his reputation.

      . This decision applies to the breach of contract claim only and has no bearing on any other outstanding claim between the parties that is not currently before this court.

      . Baldwin sought damages for tortious interference with a contract, abuse of rights, and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as unpaid wages. Reportedly, his petition was later amended to assert a claim for racial discrimination. Baldwin’s claims for intention interference with a contract, abuse of rights, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress were dismissed by summary judgment. However, his racial discrimination claim remains viable in light of the trial court’s denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

      . Also named as a defendant was Nelson Schexnayder, individually and in his official capacity as athletic director for UL, who was later voluntarily dismissed.

      . Baldwin v. Board of Sup'rs for University of Louisiana System, 08-2359 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/30/09), 11 So.3d 1247 (unpublished opinion), writs denied, 09-1917, 09-1919 (La.12/18/09), 23 So.3d 947, 948, cert. denied, 560 U.S. 926, 130 S.Ct. 3330, 176 L.Ed.2d 1222 (2010).

      . In part, the contract provides in paragraphs three and four of Section 11: "Should Jerry Lee Baldwin's appointment as Head Coach at [UL] be terminated ...” and "Should Jerry Lee Baldwin's employment be terminated-” See full text of these paragraphs, supra.

      . There was no "coaching purgatory” as argued by Baldwin; Baldwin was not obligated to stay at UL. By leaving UL, Baldwin would relinquish his claim to the continued payment of his salary and benefits. He chose to stay and collect the salary and benefits.

        . See Sims, 07-0054 at 10, 956 So.2d at 590 ("[W]hen a contract can be construed from the four corners of the instrument without looking to extrinsic evidence, the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a matter of law and summary judgment is appropriate.”).

      . See Baldwin, 13-0602 at 6, 138 So.3d at 654; see also La. C.C. art. 1853 (a judicial confession is a "declaration made by a party in a judicial proceeding ... [which] constitutes full proof against the party who made it.”). The contention by defendants that stipulated damages were paid was an alternative legal argument, not a judicial confession.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael BREECHER.
    No. 2014-KK-2064.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2014.
   In re Breecher, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 13-4440; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-K-455.

Writ granted. The ruling of the trial court ordering the handwriting exemplar is reinstated. La. Const. Art. 1 § 16 (A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense); La.C.Cr.P. arts. 731 and 732 (A trial court has the authority to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum during pre-trial discovery proceedings); La.C.E. arts. 401 and 607(D). (Evidence of witness bias is relevant and admissible.) The evidence sought satisfies the criteria set forth in State v. Marcelin, 10-2036 (La.10/15/10), 46 So.3d 191.

KNOLL, J., dissents and would deny the writ.


author: JOHNSON, C.J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael MONROE.
    No. 2013-KP-2986.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2014.
    JOHNSON, C.J., would grant and assigns reasons.
    WEIMER, J., would grant.
   JOHNSON, C.J.

I would grant the writ application to consider the merits of the defendant’s claims.

In the present case, relator was sentenced under former R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii), which is one of the sentencing provisions retroactively modified by R.S. 15:308(B). Relator was sentenced as a third felony offender, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment, at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. At the time of relator’s offense and conviction, the applicable portion of R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii) mandated a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for third felony offenders, if they committed a felony-grade violation of the Louisiana Controlled Dangerous Substances Law involving possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance punishable by more than five years imprisonment according to the following formula: “If the third felony or ... any of the prior felonies is.... ”) (emphasis added). Relator was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, which was then punishable by not less than five years nor more than 30 years. R.S. 40:967 and therefore qualified for sentencing under this provision.

The Habitual Offender Law has since been amended such that, in relator’s case, he no longer qualifies for a mandatory life sentence “without benefit” because the “or” in the sentencing formula has been changed as follows: “If the third felony and the two prior felonies are.... ” R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) (emphasis added). Relator now falls under the sentencing provision of R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a):

If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then:
(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction.

Thus, in relator’s case, the current provisions do not permit a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, but rather allow a maximum sentence of 60 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, or suspension of sentence, and without benefit of parole for two years of the term. See R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b); R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). Consequently, it appears that R.S. 15:308(B) mandates that the more lenient sentencing provision of the Habitual Offender Law shall apply to relator’s sentence, and his claim that his sentence is illegal, entitling him to resentencing, appears meritorious, assuming that the decision in State v. Dick, 06-2223 (La.1/26/07), 951 So.2d 124, including its dicta, has been superseded.

For these reasons I would grant the writ application.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael MONROE.
    No. 2013-KP-2987.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2014.
    JOHNSON, C.J., would grant and assigns reasons.
    WEIMER, J., would grant.
   JOHNSON, C.J.

I would grant the writ application to consider the merits of the defendant’s claims.

In the present case, relator was sentenced under former R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii), which is one of the sentencing provisions retroactively modified by R.S. 15:308(B). Relator was sentenced as a third felony offender, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment, at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. At the time of relator’s offense and conviction, the applicable portion of R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii) mandated a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for third felony offenders, if they committed a felony-grade violation of the Louisiana Controlled Dangerous Substances Law involving possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance punishable by more than five years imprisonment according to the following formula: “If the third felony or ... any of the prior felonies is(emphasis added). Relator was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, which was then punishable by not less than five years nor more than 30 years. R.S. 40:967 and therefore qualified for sentencing under this provision.

The Habitual Offender Law has since been amended such that, in relator’s case, he no longer qualifies for a mandatory life sentence “without benefit” because the “or” in the sentencing formula has been changed as follows: “If the third felony and the two prior felonies are....” R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) (emphasis added). Relator now falls under the sentencing provision of R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a):

If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then:
(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence pre-scribéd for a first conviction.

Thus, in relator’s case, the current provisions do not permit a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, but rather allow a maximum sentence of 60 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, or suspension of sentence, and without benefit of parole for two years of the term. See R.S. 40:967 (B)(4)(b); R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). Consequently, it appears that R.S. 15:308(B) mandates that the more lenient sentencing provision of the Habitual Offender Law shall apply to relator’s sentence, and his claim that his sentence is illegal, entitling him to resentencing, appears meritorious, assuming that the decision in State v. Dick, 06-2223 (La.1/26/07), 951 So.2d 124, including its dicta, has been superseded.

For these reasons I would grant the writ application.


author: HUGHES, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ted Dwayne STEVENS, Jr.
    No. 2014-K-1530.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2014.
   In re Stevens Jr., Ted Dwayne; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. CR-132400; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1162.

Prior report: La.App., 140 So.3d 1267.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant and assigns reasons.

HUGHES, J.,

would grant the writ.

While the subject matter may be unpleasant, justice should be blind, not squeamish. The failure to allow the videotapes at trial raises constitutional issues.

Consent is an element of the crimes charged. The wife testified that she never consented to the sexual practices she and her husband engaged in. The husband testified that she always consented. The 200 videotapes, or a portion thereof, would provide objective evidence for the fact finder, in this case a jury, to make this credibility determination.

The husband argues that the trial judge instead made this credibility call — believing the wife and disbelieving the husband — by withholding the videotapes from the jury. He argues he was thus deprived of his right to a jury trial, as well as his right to present a defense and to confront his accuser, by being denied the opportunity to impeach his wife’s explicit testimony on the issue of consent with the objective videotape evidence.

While it is true that prior consensual acts do not excuse a subsequent criminal act, in a “he said, she said” situation such as this, the probative value of the videotapes cannot be ignored.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lynn E. FORET, M.D.
    No. 2014-C-2097.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 16, 2015.
   PER CURIAM.

|,The State filed the instant action against defendant in East Baton Rouge Parish based on La. R.S. 22:1931.5(4) of the Sledge Jeansonne Louisiana Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (“Jeansonne Act”), and La. R.S. 51:1405 of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”). The district court ruled the LUTPA claims were filed in an improper venue. It further ruled the Jeansonne Act and LUTPA did not apply to defendant’s conduct as it occurred prior to their effective dates. On appeal, the court of appeal determined the district court correctly granted the exception of improper venue, but vacated the judgment in all other respects. Both the State and defendant seek review in this court.

We conclude the lower courts erred in finding venue was improper in East Baton Rouge Parish as to the LUTPA claim. The Jeansonne Act sets forth a mandatory venue for that claim in East Baton Rouge Parish pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1931.3(E)(“Any action brought pursuant to the provisions of this Part shall be filed in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the parish of East Baton Rouge”). Because there is no common venue for the Jeansonne Act and LUTPA claims, the | adoctrine of ancillary venue applies, making East Baton Rouge Parish a proper venue for both claims.

Therefore, venue is also proper in East Baton Rouge Parish as to the LUTPA claim under the doctrine of ancillary venue. See Underwood v. Lane Memorial Hosp., 97-1997 (La.7/08/98), 714 So.2d 715. Because venue was proper as to both claims in East Baton Rouge Parish, the district court did not err in reaching the remaining exceptions.

Accordingly, the writs are granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is vacated insofar as it holds venue is not proper in East Baton Rouge Parish. The ease is remanded to the court of appeal to consider the remaining assignments of error.


author: CARAWAY, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff v. Troy BOULTON, Defendant.
    No. 47,341-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Eugene Allen, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellant, State of Louisiana, Dept, of Children and Family Services, Support Enforcement Services.
    Mixon & Carroll, PLC, Columbia, LA, by James E. Mixon, James L. Carroll, Brian E. Frazier, for Appellee, Daidre Boulton.
    Before CARAWAY, DREW and SEXTON (Pro Tempore), JJ.
   CARAWAY, J.

_|jln this action filed by the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services, Support Enforcement Services (“State”), seeking to reduce the father’s previously established child support obligation, the trial court denied the requested reduction in child support on the grounds that the evidence failed to prove a material change in circumstances. Finding the appeal untimely, we dismiss the appeal.

Facts

On September 22, 2004, Troy Boulton was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $408.76 in addition to a 5% administrative fee to the State. The support award concerned his two minor children born during his former marriage to Daidre Boulton. At that time, Daidre utilized the services of the State tó obtain the order of support. However, it was the Caldwell Parish District Attorney’s Office which filed a motion to modify Troy’s child support obligation on March 11, 2009, on the grounds that Troy was drawing social security from which the children received a lump sum and monthly payments.

Initially, the district judge dismissed a motion to modify on January 22, 2010, on the grounds that the Caldwell Parish District Attorney’s Office, the initially named plaintiff, had no right of action to pursue the reduction in the child support obligation. Thereafter, on August 3, 2011 (almost one year and eight months later), the State filed the present Amended Motion to Modify the child support obligation re-urging the earlier material change in circumstances. In the alternative, the State argued that the amendment to |2the original motion should be considered as a new motion for modification of the support judgment.

After a hearing, the trial court issued a written judgment on September 30, 2011, denying the State’s request to amend the motion to modify and denying the August 3, 2011 motion to modify the child support obligation on the grounds that “the evidence does not prove any material change of circumstances.” Notice of Judgment was mailed on September 30, 2011.

On November 22, 2001, the State filed a Motion for Appeal which was granted by the trial court on November 29, 2011.

Discussion

This action to modify child support was instituted by the state in accordance with the provisions of La. R.S. 46:236.1.1, et seq. Specifically, the state proceeded under La. R.S. 46:236.1.2(D)(1) which gives it authority to take direct civil action to modify an order or judgment of support. Such actions utilize the child support guidelines of La. R.S. 9:315, et seq., in fixing or modifying the amount of support in the same manner as private child support determinations. State, Dept. of Social Services, ex rel. D.F. v. L.T., 05-1965 (La.7/6/06), 934 So.2d 687; State ex rel. H.B. v. Blair, 40,140 (La.App.2d Cir.8/17/05), 909 So.2d 710, writ denied, 05-2392 (La.3/17/06), 925 So.2d 548. Thus, the child support determinations made in either type of proceedings are the same.

The provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 3943 reads as follows:

An appeal from a judgment awarding custody, visitation, or support of a person can be taken only within the delay provided in Article |s3942. Such an appeal shall not suspend execution of the judgment insofar as the judgment relates to custody, visitation, or support.
La. C.C.P. art. 3942 states:
A. An appeal from a judgment granting or refusing an annulment of marriage or a divorce can be taken only within thirty days from the applicable date provided in Article 2087(A).
B. Such an appeal shall suspend the execution of the judgment insofar as the judgment relates to the annulment, divorce, or any partition of community property or settlement of claims arising from the matrimonial regime.

La. C.C.P. art. 2087(A) reads in pertinent part:

A. Except as otherwise provided in this Article or by other law, an appeal which does not suspend the effect or the execution of an appealable order or judgment may be taken within sixty days of any of the following:
(1) The expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as provided by Article 1974 and Article 1811, if no application has been filed timely.
(2) The date of the mailing of notice of the court’s refusal to grant a timely application for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as provided under Article 1914.

In 1973, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the phrase “judgment awarding” then and now contained in Article 3943 in Malone v. Malone, 282 So.2d 119 (La.1973). Describing the wording of the article as “unfortunate,” the court held that the article applied to “appeals from judgments awarding, denying, modifying or terminating” alimony or custody. Other than the expansion of the types of judgments included in Article 3943, the language of the statute remains the same. Indeed the court discussed the main purpose of the statute which was “to codify the [Jurisprudential rule denying a sus-pensive appeal in custody cases and to provide a wife necessary support pending appeal.”

Prior to the 1973 decision, confusion in the circuits had arisen over the language of the statute and the issue of whether it applied only to judgments awarding custody or alimony. The court concluded that such confusion was not intended by the Legislature and that “the uniform treatment of judgments relating to alimony or custody seems to have been intended.” Further the court noted that “strong reason supported] the policy of expediting appeals in alimony and custody matters.” Certainly the same policy continues to underlie the statute as it reads today.

In the present case, the State obtained its appeal after the expiration of the 30-day delay but before the 60-day delay. The State argues that this case “presents a unique set of facts and law,” that is, a question of the application of La. R.S. 9:315.7(D) regarding a credit of social security benefits to the child support obligation, which precludes the application of Article 3942. That argument is not relevant to the question of the timeliness of appeal. La. R.S. 9:315.7 is included in those articles addressing the calculation of the child support obligation and merely gives instruction on the use of social security benefits in that overall calculation. Thus, we consider the request for an alteration of the child support obligation due to these benefits and the resulting judgment as falling within the rule of Article 3943. Because the present appeal was obtained after the 30-day time limit of that Article, and considering the above ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court, we dismiss the appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

      . In 1973, C.C.P. art. 3943 read as follows:
      An appeal from a judgment awarding, custody of a person or alimony can be taken only within the delay provided in Article 3942. Such an appeal shall not suspend the execution of the judgment in so far as the judgment relates to custody or alimony.
      In 1993, Article 3943 was changed to provide for appeal from “a judgment awarding custody, visitation, or support of a person.”