author: VICTORY, J. KNOLL, J.,

text:
    SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, L.L.C. v. Donyelle JANUARY, Assurant Specialty Property, American Security Insurance Company and Capital One Bank.
    No. 2012-CC-2668.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 28, 2013.

      Aufrecht & Anderson, LLC, Wayne Morris Aufrecht, Rachel Thyre Anderson, for Applicant.
    Favret, Demarest, Russo & Lutkewitte, PLC, Thomas J. Lutkewitte, Brad P. Scott, Conor Thomas Lutkewitte, Law Offices of Gordon P. Serou Jr., LLC, Gordon Paul Serou, Jr., New Orleans, LA, for Respondent.
   VICTORY, J.

I,We granted this writ application to resolve a split in the courts of appeal regarding whether the fourth category of the doctrine of contra non valentem, i.e., the discovery rule, is applicable to suspend prescription of a conversion claim against a payor under La. R.S. 10:3^120(f). After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find that the discovery rule cannot suspend the one-year prescriptive period of La. R.S. 10:3-420(f). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 26, 2010, Specialized Loan Servicing, L.L.C. (“Specialized”) filed a petition asserting a claim for damages against Assurant Specialty Property (“As-surant”), American Security Insurance Company (“American Security”), Donyelle January (“January”), and Capital One Bank (“Capital One”). According to the petition, Specialized was the servicer of a note and mortgage agreement executed by January and affecting January’s property located at 400 Missouri Street, New Iberia, Louisiana. Specialized was the primary insured on a policy covering the property issued by Assurant and its subsidiary and underwriter, American Security. January was the secondary insured. The petition alleges that following a fire on June |⅞8, 2009, American Security issued a check on June 26, 2009, in the amount of $142,242.33, with January and Specialized named as payees. The check was forwarded by American Security to Assurant, who subsequently forwarded the check to January in conformance with the insurance policy. Along with the check, Assu-rant included information explaining the procedures to January for endorsing the check and returning it to Specialized. The petition alleges that “[ujnbeknownst to [Specialized], January negotiated the check to Capital One Bank in New Iberia, on or around July 15, 2009” and that “Capital One Bank cashed the check in favor of January without any endorsement by [Specialized].” The petition states that before discovering January had cashed the check, Specialized contacted January and requested a return of the endorsed check. Upon discovering that January had negotiated the check, Specialized contacted As-surant who told them that the check was made payable to “Specialized Loan Servicing and Donyelle M. January.” However, Assurant claimed that the check had been altered by somebody erasing the word “and” on the check. Based on these claims, Specialized filed a claim with Capital One, asserting that the check cashed by Capital One contained a fraudulent alteration. On February 8, 2010, Capital One rejected the fraud claim. Specialized then filed this lawsuit claiming damages in the amount of $142,242.33, with interest, attorney fees and other damages. The petition alleged that Capital One was liable for conversion under the Louisiana Uniform Commercial Code (the “La. U.C.C.”), La. R.S. 10:3-101-La. R.S. 10:3-605, and general negligence under La. C.C. art. 2315.

Capital One filed a peremptory exception of prescription, alleging that the claim against it was a claim of conversion under the La. U.C.C., specifically La. R.S. 10:3— 420, which claim prescribes one year from the date of negotiation of the check. As the check was negotiated on July 15, 2009, and suit was not filed until August 26, 1 o2010, Capital One argued that Specialized’s claim against it had prescribed. Specialized opposed the exception by arguing that the doctrine of contra non valen-tem applied to suspend prescription until Specialized had knowledge that the check had been negotiated, which did not occur until August 27, 2009. The district court overruled the exception, but the court of appeal granted Capital One’s writ and reversed. Specialized Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. January, 12-1145 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/18/12) (unpublished writ action). The court of appeal found that the claim was prescribed on the face of the petition, and thus the burden shifted to Specialized to prove that the claim was not prescribed. Id. While Specialized attached exhibits to its opposition purporting to show that it did not have knowledge that January had cashed the check until August 27, 2009, Specialized failed to introduce these exhibits into the record and thus they could not be considered. Id. Therefore, the court of appeal found that Specialized failed to meet its burden of proving that its claim against Capital One for conversion was not prescribed. Id.

While the court of appeal found that the doctrine of contra non valentem did not suspend prescription in this case, its discussion of Specialized’s attempt to offer exhibits to prove its lack of knowledge implies that the court believed the doctrine could apply in conversion cases on satisfactory proof. We granted Capital One’s writ application to decide the narrow legal issue of whether the fourth category of contra non valentem can apply to suspend prescription of a conversion claim under La. R.S. 10:3-420. Specialized Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. January, 12-2668 (La.2/22/13), 108 So.3d 759.

DISCUSSION

When prescription is raised by peremptory exception, with evidence being introduced at the hearing on the exception, the trial court’s findings of fact on the Lissue of prescription are subject to the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. London Towne Condominium Homeowner’s Ass’n v. London Towne Co., 06-401 (La.10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1227, 1231 (cites omitted). However, the sole issue before us is the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 10:3-420. Thus, the case presents a question of law which is reviewed by this court under a de novo standard of review. City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 12-0078 (La.10/16/12), 100 So.3d 301; First Nat. Bank, USA v. DDS Const., LLC, 11-1418 (La.1/24/12), 91 So.3d 944, 951-952; Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04-0227 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 835. A de novo review means the court will render judgment after its consideration of the legislative provision at issue, the law and the record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the tribunals below. City of Bossier City, supra at 303.

La. U.C.C.’s conversion statute, La. R.S. 10:3^120, was enacted as part of the state’s 1992 revision to Chapter 3 of Title 10 governing Negotiable Instruments. La. R.S. 10:3-420 applies to circumstances where a payee on a check alleges that a bank paid the check to someone else not entitled to enforce the instrument, providing in pertinent part:

(a) An instrument is converted when
(iii) it is taken by transfer, other than a negotiation, from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or a bank makes or obtains payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment.
(f) Any action for conversion ... prescribes in one year.

| ¡jHere, Specialized alleges that Capital One made payment with respect to the check to January, a person not entitled to receive payment. Thus, this claim falls squarely under La. R.S. 10:8 — 420(a)(iii). The conversion occurred when Capital One cashed the check for January. La. R.S. 10:3-420(f) provides that an action for conversion prescribes in one year. Thus, unless the doctrine of contra non valentem applies in this case, Specialized’s conversion claim against Capital One prescribed on July 15, 2010, one year from the date Capital One made payment to January.

Although La. C.C. art. 3467 provides that “prescription runs against all persons unless exception is established by legislation,” this Court has applied the jurisprudential doctrine of contra non valen-tem as an exception to this statutory rule. See e.g., Wimberly v. Gatch, 93-2361 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 206, 211. The doctrine of contra non valentem applies as an exception to the statutory prescriptive period where in fact and for good cause a plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues. The Court has recognized four instances where contra non valentem can apply: (1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiffs actions; (2) where there was some condition coupled with a contract or connected -with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; (3) where the debtor himself has done some act effectively to prevent the creditor from availing himself |fiof his cause of action; or (4) where some cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant. Wimberly, supra at 211. However, the doctrine of contra non valentem only applies in “exceptional circumstances.” La. C.C. art. 3467, Official Revision Comment (d); State Through Div. of Admin. v. McInnis Bros. Const., 97-0742 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 937, 940; Renfroe v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 01-1646 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 947, 953.

Here, Specialized argues that the fourth category of contra non valentem applies to suspend prescription because Specialized did not know and could not have known that January improperly cashed the insurance check until American Security informed it of that fact on August 27, 2009. The discovery rule provides that prescription commences on the date the injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is based. Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 03-1030 (La.2/6/04), 865 So.2d 49, 55.

Our courts of appeal are split on the issue of whether the discovery rule can suspend prescription of a conversion claim under La. R.S. 10:3-420. The First and Second Circuits have held that the doctrine of contra non valentem cannot be applied to suspend prescription of a cause of action for conversion of a negotiable instrument under La. R.S. 10:3 — 420(f), except in the event of fraudulent concealment by the defendant asserting prescription. ASP Enterprises, Inc. v. Guillory, 08-2235 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/11/09), 22 So.3d 964, writ denied, 09-2464 (La.1/29/10), 25 So.3d 834; Peak Performance Physical Therapy & Fitness, LLC v. Hibernia Corp., 07-2206 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08), 992 So.2d 527, writ denied, 08-1478 (La.10/3/08), 992 So.2d 1018; Costello v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 45,518 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/29/10), 48 So.3d 1108. The Third Circuit applies the doctrine of contra non valentem to conversion cases on a case by case basis. In LaCombe v. Bank One Corp., 06-1374 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07), 953 So.2d 161, writ denied, 07-746 (La.6/1/07), 957 So.2d 177, the court held that prescription was suspended where an employer had no reason to suspect that his employee was forging his endorsement and depositing the checks into her own account. In Metro Elec. & Maintenance, Inc. v. Bank One Corp., 05-1045 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 924 So.2d 446, the court refused to apply the discovery rule to suspend prescription because the plaintiff could easily have discovered the conversion had he examined his bank statements. Likewise, in this case, the Fourth Circuit apparently would have applied the discovery rule to suspend prescription had the plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence into the record to prove its lack of knowledge of the conversion. Specialized Loan Servicing, supra.

Specialized cites to other court of appeal cases holding that contra non valentem applies in conversion cases on a case by case basis. See Robinson v. Whitney National Bank, 96-0628 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/23/96), 683 So.2d 847 (acknowledging the applicability of the doctrine but refusing to apply it where the plaintiff could have discovered the cause of action by examining her bank statements), writ denied, 96-2807 (La.1/6/97), 685 So.2d 120; Chapital v. Guaranty Sav. & Homestead Ass’n, 96-0244 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/2/96), 681 So.2d 1307 (applying doctrine to suspend prescription until plaintiff became aware that forged check had been deposited), writ denied, 96-2639 (La.12/13/96), 692 So.2d 1068; Johnson v. Concordia Bank & Trust Co., 95-1187 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/27/96), 671 So.2d 1093 (applying doctrine to suspend prescription on suit against bank for |^wrongfully dispersing interest to tutor); Riceacres, Inc. v. Hayes, 93-310 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/94), 631 So.2d 703 (applying doctrine to suspend prescription where bank paid cashier’s checks over forged endorsement); Black v. Whitney National Bank, 618 So.2d 509, 516 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993) (acknowledging the applicability of the doctrine but refusing to apply it where plaintiff should have discovered forged checks at some point during a nine-year period). However, these cases were decided based on the applicable law prior to the 1992 revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code when conversion of a negotiable instrument was governed by former La. R.S. 10:3-419.

Effective January 1, 1994, former La. R.S. 10:3-419 was amended and reenacted as La. R.S. 10:3-420. Former La. R.S. 10:3^19 was silent on the nature of the action for conversion and contained no prescriptive period. This gave rise to a number of appellate decisions on the issue of prescription and whether the five-year period relating to actions on negotiable instruments applied, or whether the one-year prescriptive period relating to delictual actions applied. This Court resolved the Rissue in Daube v. Bruno, 493 So.2d 606 (La.1986), by holding that absent specific legislative treatment of the issue in the conversion statute itself, reference to the general law of delictual obligations was necessary to define the cause of action for conversion and to determine the applicable prescriptive period. By characterizing the action as a tort claim, the Court applied the one-year prescriptive period for delic-tual actions found in La. C.C. art. 3492. The application of the general one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions to conversion claims under former La. R.S. 10:3^19 in Daube provided a basis for other courts to apply the doctrine of contra non valentem to conversion claims, as that doctrine was sometimes used to suspend prescription in tort actions. However, now that the prescriptive period for conversion is specifically provided for in La. R.S. 10:3-420, case law interpreting former La. R.S. 10:3^19 is no longer relevant.

Thus, the res nova issue before us is whether the discovery rule can interrupt the one-year prescriptive period contained in La. R.S. 10:3-420. In making this determination, we must look first to the purpose behind Louisiana’s enactment of its version of the U.C.C. La. R.S. 10:1-103 provides:

(a) This Title shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and
(3) to promote uniformity of the law among the various jurisdictions.
(b) Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Title, the other laws of Louisiana supplement its provisions.

The U.C.C. Comment following this statute explains the interaction between this statutory law and other bodies of law, as follows:

|102. Applicability of supplemental principles of law. Subsection (b) states the basic relationship of the Uniform Commercial Code to supplemental bodies of law. The Uniform Commercial Code was drafted against the backdrop of existing bodies of law, including the common law[] and equity, and relies on those bodies of law to supplement its provisions in many important ways. At the same time, the Uniform Commercial Code is the primary source of commercial law rules in areas that it governs, and its rules represent choices made by its drafters and the enacting legislatures about the appropriate policies to be furthered in the transactions it covers. Therefore, while principles of common law and equity may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, they may not be used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions reflect, unless a specific provision of the Uniform Commercial Code provides otherwise. In the absence of such a provision, the Uniform Commercial Code preempts the principles of common law and equity that are inconsistent with either its provisions or its purposes and policies.

La. R.S. 10:1-103, Official Commercial Code Comment 2.

We also look to the jurisprudence of other states that utilize similar U.C.C. conversion statutes. Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank of Lafayette, 464 So.2d 721, 730 (La.1985) (as “[t]he U.C.C. was adopted in Louisiana in an effort to harmonize the commercial law of Louisiana with that of the other states,” “[w]e should ... examine the jurisprudence of other states” interpreting our corollary statutes). After examining the jurisprudence of other states, it is evident that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions addressing this specific issue have refused to apply the discovery doctrine to toll the statute of limitations on U.C.C. conversion claims. See e.g., Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 496-99 (6th Cir.2011) (applying Ohio law); Rodrigue v. Olin Emps. Credit Union, 406 F.3d 434, 444-47 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Illinois law); John Hancock Financial Services, Inc. v. Old Kent Bank, 346 F.3d 727, 733-34 (6th Cir.2003) (applying Michigan law); Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1229-32 (3rd Cir.1993) (applying Pennsylvania law); Kuwait Airways Corp. v. AmericanSec. Bank, N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 460-63 (D.C.Cir.1989)11 (applying District of Columbia law); Advance Dental Care, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 906 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Md.2012); Calex Exp., Inc. v. Bank of America, 401 F.Supp.2d 407 (M.D.Pa.2005); Gress v. PNC Bank, National Assoc., 100 F.Supp.2d 289 (E.D.Pa.2000); First Investors Corp. v. Citizens Bank, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 687, 690 (W.D.N.C.1991) (applying North Carolina law), aff'd, 956 F.2d 263 (4th Cir.1992); AmerUS Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, N.A., 143 Cal.App.4th 631, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 500 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.2006); Hawkins v. Nalick, 2012 IL App (5th) 110553, 363 Ill.Dec. 767, 975 N.E.2d 793, 797-99 (2012); Kidney Cancer Ass’n v. North Shore Community Bank and Trust Co., 373 Ill.App.3d 396, 311 Ill.Dec. 512, 869 N.E.2d 186 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.2007); Haddad’s of Illinois, Inc. v. Credit Union 1, Credit Union, 286 Ill.App.3d 1069, 222 Ill.Dec. 710, 678 N.E.2d 322 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.1997); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Bank One, 852 N.E.2d 604, 610-12 (Ind.App.2006), vacated in part on other grounds, 879 N.E.2d 1086 (Ind.2008); Husker News Co. v. Mahaska State Bank, 460 N.W.2d 476, 477-79 (Iowa 1990); Brennan v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 245 Mich.App. 156, 626 N.W.2d 917, 919 (2001); Smith v. Franklin Custodian Funds, Inc., 726 So.2d 144, 148 (Miss.1998); Yarbro, Ltd. v. Missoula Federal Credit Union, 310 Mont. 346, 50 P.3d 158, 161-63 (2002); Mandolfo v. Mandolfo, 281 Neb. 443, 796 N.W.2d 603, 610-12 (2011); N.J. Lawyers’ Fund for Client Prot. v. Pace, 186 N.J. 123, 892 A.2d 661, 662 (2006); Gerber v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 64 Misc.2d 687, 315 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603 (N.Y.C.Civ.Ct.1970); Mattlin Holdings, L.L.C. v. First City Bank, 189 Ohio App.3d 213, 937 N.E.2d 1087, 1089-91 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.2010); Palmer Mfg. & Supply, Inc. v. BankOhio Natl. Bank, 93 Ohio App.3d 17, 637 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio App. 2 Dist.1994); Estate of Hollywood v. First Nat. Bank of Palmerton, 859 A.2d 472 (Pa.Super.2004); Fuscellaro v. Industrial Nat’l Corp., 117 R.I. 558, 368 A.2d 1227, 1229-31 (1977); Pero’s Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 621-25 (Tenn.2002); Lyco Acquisition 1984 Ltd. Partnership v. First Nat. Bank of Amarillo, 860 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tx.App.1993); Southwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Bankers Commercial Life Ins., Co., 563 S.W.2d 329, 331-32 (Tx.App.1978); Wang v. Farmers State Bank of Winner, 447 N.W.2d 516, 518-19 (S.D.1989).

A small number of courts have applied the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for conversion of negotiable instruments. See DeHart v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A./South Jersey, 67 B.R. 740, 745 (D.N.J.1986); Stjernholm v. Life Ins. Co. Of N.A., 782 P.2d 810, 811-12 (Colo.Ct. App.1989); Branford State Bank v. Hackney Tractor Co., 455 So.2d 541, 542 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984); UNR-Rohn, Inc. v. Summit Bank of Clinton County, 687 N.E.2d 235, 240-41 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); Gallagher v. Santa Fe Federal Employees Federal Credit Union, 132 N.M. 552, 52 P.3d 412, 416-17 (2002).

In applying the majority rule, courts enforce the U.C.C.’s purpose of promoting swift resolution of commercial disputes. Mandolfo, supra, 281 Neb. 443, 451, 796 N.W.2d 603. The reasoning is that a “discovery rule would be inimical to the underlying purposes of the [U.C.C.], including the goals of certainty of liability, finality, predictability, uniformity, and efficiency in commercial transactions.” Id. (citing Rodrigue, supra at 445-46). Further, these courts conclude that “[t]he finality of transactions promoted by an ascertainable definite period of liability is essential to the free negotiability of instruments on which commercial welfare so heavily depends.” Id. (citing Haddad’s of Illinois, supra (quoting Fuscellaro, supra)). Further, in rejecting the discovery rule, “many courts reason that the victim of conversion is often in the best position to prevent or detect the loss.” Id. at 452, 796 N.W.2d 603; Haddad’s of Illinois, supra. “Watchful victims of conversion should be able to quickly realize when they have |1sbeen wronged.” Id. Courts applying such a rationale believe that “the public would be poorly served by a rule that effectively shifts the responsibility for careful bookkeeping away from those in the best position to monitor accounts and employees.” Id. (citing Husker News Co., supra, 460 N.W.2d at 479).

In siding with the majority rule that the “discovery rule” is inapplicable to toll the statute of limitations on an action for conversion of negotiable instruments, the Tennessee Supreme Court emphasized two principles which support the majority holding: (1) the commercial policies which form the basis for the U.C.C. mitigate strongly against open-ended liability on negotiable instruments; and (2) a claim for conversion of a negotiable instrument is unlike other claims to which the “discovery rule” has been applied because the tort of conversion is complete and the injury occurs at the moment the negotiable instrument in converted, regardless of the plaintiffs ignorance of the conversions. Pero’s Steak & Spaghetti House, supra, 90 S.W.3d at 622-24. The court concluded that while “[n]ot applying the discovery rule may very well be harsh in certain cases,” it was “persuaded by the reasoning of the majority view,” stating as follows:

Negotiable instruments are intended to facilitate the rapid flow of commerce by providing certainty and finality in commercial transactions. These policies are best served by refusing to apply the discovery rule and by finding that the cause of action for conversion of negotiable instruments accrues when the instrument is negotiated. Of course, adoption of the majority rule also fosters uniformity, which is a fundamental objective of the Uniform Commercial Code and the TUCC. (Cites omitted.)

Id. at 624.

We agree with the majority view that the discovery rule does not apply in La. U.C.C. conversion cases. The adoption of the majority view fosters uniformity, which is a fundamental objective of the U.C.C. and the La. U.C.C. See La. R.S. 10:l-103(a)(3). We reject Specialized’s argument that because other states have a 114three-year statute of limitations for conversion claims, adoption of the discovery rule would make Louisiana’s conversion more uniform with the other states. The uniformity among the states that should be fostered is the clear-cut rule that the prescriptive period (or statute of limitations) for conversion claims begins to run on the date of the conversion. Having a definite cut-off date for bringing conversion claims promotes the U.C.C.’s purpose of promoting finality, certainty, and swift resolution of commercial disputes. Further, the victims of the conversion are in a much better position to detect the loss, and thus should be responsible for monitoring their accounts and employees to detect if they have been the victim of conversion of funds.

Even without regarding other states’ positions on the matter, our own laws lead to the conclusion that the discovery rule cannot suspend prescription on a conversion claim. First, as we have stated, the discovery rule applies only in “exceptional circumstances.” There is nothing exceptional about conversion cases that would necessitate the application of the discovery rule, because, absent fraud on the part of the defendant, the victim, using some diligence, should be able to quickly discover that he has been the victim of conversion. In fact in this case, even the face of the petition confirms that Specialized had knowledge, before this claim prescribed on July 15, 2010, that January had cashed the check without its endorsement. Second, the La. U.C.C., particularly La. R.S. 10:3-420, governs this claim, and as we have | ^explained, other statutory or jurisprudential rules can only be used to supplement, not supplant, the provisions of the La. U.C.C. The legislature has adopted a strict one-year prescriptive period for conversion claims. Inserting the discovery rule of contra non valentem into the statutory one-year prescriptive period of La. R.S. 10:3-420 would result in this jurisprudential rule supplanting this La. U.C.C. provision, which would be in violation of La. R.S. 10:1-103.

Finally, examination of other La. U.C.C. provisions indicates that had the legislature intended the prescriptive period of La. R.S. 10:3-420 to be suspended by the discovery rule, it would have said so. Other La. U.C.C. statutes with prescriptive periods for negotiable instruments transactions have the discovery rule built in. For instance, La. R.S. 10:3-416, regarding transfer warranties, provides that “a cause of action for breach of warranty under this Section accrues when the claimant has reason to know of the breach.” Further, both La. R.S. 10:3-208 and 10:3-417 regarding presentment warranties provide that “a cause of action for breach of warranty under this Section accrues when the claimant has reason to know of the breach.” Had the legislature intended for the discovery rule to likewise apply in cases alleging conversion of negotiable instruments they would have stated so in La. R.S. 10:3-420.

CONCLUSION

A claim for conversion under the La. U.C.C., specifically La. R.S. 10:3-420, prescribes one year from the date of the conversion. We agree with the majority view of other states that the discovery rule does not apply to suspend the prescriptive period. Refusing to apply the discovery rule best serves the underlying purposes of the U.C.C. and the La. U.C.C. of certainty of liability, finality, predictability, uniformity, and efficiency in commercial transactions, and places the burden of diligence on the party in the best position to detect the conversion. Further, | ^conversion cases do not present the type of “exceptional circumstances” that would merit the application of the jurispruden-tially created discovery rule to suspend the strict one-year prescriptive period created by the legislature.

DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the court of appeal is affirmed. AFFIRMED.

KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

HUGHES, J., concurs with the result.

KNOLL, J.,

dissenting.

| jWith all due respect, I dissent. This Court has repeatedly applied the discovery rule to toll the prescriptive period where the plaintiffs cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff. There is no provision of either the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) or the Louisiana U.C.C. which precludes the application of the discovery rule to the instant case.

In Daube v. Bruno, 493 So.2d 606, 609 (1986), this Court held a conversion claim under the Louisiana U.C.C. constitutes a delictual action. Louisiana courts have consistently applied the discovery rule to a wide variety of tort claims, including non-U.C.C. conversion claims. As the present case concerns a tort claim, I can see no reason, given the jurisprudence of this Court, why the discovery rule should not apply with equal force to Specialized’s claim. See DeHart v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A./South Jersey, 67 B.R. 740, 745 (D.N.J.1986) (“This court does not perceive any pragmatic or metaphysical distinction between this [U.C.C. conversion] case and those where the discovery rule has been applied.”); Husker News Co. v. Mahaska State Bank, 460 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Iowa 1990) (Larson, J., dissenting) (“[This] is a tort case, and we have consistently held that the discovery rule should be applied in tort cases.”).

While the present case presents a claim under the Louisiana U.C.C., this fact alone does not mandate a different outcome. The U.C.C. provides “[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of [the U.C.C.], the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions.” U.C.C. § 1-103. Similarly, La.Rev.Stat. § 10:1-108(b), titled “applicability of supplemental principles of law,” states “[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Title, the other laws of Louisiana supplement its provisions.” Further, the official comments to U.C.C. § 3-118, which provides the prescriptive period for conversion claims, note “the circumstances under which the running of a limitations period may be tolled is left to other law pursuant to Section 1-103.” U.C.C. § 3-118, cmt. 1. Therefore, the U.C.C. expressly permits courts to toll the prescriptive period for a conversion claim in accordance with state law. See Paul J. Jaskot, Recent Decision, Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.1993), 67 Temp. L.Rev. 417, 434 (1994) (“the drafters of the U.C.C. never prohibited individual states from applying equitable principles to toll an applicable statute of limitations.”).

As there is no provision of the U.C.C. or the Louisiana U.C.C. which specifically prohibits the application of the discovery rule to U.C.C. conversion claims, the discovery rule may be applied to the instant case, provided its application would comply with Louisiana law. See DeHart, 67 B.R. at 745; Stjernholm v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 782 P.2d 810, 811-12 (Colo.Ct.App.1989); Jaskot, supra, at 430 (“Absent an explicit provision, the discovery rule’s | «¡inherently equitable application should be denied only where its use does not comport with the [state] courts’ use of the rule.”).

While a majority of courts have held the discovery rule does not apply to U.C.C. conversion claims, a significant number of courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Moreover, while courts may extend deference to other states’ U.C.C. decisions, “courts should determine the outcome of U.C.C. cases in accordance with the Code’s text and related interpretive aids, regardless of the previous interpretations of other courts.” Jaskot, supra, at 428-29 (citing White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 4, at 18 (3d ed.1988)).

Significantly, the policy reasons cited by courts prohibiting the discovery rule are inapplicable to the present case. These courts, like the majority in the present case, have noted (1) the need for finality and certainty in transactions involving negotiable instruments; (2) the need for uniformity; and (3) the presumption that victims of conversion are in the best position to detect the loss. See, e.g., Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir.1993); Pero’s Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 623-24 (Tenn.2002); Husker News, 460 N.W.2d at 478.

The need for finality and certainty favors the strict application of prescriptive periods in all cases, not just U.C.C. conversion claims. See Husker News, 460 N.W.2d at 479 (Larson, J., dissenting). It has not been our jurisprudence, however, to strictly and mechanically apply prescriptive periods in all cases. Rather, this Court has applied the doctrine of contra non valentem, “[t]o |4soften the occasional harshness of prescriptive statutes.” Carter v. Haygood, 04-0646, p. 11 (La.1/19/05); 892 So.2d 1261, 1268. Indeed, we have noted contra non valentem is “notably at odds with the public policy favoring certainty underlying the doctrine of prescription.” Jenkins v. Starns, 11-1170, p. 18 (La.1/24/12); 85 So.3d 612, 623. Yet, we have repeatedly subordinated the need for finality and certainty in the interest of fairness. See Wells v. Zadeck, 11-1232, p. 9 (La.3/30/13); 89 So.3d 1145, 1150 (“The courts [] weigh the ‘equitable nature of the circumstances in each individual case’ to determine whether prescription will be tolled.”) (quoting Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., Inc., 502 So.2d 1034, 1056 n. 52 (La.1987)).

Additionally, permitting the discovery rule in the instant case would not impede commerce in any way. Specialized’s litigation does not concern the finality of a commercial transaction. Rather, Specialized’s claims simply allege negligence by Capital One in cashing the check. Permitting Specialized to pursue its claims does not alter the finality of a commercial transaction. As the check has been negotiated, the transaction is final.

While establishing uniformity in commercial law among various jurisdictions is an overarching goal of the U.C.C., the U.C.C. by its own terms leaves open the possibility that a state could apply its own law to toll the prescriptive period on a conversion claim. U.C.C. § l-103(a) & (b); U.C.C. § 3-118 cmt. 1. Additionally, almost every other state has adopted the three-year prescriptive period of U.C.C. § 3-118 for conversion claims, while La. Rev.Stat. § 10:3-420 provides only one-year. Specialized’s claim against Capital One would be timely in every other state, but not Louisiana. Thus, the U.C.C.’s goal of uniformity would not be achieved if the discovery rule is prohibited in the instant case. Cf. Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank of Lafayette, 464 So.2d 721, 730 (La.1985) (“The U.C.C. was adopted in Louisiana in an effort to harmonize the commercial law of Louisiana with that of the other states.”).

Further, a number of courts which have rejected the discovery rule have reasoned the limitations period of three years provides sufficient time for a plaintiff to discover the conversion and bring suit, even without the benefit of the discovery rule. See Kuwait Airways Corp. v. American Sec. Bank, N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 461 (D.C.Cir.1989) (“[A]n ordinary business could have detected the siphoning off of funds within a three-year period of their conversion.”); Pero’s, 90 S.W.3d at 624 (“[Tjhree years should be more than ample time for a plaintiff to discover a conversion claim.”); Palmer Mfg. & Supply, Inc. v. BancOhio Nat’l Bank, 93 Ohio App.3d 17, 22, 637 N.E.2d 386, 389-91 (1994) (“[Fjour years is ample time for a prudent business or individual, exercising due diligence, to discover a forgery and bring an action for conversion.”). Effectively, the U.C.C. and the commercial law of the other forty-nine states provide a “built-in” discovery period to provide sufficient time for victims of conversion to detect the loss and bring their claims. This reasoning is inapplicable to the instant case as Louisiana provides only a one-year prescriptive period.

Finally, we cannot presume Specialized was in the best position to detect the loss in the instant case. Specialized did not issue the check and was not the depository bank; it had no authority to monitor or control the finances of January, American Security, or Assurant. As the check was not drawn on Specialized’s account, it could not have learned of the conversion simply by checking its own bank accounts. Under these circumstances, Capital One was in a better position to detect the conversion.

| fiConsequently, under our jurisprudence, the discovery rule should apply to toll the one-year prescriptive period in the present case. Specialized did not have a reasonable basis to pursue a claim against Capital One until August 27, 2009, when American Security notified Specialized January had cashed the insurance check. See Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So.2d 420, 424 (La.1987) (prescription begins to run “when plaintiff has reasonable basis to pursue claim against specific defendant.”). As noted above, Specialized did not issue the check, it did not possess the check, the check was not drawn on its account, and Specialized had no power to monitor defendants’ finances. Although Capital One argues Specialized was aware January possessed the check prior to the conversion and had no intention to relinquish control, the mere apprehension something could be wrong is insufficient to begin the running of prescription. In re Medical Review Panel of Howard, 573 So.2d 472, 474 (La.1991). Accordingly, contra non valentem should apply to toll prescription until August 27, 2009, the date of discovery.

The majority’s holding unnecessarily contradicts our long-standing jurisprudence that has applied the discovery rule to tort claims where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff. There is no provision of either the U.C.C. or the Louisiana U.C.C. prohibiting application of the discovery rule to the present case. Both the U.C.C. and the Louisiana U.C.C. permit the application of supplemental principles of law to U.C.C. claims, and the comments to the U.C.C. expressly provide a state may apply its own law to toll the prescriptive period for a conversion claim. The policy reasons cited by the majority and other courts would not be served by prohibiting the application of the discovery rule to the present case. Accordingly, I see no reason for treating Specialized’s case differently from any other tort case. It is simply unfair to |7prohibit the discovery rule ■for Specialized’s conversion claim, as Specialized undoubtedly lacked the ability to detect its loss. I feel therefore I must dissent.

      . See La. R.S. 10:3-110(d), which in pertinent part provides: "If an instrument is payable to two or more persons not alternatively, it is payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them.” U.C.C. Comment 4 that follows La. R.S. 10:3-110 in pertinent part explains:
      If an instrument is payable to X and Y, neither X nor Y acting alone is the person to whom the instrument is payable. Neither person, acting alone, can be the holder of the instrument. The instrument is "payable to an identified person.” The "identified person” is X and Y acting jointly. [U.C.C.] Section 3-109(b) and Section 1-102(5)(a). Thus, under [U.C.C.] Section 1-201(20) X or Y, acting alone, cannot be the holder or the person entitled to enforce or negotiate the instrument because neither, acting alone, is the identified person stated in the instrument.

      . There has been no allegation that Capital One fraudulently concealed the fact that it had cashed the check; therefore, the issue of whether the third category of contra non va-lentem applies to suspend prescription in a conversion case is not before us.

      . Former La. R.S. 10:3-419, titled "Willful refusal to accept or pay; payment on a forgery; innocent representation," provided:
      (1) When a drawee to whom an instrument is delivered for acceptance refuses to return it on demand; or when a person to whom an instrument is delivered for payment refuses on demand either to pay or to return it; or when a person pays an instrument on a forged indorsement, he is liable to the true owner.
      (2) In an action against a drawee under subsection (1) the measure of the drawee’s liability is the face amount of the instrument. In any other action under subsection (1) the measure of liability is presumed to be the face amount of the instrument.
      (3) Subject to the provisions of this Title concerning restrictive indorsements a representative, including a depository or collecting bank, who was in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner is not liable to the true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.
      (4) An intermediary bank or payor bank which is not a depository bank is not liable solely by reason of the fact that proceeds of an item indorsed restrictively are not paid or applied consistently with the restrictive indorsement of an indorser other than its immediate transferor.

      . Although Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, this reference to common law in the comment is an acknowledgment that the U.C.C. has its roots in common law jurisdictions.

      . The cause of action begins to accrue when the act of conversion occurred. In the case of a payor bank, the cause of action begins to accrue on the date of payment. See Rodrigue v. Olin Employees Credit Union, 406 F.3d 434, 441 (7th Cir.(Ill.) 2005).

      . As stated, Specialized has not alleged, and the evidence does not point to, any fraud on the part of Capital One.

      . The petition alleges that when Specialized found out Capital One had cashed the check, it filed a claim with Capital One asserting that the check purported to contain a fraudulent endorsement, and that on February 8, 2010, Capital One rejected the claim. This plainly shows that Specialized had knowledge of the conversion prior to the July 15, 2010 prescriptive date.

      . See, e.g., Cole v. Celotex Corp., 620 So.2d 1154 (La.1993) (asbestos exposure); Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So.2d 420 (La.1987) (redhibition).

      . See Martinez Mgmt., Inc. v. Caston, 39,500 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/13/05); 900 So.2d 301 (cause of action against bookkeeper began to run when employer actually learned of bookkeeper's conversion); Johnson v. Concordia Bank & Trust Co., 95-1187 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/27/96); 671 So.2d 1093 (prescription on conversion claim against bank for wrongfully disbursing interest to tutor was suspended during tutorship); see also Dugas v. Thompson, 11-0178 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/29/11); 71 So.3d 1059; Gallant Invs., Ltd. v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 08-1404 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/13/09); 7 So.3d 12; Metro Elec. & Maint., Inc. v. Bank One Corp., 05-1045 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06); 924 So.2d 446; Thornton v. City of Shreveport, 38,025 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/28/04); 865 So.2d 242 (all analyzing application of discovery rule, but finding it inapplicable under the facts of the case).

      . See Mauldin Furniture Galleries v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., No. 6:10-240-TMC, 2012 WL 3680426, at ⅜4-5 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2012); Fine v. Sovereign Bank, No. 06-cv-11450-NG, 2010 WL 3001194, at ⅜5 (D.Mass. July 28, 2010); YF Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2008 WL 4277902, at ⅜3-4 (D.Ariz. Sept. 18, 2008); DeHart v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A./South Jersey, 67 B.R. 740, 743-46 (D.N.J.1986); LaCombe v. Bank One Corp., 06-1374 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07); 953 So.2d 161, 163-64, writ denied, 07-0746 (La.6/1/07); 957 So.2d 177; Geraldo v. First Dominion Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2002 WL 31002770 at *4 (Ohio Ct.App. Sept. 6, 2002); Gallagher v. Santa Fe Fed. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 132 N.M. 552, 52 P.3d 412, 417 (N.M.App.2002); UNR-Rohn, Inc. v. Summit Bank, 687 N.E.2d 235, 241 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); Stjernholm v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 782 P.2d 810, 811-12 (Colo.Ct.App.1989); Branford State Bank v. Hackney Tractor Co., 455 So.2d 541, 542 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (per curiam).

      . The majority notes there is evidence indicating Specialized was aware of the conversion in February 2010, five months before the end of the one-year prescriptive period in July 2010. Op., p. 588 n. 4. The majority seems to suggest, as Specialized knew of the conversion before the end of the prescriptive period, it cannot benefit from the discovery rule. Our jurisprudence, however, does not require certain plaintiffs to file their claims immediately or earlier than other plaintiffs. Under the discovery rule, Specialized was simply required to file its claim one-year from the date it learned of the conversion, which it did.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Keri McGee CORMIER v. Brandon Lee CORMIER.
    No. 2013-CJ-1561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 19, 2013.
   In re Cormier, Brandon Lee; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 66,495-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1340.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of D.L.
    No. 2013-CK-1738.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 21, 2013.
   In re D.L.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Juvenile Court, No. 2013-175-03-DQ-E; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0997.

Stay denied; writ denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and CLARK and HUGHES, JJ., would grant stay.


text:
    Gregory William TRAMONTIN v. Brenda Boyette TRAMONTIN.
    No. 2013-CC-1700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 22, 2013.
   In re Keith, Brenda; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, E. Baton Rouge Family Court, No. 128,498; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 20013 CW1029.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    Trent HARVEY v. Kelly (Singleton) HARVEY.
    No. 2013-CJ-1600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 22, 2013.
   In re Grady, Kelly; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div B, No. 78,644; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 18-81.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Emanuel SUMMERS.
    No. 2013-KD-1761.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 23, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 502-079; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1019.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of R.W.
    No. 2013-CK-0896.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 23, 2013.
   In re W., R.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, Nos. 2012-352-01 DQ F, 2013-028-03 DQ E/F; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0359.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Chadrick CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0403.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Carter, Chadrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 2-08-161; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0421.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Gary FALEY v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden and La. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections.
    No. 2013-CI-0533.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Faley, Gary; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 611847; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 0084.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeffery J. FUSSELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Fussell, Jeffery J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 109263; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 2074.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    Damon THOMAS v. Ivy MORRIS, ARDC Supervisor, Rayburn Correctional Center.
    No. 2013-CI-0560.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Thomas, Damon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 603,025; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA1148.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jean BOITEUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Boiteux, Jean; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 09-2444; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-90.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Justin TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Taylor, Justin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 03-1041; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-28.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy C. JORDAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Jordan, Troy C; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 440167; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012-KW-1990.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Henry CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Carter, Henry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 317-332; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0191.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Paul GRAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Gray, Paul; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 85-5278; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0211.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew D. WETZEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0626.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Wetzel, Andrew D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 437719 C/W 439156 C/W 440180 C/W 446758 C/W 448399; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0033.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darnell GILMORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0627.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Gilmore, Darnell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 460-615; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1606.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brian S. YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Young, Brian S.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 03-5199; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-116.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D); La.C.Cr.P. art. 851.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew D. WETZEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Wetzel, Andrew D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court, No. 455768; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0101.

Denied. La-C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0635.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Johnson, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 05-05-0110; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0122.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

HUGHES, J., would grant to consider the merits.


text:
    Freddie CANN v. LA DEPT OF PAROLE AND PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-CI-0636.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Cann, Freddie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 614294; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1935.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David Lee HILL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1081.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 31, 2013.
   In re Hill, David Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 305,050; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-159-KH.

Denied.


author: MARC E. JOHNSON, Judge. CHEHARDY, Chief Judge,

text:
    Helena HARRIS, Margaret D. Remedes, Mary C. Clement, Lauren Claire Call, Adrianne A. Richoux, Dana S. Dunlap, Ronald E. Sessum, Keith D. Hutchins v. JEFFERSON PARISH PRESIDENT AND PARISH COUNCIL.
    No. 12-CA-715.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    May 23, 2013.
    N. Kim Nguyen, Attorney at Law, Gret-na, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellees.
    Andrew M. Maestri, Johanna E. Lambert, Jefferson, LA, for Defendants/Appellants.

      Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, MARC E. JOHNSON and ROBERT A. CHAISSON.
   MARC E. JOHNSON, Judge.

| ^Defendants, Jefferson Parish President and Parish Council (collectively “the Parish”), appeal the judgment of the Jefferson Parish Personnel Board (“the Board”) in favor of Plaintiffs finding they are entitled to their annual Dominick A. Albano Tenure awards. We affirm.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1966, the Jefferson Parish Council (“the Council”) passed Ordinance 14796, which amended the Parish Pay Plan by adding the Dominick A. Albano Tenure Award Program (“Tenure Award Program” or “Tenure Award”) and making it retroactive to January 1, 1966. Under the Tenure Award Program, each employee in the classified service having two or more years of continuous service is paid $25 for each full calendar year of such service, payable annually in a lump sum on December 1.

|3In November 2010, the Council adopted Ordinance 23916, ratifying the Parish’s annual operating budget for 2011. Ordinance 23916 explicitly denied funding for Tenure Awards. It stated, “That due to fund-wide or district-wide budgetary restrictions annual pay increases, sale of annual leave and tenure pay will not he granted as stated in the Personnel Rules (Rule IV, Section 2.1, Rule IX, Section 2.4, Pay Plan Special Pay Provision 6, respectively).” (Emphasis added.) Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances, Ordinance 23916, Section 7. As such, on December 1, 2011, parish employees who were eligible for the Tenure Award did not receive it.

On December 28, 2011, eight Jefferson Parish employees (“the Employees”) filed a Petition of Appeal to the Personnel Board appealing the Parish’s decision not to pay them their Tenure Awards. In their appeal petitions, the Employees designated the Parish President and the Parish Council Chairman as the officials who authorized the actions against them. They sought to have the Board order that they be paid their annual Tenure Awards. The Employees specifically complained,

The Pay Plan of the Classified Service states that, “In addition to the pay rates heretofore provided in this Plan, each employee in the classified service having 2 or more years of continuous sendee shall be paid $25.00 for each full calendar year of such service.” “This payment shall be termed a Tenure Award, shall be intended to encourage and recognize career service, and shall be payable to employees in a lump sum, annually, on December 1.” There are no provisions for selectively paying the award based on budgetary constraints as is stated in the Personnel Rules when referring to annual pay raises. An action of this nature must be approved by the Jefferson Parish Personnel Board.

|4The eight cases were consolidated for purposes of the appeal by the hearing officer/referee. The hearing officer later recused himself, on motion of the Parish, and ordered that the appeals be presented to the Board as a whole. The parties were ordered to submit memoranda as to why the tenure payments were due or not due.

In its memorandum, the Parish asserted that it “must discontinue the practice of providing employees the Tenure Award because it is a prohibited donation of funds in violation of La. Const. Art. VII, § 14.” The Parish argued that the Tenure Award “does not pass constitutional muster” because it is not a merit award, but rather “is given to all employees regardless of the employee’s actions beyond those that are currently compensated.” The Parish concluded that the Tenure Award constitutes a prohibited donation of public funds in violation of La. Const. Art. VII, § 14, and should be discontinued. Alternatively, the Parish maintained that the Board has no authority to require the Council to fund the tenure award.

At the Board hearing, Ronald Sessum, one of the appealing workers, argued on behalf of the Employees. The Employees’ position was that neither the Parish President nor the Parish Council had the legal authority to refuse payment of the Tenure Award. An assistant parish attorney argued on behalf of the Parish and maintained the Parish opposed payment of the Tenure Award on the grounds that it is unconstitutional and that the Parish does not have the funds to pay the awards.

After taking the matter under submission, the Board issued its decision on June 20, 2012, stating in pertinent part:

The Personnel Board having reviewed the record, the submissions and arguments of both sides, the facts and the applicable law rules as follows:
|sl. The Dominick A. Albano Tenure Award is not an unconstitutional use of Parish funds under the applicable law and the facts of this case.
2. The action of the Administration in presenting an amendment to the Parish Pay Plan to the Parish Council without first submitting it to the Personnel Board for consideration, is in direct conflict with Article 4, Section 4.0B D of the Home Rule Charter, which was specifically written to protect the Civil Service System and the employees of the Parish, is not in the best interests of either.
The appeals are granted; the appellants are entitled to, and should receive their annual Dominick A. Albano Tenure awards due December 1, 2011.

The Parish appeals, seeking reversal of the determination that the Employees are entitled to the Tenure Awards due December 1, 2011.

ISSUES

’ On appeal, the Parish contends the Board lacks subject matter jurisdiction to render a decision regarding the constitutionality of the Tenure Award. Alternatively, it argues the Board erred in finding the Tenure Award is constitutional. The Parish also asserts the Board erred in ordering the Parish to amend its 2011 operating budget to fund the Tenure Award.

LAW & ANALYSIS

The Parish’s sole response to the Employees’ administrative appeal before the Board was that its own ordinance is unconstitutional. And, now, after the Board found the ordinance establishing the Tenure Award is constitutional, the Parish argues the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the Tenure Award. The Employees contend that the | (¡determination of the constitutionality of a local ordinance should be left to the Board. Alternatively, the Employees argue the Parish failed to properly raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction as required by the Board’s appellate procedure.

The Jefferson Parish Personnel Board Rules of Appeal Procedure provide for summary disposition of appeals when a written request is filed by any interested party on the ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter. Jeff. Par. Pers. Bd. Rules of App. Proc., Rule 4(a)(1). If the Board denies the request or refers it to the merits, however, the Board may reconsider it at any time prior to final disposition of the appeal. Jeff. Par. Pers. Bd. Rules of App. Proc., Rule 4(c). Further, the Board, on its own motion, may at any time summarily dispose of an appeal on any of the grounds listed in Subsection (a) of Rule 4. Jeff. Par. Pers. Bd. Rules of App. Proc., Rule 4(d).

These provisions, as related to the Board’s subject matter jurisdiction, must be read in conjunction with the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure rules on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over subject matter cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. La. C.C.P. art. 3. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a declinatory exception. La. C.C.P. art. 925(A)(6). Declinatory exceptions must be pleaded prior to or in the answer or certain other limited pleadings. La. C.C.P. art. 928(A). All objections that may be raised through the declinatory exception are waived unless pleaded therein, except the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. La. C.C.P. art. 925(C). (Emphasis added.)

Generally, the failure to plead a decli-natory exception prior to answer or judgment by default constitutes a waiver of the objection. However, the exception of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter goes to the core of the validity of a judgment and is not subject to the waiver |7provisions generally affecting declinatory exceptions ... and the exception may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

Piper v. Olinde Hardware & Supply Co., Inc., 288 So.2d 626, 628 (La.1974).

Accordingly, we are not precluded from considering the issue of whether the Board had jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the Tenure Award.

The Jefferson Parish Personnel Board receives its authority through the Jefferson Parish Home Rule Charter (“Charter”), which provides for administrative organization in the parish government, including a department of personnel. Jeff. Par. Charter, Art. 4, Section 4.03. The Charter states the personnel department shall consist of a personnel director and “a Personnel Board, which shall be policy making and quasi-judicial in nature.” Jeff. Par. Charter, Art. 4, Section 4.03(C).

The duties of the Board, in pertinent part, include reviewing the salary plan developed by the personnel director, holding public hearings thereon, making necessary amendments, and submitting the proposed plan to the Council for approval. Jeff. Par. Charter, Art. 4, Section 4.03(D)(2). Similarly, the Board reviews personnel rules prepared by the personnel director, including policies and procedures for administration of the salary plan; makes necessary amendment after public hearing; and submits the proposed rules to the Council. Jeff. Par. Charter, Art. 4, Section 4.03(D)(3)(b). In addition, the Board holds hearings on disciplinary matters as provided by the rules, and performs “such other policy making or quasi-judicial duties as may be required.” Jeff. Par. Charter, Art. 4, Section 4.03(E)(1) and (4). Nothing in the Charter, the Code of Ordinances, the Personnel Rules, or the Personnel Board Rules of Appeal Procedure authorizes the Board to rule on the constitutionality of an ordinance.

] ^Determination of a law’s constitutionality is a judicial function constitutionally vested in the courts. La. Const. Art. V, § 1; Beauclaire v. Greenhouse, 05-765 (La.2/22/06); 922 So.2d 501, 506. A civil service commission lacks the power to rule on the constitutionality of a statute. Appeal of Brisset, 436 So.2d 654, 658 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied sub nom., In re Brisset, 441 So.2d 749 (La.1983).

Considering the foregoing, we find the Board did not have authority to rule on the constitutionality of the Tenure Award Program, as established by parish ordinance.

Notwithstanding its dissatisfaction with the Board’s ruling on constitutionality, the Parish urges us to review the constitutionality issue ourselves, if we decide the Board improperly ruled on the constitutionality issue. The Parish asserts the ruling of the Board “effectively placed the constitutionality of the Tenure Award at issue.” Despite its prior assertion that the Board did not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine constitutionality, the Parish now desires this Court to rule on the issue. The reasons stated by the Parish in its brief for failure to pay the Tenure Award are “financial concerns of an approximately $700,000 expenditure, which may not be constitutionally permissible.”

“[Cjourts will not decide abstract, hypothetical or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies. In order to avoid deciding abstract, hypothetical or moot questions, courts require cases submitted for adjudication to be justiciable, ripe for decision, and not brought prematurely.” Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans through Dept. of Finance, 98-601 (La.10/20/98); 720 So.2d 1186, 1193.

We do not find that this case is in the proper posture for a ruling on constitutionality. It was brought as individual claims by employees who were |9denied monies to which they are entitled under the Parish Pay Plan. The Parish admits that the Tenure Awards Program is still part of the Pay Plan, but that the Council has not allocated funding for the Tenure Awards for several years. It does not appear the Parish has standing to assert the unconstitutionality of its own ordinance in this proceeding.

In Greater New Orleans Expressway Com’n v. Olivier, 04-2147 (La.1/19/05); 892 So.2d 570, the Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission filed a petition for mandamus against two judges of the First Parish Court of Jefferson Parish to compel them to collect from certain traffic violators a five-dollar cost required by La. R.S. 32:57(G). The statute designated the proceeds for a special fund for the benefit of the Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission. The judges had refused to collect this cost, believing that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court held the statute was unconstitutional. The Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that parish court judges, as parties to a mandamus proceeding that sought to compel them to perform statutory duties that were ministerial in nature, lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. The court pointed out,

Among the threshold requirements that must be satisfied before reaching a constitutional issue is the requirement that the party seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality have standing to raise a constitutional challenge. The requirement of standing serves to facilitate deference to the legislature in matters within the legislature’s purview. Because legislators owe the same duty to obey and uphold the constitution as do judges, legislators are presumed to have weighed the relevant constitutional considerations in enacting legislation, and legislative acts are presumed constitutional “until declared otherwise in proceedings brought contradictorily between interested persons.” [Citations omitted.]

Greater New Orleans Expressway Com’n v. Olivier, 892 So.2d at 573.

|inIn the present case, the Employees appealed the Parish’s refusal to pay the Tenure Award, as clearly required by the 1966 ordinance. In their administrative appeal, they sought payment of the award. Thus, in essence, the Employees sought a mandamus ordering the Parish to pay their awards in compliance with the ordinance. In Dore v. Tugwell, 288 La. 807, 813-14, 84 So.2d 199, 201 (La.1955), two widows sought a mandamus to compel the State Auditor and State Treasurer to pay them widows’ pensions as required by statute. The state officers refused on the basis the payment of the pensions was unconstitutional. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the state officers were without standing to question the constitutionality of the statute. We find Dore analogous to the present case, and conclude the Parish does not have standing in this proceeding to question the constitutionality of the ordinance. Accordingly, we will not address the constitutionality of the Tenure Award in this appeal.

Ordinances are presumed constitutional and, thus, are valid and enforceable until they are judicially held to be unconstitutional. City of Kenner v. Kyle, 02-1262 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/8/03); 846 So.2d 34, 39. The Tenure Award provides, “each employee in the classified service having 2 or more years of continuous service shall be paid $25.00 for each full calendar year of such service.” [Emphasis added.] There is no language in the Pay Provision that predicates the award on budgetary approval or restrictions. Under the Board’s Rules of Appeal Procedure, Rule 9(c), the burden of proof as to the facts shall be on the appointing authority. The record shows that the Parish offered no evidence or argument that Plaintiffs were not entitled to the Tenure Award based on the facts; rather, the Parish’s sole defense was that the award was unconstitutional. Therefore, we find no error in the Board’s judgment that Plaintiffs are entitled to their annual Tenure Awards.

h Regarding the Parish’s contention that the Board erred in ordering the Parish Council to amend its operating budget to fund the Tenure Award, we find no merit to that contention because the Board’s ruling did not order the Council to amend its operating budget. The ruling simply held that Plaintiffs are entitled to receive the Tenure Award.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing, we find the Jefferson Parish Personnel Board did not have authority to rule on the constitutionality of the Dominick A. Albano Tenure Award. However, its determination that the Tenure Award is constitutional is inconsequential to its judgment that Plaintiffs are entitled to the Tenure Award because ordinances are presumed constitutional until a judicial determination to the contrary. A review of the record shows the Parish failed to prove Plaintiffs were not entitled to the Award under the facts. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s judgment finding Plaintiffs/Appellants are entitled to the Tenure Award.

AFFIRMED.

CHEHARDY, Chief Judge, concurs in part and dissents in part.

CHEHARDY, Chief Judge,

concurs in part and dissents in part.

11¾1 concur with the majority’s determination that this case is not in a proper posture for a ruling on constitutionality, but I respectfully dissent from their decision to affirm the Personnel Board’s ruling without further proceedings. I would vacate the judgment and remand to the Personnel Board for reconsideration and a new ruling.

I agree that the Parish does not have standing to assert the unconstitutionality of its own ordinance. The Parish’s self-contradictory response to the Employees’ claims — first raising constitutionality in the Board proceedings, then arguing that the Board cannot consider constitutionality — illustrates that the Parish must seek another way to deal with the Tenure Award.

In my view, a refusal by an appointing authority to pay a salary to which an employee is entitled may be analogized to a disciplinary action by the appointing authority.

A parish civil service employee may apply to the personnel board for review of a disciplinary action, at which time the appointing authority bears the burden of proving legal cause. Lewis v. Jefferson Parish Dept. of Pub. Works, 99-16, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/19/99), 761 So.2d 558, 559, writ denied sub nom., Lewis v. Jefferson Paris Dept. of Public Works, 1999-2906 (La.1/14/00), 753 So.2d 215. The board can then consider only whether the action taken against the employee was made in good faith for cause. Id.

Legal cause for disciplinary action exists if the facts found by the board disclose that the conduct of the employee impairs the efficiency of the public service. Id. The burden of proof of the appointing authority in a civil service case, such as this one, is by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

“An appellate court review of an administrative disciplinary decision is limited to a determination of whether the decision was made in good faith for legal cause.... ” Id., 761 So.2d at p. 560.

The record before us shows the Board predicated its ruling on an improper foundation — the constitutionality of the Tenure Awards Program, which the Board is not authorized to determine, rather than on whether the actions taken against the Employees were made in good faith for cause. In my opinion, the ruling should be vacated and the matter remanded for reconsideration and a new ruling by the Personnel Board.

Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.

      . There are eight plaintiffs: Helena Harris, Margaret D. Remedes, Mary C. Clement, Lauren Claire Call, Adrianne A. Richoux, Dana S. Dunlap, Ronald E. Sessum, and Keith D. Hutchins.

      . The record does not contain a copy of Ordinance 23916, but we are entitled to take judicial notice of it. See La. C.E. art. 202.

      .According to the appeal petitions, all eight employees were employed in the Jefferson Parish Personnel Department with the following job titles: Ronald Sessum, Assistant Director of Personnel; Dana Dunlap, Executive Assistant; Lauren Call and Keith Hutchins, Personnel Technician III; Mary Clement and Adrianne Richoux, Typist Clerk III; and Helena Harris, Clerk III. Margaret Remedes' job title was not listed in her appeal petition.

      . The basis for the motion to recuse was that the hearing officer was an employee in the classified service of the parish and, therefore, had an interest in the outcome of the appeals.

      . Prior to the hearing, the Board notified the Attorney General of Louisiana of the constitutional challenges raised by the Parish. The Attorney General did not intervene in the proceeding.

      . In a footnote, the Board noted.
      The jurisdiction of the Personnel Board is limited to those who file timely appeals before it, so the Board lacks the power to extend its ruling. Howeverf,] the Board is not unmindful that the vast majority of Parish employees are not covered by this ruling. This inequity cries out for redress. It is hoped the Parish Council will see fit to extend the 2011 tenure award to all employees who otherwise would have qualified for it.

      . We take judicial notice of the Jefferson Parish Personnel Board Rules of Appeal Procedure, pursuant to La. C.E. art. 202. In addition, the Board "may take notice of the provisions of the Charter, the Personnel Rules, the Classification Plan, and the Pay Plan without the necessity of an offer in evidence.” Jeff. Par. Pers. Bd. Rules of App. Proc., Rule 9(p).

      . Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines "quasi judicial” as: "A term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” See Connolly v. Stone, 01-929 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/15/02); 807 So.2d 979, 981.

      . Since the Tenure Awards Program was established by parish ordinance, a logical alternative would be for the Parish to seek passage of another ordinance removing it from the Pay Plan.


author: STEPHEN J. WINDHORST, Judge.

text:
    Newell NORMAND, Sheriff and Ex-Officio Tax Collector for the Parish of Jefferson v. 1ST LAKE REALTY, INC., et al.
    No. 12-CA-797.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    May 23, 2013.

      Kenneth C. Fonte, Attorney at Law, Metairie, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    P.J. Stakelum, III, David R. Sherman, Glenn S. Newbauer, Attorney at Law, Me-tairie, LA, for Defendants/Appellees.
    Panel composed of Judges JUDE G. GRAVOIS, STEPHEN J. WINDHORST and HANS J. LILJEBERG.
   STEPHEN J. WINDHORST, Judge.

| «.In this summary proceeding to collect occupational license taxes against 45 defendants, Newell Normand, Sheriff and Ex-Officio Tax Collector for the Parish of Jefferson (“Appellant”), appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of 42 defendants, dismissing his claims against them. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Appellant filed a summary proceeding against 45 defendants, seeking to collect delinquent or unpaid occupational license taxes, interest, penalties, and attorney’s fees from each defendant for the tax years 2003 through 2008. 1st Lake Realty, Inc. (“1st Lake”) was the only defendant to make any payment of the assessed taxes prior to trial. The remaining defendants contested the application of the occupational license tax claiming that they did not engage in “business” subject to the occupational license tax.

Trial was held on June 13, 2012. After appellant rested his case, two of the defendants, HMF Investments Co., L.L.C. and Levee Run Apartments, moved for an involuntary dismissal. The trial court granted the involuntary dismissal, | ¡¡dismissing appellant’s claims against these two defendants. Defendant, 1st Lake, also moved for an involuntary dismissal claiming the evidence showed it had paid all occupational license taxes and interests owed. Appellant argued that 1st Lake did not pay all of the penalties owed. The trial court deferred 1st Lakes’ motion to the merits.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of appellant against 1st Lake in the amount of $712.50 in penalties and $71.25 in attorney’s fees, and in favor of the remaining 42 defendants, dismissing all of appellant’s claims against them. Appellant filed this appeal seeking review of only that portion of the judgment rendered in favor of the 42 defendants.

FACTS:

The 42 appellees are partnerships or limited liability corporations that own various apartment complexes located in Jefferson Parish. Each of the appellees has a separate management contract with 1st Lake for the management of the properties they own. Pursuant to the management contracts, 1st Lake receives a management fee of between four to six percent of the gross revenues generated by the properties depending on the terms of each contract.

The management contracts give 1st Lake the authority to conduct all operational and managerial rights and duties as to each respective property. 1st Lake conducts all of the day-to-day business for each property, including determining the amount of rent to charge, leasing the units, collecting rent, marketing, hiring and firing the employees that work at the individual properties, maintenance, and accounting for receipts and expenses relating to the properties. 1st Lake provides on-site management offices on most of the properties and staffs |4the offices with its own employees, including a manager, assistant manager, maintenance workers, and grounds workers.

Tenants housed at the properties pay their rent checks to the on-site management office. All rent monies collected by 1st Lake are deposited into a master bank account owned and operated by 1st Lake. From the master bank account, 1st Lake pays its employees’ salaries, all expenses, maintenance costs, real estate taxes and insurance. 1st Lake is reimbursed by ap-pellees for direct expenses incurred per the terms of the management contracts. Any surplus cash is paid directly to the individual partners or members of the corporations that own the properties in a monthly cash distribution.

The management contracts delegated all operational and managerial authority to 1st Lake. Appellees only retained the authority to be consulted on certain repairs that exceeded a stated dollar amount and the right to terminate the respective management contract in accordance with its terms.

Appellees are not involved in the management or operation of the properties. Appellees own the real estate, but they do not have a place of business nor do they have employees. Appellees do not own any bank accounts. They do not enter into any leases with any of the tenants nor do they collect rent. Appellees do not have keys to any of the on-site management offices.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

In his first assignment of error, appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that appellees were not engaged in “business” pursuant to the Jefferson Parish occupational license tax.

The imposition of an occupational license tax by a municipality or parish is authorized by La. R.S. 47:341. The Parish of Jefferson is granted authority to | .¡impose an occupational license tax by Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinance, Part II, Chapter 35 — Taxation, Article VI — Occupational License Tax. Jefferson Parish Ordinance Section 35-153 authorizing the imposition of an occupational license tax was adopted in 1987. The ordinance provides:

... there is hereby levied an annual occupational license tax upon each person, association of persons, partnerships, firms and corporations pursuing any trade, profession, vocation, calling or business in the parish, subject to license under Section 28, article 6 of the 1974 Louisiana State Constitution and Louisiana R.S. 47:341 through 47:368, as amended.

Thus, to impose an occupational license tax: 1) the tax must be imposed on a “person,” “partnership,” etc., and 2) the person or entity taxed must be engaged in a “trade, profession, vocation, calling or business” subject to license as set forth in La. R.S. 47:341 et seq.

A “person” is defined in Section 35-154(10) as including “an individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity.” Appellees do not dispute that they are considered “persons” pursuant to Section 35-135.

Here, the primary dispute involves the meaning of the word “business” as it is used in Section 35-153. Appellant argues that as owners of rental property, appel-lees are engaged in business subject to the occupational license tax. Appellees argue that they are investors and as such are not engaged in “business” subject to the tax.

Section 35-154(9) provides the definition of business as it is used in Section 35-153. Business is defined as including “any business, trade, profession, occupation, vocation or calling.” Thus, Section 35-154(9) defines “business” with the word “business” without any indication as to what “business” includes or excludes.

| (^Interpretation of the word “business” as it applies to the parish ordinance imposing the occupational license tax is a question of law. Questions of law are subject to de novo review. Cleco Evangeline, LLC v. Louisiana Tax Com’n, 01-2162 (La.4/3/02), 813 So.2d 351, 353. Findings of fact made by the trial court are reviewed under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.4/12/93); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.9/12/89).

Statutes and ordinances that purport to impose business and license taxes must be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the tax collector. Gertrude Gardner, Inc. v. McNamara, 359 So.2d 644, 649 (La.App. 1 Cir.1978), writ denied, 362 So.2d 578 (La.1978). License laws cannot be extended by construction, omissions cannot be supplied by the courts, and a license law cannot be exacted, unless it is imposed by the words of the statute or ordinance. Id., citing State v. Norman Mayer & Co., 170 La. 337, 127 So. 743 (1930). If a tax statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction in favor of the taxpayer must be adopted. Cleco, 813 So.2d at 356.

When a law is clear and unambiguous and application would not lead to absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be considered. Harrah’s Bossier City Inv. Co., LLC v. Bridges, 09-1916 (La.5/11/10), 41 So.3d 438, 446-447, citing La. C.C. art. 9; Cleco, 813 So.2d at 354. This principal applies to tax statutes. McLane Southern, Inc. v. Bridges, 11-1141 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 479, 483. When a law is ambiguous or not clear, or its application would lead to absurd consequences, courts look to secondary rules of interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the law. Id. A statute or law should be interpreted pursuant to its plain language. Cleco, 813 So.2d at 354; Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co., 02-1138 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 959, 964. The general prevailing meaning of a word 17must be applied when interpreting statutes. Cleco, 813 So.2d at 354; Gregor, 851 So.2d at 964.

Appellant claims that to aid the court in interpreting the word “business,” the court should rely on the definition of business as set forth in La. R.S. 47:301. La. R.S. 47:301 defines business as including “any activity engaged in by any person or caused to be engaged in by him with the object of gain, benefit, or advantage, either direct or indirect.” Appellant argues that the definition of business as used in Sections 35-153 and 35-154(9) should not be interpreted to be narrower than the definition used in La. R.S. 47:301. Appellant contends that conforming the definition of business as it is provided in Section 35-153 to La. R.S. 47:301 would achieve a consistent body of tax law and complement the legislative intent to give “any business” a broader meaning.

Appellees counter that appellant’s definition of business is too broad and would include anyone who makes an investment even though the occupational license tax omits any mention of investments and the ownership of investments within the definition of business. Appellees further argue that La. R.S. 47:301’s definition of business is inapplicable to the facts of this case because it is under the chapter for sales and use tax, not the chapter for occupational license tax. Appellees contend that the occupational license tax imposes its own definition of |sbusiness that is different from La. R.S. 47:301. Furthermore, La. R.S. 47:302 provides that the sales tax is imposed “upon the sale at retail, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage for use and consumption in this state, of each item or article of tangible personal property, as defined herein.” Thus, appellees argue that the sales tax is imposed on the user and the purchaser, not upon an investor.

In order for a person to be subject to the parish occupational license tax, the person must be engaged in a “trade, profession, vocation, calling or business”. The parish ordinance defines business as “business.” In determining the common and approved usage of an undefined word, “[dictionaries are a valuable source.” Cleco, 813 So.2d at 354; Gregor, 851 So.2d at 964.

The word “business” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990), as: “employment, occupation, profession, or commercial activity engaged in for gain or livelihood; that which habitually busies or occupies or engages the time, attention, labor, and effort of persons as a principal serious concern or interest or for livelihood or profit.”

The Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary defines “business” as “One’s occupation. Trade: commerce. A commercial enterprise ...” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines “business” as: “employment; occupation; profession; calling; vocation; means of livelihood; that which occupies the time, attention, and labor of men, for the purpose of profit or improvement.”

Thus, the general definition of business indicates that it is an activity that requires a substantial amount of time and attention and some physical effort. It does not expressly include, and does not seem to include by extension or implication, investment or the ownership of property for investment. In [¡¡determining whether business could include investment, it is necessary to determine what the word “investment” means.

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) defines “investment” as “an expenditure to acquire property or other assets in order to produce revenue; to place money or property in ... real estate ... so it may produce revenue or gain.”

The word “investment” is defined in Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary as “the act of investing; specifically ... the laying out of money in the purchase of some kind of property; ... the property in which one invests or may invest; also, the capital invested.”

In interpreting the general meaning of the word “business” as used in Section 35-135, it is clear that the definition omits investments or the ownership of property for investment. A distinction exists as to what is a business and what is an investment. Schlesinger v. Fontenot, 235 La. 47, 56, 102 So.2d 488, 491 (1958). “It is universally and fundamentally true that even though property is acquired for revenue, it does not necessarily mean the investor is engaged in a trade or business.” Id. Thus, to import the word “investment” or ownership of property for investment into the definition of business would be a violation of the principal set forth in Gertrude Gardner, supra.

The proper meaning to be placed on a word in a statute does not depend on an isolated definition attributable to it; instead, the word and the context in which it is used shall be considered. David v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 02-2675 (La.7/2/03), 849 So.2d 38, 46.; Arshad v. City of Kenner, 11-1579 (La.1/24/12), 95 So.2d 477, 487. Although not specifically defined, the Occupational License Tax Ordinance, Section 35-153, is not without guidance as to the meaning, intent, and purpose of the word “business.” It is used with several other terms, and within 11ftcontext, these several terms (“trade, profession, vocation, calling or business”) are fairly synonymous. Together, their meaning is clear. There is no reason to give “business” a different connotation which is significantly broader and more inclusive than the other four terms by including investment ownership (which is already subject to ad valorem taxation).

Furthermore, the plain language of La. R.S. 47:302 provides that the sales and use tax applies to purchasers and users, not investors. Moreover, La. R.S. 47:302 specifically applies to “tangible personal property,” and thus, immovable property such as land or buildings are not subject to the provisions of La. R.S. 47:302. Therefore, the definition of business as defined in La. R.S. 47:301 is not applicable to the facts of this case.

The trial court found that appellees function solely as investment vehicles holding legal title to various apartment complexes. The trial court further found that to be engaged in business, the activity that is alleged to constitute a business must occupy a substantial portion of one’s time and attention and require some level of physical effort. The trial court found that the word “investment” is omitted from the definition of business and the parish ordinance did not impose a tax on one who merely invests in rental property. Rather, it imposes a tax on a person actively managing and operating rental property. Significantly, the trial court additionally found that appellees contractually relinquished all operational and managerial rights to 1st Lake. In this case, 1st Lake paid the occupational license tax for engaging in the business of leasing and renting the respective properties.

| nBased on the general meaning of business above, we find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in finding that appellees were not engaged in business subject to the occupational license tax.

In his second assignment of error, appellant claims that the conduct of 1st Lake, as agent for appellees, should be attributed to appellees for the purpose of determining whether appellees are engaged in business. He contends that attributing 1st Lake’s management and operation of the properties to appellees is not precluded by any of the provisions of the occupational license tax statutes or ordinances. Furthermore, he argues that this application would be consistent with the definition set forth in La. R.S. 47:301(1) which does not require the person engaging in business to directly engage in the activity, and considers a person who causes another’s engagement in an activity to be engaged in business himself.

Appellant mistakenly relies on La. R.S. 47:301 and federal tax cases to assert that the actions of 1st Lake, as agent, can be attributed to appellees. For the reasons stated above, La. R.S. 47:301 is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Here, we are interpreting a parish ordinance that imposes an occupational license on persons who engage in business which is factually and legally distinct from the federal cases cited by appellant. There are no Louisiana cases interpreting this ordinance to attribute acts of an agent to appellees. The general definition of business does not include attributing the acts of an agent to appellees. We find that the trial court did not err in not attributing the actions of 1st Lake, as an agent, to appellees. This assignment of error is without merit.

li2In his final assignment of error, appellant contends that the applicable tax rate is located in La. R.S. 47:355, and not Section 35-175 of the Jefferson Parish tax ordinance, assuming appellees are liable for the occupational license tax. Based on the findings above, this assignment of error is moot and need not be addressed.

CONCLUSION:

For the above stated reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment finding that ap-pellees are not engaged in business subject to the Jefferson Parish occupational license tax and dismissing appellant’s claims against appellees.

AFFIRMED

      . These defendants included: 1st Lake Realty, Inc., Breckenridge Apartments, L.L.C., Boardwalk Apartments, L.L.C., Camelot Court, L.L.C., Canterbury Square, L.L.C., Citrus Creek I Apartments, L.L.C., Citrus Creek II Apartments, L.L.C., Clearwater Properties, L.L.C., Crossings I, L.L.C., Crossings II, L.L.C., Crossroads Apartments, L.L.C., Creeks of River Ridge, Villa Verde Investors, L.L.C., Fox Run I Apartments, L.L.C., Fox Run II Apartments, L.L.C., Frenchman's Cree, L.L.C., Gallery Investments, L.L.C., Lindy Investments, L.P., Lindy Investments II, L.L.P., Lindy Investments III, L.L.P., SLS Properties, Global Equities I Limited Partnership, Lost Bayou, L.L.C., Magnolia Creek Investments, L.L.C., Norgate Investors, A Louisiana Partnership in Commendam, Natchez Landing Apartments, L.L.C., Northbridge, L.L.C., Citrus Curve, L.L.C., Park Oaks Apartments, L.L.C., Parktown, L.L.C., PEA I, L.L.C., Registry Apartments, L.L.C., Riverwood Associates, L.L.C., Sandpiper Apartments, L.L.C., Sawmill Creek Apartments, L.L.C., Shadows Apartments, L.L.C., Surfrider, L.L.C., LLS Properties, L.L.C., Turtle Creek Apartments, L.L.C., Sunscape Investments I, L.L.C., HMF Investments Co., L.L.C., Willowood Apartments, L.L.C., Elmwood Investments, L.L.P., Town Bridge Apartments, and Levee Run Apartments.

      . Thirteen of the smaller properties share on-site management offices with other larger properties.

      . Rents from four of the properties are deposited into separate, property specific bank accounts.

      . The same language is used to define "business” in the state statute La. R.S. 47:342.

      . Additionally, appellant extensively argues the application of La. R.S. 47:355 to calculate appellees occupational license tax rate. Witnesses for appellant testified that Section 35-175 or the state counter-part. La. R.S. 47:355, was used to impose or calculate the occupational license tax in this case. La. R.S. 47:355 is titled:
      "Wholesale dealers in merchandise, service and rentals; Retail dealers to institutional consumers; Shipbuilders; and Contractors.”
      The use of the word "rentals” in the title or use of the language in subsection B, does not make La. R.S. 47:355 applicable to the case at bar. The term "rentals” is used in connection with "wholesale dealers.” It was admitted in testimony that appellees are not wholesale dealers. Furthermore, the reference to La. R.S. 47:355 in Section 35-153 is not dis-positive to the facts of this case. Any argument or discussion regarding the application of La. R.S. 47:355 or Section 35-175 is inapplicable.

      . Appellant further claims that pursuant to appellees individual federal income tax returns, appellees, by their own admission, are engaged in business. Appellees federal tax returns are not dispositive as to whether ap-pellees engaged in business subject to the parish occupational license tax. Appellant did not present any evidence or expert testimony to establish the significance of the form used and the boxes filled out by appellees on their federal tax returns.

      . Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary Revised Edition (1996) at p. 97.

      . Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (1983) atp. 245.

      . Id. at p. 966.

      . There are no Louisiana cases interpreting the word business as it is used in La. R.S. 47:341, et seq or Jefferson Parish Ordinance Section 35-153 et seq.

      . Appellant argues that this would also be consistent with appellees individual federal tax returns. This argument is not considered. See FN 6.

      . The federal cases relied on deal with federal laws and the interpretation of those laws and are not relevant to the interpretation of the parish ordinance at issue.