text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of K.R. and J.W.R.
    No. 48,336-JAC.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    June 26, 2013.

      Walter M. Caldwell, IV, West Monroe, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Mother.
    James E. Patton, II, Monroe, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellees, K.R. and J.W.R.
    Keesha M. Bordelon, Rayville, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, La. Dept, of Children and Family Services.
    John L. Sanders, II, Assistant District Attorney, for Plaintiff/Appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Sayde K. Bernheim, for Defendant/Ap-pellee, Father.
    Before BROWN, WILLIAMS, and GARRETT, JJ.
   BROWN, Chief Judge.

hAn instanter order was issued on October 12, 2012, placing K.R. and J.W.R., ages 11 and 9 respectively, in the state’s custody before their placement with their maternal grandparents. At the continued custody hearing, the father, who lives in Plaquemines Parish, stipulated to continuation of this custodial arrangement. The affidavit filed by the state in support of the instanter order contained no allegations against or involving the children’s father inasmuch as they have been in the custody of their mother and/or maternal grandparents. The mother through her court-appointed attorney likewise stipulated to continued custody of the children with their grandparents.

The affidavit filed by the state in support of the instanter order set forth the reason for them request. The state had received a report on September 13, 2012, that another child, 16-year-old J.C., had overdosed and died as a result of taking his mother’s medication about a week earlier. Further, the mother has a history with DCFS due to her alleged neglect of her children on several occasions. The mother was validated for dependency in 2006 when she was arrested for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (crack cocaine) after having a vehicular accident while the children were in the car with her. The children were placed in foster care at that time, then placed in the custody of their maternal grandparents. The children were returned to their mother in 2007 when their grandmother was diagnosed with cancer. The mother was validated in March 2010 for lack of supervision for leaving K.R. and J.W.R. home alone. Because of her severe substance abuse problem, the mother had been treated on multiple | ¡^occasions at inpatient and outpatient facilities for drug abuse. The state alleged that good cause existed and that K.R. and J.W.R. could not be adequately protected from their mother’s drug dependency while in her care.

The state filed a child in need of care petition on November 26, 2012, based upon the allegations and concerns about the mother’s dependency and the older son’s overdose and death set forth in the instanter order and supporting affidavit. An adjudication hearing was set for December 17, 2012. Both parents were represented by court-appointed attorneys and stipulated that K.R. and J.W.R. were children in need of care. The court ordered that custody was to be maintained with the state pending the disposition hearing to be held on January 14, 2013, and ordered a home study of the father’s residence to be conducted by DCFS.

Although the mother had informed the trial court in previous appearances that she would be hiring her own attorney, she did not do so until January 3, 2013. A motion to continue the disposition hearing was filed by the mother’s new counsel on January 4, 2013. At two prehearing conferences, the judge advised retained counsel that she would deny his motion to continue and would likewise bar any testimony from either the mother or the father of the children at the disposition hearing based upon application of La. Ch. C. art. 680.

At the beginning of the disposition hearing on January 14, 2013, the trial court heard and denied the mother’s motion to continue. The mother’s attorney objected to the court’s denial of a continuance, as well as the court’s interpretation of La. Ch. C. Art. 680 as allowing only the state and ^children to present evidence and call witnesses at the disposition hearing and limiting the parents to cross-examination of the witnesses of the state and children. The mother was opposed to the placement of the children with the father and wanted the children continued in the custody of her parents.

The trial court found that the state failed to meet its burden that a non-offending parent, the father, was unfit for placement, and believed that the least restrictive disposition consistent with the health and safety of the children was to place them with their father. Therefore, the children were placed with him in his parents’ home in Plaquemines Parish, with several restrictions. It is from this judgment that the mother has appealed, urging that the trial court erred in denying her the opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses at the disposition hearing and in refusing to continue the proceedings so that she could collect additional evidence about the father’s criminal conduct/history. We affirm.

Discussion

Denial of Motion For Continuance

According to the mother, the trial court erred in denying the motion to continue filed by her attorney on January 4, 2013, and re-urged by counsel at the January 14, 2013, disposition hearing. The state, the father’s attorney, |4and the children’s attorney agree that the trial court’s denial of the motion to continue was proper, citing La. Ch. C. art. 678.

[1,2] Louisiana Children’s Code art. 678(C) provides in part that upon a showing of good cause and notice to the opposing party, the court may grant, deny, or restrict a requested continuance of the proceeding in accordance with the best interests of the child. Article 678(C) is permissive and grants to the court the discretion to determine whether good cause for a continuance has been shown and whether doing so is in the best interest of the children. This discretion is analogous to that granted to courts under La. C.C.P. art. 1601. Among the factors courts consider in deciding an article 1601 motion for continuance are diligence, good faith, and reasonable grounds. Coffman v. Mainhardt, 602 So.2d 264 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992); Notoco Industries, Inc. v. Powell, 01-1817 (La.App.1st Cir.11/08/02), 835 So.2d 835.

The mother initially stated that she intended to hire an attorney at the continued custody hearing on October 15, 2012. She did not do so for more than 10 weeks, during which time she was represented by an attorney experienced with juvenile matters at two hearings and an appearance. The mother has failed to show that she acted with diligence in retaining another lawyer. She thus failed to demonstrate good cause for the requested continuance. Furthermore, the disposition hearing was held 28 days after the adjudication, creating a potential timeliness issue. La. Ch. C. art. 678(B) provides that the disposition hearing may be conducted immediately after the adjudication and shall be conducted within 30 days after the | Badjudication. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance. See La. C.C.P. art. 1601; Notoco Industries, Inc., supra.

Limitation of Evidence at Disposition Hearing

The mother also takes issue with the trial court’s denial of her request to present evidence and/or call witnesses at the disposition hearing. The state, the father’s attorney, and the children’s attorney agree that the correct procedure was followed by the trial court.

The applicability of the rules of evidence during the “Child in Need of Care” proceeding depend on the stage at which the evidence is being submitted. State ex rel. D.H., 04-2105 (La.App.1st Cir.02/11/05), 906 So.2d 554. The adjudication hearing was held on December 17, 2012. The mother and the father had the option to have a full adjudication hearing on this date. See La. Ch. C. art. 662, which provides that at an adjudication hearing, the children and the parents may introduce evidence, call witnesses, be heard on their own behalf, and cross-examine witnesses called by the state. Instead, both parents, who were represented by counsel, stipulated that the children were in need of care.

Once the adjudication hearing was complete, La. Ch. C. art. 662 was no longer applicable regarding the presentation of evidence; rather, the articles on disposition, set forth in La. Ch. C. art. 678 et seq., became the governing provisions for the disposition hearing set for January 14, 2013. Louisiana Children’s Code article 680 provides that the court shall consider the report of the predisposition investigation, the case plan, any reports of | fimental evaluation, and all other evidence offered by the child or the state relating to the proper disposition. The court may consider evidence which would not be admissible at the adjudication hearing. As noted by this court in State in the Interest of C.W. v. Womack, 28,310 (La.App.2d Cir.02/28/96), 669 So.2d 700, this includes hearsay evidence.

What article 680 does not specifically provide, however, is that the parents have the right to present evidence at the disposition hearing. As this court observed in State in the Interest of C.W., supra at 706:

A judgment of disposition is not a permanent termination of parental rights. In fact, the disposition must be reviewed within nine to twelve months after the disposition hearing and dispositional reviews must be held at least once every twelve months thereafter. La. Ch. C. art. 702. Furthermore, the court may modify a judgment of disposition on its own motion or upon a motion of the district attorney, the department, the child, or his parents. La. Ch. C. art. 714.

The state at the disposition hearing called DCFS foster care worker Donna Harris to testify. Ms. Harris presented the report of the predisposition investigation, the case plan, and information concerning the father. Ms. Harris testified that the home study done in Plaquemines Parish of the paternal grandparents’ home recommended placement of the children with the paternal grandparents, not the father.

At the time of the hearing, a criminal history check on the father had not been provided to the DCFS. The father, however, had told Ms. Harris that he had a history of DWI charges, with the most recent having been in 2012. Ms. Harris testified that the agency had concerns about the father arising from both a cruelty to juveniles charge and issues with intoxication. Further, Ms. Harris testified that the father was not current with his child 17support obligation for the boys and was in arrears over $3,000. Also, the father had not provided proof of his income to Ms. Harris. While a substance abuse counselor had not been set up for him as provided in the case plan, the father had done nothing on his own toward seeing one. The state had no information about what, if any, treatment the father had received, and no information about whether he was on probation.

Citing that it was problematic for the children to be moved, that they had just gotten used to their new school, and that they were receiving grief therapy, DCFS felt it was best to leave the children with the current placement. Counsel for the mother made it clear during the course of the hearing that the mother agreed with the state that the children should be continued in the custody of the maternal grandparents. In closing, the state argued that the current placement of the children with the maternal grandparents was safe and in the best interest of the children.

We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence proffered by the mother. The testimony of the DCFS worker did include the mother’s concerns about the father’s criminal history, although the department’s investigation of the father was incomplete as of the date of the disposition hearing. Neither the mother nor the father cross-examined this witness.

We do not envy the predicament faced by the trial court in this case. In order to determine the placement of children, the court must be made aware of all circumstances of the children’s situation. State in the Interest of ERL, 44,225 (La.App.2d Cir.02/25/09), 4 So.3d 286; State in the Interest of C.W., supra. As the court observed, the disposition alternatives of La. Ch. C. art. 681 are set forth in order of preference. The first is that the children be placed in the custody of a parent or such other suitable person as deemed in the best interests of the children. In order to have the trial court override the father’s right to custody of the children and place them with the maternal grandparents as the state desired, the state had the burden of proving that the welfare of the children could not be adequately safeguarded in the custody of their father. See La. Ch. C. art. 682. The trial court found that the state failed to establish that the father was unfit and in light of this record, we agree with that conclusion.

Conclusion

For the i'easons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

GARRETT, J., concurs in the result.

WILLIAMS, J., concurs in the result.

      . The court ordered: (1) family services; (2) grief counseling for the children; (3) that the father would not be allowed, under any circumstances, to drive the children; (4) supervised visitation for the mother through DCFS in Plaquemines Parish; (5) that the father can not sleep in the same bedroom as the children; and (6) that the father must submit to a substance abuse assessment in Plaquemines Parish and follow any recommendations.

      . We note, however, as did the court in State in the Interest of C.W., supra, that pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 714, the trial court may modify its judgment of disposition on its own motion, or upon motion of the district attorney, the state, the parents or the children.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PITMAN, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee v. In the Interest of L.J., Appellee.
    No. 48,341-JAC.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    June 26, 2013.

      Layne M. Adams, Monroe, LA, for Appellant, Chequilla Jackson.
    Legal Services of North La. by Lakeisha Gray, Angela M. Smith, J. Edward Patton, Monroe, LA, Anu Kakonen, Reneé Coté, for Appellee, L.J.
    Keesha Mason Bordelon, Rayville, LA, for Appellee, State of LA, Dept, of Children & Family Services.
    Bobby Manning, Monroe, LA, for Appel-lee, Otis Wiley.
    Before STEWART, CARAWAY & PITMAN, JJ.
   PITMAN, J.

11Chequilla Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals a judgment from the West Monroe City Court terminating her parental rights to L.J. For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment is affirmed.

FACTS

On January 23, 2011, Jackson gave birth to her daughter “L.J.” At birth, L.J. was drug-affected by cocaine and was placed in the custody of the State of Louisiana by an instanter order signed on February 3, 2011. In addition to testing positive for cocaine, Jackson had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. According to Louisiana Department of Child and Family Services (“DCFS”) reports, Jackson had been noncompliant with her medication. On March 22, 2011, L.J. was adjudicated as a “child in need of care” and custody was maintained with DCFS. Since that time, L.J. has been living in Mississippi with her great-grandmother, great-grandfather and one biological sister, A.J. Jackson’s parental rights to A.J., who was also born with cocaine in her system, were terminated by the State of Mississippi in January 2012 because of Jackson’s drug addiction.

To assist Jackson in reunification with L.J., in March 2011, the Ouachita Parish DCFS developed a case plan, which was approved by the court. The case plan required Jackson to do the following to prove that she could provide a stable environment for LJ.’s care:

1. Obtain and maintain safe and stable housing that is adequate in size and cleanliness, has working utilities, and contains no safety hazards.
2. Keep food in her home to feed her children.
3. Allow a DCFS caseworker to visit her home twice per month.
1⅞4. Seek classes to assist her with budgeting and financing to assist her managing her bills.
5. Pay $25 per month for child support for L.J.
6. Complete a drug rehabilitation program and follow all recommendations of the rehabilitation staff and counselors.
7. Submit to random drug screens within 24 hours of the request being made or the screen will be considered a positive screen.
8. Seek services at a domestic violence shelter and follow all the rules and guidelines at the shelter, including seeking the treatment she needs.
9. Attend couples counseling with Otis Dewayne Wiley, L.J.’s biological father, if the two decide to stay in a relationship. Follow all recommendations made in couple’s counseling.
10.Attend parenting classes and follow all recommendations of the staff and counselors.

After L.J. was placed in the custody of the DCFS, Jackson continued to fight her drug addiction, but was slow to work on the requirements of her case plan. Jackson’s progress was monitored by a caseworker with DCFS. According to reports in the court record, there were several months when Jackson’s whereabouts were unknown. In July 2011, Jackson explained to DCFS that she was hard to find because she had been living with different friends and had been incarcerated a few times. The case plan allowed for weekly supervised visits with L.J., but Jackson saw L.J. only twice between March and December 2011.

Jackson presented with positive drug screens twice while L.J. was in the care of DCFS and it was recommended that Jackson participate in an inpatient rehabilitation program in Rayville, Louisiana. She entered the Rayville Recovery Program in September 2011, but failed to complete the treatment after being involved in an altercation with another patient and failing to acknowledge her relationship with a fellow patient in the facility, L.J.’s father, Otis DeWayne Wiley (“Wiley”).

|3In January 2012, Jackson moved to Indiana to attempt to repair her relationship with her own mother. At that time, she was pregnant with twins. Jackson moved into a women’s shelter after an argument with her mother. Her pregnancy was determined to be high-risk and she was placed in the hospital on bed rest for six weeks. At the time of her hospitalization, she had not yet completed an outpatient drug rehabilitation program or the parenting classes required by her case plan. One of Jackson’s twins died at birth and the surviving twin (“H. J.”) is currently in Jackson’s care in Indiana, but is being supervised by the Indiana DCFS. Jackson has admitted that Wiley, who is also H.J.’s father, is involved with the care of H.J. and is a regular fixture in her household. Jackson and Wiley maintain a relationship, but have not received the couples counseling required in Jackson’s case plan.

After her move to Indiana, Jackson and H.J. spent three weeks in a shelter before she received help from Area Four, a case management company in Indiana. Area Four located and paid for an apartment for Jackson and H.J. Jackson relied on a number of services from Area Four to help with her housing and with the care of H.J. The assistance from Area Four was scheduled to end in October 2012.

Due to Jackson’s failure to complete the requirements of the court-approved case plan, the State of Louisiana, through DCFS, filed a petition for termination of parental rights and certification for adoption against both Jackson and Wiley on May 18, 2012. At the termination hearing on September 6, 2012, the DCFS caseworker assigned to L.J.’s case testified |4that Jackson admitted to using drugs as recently as December 2011, although she provided two negative drug screens between January and September 2012. Jackson testified that she understood the importance of a rehabilitation program, but then asserted that she would be able to stop the use of illegal drugs on her own without the help of such a program.

During the 19 months that L.J. was in the custody of DCFS, Jackson received two lump-sum disability payments totaling approximately $40,000. That money is being managed by Area Four, since Jackson has not demonstrated the ability to manage her own funds. Despite the requirement that Jackson provide $25 each month to help with the care of L.J., Jackson provided only $100 and a few outfits, according to DCFS reports. At the termination hearing, Jackson herself testified that her contribution for the support of L.J. has been inadequate.

As of the time of the termination hearing, Jackson had failed to complete a drug rehabilitation program, had not attended domestic violence counseling or parenting classes and had not provided any significant contributions on behalf of L.J. while L.J. was in the custody of DCFS.

On September 6, 2012, judgment was rendered in open court terminating the parental rights of Jackson and Wiley, in accordance with Louisiana Children’s Code article 1015(5), which states, in pertinent part:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:
5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for |fithe safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

A final judgment terminating the parental rights of Jackson and Wiley to L.J. was signed January 3, 2013, and this appeal by Jackson followed. No appeal was filed on behalf of the father, Wiley.

DISCUSSION

Noncompliance with case plan

In her first assignment of error, Jackson claims that the trial court erred in determining that DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that she did not substantially comply with her case plan. Jackson admits that she has not completed a drug rehabilitation program, but argues that her two clean drug screens are evidence that she has stopped her drug use. Jackson argues that the only requirement of the case plan she has not fulfilled is the intensive outpatient drug rehabilitation and that all other requirements have been met. She further argues that, absent extenuating circumstances, i.e., her pregnancy with twins that required an extended hospital stay, she would have fully complied. Jackson argues that she has obtained appropriate housing with all utilities, has been willing to allow home visits from DCFS, has been receiving help with her budget and financial counseling, has a secure income in the form of SSI and food stamps, has submitted to a psychiatric evaluation and has passed two random drug screens on February 8 and June 8, 2012. Further, Jackson argues that DCFS has no proof that she has not acquired adequate food and 1 ficlothing for her children and that she has not been taking her medications as required.

Jackson further asserts that DCFS has no evidence of any substance abuse by her after December 2011. In fact, she states that she has had two clean drug screens since that time. She also points out that Indiana DCFS investigations of her have revealed no drug use and that the Indiana DCFS has found her to be a suitable guardian for the twin child, H.J., who is currently in her custody.

Jackson argues that, without proof of a continuing drug problem and without proof of her failure to satisfy the other requirements in her case plan, there is no persistence of the original conditions that led to L.J.’s removal from her custody.

The State of Louisiana, through DCFS, and the attorney appointed to represent the interests of L.J. argue that Jackson has been wholly non-compliant with her case plan. The State argues that Jackson’s testimony about her last drug use was inconsistent and she has still not completed a drug rehabilitation program. The State argues that it was proven that Jackson has failed to complete any substance abuse treatments, domestic violence counseling or parenting classes or provided any significant contributions on behalf of L.J. while L.J. was in custody of the DCFS.

The State further argues that Jackson has not proven fhat she is capable of maintaining a home or managing her finances on her own without the professional assistance of Area Four or DCFS and without her therapist and psychiatrist. The State contends that Jackson has not ^substantially complied with the case plan and has not shown significant, measurable progress.

In order to terminate parental rights, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is in violation of one of the factors listed in La. Ch. C. art. 1015(5), which requires the state to prove 1) that the child has been removed from the parent’s custody for at least one year, 2) there has been no substantial compliance with the case plan approved by the court and 3) there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or conduct in the near future.

A case plan is designed to address the problems which brought a child into care and provide remedies to those problems. Reformation means more than mere cooperation from the parents. Parents should demonstrate significant modification of the behavior that served as the basis of the state’s removal of a child. State in Interest of M.A.S. and R.S., 38,677 (La.App.2d Cir.5/7/04), 873 So.2d 817.

Lack of substantial compliance with a case plan can be evidenced by the parent’s failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services, the parent’s lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problem preventing reunification or the persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions. La. Ch. C. art. 1036(C).

Appellate courts review a trial court’s findings as to whether parental rights should be terminated according to the manifest error standard. In re A.J.F., 00-0948 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47.

|8A review of the testimony presented at the termination hearing shows that L.J. has been removed from Jackson’s custody for at least one year. DCFS was granted custody of L.J. in March 2011 and has had continuous custody since that time. L.J. has been living in Mississippi with her great-grandparents, who are qualified foster parents, the majority of her time away from Jackson.

Jackson has failed to comply with her court-ordered case plan in several areas, the most notable being her failure to complete a drug rehabilitation program. Despite several opportunities, Jackson never attended more than three sessions before halting her participation in an outpatient program. L.J. was born with cocaine in her system and Jackson’s substance abuse was the main reason initially cited for removing L.J. from Jackson’s custody, adjudicating L.J. a “child in need of care” and placing her in the custody of DCFS. Jackson has at least a six-year long history of drug abuse. Although she has made some progress, stating that she has provided two negative drug screens and that she has been drug free for several months, we agree with the trial court that the progress is minimal and that there has not been substantial compliance on Jackson’s part to fully complete the requirements of the drug rehabilitation program.

The evidence also showed that Jackson admitted to her continued relationship with Wiley, but they have not attended the eouples counseling or the domestic violence counseling required by the case plan. There is no evidence that Jackson completed the required parenting classes, and she has | stalled to provide financial support for L.J., despite receiving two lump-sum disability payments totaling approximately $40,000.

We find that the trial court did not commit manifest error when it determined that Jackson had not substantially complied with her case plan. This assignment of error is without merit.

Expectation of significant improvement

In her second assignment of error, Jackson argues that the trial court erred in its determination that DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in Jackson’s condition in the near future.

Jackson argues that evidence of a lack of reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition in the near future must be proven by expert testimony or by an established pattern of behavior. Jackson continues to argue that there was no testimony from a qualified expert presented; and, without a positive drug screen, there is no established pattern of behavior and that the finding that there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement was improper.

The State and the attorney appointed to represent the interest of L.J. argue that Jackson has failed to make, or show that she is attempting to make, significant changes in her behavior despite having more than 18 months in which to realize the changes and improvements required by her case plan.

A mother’s refusal to comply with the prongs of a case plan developed to reunite her with her children indicates that she has not | ^reformed. State in Interest of C.L.R. v. Russo, 567 So.2d 703 (La.App. 3d Cir.1990). Reformation requires more than just cooperation with agency authorities. Reformation is shown by a significant, substantial indication of reformation, such as altering or modifying in a significant way the behavior which served as the basis for the state’s removal of the child from the home. State in Interest of S.M., et al., 98-0922 (La.1998), 719 So.2d 445.

The best interest of the child must be served by terminating parental rights in order to achieve permanency and stability for that child. State in Interest of D.S.C., S.W.C., and J.S.W. v. J.C.R., M.H.W., and A.R.S., 35,898 (La.App.2d Cir.2/27/02), 811 So.2d 198.

Jackson is now living in Indiana and has secured housing with the help of Area Four, the case management company in Indiana. Area Four also manages Jackson’s money, as it has been determined that she is not yet responsible enough to manage it herself. Jackson relies on Area Four to assist with her housing and with the care of H.J., who is still in her custody. At the time of the termination hearing, Jackson was still under the care of a psychiatrist. She failed to prove that she is capable of maintaining a home on her own without the assistance of Area Four or DCFS and without her therapist and psychiatrist.

Contrary to Jackson’s assertions that there was no evidence of an established pattern of behavior, the evidence shows that, other than the fact that Jackson has housing, not much else in the case plan has been accomplished. For these reasons, the trial court thus determined that there was no reasonable expectation of improvement from Jackson.

_[ijL.J.’s current living situation, with relatives and in the same home as her sibling, is a very positive environment for her. She is thriving and, as the lower court determined, deserves to have a sense of permanency in her life.

Based on the foregoing evidence, we find that the trial court did not commit manifest error in determining that there was no reasonable expectation that Jackson would make substantial improvements in the near future. This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of Chequilla Jackson to the minor, L.J., is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Che-quilla Jackson.

AFFIRMED.


author: STEWART, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Farrell M. ROCHELLE, Appellant.
    No. 47,984-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    July 3, 2013.

      Washington & Wells, Shreveport, LA, by Alex J. Washington, for Appellant.
    Richard Z. Johnson, Jr., District Attorney, Ron C. Stamps, Britney A. Green, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before BROWN, STEWART and PITMAN, JJ.
   STEWART, J.

|,The defendant, Farrell M. Rochelle, was found guilty as charged of being a principal to second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 and La. R.S. 14:24. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with credit for time served. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On March 25, 2010, the defendant, Cad-dara Hogan and Paris Smith, were initially charged via bill of indictment with first degree murder during the attempted perpetration of an armed robbery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30. The indictment was subsequently amended to the charge of principal to second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 and La. R.S. 14:24. The defendant and Smith were tried together, and the jury trial commenced on March 20, 2012. The following evidence was adduced at trial.

Rena Carroll Lee, also known as “Lok-ie,” testified that Ronald Wilson, also known as “Paintbrush,” arrived at her home at approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 3, 2010. According to Lee, Wilson frequented her home once or twice a week for sex and to use drugs. On the night in question, Lee stated that she and Wilson talked and watched television while he was using drugs. Wilson was sitting in a chair by the door, while Lee was sitting on her couch with her back to the door.

Lee testified that she heard a loud noise, and turned to look in the direction the noise came from. She saw her door was open, and a man 12standing there holding a gun. Lee testified that the man was wearing a black hoodie and had a bright grey and white “ski scarf’ wrapped around his face. The man pointed his gun at Wilson, and asked “Where’s the money?” In turn, Wilson asked “What money?” The man then shot Wilson in the foot. After the man asked Wilson a second time about the money, he stated that the money was in his truck. The man instructed Wilson to go get the money. Lee stood with Wilson and began to walk outside, but the man instructed her to go inside and close the door. As she closed the door, she observed two more people standing outside. Lee then heard bumping against the side of her house, followed by a series of eight gunshots.

After it became quiet outside, Lee opened the door and called Wilson’s name to no avail. She attempted to call 9-1-1 twice, but received a busy signal both times. By that time, her neighbors called her to come out of her house, and she remained with them until the police arrived.

John Scroggins, Lee’s neighbor, testified that he came home at approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 3, 2010. He was watching television when he heard a popping noise that he believed was a gunshot. He soon heard what he thought to be another gunshot, followed by a booming sound that he believed came from a larger gun. When Scroggins went to his window to see what was going on, he witnessed three African-American men and a white dog running up the road. He described two of the men as tall, and the third man as a “little ole short rascal.” Scroggins could not recall what they were wearing.

| ^Detective Adam Ewing of the DeSoto Parish Sheriffs Office investigated Wilson’s murder. Ewing testified that when he arrived at the scene, he learned that there had been a robbery. He testified that someone had kicked the door into the home, shot Wilson in the foot, and taken him out to his vehicle at gunpoint. At some point, Wilson armed himself with a shotgun he had in his truck. A struggle ensued, and Ewing stated that the authorities assumed that Wilson was shot during the struggle.

Wilson was found lying on his back outside of the home, with his 12-gauge shotgun lying beside him. It was determined that Wilson had “got off two shots.” Even though the investigation did not reveal exactly how many shots were fired, Detective Ewing was able to prove that at least four shots were fired, two from a “pistol” and two from Wilson’s shotgun.

Detective Ewing related that the authorities had recovered a projectile from the carpet where Wilson was shot in the foot. They also recovered Wilson’s wallet, which contained approximately $732.00, on the passenger side of his pickup truck. The weapon used in the robbery was never recovered.

Detective Ewing noted the difficulty of developing suspects, since initially they had only been given nicknames. He testified that Marcus Gant, also known as “Mookie,” was interviewed. Mookie informed the authorities that he had been to Lee’s home prior to the incident to deliver some cocaine. He further stated that upon leaving the house, he saw three individuals, and identified one of them as Cad-dara Hogan. He also identified one of the other individuals as “one of the twins.”

|4Petective Ewing stated that the defendant and his fraternal twin brother, Terrell Rochelle, were arrested and interviewed in depth. Ewing testified that he believed the defendant truthfully told him what happened, to clear his brother from any involvement. The defendant admitted to his participation in “hitting a lick.” Detective Ewing stated that based on this investigation, he could not exclude the defendant as a suspect, and that he had no doubt the defendant was present at the scene of the crime.

Detective Ewing testified that he was able to determine how the defendant, Hogan, and Smith learned that Wilson had money. Apparently, the trio went to the home of their friend, Eric Gilliam, also known as “Little E,” on the evening of February 3, 2010, to celebrate his homecoming from rehabilitation. Wilson, a painter, was repairing a porch on Gilliam’s home while the party was going on. The trio learned that Wilson would receive a partial payment for that job that day.

Hogan testified that he, Smith, and the defendant met at Gilliam’s party around noon and remained there until it was dark outside. He stated that Wilson, whom he knew from the neighborhood, was also at the party. Wilson was “fixing on a porch.” Hogan related that he, Smith, and the defendant planned to rob Wilson, or “hit a lick,” and split the money among themselves. He stated that it was the defendant’s idea to rob Wilson. Hogan admitted that they chose to rob Wilson because they knew he would get paid for fixing the porch. They knew that “Ms. Sharonda” had received her income tax refund and planned to use some of the money to pay Wilson for fixing the porch. They also knew that when Wilson got paid, he would lBgo to that “drug party they always had” at Lee’s house. Hogan stated that all three of them had on black hoodies not because they had planned to wear them, but because it was cold outside. The trio planned to go to Lee’s home because they knew that Wilson would be there.

Hogan stated that once they arrived at Lee’s home, they noticed that Wilson’s truck was there, and waited to see if he would come out the house. When he didn’t, Hogan and the defendant went to the door. The defendant had a small chrome and black .380 in his possession. After listening for a few minutes at the door, the defendant went into the house, while Hogan remained at the door. He noted that the door had a slight crack in it, so they were able to just push it open. Hogan related that the defendant demanded money from Wilson, and when he didn’t comply, the defendant shot him in the foot. They then went outside, where the defendant followed Wilson to his truck, while Hogan and Smith waited at the back of Wilson’s truck. At some point, Wilson was able to obtain his shotgun from his truck.

Hogan testified that he heard shots being fired and ran away. He claims that he was not sure what happened after the shots were fired because the trio split up and ran in different directions. They later heard of Wilson’s murder while the trio was at Smith’s house. The three of them conspired to lie about the events that had transpired and of their involvement with the crime. Hogan denied being the organizer of the events, further stating that he did not force Smith and the defendant to participate.

| fiSmith testified that Hogan instructed him to go get a gun from Hogan’s grandmother’s house. Smith related that due to his fear of Hogan, he did as he was instructed. Smith then went home. He later met up with the defendant and Hogan and walked to Lee’s house. Smith stated that he did not know that they were going to Lee’s house.

Upon arrival at Lee’s house, Smith stated that Hogan forced him to kick in the door. Contrary to Hogan’s testimony, Smith testified that it was Hogan who asked Wilson for money and subsequently shot him in the foot. Smith testified that he started to run when Wilson was initially shot, but Hogan grabbed his arm and told him to stay. When Wilson pulled out his shotgun from his truck, Smith ran. However, he stated that he did hear three shots.

Dr. James Trailor testified that he performed the autopsy on Wilson and prepared the report regarding the autopsy. He stated that Wilson died as a result of a gunshot wound. The bullet entered his upper left arm, exited his arm, and reentered the left side of his chest. The bullet then hit the upper lobe of his left lung, and went through his heart and the middle lobe of the right lobe of his right lung. It cracked the right sixth rib over the lateral part of the chest wall, and was stuck in the tissue right near the rib fracture. Dr. Trailor was able to recover the projectile.

The defendant testified that on February 12, 2010, he and his twin brother reported to the sheriffs department to take a lie detector test. After the brothers were informed that they had failed the lie detector test, the defendant decided to tell the truth, so that his twin brother, Terrell, who had |7no involvement, could be released. He admitted to being at the crime scene, and discussed his version of what transpired.

The defendant denied being at Gilliam’s house all day, and related that he arrived there at 5:30. Smith was not present. Later on that evening, he and Hogan walked to the basketball goal, where Hogan said, “Walk up the street with me so I can get this lick right quick.” The defendant initially refused, but when Hogan asked him again five minutes later, he said, “Okay, come on.” He stated that he did not know Wilson, but Hogan did. They met up with Smith as they were walking toward Lee’s house.

Conflicting with Hogan’s testimony, the defendant testified that they went on the porch and Smith kicked in the door. He stated that Hogan pulled the gun on Wilson, and demanded money. The defendant further stated that it was Hogan who shot Wilson in the foot. At that point, the defendant testified that he ran to a friend’s house.

The defendant was found guilty as charged. On June 26, 2012, he was sentenced to serve life imprisonment, to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with credit for time served.

The defendant appeals.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In the defendant’s sole assignment of error, he alleges that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree murder. More specifically, he argues that the conflicting testimony of the state’s witnesses failed to identify the shooter. He argues that his presence at the scene does not make him guilty of second degree murder. The defendant also argues ] sthe State’s entire case was based on the testimony of Hogan, who, he contends, only agreed to testify to save himself.

When issues are raised on appeal, both as to the sufficiency of evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517; State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La.App.2d Cir.1/14/09), 1 So.3d 833. On appeal, a reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Jackson, supra.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Eason, 43,788 (La.App.2d Cir.2/25/09), 3 So.3d 685, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3472, 177 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2010); State v. Hill, 42,025 (La.App.2d Cir.5/9/07), 956 So.2d 758, writ denied, 2007-1209 (La.12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of a fact, for example, a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So.2d 1154 (La.1985). Circumstantial evi-denee provides proof of collateral facts and circumstances, from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Id. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by the evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Speed, 43,786 (La.App.2d Cir.1/14/09), 2 So.3d 582, writ denied, 2009-0372 (La.11/6/09), 21 So.3d 299. This is not a separate test that applies instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction. Id. Rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Speed, supra; State v. Allen, 36,180 (La.App.2d Cir.9/18/02), 828 So.2d 622, writs denied, 2002-2595 (La.3/28/03), 840 So.2d 566, 2002-2997 (La.6/27/03), 847 So.2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.Ct. 1404, 158 L.Ed.2d 90 (2004). In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Gullette, 43,032 (La.App.2d Cir.2/13/08), 975 So.2d 753; State v. Burd, 40,480 (La.App.2d Cir.1/27/06), 921 So.2d 219, writ denied, 2006-1083 (La.11/9/06), 941 So.2d 35. An accomplice is a competent witness to testify against his co-perpetrator even if the prosecution offers him inducements to testify; these inducements only affect the witness’s credibility. State v. Jetton, 32,893 (La.App.2d Cir.04/05/00), 756 So.2d 1206, writ denied, 00-1568 (La.03/16/01), 787 So.2d 299. The credibility of an accomplice’s testimony is not within the province of the court of appeal to decide. Id. Rather, credibility evaluations are within the province of the jury as trier of fact. Id. The fact finder is charged with making a credibility determination and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness; thus, the reviewing court may impinge on that discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. State v. Eason, supra; State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La.01/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). Such testimony alone is sufficient even where the state does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. State v. Robinson, 36,147 (La.App.2d Cir.12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1207; State v. Ponsell, 33,543 (La.App.2d Cir.8/23/00), 766 So.2d 678, writ denied, 2000-2726 (La.10/12/01), 799 So.2d 490.

In cases involving a defendant’s claim that he was not the person who committed the crime, the Jackson rationale requires the state to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof. State v. Lewis, 43,402 (La.App.2d Cir.8/13/08), 990 So.2d 109. A tentative identification is not necessarily unreliable. Id.

La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides:
A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juvenile, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. (Emphasis added.)
La. R.S. 14:64(A) states:
A. Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.

The state is not required to show that the defendant’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death in order to satisfy the causation element of this offense. Sufficient proof is presented where it is shown that the defendant’s actions were a “contributing cause” or a “substantial factor” in the resulting death of the victim. State v. Stone, 33,383 (La.App.2d Cir.1990), 758 So.2d 997, writ denied, 2000-2145 (La.6/1/01), 793 So.2d 181. Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2), no intent to harm or kill is necessary to be a principal to second degree murder occurring during the course of a robbery. State v. Hampton, 46,363 (La.App.2d Cir.5/18/11), 69 So.3d 614, writ denied, 2011-1467 (La.2/3/12), 79 So.3d 1024, State v. Grant, 623 So.2d 204 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 629 So.2d 400 (La.1993).

Further, La. R.S. 14:24 identifies those persons who can be classified as principals:

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.

In the instant case, the state was required to prove that Wilson’s murder occurred during the perpetration of or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery. After a careful review of the record, we find that the testimony and evidence presented overwhelmingly satisfied the state’s burden of proving the essential elements of the charged offense of being a principal to second degree murder.

Even though the testimonies of the defendant, Hogan, and Smith conflicted at times, all three of these participants admitted that they had planned to “hit a lick” that fateful night, and that they were present at the scene when Wilson met his demise. The evidence suggests that either the defendant or Hogan armed himself with a dangerous weapon and attempted to take Wilson’s money, which is a thing of value, from his immediate control. These facts indicate that the elements of attempted armed robbery, |13an enumerated offense for the offense of second degree murder, were met. Unfortunately, the defendant acknowledged his decision to participate in robbing Wilson after Hogan asked him to, and this attempted robbery ultimately led to Wilson’s death.

We find that the evidence presented at trial, viewed under the Jackson standard, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant was involved in the attempted armed robbery of Wilson, which led to Wilson’s death, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:24 and 14:30. This assignment of error therefore is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons discussed above, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.

      . Hogan pled guilty to the reduced charge of manslaughter via plea bargain agreement.


author: RANDY GRANT PIERCE, Justice.

text:
    The MISSISSIPPI BAR, Appellant v. Brandon Leigh GALLOWAY, Appellee.
    No. 2011-BD-01140-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Feb. 2, 2012.
   RANDY GRANT PIERCE, Justice.

ORDER OF DISBARMENT

¶ 1. This matter is before the Court en banc on the amended formal complaint filed by the Mississippi Bar (“Bar”) in keeping with Rule 6 of the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar (“MRD”). Because Brandon Leigh Galloway (“Galloway”) has been adjudicated guilty of a felony, the Bar asks this Court to: strike Galloway from the rolls of the Bar; immediately suspend Galloway from the practice of law in Mississippi according to MRD 6(a); enter an order of disbarment of Galloway pursuant to MRD 6(d); and, upon entry of an order for disbarment, assess Galloway with the costs associated with this action. After due consideration, this Court finds that the requested relief should be granted. Further, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact that no appeal has been filed. Therefore, we find that disbarment is proper at this time.

¶ 2. Currently, the Bar has suspended Galloway for failure to pay mandatory Bar dues. On April 11, 2007, Galloway entered a plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance in the Circuit Court of Harrison County. As a result, the court sentenced Galloway to eight years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). The court provided that the sentence imposed would be suspended upon Galloway’s successful completion of the Long Term Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Program (“Rehab”) with MDOC. If and when Galloway successfully completed Rehab, the court would reconsider the eight-year sentence imposed.

¶ 3. Galloway completed Rehab, and the court reconsidered her sentence on March 3, 2008. Upon reconsideration, the court suspended the execution of the original eight-year sentence, resentencing Galloway to three years of reporting probation. Galloway did not appeal her conviction or sentence, and time do so has since expired.

¶ 4. The Bar served Galloway with process on September 19, 2011. Galloway did not file a formal response to that complaint, but responded by a handwritten letter to Adam Kilgore, general counsel for the Bar. In that letter, Galloway informed the Bar that she would not contest the complaint. Out of an abundance of caution, the Bar forwarded Galloway’s response to this Court because it believed that whether Galloway intended the handwritten letter to be her response to the formal complaint was unclear.

¶ 5. This Court possesses “exclusive and inherent jurisdiction” over the discipline of attorneys under the MRD. De novo review is the standard of review when this Court considers attorney discipline. Additionally, this “Court must decide each disciplinary case on its own unique merits.” Moreover, the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the attorney’s actions constituted professional misconduct falls upon the Bar.

¶ 6. In this case, Galloway’s conviction is undisputed. In addition, Galloway even provided the Bar written notice that she would not contest the complaint filed against her. The Bar presented this Court with a certified copy of the judgment of conviction accepting Galloway’s guilty plea. MRD 6(a) provides that the certified copy of the judgment of conviction “shall be conclusive evidence thereof,” and thus, this Court “shall then forthwith strike the name of the attorney and order his immediate suspension from the practice of law.” MRD 6(d) states that, once the time for appeal from the judgment or conviction has expired or all appeals have been concluded -without reversal, this Court shall order disbarment. Consequently, the Bar has met its burden to show that Galloway should be disbarred immediately.

¶ 7. IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

1. Brandon Leigh Galloway is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi.
2. This order shall constitute notice of disbarment in this cause.
3. The Clerk of the Mississippi Supreme Court shall forward an attested copy of this order to Brandon Leigh Galloway and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar.
4. Brandon Leigh Galloway shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of her disbarment, properly disburse all funds she may hold in trust, and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar.
5. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the circuit court judges and chancellors in and for Harrison County, Mississippi, and the senior judge of each court shall enter this order upon the minutes of his or her respective court.
6. The Clerk of the Mississippi Supreme Court shall likewise immediately forward an attested copy of this order to Clerks of the Circuit and Chancery Courts of Harrison County, the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.
7. Brandon Leigh Galloway shall file, within forty-five days following entry of this order, an affidavit with this Court stating that all her clients have been notified of her disbarment and her consequent inability to practice law in the State of Mississippi and that she has fully complied with all requirements set forth in Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar.
8. The Mississippi Bar shall have and recover of and from Brandon Leigh Galloway all of its costs and expenses of this disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.

DICKINSON, P.J., not participating.

      . McIntyre v. Mississippi Bar, 38 So.3d 617, 623 (Miss.2010).

      . Mississippi Bar v. Langston, 987 So.2d 936, 937 (Miss.2008).

      . Mississippi Bar v. Pels, 708 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Miss.1998).

      . Mississippi Rule of Discipline 6(a) (2008).

      . Mississippi Rule of Discipline 6(d) (2008).


author: LESLIE D. KING, Justice.

text:
    The MISSISSIPPI BAR v. Kenneth L. JONES.
    No. 2011-BD-01810-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    April 19, 2012.
   LESLIE D. KING, Justice.

ORDER OF DISBARMENT

¶ 1. This matter is before the Court en banc on the “Petition of the Mississippi Bar to Accept Irrevocable Resignation Pursuant to Rule 10, MRD.” In its Petition, the Mississippi Bar requests that this Court accept the irrevocable resignation of Kenneth L. Jones and enter an order of disbarment. All procedural prerequisites have been met, thus we order the disbarment of Kenneth L. Jones.

¶ 2. On November 29, 2011, Kenneth L. Jones executed a Notice of Irrevocable Resignation, and he delivered it to the Mississippi Bar on or about December 1, 2011. In the Notice, Jones acknowledged two disciplinary matters pending against him before the Committee on Professional Responsibility (Docket Nos. 11-081-1 and 11-127-1) and averred that said disciplinary matters were the only disciplinary matters pending against him. Further, Jones stated that he did not desire to defend these matters and he requested permission to resign with prejudice from the Mississippi Bar. The Bar filed the instant Petition on December 6, 2011, requesting that this Court accept Jones’s irrevocable resignation.

¶ 3. Pursuant to Rule 1 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline, this Court “has exclusive and inherent jurisdiction of matters pertaining to attorney discipline[.]” M.R.D. 1(a); Miss. Bar v. Thompson, 83 So.3d 1282, 1283 (2012) (quoting In re Keenum, 63. So.3d 552, 552 (Miss.2011)). We review cases involving attorney discipline de novo. Thompson, 83 So.3d at 1283; Keenum, 63 So.3d at 552.

¶ 4. Rule 10.5 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline provides that

[a]n attorney may tender an irrevocable resignation to either the Court or the Tribunal. Such a resignation shall acknowledge each and all disciplinary matters then pending, provide the docket number or numbers, state that the attorney does not desire to defend, and request permission to resign with prejudice from the Bar. Upon receipt of such a resignation, and any response that the Bar may elect to file, the disciplinary proceedings shall terminate and either the Court or the Tribunal shall enter its order accepting the resignation, revoking the attorney’s license, and barring forever thereafter the attorney’s right to seek reinstatement to the privilege of practicing law in this state. Such a resignation and order shall be considered disciplinary action, and the resignation shall be considered tantamount to the proof of guilt on the matter charged.

M.R.D. 10.5.

¶ 5. After due consideration, we find that Kenneth L. Jones has properly filed his Notice of Irrevocable Resignation in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Discipline 10.5, and the Bar is entitled to the relief it seeks. Based on the record before us, and consistent with the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar and our caselaw, this Court finds that Kenneth L. Jones shall be disbarred permanently.

¶ 6. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

1. Kenneth L. Jones is hereby permanently DISBARRED from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi;
2. This order shall constitute notice of permanent disbarment in this cause;
3. The Clerk of this Court shall forward an attested copy of this order to Kenneth L. Jones and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar;
4. Kenneth L. Jones shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment, properly disburse all funds he may hold in trust, and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Discipline 11;
5. Kenneth L. Jones shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi, and that he has complied fully with all the requirements set forth in Mississippi Rule of Discipline 11, as well as the requirements of this order;
6. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the circuit court judges and chancellors in and for Harrison County, Mississippi, and the senior judge of each court shall enter this order upon the minutes of his or her respective court;
7. The Clerk of this Court likewise shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States;
8. All outstanding disciplinary proceedings against Kenneth L. Jones, including Cause No. 2011-BD-1810, are hereby terminated; and
9. Costs of this proceeding are hereby assessed against Kenneth L. Jones.

¶ 7. SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED this the 19th day of April, 2012.

DICKINSON, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.


author: WILLIAM L. WALLER, JR., Chief Justice.

text:
    THE MISSISSIPPI BAR v. Jimmy Davis HULL a/k/a Jim Davis Hull.
    No. 2011-BD-01685-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Aug. 14, 2012.
   ORDER OF DISBARMENT

WILLIAM L. WALLER, JR., Chief Justice.

¶ 1. The Mississippi Bar has filed a formal complaint under Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline, seeking disbarment of attorney Jimmy Davis Hull, a.k.a. Jim Davis Hull, who pleaded guilty to one count of “False Statements Relating to Health Care Matters,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1035, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Upon acceptance of Hull’s guilty plea in Case Number 3:07crl65LG-RHW-002, the federal district court sentenced Hull to serve sixty months in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons. Hull was further ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,444,463.70.

¶ 2. The Bar, on its own initiative, filed this formal complaint against Hull on November 10, 2011. Proof of service was executed on December 16, 2011. Hull did not respond to the complaint.

¶ 3. Rule 6(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline states that if an attorney enters a plea of guilty to any felony (other than manslaughter), the judgment “shall be conclusive evidence” of that attorney’s guilt. M.R.D. 6(a). Consequently, “[t]he Court shall then forthwith strike the name of the attorney and order his immediate suspension from the practice of law.” M.R.D. 6(a). Here, Hull has pleaded guilty to one count of “False Statements Relating to Health Care Matters,” and the Bar has forwarded a certified copy of the judgment. This constitutes conclusive evidence of Hull’s guilt under Rule 6(a).

¶4. Rule 6(d) states that “[wjhen time for appeal from judgment or conviction ... expires or all appeals have been concluded without reversal, Complaint Counsel shall certify that result to the Court, and the Court shall forthwith enter an order of disbarment.” M.R.D. 6(d). No further proceedings have been filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in Case Number 3:07crl65LG-RHW-002, and the time for appeal has now passed. Thus, Hull’s criminal conviction is now final. Rule 6(d) requires us to enter an order disbarring Hull.

¶ 5. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

1. Jimmy Davis Hull, a.k.a. Jim Davis Hull, should be, and is hereby, DISBARRED from the practice of Law in the State of Mississippi;
2. This order shall constitute notice of disbarment in this cause;
3. The Clerk of this Court shall forward an attested copy of this order to Jimmy Davis Hull and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar;
4. Jimmy Davis Hull shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment, properly disburse all funds he may hold in trust, and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys under Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline;
5. Jimmy Davis Hull shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi, and that he has complied fully with all the requirements set forth in Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline, as well as the requirements of this order;
6. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Mississippi shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the Circuit Court Judges and Chancellors in and for Attala County, Mississippi, and the Senior Judges of such courts shall enter this order upon the minutes of their respective courts;
7. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Mississippi shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States; and
8.Costs of the formal complaint should be, and are hereby, assessed against Jimmy Davis Hull.

¶ 6. SO ORDERED.

      . The Bar’s complaint is against "Jimmy Davis Hull”; the district court’s judgment refers to "Jim Davis Hull.” In a supplement to its formal complaint, the Bar affirms that "Jimmy Davis Hull” and "Jim Davis Hull” are the same individual, based on Bar records and date of birth.


text:
    THE MISSISSIPPI BAR v. Michael J. BROWN.
    No. 2012-BD-00540-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Oct. 4, 2012.
   ORDER OF DISBARMENT

GEORGE C. CARLSON, JR., Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. This case is before the Court on the formal complaint filed by the Mississippi Bar under Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar (MRD). Attorney Michael J. Brown, who is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court, has had entered against him a judgment in the Chancery Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County, in which the chancellor found that Brown committed fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty, deceit, or a willful failure to account for the money or property of a client. Proof of service of process upon Brown has been executed and filed with the Clerk of this Court. Brown has not filed a response, even though, by single-justice order from this Court entered on April 25, 2012, he was given an additional thirty days to respond. In its Formal Complaint, the Bar states that Brown is currently suspended from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi according to an Agreed Order of Suspension before a Complaint Tribunal. The Bar asks this Court to enter an order of disbarment of Brown pursuant to MRD 6(d), and to assess Brown for the costs associated with this action in accordance with MRD 27(a).

¶ 2. On February 1, 2012, the Chancery Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County held a hearing, seeking to have Brown provide an accounting of all funds inherited by the minor Demon B. McClinton from his deceased mother, Rebecca Henry. Brown, the attorney for McClinton’s guardianship, was unwilling and unable to provide such an accounting, nor could he prove that he had deposited the funds in a federally insured bank as required by the chancellor’s order pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 93-13-17. In fact, Brown testified under oath that all files and documentation related to the guardianship were destroyed by water damage caused by leaking pipes at Brown’s Flowood office.

¶ 3. Evidence presented at the hearing established that Brown had caused $550,000 of the minor’s funds to be loaned to one Linus Shackelford. Other than the loan in question, Shackelford’s relationship to Brown or McClinton is not revealed in the record. Brown also personally had signed a promissory note indicating that he personally had borrowed $507,745.81 from the minor McClinton. Further, Brown had forged two checks from Regions Bank in the sum of $205,020.81 and $32,725, respectively. Finally, Brown caused the court on September 7, 2001, to approve a fee of $398,000, which the chancellor determined to be outrageous and unreasonable, and which fee was approved based upon Brown’s commission of a fraud upon the Court.

¶ 4. Brown was held in contempt and ordered incarcerated at the Hinds County Jail until such time as he filed the required accounting to McClinton and returned all guardianship funds. At a further hearing on February 7, 2012, Brown was allowed to post a $100,000 bond payable to the guardianship, with the understanding that he would appear at a March 20, 2012, hearing with a complete accounting. He also was charged to appear at that date and show cause why he should not be further held in contempt should he be unable or unwilling to provide the accounting and/or advise why the minor’s funds were not deposited in a federally insured bank pursuant to statute. On February 8, 2012, the chancellor appointed a special master, Paul E. Rogers, to investigate and report as to the receipt, disposition, and location of any assets of the guardianship.

¶ 5. The special master executed a search warrant on Brown’s home. Despite Brown’s testimony that the files had been destroyed by water damage, the special master recovered a banker’s box labeled “McClinton” that contained all of Brown’s files and documentation related to the guardianship. The chancellor determined that Brown had committed intentional perjury by lying under oath about the fate of those files at the February 1, 2012, hearing.

¶ 6. On March 20, 2012, Brown appeared before the Court, and for the first time produced an accounting, which showed that Brown had disbursed guardianship funds from his escrow account in the amount of $1,295,783.81. Brown admitted that he never sought or obtained approval of the court for this disbursement. A review of the checks presented from Brown’s escrow account showed that approximately $235,000 in checks were written either to “cash” or to Brown and were endorsed by Brown. Brown also deposited the proceeds of Rebecca Henry’s life insurance policy in the sum of $52,747.27 into his own escrow account. Brown also admitted to proposing and facilitating the $550,000 loan to Linus Shackelford without a proper court order. The special master also determined that Brown had plagiarized an opinion letter in obtaining his $398,000 guardianship fees, and the chancellor found those fees to constitute a fraud upon the court.

¶ 7. The chancellor’s' judgment held that Brown was guilty of contempt, fraud, embezzlement, and breach of fiduciary duty— including failing to deposit any of the funds into a federally insured bank as required by court order and Mississippi Code Section 93-13-17. Brown was held responsible for $1,295,783.81 in guardianship funds, jointly liable with Shackelford for another $550,000, and liable for the unreasonable fees of $398,000 acquired through providing fraudulent information to the court. The judgment also was provided to the Bar and to the District Attorney’s Offices of Hinds and Rankin Counties.

¶ 8. This Court possesses “exclusive and inherent jurisdiction” over the discipline of attorneys under the MRD. McIntyre v. Miss. Bar, 38 So.3d 617, 623 (Miss.2010). De novo review is the standard when this Court considers attorney-discipline. Miss. Bar v. Langston, 987 So.2d 986, 937 (Miss.2008). Additionally, this “Court must decide each disciplinary case on its own unique merits.” Miss. Bar v. Pels, 708 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Miss.1998). Moreover, the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the attorney’s actions constituted professional misconduct falls upon the Bar.

¶ 9. In this case, the Bar has provided to this Court a certified copy of the final civil judgment against Brown based on clear and convincing evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty, deceit, or willful failure to account for money or property of a client. MRD 6(c) provides that such a certified copy “shall constitute sufficient, clear and convincing evidence of the facts necessary to support such judgment, and, unless successfully rebutted, the Court shall forthwith strike the name of the attorney and order his immediate suspension from the practice of law.” MRD 6(d) provides that, once the time for appeal from the judgment or conviction has expired or all appeals have been concluded without reversal, this Court shall forthwith enter an order of disbarment.

1110. In the instant matter, Brown has failed to file any response or answer to the formal complaint against him, and, therefore, Brown has not successfully rebutted the clear and convincing evidence of the facts necessary to support the chancery court judgment entered against him. Brown’s fraud, perjury, embezzlement, and shocking abuse concerning the guardianship of a minor client render him grossly unfit to practice law in the State of Mississippi. Consequently, the Bar has met its burden to show that Brown should be disbarred immediately.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

1. Michael J. Brown is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi;
2. This order shall constitute notice of disbarment in this cause;
3. The Clerk of this Court shall forward an attested copy of this order to Michael J. Brown and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar;
4. Michael J. Brown shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment, properly disburse all funds he may hold in trust, and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys under Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline;
5. Michael J. Brown shall file, within forty-five days following entry of this order, an affidavit with this Court stating that all his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in the State of Mississippi and that he has fully complied with all requirements set forth in Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar, as well as the requirements of this order;
6. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the circuit court judges and chancellors in and for Hinds and Rankin Counties, Mississippi, and the senior judges of such courts court shall enter this order upon the minutes of their respective courts;
7. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Mississippi shall likewise immediately forward an attested copy of this order to Clerks of the Circuit and Chancery Courts of Hinds and Rankin Counties, the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States; and
8. The Mississippi Bar shall have and recover of and from Michael J. Brown all of its costs and expenses of this disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED, this the 4th day of October, 2012.