author: VILLANTI, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Carole R. SEPANIK, Appellee.
    No. 2D12-616.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 10, 2013.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnés, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Bruce P. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.
   VILLANTI, Judge.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Carole Sepanik’s motion to suppress her interview with police. We reverse because the trial court erroneously concluded that Sepanik, post-Miranda, reasserted her right to remain silent when she expressed a desire to go home during the interview.

Police received a call from the victim of a shooting reporting that someone had shot into his bedroom, and Sepanik was implicated in the shooting. Shortly thereafter, police found Sepanik driving nearby and carrying a firearm. She was arrested and taken to the police station for questioning. At the station, police read Sepan-ik her Miranda rights and she knowingly and voluntarily agreed to talk to them. However, over the course of the interview she volunteered a number of times that she did not want to go to jail and wanted to go home. At times Sepanik also coupled her comments with either her need to take care of her grandparents or her need to be available for her son. Thereafter, Sepanik gave incriminating statements in her interview.

After reviewing the videotape of Sepan-ik’s interview, the trial court concluded that Sepanik had only initially knowingly and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights but subsequently implicitly reasserted her right to remain silent by saying that she wanted to go home. The trial court found that “[e]ach time the statement [to go home] was made, law enforcement did not clarify the Defendant’s intent and they certainly did not cease questioning,” and it concluded that “a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.” Thus, the trial court suppressed Sepanik’s statements. Under the circumstances of this case, this was error.

An appellate court reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is required to interpret the evidence and all reasonable inferences and deductions from the evidence in the manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling. Bailey v. State, 31 So.3d 809, 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Therefore, as a general rule, a trial court’s conclusions on the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. State v. Crosby, 599 So.2d 138, 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). But this “clearly erroneous” standard does not apply with full force when the trial court’s determination turns upon the meaning of transcripts, depositions, other documents, or recordings which are presented in essentially the same form to the appellate court because the trial court does not have a special vantage point in such cases. Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520, 524 n. 9 (Fla.1999); Bailey, 31 So.3d at 812; Crosby, 599 So.2d at 141. In this case, the videotape of Sepanik’s interview was part of the record on appeal and this court had the same opportunity as the trial court to review the videotape. And there is no factual dispute about what Sepanik said. The issue is purely one of law, i.e., whether Sepanik’s various iterations that she wanted to go home required police to stop their interrogation to clarify her intent, as held by the trial court.

In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that a suspect’s post-Miranda ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney does not require law enforcement to stop questioning to clarify the suspect’s statement. In State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715, 718 (Fla.1997), the Florida Supreme Court relied on Davis and held that police are not required to ask clarifying questions if a suspect makes an equivocal or ambiguous request to terminate interrogation after he has validly waived Miranda rights.

In Owen, the court was faced with two statements the defendant made during questioning, “I don’t want to talk about it” and “I’d rather not talk about it.” Id. at 717 n. 4. The court explained that “ ‘[a] suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.’ ” Id. at 718 (quoting Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994)). “To require the police to clarify whether an equivocal statement is an assertion of one’s Miranda rights places too great an impediment upon society’s interest in thwarting crime.” Id. at 719. The defendant’s two statements quoted above were equivocal. Id.

Courts have followed Owen in cases with facts more compelling than the facts of this case. See, e.g., Bailey, 31 So.3d at 811 (holding that defendant’s statement, “Man, I don’t really want to talk about that ... [clause I don’t want no record of it on tape” was not enough to revoke the defendant’s prior Miranda waiver); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 742-43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that defendant’s post-M¿-randa statement two-thirds into police interview, “I really don’t have nothing to say,” was not an unambiguous revocation of his waiver of right to remain silent; thus police were not required to end interrogation or clarify defendant’s intent); Ford v. State, 801 So.2d 318, 319-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (finding that defendant’s repeated statement during interrogation, “Just take, me to jail,” was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent and interrogator did not have to cease questioning or clarify whether defendant wanted the interrogation to end).

To further illustrate, in State v. Davis, 971 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), police questioned the defendant about his father’s death after he waived his Miranda rights. During the interview the defendant stated on several occasions that he wanted to go home. Id. An officer asked the defendant, “Which one of these guys do you feel more comfortable talking with?” and the defendant replied, “None of ‘em.” Id. Police continued questioning him and the defendant confessed to the crime. Id. The trial court granted suppression, concluding that his statement “none of ‘em” was an unequivocal assertion of the defendant’s right to terminate questioning. Id. The district court reversed the suppression order based on Owen, noting that “the statement made by [defendant] was more, not less, equivocal than the statements made in Owen.” Id. at 1019.

If “none of 'em” is not a clear assertion of the defendant’s right to remain silent, see Davis, 971 So.2d at 1018, we fail to see how “I want to go home” is anything more than an expression of stream of consciousness any defendant in custody would think. If the rule were otherwise, then virtually any stream-of-consciousness type of statement uttered by a suspect could be deemed as requiring clarification for Miranda purposes. This would create an untenable predicament for law enforcement which “places too great an impediment upon society’s interest in thwarting crime.” Owen, 696 So.2d at 719.

Finally, we analyze the context of Sepanik’s statements, recognizing that “context is generally as important, if not more important, than the exact words a suspect uses in a statement that is alleged to be an invocation of the right to remain silent.” Bailey, 31 So.3d at 814-15. Before she was read Miranda rights, Sepanik stated that she did not know why she was at the station and that she just wanted to go home. She asked, “After I talk to you, can I go home?” She thereafter agreed to talk to the detective after knowingly and voluntarily waiving Miranda rights. In fact, about two hours into the interview, Sepanik again told a detective, “I’ll just wait if you need to talk to me.” She coupled her comments a number of times with either her need to care for her grandparents or be available for her son. Although Sepanik expressed a number of times during the interview her desire to go home, alone or in context her statements were not a clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous assertion of the right to remain silent. Here, “[t]he words on the recording simply [did] not come across as a clear assertion” of the right to remain silent. Bailey, 31 So.3d at 816.

By suppressing the evidence the trial court erroneously failed to follow Davis and Owen because without any contextual justification it interpreted Sepanik’s nebulous comments as a distinct and clear directive that questioning cease. Therefore, pursuant to Owen, we reverse the suppression order and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

WALLACE and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.

      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694(1966).

      . At times Sepanik said, "I can't go to jail again,” apparently in reference to a previous incident in which she had been taken to jail as a result of an allegation made by her ex-husband.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Terrance ROGAN, Valerie Rogan, and Ronald Kay, Petitioners, v. James OLIVER, Respondent.
    No. 2D12-3935.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 10, 2013.

      Anne C. Sullivan of Cole, Scott & Kis-sane, P.A., Miami; and Ron M. Campbell of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Bonita Springs, for Petitioners.
    Eric J. Vasquez of Law Offices of Eric J. Vasquez, Naples, for Respondent.
   VILLANTI, Judge.

Terrance Rogan, Valerie Rogan, and Ronald Kay (the Petitioners) petition this court to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the trial court’s order that denied their motion to compel the depositions of two attorneys who were formerly counsel to the Majors Homeowner’s Association. Because the trial court applied the incorrect law in determining whether the attorney/client privilege had been waived, we grant the petition and remand for further proceedings.

Respondent James Oliver sued the Petitioners for defamation under various theories of liability. According to Oliver — a past president of the Association — the Petitioners made written and oral statements accusing him of abusing his position when he was president and using Association funds for personal projects. Oliver alleged that these statements were false and injurious to his reputation in the community. The Petitioners raised the affirmative defense of truth.

During his deposition, Oliver testified that he relied on the advice of the Association’s prior counsel — attorneys Ashley Lupo and Gregory Marler — in determining whether certain actions taken by him and the others on the Association’s board of directors were authorized and proper. The Petitioners then sought to depose Lupo and Marler concerning the advice they gave the Association’s board members, including Oliver. Oliver objected, contending that the communications between the Association’s board and Lupo and Marler were protected by attorney/client privilege and asserting that neither he nor the prior board would waive that privilege. In addition, he argued that some of the communications were made to him in his individual capacity and so were protected by his attorney/client privilege. The Petitioners filed a motion to compel the depositions of Lupo and Marler, which the trial court denied. The Petitioners now ask this court to quash this order by way of a writ of certiorari.

The standard by which a petition for writ of certiorari is reviewed is quite narrow. A petitioner seeking a writ of common law certiorari “must establish (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.” Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So.2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Elements two and three constitute a jurisdictional test, and “[i]f the jurisdictional prongs of the standard three-part test are not fulfilled, then the petition should be dismissed rather than denied.” Id. at 649.

Generally, certiorari jurisdiction exists to consider the denial of a motion to compel the deposition of a material witness. See Nucci v. Simmons, 20 So.3d 388, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). As this court explained:

“In circumstances involving the denial of the right to take testimony of an alleged material witness, it has been recognized that such a denial cannot be remedied on appeal since ‘there would be no practical way to determine after judgment what the testimony would be or how it would affect the result.’ ”

Id. (quoting Medero v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 658 So.2d 566, 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). A material witness is one “who possesses information ‘going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.’ ” Duran v. MFM Grp., Inc., 841 So.2d 500, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (quoting Wingate v. Mach, 117 Fla. 104, 157 So. 421, 422 (1934)). Thus, the jurisdictional test in this type of case hinges on whether the indi-vidual sought to be deposed possesses information about which no other witness could properly testify.

Here, the Petitioners have asserted that Lupo and Marler are material witnesses because they, and only they, can testify as to what information and/or advice they gave the board of directors, including Oliver, concerning the propriety of the board’s actions. While Oliver argues that the management company employees could testify as to what they were told by Lupo and Marler, that testimony would constitute inadmissible hearsay. Thus, Lupo and Marler appear to be material witnesses in this case, and any error in the order prohibiting their depositions cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal. Hence, we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.

Turning to those merits, it becomes apparent that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by applying the incorrect law.

It is by now well established, and undisputed by the parties to this case, that the attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). Both for corporations and individuals, the attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, supra, at 389, 101 S.Ct. at 682; Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1577, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976).
The administration of the attorney-client privilege in the case of corporations, however, presents special problems. As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest. Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals empowered to act on behalf of the corporation....
The parties in this case agree that, for solvent corporations, the power to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege rests with the corporation’s management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors. The managers, of course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of themselves as individuals. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
The parties also agree that when control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege passes as well. New managers installed as a result of a takeover, merger, loss of confidence by shareholders, or simply normal succession, may waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications made by former officers and directors. Displaced managers may not assert the privilege over the wishes of current managers, even as to statements that the former might have made to counsel concerning matters within the scope of their corporate duties.

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348-49, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 85 L.Ed.2d 872 (1985) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted); see also Tail of the Pup, Inc. v. Webb, 528 So.2d 506, 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (noting same).

Here, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by concluding that Oliver — a “displaced manager” — had the authority to waive or assert the attorney/client privilege on behalf of the Association. This ruling placed the authority at issue in the incorrect hands. It is the Association, through its current board of directors, which is the entity with the authority to waive or assert attorney/client privilege as to communications between the Association’s prior board and its counsel. To the extent that the trial court placed this authority with Oliver, it departed from the essential requirements of the law.

Accordingly, because the trial court applied the incorrect law when deciding the merits of the Petitioners’ motion, we grant their petition, quash the order, and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court must consider whether the current Association board members have waived the attorney/client privilege on behalf of the Association and, if so, whether that waiver was valid in light of the current composition of the board.

Petition granted.

WALLACE and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.

      . We do not overlook Oliver’s contention that some of the communications between him and the Association’s counsel were made to him in his individual capacity; however, nothing in the record before this court supports this assertion. Nevertheless, on remand the trial court may revisit this issue to the extent that Oliver can identify any such alleged statements.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Jeffery COLE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-0075.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2013.
    Jeffery Cole, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Munn v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 807 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

BENTON, C.J., ROWE and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Rodney ANDERSON, Petitioner, v. Teresa McMILLAN, et al., Respondents.
    No. 1D12-6097.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2013.

      Rodney Anderson, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Donna La Plante, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is granted. The Circuit Court in and for Jackson County is directed to issue a ruling on petitioner’s request to be certified as indigent in circuit court case number 2011-CA-917 within a reasonable time, not to exceed 30 days after issuance of mandate in this cause.

PETITION GRANTED.

ROWE, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Romeka SCOTT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-5986.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2013.
    Romeka Scott, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition is granted and Romeka L. Scott is hereby afforded belated appeal from judgment and sentence in Leon County Circuit Court case number 2010 CF 2759 A. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of the opinion will be provided to the clerk of the circuit court who shall treat it as a notice of appeal. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

The circuit court is directed to appoint counsel to represent petitioner in her direct appeal if she qualifies for such an appointment.

PETITION GRANTED.

ROWE, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Marcus Dedon MACKEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-1381.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 11, 2013.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Lacey Kantor, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General; and Monique Rolla, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm Appellant’s convictions and sentences but remand for the trial court to correct a scrivener’s error in the judgment. Specifically, as to count four, the judgment should reflect that Appellant was convicted of a second-degree misdemeanor in violation of section S22.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2010).

AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

LEWIS, CLARK, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Archie L. REMBERT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D13-518.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 12, 2013.
    Archie L. Rembert, Avon Park, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the order denying his motion for postconviction relief filed December 6, 2012, in Case No.2010-CF-595, in the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County, Florida. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

ORFINGER, CJ., LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Alexander ALBRITTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-5894.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2013.
    Alexander Albritton, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Miller v. Alabama, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012); Hurd v. State, 807 So.2d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).

CLARK, MARSTILLER, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    GREAT NORTHWEST FLORIDA, etc., et al., Appellants, v. Lee J. MAHER, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. 5D12-3717.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 16, 2013.

      Joseph Silva, Jr. of the Silva Law Group, Panama City, for Appellants.
    Rosemary Hanna Hayes and Stephanie Vollrath of Hayes Law, PL, Orlando, for Appellee, Lee J. Maher.
    Sally R. Culley of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, A Professional Association, Orlando and Ben F. Easterlin, IV of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, GA, Pro Hac Vice, for Appellee, Zachary Steele.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.315(a).

GRIFFIN, LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.


text:
    John ROGELL, Appellant, v. LDD SOUTHEAST DEVELOPMENT INC., f/k/a Lowe/Palm Coast, Inc., Lowe Destination Development, Inc., Lowe Hospitality Group, Inc., Palm Coast Real Estate Services, Inc. d/b/a Ocean Hammock Realty, Ocean Blue Real Estate and Palm Coast Real Estate Company, Appellees.
    No. 5D12-2157.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 16, 2013.
    David W. Glasser, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Donald C. Works, III, and Jessica De-Bono Anderson of Jackson Lewis LLP, Orlando, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Havens v. Chambliss, 906 So.2d 318 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

TORPY, LAWSON and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Alton INGRAM, Appellant, v. Lisa INGRAM, Appellee.
    No. 4D12-1940.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 17, 2013.
    Alton Ingram, Berkeley, CA, pro se.
    No brief filed on behalf of appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the order establishing summer visitation, as none of the arguments made by the appellant on appeal were preserved by proper objection in the trial court. In addition, the issues are moot for the previous summer’s visitation. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to observe that the restrictions regarding the possession of guns by the child or by the father in the presence of the child are overly broad. Even though the guardian ad litem and mother sought a prohibition against the child handling a real gun, BB gun, or paintball gun because of the child’s tender years and his unfortunate experience with a BB gun on a visit with the father, the trial court additionally included in the prohibition toy guns. No evidence showed that the child should be disallowed to possess or play with a pop gun, water pistol or some similar childhood toy.

WARNER, GROSS and CIKLIN, JJ„ concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. A.A., a Child, Appellee.
    No. 4D12-771.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 17, 2013.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. The state contends that the trial court could not dismiss this juvenile case, because the court had not acquired jurisdiction as the child had not been served. However, the child had been detained and taken into custody. Therefore, jurisdiction attached. See § 985.0301, Fla. Stat. (2011):

(1) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law.
(2) The jurisdiction of the court shall attach to the child and the case when the summons is served upon the child ..., or when the child is taken into custody with or without service of summons and before or after the filing of a petition, whichever first occurs, and thereafter the court may control the child and the case in accordance with this chapter.

(Emphasis supplied).

WARNER, GROSS and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.


author: GERBER, J.

text:
    William A. CROMARTY and Maureen Cromarty, Appellants, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-4435.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 17, 2013.
    Carol A. Gart of Carol A. Gart, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellant.
    Donna L. Eng, Michael K. Winston and Dean A. Morande of Carlton Fields, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   GERBER, J.

The borrowers appeal from the circuit court’s final summary judgment of foreclosure in the bank’s favor. The borrowers argue, among other things, that the bank failed to negate their affirmative defense of lack of standing. Specifically, the borrowers argue that the note’s blank endorsement was undated and the bank’s evidence was insufficient to establish that it held the note and was entitled to enforce the note at the time it filed suit.

We agree with the borrowers’ argument as to standing and reverse. See Hall v. REO Asset Acquisitions, LLC, 84 So.3d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“While the note introduced had a blank endorsement and was sufficient to prove ownership by ap-pellee, who possessed the note, nothing in the record shows that the note was acquired prior to the filing of the complaint. The endorsement did not contain a date, nor did the affidavit filed in support of the motion for summary judgment contain any sworn statement that the note was owned by the plaintiff on the date that the complaint was filed.”). We conclude the borrowers’ other arguments lack merit.

Reversed and remanded.

MAY, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.


text:
    Samora RANCY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D13-1244.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 17, 2013.
    Robert Wesley, Public Defender, And Jamie David Parker Kane, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Samora Raney, seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing the lower court to grant an immediate hearing for the purposes of setting bond and reasonable conditions for pretrial release.

The Petitioner was arrested for home invasion robbery and is being held without bond. The State filed a Motion for Pretrial Detention pursuant to section 907.041(4)(a)(12), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132.

The court held a hearing on the motion. The Petitioner correctly points out that neither the court’s oral pronouncement, nor its written order contained any findings of fact or conclusions of law as required by rule 3.132(c)(2) and section 907.041(4)(I). The State concedes this was error.

The petition is granted and the matter is remanded to the lower court for an immediate hearing to further determine the issue of pretrial release or detention in accordance with the statute and the rule.

PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

SAWAYA, LAWSON and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Paul LEONE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D13-389.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 19, 2013.
    Paul Leone, Crawfordville, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal of the petitioner’s judgment and sentence is granted, based upon the failure of the trial court to advise the petitioner of his right to appeal. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence in Case No.2010~CF-1164-A, in the Circuit Court in and for Citrus County, Florida. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

GRIFFIN, SAWAYA and COHEN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jack CATALDO, Appellant, v. DAYTONA STATE COLLEGE, Appellee.
    No. 5D12-2482.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 19, 2013.
    Jack Cataldo, Daytona Beach, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Jack Cataldo appeals an order of the Florida Commission on Human Relations, which dismissed his discrimination claims against Daytona State College. Cataldo filed his complaint on September 21, 2011, alleging violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01-760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes (2011) (“the Act”). Two hundred and forty days later, on May 17, 2012, the Commission issued its order dismissing Cataldo’s claims based upon its determination that Cataldo’s complaint failed to state a claim under the Act. Under a unique provision of the Act, this ostensibly adverse determination is actually treated as a favorable determination because it was not made within 180 days after Cataldo filed his claims. See § 760.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4), as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause.”). The general rule is that “an appeal may be prosecuted only from a decree adverse to the appellant. Fountain v. City of Jacksonville, 447 So.2d 353, 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1894) (citation omitted). Because the Commission’s belated dismissal has the same legal effect as a favorable determination, we see no basis for Cataldo to prosecute this appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

LAWSON, JACOBUS and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jared Lucas BROWN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-0329.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 22, 2013.
    Matthew R. Mclain and Dave Sooklal of Brownstone, P.A., Winter Park, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a belated appeal of the August 15, 2012, corrected judgment and sentence in Bay County Circuit Court case number 11-001515-CF-MB. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

PETITION GRANTED.

BENTON, C.J., ROWE and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Bruno CANNELLA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-6169.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 22, 2013.
    Bruno Camella, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a belated appeal of the October 11, 2012, order denying the motion for postconviction relief in Santa Rosa County Circuit Court case number 2007-CF-000173-A. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

BENTON, C.J., ROWE and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    James Lee COPELAND, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-3851.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 22, 2013.
    James Lee Copeland, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the judgment and sentence rendered on or about March 7, 2011, in Gadsden County Circuit Court case number 10-00163-CFA, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal. If petitioner qualifies for the appointment of counsel at public expense, the lower tribunal is directed to appoint counsel to represent him in the appeal authorized by this opinion.

LEWIS, THOMAS, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    John S. SMITH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-2673.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 22, 2013.
    John S. Smith, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a belated appeal of the March 8, 2011, judgment and sentence in Bay County Circuit Court case number 09-002656-CFMA. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

PETITION GRANTED.

BENTON, C.J., ROWE and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


author: CLARK, Justice.

text:
    CALDWELL PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Caldwell Parish Police Jury, Caldwell Parish Hospital District # 1, Town of Columbia v. LOUISIANA MACHINERY COMPANY, L.L.C. Caldwell Parish School Board, Caldwell Parish Police Jury, Caldwell Parish Hospital District # 1, Town of Columbia v. Louisiana Machinery Rentals, L.L.C. Tensas Parish School Board, Tensas Parish Police Jury, Tensas Parish Law Enforcement District, Town of Newellton, Town of St. Joseph v. Louisiana Machinery Company, LLC. Tensas Parish School Board, Tensas Parish Police Jury, Town of Newellton, Town of St. Joseph, Tensas Parish Law Enforcement District v. Louisiana Machinery Rentals, LLC.
    Nos. 2012-C-1383, 2012-C-1762.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 29, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied April 5, 2013.

      Rainer, Anding & McLindon, Robert R. . Rainer, Drew Michael Talbot, for applicant. (Nos. 2012-C-1383, 2012-C-1762)
    Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, Jesse R. Adams, III, Andre Brian Burvant, Kathryn Scioneaux Friel, Matthew Andrew Mantle, for respondent. (No. 2012-C-1762)
   CLARK, Justice.

|TWe granted certiorari in these consolidated cases in order to determine whether the court of appeal erred in overturning the rulings of the district courts with regard to certain tax assessments. Questions were raised as to whether review 12by this Court and the court of appeal was timely sought. Because we have determined that the application to this Court in Caldwell Parish School Board, 12-C-1383, was untimely filed, and the underlying appeal to the court of appeal in Tensas Parish School Board, 12-C-1762, was also untimely filed, we find we lack jurisdiction to consider the validity of the decision of the court of appeal in Caldwell Parish School Board, and the district court judgment in Tensas Parish School Board is final and definitive.

Facts and Procedural History

In these consolidated cases, the Concor-dia Parish School Board (the “Collector”), pursuant to Louisiana Constitution, Article VII, § 3(B), has been designated as the single collector for sales and use taxes levied by all taxing authorities in Caldwell and Tensas Parishes. The Collector, acting on behalf of the Caldwell Parish School Board, the Caldwell Parish Police Jury, Caldwell Parish Hospital District # 1, and the Town of Columbia in Caldwell Parish School Board, and on behalf of the Tensas Parish School Board, the Tensas Parish Police Jury, the Town of Newellton, the Town of St. Joseph, and the Tensas Parish Law Enforcement District in Tensas Parish School Board, began tax collection proceedings against Louisiana Machinery Company, L.L.C., and Louisiana Machinery Rentals, L.L.C., after audits indicated the two companies underpaid sales and use taxes for the period December 1, 2000, through June 30, 2007.

The Collector sent tax assessment notices in both proceedings to the two companies on three occasions. The dates and language of the notices were the same, although the amounts assessed were different. The notices read, in pertinent part:

NOTICE: As provided in La. R.S. 47:387.51 B, if you wish to protest, you have thirty (30) days from the date hereof to file with this office a written protest, signed by you or your duly authorized agent, which |sshall be under oath, fully disclosing the reasons therefor, and request a hearing.
If you do not timely file a written protest and request a hearing, you have sixty (60) calendar days from the date hereof to:
1) Pay the amount set forth herein above,
2) Pay the total amount set forth herein above under protest as provided in La. R.S. 47:337.63 and file suit for recovery within thirty (30) days of payment, or
3) Within thirty (30) days of receipt of the Notice of Assessment, file suit in any state court of competent jurisdiction contesting the final assessment, and in connection therewith, post a commercial bond or other security as provided in La. R.S. 47:337.64 in accordance with the procedures set forth therein.
Do not disregard this notice, failure to act within the time or manner provided will result in the assessment becoming final and enforceable by warrant for distraint. Additional penalties, interest and collection fees may be assessed at that time (Emphasis in original).

Following the notices of assessment sent on December 24, 2009, the companies submitted additional documentation to the Collector. The Collector, on February 22, 2010, sent out revised assessments with amended amounts due, but containing the same legal remedies in the previous notices. Again, the companies responded by submitting additional documentation. Finally, on April 26, 2010, the Collector sent the companies another revised assessment containing amended amounts due, and, again, containing the same legal notice.

After neither company responded to the April 26, 2010, notices, on September 24, 2010, the Collector filed separate summary proceedings on behalf of the taxing entities against both companies in the appropriate district courts, the Thirty-seventh Judicial District Court in Caldwell Parish School Board and the Sixth Judicial District Court in Tensas Parish School Board, alleging the companies owed sales and use taxes, penalties, interest, and attorney fees. The ^companies answered the petitions and filed various exceptions, including exceptions of prescription and no cause of action.

In October 2010, the Collector filed motions for partial summary judgment in all suits, asserting the tax assessments became final on June 25, 2010, sixty days after the April 26, 2010, notices were issued to the companies; the notices were the equivalent of judgments; and the notices established the companies’ liability. The district courts agreed, granting the motions for partial summary judgment in favor of the taxing entities. The companies appealed all four judgments.

The court of appeal consolidated the two Caldwell Parish suits and reversed the district court’s granting of the taxing entities’ motions for summary judgment. Caldwell Parish School Board v. Louisiana Machinery Co., L.L.C., 47,349, 47,350 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/16/12), 94 So.3d 144. The court of appeal then consolidated the two Tensas Parish suits and, again, reversed. Tensas Parish School Board v. Louisiana Machinery Co., L.L.C., 47,516, 47,517 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/29/12), 94 So.3d 1039. We granted certiorari in the two consolidated matters, Caldwell Parish School Board v. Louisiana Machinery Co., L.L.C., 12-1383 (La.9/28/12), 98 So.3d 822, and Tensas Parish School Board v. Louisiana Machinery Co., L.L.C., 12-1762 (La.9/28/12), 98 So.3d 823, and in turn, consolidated them for argument and opinion.

Discussion

Questions were raised whether the application to this Court in Caldwell Parish School Board was filed timely, and whether the underlying appeal in Tensas Parish School Board was filed timely. Both questions must be answered before we can address the merits of the cases.

Caldwell Parish School Board— Timeliness of the Application in this Court

Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a) provides:

| ¡An application seeking to review a judgment of the court of appeal either after an appeal to that court, or after that court has granted relief on an application for supervisory writs (but not when the court has merely granted an application for purposes of further consideration), or after a denial of an application, shall be made within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of the original judgment of the court of appeal; however, if a timely application for rehearing has been filed in the court of appeal in those instances where a rehearing is allowed, the application shall be made within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of denial of rehearing or the judgment on rehearing. No extension of time therefor will be granted.

Here, the court of appeal rendered its opinion on March 16, 2012. The taxing entities filed an application for rehearing of that judgment. On May 31, 2012, the court of appeal, citing La. R.S. 47:337.61(3), refused rehearing. The taxing entities then filed a writ application in this Court on Monday, June 18, 2012, less than thirty days after the court of appeal refused rehearing, but more than thirty days after the court of appeal opinion.

Louisiana Machinery Company, L.L.C., argues that, as found by the court of appeal, La. R.S. 47:337.61(3) expressly prohibits a rehearing in a summary proceeding to collect taxes. Therefore, the company argues, the thirty-day period for seeking a writ application to this Court was not extended by the Collector’s improper filing of a motion for rehearing. The Collector, on the other hand, argues that the statute’s prohibition on rehearing only applies to the trial court.

We determine the meaning of statutes in accordance with the rules of statutory construction. In accord with these rules, the interpretation of any statutory provision starts with the language of the statute itself. In re Succession of Faget, 10-0188, p. 8 (La.11/30/10), 53 So.3d 414, 420. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written. ABL Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Southern Univ., 00-0798, p. 6 (La.11/28/00), 773 So.2d 131, 135. Further, when interpreting a statute, the court should give it the meaning the legislature intended. ABL Mgmt., Inc., 00-07986 at 6; 773 So.2d at 135. A statute’s provisions must be construed so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used. La. R.S. 1:4; In re Clegg, 10-0323, p. 20 (La.7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1141, 1154. Unequivocal provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their generally understood meaning. La. R.S. 1:3. Words and phrases must be read in context and construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. La. R.S. 1:3. “The word ‘shall’ is mandatory and the word ‘may’ is permissive.” La. R.S. 1:3. Further, every word, sentence, or provision in a law is presumed to be intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Colvin v. Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Bd., 06-1104, p. 6 (La.1/17/07), 947 So.2d 15, 19.

The statute in question, La. R.S. 47:337.61, reads in pertinent part:

In addition to any other procedure provided in this Chapter or elsewhere in the laws of this state, and for the purpose of facilitating and expediting the determination and trial of all claims for taxes, penalties, interest, attorney fees, or other costs and charges arising, there is hereby provided a summary proceeding for the hearing and determination of all claims by or on behalf of the taxing authority, or by or on behalf of the collector, for taxes and for the penalties, interest, attorney fees, costs or other charges due thereon, by preference in all courts, all as follows:
(3) That all matters involving any such claim shall be decided within forty-eight hours after submission, whether in term time or in vacation, and whether in the court of first instance or in an appellate court, and all judgments sustaining any such claim shall be rendered and signed the same day, and shall become final and executory on the fifth calendar day after rendition. No new trial, rehearing or devolutive appeal shall be allowed. Suspensive appeals may be granted, but must be perfected within five calendar days from the rendition of the judgment by giving of bond, with good and solvent security, in a sum double that of the total amount of the judgment, including costs. Such appeals, whether to a court of appeal or to the supreme court, shall be made returnable in not more than fifteen calendar days from the rendition of the judgment.

La. R.S. 47:337.61 (emphasis added).

|7The statute is certainly not unambiguous as to whether rehearings are allowed in appellate courts. The sentence “[n]o new trial, rehearing or devolutive appeal shall be allowed” seems to be in the section dealing with proceedings in the trial court prior to appeal, as it refers to motions for new trial and motions for devolu-tive appeals, which may only be taken from judgments in the trial court. However, use of the term “rehearing” in this sequence is confusing, as there is no procedure in the Code of Civil Procedure for rehearing in the trial court, and this fact has been recognized by at least one appellate court. See Hargrave v. Delaughter, 08-1168, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/4/09), 10 So.3d 245, 252. Moreover, in Vasalle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 01-0462 (La.11/28/01), 801 So.2d 331, this Court questioned whether there is any formal procedural means for a litigant to ask a trial court to reconsider an earlier judgment:

Wal-Mart argues that plaintiffs’ motion seeking reconsideration of their original motion for JNOV, filed February 18, 1999, was untimely and unauthorized by the Code of Civil Procedure and, as it was the vehicle and the authority for the trial court to reverse its January 29, 1999 ruling, could not have been considered by the court. We need not, however, determine whether the motion for reconsideration has a place in our trial practice or whether the motion, if it is a valid motion, was timely filed because this motion was not the source of the district court’s authority for granting plaintiffs’ motion for JNOV. As explained above, a trial court may correct an interlocutoiy ruling it later determines was erroneously issued on its own motion. Because the judge had that right, he had the right to accomplish the same end indirectly by acting on plaintiffs’ request that he reconsider his ruling.

Under these circumstances, the only logical conclusion is that the term “rehearing” refers to rehearing in the court of appeal. This reasoning is reinforced by the overall emphasis of the statute on expediting the procedure in both the trial and appellate courts. In support, we note the statute makes it clear the case “shall be decided within forty-eight hours after submission, whether in term time or in 18vacation, and whether in the court of first instance or in an appellate court....” La.R.S. 47:337.61 (emphasis added). Seen in this context, it follows that the legislature would eliminate rehearings in an effort to make the judgment final as soon as possible.

Therefore, a rehearing is not allowed in this instance. Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a) provides the thirty-day period for applying for a writ of certiorari may be extended “if a timely application for rehearing has been filed in the court of appeal in those instances where a rehearing is allowed” (emphasis added). Because a rehearing was not allowed, the thirty-day period ran from the date the court of appeal issued notice of judgment on May 16, 2012, and the application was due in this Court on Friday, June 15, 2012.

The Collector filed its writ application in this Court by Federal Express delivery on Monday, June 18, 2012. Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(d) explains “[applications forwarded by private delivery or courier service shall be deemed timely filed only if received by the clerk on or before the last day of the delay for filing.” Because this application was not received on or before June 15, 2012, it is untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to consider the validity of the decision of the court of appeal. See Thompson v. Bamburg, 231 La. 1082, 93 So.2d 666 (1957).

Tensas Parish School Board— Timeliness of the Suspensive Appeal

In 12-C-1762, the Collector argues the court of appeal erred in holding the companies’ suspensive appeals were timely perfected. The district court judgments were signed on December 20, 2011, and notices of judgment were mailed on January 13, 2012. The companies’ appeals were filed on January 17, 2012, which was within five days of the mailing of notice of judgment, but more than five days from the signing of judgment. Relying on La. R.S. 47:337.61, the Collector argues that the companies had only five calendar days from the date the | ¡judgment was rendered to perfect their suspensive appeals.

By contrast, the companies argue the district court did not mail a notice of judgment until January 13, 2012. The companies maintain they complied with La. R.S. 47:337.61, by filing their suspensive appeal on January 17, 2012, within five days of the mailing of notice of judgment.

As stated earlier, La. R.S. 47:337.61(3) provides:

(3) That all matters involving any such claim shall be decided within forty-eight hours after submission, whether in term time or in vacation, and whether in the court of first instance or in an appellate court, and all judgments sustaining any such claim shall be rendered and signed the same day, and shall become final and execu-tory on the fifth calendar day after rendition. No new trial, rehearing or devolutive appeal shall be allowed. Suspensive appeals may be granted, but must be perfected within five calendar days from the rendition of the judgment by giving of bond, with good and solvent security, in a sum double that of the total amount of the judgment, including costs. Such appeals, whether to a court of appeal or to the supreme court, shall be made returnable in not more than fifteen calendar days from the rendition of the judgment (emphasis added).

Nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure defines how a judgment is rendered. However, Chapter 3 of the code is entitled “Rendition.” The first article in that chapter is La. C.C.P. art. 1911, which provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, every final judgment shall be signed by the judge. For the purpose of an appeal as provided in Article 2083, no appeal may be taken from a final judgment until the requirement of this Article has been fulfilled. No appeal may be taken from a partial final judgment under Article 1915(B) until the judgment has been designated a final judgment under Article 1915(B). An appeal may be taken from a final judgment under Article 1915(A) without the judgment being so designated.

This article implies a final judgment is rendered when it is signed by the judge. See also La. R.S. 13:4207 (setting maximum delay for rendering a | judgment under advisement). Such an interpretation would be consistent with the overall intent of the statute, which seems to focus on adjudicating the matter to finality as soon as possible.

On the other hand, it is unclear how the parties would know the trial court signed the judgment without receiving formal notice. La. C.C.P. art.1914 provides the “rendition of an interlocutory judgment in open court constitutes notice to all parties.” However, the judgment in the instant case was not interlocutory in nature, nor was it rendered in open court. Therefore, the judgment would be governed by La. C.C.P. art. 1913(A), which provides “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law, notice of the signing of a final judgment, including a partial final judgment under Article 1915, is required in all contested cases, and shall be mailed by the clerk of court to the counsel of record for each party, and to each party not represented by counsel.” Nothing in La. R.S. 47:337.61(3) expressly dispenses with the notice requirement. Therefore, it could be argued that rendition of the judgment necessarily includes notice to the parties. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the general appeal articles, which provide the appeal delays commence from the mailing of notice. See La. C.C.P. arts.2087 and 2133.

Moreover, as a policy matter, defendant argues it would be unreasonable to begin the five-day appeal delay from the moment the judgment is signed, because it would place an onerous burden on litigants to constantly monitor the status of the case.

However, that concern appears to be lessened in the present case, as the companies approved and submitted the final judgment for the district court judge’s signature; thus, the companies should have been aware they had a heightened duty to monitor the case, in light of the short appeal delays. Further, the requirements contained in Louisiana District Court Rule 9.5, entitled “Court’s Signature; | n Circulation of Proposed Judgment,” also served to place the defendant on notice. The Rule states in pertinent part:

All judgments, orders, and rulings requiring the court’s signature shall either be presented to the judge for signature when rendered or, if presented later, contain the typewritten name of the judge who rendered the judgment, order, or ruling.
If presented later, the responsible attorney or the self-represented party shall circulate the proposed judgment, order, or ruling to counsel for all parties and to self-represented parties and allow at least five (5) working days for comment before presentation to the court. When submitted, the proposed judgment, order, or ruling shall be accompanied by a certificate regarding the date of mailing, hand delivery, or other method of delivery of the document to other counsel of record and to self-represented parties, stating whether any opposition was received.

Furthermore, the companies’ counsel admitted during oral argument that defendant had, in fact, managed to perfect appeals in several other tax cases brought in summary proceedings, showing that the burden, while “onerous,” is one that may be borne.

Finally, and most importantly, La. R.S. 47:337.61(3) clearly states that suspensive appeals “must be perfected within five calendar days from the rendition of the judgment,” and not “five days from the mailing of notice.” As we stated earlier, such unequivocal provisions are not subject to judicial construction. Although we might find it more equitable from a policy perspective to measure the five-day period for perfecting a suspensive appeal from the date notice was sent, had the legislature intended the appeal delay to be measured from the mailing of notice of judgment, the legislature could have quite easily worded the statute to so provide. By wording the statute as it has, the legislature clearly intended that the period be measured from rendition rather than from mailing of notice. Should the legislature at some point wish to amend the statute to allow the time period to begin at the mailing of notice, as the general appeal statutes provide, it certainly has that power. Unless and until the legislature makes that decision, though, the 11?statute mandates that suspensive appeals must be perfected within five days of the rendition of judgment. Because this appeal was filed more than five days from the rendition of judgment, it was untimely, and the court of appeal erred in determining otherwise.

Conversion of Matter into Ordinary Proceeding

The companies contended that the Collector essentially converted this matter into an ordinary proceeding by filing a motion for partial summary judgment, a procedural device which, they argue, is not available in a summary proceeding. By so doing, the companies assert, they were not bound by the filing delays contained in La. R.S. 47:337.61(3).

The court of appeal in Tensas Parish School Board apparently agreed that summary judgments were not available in summary proceedings, stating: “Within the[ ] general rules for summary proceedings, there obviously is no allowance or need for motions for summary judgment.” Tensas Parish School Board, 94 So.3d at 1044-45. The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the notion that motions for summary judgment are unavailable in summary proceedings in Catahoula Parish School Board v. Louisiana Machinery Rentals, LLC, 12-0443, 12-0444 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/24/12), 105 So.3d 169 (application now pending in this court in 12-C-2504). In Catahoula Parish School Board, a matter factually identical to the instant case, the court of appeal explained, while summary judgments are allowable in summary proceedings, because the evidentiary rules governing a motion for summary judgment are more stringent than the evidentiary rules governing a summary proceeding held under La. R.S. 47:337.61, “should a summary judgment proceeding be implemented in summary proceedings under Sec. 61, the strict evidentiary requirements of a summary judgment proceeding 11Rmust be followed.” Catahoula Parish School Board, 105 So.3d at 179.

In general, the rules governing ordinary proceedings are applicable to summary proceedings, except as otherwise provided by law. La. C.C.P. art. 2596. Furthermore, “[t]he summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the ... determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article 969.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). La. C.C.P. art. 969 bars the use of summary judgments in most divorce cases.

Because summary proceedings are governed by the rules applicable to ordinary proceedings “except as provided by law,” and no law, particularly La. R.S. 47:337.61, precludes the use of summary judgment in a summary proceeding, summary judgments are not precluded in summary proceedings and their use, therefore, does not convert a summary proceeding into an ordinary proceeding. The delays for review contained in La. R.S. 47:337.61 consequently apply.

Conclusion

In sum, we hold that the writ application to this Court in Caldwell Parish School Board, 12-C-1383, was untimely filed and, thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider the validity of the decision of the court of appeal. We also find that the | uunderlying appeal to the court of appeal in Tensas Parish School Board, 12-C-1762, was untimely filed, and the judgment of the district court in that matter is final and definitive.

Decree

Caldwell Parish School Board v. Louisiana Machinery Co., 12-C-1383

Writ dismissed; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.

Tensas Parish School Board v. Louisiana Machinery Co., 12-C-1762

Reversed; judgment of the trial court reinstated.

      . Because the issue of whether the affidavits introduced in support of a motion for summary judgment filed in a summary proceeding described in La. R.S. 47:337.61 must follow the evidentiary requirements contained in C.C.P. art. 968 is not necessary to our resolution of these matters, we pretermit its discussion.

      . La. C.C.P. art. 969:
      A. Judgments on the pleadings and summary judgments shall not be granted in any action for divorce or annulment of marriage, nor in any case where the community, paraphernal, or dotal rights may be involved in an action between husband and wife.
      B. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph A, judgments on the pleadings and summary judgments may be granted without hearing in any action for divorce under Civil Code Article 103(1) under the following conditions:
      (a) All parties are represented by counsel;
      (b) Counsel for each party, after answer is filed, file a written joint stipulation of facts, request for judgment, and sworn verification by each party; and
      (c) Counsel for each party file a proposed judgment containing a certification that counsel and each party agree to the terms thereof.
      (2) The court may render and sign such judgments in chambers without a hearing and without the taking of testimony.