text:
    Laura Leigh WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Doc Holmes Correctional Institute/ Division of Risk Management, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-2631.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 4, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied April 14, 2014.
    Stacy J. Ford of Litigation and Appeals Advocacy, P.L.L.C., Saint Cloud, for Appellant.
    Colleen Cleary Ortiz of Colleen Cleary Ortiz, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying com-pensability of Claimant’s accident/injuries and all claims stemming therefrom, including a claim for impairment benefits. Claimant disputes both rulings, and, relative to impairment benefits, also argues in the alternative that she is entitled to some impairment benefits even if compensability is ultimately denied, because the Employer/Carrier made use of the “pay and investigate” rule set out in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2011). We affirm the order in its entirety, as follows.

We affirm without further comment the JCC’s ruling that the accident/injuries are not compensable. Regarding Claimant’s alternative argument, we affirm the denial of impairment benefits because Claimant did not establish entitlement to such benefits, notwithstanding the lack of compensability of her claims. Here, Claimant asserts that she became entitled to the payment of impairment benefits during the period when her case was being handled by the Employer/Carrier “as if the claim had been accepted as compensa-ble,” under section 440.20(4). Thus, argues Claimant, regardless of whether Claimant’s injuries are in fact compensa-ble, the Employer/Carrier was obligated to pay some amount of impairment benefits to satisfy its liabilities incurred under section 440.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), during the period when the case was accepted as if compensable under section 440.20(4).

Section 440.15(8)(a) provides, however, that impairment benefits are payable when the employee reaches the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI). Further, impairment benefits are payable upon establishment of a “permanent impairment.” § 440.15(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2011). “Permanent impairment” is defined in part as “existing after the date of [MMI].” § 440.02(22), Fla. Stat. (2011). There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record that Claimant reached MMI during the period when the case was handled as if compensable. Although the JCC found Claimant had a ten percent permanent impairment rating (10% PIR) and the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support that finding, the JCC made no express finding as to MMI, and the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence that Claimant reached MMI at any point prior to the denial of the case by the Employer/Carrier. Contrary to Claimant’s assertion, the record does not indicate the parties agreed on an MMI date. In any event, a JCC should not accept a stipulation on a date of MMI where the evidence is at variance with the stipulation. See Buttrick v. By the Sea Resorts, Inc., 108 So.3d 658, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Here, the same document indicating Dr. Bhatt assigned a 10% PIR states “NO” in response to the question of whether Claimant had reached MMI. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Claimant did not establish that the E/C was liable for impairment benefits during the period when the case was accepted as compensable under section 440.20(4).

AFFIRMED.

VAN NORTWICK, PADOVANO, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Kenneth Edward KONIG, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-0568.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 7, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied April 14, 2014.
    Petition Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel-Original Jurisdiction. Kenneth Edward Konig, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

This petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is dismissed as untimely. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(d)(5).

LEWIS, C.J., WETHERELL and ROWE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Travis H. OVERTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-0668.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 7, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied April 14, 2014.
    Travis H. Overton, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

WOLF, VAN NORTWICK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lamar FLOYD, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-0707.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 7, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied April 10, 2014.
    Lamar Floyd, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

WOLF, VAN NORTWICK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tressey JONES, Appellant, v. SHADOW TRAILERS, INC./USIS, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-4168.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 18, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied April 11, 2014.

      Kelli Biferie Hastings of the Law Office of Kelli B. Hastings, PLLC, Orlando, and Sean McCormack of Colling, Gilbert, Wright & Carter, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Michael D. Quiggins of Eraclides, Gel-man, Hall, Indek, Goodman & Waters, LLC, Tallahassee, and Cindy R. Galen of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman & Waters, LLC, Sarasota, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying his motion for “medical-only” attorney’s fees, payable by the Employer/Carrier (E/C) as provided for in section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2012). We affirm.

The parties agree that the E/C conceded Claimant’s entitlement to the benefits claimed in Claimant’s petition for benefits, eight days after it received the petition. Section 440.34(3)(a) allows for E/C-paid attorney’s fees where a claimant “successfully asserts a petition for medical benefits only.” Claimant argues that he is due E/C-paid fees under Allen v. Tyrone Square 6 AMC Theaters, 731 So.2d 699, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), wherein this court considered section 440.34(3)(a), and held that “[w]hen a specific request for reasonable and necessary medical care is made, the employer is under an obligation to provide the benefits within a reasonable time-whether a petition for medical benefits is ever filed, or not.”

Allen was decided before a 2002 amendment to section 440.34(3), which added the language that, “[r]egardless of the date benefits were initially requested, attorney’s fees shall not attach under this subsection until 30 days after the date the carrier or employer, if self-insured, receives the petition.” See Ch. 02-236, § 13, at 1736, Laws of Fla. This amendment is substantive, see Stolzer v. Magic Tilt Trailer, Inc., 878 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), and applies to Claimant’s January 29, 2013, date of accident, see Leather Shop v. Mills, 592 So.2d 744, 745 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). To be clear, the amendment supersedes the rule announced in Allen, for dates of accident since the amendment went into effect; it creates a bright-line rule for the attachment of E/C-paid attorney’s fees under every sub-subsection of 440.34(3). See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Reddick, 954 So.2d 723, 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“Florida’s well-settled rule of statutory construction [is] that the legislature is presumed to know the existing law when a statute is enacted, including ‘judicial decisions on the subject concerning which it subsequently enacts a statute.’ ”) (quoting, in a parenthetical, Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 290 (Fla.2001)).

AFFIRMED.

PADOVANO, CLARK, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


author: SILBERMAN, Judge.

text:
    Dean SHELLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D13-1941.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 19, 2014.

      Victoria Hatfield of O’Brien Hatfield, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   SILBERMAN, Judge.

Dean Shelley responded to a Craigslist ad posted in the Casual Encounters section by a police officer posing as a single mother nudist “looking for family fun.” Shelley made arrangements via electronic communication to have sex with the “mother’s” fictitious ten-year-old daughter and was arrested when he arrived at the predetermined meeting place. In this appeal, Shelley seeks review of his convictions for (1) use of computer services or devices to solicit consent of a parent or legal guardian, and (2) traveling to meet a minor after using computer services or devices to solicit consent of a parent or legal guardian. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Shelley entered guilty pleas to the charges while reserving his right to appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss and amended motion to dismiss. Shelley argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss because the undisputed facts failed to establish a prima facie case of the crimes. Shelley also argues that the trial court erred in denying the amended motion to dismiss because his convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We address these arguments in turn.

I. Prima Facie Case

Shelley argues that the undisputed facts do not establish that he actually contacted a child or a person he believed to be a child. We recognize that the then-applicable standard jury instructions for both offenses required that the defendant use a computer to contact the person believed to be the child victim. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.17(b), (d) (2009). However, the applicable statutes, which are controlling, do not contain this requirement. See § 847.0135(3)(b), (4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011); State v. Wilson, 128 So.3d 946, 948 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). The supreme court has recently approved amendments to the standard jury instructions that cure the errors. See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2012-09, 122 So.3d 263, 276, 279 (Fla.2013).

Shelley also argues that the undisputed facts fail to establish that he solicited, lured, or enticed a parent to consent to a child’s participation in the illegal conduct. Shelley claims that his conduct on the date charged in the information did not constitute soliciting, luring, or enticing because the plan to engage in illicit sexual contact was set in motion before that date. And he claims that the undercover officer was the person who did the soliciting, luring, and enticing.

Both of these arguments have been rejected by our sister courts. See Hartley v. State, 129 So.3d 486, 489-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that certain text exchanges on specific dates constituted soliciting even though they were merely confirming plans established on another date to meet the child for a sexual encounter); State v. Murphy, 124 So.3d 323, 328-29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (rejecting the argument that the defendant did not solicit a parent’s consent because an officer was posing as the parent and had placed the Craigslist ad). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting Shelley’s challenges to the State’s prima facie case and denying the motion to dismiss.

II. Double Jeopardy

Shelley argues that his convictions for soliciting and traveling violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Shelley asserts that the elements of soliciting under section 847.0135(3)(b) are subsumed by the elements of traveling under section 847.0135(4)(b). The State does not dispute that the soliciting offense is subsumed by the traveling offense but argues that the dual convictions are proper because the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments for the crimes.

We conduct a de novo review of a double jeopardy claim based on undisputed facts. Pizzo v. State, 945 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Fla.2006). “ ‘The prevailing standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions 'for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature “intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.” ’ ” Valdes v. State, 3 So.3d 1067, 1070 (Fla.2009) (quoting Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 19 (Fla.2001)). The legislative intent may “be explicitly stated in a statute.” M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996). If there is no explicit legislative intent to allow separate punishments for two crimes arising out of the same criminal transaction, courts must apply the Blockburger test as codified in section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (2011), to determine whether the legislature intended to allow separate punishments. M.P., 682 So.2d at 81.

In this case, section 847.0135(3)(b) expressly provides, “Each separate use of a computer online service, Internet service, local bulletin board service, or any other device capable of electronic data storage or transmission wherein an offense described in this section is committed may be charged as a separate offense.” Thus, there is an explicit statement of the legislature’s intent to authorize multiple punishments for each violation of section 847.0135(3)(b).

However, there is no explicit statement of intent to authorize multiple punishments for conduct that violates both section 847.0135(3)(b) and section 847.0135(4)(b). We recognize that the First District has reached the opposite conclusion. See Murphy, 124 So.3d at 330-31. The Murphy court reasoned that, by separately establishing and defining soliciting and traveling in different sections of the statute, the legislature expressed its intent to allow for multiple punishments for the crimes. Id. at 330.

We do not agree that the placement of the offenses in separate provisions constitutes an explicit statement of intent for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis. Compare M.P., 682 So.2d at 82 (holding that the legislature explicitly stated its intent to allow multiple punishments by providing “that ‘[t]he provisions of this section are supplemental to all other provisions of law1 ” (quoting § 790.22(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994))), with Gorday v. State, 907 So.2d 640, 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (holding that there was “nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the credit card theft statute” that established an intent to allow for convictions under both the credit card statute and the armed robbery statute for an armed robbery of a purse containing a credit card).

There being no explicit statement of intent, we must proceed to a Blockburger analysis under section 775.021(4). Under that section, the legislature provided for three exceptions to the general rule authorizing multiple convictions for separate criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal transaction or episode. Id. The exception that Shelley argues applies in this case is for “[ojffenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.” § 775.021(4)(b)(3).

To determine whether this exception applies we must analyze whether the soliciting offense contains an element that is not found in the traveling offense. See Pinder v. State, 128 So.3d 141, 142-48 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018). The soliciting offense is set forth in section 847.0135(3)(b) and provides, in pertinent part:

Any person who knowingly uses a computer online service, Internet service, local bulletin board service, or any other device capable of electronic data storage or transmission to:
(b) Solicit, lure, or entice, or attempt to solicit, lure, or entice a parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a child or a person believed to be a parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a child to consent to the participation of such child in any act described in chapter 794, chapter 800, or chapter 827, or to otherwise engage in any sexual conduct, commits a felony of the third degree. ...

This language is repeated in the traveling offense which provides, in pertinent part:

Any person who travels any distance either within this state, to this state, or from this state by any means, who attempts to do so, or who causes another to do so or to attempt to do so for the purpose of engaging in any illegal act described in chapter 794, chapter 800, or chapter 827, or to otherwise engage in other unlawful sexual conduct with a child or with another person believed by the person to be a child after using a computer online service, Internet service, local bulletin board service, or any other device capable of electronic data storage or transmission to:
(b) Solicit, lure, or entice or attempt to solicit, lure, or entice a parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a child or a person believed to be a parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a child to consent to the participation of such child in any act described in chapter 7%, chapter 800, or chapter 827, or to otherwise engage in any sexual conduct, commits a felony of the second degree ....

§ 847.0135(4)(b) (emphasis added).

In essence, the traveling offense proscribes traveling to meet a child to engage in unlawful sexual contact after having solicited the child’s parent, legal guardian, or custodian or a person believed to be such. Thus, the soliciting offense does not contain an element that is not found in the traveling offense. See Hartley, 129 So.3d at 491; Pinder, 128 So.3d at 143. As a result, dual convictions for soliciting and traveling in the course of one criminal transaction or episode violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Id.

The State asserts that because Shelley’s three separate uses of computer devices on the date charged in the information would have supported three separate soliciting charges, the soliciting charge is not subsumed by the traveling charge. We are not persuaded by this argument. The State only charged one use of computer devices to solicit, and that charge was based on a solicitation occurring on the same date as the traveling offense. We find no legal basis to deny a double jeopardy challenge based on uncharged conduct simply because it could have been charged. But we acknowledge that convictions for both soliciting and traveling may be legally imposed in cases in which the State has charged and proven separate uses of computer devices to solicit. See Hartley, 129 So.3d at 491 (vacating a soliciting conviction for conduct on the same date as the traveling conviction but affirming two soliciting convictions for conduct on different dates); Pinder, 128 So.3d at 144 (affirming soliciting and traveling convictions because the soliciting conduct was charged over multiple dates and the evidence established multiple offenses over multiple dates).

In conclusion, the convictions for both soliciting and traveling as charged in this case violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because the soliciting offense is subsumed by the traveling offense. We therefore affirm the conviction and sentence for traveling and vacate the conviction and sentence for soliciting. See Pizzo, 945 So.2d at 1207 (holding that the proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation is to vacate the subsumed offense). We also certify conflict with the First District’s decision in Murphy to the extent that it holds that the legislature explicitly stated its intent to allow separate convictions for soliciting and traveling for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part; conflict certified.

NORTHCUTT and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.

      . Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).


author: CRENSHAW, Judge.

text:
    Henry LAFFERTY, Jr., Appellant, v. Lora LAFFERTY, Appellee.
    No. 2D12-4540.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 28, 2014.

      Edward B. Sobel of Edward B. Sobel, P.A., Bradenton, for Appellant.
    Susan J. Silverman, Sarasota; and Melton H. Little of Kallins & Little, P.A., Palmetto, for Appellee.
   CRENSHAW, Judge.

Henry Lafferty, Jr., Former Husband, appeals the final judgment of dissolution of his marriage to Lora Lafferty, Former Wife. We affirm the majority of the thorough judgment without comment; but because the court erred in calculating the retroactive alimony and in failing to properly conduct an imputation analysis, we reverse on those issues as well as two additional calculations.

I. Background

The parties married in 1988, and Former Wife filed her petition for dissolution in 2010. During and after the marriage, Former Husband served in the United States Army and, as relevant here, Former Wife was a nurse manager at a local hospital. In the final judgment, the court awarded Former Wife retroactive alimony of $29,423 and durational, periodic alimony of $1000 monthly for five years as well as attorney’s fees. The retroactive alimony award did not include a $1000 setoff for rent Former Husband paid. Former Wife’s Florida nursing license lapsed after she resigned her position at the hospital, but she now has a South Carolina nursing license. Though able to work, Former Wife was unemployed at the time of trial, which she testified was based on unavailability of jobs. Most of the material calculations in this case were done by Former Wife’s CPA, Mr. Miller.

II. Calculation of Retroactive Alimony

Though we affirm the judgment in its allowance of retroactive alimony, in reviewing the record, we must agree with Former Husband that the amount of retroactive alimony awarded was error. Although the final judgment cites to the schedule prepared by Mr. Miller, the amounts therein are not all supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Ponce v. Ponce, 997 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Rather, it appears that Mr. Miller did not look to Former Wife’s need during this time period but rather added the net disposable income attributed to each party together and decided Former Wife was entitled to an amount that is forty-five percent of the total. That percentage does not appear to have any basis in the record. From that number Mr. Miller subtracted Former Wife’s net, disposable income which resulted in the amount the trial court awarded: $29,423. While the final judgment says Former Wife testified to her need of this amount, Former Wife never actually quantified any amounts. Thus, there is a dearth of competent evidence of both Former Wife’s need for this amount and the reason for the percentage awarded to her. Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse this portion of the judgment and remand for further proceedings to determine the amount of retroactive alimony. Regarding any time period for which the court awards retroactive alimony and Former Wife was not employed, the court must also undertake an imputation analysis as described below.

III. Lack of Imputation to Former Wife

The record in this case, including the final judgment, reflects that the court did not conduct an analysis regarding imputation of income to Former Wife as part of its alimony award. The framework the court uses to determine whether imputation is necessary and, if so, how to calculate an amount is an issue of law we review de novo. See Tarkow v. Tarkow, 128 So.3d 82, 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (citing Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So.3d 867, 869 (Fla.2010)). In computing an alimony award where one spouse has become unemployed, the court must consider whether that change in circumstance was voluntary. Valentine v. Van Sickle, 42 So.3d 267, 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing Gildea v. Gildea, 593 So.2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)). If so, the court must then determine the diligence of that spouse in finding additional income. Schlagel v. Schlagel, 973 So.2d 672, 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). When the court concludes that one spouse was voluntarily un- or underemployed and has not been diligent in finding replacement income, the court should, based on competent, substantial evidence, impute income to that party. See Schlagel, 973 So.2d at 675 (citing Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 912 So.2d 363, 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Hinton v. Smith, 725 So.2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)). A failure to do so is error. See Riley v. Riley, 14 So.3d 1284, 1290 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Where there is insufficient evidence to determine the amount to impute, there is a presumption based on the spouse’s historical earnings that arises, though it can be rebutted by the spouse to whom income is imputed. See Ghay v. Ghay, 954 So.2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“[T]he Florida Supreme Court and other district courts have suggested that a presumption arises from a spouse[’]s historical earnings that supports a finding the spouse can continue to earn the same amount, absent evidence to the contrary.” (citing Garfield v. Garfield, 58 So.2d 166, 167 (Fla.1952); Seitz v. Seitz, 471 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985))). And in those cases where the court cannot use historical earnings, for example if there is evidence of changed circumstances, it should at least impute the minimum wage. Riley, 14 So.3d at 1289-90. Thus, if the court determines on remand that Former Wife was voluntarily unemployed and if it determines that she has not been diligent in replacing that income, it must impute some income to her. It is within the court’s discretion to determine the amount, though it must at least reflect income based on the minimum wage.

IY. Setoff for Monies Already Paid

The court determined that retroactive alimony covering the alimony penden-te lite was necessary and ordered retroactive alimony in the sum of $29,423. See § 61.071, Fla. Stat. (2010). The court found that Former Husband made a onetime $1000 payment for Former Wife’s rent. He argues that this $1000 payment should have been set off against the retroactive alimony. We agree.

‘While it is true that a setoff against alimony payments is generally frowned upon, see Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So.2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), courts have nonetheless recognized that a setoff may be appropriate where there are compelling equitable criteria.” Smith v. Smith, 691 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (citing Filaretou v. Filaretou, 652 So.2d 952, 954 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (determining that payment of expenses of the marital home required setoff based on a finding of “compelling equitable criteria”)). “The criteria for an award of temporary alimony are the same as for permanent alimony, namely, the need of the spouse requesting the alimony and the ability of the other spouse to pay.” Stern v. Stern, 907 So.2d 701, 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (citing Mitzenmacher v. Mitzenmacher, 656 So.2d 178, 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). We have previously required setoff when one spouse pays the other spouse’s mortgage; the same rule applies here where Former Husband paid Former Wife’s rent for one month. See Filaretou, 652 So.2d at 954. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the court to include the $1000 paid into any retroactive alimony award.

V. Error as to Attorney’s Fees

Former Wife concedes that the trial court erred in ordering Former Husband to pay $32,381.30 after that amount was discounted by $782.50 for expenses accrued by Former Wife’s failure to provide discovery. Rather the court should have ordered Former Husband to pay only $31,598.80 as stated in the court’s own findings. On remand, the court shall amend the judgment accordingly.

VI. Conclusion

We affirm the entire judgment except as discussed herein. On remand the court must recalculate the amount of retroactive alimony based on competent, substantial evidence and may take new evidence as needed. The court must also determine whether income need be imputed to Former Wife in determining the amount of alimony Former Husband must pay. The court may also take new evidence on this issue. Finally, the court shall amend the judgment as set forth in sections IV and V of this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

DAVIS, C.J. and BLACK, J., Concur.

      . Former Wife did not seek permanent alimony.


author: SWANSON, J.

text:
    Cynthia Nicole TAYLOR, Former Wife, Appellant, v. Jeremy Lee LUTZ, Former Husband, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-3659.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 7, 2014.

      Thomas L. Powell of Powell & Mack, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Adam R. Cowhey of Adam R. Cowhey, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   SWANSON, J.

Former Wife has appealed the trial court’s post-dissolution Amended Order on Former Wife’s Amended Motion for Contempt, to Enforce, and for Attorney’s Fees, and from the court’s Order Granting Attorney’s Fees. As her first point on appeal, Former Wife argues the trial court erred in finding the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) unambiguously provided for bridge-the-gap alimony as contemplated in section 61.08(5), Florida Statutes (2010), and, therefore, erred in refusing to enforce the provision because of her remarriage. Former Wife’s second point challenges the trial court’s award of fees to her attorney in the reduced amount of $1000, claiming the court failed initially to determine a lodestar amount. For the reasons that follow, we reverse on both points.

This short-term marriage, having lasted approximately four and one half years, was dissolved in May 2010 by final judgment in which the MSA was adopted and incorporated. As regards Former Wife’s first point, paragraph 2.1 of the agreement sets forth the following provision for alimony:

ALIMONY. The Husband shall pay to the Wife Bridge-the-Gap alimony which is non-modifiable in the amount of $500.00 a month for three (8) years. The first payment [is] due on May 20th and every month thereafter.

(Emphasis in original.) After entry of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, Former Husband made only two partial payments of alimony, each in the amount of $235. In May 2011, the trial court entered an order finding Former Husband owed Former Wife $5,197.97 in unpaid alimony and attorney’s fees, and ordered him to pay this amount at the rate of $50 per month, in addition to his ongoing obligations of $500 per month for alimony, and $61.55 per month for attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Former Husband failed to make any of the payments ordered by the court.

In the meantime, Former Wife remarried on April 23, 2011. In June 2012, she filed a second motion to enforce Former Husband’s obligations, followed by an amended motion filed in January 2013. At the ensuing hearing, there was no dispute over Former Husband’s failure to abide by the trial court’s May 2011 enforcement order and the final judgment. He argued, however, that by operation of section 61.08(5), his alimony obligation ceased au-toraatically upon Former Wife’s remarriage. That subsection states:

Bridge-the-gap alimony may be awarded to assist a party by providing support to allow the party to make a transition from being married to being single. Bridge-the-gap alimony is designed to assist a party with legitimate identifiable short-term needs, and the length of an award may not exceed 2 years. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony shall not be modifiable in amount or duration.

(Emphasis added.) The trial court agreed, ruling that paragraph 2.1 of the parties’ MSA was clear: The parties intended Former Wife to receive bridge-the-gap alimony, but Former Husband’s obligation to pay the alimony terminated under the language of the statute when Former Wife remarried. We hold the trial court erred as a matter of law in reaching this conclusion.

Our decision is guided by certain unassailable principles. First, it is well settled that in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the parties are free to agree to obligations the trial court could not order in the absence of an agreement. See, e.g., O’Malley v. Pan Am. Bank of Orlando, N.A., 384 So.2d 1258 (Fla.1980) (holding parties may agree for an alimony obligation to continue beyond the death of the obligor and be enforceable against his estate); Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (finding parties had assumed the obligation to pay college expenses for their child beyond the age of emancipation and holding the trial court must enforce that agreement as a matter of contract). But cf. Franks v. Franks, 86 So.3d 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that the bridge-the-gap alimony the trial court awarded to the wife, absent an agreement, exceeded the period permitted by section 61.08(5), and remanding case to the trial court to clarify the nature of the alimony awarded). Second,

A marital settlement agreement is a contract subject to interpretation like any other contract. Delissio v. Delissio, 821 So.2d 350, 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).... Where an agreement’s terms are unambiguous, a court must treat the written instrument as evidence of the agreement’s meaning and the parties’ intention. Id. A court must not isolate a single term or group of words and read that part in isolation. Id. Rather, the goal is to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the text of the entire agreement in order to accomplish the agreement’s stated meaning and purpose. Id.

Avellone v. Avellone, 951 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Third and finally, as the Florida Supreme Court ruled in Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So.2d 281 (Fla.1953), “[i]t is not what [the alimony] is called but what it is that fixes its legal status. It is the substance and not the form which is controlling.” Id. at 288.

Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude the language in paragraph 2.1 of the parties’ MSA is clear and unambiguous. The alimony agreed to by the parties is non-modifiable and in the amount of $500, to be paid monthly for three (3) years. No provision was included stating the alimony would cease upon Former Wife’s remarriage. Although section 61.08(5) does contain that proviso, that fact is not determinative of our analysis. The unambiguous language of the parties’ agreement, and not the statute, controls here, and because the language of paragraph 2.1 is clear and unambiguous, we “must treat the written instrument as evidence of the agreement’s meaning and the parties’ intention.” Delissio, 821 So.2d at 353. To do otherwise would most certainly vault form over substance. Underwood, 64 So.2d at 288. Accordingly, we hold that Former Husband’s obligation to pay Former Wife $500 per month for three years did not terminate upon Former Wife’s remarriage. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to order enforcement of paragraph 2.1 of the MSA.

As her second point on appeal, Former Wife contends the trial court erred in failing to determine a lodestar amount of attorney’s fees and by reducing the requested amount without providing justification. Again, we turn to the parties’ MSA, which provides in paragraph 7.12 the following:

ENFORCEMENT OF THIS AGREEMENT. The party against whom a Court Order is secured to compel performance of this Agreement, or any part hereof, agrees to pay the prevailing party all costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with such proceeding.

(Emphasis in original.) “The Florida Supreme Court has explained that ‘the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorney’s fees.’ ” Conway v. Conway, 111 So.3d 925, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So.2d 807, 810 (Fla.1992)). In this case, there is no question that Former Wife is the prevailing party.

In her second motion to enforce Former Husband’s financial obligations under the final judgment, Former Wife sought $11,159.50 in attorney’s fees, which had accrued since her previous enforcement action. The trial court considered the general equitable factors enunciated in Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So.2d 697 (Fla.1997), relevant to an award of attorney’s fees under section 61.16, Florida Statutes, including the duration and scope of the litigation, the parties’ respective financial situations, and the fact that it was granting, only partially, Former Wife’s motion. It then awarded Former Wife’s attorney $1000 in fees. In Rosen, the Florida Supreme Court was concerned primarily with “pointing out that proceedings under chapter 61 are in equity and governed by basic rules of fairness as opposed to the strict rule of law.” Id. at 700. Nevertheless, it confirmed that “arriving at the ‘lodestar’ (reasonable hours times a reasonable hourly rate) may be an appropriate starting point for setting a reasonable attorney’s fee in domestic relations cases[.]” Id. (discussing Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985), in the wake of Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828, 835 (Fla.1990)).

In the present case, the trial court failed to utilize a lodestar amount as a starting point, and nowhere in the order on review or in the record on appeal is there evidence from which we can divine the basis for the court’s award of only $1000, when the amount requested was over ten times that amount. In short, the trial court’s award eludes appellate review. Consequently, we hold, under these circumstances, that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Former Wife $1000 in attorney’s fees without first fixing a lodestar amount.

In summation, the portion of the Amended Order on Former Wife’s Amended Motion for Contempt, to Enforce, and for Attorney’s Fees that held the Former Wife’s entitlement to alimony terminated upon her remarriage, along with the trial court’s Order Granting Attorney’s Fees in the amount of $1000, are hereby REVERSED, and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PADOVANO and CLARK, JJ., concur.


text:
    Amber HAMM, on behalf of and as natural guardian for, the minor child, Kimberlee Rae Hamm, of the decedent/Employee James Martens, Appellant, v. PMI EMPLOYEE LEASING and Comprehensive Insurance Solutions, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-4895.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 7, 2014.
    Roland P. Tan, Jr., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Kristen J. Longberry of the Longberry Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, the minor child of the decedent employee challenges an order from the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying her death benefits payable under section 440.16, Florida Statutes (2012). The Employer/Carrier (E/C) here accepted the employee’s death as a compensable workplace injury and subsequently filed an emergency motion seeking to determine the beneficiaries of death benefits. No petition for benefits (PFB) or other claim for benefits was pending when the E/C filed its motion. Because we conclude the JCC lacked jurisdiction to address the E/C’s motion, we quash the order on appeal and remand with directions that the motion be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Polk County v. Sofka, 702 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Fla.1997) (holding “‘the parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists,’ and ‘[cjourts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and if want of jurisdiction appears at any state of the proceedings, original or appellate, the court should notice the defect and enter an appropriate order’ ” (citations omitted)).

This court has previously reversed findings of fraud under section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes, holding that a JCC has no jurisdiction over this affirmative defense in the absence of a pending PFB filed by the claimant. See Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Rippy, 67 So.3d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding jurisdiction of JCC is invoked with filing of PFB and employer/carrier has no statutory right to file PFB); see also Polston v. Hurricane Island Outward Bound, 920 So.2d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Simpson v. Am. Custom Interiors, 911 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Similarly, the JCC here lacked jurisdiction to address death benefit entitlement on the E/C’s motion where no individual had filed a claim requesting the payment of such benefits. Under the self-executing system of workers’ compensation, the E/C was permitted to pay nothing based upon its own assessment of its liability. Instead, the E/C, by its motion, essentially requested an advisory or declaratory opinion for which there is no provision in Chapter 440. A JCC, however, has no powers beyond those specifically conferred by the statute. See Pace v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 868 So.2d 1286, 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Because we conclude the JCC did not have jurisdiction, we cannot reach the question of whether she erred when she concluded the natural minor child of the decedent is not entitled to death benefits due to a failure to prove dependency upon the decedent. We QUASH the order of the JCC and REMAND with directions that the JCC dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction.

PADOVANO, CLARK, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    CHOICE PLUS LLC, claimant’s representative, f/b/o, Marvin Ditzel as heir to the Estate of Marvin Aubrey Ditzel, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, Bureau of Unclaimed Property, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-0144.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 7, 2014.
    Michael Farrar, Miami; and Seann M. Frazier of Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, L.L.P., Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    PK Jameson, General Counsel, and Josephine Schultz, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Financial Services, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied as moot.

ROWE, MARSTILLER, and RAY, JJ„ concur.


text:
    Larry RUSS and Donna Russ, Appellants, v. The BANK OF NEW YORK as Trustee for the certificate holders C. Walt Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2006-43CB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-43CB, Thomas Ellinor, Bill Kinsaul, Bay County Clerk of Court, Morris Hardwick, Schneider LLC, Jessica Craven, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-0339.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 8, 2014.
    Kenneth Steven Pelsinger, Levittown, NY; Larry Russ, pro se, for Appellants.
    John R. Chiles and Nicolas S. Agnello of Burr & Forman LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Benton v. Moore, 655 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

LEWIS, C.J., PADOVANO and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Keisha M. JONES-JOSEPH.
    No. 2014-B-0061.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

_JjThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Keisha M. Jones-Joseph, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently ineligible to practice.

FORMAL CHARGES

Count I — The Taylor Matter

In July 2008, Loraine Taylor hired respondent to represent her in a community property partition matter. Although respondent accepted a $8,000 fee payment plus $300 in costs, a copy of court minutes reflects that she took no action to advance the litigation. According to the minute entry dated August 12, 2008, respondent enrolled as counsel on behalf of Ms. Taylor. The next entry, which is dated March 23, 2011, reflects the filing of a rule by Ms. Taylor’s new counsel, J. Ransdell Keene. Following an unsuccessful attempt to notify respondent of Ms. Taylor’s complaint, the ODC hand-delivered a copy of the complaint to her in February 2011, but she failed to respond.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.2 (scope of the representation), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to |2communicate with a client), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.2 (failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Count II — The Smith Matter

In December 2008, Celestine Smith hired respondent to represent her in a personal injury matter. Thereafter, Ms. Smith attempted to contact respondent multiple times, both by phone and by visiting her office, but she was unsuccessful. In August 2009, Ms. Smith met with respondent, at which time respondent advised that due to health problems, she would be referring client files to other attorneys and would soon inform Ms. Smith whether she would be referring her file. When she did not hear from respondent, Ms. Smith attempted to contact her but was again unsuccessful. In February 2012, Ms. Smith Anally received correspondence from respondent. In the correspondence, respondent claimed to have sent to her a closing letter dated October 19, 2009 advising that her file was enclosed and that she had until November 21, 2009 to file suit. However, Ms. Smith did not receive the closing letter or the file.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.2, 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).

Count III — The Bums Matter

In March 2009, Tatianna Burns hired respondent to represent her in a child custody matter, for which she paid respondent $4,500. After respondent’s | ^secretary terminated her employment, respondent did not respond to Ms. Burns’ phone calls or emails. When respondent’s phone number was disconnected, Ms. Burns was able to reestablish contact with her through a third party who requested a refund on Ms. Burns’ behalf. Although respondent promised to refund the fee to Ms. Burns within thirty days, she did not do so. After receiving notice of Ms. Burns’ complaint, respondent sought an extension of time in which to respond. Nonetheless, she did not provide a written response.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.16(d), 8.2, 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).

Count TV — The Rozier Matter

In June 2008, Rita Rozier hired respondent to represent her in a custody and child support matter for a flat fee of $2,500. Thereafter, respondent failed to maintain sufficient communication with Ms. Rozier and did not properly handle her case. When she became dissatisfied ■with the representation, Ms. Rozier attempted to contact respondent through visitation, by phone, and in writing, all in an effort to terminate services and retrieve her file, but she was not successful. Another attorney tried to contact respondent on Ms. Rozier’s behalf but was likewise unsuccessful. After the ODC was able to reach respondent, she unilaterally converted the flat fee to an hourly fee in order to claim that all but 63$ of the fee paid by Ms. Rozier was earned.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4,1.16(d), and 8.4(a).

\4Count V — The Perrodin Matter

In November 2007, Barbara Perrodin hired respondent to obtain a restraining order and to handle her custody, child support, divorce, and community property matters. Her fee agreement with respondent was $1,500 for the restraining order and $6,000 for the remaining matters. Although she ultimately paid approximately $10,878.50 for these services, Ms. Perrodin lost contact with respondent, was not divorced, and stopped receiving child support payments, which were being mailed directly to respondent’s office. Ms. Perro-din left messages for respondent at a phone number that was posted on her office door but received no return communication. After receiving notice of Ms. Perrodin’s complaint, respondent sought an extension of time in which to respond. Nonetheless, she did not provide a written response.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.2, 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).

Count VI — The Williams Matter

In 2007, Alphonso Williams hired an attorney to represent him in child support, custody, and divorce matters. When the attorney ceased the practice of family law, the representation was transferred to respondent. In April 2008, Mr. Williams consented to the transfer and agreed to pay respondent a $4,000 flat fee to represent him. In October 2009, respondent withdrew without completing the representation. When Mr. Williams tried to obtain information about his case, respondent failed to respond to his correspondence and phone calls. Mr. Williams had to retain and pay another attorney to complete the representation. Respondent also unilaterally converted her flat fee to an hourly rate in order to claim that no refund is due to Mr. Williams. Respondent received notice of the complaint in |fiOctober 2009 and a hand-delivered copy of the complaint in December 2010. While she claimed to have responded to the ODC by fax and by mail, the ODC did not receive her response.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).

Count VII — The Walls Matter

In July 2009, Carrie Mae Walls hired respondent to assist her in obtaining grandparent visitation. Respondent did not perform the services for which she was hired and Ms. Walls’ attempts to contact her went unanswered. After discovering a “by appointment only” notice posted on the door of respondent’s office, Ms. Walls attempted to contact respondent by phone to set an appointment, but she was not successful. Following receipt of Ms. Walls’ complaint, respondent provided a cursory reply and purportedly refunded the entire fee.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4(a).

Count VIII — The Trust Account Matter

In July 2008, the ODC received notice of an overdraft in respondent’s trust account. The ODC sent notice to respondent via certified mail requesting a written explanation for the overdraft and bank statements for the previous six months. Although respondent’s intern signed the return receipt card, respondent did not reply. Respondent was then notified by certified mail that the ODC had opened a disciplinary investigation, but the certified mail notice was returned unclaimed. After receiving a second notice at her home address, respondent submitted a reply. | (¡Pursuant to the ODC’s request, she supplied additional statements and information regarding the trust account. In explanation for the overdraft, respondent indicated she failed to timely make a deposit. Because the deposit represented funds from other clients, she used one client’s funds to pay the expenses of another and ultimately converted client funds.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).

Count IX — The Carino Matter

Santiago Carino hired respondent to represent him in an employment discrimination claim, for which he paid her a $2,500 retainer fee. Initially, Mr. Carino had no difficulty communicating with respondent, but communication between them ceased when Mr. Carino decided to move to Texas. Although Mr. Carino personally gave respondent his new contact information and attempted to reach her numerous times, a representative from the Louisiana State Bar Association ultimately contacted respondent on his behalf. Thereafter, respondent contacted Mr. Car-ino, advising that he would soon be receiving a letter from her, but the correspondence was never received.

The ODC sent notice of Mr. Carino’s complaint to respondent via certified mail. Although her paralegal signed the return receipt card, respondent did not reply. The ODC then contacted her by phone on February 11, 2009. That day, respondent faxed to the ODC a one-page response to the complaint, stating that she recalled the file being closed and in storage. After reviewing her response, Mr. Carino indicated he had not been notified the file was closed and had not received a refund. The ODC’s auditor determined there were insufficient funds in respondent’s trust account at the time of the purported refund. Respondent |7admitted the check never cleared her account and promised to issue another refund check, which Mr. Carino never received.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In December 2012, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration. Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee adopted the deemed admitted factual allegations of the formal charges as its factual findings. Based on those facts, the committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.

The committee determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to her clients, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing substantial harm. After reviewing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the applicable baseline sanction ranges from suspension to disbarment.

The committee found the following aggravating factors present: a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding |sby intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1998). The only mitigating factor present is the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee determined that based on the ABA Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the prior jurisprudence of the court, respondent’s conduct warrants disbarment.

Neither respondent nor the ODC «filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee’s factual findings in this deemed admitted matter are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges and/or by the evidence submitted in support of those allegations, with one exception relating to the Williams matter (see note 3, supra).

The board also determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges, with the exception of Rules 1.1 and 1.2. According to the board, the formal charges do not specifically allege that respondent failed to provide competent representation or that she somehow derogated from the objectives desired by her clients.

The board determined respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to her clients and the legal profession. She caused significant harm to her clients by collecting fees and not performing services, by failing to refund unearned fees, and by converting trust account funds. Furthermore, she caused the ODC to expend additional resources by failing to cooperate with its investigations in a prompt manner, if at all. After reviewing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the applicable baseline sanction is | ^disbarment. The board adopted the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the committee, and also found indifference to making restitution as an additional aggravating factor.

After considering the jurisprudence of the court, the board found no reason to deviate from the baseline sanction of disbarment. Accordingly, the board recommended respondent be disbarred. The board also recommended she refund all unearned fees and be assessed with the costs and expenses of this matter.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

|! ftThe record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent neglected legal matters and failed to communicate with clients, essentially abandoning her law practice. She also failed to provide accountings of fees paid, failed to refund unearned fees, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigations. Based on these facts and the other evidence in the record, respondent has violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16(d), 3.2, 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987).

The record supports a finding that respondent violated duties owed to her clients and the legal profession, causing actual harm. The applicable baseline sanction in this matter is disbarment. The aggravating and mitigating factors found by the disciplinary board are supported by the record.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, case law indicates that we have imposed disbarment for misconduct similar to that committed by respondent. See, e.g., In re: Hatfield, 08-2632 (La.2/20/09), 2 So.3d 425; In re: Williams, 06-2578 (La.2/2/07), 947 So.2d 710; In re: Poirrier, 01-1116, 01-1118 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 94. Based on this jurisprudence, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and disbar respondent. We further order respondent to pay restitution to her clients and to refund all unearned fees.

InDECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Keisha M. Jones-Joseph, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25736, be and she hereby is disbarred. Her name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. It is further ordered that respondent shall make restitution to her victims. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent has been ineligible to practice since May 31, 2013 for failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements. She is also ineligible for failure to pay her bar dues and the disciplinary assessment.

      . Contrary to this allegation, the ODC introduced into the record a copy of a letter reflecting respondent’s reply to the complaint. The letter was not listed on the ODC’s exhibit list, although it was stamped as ODC Exhibit 33.

      . Contrary to this allegation, the ODC submitted evidence that respondent provided a written response on December 29, 2009.

      . ABA Standard 4.41 provides that disbarment is generally appropriate when (a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or (c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dejon MARSHALL.
    No. 2014-KK-0369.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

|1Writ granted. A fair reading of the testimony at the motion to suppress hearing reveals the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was trespassing upon abandoned and unoccupied property when they called him from the alley next to the boarded-up residence. See New Orleans City Code § 54-153; La. Rev.Stat. 14:63. While an arrest requires probable cause, an investigatory stop requires only the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion; that is, the officer need only possess some minimal level of objective justification to believe the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense. See State v. Lampton, 12-1547 (La.4/5/13), 110 So.3d 557 (citations omitted); La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 215.1. That suspicion flowered into probable cause to arrest the defendant for trespassing when he produced an identification card with an address in another area of the city. See State v. Brisban, 00-3437, p. 8 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 929 (“Probable cause deals with probabilities and recognizes that a degree of uncertainty may exist. Although mere suspicion cannot justify an arrest, the officer does not need sufficient proof to convict.”) (citations omitted). Although the officers did not ultimately arrest the defendant for trespassing, they possessed probable cause to do so when the search of the pill bottle was effected. Accordingly, the warrantless seizure of the unlabeled pill bottle containing white | gpills that the defendant had in “plain view” in his hand, and the subsequent search of the pill bottle to determine its contents, were lawful as incident to a valid arrest. See State v. Sherman, 05-0779, pp. 17-18 (La.4/4/06), 931 So.2d 286, 297 (“Where the police have probable cause to arrest, and conduct a search of that person incident to arrest, the fruits of that search may not be suppressed merely because the police did not intend to arrest the suspect for the offense for which probable cause existed.”). Because the search and seizure in this case were lawful, the district court abused its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. For these reasons, the district court’s ruling is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

HUGHES, J., concurs.

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward J. MORGAN, III.
    No. 2013-K-1495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

h Granted. The state seeks review of the trial court’s judgment precluding the use of one of defendant’s prior convictions in his habitual offender adjudication and sentencing. The trial court ruled the state failed to prove defendant entered a valid guilty plea in Multnomah County, Oregon, to delivering cocaine, a felony offense if committed in Louisiana, and could therefore establish him only a second, not third, felony offender. The trial court thereafter vacated defendant’s initial sentence on count three charging aggravated incest in a multiple count indictment, and resen-tenced him as a second offender to 30 years imprisonment at hard labor.

The court of appeal found the state did prove the existence of the Multnomah County guilty plea, and that defendant was represented by counsel. After recognizing the burden of showing a procedural irregularity then shifted to defendant under this Court’s decision in State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769, 779-80 (La.1993), however, the court of appeal found the defendant showed such an irregularity. Specifically, the court held the state’s exhibits failed to show defendant was advised of his trial rights, and that he waived them. See State v. Townsend, 04-0005, p. 1 (La.4/23/04), 874 So.2d 152, 153 (“We assume for | ¡¡present purposes that the court of appeal correctly found that the documentary evidence introduced by the state at the habitual offender hearing to carry its initial burden under [Shelton ] also carried the defendant’s burden to make an ‘affirmative showing’ of a procedural defect in his guilty plea in Texas because the documents omitted any mention of advice with respect to the privilege against self-incrimination.”). Key in the court’s decision was the absence of the trial judge’s signature on the waiver of rights form, suggesting the judge was not present at the time defendant was informed of his rights. The court further noted the absence of a transcript of plea proceedings and of a minute entry showing a guilty plea colloquy during which the defendant was informed of his rights. In the court of appeal’s view, “[a] guilty plea waiver of rights form, even if well-executed in every detail, without minutes or a transcript of the plea, is not sufficient to show a knowing and voluntary waiver of Boykin rights.” State v. E.J.M., III, 12-774 at 36 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13), 119 So.3d 648, 670 (citing State v. Pertuit, 98-1264, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/27/99), 734 So.2d 144, 146). Therefore, the court found no abuse in the trial court’s discretion in determining the state failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate defendant was properly advised of his constitutional rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them before entering the Multnomah County guilty plea.

The lower courts erred. This Court made clear in State v. Balsano, 09-0735 (La.6/19/09), 11 So.3d 475, that for out-of-state guilty pleas, a defendant must show more than a technical violation of this Court’s three-right prophylactic Boykin rule meant to facilitate the taking of voluntary guilty pleas in Louisiana and demonstrate that the guilty plea did not reflect a knowing and voluntary waiver of trial. In so holding, Balsano returned the Court’s jurisprudence “to its original substantive aspect” regarding the validity of non-Louisiana guilty pleas for use in habitual offender proceedings. Id., 09-0735 at 13, 11 So.3d at 482; see State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372, 1374 (La.1979) (for non-Louisiana pleas used to enhance sentence, the defendant “has the affirmative burden of showing that he was in fact not advised, either by the court or through counsel, of the particular circumstances of his plea that were not touched upon in an otherwise sufficient colloquy.”) (emphasis added); State v. Bolton, 379 So.2d 722, 723 (La.1979) (as to non-Louisiana and federal pleas the defendant “has the burden of proving that the plea was involuntary or that (if taken subsequent to Boykin) he did not waive Boykin rights”).

In the present case, to prove the predicate offense from Multnomah County, the state introduced, inter alia, a waiver of rights form filled out and signed by both defendant and his counsel. In addition, the state included a judgment that specifically referred to defendant’s sentence, signed by the trial court judge on the same date as the waiver of rights form. Although defendant argues that the state failed to show his plea was constitutionally valid, he did not claim below he was not informed of his Boykin rights by the court or that he did not understand them. He asserted only that no proof exists in those respects. The waiver form defendant himself concedes he signed, however, enumerated the trial rights waived by a guilty plea (jury trial, confrontation, privilege against self-incrimination) and concluded with a certificate signed by counsel attesting that “[t]o the best of my knowledge and belief, the declarations made by defendant in the foregoing petition [that he understood the trial rights as enumerated] are true and accurate,” and that defendant’s decision to enter the plea was “made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.” Defendant failed to produce any affirmative evidence that the contemporaneous statements of counsel on the waiver form did not reliably establish the knowing and voluntary of the guilty plea as a waiver of the enumerated trial rights both he and counsel acknowledged by signing the form. See State v. Halsell, 403 So.2d 688, 692 (La.1981) (a trial court may rely on the contemporaneous statements of counsel on a plea waiver form because “[a]ny other holding by this Court would tend to undermine the relationship of trust that must necessarily exist between the bench and bar.”); cf. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475, 486 (La.1983) (declining to adopt a rule requiring trial judges to inform defendants personally of the right to trial by jury); State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304, 1308-09 (La.1978) (declining to adopt a rule barring waiver of jury trial except by defendant personally); State v. Muller, 351 So.2d 143, 146-47 (La.1977) (declining to adopt a rule that judges must advise defendants personally of the right to trial by jury). The state thus demonstrated through that waiver of rights form, notwithstanding the lack of documentation the trial court conducted a colloquy with defendant regarding the rights he was waiving, that “the plea was nevertheless voluntary as a constitutional matter and therefore valid for purposes of enhancing the defendant’s sentence.” Balsano, 09-0735, p. 14, 11 So.3d at 483. Even had the trial court judge himself signed the waiver form, that is still not conclusive proof the court directly informed defendant of the rights he was waiving, merely that the trial court judge was present. Instead, the proper consideration for this out-of-state conviction is whether defendant knew and understood what he was waiving, not necessarily who informed him. Since defendant failed to meet his burden of proof, the trial court erred in finding defendant only a second felony habitual offender when the state presented sufficient evidence to establish him a third offender.

Consequently, defendant’s sentence is vacated and remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with defendant’s third felony habitual offender status.

WRIT GRANTED; SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED.


text:
    Thomas McMASTERS v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2013-C-2634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied May 2, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

| VWrit granted. The ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the decision of the Civil Service Commission is reinstated.

La. R.S. 40:2531 provides certain minimum standards for law enforcement officers under investigation with a view to possible disciplinary action, demotion or dismissal, including time limitations for the investigation. Specifically, La. R.S. 40:2531(B)(7) provides in pertinent part:

When a formal and written complaint is made against any police employee or law enforcement officer, the superintendent of state police or the chief of police or his authorized representation shall initiate an investigation within fourteen days of the date the complaint is made. Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, each investigation of a police employee or law enforcement officer which is conducted under the provisions of this Chapter shall be completed within sixty days ... The investigation shall be considered complete upon notice to the police employee or law enforcement officer under investigation of a pre-disci-plinary hearing or a determination of an unfounded or unsustained complaint. Further, nothing in this Paragraph shall limit any investigation of alleged criminal activity.

Thomas McMasters, an employee of the New Orleans Police Department, became the subject of a complaint on November 28, 2009, alleging that he signed a false arrest affidavit and failed to verify that the arrested individual had a prior arrest and conviction for prostitution within the last twelve months, which is an element of|?the crime for which the individual was arrested. This resulted in the individual’s false imprisonment for prostitution by loitering. The investigation was not completed within sixty days as McMasters did not receive notice of a disciplinary hearing until February 16, 2011. After the hearing, the appointing authority found he violated rules relative to (a) moral conduct by committing false imprisonment, (b) failing to properly verify the arrestee’s record in an arrest for prostitution by loitering, and (c) documenting false or inaccurate information on the affidavit for arrest. He was both suspended for forty days and dismissed from the police department. The Civil Service Commission affirmed this decision. The court of appeal reversed, finding that, because the investigation was not completed within sixty days, the discipline imposed was an absolute nullity.

We reverse. In O’Hern v. New Orleans Police Dept., 13-1416 (La.11/8/13), 131 So.3d 29, which was decided while this case was pending, we interpreted the last sentence of La. R.S. 40:2531(B)(7), providing that “nothing in this Paragraph shall limit any investigation of alleged criminal activity” to mean that the sixty-day time limitation within which to complete an investigation does not ápply to investigations involving criminal activity. The investigation into Mr. McMasters’s conduct was clearly an investigation of alleged criminal activity. Therefore, the sixty-day time period of La. R.S. 40:2531 does not apply pursuant to our holding in O’Hern.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the decision of the Civil Service Commission is reinstated.

REVERSED; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DECISION REINSTATED.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie JONES.
    No. 2013-K-2039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

|! Granted. Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), because his case was in the direct review pipeline when Miller was decided. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (new rules of constitutional criminal procedure apply retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or in the direct review pipeline); compare State v. Tate, 12-2713 (La.11/5/13)(Miller not retroactive to final sentences subject only to collateral attack). The court of appeal erred, however, in ordering that the trial court resentence defendant “in a manner allowing parole eligibility in accordance with the principles annunciated in Miller [ ].” State v. Jones, 12-788, p. 27 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) - So.3d -,-, 2013 WL 2249168. On remand of the case, the trial court is directed to hold a hearing in compliance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 878.1, implementing the Miller decision in Louisiana, before resentencing defendant to a term of life imprisonment at hard labor that, in the court’s discretion, after considering any aggravating and mitigating evidence relevant to the offense or the character of defendant, may, or may not, be subject to parole eligibility pursuant to the provisions of La.R.S. 15:574.4(E).


text:
    Kailash K. DHALIWAL,, and the Succession of Manmohan S. Dhaliwal v. Karminderdal S. DHALIWAL and Dhillon Sookham.
    No. 2013-C-2931.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Karminderdal S. Dhaliwal, et al.; Sookham, Dhillon; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2011-0429; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,034-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Gannon BERTRAND v. G-FORCE TRANSPORTATION, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2944.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re G-Force Transportation, L.L.C.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, Office of Worker’s Compensation # 4, No. 13-03526; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 13-01035.

Granted. A party generally may obtain discovery of any information which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. La.Code Civ. P. art. 1422; Stolzle v. Safety & Systems Assurance Consultants, Inc., 02-1197 (La.5/24/02), 819 So.2d 287. Many of claimant’s discovery requests have little relevance to the subject matter of his claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation compelling relator to answer all the requested discovery is vacated. The case remanded to the Office of Workers’ Compensation, which is instructed to review the discovery requests and compel relator to answer only those discovery requests relevant to the subject matter of the claim.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne A. JAMES.
    No. 2014-KK-0352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2014.
   In re James, Wayne A.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 524395; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2106.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    C.M.H. v. D.M. and S.D.M.
    No. 2014-GJ-0327.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2014.
   In re D.M.; S.D.M.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 33819; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CU 1477.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Angela BAHAM & Rodney R. Williams.
    No. 2014-KK-0350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 517-134; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2018-K-1592.

Denied.


text:
    OLYMPIA MINERALS, LLC, et al. v. HS RESOURCES, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Bass Partnership; Cinco Resources, Inc.; Direct Energy Partner, LTD.; Forest Oil Corporation; Hayes Exploration, LTD.; Olympia Minerals Leasing, LLC; Olympia Minerals, LLC; Olympia Minerals, LLC, et al.; Orr Exploration, LTD.; Sabine Development Company, LLC; Tedora Exploration, LTD.; The Wiser Company; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2005-0927; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-110.

Granted.


text:
    OLYMPIA MINERALS, LLC, et al. v. HS RESOURCES, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2637.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Aspect Energy, LLC; Aspect Resources, LLC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2005-0927; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-110.

Granted.


text:
    Tenesha SMITH, et al. v. TRANSPORT SERVICES COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2788.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re All Plaintiffs listed on Exhibit “A”; Dixon, Wallace; Porter Sr., Melvin; Smith, Tenesha et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2004-8425; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1023.

Granted.


text:
    Lloyd RICHARD v. Sheriff Willy J. MARTIN, Jr., et al.
    No. 2013-CP-3001.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Richard, Lloyd; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 33,437; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-651.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    PAMPLEMOUSSIER L.L.C. v. Sheldon L. POCHE, Jr., Jana Mauroner Poche, Robert B. McNabb, CPA, APAC, Regions Bank, City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana Department of Labor, Louisiana Department of Revenue, and the United States Department of Treasury-Internal Revenue Service.
    No. 2013-C-2432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Poche Jr., Sheldon L.; Poche, Jana Mauroner; — Defendant(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 27, 2014, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 586,593; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1829.

Reconsideration denied. See La.R.S. 1:55 E(3).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leroy WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Wilson, Leroy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 131263 C/W 131267 CW 131268 C/W 131269 C/W 131271 C/W 131272; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-904.

Denied.


text:
    James CRANDELL v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-CI-1248.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Crandell, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Re-, view, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No, 604,494; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1673.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher CHARLES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Charles, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 74,902; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW12-00937.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Catina BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1809.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Brown, Catina; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 09-636; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 18-KH-463.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Troy TAYLOR.
    No. 2013-K-1830.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 503-161; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0345.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kirby MATTHEW, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1845.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Matthew Jr., Kirby; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 72734; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00561.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert Emmett HUEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-OK-1847.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Huen, Robert Emmett; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 558261; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0742.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael MOREHEAD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1848.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Morehead, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 310142; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0743.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joe WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1865.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Washington, Joe; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 03-11-0290; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0553.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antonio MONTERO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1866.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Montero, Antonio; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-16918; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00404.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arnold Bennett CURTIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1869.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Curtis, Arnold Bennett; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 93-F-04524; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,657-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

CLARK, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Theodore MATHIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1871.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Mathis, Theodore; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 291-690; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-878.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard PARKER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1872.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Parker Jr., Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 486-468; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0541.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    Eddie Gene EVANS v. LOUISIANA BOARD OF PAROLE and Louisiana Attorney General James “Buddy” Caldwell.
    No. 2013-CI-1873.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Evans, Eddie Gene; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 612,652; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 2053.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dennis H. BLACKERBY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1876.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Blackerby, Dennis H.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06-CR-061235; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00427.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis J. DARGIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1877.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Dargin, Curtis J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 01-4313; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00173.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeremy PEROT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1878.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Perot, Jeremy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3 No. 255,330; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-583-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Landis DOMINO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1891.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Domino, Landis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 511-426; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0749.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher CALENDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1892.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Calender, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 432-327; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2012-K-1677, 2013-K-0390, 2013-K-0639.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Granville ROSE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1893.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Rose, Granville; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 461^149; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1379.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Noel DEAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1894.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Dean, Noel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 403-447; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0940.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Williams, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 389-545; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0941.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randy L. McDONALD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1896.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re McDonald, Randy L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 98-CR-018591; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. KH 12-00180, KH 18-00125.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Theodore SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1899.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Smith, Theodore; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 274151-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0904.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie D. RICHMOND v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1903.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Richmond, Willie D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 22705.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; .State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Keith COOPER.
    No. 2013-K-1931.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Cooper, Keith; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 498-075; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0174.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin TAYLOR.
    No. 2013-KO-1978.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Taylor, Kevin; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 491-715; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0503.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey STEVENSON.
    No. 2013-KO-2025.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Stevenson, Corey; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 11-2452; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-156.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Taylor, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 503-161; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0345.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant as to issue of prescription only.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Troy WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-KK-2636.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 483-210; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0966.

Denied.


text:
    SOUTHPARK COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, LLC v. SOUTHPARK ACQUISITION COMPANY, LLC, et al.
    No. 2013-C-2794.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Broussard Hospital Holdings L.L.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-20093386; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-59.

Denied.


text:
    LODWICK, L.L.C., et al. v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2898.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Oracle Oil L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 501,879; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-312-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Sarada LeBOURGEOIS v. ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2901.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 08-2705; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1263 C/W 2013-C-1331.

Denied.


text:
    Sarada LeBOURGEOIS v. ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2918.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Bell Title Corporation; Ham, Chad; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 08-2705; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1263 C/W 2013-C-1331.

Denied.


text:
    J-CON, INC. v. DAVIE SHORING, INC. and Minden Curtis, L.L.C.
    No. 2013-CC-2949.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re J-Con Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 723-558; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-833.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David BROWN.
    No. 2013-KK-2952.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Brown, David; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. W-04-3-77; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW1685.

Denied.


text:
    Ryan HAYGOOD, D.D.S., Haygood Dental Care, LLC v. Ross H. DIES, Ross H. Dies, D.D.S., J. Cody Cowen, D.D.S., and Benjamin a Beach, D.D.S., a Professional Dental Limited Liability Company, Camp Morrison, C. Barry Ogden, Karen Moorhead and Dana Glorioso.
    No. 2013-C-2955.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Beach D.D.S., Benjamin A.; Cow-en D.D.S., J. Cody; Dies D.D.S., Ross H.; Dies, Ross H. et al.; Ross H. Dies, D.D.S., J. Cody Cowen, D.D.S., and Benjamin A. Beach, D.D.S., a Professional Dental Limited Liability Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 554,003; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-485-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Floyd WALSWORTH, Jr. v. CHESAPEAKE LOUISIANA, L.P. and Chesapeake Operating, Inc.
    No. 2013-C-2957.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Walsworth, Jr., Floyd; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 544,902; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-588-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., recused.


text:
    Tiffany A. BAKER v. CITY OF LEESVILLE, et al.
    No. 2013-C-2958.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re City of Leesville; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 87,227; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-480.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    In the Matter of Stephen C. BRAUD.
    No. 2013-CC-2961.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Board of Ethics; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Ethics Adjudicatory Board — Panel B, No. 2012-15123; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 0972.

Denied.


text:
    Clemmie JOHNSON v. EUROPEAN MOTORS-Ali (Owner).
    No. 2013-C-2964.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Ali Moghimi d/b/a European Motors; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Oua-chita, Monroe City Court, No. 2007CV02890; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,513 CA.

Denied.


text:
    NATCHITOCHES PARISH LAW ENFORCEMENT DISTRICT v. DECIMAL, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2972.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re City Tele-Coin Company, Inc.;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoch-es, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 82,537; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-238.

Denied.


text:
    Barbara REGUA v. Florence SAUCIER, Fred Saucier and Janet Malone.
    No. 2013-C-2976.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re Malone, Janet; Saucier, Florence et al.; Saucier, Janet; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 114-950; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0832.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Demetric WHITLOCK.
    No. 2013-KK-2979.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 12-F2923-4; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49029-KW.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.