author: EZELL, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Morris DAVENPORT, Jr.
    No. 13-39.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    July 3, 2013.

      D. Scott Kendrick, Natchitoches, LA, for Applicant.
    Anna L. Garcie, Assistant District Attorney, Many, LA, for Respondent.
    Court composed of JIMMIE C. PETERS, BILLY H. EZELL, J. DAVID PAINTER, Judges.
   EZELL, Judge.

| STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant, Morris Davenport, Jr., was charged by bill of indictment with one count of aggravated rape, in violation of La.R.S. 14:42(A)(6). On November 27 and 28, 2012, the Defendant was tried before a jury. After both the State and defense rested, the Defendant requested a motion for judgment of acquittal under La.Code Crim.P. art. 778. The Defendant argued that the State failed to prove a material element of the crime; that the victim was impaired by having an intelligence quotient (I.Q.) score of less than seventy. Before the jury was charged and while the jury was still present, the trial judge granted the Defendant’s motion, finding that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to prove the victim was impaired. The trial judge ordered that the Defendant be acquitted and dismissed the jury.

On December 4, 2012, five days after the trial concluded, the trial court held a hearing during which it realized that a motion for acquittal, under La.Code Crim.P. art. 778, only applies in bench trials and not jury trials, as was the case in the instant matter. Therefore, it subsequently corrected the error by ordering a mistrial.

The Defendant filed a notice of intent to seek a writ of supervisory review and cer-tiorari on December 6, 2012. The trial judge set a return date of January 15, 2013, and stayed all proceedings pending review by this court.

The Defendant filed an application for supervisory review with this court on January 11, 2013. The Defendant is now before this court asserting an error in the trial court’s judgment ordering a mistrial, because it was a violation of his United States Fifth Amendment Constitutional right against double jeopardy. He requests this court reverse the trial court’s judgment ordering a mistrial.

We find the Defendant’s writ application should be granted.

FLAW AND DISCUSSION

The issue raised by the Defendant in the instant case pertains to his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The Defendant argues that, because the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal, any further prosecution by the State in relation to the same charge of aggravated rape would violate this right. The State, however, argues that because the trial judge was without the power to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal initially, the acquittal ruling was null and void ab initio, and the judgment ordering a mistrial is valid.

Authority to grant a motion for acquittal

In 1975, the Louisiana Constitution was amended. This amendment revised La. Code Crim.P. art. 778 by eliminating a trial judge’s authority in jury trials to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal and reserving such authority to judges in bench trials. See State v. Jackson, 344 So.2d 961 (La.1977).

Thus, per the 1975 amendment, a trial judge in a bench trial is allowed to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal in two instances. The trial judge can elect to grant the motion under La.Code Crim.P. art. 778 or La.Code Crim.P. art. 821. The first governs motions made after the close of the prosecution’s case, and the latter governs motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. In the instant case, the defense twice moved for a motion for judgment of acquittal, after the close of the prosecution’s case and after the defense rested. The trial judge denied the first motion but granted the second before charging the jury. However, because the Defendant was tried by jury, the trial judge did not have the authority to grant a judgment of acquittal under these circumstances.

|sThe instant matter addresses a res nova issue regarding double jeopardy in the context of a judgment of acquittal that results from a procedural error by a trial judge who does not have the power to grant such under the amended version of La.Code Crim.P. art. 778. The complexities of this issue arise from a code article distinct from the federal rules of evidence and specific to Louisiana criminal procedure. Louisiana jurisprudence is silent on this issue.

While several Louisiana cases discuss double jeopardy in the context of acquittal, these cases address the issue in the context of a bench trial, where the judge has the authority to enter the judgment. See State v. Hurst, 367 So.2d 1180 (La.1979); State v. Reed, 315 So.2d 703 (La.1975). Louisiana jurisprudence has yet to address the action of a trial judge who enters an order for judgment of acquittal in a jury trial where it is without the requisite authority.

The United States Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts have, however, addressed the issue. The federal courts have found that an acquittal exists not only where the particular action is labeled an acquittal but also when the substance of the ruling concerns the merits of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. “Thus[,] an ‘acquittal’ includes ‘a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, a factual finding [that] necessarily establish[es] the criminal defendant’s lack of criminal culpability, and any other rulin[g] which relate[s] to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.’” Evans v. Michigan, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 1075, 185 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013) (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, (1978) (first alteration ours)).

In Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962), the United States Supreme Court considered the validity of a judgment of acquittal within the | ¿context of double jeopardy when a judge, although statutorily given the authority to grant a judgment of acquittal, did so on a basis not enumerated under the statute. In Fong Foo, the trial judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal as to the defendants and subsequently entered a formal judgment of acquittal. However, the trial judge relied on an incorrect basis for granting the judgment of acquittal — the supposed improper conduct by the prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney and the supposed lack of credibility in a prosecution witness’s testimony.

The government filed a writ of mandamus, which was granted by the United States First Circuit Court of Appeal. The First Circuit vacated the trial court’s judgment of acquittal and reassigned the case for trial. Upon writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, a majority court found that the trial terminated upon the entering of the judgment of acquittal, which was final and could not be reviewed without subjecting the defendants to double jeopardy — despite the fact that the acquittal was based on “an egregiously erroneous foundation.” Id. at 672. The Supreme Court accepted the appellate court’s holding that the district court had erred, but nevertheless found the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated when the court of appeal set aside the judgment of acquittal and directed the defendants be tried again for the same offense. Thus, when a defendant has been acquitted at trial, he may not be tried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal are erroneous.

A dissenting Justice Clark found that the trial judge’s lack of authority to enter the judgment of acquittal rendered the judgment null. His opinion, however, weighed heavily on the timing of the judgment of acquittal, which was entered before the prosecution had the opportunity to conclude presentation of its case and frustrated the government’s duty to prosecute those who violate the law. Justice Clark concluded | Bthat the mere use of the word ‘acquittal’ should not operate as a “magic open sesame,” freeing persons of criminal charges. Id. at 144, 673 (Clark, J., dissenting).

The Supreme Court revisited this issue in Sanabria v. U.S., 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978), a procedurally similar case with unusual facts. The defendants were charged with illegally engaging in horse and numbers betting. The trial court determined that the specific crime the government was prosecuting did not support the numbers betting charge and excluded all numbers betting evidence but allowed the horse betting theory to proceed. One particular defendant, who was only charged with numbers betting, then moved for a judgment of acquittal. The court granted the judgment of acquittal as to that defendant, finding insufficient evidence of his involvement in the horse betting. The case then went to trial against the remaining ten defendants on the theory that they were engaged in horse betting.

The trial court denied the government’s motion for reconsideration from the order excluding the evidence and the order entering a judgment of acquittal. The government appealed. The United States First Circuit held that the trial judge’s action in excluding the evidence served to “dismiss” the numbers theory charge. Upon that basis, characterizing the trial court’s action of excluding the evidence as a dismissal of that charge, the First Circuit found that the trial court erred in subsequently acquitting the defendant. The court then vacated the judgment of acquittal as to that charge, considering it erroneous in light of the previous dismissal, and remanded for the government to try the defendant for any violation based on the numbers betting activities under the federal statute. Id.

Upon review, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the First Circuit’s remand for a new trial within the context of double jeopardy. |fiThe court explained, “the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence” is that a verdict of acquittal cannot be reviewed “without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.” Id. at 64, 98 S.Ct. 2170. (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642, (1977) (alteration in original)). Citing Fong Foo, the court noted, “The fundamental nature of th[e] rule is manifested by its explicit extension to situations where an acquittal is based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court found that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence; however, the judgment of acquittal resulting thereby was final and unreviewable. The Court held, once entered, regardless of any erroneous nature underlying the ruling, a judgment of acquittal bars any future prosecution and thus, also, appellate review. The Court found no constitutional exception to the rule forbidding successive trials that would permit retrial once the defendant has been acquitted.

The characterization of the action was an important factor in the United States Supreme Court’s decision because of the previous jurisprudence expressed in Lee v. U.S., 432 U.S. 23, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977). The Lee Court made a sharp distinction between voluntary dismissals or grants of motions for retrial versus judgments of acquittal. The Court held that the former two could be the basis for further prosecution; however, once the action is characterized as an acquittal, the rule against double jeopardy attaches, and retrial is barred.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has also followed the general principle expressed in Fong Foo. The Louisiana Supreme Court cited Fong Foo, as well as the jurisprudence relied upon in Fong Foo, stating, “The double jeopardy provision 17indeed forbids the retrial of a defendant who has been acquitted.” State v. David, 468 So.2d 1133, 1135 (La.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130, 106 S.Ct. 1998, 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1986) (citing U.S. v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-30, 101 S.Ct. 426, 432-34, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); Burks v. US., 437 U.S. 1, 16, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977); Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143, 82 S.Ct. 671; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)).

The issue in David involved whether the State could impose a harsher sentence on the defendant following a retrial because of legal error. Distinguishing a retrial from a judgment of acquittal, the court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply where the defendant’s sentence was merely set aside on the basis of an error in the proceedings leading to the conviction.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has also addressed the effect of a judgment of acquittal in the context of directed verdicts and jury verdicts, although prior to the 1975 constitutional amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 778. See State v. Baskin, 301 So.2d 313 (La.1974). The Baskin court held that the effect of a judgment of acquittal is the same in both directed verdicts and jury verdicts, and “[e]ven where a directed verdict of acquittal is based upon an ‘egregiously erroneous foundation,’ the accused cannot be retried without violating the double jeopardy guarantee.” Id. at 316 (citing Fong Foo, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671).

Recently, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Evans v. Michigan, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 185 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013), addressing judgments of acquittal arising from a trial judge’s legal error in the context of double jeopardy. In Evans, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because it found the State had not proved an element of the crime. However, the trial court’s ^interpretation of the statute was incorrect, and the State was not required to prove the particular element to convict the defendant of the crime.

A divided Michigan Supreme Court held that when a trial judge grants a motion of acquittal based on an error of law, double jeopardy is not implicated when the error is not related to evidence of a factual element of the offense charged. The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that because the trial court in Evans granted the judgment of acquittal based on the erroneous addition of an unrequired element to the statute, the case terminated based on an error of law unrelated to the defendant’s guilt or innocence regarding the actual elements of the offense charged. The court, therefore, concluded that the trial court’s action fell outside the definition of acquittal.

The United States Supreme court subsequently reversed the Michigan Supreme Court decision and held that “[a] mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless,” and cannot be reviewed “on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.” Id. at 1074 (quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896) (second alteration in original)). Citing Fong Foo, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that this is the result despite any egregious or erroneous basis for the ruling. However, the Supreme Court noted that the judge in Evans granted the motion of acquittal pursuant to a rule that requires the court to grant an acquittal when the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. Thus, the trial judge had the requisite authority to grant the judgment of acquittal.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Evans is also narrowly tailored to the issue of acquittal in the case where a court grants the motion based upon a mistaken belief that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant. The Evans court stated, “Here 19[the defendant’s] acquittal was the product of an erroneous interpretation[n] of governing legal principles, but as in our other cases, that error affects only the accuracy of [the] determination to acquit, not its essential character.” Id. at 1076 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added) (second and third alterations in original); See also, Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (barring retrial in the sentencing phase where the trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison because it misinterpreted the aggravating factors required for capital punishment).

In the instant case, the trial judge entered an order acquitting the Defendant of the charge of aggravated rape. The trial court’s judgment was based upon the underlying belief that he was vested with the authority to grant the judgment under La. Code Crim.P. art. 778. This basis was obviously erroneous, since La.Code Crim.P. art. 778 does not apply in jury trials.

Unlike the prior jurisprudence addressing double jeopardy in the context of an acquittal, the trial judge in this case issued an acquittal based upon a legal error that directly affected his authority to grant the motion. The trial judge did not misread or misinterpret the statutory elements of the crime charged, nor can it be concluded that the judge misread or misinterpreted the statute the acquittal was granted pursuant to, as the statute itself unambiguously states that it allows trial judges in jury trials only to grant a judgment of acquittal.

Because these facts are distinct from those previously addressed by the United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts, this court finds the underlying policy relied upon in Evans instructive. In differentiating between merit-related acquittals and terminations of proceedings unrelated to factual guilt, the Supreme Court explained | inthat the law attaches particular significance to acquittals, and any merits-related ruling that concludes proceedings is final. To permit otherwise, “would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” Evans, 133 S.Ct. at 1075.

The Supreme Court also noted the effect a retrial following an acquittal would have on the defendant, which would upset the defendant’s “expectation of repose” and “subject him to additional embarrassment, expense and ordeal while compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.” Id. (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). However, termination of the proceedings not borne of a basis related to factual guilt but some other procedural grounds does not pose the same concerns, since there is no expectation of finality in a properly granted mistrial or action setting aside the charge.

While the Evans court does follow Fong Foo in holding that all judgments of acquittal bar retrial even when based upon an erroneous or egregious foundation, the court advocated this holding because it found the mistake in Evans flowed from an incorrect antecedent ruling of law, an erroneous interpretation of legal principles. The court explained that such an error only affects “the accuracy of [the] determination to acquit, not its essential character.” Id. at 1076 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).

The error made by the judge in the present case, granting a judgment of acquittal without the statutory authority to grant the judgment, is the product of an erroneous interpretation of law; however, the error did not affect the accuracy of his determination as to whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant ofJjjthe crime charged. Whether the error was one that affected the ruling’s essential character is undetermina-ble, because the United States Supreme Court does not elaborate upon or define what the “essential character” of a judgment of an acquittal is. Assuming the United States Supreme Court’s definition of acquittal, a ruling adjudging the guilt or innocence of a defendant, properly reflects the essential character of an acquittal, this court finds the error in the instant case also does not affect the essential character of the acquittal. The court’s determination of the Defendant’s culpability in granting the judgment of acquittal is unrelated to the court’s statutory authority to grant the motion.

Considering the prior jurisprudence elicited by the United States Supreme Court, the legal error underlying the court’s ruling of acquittal, despite its erroneous nature, does not constitute an exception to the rule forbidding successive trials for the same offense. The trial court’s grant of a judgment of acquittal was based upon its assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State and was a decision that directly affected the Defendant’s status as guilty or innocent.

The trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial following the grant of a judgment of acquittal effectively subjects the Defendant to double jeopardy. The error made by the trial court does not affect the substance of its ruling, nor does it revoke the Defendant’s right to be free from double prosecution following a grant of a judgment of acquittal on the merits — despite the absence of a legal foundation.

Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in ordering a mistrial following the entry of a judgment of acquittal against the Defendant. Once entered, the judgment of acquittal was final. See Sanabria v. U.S., 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978); Fong Foo v. U.S., 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962).

^JjgDECREE

The writ is hereby granted and made peremptory. The ruling of the trial court ordering a mistrial is reversed, vacated, and set aside.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GREMILLION, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric John ANDERSON.
    No. 13-42.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    July 3, 2013.

      James C. Downs, District Attorney, Ninth Judicial District Court, Michael W. Shannon, Assistant District Attorney, Alexandria, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Edward K. Bauman, Lake Charles, LA, for Defendanl/Appellant, Eric John Anderson.
    Court composed of J. DAVID PAINTER, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

1 )On May 3, 2010, Defendant, Eric John Anderson, Devonta Mitchell, and a person referred to only as “Fleet” entered the home of Sammie Williams uninvited, armed with guns, and looking for money alleged to be in the house. Upon leaving the house, Defendant approached Mabel Fisher, who was sitting outside in her vehicle, and attempted to take her purse. The men then fled in a stolen SUV. One of the men fired at Fisher as he ran to the SUV and again as she followed them in her car. Defendant and Mitchell were apprehended the next day heading towards Baton Rouge in a different stolen vehicle.

Defendant was charged by a bill of information with one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a violation of La. R.S. 14:68.4, one count of attempted second degree murder, violations of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1, one count of aggravated burglary, a violation of La.R.S. 14:60, and one count of attempted armed robbery with the use of a firearm, violations of La.R.S. 14:27, 14:64, and 14:64.3. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged on all counts.

Defendant was sentenced to five years at hard labor for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; twenty-five years at hard labor for attempted second degree murder, with the first ten years to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; ten years at hard labor for aggravated burglary; and twenty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for attempted armed robbery, plus five years for the use of a firearm, for a total of twenty-five years at hard labor. All the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. While Defendant objected to the excessiveness of the sentences at the sentencing hearing, no written motion to reconsider the sentence was filed.

l2Pefendant argues three assignments of error: 1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt; 2) Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; and 3) the sentences were constitutionally excessive under the circumstances of the case.

We affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

Defendant argues that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to sustain the convictions. He bases this primarily on Mitchell’s assertion at trial that his confession concerning Defendant’s participation in the offenses was a complete fabrication. Defendant argues that nothing other than Mitchell’s false confession connects him to the crimes alleged. The law here is black letter:

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).... [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984). Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidenti-fication. State v. Weary, 03-3067 (La.4/24/06), 931 So.2d 297; State v. Neal, 00-0674 (La.6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Weary, 03-3067 at p. 18, 931 So.2d at 311; Neal, 00-0674 at p. 11, 796 So.2d at 658; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988). It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Bright, 98-0398, p. 22 (La.4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1147.

State v. Hughes, 05-992, pp. 5-6 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051.

Unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is defined as “the intentional taking or use of a motor vehicle which belongs to another, either without the other’s consent, |sor by means of fraudulent conduct, practice, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the other of the motor vehicle permanently.” La.R.S. 14:68.4. Second degree murder is defined as the killing of a human being “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1. Armed robbery is defined as “the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” La.R.S. 14:64(A). Furthermore, La.R.S. 14:64.8 provides for additional punishment if the dangerous weapon is a firearm. Attempt is defined in pertinent part, as:

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

La.R.S. 14:27. Finally, aggravated burglary is the unauthorized entering of an inhabited dwelling where a person is present, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft, when armed with a dangerous weapon. La.R.S. 14:60(1).

Williams testified that she was at her home on Clinton Street in Alexandria, around 1:00 p.m., with two infants she was babysitting. She said that she was in the living room watching TV and talking on the phone when she heard someone in the house. When she went to investigate, she encountered two men in the hallway. She did not know who they were. Both men wore black hoodies with the hoods pulled up over their faces. She said that both men were armed, one with a pistol and one with a “funny looking gun about that long.... Like a sawed off shotgun or something.” One of the men told her not to look at them or she would be shot.

They began searching the house, repeatedly asking her “where’s the room.” She stated that she had a nephew, Eric, who had been living with her, but she had 14recently evicted him for selling marijuana. She asked if they were looking for him. Suddenly, she heard a car horn honk from outside. One of the men went to look out, and when he described the car to her, she knew it was her long-time friend, Fisher. They told her to tell the person in the car to come into the house, but she denied knowing who the person was and would not call out to her. The men took the battery out of her phone and left the house. Williams said she got the other house phone from the bedroom and called the police. She heard two gunshots at that time. She thought they had shot Fisher.

Fisher testified that she saw a man standing by the door of Williams’ house as she approached in her vehicle. When she honked her horn, two other men exited the house. She could not describe the men who came out of the house because they were wearing hoodies but could see they were black men. Two of the men walked up to her car; both men had guns. One stood by her window and the other one got into the passenger-side seat and tried to grab her purse. She fought back, and eventually he left the car without the purse and ran towards a white SUV. She stated that one of the men turned and fired the gun twice in the direction of her car. She followed the fleeing SUV and managed to get the license plate number. She stated that at one point, the SUV stopped and one man got out and fired the gun again at her vehicle several times. She was talking to the police on her cell phone while this was happening. The police advised her to return to Williams’ house, which she did. She described the two men as young. She could not describe the guns, except that she said one gun was longer, like a shotgun.

Corporal Shannon Blackwood, a “line officer” with the Alexandria Police Department, testified that he received a dispatch regarding a home invasion. He went to Williams’ home and spoke with her and Fisher. After he returned to the ^police station, he received another dispatch that the white SUV reported as the vehicle used by the perpetrators was located abandoned behind a house next to a levee. The license plate number was the same as given to the police by Fisher. However, the license plate actually belonged to a vehicle registered in Natchitoches, Louisiana. The SUV had been reported stolen approximately six weeks prior to this incident. Donald Rachel testified that he had loaned the SUV to a friend and it was never returned. A few weeks later, he received in the mail a picture of the vehicle as it ran a red light in New Orleans and was ticketed for the violation.

James David Fail, a trooper with the Louisiana State Police Department, testified that the day after the incident at Williams’ house, he stopped a truck for speeding on I — 10 on the Whiskey Bay bridge. The driver of the truck was Mitchell, who was sixteen years old at the time and did not have a driver’s license, and Defendant, who was twenty-three years old and had a suspended license, was Mitchell’s passenger. The trooper located two handguns in the truck, a nine millimeter Smith and Wesson and a .32 caliber revolver. Furthermore, the truck had just been reported stolen in Alexandria.

A DNA search was done on the handguns located in the truck and a partial DNA sample was found. Winnie Kurow-ski, a forensic chemist with the Acadia Criminalistics Laboratory, testified that she got a partial DNA profile. Mitchell could not be excluded as a possible source of the profile, although Kurowski was able to exclude Defendant as a possible source. She did state, however, that the guns were not tested for DNA until a year later and that the guns had been handled by others by that time. Both Mitchell’s and Defendant’s fingerprints were located on the SUV that fled the scene of Williams’ house.

| ^Finally, Mitchell testified. Despite his confession given on May 10, 2010, Mitchell adamantly denied that Defendant was with him when the offenses were committed. He called himself a “compulsive liar.” He further denied that the guns found in the truck were his, or that anyone shot at Fisher as he fled from the house in the SUV.

Detective David Foshee, an officer with the Alexandria Police Department, interrogated Mitchell on May 10, 2010. He explained that because Mitchell was a juvenile they had to wait until Mitchell’s mother could arrive from New Orleans before they could question him. A transcript of the interrogation was given to the jury to read as they viewed the video of the interview.

A summation of the interrogation is as follows:

After Mitchell was Mircmdized, he confessed to his, Defendant’s, and “Fleet’s” participation in the offenses. He first told the detective that he had obtained the SUV in New Orleans from L.D., who he did not know at all. He said that he, Defendant, and “Fleet” “went on a lick went to go hit a lick[.]” He explained that “Fleet” knew there was money in Williams’ house because he knew that “Dude E” had money, so they went to rob “Dude E.” He said that “Fleet” stayed outside as a lookout while he and Defendant went into the house. After he and Defendant encountered Williams and she asked if they were looking for Eric, he figured out that Eric was “Dude E.” He admitted that he was armed with a pistol and Defendant was armed with a rifle. They searched for money but found nothing. When they heard a horn honk, they went back outside. Mitchell said he went to the SUV while “Fleet” and Defendant approached Fisher’s car. He said that Defendant and “Fleet” switched guns and that Defendant got into the car with the driver. He described how Defendant shot at the girl in the car as he ran |7towards the SUV. He also stated that Defendant was driving the SUV and, at one point, Defendant stopped the car and got out and fired again at Fisher as she followed them. He described where they dumped the SUV. He also explained that he stole the truck they were eventually stopped in from a convenience store late that evening when the driver got out and left the keys in the ignition.

Defendant is correct that his primary connection with the offenses was through Mitchell’s confession. The two victims were not able to identify the men who accosted them because their faces were hidden. Defendant’s fingerprint was located on the stolen SUV, indicating that he was in the vehicle. He was also in the company of Mitchell the very next day in another stolen vehicle. While Mitchell was arrogant and belligerent on the stand at Defendant’s trial, he admitted to the offenses but maintained that he lied about Defendant’s presence during the robbery attempts. He further denied that he even knew a “Fleet.” However, the two victims encountered more than one man. Williams met up with two men inside her house, and Fisher described three men, one standing at the door and two who came out of the house when she honked the horn.

As noted in State v. Hatch, 06-1587 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/07), 964 So.2d 394, a conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a purported accomplice. “For an accomplice’s testimony to be materially corroborated ‘it is enough if there is evidence that confirms material points in the accomplice’s tale, and confirms the defendant’s identity and some relationship to the situation.’” State v. Castleberry, 98-1388, p. 13 (La.4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749, 761, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 893, 120 S.Ct. 220, 145 L;Ed.2d 185 (1999) (quoting State v. Schaffner, 398 So.2d 1032, 1035 (La.1981)).

^Although Mitchell, Defendant’s accomplice, claimed that he lied during the interrogation session, he described the events in his confession exactly as the victims had described the events. Mitchell’s confession was remarkably consistent with the victims’ testimonies.

The jury heard all the testimony, including the confession and Mitchell’s recantation. The jury obviously did not believe Mitchell’s trial testimony, and we find no error in that conclusion. We have neither the authority nor the inclination to second-guess the jury. See State v. Ryan, 07-504 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/07), 969 So.2d 1268.

The State proved all the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, including the identity of Defendant. Defendant entered an inhabited dwelling without authorization or invitation, armed with a firearm, with the intent to rob someone inside the house. He further attempted to rob Fisher of her purse while armed with a firearm. He shot at her on two occasions, thus, exhibiting the requisite intent to kill her. Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances; aiming a gun directly at a victim and pulling the trigger supports a finding of specific intent to kill. State v. Lawson, 08-123 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/08), 1 So.3d 516. He arrived in Alexandria in a stolen vehicle and left Alexandria in a different stolen vehicle. While Mitchell claimed that he was the one who stole the second vehicle, he said that Defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. At the very least, Defendant was a principal to Mitchell’s offense. Principals are those who are “concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime[.]” La.R.S. 14:24.

UThere is no merit to this assignment of error.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

First, Defendant asserts that defense counsel failed to submit into evidence two letters that Mitchell wrote to Defendant approximately one year prior to Defendant’s trial indicating that Mitchell lied when he confessed to the offenses and told the police that Defendant participated in the offenses. Defendant argues in brief that had defense counsel submitted the letters, they would have corroborated Mitchell’s story that he lied. Second, he argues that defense counsel failed to file a motion to quash.

Generally, the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is a matter more properly addressed in an application for post conviction relief, filed in the trial court where a full evidentiary hearing can be conducted. State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729 (La.1984); State v. Johnson, 557 So.2d 1030 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990); State v. Reed, 483 So.2d 1278 (La.App. 4 Cir.1986). Only if the record discloses sufficient evidence to rule on the merits of the claim do the interests of judicial economy justify consideration of the issues on appeal. State v. Seiss, 428 So.2d 444 (La.1983); State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528 (La.1982); State v. Garland, 482 So.2d 133 (La.App. 4 Cir.1986); State v. Landry, 499 So.2d 1320 (La.App. 4 Cir.1986).
The defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is to be assessed by the two part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Fuller, 454 So.2d 119 (La.1984). The defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Counsel’s performance is ineffective when it can be shown that he made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Counsel’s deficient performance will have prejudiced the defendant if he shows that the errors were so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial. To carry his burden, the defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. The defendant must make both showings to prove that counsel was so ineffective as to require reversal. State v. Sparrow, 612 So.2d 191, 199 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992).
|10This Court has recognized that if an alleged error falls “within the ambit of trial strategy” it does not “establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Bienemy, 483 So.2d 1105 (La.App. 4 Cir.1986). Moreover, as “opinions may differ on the advisability of a tactic, hindsight is not the proper perspective for judging the competence of counsel’s trial decisions. Neither may an attorney’s level of representation be determined by whether a particular strategy is successful.” State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714, 724 (La.1987).

State v. Griffin, 02-1703, pp. 8-10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/15/03), 838 So.2d 34, 40, writ denied, 03-809 (La.11/7/03), 857 So.2d 515.

The record before this court is not sufficient to discern whether defense counsel’s performance was defective because he failed to introduce the letters that Mitchell wrote to Defendant. Defendant contends that “these letters prejudiced [his] case to such a degree that the only proper remedy would be to vacate his convictions and sentences.” However, a review of the letters, which Defendant attached to a “Motion for New Attorney” filed on May 22, 2012, suggests there may have been a trial strategy in not presenting them. For this reason, a contradictory hearing would be the most appropriate means in which to address whether defense counsel’s performance was defective. Accordingly, we relegate this allegation to post-conviction relief.

As for Defendant’s assertion that defense counsel should have filed a motion to quash, in brief, he argues:

Although counsel objected to the jury panel not being a proper cross-section of the community, and his objection was overruled, counsel should have filed a Motion to Quash. La.Code Crim.P. art. 535 provides that a Motion to Quash the jury venire shall be filed at least three days before the commencement of trial. Although the trial court’s reasons for overruling defense counsel’s objection is not in the record, counsel’s motion was properly denied on procedural grounds. There can be no strategic reason for not filing the Motion to Quash.

1 nThe only mention of this objection is found in a minute entry. The objection to the composition of the jury panel was made prior to voir dire. There is nothing else in the record before this court concerning this objection and ruling. Furthermore, it is not clear what Defendant would have quashed — the indictment or the jury panel. That counsel was insufficient is speculation. Defendant’s argument and briefing is insufficient. There is no merit to this allegation.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCES

Defendant argues that although defense counsel objected to the sentences at the conclusion of the hearing, defense counsel did not file a written motion to reconsider; thus, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. He also argues that the trial court failed to adequately state for the record the factual basis used for imposing the sentences, as required by La.Code Crim. P. art. 894.1.

As noted, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Defendant objected to the sentences as excessive. He gave no reasons why the sentences would be considered excessive in the present case. Nor did Defendant file a written motion to reconsider the sentences. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1(E) provides:

Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of exeessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

However, in the current case, Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider the sentences. Failure to file a motion to reconsider does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, Defendant may have a basis to claim ineffective assistance if he can show a reasonable probability that but for defense counsel’s error, his |12sentence would have been different. State v. Blake, 03-1465 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/04), 872 So.2d 602. Furthermore, in State v. Francis, 99-208 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/99), 748 So.2d 484, writ denied, 00-544 (La.11/13/00), 773 So.2d 156, this court noted that where the record was sufficient to resolve the claim, and the claim was raised by assignment of error on appeal, it may be considered. This record is sufficient and we will address the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to reconsider the sentence.

For the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, La.R.S. 14:68.4(B) provides for a range of imprisonment of not more than ten years, with or without hard labor and a fine of up to $5,000.00. Defendant received five years at hard labor. For the offense of attempted second degree murder, La.R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27(D)(l)(a) provide for imprisonment of no less than ten years nor more than fifty years at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant received twenty-five years imprisonment. For the offense of aggravated burglary, La.R.S. 14:60 provides for a range of imprisonment of no less than one year nor more than thirty years. Defendant received ten years at hard labor. Finally, for the offense of attempted armed robbery, La.R.S. 14:64(13) and 14:27 provide for a range of punishment no less than five years and no more than forty-nine and one-half years. Defendant received twenty years imprisonment, plus five years because of the use of a firearm. See La.R.S. 14:64.3(B). All of the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for a total of twenty-five years at hard labor.

The first question is whether there was a likelihood that had defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider, the trial court would have reduced the sentences. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court questioned Defendant about his personal history and noted that although there was an indication of a prior conviction, there was no documentation establishing a criminal 11shistory and that Defendant was only twenty-five years old, which the trial court considered mitigating factors. The trial court went on to state:

Ah, all right. Under Article 894.1, I believe that the following would apply: “There’s an undo [sic] risk that during a period of suspended sentence or probation that the defendant will commit another crime”. Of course, he’s not entitled to probation or suspended sentence. “The defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution and a lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime.” Under the aggravating factors I find that the Defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily injury to more than one person. Number six: “the offender used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense. The offender committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense.” He committed a burglary to commit the robbery. “The offender used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense.” Number eighteen is applicable: “The offender foreseeably endangered human life by discharging a firearm”. In [sic] other relevant aggravating factors, Mr. Shannon?
All right. One of the things that I like to consider is whether or not there’s rehabilitation. I do not believe that that’s appropriate; a sentence is not going to rehabilitate the Defendant. Ah, he does not have sufficient education, training, or life experience to be rehabilitated. He’s twenty-five years old, [doesn’t] have an education, has not worked. I think that there needs to be a sentence imposed that will create gen, general deterrence in the community. I’m not aware of any victim input. I am aware that the victim in the case, ah, one was an elderly person and the other one chased Mr. Anderson down in her car, was able to get a, his license plate number, or part of it, and Mr. Anderson and his co-defendant were shooting at her when she was trying to do that. And I think that there needs to be a sentence that would specifically deter the Defendant from committing future criminal conduct.

The trial court heard the victims’ testimonies at trial and based its sentencing decisions on the evidence, as noted above. The sentences imposed were one-half the allowed range of imprisonment in the case of the unauthorized use of a motor 114vehicle and less than one-half of the allowable range of imprisonment in the remaining offenses. It is unlikely the trial court would have reduced these moderate sentences had defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentences.

The second question is whether this court finds that the sentences are excessive. State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331; and State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Here, the sentences were, in all but one of the offenses, less than one-half the allowable range of imprisonment. The most severe sentence was imposed on the offense of attempted second degree murder, twenty-five years, and all sentences were imposed concurrently. In State v. Sampy, 07-1059 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08), 978 So.2d 553, writ denied, 08-845 (La.11/10/08), 996 So.2d 1066, this court did not find a thirty-year sentence uncommon for the offense of attempted second degree murder. The defendant, who was a first felony offender, shot her husband who confronted her in a parking lot with his pregnant girlfriend. Assessing whether the sentence was excessive, this court noted that the defendant also shot the girlfriend but received a manslaughter conviction and a sentence of ten years, which was ordered to be served concurrently.

In the current case, Defendant could have received a more onerous total sentence considering there were two victims involved and the applicable sentences imposed could have been ordered to be served consecutively, for a total of forty years imprisonment.

Considering the circumstances of this case, this court cannot find that the trial court abused its vast discretion when it sentenced Defendant. Furthermore, the trial court adequately stated the factual basis for the sentences as required by 115La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. The sentences do not shock this court’s sense of justice. There is no merit to this assignment of error.

DECREE

Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


author: LAMAR, Justice, WALLER, Chief Justice,

text:
    MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES and Frank Hartley, Jr. v. John D. WATTS and Lenita S. Watts.
    No. 2011-IA-01624-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Dec. 6, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied June 13, 2013.
    As Modified June 13, 2013.
    Office of the Attorney General by Tonya M. Blair, M. Earl Scales, Douglas L. Tynes, Jr., attorneys for appellants.

      Joseph P. Durr, W. Brady Kellems, Brookhaven, Cheli K. Durr, attorneys for appellees.
   LAMAR, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The County Court of Jackson County, sitting as Youth Court (‘Youth Court”), exercised jurisdiction over two minors following allegations of abuse and neglect. The foster parents of the two minor children subsequently filed adoption proceedings in the Lincoln County Chancery Court (“Chancery Court”). The Mississippi Department of Human Services (“MDHS”) sought interlocutory appeal after unsuccessfully challenging the chancery court’s jurisdiction to consider the adoption proceedings. We find that the Chancery Court has jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings and affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. The Jackson County Department of Human Services took minors A.B. and B.H. into custody due to neglect by the children’s mother. At that time, the minors’ father, Frank Hartley, was incarcerated in Florida. The Youth Court ultimately placed the children with foster parents. Due to a shortage of foster homes in Jackson County, the children were placed with Lenita and John Watts, who serve as foster parents in Lincoln County.

¶ 3. MDHS subsequently began proceedings to terminate the parental rights of both parents in Youth Court. But, Hárt-ley, having been released from prison, sought custody of the children or, alternatively, a plan for reunification with the children, and the Youth Court ultimately dismissed the motion for termination of Hartley’s parental rights. The Youth Court entered an order allowing Hartley to take the children to his home in Pennsylvania, under the supervision of the Pennsylvania courts, and MDHS informed the Wattses they would have to surrender the children for unsupervised overnight visitation with Hartley. The Wattses had no notice of the hearing on Hartley’s custody in the Youth Court, and they were not present at the hearing.

¶4. The Wattses filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, Adoption, or in the Alternative Custody, and for Other Relief in the Chancery Court of Lincoln County, where the children and the Wattses resided. Additionally, the Wattses requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting Hartley from taking custody of the children.

¶ 5. The Chancery Court heard oral argument on the Wattses’ request for a TRO. MDHS opposed the Wattses’ petition, arguing, among other things, that the Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction, because the Youth Court had exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings related to the children due to the ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings in that court. The Chancery Court found that it did have jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding.

¶ 6. After the Chancery Court’s decision retaining jurisdiction, the parties entered into an Agreed Order of Temporary In-junctive Relief (“Agreed Order”). MDHS sought interlocutory appeal on the jurisdictional issue, which we granted, leaving the Agreed Order in effect pending this appeal. The sole issue before us is whether the Lincoln County Chancery Court has jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings involving children who are simultaneously the subject of abuse and neglect proceedings in the Youth Court.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. The question of whether the chancery court has jurisdiction to hear a particular matter is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo.”

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

¶ 8. The Mississippi Constitution gives chancery courts “full jurisdiction [over] ... minor’s business.” The Mississippi Legislature gives youth courts “exclusive original jurisdiction” over “all proceedings” involving abused and neglected children. But “the chancery court’s jurisdiction ... set by the Mississippi Constitution ... cannot be diminished by statute.”

¶ 9. MDHS argues that the Youth Court has exclusive original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, over these two children in all proceedings because of the ongoing proceedings in Youth Court involving their abuse and neglect. MDHS relies primarily upon this Court’s decision in K.M.K. v. S.L.M, 775 So.2d 115 (Miss.2000), to support its position. In K.M.K., a minor was placed in the custody of foster parents by the County Court of Hinds County, sitting as Youth Court. Approximately six months later, the foster parents filed a petition for termination of parental rights in the Chancery Court of Hinds County. The natural mother filed an emergency motion to dismiss the chancery court petition, arguing that the youth court had “taken jurisdiction of the matter and had already entered an order granting [her] specific visitation rights.”

¶ 10. On interlocutory appeal, we held that “a chancery court may not exercise jurisdiction over any abused or neglected child or any proceedings pertaining thereto over which the youth court may exercise jurisdiction if there has been a prior proceeding in the youth court concerning that same child.” However, in K.M.K., we specifically limited our holding “to questions of priority jurisdiction in counties that have a county court sitting as a youth court in addition to a chancery court. We further noted “there are some matters concerning abused and neglected children over which the youth court has no jurisdiction.” Thus, MDHS’s reliance on K.M.K. is misplaced. Jurisdiction to hear and determine adoption proceedings is vested exclusively in our chancery courts.

¶ 11. MDHS also argues that the children were not “ripe” for adoption because the Youth Court had not yet terminated the natural parents’ rights. Although a youth court may terminate a parent’s rights under Mississippi Code Section 93-15-103 outside of an adoption proceeding, an adoption petition frequently includes an incidental termination of parental rights. Furthermore, as the Chancery Court recognized, two statutory schemes govern termination of parental rights. Mississippi Code Section 93-15-103 provides a finite list of specific factors that are to be considered in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. Mississippi Code Section 93-17-7 provides a more expansive list of factors that may be considered as reasons to terminate parental rights in the course of a contested adoption. Mississippi Code Section 93-17-13 additionally directs a chancellor granting an adoption over an objecting parent to include the language that “all parental rights of the natural parent, or parents, shall be terminated” in the final judgment of adoption.

¶ 12. Clearly, a chancellor has authority to terminate the rights of natural parents to enter a judgment of adoption, and is allowed to consider a more expansive list of factors in a contested adoption proceeding than the finite reasons that may considered in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. We find nothing that would require a chancery court to hold in abeyance its exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption petition until a youth court first terminates the rights of the natural parents. Therefore, we find that the Chancery Court may exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over these adoption proceedings even though the Youth Court has not yet terminated the rights of the parents.

¶ 13. We also have held that a chancery court may properly exercise jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding, even though a youth court has awarded custody of the child to another relative, because an adoption proceeding is a different subject matter from a custody ruling. In In re Beggiani, foster parents petitioned for adoption of their foster child in Hinds County Chancery Court, where they resided, although the Youth Court of Carroll County had established jurisdiction over the minor due to neglect. The child’s mother already had surrendered her rights and consented to adoption; however, the maternal grandmother opposed the adoption and sought custody of the child in youth court. The youth court granted custody to the grandmother in October 1986, and the chancery court granted the foster parents’ petition for adoption in March 1987; both parties appealed.

¶ 14. This Court recognized the “well established rule ... that where two (2) suits between the same parties over the same controversy are brought in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction retains jurisdiction over the whole controversy to the exclusion or abatement of the second suit.” However, for the “priority of jurisdiction” rule to apply, “there must, of necessity, be a determination that both actions involved the same controversy, the same remedy, and that such related to the same question.” We concluded that, although the youth court retained jurisdiction for “the offense and purpose of the ‘neglected or abused’ subject matter,” this did not “act to exclude the adoption proceeding in the Hinds County Chancery Court which made up a different subject matter.” We further recognized that:

[Ajdoption proceedings are entirely separate and distinct statutory proceedings neither connected to nor controlled by prior custody awards of another court. Lewison v. State, 193 So.2d 53 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1966). Even though a juvenile court may have obtained and retained jurisdiction over a custody case by an initial adjudication of dependency and a custody award, jurisdiction of another court in a subsequent adoption proceeding is unaffected, and the juvenile court could not act so as to thwart the adoption proceeding.

We ultimately held that the chancery court acted properly in assuming jurisdiction over the adoption and reversed the decision of the youth court in part because “an adoption is superior to a custody award.”

¶ 15. The dissent acknowledges the difficulty of these types of cases, but finds that “sound judicial administration and economy” mandate that the chancery courts should not involve themselves in these types of disputes. With all due respect, we are more persuaded that the dictates of our Constitution, our own case-law, and the best interests of these two children say otherwise. The Wattses are seeking to adopt the children, and it is undisputed that the chancery courts have exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions. The statutes which bestow jurisdictional powers on the Youth Court do not diminish the Chancery Court’s jurisdictional authority granted by our Constitution. Therefore, even though the Youth Court properly exercised jurisdiction over proceedings related to these abused and neglected minors, its jurisdiction did not extend to the Wattses’ petition for adoption, and the Youth Court may not exercise its jurisdiction in a manner “so as to thwart the adoption proceedings.” We find that the Chancery Court properly exercised its jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings and we further order that the Lincoln County Chancery Court has jurisdiction over the custody and placement of the children until the adoption proceedings are concluded.

CONCLUSION

¶ 16. We hold that chancery courts have exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions and may exercise such jurisdiction, even if a youth court has established jurisdiction over the minor due to abuse and neglect, and even if a youth court already has awarded custody to someone other than the adoption petitioner. The order of the Lincoln County Chancery Court is affirmed, and this case is remanded to the Chancery Court of Lincoln County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 17. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. PIERCE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

WALLER, Chief Justice,

Dissenting:

¶ 18. Because the Lincoln County Chancery Court improperly asserted jurisdiction over John and Lenita Watts’s adoption petition, I respectfully dissent. The Wattses’ foster-parent relationship to A.B. and B.H. derived from the County Court of Jackson County, sitting as the Youth Court; thus, the Wattses are subject to jurisdiction in Jackson County concerning the two children. Further, the Youth Court has considered a petition to terminate the natural parents’ parental rights and determined that reunification with the father, Frank Hartley, should begin. Because the Youth Court in Jackson County already has exercised jurisdiction over termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, it retains continuing jurisdiction over that issue, and the Lincoln County Chancery Court should not be allowed to reach that same issue by adjudicating an adoption over Hartley’s objection. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 19. Adoption and termination of parental rights are connected. Certainly, chancery courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine adoption proceedings. See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-3(4) (Rev.2004) (amended by Laws of 2012, ch. 556, § 1, effective July 1, 2012). But to grant an adoption over a parent’s objection, as here, chancery courts must first terminate the objecting parent’s parental rights. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-7 (Rev. 2004). Conversely, a youth court that considers terminating parental rights must determine that “adoption is in the best interest of the child, taking into account whether the adoption is needed to secure a stable placement for the child and the strength of the child’s bonds to his natural parents and the effect of future contacts between them.... ” Miss.Code Ann. § 93-15-103(1) (Rev.2004). So, even though a youth court cannot hear or grant an adoption, it still must weigh whether adoption is in the child’s best interest before terminating parental rights. Adoption factors into termination of parental rights and vice-versa.

¶ 20. As the majority notes, a chancellor considering whether to terminate parental rights in a contested adoption proceeding is afforded a more expansive list of factors to consider than a youth court deciding whether to terminate parental rights only. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 93-15-103, 93-17-7 (Rev.2004). But, even if the means are slightly different, the end remains the same: termination or nontermi-nation of parental rights.

¶ 21. Here, the Youth Court in Jackson County has exercised its original jurisdiction over termination of parental rights. As the majority notes, proceedings to terminate the mother’s parental rights apparently remain pending, and the petition to terminate Hartley’s parental rights was dismissed so that reunification efforts could begin. Having exercised jurisdiction over termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, the Youth Court in Jackson County should retain continuing jurisdiction over A.B. and B. H.

¶ 22. This Court has held that where a chancery court exercises original jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding and decides issues pertaining to custody and visitation, that court has continuing jurisdiction over matters of contempt and termination of parental rights. Tollison v. Tollison, 841 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Miss.2003). In Tollison, a couple living in Prentiss County separated, and as a result, the wife and child moved to Lafayette County. Id. at 1063. Thereafter, the couple obtained a divorce in Prentiss County. Id. at 1064. Years later, the wife filed a complaint for contempt and termination of parental rights in the Lafayette County Chancery Court. Id. This Court held that the complaint should have been filed in Prentiss County — the court of original jurisdiction — rather than Lafayette County. Id. at 1066.

¶ 23. Though Tollison’s facts clearly are distinguishable, the principle of continuing jurisdiction should apply here to the Youth Court in Jackson County. Admittedly, we have held that a chancery court may properly exercise jurisdiction over an adoption even after a youth court has awarded custody to another relative. In re Beggiani, 519 So.2d 1208, 1209-11 (Miss.1988). In In re Beggiani, we reasoned that “adoption proceedings are entirely separate and distinct statutory proceedings neither connected with nor controlled by the prior custody awards of another court.” Id. at 1211 (citation omitted). Yet, termination of parental rights and reunification were not at issue in that case. The natural mother had signed a surrender of parental rights, and the natural father apparently was not in the picture. Id. at 1209.

¶ 24. In K.M.K. v. S.L.M., 775 So.2d 115, 118 (Miss.2000), we held “that a chancery court may not exercise jurisdiction over any abused or neglected child or any proceeding pertaining thereto over which the youth court may exercise jurisdiction if there has been a prior proceeding in the youth court concerning that same child.” There, the minor’s foster parents had filed a petition in the Chancery Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County to terminate the natural parents’ parental rights after the County Court of Hinds County, sitting as the Youth Court, had refused to terminate the natural mother’s visitation rights. Id. at 116-17. We limited our holding in K.M.K. to “questions of priority jurisdiction in counties that have a county court sitting as a youth court in addition to a chancery court.” Id. at 118. And we noted specifically that youth courts do not have jurisdiction over adoption petitions. Id. at 118 n. 1 (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-3 (1994)).

¶ 25. Because all matters concerning the children should have been filed in Jackson County, I believe we should extend KM.K’s holding to these particular facts. In my view, a chancery court should not exercise its jurisdiction over a contested adoption proceeding if a youth court already has exercised its jurisdiction over termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, and reunification efforts have begun.

¶ 26. The same considerations that led to our holding in K.M.K. are pertinent here. Legislative intent was one of our principal concerns in that case. K.M.K., 775 So.2d at 118. One of the primary goals of youth courts is reunification, if that is found to be in the child’s best interest. B.A.D. v. Finnegan, 82 So.3d 608, 616 (Miss.2012) (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-103 (Rev.2009)). That goal is thwarted, however, if chancery courts are allowed to exercise jurisdiction over contested adoptions even as reunification is underway. In K.M.K., we also sought to prevent forum shopping and to avoid conflicting orders between trial courts on the same issues and multiple suits. K.M.K., 775 So.2d at 118. Under the majority’s opinion, foster parents or other persons aggrieved by a youth court’s deeision(s) can simply file for adoption in chancery court in hopes of obtaining a more desirable outcome. Chancery courts must not be allowed to function as appellate courts for prior youth-court decisions. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So.3d 868, 886 (Miss.2010). Further, allowing the Lincoln County Chancery Court to exercise jurisdiction over the adoption at this point in the Youth Court proceedings potentially leads to conflicting orders and creates confusion. If a youth court has dismissed a petition to terminate a parent’s parental rights and ordered that reunification begin, it is inconsistent for a chancery court to step in, terminate that same parent’s parental rights, and grant an adoption. Also, what then becomes of the youth court’s reunification orders as the adoption proceedings are pending?

¶ 27. These types of cases are difficult for everyone involved, including courts. That said, I believe that principles of sound judicial administration and economy require chancery courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over contested adoption proceedings where a youth court has exercised jurisdiction over termination-of-parental-rights proceedings and reunification efforts have begun. The Wattses’ course for relief was in Jackson County, where A.B. and B.H. were subject to the Youth Court’s jurisdiction as neglected children, where the Wattses had derived their foster-parent status, and where termination of parental rights already has been considered. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

      . Hartley was convicted of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor between the ages of twelve and sixteen.

      . The record of the Youth Court proceedings is not before this Court. It is unclear whether the Youth Court ever dealt with the merits of the petition to terminate Hartley’s parental rights. Also, it appears the proceeding to terminate the mother’s parental rights is still pending in the Youth Court. The dissent expresses concerns about "res judicata” and “conflicting orders” between the two courts. However, these issues are not before this Court and are potential issues that the chancellor acknowledged in his order. Nothing in this opinion should be read to preclude such issues being raised in the lower court. We rule today only upon the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court to proceed.

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 43-15-13(9) (Rev. 2009).

      . It is undisputed the Wattses lived in Lincoln County when they filed their petition on October 10, 2011, and that the children lived with the Wattses in Lincoln County from December 14, 2009, until the Wattses filed their petition.

      . In the Agreed Order, the Chancery Court found it had subject matter and party jurisdiction, but that MDHS and Hartley reserved all objections to jurisdiction; that the minor children were to be placed with MDHS, but not allowed to be removed from Mississippi; that all nonphysical contact between the children and Hartley would be monitored; and that the Chancery Court would appoint a guardian ad litem (GAD), who would supervise any physical contact between the children and Hartley if the GAD chose to do so.

      . Following oral arguments, we requested additional briefing from the parties on the question of whether the statutory grant of "exclusive original jurisdiction” to youth courts over "all proceedings” concerning abused and neglected children impermissibly encroaches upon the chancery courts' constitutionally granted "full jurisdiction” over "minor’s business.” After thorough study, we find it unnecessary to answer this question in order to decide this case, and we leave it for determination on another day.

      . White v. White, 26 So.3d 342, 346 (Miss.2010) (citing In re Guardianship of Z.J., 804 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Miss.2002); Burch v. Land Partners, L.P., 784 So.2d 925, 927 (Miss.2001)).

      . Miss. Const. art. 6, § 159 (1890).

      . See Mississippi Code Section 43-21-151, which reads as follows: "(1) The youth court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings involving a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, a neglected child, an abused child or a dependant child, except in the following circumstances None of the enumerated excepted circumstances is present herein.

      . White v. White, 26 So.3d at 347.

      . K.M.K., 775 So.2d at 116.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 117.

      . Id. at 118.

      . Id.

      . Id. at n. 1 (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-3 (1994) (adoption proceedings must be filed in chancery court)) (emphasis added).

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-3(4) (Rev. 2004) (adoption proceedings must be filed in chancery court).

      . In re Beggiani, 519 So.2d 1208 (Miss.1988).

      . Id. at 1209.

      . Id.

      . Id.

        .Id. at 1210 (citations omitted).

      . Id.

      . Id. at 1211.

      . Id. (citation omitted).

      . Id. at 1213-14.

      . Diss. Op. at ¶ 27.

      . Beggiani, 519 So.2d at 1211.

      . The Wattses are contractual foster parents. Unfortunately, the actual contract that the Wattses entered into is not in the record. But regulations of the Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS) state that foster parents who agree to serve as a "resource home,” "expressly waived any right to custody of a child placed in [their] home for care, unless the child is made free for adoption by the written decision and action of the court.” Dep’t of Human Services Regulations, 11-111 CMSR § 006-35, Appendix S (Rev.2008) (emphasis added).


author: KITCHENS, Justice,

text:
    BAILEY BRAKE FARMS, INC. v. George Calvin TROUT and Ron Nassar.
    No. 2011-CA-00610-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    May 23, 2013.

      Jak McGee Smith, Tupelo, Gregory M. Hunsucker, J. Rhea Tannehill, Jr., Oxford, attorneys for appellant.
    Grady F. Tollison, Jr., Cameron Morgan Abel, Oxford, Thomas Roy Trout, Roger H. McMillin, Jr., New Albany, attorneys for appellees.
    Before WALLER, C.J., LAMAR and KITCHENS, JJ.
   ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

KITCHENS, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor.

¶ 2. The plaintiffs, two shareholders of a closely held corporation, attempted to tender their shares to the corporation pursuant to a buy-sell agreement. Dissatisfied with the corporation’s offer to purchase, the two shareholders sought relief in the Lafayette County Chancery Court, and the court submitted the matter to binding arbitration to determine the stock’s value as required by the contract. However, the chancellor rejected the arbitrators’ valuations and ordered the corporation to buy the plaintiffs’ stock at a much higher purchase price. The corporation has appealed the chancellor’s rejection of the arbitration award, and the plaintiffs have cross-appealed, claiming that they were entitled to additional damages, including prejudgment interest. Finding no legal basis for setting aside the arbitration award, we reverse the chancery court and reinstate the arbitration award.

Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3. Bailey Brake Farms, Inc., owns several hundred acres of land in Tallahatchie County, Mississippi. Bailey Brake leases the hunting rights to Bailey Hunting and Fishing Association, Inc., a nonprofit corporation which operates as a hunting club for the shareholders of Bailey Brake. Both corporations were formed on the same day in 1992 by seventeen, self-described “well-educated duck hunters.”

¶ 4. Each shareholder executed an identical Stock Subscription Agreement and a Buy-Sell Stock Restriction Agreement with Bailey Brake. These agreements required the shareholders to purchase 100 shares by annual subscription payments paid over an eleven-year period. If a shareholder wished to transfer or sell his interest, any offer of sale had to be presented first to the corporation and then to the individual shareholders. The agreements prescribed fixed repurchase prices for the first five years; but, after the fifth year, the price was to be the “fair market value” as established by the shareholders. If the transferring shareholder and the corporation could not agree on the purchase price, the contract provided that “the value of each share of the Corporation shall be determined by arbitration,” and “this value shall be binding on the Corporation and the Shareholders and their representatives.”

¶ 5. In 1997, shareholder Ron Nassar notified Bailey Brake that he wished to sell his shares. Nassar and Bailey Brake could not agree on a purchase price, and, after four years, the dispute was unresolved. On May 19, 2001, Nassar, joined by fellow shareholder George Calvin “Bud” Trout, sought to tender his shares to Bailey Brake and ceased payment of all assessments and dues. On February 7, 2002, Nassar and Trout filed a complaint against Bailey Brake in the Lafayette County Chancery Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the court “declare [the] plaintiffs’ rights as shareholders” and “enjoin the defendant corporation from denying plaintiffs equal benefits of the profits and benefits of the corporation.”

¶ 6. After six years of litigation, on February 15, 2008, the chancellor entered an agreed order appointing a special master to make recommendations of findings of fact and conclusions of law on “all issues.” The special master recommended that the court enforce the arbitration provision, with the arbitrators determining the fair market value of the stock as of May 19, 2001, the date Nassar and Trout attempted to tender their shares to Bailey Brake. The report also concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest because they had failed to request such relief in their complaint.

¶ 7. The chancellor accepted the special master’s findings and recommendations in their entirety and in a written order declared that “[t]his is a temporary or interlocutory judgment with the Court retaining jurisdiction for entry of a future final judgment after a value for the stock has been ascertained through the procedures for determining value as expressed in Article IV of the Buy-Sell Stock Restriction Agreement.”

¶ 8. The matter proceeded to arbitration before two arbitrators, one appointed by each side. On November 2, 2010, the arbitrators issued their decision, finding that, before deducting any unpaid “assessments,” the fair market value of Nassar’s interest was $47,235.88, and the fair market value of Trout’s interest was $45,323.88. The arbitrators agreed that the plaintiffs should bear their share of “reasonable and necessary” assessments which had enhanced and improved the property, but they could not agree on an amount. The arbitrators suggested that the parties submit this issue to the court or appoint a third arbitrator to resolve the issue of the assessments.

¶ 9. The plaintiffs then moved the chancery court to add a third arbitrator or, in the alternative, to reconsider the arbitration award. At a hearing on this motion, the defendant agreed to waive the assessments, their value being the only issue not resolved in arbitration. On March 24, 2011, shortly after the hearing, the trial court entered its final order, allowing the defendant to waive the assessments but finding that the arbitrators had submitted “an incomplete decision,” and that “conflicting documents submitted for the valuation of the shares indicate the valuation to have been based on undue means.” The order then outlined the court’s own method of valuation and ordered Bailey Brake to pay $157,586.67 to Nassar and $155,666.67 to Trout, roughly three times the amount of the arbitration award.

Issues

¶ 10. Bailey Brake claims that the chancellor exceeded his authority by disregarding the arbitrators’ valuation, because arbitration awards can be modified or vacated only on very narrow grounds, and no such grounds were present in this case. Bailey Brake takes issue with the chancellor’s adopting, verbatim, an order submitted by the plaintiffs and allegedly failing to review any evidence before issuing the final order. The defendant also argues that, notwithstanding the trial court’s limited authority, the chancellor did not apply the proper accounting principles in valuing the shares, and that the plaintiffs were judicially estopped from seeking a modification of the arbitrators’ decision. Given the lack of evidence and specific findings from the chancellor, we agree with Bailey Brake that the arbitration award should not have been disturbed.

¶ 11. The plaintiffs assert on cross-appeal that the chancellor erred by denying their motion to amend their complaint to include additional claims and damages, and erred by failing to award them prejudgment interest pursuant to the parties’ Buy-Sell Stock Restriction Agreement. We find the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to amend, which was filed five and a half years into the litigation. Moreover, despite the plaintiffs’ assertion to the contrary, the parties’ Buy-Sell Stock Restriction Agreement does not entitle the plaintiffs to prejudgment interest in this instance. Therefore, we find the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal to be without merit.

I. Bailey Brake’s Direct Appeal

¶ 12. As an initial matter, the plaintiffs attempt to persuade this Court that the contract contemplated an appraisal rather than arbitration. Citing IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So.2d 96 (Miss.1998), the plaintiffs claim that the arbitration provision of the Buy-Sell Stock Restriction Agreement simply established a valuation method and was not intended to result in a final, binding judgment. Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, the decision to adopt the valuation of the arbitrators was wholly within the chancellor’s discretion.

¶ 13. As the defendant correctly notes, in IP Timberlands, 726 So.2d 96, this Court rejected the same argument that the plaintiffs now make. The contract in IP Timberlands called for a price to be fixed by “arbitrators.” Id. at 104. This Court explained that the terms “arbitration” and “appraisal” have distinct, well-defined meanings, and that the parties, described as “knowledgeable and experienced timber companies,” could have used the term “appraisers” had they intended an appraisal rather than binding arbitration. Id. at 106-07. The defendant also notes that, until now, the plaintiffs persistently pursued arbitration of their claims, not ap-praisement. Given the plaintiffs’ repeated pleas in the chancery court for arbitration, their claim is even less persuasive than the similar argument rejected in IP Timber-lands.

¶ 14. Additionally, the plaintiffs have never argued that the arbitration provision was invalid únder the law of contracts (e.g., that the arbitration provision was a result of unequal bargaining power). See Adams Cmty. Care Center, LLC v. Reed, 37 So.3d 1155, 1158 (Miss.2010) (“To determine whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, we apply the law of contracts.”) (citation omitted)); Marcoin, Inc. v. Hammond, 368 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Miss.1979) (“Where there is grossly disproportionate bargaining power, the principle of freedom to contract is nonexistent and unilateral terms result.”) (citation omitted)). Because the valuation was an arbitration award, as contemplated by the legally valid and binding contract, it is binding on the parties absent very narrow circumstances which are prescribed by statute. Margerum v. Bud’s Mobile Homes, Inc., 823 So.2d 1167, 1170 (Miss.2002) (quoting Hutto v. Jordan, 204 Miss. 30, 39, 36 So.2d 809, 810 (1948)); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-15-23 (Rev.2004). This Court has long acknowledged that arbitration “might proceed altogether on views of what was right and just between the parties without following either the rules that would govern a court of law or equity in the circumstances.” Craig v. Barber, 524 So.2d 974, 977 (Miss.1988) (quoting Hutto, 36 So.2d at 811; Jenkins v. Meagher, 46 Miss. 84 (1871)). Thus, when competent and fully informed parties expressly contract to arbitrate their disputes, their rights are “narrower than in judicial trials, for there is no review or correction of errors of the judgment, either upon the law or facts.... ” Hutto, 36 So.2d at 811 (quoting Jenkins, 46 Miss. 84). See also Adams Cmty. Care Center, 37 So.3d at 1158; Marcoin, Inc., 368 So.2d at. 1259.

¶ 15. In this case, the chancellor held, without explanation, that the award was reached by “undue means,” and that the decision was incomplete as contemplated by Mississippi Code Section 11-15-23. The relevant portions of this statute provide:

Any party complaining of an award may move the court to vacate the same upon any of the following grounds:
(a) That such award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or that they so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award on the subject matter was not made.

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-23 (Rev.2004). Thus, although undue means and unresolved issues can be valid reasons for setting aside an arbitration award, the court’s order provided no basis for these findings. The order’s only analysis in this regard is as follows:

The Court ordered that the stocks of the Plaintiffs be valuated by two arbiters. The two arbiters have submitted an incomplete decision on the valuation.
Documents on which to base the valuation and submitted to the arbiters conflicted. The Court finds that the conflicting documents submitted for the valuation of the shares indicate the valuation to have been based on undue means.

The remainder of the order outlined the chancellor’s valuation assessment, but did not articulate why the arbitrators’ decision was incomplete or what “undue means” were employed to procure the award.

¶ 16. The arbitrators’ written decision detailed the evidentiary basis and reasoning behind the decision. They concluded that one of the two appraisals submitted by the parties was more reliable, discounted the stock’s value based on limited marketability and minority interest, found that, on the date in question, there were sixteen stockholders, and followed the court’s previous order to deduct “dues” of $21,900 from each plaintiffs share. Although the chancellor ultimately disagreed with all these findings, he failed to articulate any “undue means” utilized or any specific deficiencies with the arbitrators’ thorough analysis and valuation methods.

¶ 17. As for the chancellor’s finding that the arbitrators submitted an “incomplete decision,” we can but guess that he was referring to the arbitrators’ disagreement and indecision over what amounts of deductions were due to “assessments.” Yet, even if we did make such an assumption, the final order explicitly stated that “[t]he Court will allow the Corporation to withdraw its submission of assessments.” With no dispute over assessments, nothing about the arbitrators’ decision was “incomplete.”

¶ 18. Bailey Brake gives several alternative reasons for reversal, but none is as compelling as the chancellor’s having exceeded the narrow authority that permits judicial review of arbitration awards. The chancellor’s order disregarded longstanding Mississippi jurisprudence that “every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of arbitration proceedings.” Craig, 524 So.2d at 977 (quoting Hutto, 36 So.2d at 811). We find that the chancellor incorrectly substituted his own judgment for the arbitration award and treated it as if it was a recommendation from a special master. Thus the chancellor erred in setting aside the arbitration award, and the arbitrators’ decision must be reinstated.

II. Nassar’s and Trout’s Cross-Appeal

¶ 19. The main contention of the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal is that the chancellor erred by denying their motion to amend their complaint. Once the defendant had filed its answer, the plaintiffs could amend their complaint “only by leave of court or upon written consent of the adverse party; leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” M.R.C.P. 15(a). On appeal, “[w]hen considering a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend a pleading, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Hutzel v. City of Jackson, 38 So.3d 1116, 1119 (Miss.2010) (Pratt v. City of Greenville, 804 So.2d 972, 978 (Miss.2001)). While Rule 15 states that an amendment “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” absent a mistake of law, which is subject to de novo review, the plaintiffs have a heavy burden to overcome.

¶ 20. On November 13, 2007, five and a half years after filing their complaint, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add new causes of action, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of good faith and fair dealing. The amendment sought actual damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest from the date of the breach, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

¶ 21. Bailey Brake responded that the amendment sought to change the very nature of the litigation, transforming their initial request for equitable relief into a stockholder’s derivative action that should have been filed in circuit court. The defendant also claimed that the amendment would be highly prejudicial because a key witness to its defense of these new claims had died. Bailey Brake asserted that all of the alleged facts underlying the new claims existed and were known to the plaintiffs at the time of their original complaint, and that the motion was an attempt to bypass the statute of limitations.

¶ 22. The plaintiffs have offered little explanation for waiting five and a half years to amend their complaint, an amendment that would have changed the nature of their case from a case in equity to an action at law. Absent extraordinary circumstances, we will affirm the denial of a motion to amend if a party has “had ample opportunity and time to amend its complaint, and has offered no justification for why it did not do so.” Barry v. Reeves, 47 So.3d 689, 695 (Miss.2010) (quoting Webb v. Braswell, 930 So.2d 387, 393 (Miss.2006)). “Applications to amend the pleadings should be prompt,” and a lack of diligence is not a compelling reason to amend. Id. (citations omitted).

¶ 23. The plaintiffs’ main assertion appears to be that intentional delays in the litigation, caused by the defendant, rendered their initial demands for relief inadequate. The plaintiffs do not articulate specific examples of bad faith on the part of the defendant that would warrant such a drastic change to their initial claims. Moreover, the law provides remedies for intentional dilatory conduct. See e.g., M.R.C.P. 37(b) (allowing sanctions for failing to comply with discovery). The plaintiffs had adequate means to remedy any alleged bad faith in the defendant’s conduct of the litigation, and a motion to amend, five and a half years after their initial complaint, was not a proper avenue for relief.

¶24. Further, the special master’s report and recommendations, later adopted in toto by the chancellor, actually addressed the breach of contract claim and resolved the issue in the plaintiffs’ favor. The special master found that Bailey Brake did not comply with the contractual terms following the plaintiffs’ tendering their stock on May 19, 2001. The special master noted that the contracts did not require the corporation to purchase the tendered shares. However, to remedy its breach of the contract, the special master recommended that Bailey Brake be required to purchase the plaintiffs’ shares at an amount determined in arbitration. According to the chancellor, an adequate measure of damages for the corporation’s breach of contract was the fair market value of their shares as of May 19, 2001.

¶ 25. As for prejudgment interest, the special master, and ultimately the trial court, correctly ruled that prejudgment interest was not available without having been pled in the initial complaint. Upchurch Plumbing, Inc. v. Greenwood Utilities Comm’n, 964 So.2d 1100, 1118 (Miss.2007). The plaintiffs rely on Upchurch to argue that such specificity is not required to be pled for the court to award prejudgment interest. Yet Upchurch simply holds that “Rule 8 does not require that a party seeking prejudgment interest must plead the specific date on which the prejudgment interest allegedly is due,” and does not abrogate the requirement “that a party assert a demand for prejudgment interest in the appropriate pleading.” The initial complaint prayed for declaratory and in-junctive relief and “general relief.” A request for “general relief’ in a complaint seeking equitable relief would not give the defendant notice of a claim for prejudgment interest. M.R.C.P. 8.

¶ 26. As an alternative, the plaintiffs argue that Article V of the Buy-Sell Stock Restriction Agreement entitles them to prejudgment interest at a rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the defendant’s breach. However, the trial court correctly recognized that this provision does not apply. Article V applies only when Bailey Brake has agreed to purchase a shareholder’s stock at an arbitrated value and then is thirty days late on a payment. Since the value of the stock was still in dispute, no payments were due from Bailey Brake; thus, the contract did not entitle the plaintiffs to prejudgment interest. For these reasons, the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal is without merit.

Conclusion

¶ 27. The chancellor granted the plaintiffs’ request to enforce the arbitration provision, but, dissatisfied with the outcome, the plaintiffs successfully moved for a judicial increase in their award. Although the chancellor cited “undue means” and an incomplete award as justifications for judicial review, he provided insufficient explanation for these conclusions, which we find are unsupported by the record. Because the chancery court was without the authority to set aside the arbitrators’ decision, we reverse the chancery court’s final order and render judgment here in favor of Bailey Brake Farms, Inc., reinstating the arbitration award. The defendant’s waiver of assessments shall remain undisturbed. On cross-appeal, we affirm.

¶ 28. ON DIRECT APPEAL: REVERSED AND RENDERED. ON CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR, CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. DICKINSON, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . The $1,912 difference represented the outstanding amount owed by Trout under the stock subscription agreement.