author: SILBERMAN, Judge.

text:
    BRIGHT HOUSE NETWORKS, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Petitioner, v. Albert B. CASSIDY, Steven L. Cassidy, Peter E. Cassidy, Carol Cassidy Rhinehart, and Michael H. Cassidy, Respondents.
    No. 2D13-1055.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Jan. 10, 2014.

      Eric J. Partlow and Melissa Rizzo of Adams and Reese LLP, Tampa, for Petitioner.
    John Marc Tamayo and Barbara W. Davis of Valenti, Campbell, Trohn, Ta-mayo, & Aranda, Lakeland, and Richard E. Straughn of Straughn & Turner, P.A., Winter Haven, for Respondents.
   SILBERMAN, Judge.

In this breach of contract action brought by the Cassidys, Bright House Networks, LLC, seeks certiorari review of a discovery order that compels it to disclose alleged trade secrets. Because disclosure of a trade secret can cause irreparable harm and the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law, we grant the petition.

Bright House is a cable service provider whose predecessor in interest entered into a contract with the Cassidys in 1984. The contract states that the cable service provider “shall perpetually provide all channels provided by the cable service and programming including all future channels to each of the following Cassidy family members at their place of residence anywhere in a [Bright House] service area free of any and all charges and costs.”

In January 2010 Bright House terminated all free cable services to the Cassidys. In a separate lawsuit for declaratory judgment and breach of contract, a federal court determined that the Cassidys were entitled perpetually to the same level of cable services that Bright House was providing before the termination of those services in January 2010. Judgments for damages were entered against Bright House for the value of the services the Cassidys should have received but did not due to the termination of services. Bright House paid the judgments and issued a 1099 form to each of the Cassidys for the year 2011. Bright House had never issued 1099s to the Cassidys previously.

After Bright House issued the 1099s, the Cassidys filed this action against Bright House for breach of contract, alleging that Bright House breached its duty to provide the cable services “free of any and all charges and costs.” Thus, the issue is whether any taxes incurred by the Cassi-dys due to the issuance of the 1099 forms constitute a “charge” or a “cost” in violation of the contract. The Cassidys further alleged that Bright House selectively provided 1099s to the Cassidys but did not provide 1099s “to the voluminous number of customers who receive free services from Defendant based upon business relationships and other considerations provided to Defendant.”

The Cassidys served their first interrogatories and first request for production of documents on Bright House. In interrogatory numbers 3 and 4 the Cassidys requested the following:

8. Please list the names and addresses of all persons or entities who have received any complimentary cable services from you at any time during the last three years while residing in or otherwise doing business in ... (a) Polk County, Florida; ... (b) The State of Florida (outside of Polk County, Florida); and ... (c) The United States of America (outside of the State of Florida).
4. For every person or entity identified in your answer to interrogatory number 3, please list by name all of those to whom you have ever issued a 1099 and, for each, state the year for which you first issued a 1099.

In document request number 3 the Cassi-dys requested that Bright House produce any 1099s issued to persons or entities identified in interrogatory number 4. In document request number 4 the Cassidys requested production of “any and all correspondence, records, or other documents that you reference in any of your answers” to the first set of interrogatories.

Bright House filed answers and objections to the interrogatories and stated interrogatory numbers 3 and 4 exceeded the scope of permissible discovery under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280 and further objected that the interrogatories sought “confidential and/or proprietary information of third parties and/or Bright House.” Bright House also objected to the request for production to the extent it sought “documents containing information regarding trade secrets, confidential and/or proprietary business information, and/or information subject to confidentiality agreements with non-parties.”

The Cassidys filed a motion to compel answers to interrogatories and response to the request for production. At a hearing on the motion on November 15, 2012, Bright House argued that the issue in the case was a legal issue of what does “free” mean and that it was unnecessary to know how many other contracts Bright House entered into with other customers. Bright House asserted, “That implicates confidential and sensitive, protected business information; and that has absolutely no bearing on what the Court’s — the scope of the Court’s job in this case.” Later Bright House again asserted that it would be improper for the court to order discovery of

this confidential and sensitive information about who we’ve entered into other contracts with, who we may have given better discounts to.
This is a very competitive business, both amongst us and our customers — our competitors and our customers. We can’t simply give out this information, particularly in this case, when it would have no bearing on the Court’s interpretation on this clear and unambiguous contract. They want to know which contracts we’ve entered into in the entire state of Florida, and in fact across the entire United States.
They want to know to whom we’ve issued 1099s for. Again, how is this ever going to be relevant in this case?

When the Cassidys responded to Bright House’s argument, they did not address the issue of confidential infonnation. The trial court granted the motion to compel, stating that Bright House’s objections were “not well-founded.” Bright House asked for clarification of whether the court was ordering Bright House to “identify other customers that we may have entered into contracts with for the — for the provision of complimentary services.” The trial court replied, “Yes, because if there’s something you’re maintaining that is confidential, well, then, you know, you have the right to make a confidential log on that, and, you know, submit that to the Court.” But the court stated that it did not find “any grounds for that at this point.” In its written order compelling Bright House to answer the interrogatories and produce the documents, the court stated the ruling was without prejudice to Bright House claiming confidentiality with respect to those documents, “but if Defendant chooses to do so, it may redact what it perceives to be confidential and provide a log to opposing counsel and the Court in order to determine if the redacted information is, indeed, confidential.”

Bright House served supplemental answers and responses to the discovery. Bright House asserts in its petition that it avoided the issue of confidentiality by “taking the issue completely off the table.” Rather than disclosing the identity of customers receiving discounts, Bright House stipulated in its answer to interrogatory number 3

that there exists a significant number of recipients of discounted/complimentary cable services for one reason or another, including public libraries, schools, governmental organizations, employees and other entities or individuals associated with managing or providing access to multi-account developments. To the extent the number could be accurately calculated, it would constitute confidential and protected business information and [be] unnecessary given the foregoing stipulation.

As to interrogatory number 4 Bright House answered that, although irrelevant to the issues in the case, “for various reasons it has not issued, nor was it necessarily required to issue 1099s to other recipients of discounted or complimentary services.” It further stated “that in circumstances wherein it has subsequently been determined that a 1099 should have been provided but was not, this may have been a mistake, and the issue is being further analyzed.” Bright House admitted it issued 1099s to the Cassidys in 2011 and produced them.

The Cassidys filed a second motion to compel, and the trial court heard the motion on February 22, 2013. The Cassidys argued that Bright House’s answers were nonresponsive and that they were entitled to Bright House’s list of customers who received discounted services. They further argued that they wanted to see what arrangements Bright House had with these other customers. Bright House maintained that “who we enter into other agreements with and the terms of those agreements are very confidential.” Bright House again stipulated that it had served no other customers with 1099s who received some complimentary service.

The trial court granted the second motion to compel in its entirety without making any specific rulings on Bright House’s objections regarding confidential and proprietary information. The order directed Bright House to provide the discovery to the Cassidys, and Bright House filed this timely petition for writ of certiorari.

Certiorari review of a discovery order is appropriate when it “ ‘departs from the essential requirements of law, causing material injury to a petitioner throughout the remainder of the proceedings below and effectively leaving no adequate remedy on appeal.’ ” Ameritrust Ins. Corp. v. O’Donnell Landscapes, Inc., 899 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla.1995)). We first address the jurisdictional issue of whether the order creates irreparable harm. Harley Shipbuilding Corp. v. Fast Cats Ferry Serv., LLC, 820 So.2d 445, 448 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). If the jurisdictional requirement is met, we then consider whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law. Id.; see also Ameritrust, 899 So.2d at 1207.

Bright House argues that its customer lists are confidential business information and constitute trade secrets. “Orders improperly requiring the disclosure of trade secrets or other proprietary information often create irreparable harm and are thus appropriate for certiorari review.” Grooms v. Distinctive Cabinet Designs, Inc., 846 So.2d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The Cassidys contend that Bright House did not preserve this issue for review because Bright House did not utter the phrase “trade secret” at either hearing on the motions to compel.

The record reflects that in its written objections and at the hearings, Bright House made the trial court and the Cassi-dys well aware that it was contesting the disclosure of customer information regarding discounted services because it was confidential, proprietary business information. And in Bright House’s original written response to the request for production, Bright House objected to the requests “to the extent that they seek documents containing information regarding trade secrets, confidential and/or proprietary business information.” We conclude that Bright House’s arguments in the trial court preserved the issue for review. Because Bright House contends that the order improperly requires the disclosure of trade secrets or other proprietary information, we have jurisdiction for certiorari review and turn to whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law.

The Florida Evidence Code contains a privilege against the disclosure of trade secrets. See § 90.506, Fla. Stat. (2012). When a party objects to the disclosure of a trade secret, first a court must determine whether the requested information is, in fact, a trade secret. Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. LLC v. 1221 Palm Harbor, L.L.C., 67 So.3d 448, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Ameritrust, 899 So.2d at 1207. Usually this determination requires the trial court to perform an in camera review of the information. Summitbridge, 67 So.3d at 449; Ameritrust, 899 So.2d at 1207.

Second, if the trial court determines that the information is a trade secret, then the court must determine if the party requesting the information has shown a reasonable necessity for the information. Ameritrust, 899 So.2d at 1207. This court has explained that “[c]ompelled disclosure through discovery must be limited to items necessary for a court to determine contested issues.” McDonald’s Rests. of Fla., Inc. v. Doe, 87 So.3d 791, 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). If the court orders disclosure, it must make findings to support its determination. Ameritrust, 899 So.2d at 1207. Furthermore, the trial court may need to order safeguards to prevent the unnecessary dissemination of the information. Summitbridge, 67 So.3d at 451.

Section 688.002(4) Florida Statutes (2012), defines a trade secret as follows:

(4) “Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

A customer list that is not readily ascertainable by the public can be a trade secret. East v. Aqua Gaming, Inc., 805 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Kavanaugh v. Stump, 592 So.2d 1231,1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); East Colonial Refuse Serv., Inc. v. Velocci, 416 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).

Here, the trial court ordered disclosure without an in camera review or making any findings regarding whether the disputed information was privileged as a trade secret or whether the Cassidys had shown sufficient necessity to overcome the privilege. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari. However, we recognize that an in camera review of a list of names and addresses may not be helpful in determining whether Bright House’s list of customers who have received discounted service is a trade secret.

Bright House argues that its compilation of information is confidential in the very competitive cable industry and that it acquired the information through the pursuit of its business strategy and the course of many confidential negotiations with customers. We have no record evidence of these assertions. Thus, the trial court may need to conduct a further hearing to determine whether the customer compilation is a trade secret. If the trial court finds that the information is a trade secret, then the court must balance the necessity for the information in the litigation against protecting the confidential information. Grooms, 846 So.2d at 655. For the information to be necessary to the litigation, it of course must be relevant and either admissible at trial or “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1). In determining necessity for the information, the trial court should consider the significance of Bright House’s stipulation that it has given discounted service to numerous customers but has not provided 1099s to anyone other than the Cassidys. See East Colonial, 416 So.2d at 1278 (stating that although the respondent contended that discovery of the corporation’s customer list was relevant to the allegation that part of his job was to obtain new business, “petitioner has admitted this allegation and respondent has failed to show sufficient necessity to overcome petitioner’s privilege”).

Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash the order compelling discovery with respect to interrogatories 3 and 4 and the request to produce as it relates to those interrogatories.

Petition granted and order quashed in part.

VILLANTI and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ALTENBERND, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Alfredo RUSSO, Appellant, v. Rosa RUSSO, Appellee.
    No. 2D12-2976.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Jan. 10, 2014.
    Lori W. Clifford of Clifford Family Law, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   ALTENBERND, Judge.

Alfredo Russo appeals the final judgment of dissolution of his long-term marriage to Rosa Russo. The final judgment incorporated by reference the report and recommended final judgment of the magistrate to whom the case was referred. We affirm the judgment with the exception of one sentence found in the magistrate’s report, which shall be removed from incorporation in the final judgment.

The Russos were married for nearly forty years. Apparently, for a significant portion of the marriage they resided in Italy. Rosa Russo filed the petition for dissolution without the assistance of an attorney. Alfredo Russo answered in similar fashion. The matter was referred to a magistrate, who did his best to conduct a hearing without the assistance of attorneys and with two pro se litigants for whom English was a second language. The trial court entered judgment, adopting the report of the magistrate.

There were no minor children of this marriage. We conclude that the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s determination that each party owned nonmarital property in Italy. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s division of the marital property, which was owned in Florida and North Carolina. Both parties, who are in their late fifties or early sixties, are employed. The husband is a certified automobile mechanic and has greater earning capacity than his wife. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent alimony of $1356 per month as recommended in the magistrate’s report and as supported by competent, substantial evidence at the hearing before the magistrate. See Perrone v. Frank, 80 So.3d 402, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Due to his employment in Italy during this marriage, Alfredo Russo is apparently entitled to a retirement benefit when he reaches sixty-five years of age and is no longer employed. This benefit is seemingly similar to social security. The magistrate did not receive any expert testimony concerning this benefit. The magistrate awarded half of this benefit to Rosa Russo. He ordered Alfredo Russo to file the necessary documents in Italy to accomplish this split and to pay Rosa Russo her half directly if the “plan administrator” would not pay her. This portion of the report concluded with the sentence: “Such payment is in the form of support and the remedy of contempt is available to Wife for the Husband’s failure to make the required payments.”

We conclude that the trial court did not err by adopting the magistrate’s decision to divide this benefit equally. However, from the record and from the magistrate’s report, it appears likely that this benefit is an asset that was equitably distributed. If so, contempt would not be a proper method of enforcement. See Oglesby v. Oglesby, 921 So.2d 849, 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). In this opinion, we do not attempt to determine the proper method to enforce this distribution of the pension benefit. If and when this benefit becomes available, . should Rosa Russo need to obtain the assistance of the court to enforce this provision of the judgment, the court will be free to determine the proper method of enforcement at that time. On remand, the trial court shall remove the above-quoted sentence of the magistrate’s report from incorporation in the judgment of dissolution.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WALLACE and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


author: ROWE, J.

text:
    Dontavious Lamar COPELAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-5250.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 17, 2014.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Nada M. Carey, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Angela R. Hensel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   ROWE, J.

Dontavious Copeland appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence to life without the possibility of parole. Copeland raises three issues on appeal. We affirm on all grounds and write only to address Copeland’s argument that a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole pursuant to section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2012).

Copeland was convicted for the murder of Jearicka Mack, a fifteen-year-old bystander at the scene of a parking lot fight outside a club. Eyewitnesses testified at trial that Copeland was involved in the fighting, he was armed with a gun that night, and he fired the gun during the fight, immediately after which the victim was found bleeding to death in the parking lot from a gunshot wound in her chest. Copeland was seventeen years old at the time of the crime.

Copeland was convicted of first-degree murder, a capital felony. Section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2012), provides that a person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished either by death or by life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. However, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States' Constitution prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to death. Seven years later, in Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the Supreme Court held that mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for those who were juveniles at the time of their crimes is unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Thus, under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2012), a juvenile convicted of a capital felony may not be sentenced to death nor to a mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole.

However, although Miller prohibits the imposition of a mandatory life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender, the Supreme Court recognized that a sentencing court may still impose a life without parole sentence, after conducting an individualized mitigation inquiry. Id. at 2471-75. In Washington v. State, 103 So.3d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), this Court held that life without the possibility of parole remains a permissible sentence for a juvenile convicted of a capital felony under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2012), as long as the trial court examines the mitigating factors in the case:

[I]f the state ... seeks imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the trial court must conduct an individualized examination of mitigating circumstances in considering the fairness of imposing such a sentence. Under Miller, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole remains a constitutionally permissible sentencing option.

Washington, 103 So.3d at 920; see also Ortiz v. State, 119 So.3d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (defendant had notice of life without parole sentence since Miller did not foreclose it); Hernandez v. State, 117 So.3d 778, 783-84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (adopting the reasoning of Washington).

In Miller, the Supreme Court discussed the mitigating factors presented by the facts of that case, including that the fourteen-year-old defendant was under the influence of drugs and alcohol, which were provided in part by his adult victim; and he had a history of family abuse and suicide attempts, but only a scant criminal record. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2462.

Here, the trial court considered several mitigating factors before sentencing Copeland to life without the possibility of parole: Copeland was just five months shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time of the shooting; there were no drug or family problems apparent from his trial or pre-sentence investigation; and Copeland had been convicted not only of killing an innocent bystander, but also of a separate armed robbery that occurred a week before Mack’s murder. The trial court stated that it heard “all of the potential mitigation” in the case, and found that life without the possibility of parole was an appropriate sentence for Copeland:

The court does find that while you were under 18, you were 17, near the age of majority. Your propensity for violence indeed was manifested in a previous crime, for which you were convicted. A willingness to pull a gun, shoot a gun, and endanger the public manifested absolute indifference to human life.... The court finds that there is no sufficient mitigator in your case that would warrant the court from departing from a life sentence in this case.... The court cannot give a mandatory life sentence, but the court does sentence you to life in prison.... There’s a 15-year-old child that is dead. And there really is no justification, beyond your being 17. And that is not sufficient to outweigh the justice that should be done in this case.

Consistent with our holding in Washington, the sentencing court conducted an individualized mitigation inquiry, considering several potential mitigating factors before finding that life without the possibility of parole was, nevertheless, appropriate in this case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Copeland’s judgment and sentence.

PADOVANO and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

      . But see Horsley v. State, 121 So.3d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ("the only sentence now available in Florida for a charge of capital murder committed by’ a juvenile is life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.”).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Zachary WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-2749.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 17, 2014.
    Zachary Wright, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Joshua R. Heller, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the lower tribunal’s “Order Denying Defendant’s Motions,” rendered April 24, 2012, in Duval County Circuit Court case number 16-2006-CF-10363-AXXX-MA, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal.

LEWIS, C.J., PADOVANO and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Joseph Christian FONTANA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-3941.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 17, 2014.
    Joseph Christian Fontana, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a belated appeal of the May 23, 2013, order which dismissed the motion-for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.800(a) in Santa Rosa County Circuit Court case number 2009-CF-000804-A. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

VAN NORTWICK, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


text:
    David A. DUGAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-4663.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 17, 2014.
    Patrick N. Leduc, Tampa, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a belated appeal of the judgment and sentence rendered on March 6, 2012, in Baker County Circuit Court case number 02-2011-CF-00082-A. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

VAN NORTWICK, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM. JOHNSON, C.J. WEIMER, J.,

text:
    In re LaShanda M. ROBINSON.
    No. 2013-B-1924.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

11 This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, LaShanda M. Robinson, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently ineligible to practice.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2010 and November 2011, the ODC filed two separate sets of formal charges against respondent, both primarily alleging that she converted funds owed to her clients’ medical providers. Respondent answered the formal charges and admitted that she had improperly handled her client trust account; however, she asserted that such conduct was not intentional and was mitigated by her inexperience in law office management and lack of accounting skills.

The formal charges were then consolidated by order of the hearing committee chair before proceeding to a formal hearing on the merits conducted by the hearing committee in April 2012. Following its review, the disciplinary board filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing both sets of formal charges.

U10-DB-029

In December 2009, the ODC received a report of an audit of respondent’s client trust account for the period from April 2008 to June 2009. The audit report concluded that respondent converted client and third-party funds to pay her personal expenses and that she regularly commingled her own funds with client funds in the trust account. Respondent has stipulated to the following instances of trust account mismanagement as set forth in the audit report:

The Robinson matter — Respondent represented her mother-in-law, Patricia Robinson, in a personal injury matter. In April 2008, respondent settled the claim for $10,000, from which she withheld $2,793.76 owed to Agilus Health, Inc. for physical therapy services and $685.88 owed to St. Frances Cabrini Hospital for emergency room services. However, respondent failed to disburse these sums to the medical providers and instead converted a total of $3,479.14 to her own use. Patricia Robinson’s medical expenses remain unpaid to date.

The Moon matter — Respondent represented Kenyatta Moon in a personal injury matter. In December 2008, respondent settled the claim for $7,000, from which she withheld $1,684.80 owed to Baton Rouge Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (“BRPMR”) for physical therapy services. However, respondent failed to disburse these funds to the medical provider and instead converted them to her own use. In August 2010, respondent remitted the sum of $750 to BRPMR in partial satisfaction of the balance owed by Ms. Moon, but the account otherwise remains unpaid.

The Davis matter — Respondent represented Jerry Davis in a personal injury matter. In June 2008, respondent settled the claim for $9,500, from which she -withheld $3,067.33 owed to Agilus Health, Inc.; $91 owed to Central Louisiana |sImaging Center; and $508 owed to St. Frances Cabrini Hospital. However, respondent failed to disburse these sums to the medical providers and instead converted a total of $3,666.33 to her own use. Mr. Davis’s medical expenses remain unpaid to date.

The Deloñs Alexander matter — Respondent represented Deloris Alexander in a personal injury matter. In May 2009, respondent settled the claim for $6,223.50, from which she withheld $1,985 owed to Advantage Physical Therapy and $1,050 owed to West Feliciana Parish Hospital. However, respondent failed to disburse these sums to the medical providers and instead converted a total of $3,035 to her own use. Ms. Alexander’s medical expenses remain unpaid to date.

The Woodside matter — Respondent represented Carolyn Woodside in a personal injury matter. In May 2009, respondent settled the claim for $6,124, from which she withheld $1,894 owed to the Rathbone Clinic and $1,025.50 owed to West Felicia-na Parish Hospital. However, respondent failed to disburse these sums to the medical providers and instead converted a total of $2,919.50 to her own use. Ms. Wood-side’s medical expenses remain unpaid to date.

The Melvin Alexander matter — Respondent represented Melvin Alexander in a personal injury matter. In May 2009, respondent settled the claim for $5,500, from which she withheld $1,485 owed to Advantage Physical Therapy and $29 owed to West Feliciana Parish Hospital. However, respondent failed to disburse these sums to the medical providers and instead converted a total of $1,514 to her own use. Mr. Alexander’s medical expenses remain unpaid to date.

The Williams and McCastle matters— Respondent represented Max Williams and Don McCastle in family law matters. From Mr. Williams, respondent received an advance fee payment of $2,375, and from Mr. McCastle, |4she received an advance fee payment of $1,900. Respondent initially deposited these payments into her client trust account but then withdrew the funds before the fees were fully earned.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in 10-DB-029 violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.5(f)(3) (when the client pays the lawyer an advance deposit against fees which are to accrue in the future on an hourly or other agreed basis, the funds remain the property of the client and must be placed in the lawyer’s trust account), 1.15(a) (a lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(d) (a lawyer shall promptly deliver to a client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rule 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) by failing to answer BRPMR’s December 2009 disciplinary complaint.

U-DB-m

In June 2011, the ODC received a report of an audit of respondent’s client trust account for the period from August 2005 to March 2008 and from June 2009 to November 2010. The audit report concluded that respondent converted client and third-party funds to pay her personal expenses and that she regularly commingled her own funds with client funds in the trust account. The report also noted that the account was overdrawn on four occasions between May and October |52010. Respondent has stipulated to the following instances of trust account mismanagement as set forth in the audit report:

The Gamer matter — Respondent represented Sequence Garner in a personal injury matter. In September 2007, respondent settled the claim for $12,000, from which she withheld $3,100 owed to BRPMR for physical therapy services and $287 owed to Baton Rouge General Medical Center for emergency room sendees. However, respondent failed to disburse these sums to the medical providers and instead converted a total of $8,387 to her own use. In August 2010, respondent remitted the sum of $750 to BRPMR in partial satisfaction of the balance owed by Ms. Garner, but the account otherwise remains unpaid.

The Brandy Alexander matter — Respondent represented Brandy Alexander in a personal injury matter. In July 2009, respondent settled the claim for $6,500, from which she withheld $355.24 owed to Field Memorial Hospital; $950 owed to Central Louisiana Imaging Center; $859 owed to the Rathbone Clinic; and $235 owed to the Daniel Clinic. However, respondent failed to disburse these sums to the medical providers and instead converted a total of $2,399.24 to her own use. Ms. Alexander’s medical expenses remain unpaid to date.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in ll-DB-104 violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15(a) and 1.15(d).

Hearing Committee Report

As previously noted, the hearing committee conducted a hearing on the consolidated formal charges. Following the hearing, the committee issued its |fireport, in which it made factual findings consistent with the underlying facts set forth above. The committee found that respondent mismanaged her client trust account by converting $22,085.01 owed to her clients’ medical providers and by commingling personal funds with client funds in the trust account. She also failed to submit a written response to the disciplinary complaint filed by BRPMR. The committee found this conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal charges.

The committee determined that respondent violated duties owed to her clients, the public, the legal system, and the profession. Her misconduct was not only knowing, but intentional. Respondent caused actual injury to her clients, who remain liable for the payment of their medical expenses when funds to do so have already been deducted from their settlement proceeds, and the healthcare providers, who still have not been compensated. The applicable baseline sanction in this matter is disbarment, both pursuant to the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the seminal case of Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), which sets forth general guidelines for imposing discipline in a conversion case.

In aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive and multiple offenses. The committee also noted that several overdrafts occurred in respondent’s client trust account even after the ODC had been investigating her mishandling of the account for more than a year. Further, the committee expressed disappointment that respondent did not take advantage of the many resources available to her through the bar association to assist her in correctly handling her trust account. With respect to mitigating circumstances, the committee recognized the following factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, personal or emotional problems, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative 17attitude toward the proceedings, inexperience in the practice of law (admitted 2004), character or reputation, and remorse.

Notwithstanding the mitigating factors, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred for “the extensive rule violations committed.” The committee also recommended that respondent be required to pay restitution of the full amount of her clients’ medical expenses, plus interest, to their healthcare providers.

Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation, asserting that the committee erred in finding she failed to cooperate with the ODC. Respondent also contended that the sanction of disbarment is too harsh.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing these consolidated matters, the disciplinary board found that the hearing committee’s factual findings are not manifestly erroneous, as they are largely based upon respondent’s stipulations. The board also found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges, except the board concluded respondent’s failure to file a formal written response to the BRPMR complaint was an oversight that did not rise to the level of an ethical violation. Accordingly, the board found no violation of Rule 8.1(c).

The board determined that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to her clients. She caused actual injury to several third-party 18healthcare providers by converting more than $22,000 dedicated to payment of medical services rendered to her clients. These providers remain uncompensated for the services they provided (with the exception of the two partial payments of $750 each which BRPMR received from respondent in August 2010). Additionally, respondent’s mismanagement of her client trust account, which included commingling and the payment of personal expenses out of her trust account, created the potential for harm to her clients. According to the ABA Standards and Hinrichs, the applicable baseline sanction in this matter is disbarment.

In aggravation, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, and multiple offenses. Like the committee, the board also noted the overdrafts which occurred in respondent’s client trust account even after formal charges had been filed against her arising out of the mismanagement of the account. In mitigation, the -board found the following factors: absence of a prior disciplinary-record, personal or emotional problems, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, inexperience in the practice of law, character or reputation, and remorse.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board acknowledged that respondent’s misconduct falls into the Hinrichs disbarment category, as she knowingly converted third-party funds, the extent of the conversion is significant, and, with one minor exception, she has failed to pay restitution. However, the board concluded that the mitigating factors present in this case are substantial and warrant a downward deviation to suspension.

Based on this reasoning, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years. The board also recommended that respondent be required to make full restitution to her clients’ medical providers and that she be assessed with the costs and expenses of this matter.

| ^Although neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the board’s recommendation, on October 9, 2013, we ordered briefing addressing the issue of an appropriate sanction. Both respondent and the ODC filed briefs in response to the court’s order.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In this matter, the record supports a finding that respondent converted more than $22,000 owed to her clients’ medical providers and commingled personal funds with client funds in her trust account. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as found by the disciplinary board.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987).

We agree with the hearing committee that respondent’s conversion of third-party funds was intentional. The conversion clearly caused actual harm to respondent’s clients and their medical providers, and the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment.

The following aggravating factors are present: a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, and multiple offenses. The following mitigating factors | Tnare supported by the record: absence of a prior disciplinary record, personal or emotional problems, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, inexperience in the practice of law at the time of the misconduct (admitted 2004), character or reputation, and remorse.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), we conducted an extensive review of the jurisprudence in conversion cases in order to determine the appropriate sanctions for different types of conversion. We reserved disbarment, then the most serious sanction available, for conversion cases in which one or more of the following elements are present:

[T]he lawyer acts in bad faith and intends a result inconsistent with his client’s interest; the lawyer commits forgery or other fraudulent acts in connection with the violation; the magnitude or the duration of the deprivation is extensive; the magnitude of the damage or risk of damage, expense and inconvenience caused the client is great; the lawyer either fails to make full restitution or does so tardily after extended pressure of disciplinary or legal proceedings.

By contrast, we stated in Hinrichs that a three-year suspension would be appropriate in cases involving fewer aggravating factors than the disbarment cases:

In such cases the lawyer is guilty of at least a high degree of negligence in causing his client’s funds to be withdrawn or retained in violation of the disciplinary rule. He usually does not commit other fraudulent acts in connection therewith. The attorney usually benefits from the infraction but, in contrast with disbarment cases, the client may not be greatly harmed or exposed to great risk of harm. The attorney fully reimburses or pays his client the funds due without the necessity of extensive disciplinary or legal proceedings.

Nearly all of the elements supporting disbarment are present in the instant case. Respondent has acknowledged that from 2007 to 2009, she converted more than $22,000 owed to the medical providers of at least eight of her clients. These Inactions were in no way attributable to respondent’s inexperience in law office management and lack of accounting skills, as she claims, but rather were intentional and prompted by her own personal financial difficulties. Respondent clearly acted in a manner that was contrary to the best interests of her clients and caused significant harm both to the clients who are still liable for their unpaid medical expenses and to the medical providers who have been deprived of funds owed them for four to six years. Finally, with the exception of a belated payment to one medical provider totaling $1,500, which payment was made only after the extended pressure of these disciplinary proceedings, respondent has failed to make any restitution whatsoever on her clients’ behalf.

Notwithstanding these aggravating factors and what appears to be a clear case for disbarment under Hinrichs, the disciplinary board has recommended a downward deviation to a three-year suspension from the practice of law. While we recognize that there are some mitigating circumstances present in this case, we find that under the circumstances, they do not justify a deviation from the baseline sanction.

Based on this reasoning, we will reject the disciplinary board’s recommendation of a three-year suspension and instead impose disbarment, as recommended by the hearing committee. We will also order respondent to pay restitution of the full amount of her clients’ medical expenses, plus legal interest.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record and the briefs filed by the parties, it is ordered that LaShanda M. Robinson, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29402, be and she hereby is disbarred. Her name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. | ,glt is further ordered that respondent shall make full restitution to her clients’ medical providers as set forth in this opinion. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

JOHNSON, C.J.

dissents.

|,I respectfully dissent. I would suspend respondent for three years.

WEIMER, J.,

dissenting.

|,I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to impose the sanction of disbarment. Under the particular facts and circumstances presented, I believe a less severe sanction would best serve the interests of justice and of the disciplinary system.

      . On May 31, 2013, respondent was declared ineligible to practice law for failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements. She is also ineligible for failure to pay her bar dues and the disciplinary assessment and for failure to file a trust account disclosure form.

      . The audit report indicates that Patricia Robinson’s insurer may have paid the emergency room bill to St. Frances Cabrini Hospital, but if that is the case, respondent owes the funds to Patricia Robinson or the insurance company.

      . The audit report also indicates that $548 owed to Dr. Verma Rajinder was withheld from Mr. Davis’s settlement but not paid; however, respondent introduced documentary evidence at the hearing in this matter that Dr. Rajinder has been paid in full.

      . The complaint primarily related to Ms. Moon’s matter but also questioned whether respondent had failed to remit medical expenses owed by her client Leroy Dukes to BRPMR. Although respondent did handle a personal injury claim for Mr. Dukes, no settlement was ever reached in the matter, and thus there is no evidence that respondent is in possession of funds in connection with that representation which her client or a third party is entitled to receive.

      . The audit report also concludes that respondent converted $15,000 belonging to her client Marshae Celestine because she could not provide the auditor with any documentation to support the disbursements made on Ms. Celestine’s behalf. However, based upon evidence submitted by respondent at the hearing in this matter, the ODC has agreed that there was no conversion of Ms. Celestine's funds.

      . Respondent had requested and obtained a reduction in the amounts owed by Ms. Robinson, Ms. Moon, and Ms. Garner for physical therapy services in order to facilitate the settlement of their personal injury claims, and upon disbursement of these settlements, she withheld the reduced amounts. However, when she failed to pay her clients’ medical expenses promptly, the healthcare providers withdrew their offer of a reduced payment. Therefore, the committee recommended (and we agree) that respondent should be responsible for making restitution of the full amount of the physical therapy expenses incurred by Ms. Robinson ($5,587.53), Ms. Moon ($2,808), and Ms. Gamer ($4,188), in addition to the outstanding medical expenses for her other clients subject of the formal charges. The total amount of restitution calculated in this fashion, less the two partial payments of $750 each which respondent has already made to BRPMR, is $25,589.98, plus interest.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rico JACKSON.
    No. 2013-KK-1409.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   PER CURIAM.

Writ granted. While defendant has always maintained his innocence, he pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Given the unique facts of this case relating to the veracity of the arresting officer which arose prior to sentencing, we find the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 559; see also State v. Lapoint, 94-1173 (La.9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1304. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and this case is remanded for purposes of allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.

WRIT GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED.

GUIDRY, J., dissents.

CLARK, J., dissents and would deny the writ.


text:
    In re Guy J. D’ANTONIO.
    No. 2013-OB-2668.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 20, 2013.
   ORDER

1, Considering the Joint Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status,

IT IS ORDERED that Guy J. D’Antonio, Louisiana Bar Roll number 4510, be and he hereby is transferred to disability inactive status. All disciplinary proceedings against respondent shall be deferred until such time as he resumes active status.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Michael T. BELL.
    No. 2013-B-2491.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 2013.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

li Respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which the parties agreed that respondent has engaged in conduct that violated Rules 1.4, 1.16(d), and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Michael T. Bell, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27740, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, retroactive to September 19, 2012, the date of his interim suspension. It is further ordered that all but one year of the suspension shall be deferred, subject to the condition that any future misconduct may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    Joyce GORMAN v. CITY OF OPELOUSAS, et al.
    No. 2013-C-1734.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 8, 2013.
   In re Lexington Insurance Company;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 10-C-4849-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1468.

Granted.


text:
    Ashley HOFFMAN, Individually and on Behalf of all others Similarly Situated v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA.
    No. 2013-CC-1575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 8, 2013.
   In re Travelers Indemnity Company of America;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 70415; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 072SR.

Granted.


text:
    Patricia WATKINS v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION.
    No. 2013-CC-1545.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 8, 2013.
   In re BP America Production Company; Chevron U.S.A. Inc.; Exxon Mobil Corporation; ExxonMobil Oil Corporation; Humble Incorporated; Marathon Oil Company; Shell Oil Company;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B., No. 58-843; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0477.

Granted.


text:
    Larry WAGONER, et al. v. CHEVRON USA, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2272.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2013.
   In re Devon Energy Production Company, L.P.; Merit Energy Company, L.L.C.; Merit Energy Partners D-III, L.P.; Merit Energy Partners III, L.P.; Merit Management Partners I, L.P.;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 22,929; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,119-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Treg M. COMEAUX.
    No. 2013-KK-2754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 4, 2013.
   In re Comeaux, Treg M.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2013-56003; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 13-01247.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charlene WILSON and Joshua Joseph.
    No. 2013-KK-2764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 4, 2013.
   In re Joseph, Joshua;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 516-938; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1583.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Milton FAULKNER.
    No. 2013-KK-2775.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 4, 2013.
   In re Faulkner, Milton;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Divs. M, B, Nos. 541-245, 517-864; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1488.

Denied.


text:
    QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES, INC., Michael X. St. Martin and Virginia Rayne St. Martin v. I.P. PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., International Paper Company, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown, Read, Hammond & Mintz, L.L.P., and John Y. Pearce.
    No. 2013-C-1582.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Quality Environmental Processes Inc. et al.; St. Martin, Michael X.; St. Martin, Virginia Rayne;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 149,973; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0776.

Granted.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES, INC., Michael X. St. Martin and Virginia Rayne St. Martin v. I.P. PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., International Paper Company, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown, Read, Hammond & Mintz, L.L.P., and John Y. Pearce.
    No. 2013-C-1588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Montgomery, Barnett, Brown, Read, Hammond & Mintz, L.L.P.; Pearce, John Y.;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 149,973; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0776.

Granted.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES, INC., Michael X. St. Martin and Virginia Rayne St. Martin v. I.P. PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., International Paper Company, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown, Read, Hammond & Mintz, L.L.P., and John Y. Pearce.
    No. 2013-C-1703.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re I.P. Petroleum Company, Inc., et al.; International Paper Company;—Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 149,973; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0776.

Granted.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Robert L. THOMAS v. Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-C-1855.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Secretary Cynthia Bridges; State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 130592; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1439.

Granted.


text:
    SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. RIMKUS CONSULTING GROUP, INC. OF LOUISIANA, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-1977.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. of Louisiana; Rogers, Craig D.;—Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2009-7556-F; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00283.

Granted.


text:
    IRB PROPERTIES, LLC v. NEIGHBORHOOD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., et al Jemico Investments, LLC, et al. v. Ms. White, et al.
    No. 2013-C-2373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re IRB Properties, LLC;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 548,813; 551,439; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,356-CA C/W 48,357-CA.

WRIT GRANTED. For the reasons assigned in dissent by Judge Brown, it is clear that Neighborhood Property Management (NPM) lost its ownership interest in the property at 3232 Lillian Street by tax sale in 2006 and, thereby, its right to the rents collected on the property by IRB Properties from February 2010 through August 2010. Further, NPM acquiesced in IRB’s collection of the rents and transferred any ownership interests it may have had in the property to IRB. Accordingly, there are no grounds upon which to base a judgment ordering IRB to pay the collected rents to NPM. The writ is granted, and the district court judgment awarding NPM $3,145.00 is reversed.

KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ„ would deny.


text:
    In re Arthur L. HARRIS, Sr.
    No. 2013-B-2368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; Confidential Party; — Other(s); Applying For Joint Petition for Consent Discipline.

Joint petition for consent discipline accepted.

VICTORY and CLARK JJ., would reject consent discipline.


text:
    In re Benjamin O. BURNS.
    No. 2013-B-2582.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; Burns, Benjamin O.; — Other(s); Applying For Joint Petition for Consent Discipline Pursuant to Rule XIX, Section 20.

Joint petition for consent discipline accepted.


text:
    In re Daniel A. WEBB.
    No. 2013-B-2583.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; Webb, Daniel A.; — Other(s); Applying For Joint Petition for Consent Discipline Pursuant to Rule XIX, Section 20.

Joint petition for consent discipline accepted.


text:
    In re Gilbert E. STAMPLEY.
    No. 2013-B-2604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; Stampley, Gilbert E.; — Other(s); Applying For Joint Petition for Consent Discipline Pursuant to Rule XIX, Section 20.

Joint petition for consent discipline accepted.


text:
    Murphy J. PAINTER v. STATE of Louisiana, through the OFFICE OF the GOVERNOR, the Department of Revenue and Taxation, Alcohol and Tobacco Control Commission; Cynthia Bridges, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Department of Revenue and Taxation, the Office of State Inspector General, and Stephen Street Jr., in his Official Capacity as the State Inspector General.
    No. 2013-CC-1680.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Painter, Murphy J.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 1, 2013, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 604-308; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 0224R.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Burtell V. THOMAS.
    No. 2013-K-0013.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Thomas, Burtell V.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 490-989; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1219.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randy Paul DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0997.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Davis, Randy Paul;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 14,976; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00293.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth Truman ROBERTS, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-1204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Roberts Jr., Kenneth Truman;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 27124; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1555.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth Truman ROBERTS, Jr.
    No. 2013-K-1215.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Roberts, Jr., Kenneth Truman;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 27124; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1555.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrance Wayne GOUDEAU.
    No. 2013-KO-1251.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Goudeau, Terrance Wayne;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 24906-10; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1326.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick ALEXANDER.
    No. 2013-KO-1337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Alexander, Derrick;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 09-3372; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-194.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Readus WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-KO-1338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Williams, Readus;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 10-735; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-305.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Demond F. COOK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Cook, Demond F.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 02-09-0158; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0336.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David G. SARPY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Sarpy, David G.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C-13323; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00963.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Travis DENNIS.
    No. 2013-KO-1384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Dennis, Travis;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 10-1386; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-818.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary Anthony BAILEY, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-1385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Bailey Jr., Gary Anthony;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 189924; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,042-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Teddy R. MAGEE.
    No. 2013-K-1396.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Magee, Teddy R.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 502-630; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1025.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Quoc-Khoi A. PHAM.
    No. 2013-K-1398.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Pham, Quoc-Khoi A.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 12-KA-635; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-635.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Desmond KIBBY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Kibby, Desmond;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 07-00-0532; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0420.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Steve E. ADAMS.
    No. 2013-K-1413.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Adams, Steve E.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 07-340; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-1052.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rebekah E. WOLFE.
    No. 2013-K-1421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Wolfe, Rebekah E.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 503-572; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0647.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daryl Wayne ROBERTSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Robertson, Daryl Wayne;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisor; and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 13-WCR-207.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shawn LACOUR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1438.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Lacour, Shawn;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 99-5954; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-425.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Angelo A. GONZALEZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1442.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Gonzalez, Angelo A.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-165; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-452.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; see also La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dante Leon MILON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1444.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Milon, Dante Leon;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 585,739; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1610.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jessie WILLIAMS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Williams, Jr., Jessie;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 293,725; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,456-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent M. CASTILLO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1668.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Castillo, Vincent M.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 12-5805; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-K-432.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vincent M. CASTILLO.
    No. 2013-KK-1784.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Castillo, Vincent M.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 12-5805; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-K-432.

Denied.


text:
    Thomas McKENZIE v. IMPERIAL FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, the Estate of Sharon R. Braud and Sharon Braud and State Farm Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-2066.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2011-14102; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1648.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher David PAYNE.
    No. 2013-KK-2092.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Payne, Christopher David;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 30583 C/W 30584; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1278.

Denied.

VICTORY, WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Patrick WILLIAMS v. PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2013-C-2158.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Peerless Insurance Company;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2011-0264; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,228-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lameeka McKINNEY.
    No. 2013-KK-2166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re McKinney, Lameeka;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 11-5008; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-K-548.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant and assigns reasons.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    FAIR FARMS, INC. and Roy Dean Hart v. Robert B. HOLT, Anthony Hal Waller, and William Bradley Johnson.
    No. 2013-C-2322.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re C. Boyce Miller; Holt, Robert B. et al.; JBF Partnership; Johnson Johnny; Johnson, Linda Carol; Johnson, William Bradley; OBOBA, Inc.; Robert B. Holt, Inc.; Transylvania Gin, Inc.; Waller, Anthony Hal;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 21,639; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,246-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Joanne T. HOLLIDAY v. Natasha DUFRENE, Farmers Insurance Exchange, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-CC-2324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C582539; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1052.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Michael Edward BLAKE v. Alicia Dimarco BLAKE.
    No. 2013-CC-2347.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Blake, Michael Edward;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 52-267; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0714.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darrin R. HILL.
    No. 2013-KK-2352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 359-046; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0861.

Denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    In re Landis CAMP.
    No. 2013-OC-2359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Camp, Landis J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs.

Denied on showing made.


text:
    SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, etc. v. KING INVESTMENTS OF LOUISIANA, INC., etc.
    No. 2013-CC-2362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Scottsdale Insurance Company Etc.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 12-4611; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0600.

Denied.


text:
    Stephen Duncan SAUSSY, Jr. v. Leslie A. BONIN d/b/a Leslie A. Bonin, LLC and CNA Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-2365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Saussy Jr., Stephen Duncan;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 10-328; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1755.

Denied.


text:
    SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. v. KING INVESTMENT OF LOUISIANA, INC. et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2376.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re King Investment of Louisiana, Inc. f/k/a Crescent Environment Services, Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 12-4611; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0618.

Denied.


text:
    Joann SCHILLING v. BERNHARD BROTHERS MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, LLC and Ratcliff Construction Company, LLC.
    No. 2013-C-2378.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Schilling, Joann;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 597,318; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 2105.

Denied.


text:
    Damon HARRIS v. Kianka HUNTER.
    No. 2013-CC-2394.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re Harris, Damon;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 2013-07394; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1231.

Denied.

VICTORY and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher LEE, et al.
    No. 2013-KD-2494.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 500-034; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. PENDING.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vernon THOMAS.
    No. 2013-KK-2936.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 511-335; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1639.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Augustus JACKSON.
    No. 2013-KK-2938.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 513-418; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1610.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Judy SEROU, Gordon Serou, Jr., Stephen S. Serou, and Michael Serou v. TOURO INFIRMARY, Specialty Hospital of New Orleans, Inc., and Columbia Casualty Company.
    No. 2012-CA-0089.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Jan. 28, 2013.
   ORDER

|,Because we conclude that Aggreko’s argument that the reversal of the trial court judgment dated September 29, 2011, in its favor and against Touro requires either a unanimous three-judge panel or a referral to a five-judge panel under La. Const, art. V, § 8(B), we hereby RECALL and VACATE our Order of January 24, 2013 by which we denied Aggreko’s application for rehearing, GRANT only the application of Aggreko for rehearing, VACATE our judgment of January 9, 2013, insofar and only insofar as it decided the appeal of the judgment of September 29, 2011 (but not of the judgment of October 5, 2011), and refer the matter to a five-judge panel for oral argument.

JUDGE PAUL A. BONIN

JUDGE DANIEL L. DYSART

JUDGE ROSEMARY LEDET


author: AMY, Judge.

text:
    In re Bernard B. LAFLEUR.
    No. 12-1227.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 6, 2013.

      Anthony C. Dupré, Ville Platte, LA, for Appellee, Bernard B. LaFleur.
    Harrietta J. Bridges, Baton Rouge, LA, for Appellant, State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections Office of Motor Vehicles.
    Court composed of MARC T. AMY, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and JOHN E. CONERY, Judges.
   AMY, Judge.

hThe complainant in this matter was arrested on suspicion of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles, suspended the complainant’s commercial driver’s license and declared him ineligible for commercial driving privileges for one year. However, the district attorney declined to prosecute the driving while intoxicated charge. After an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge found that the Department of Public Safety and Corrections had met its burden and upheld the suspension. However, after a de novo trial in the district court, the district court found that the complainant was entitled to an immediate reinstatement of his commercial driving privileges because the complainant had not been convicted of the driving while intoxicated charge. The Department of Public Safety and Corrections appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

According to the record, the complainant, Bernard B. Lafleur, was stopped by Trooper Willie Williams, Jr., an officer with the Louisiana State Police, because one of Mr. Lafleur’s headlights was not working properly. Observing several indications of intoxication, the trooper arrested Mr. Lafleur and took him to a police station for processing. After being advised of his rights, Mr. Lafleur submitted to a blood alcohol test. The test results showed that Mr. Lafleur’s blood alcohol content was 0.144 grams percent by weight. The record indicates that Mr. La-fleur was charged with driving while intoxicated, first offense, a violation of La.R.S. 14:98.

Mr. Lafleur’s commercial driver’s license was seized as a result of the arrest, and the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles, |2(PPSC) suspended Mr. Lafleur’s driving privileges. Mr. Lafleur timely sought an administrative hearing concerning the suspension. However, before the administrative hearing, the district attorney’s office notified Mr. Lafleur that it was “declining prosecution at this time on the charges of DWI 1st and the charges Usted above.”

The record contains only a copy of the administrative law judge’s decision and order. That decision indicates that a hearing was conducted on June 11, 2012, before Administrative Law Judge John 0. Kopy-nec. At the hearing, Mr. Lafleur and Trooper WiUiams testified, and exhibits were submitted into evidence. The administrative law judge affirmed the suspension. The administrative law judge concluded that, pursuant to La.R.S. 32:668, DPSC “properly suspended Respondent’s driver’s license because the Department met its burden of proving the statutory requirements of the Louisiana Tests for Suspected Drunken Drivers law.” Further, Mr. Lafleur argued that, because the district attorney had declined to prosecute the driving while intoxicated charges, he was entitled to an immediate reinstatement of his driving privileges. However, the administrative law judge rejected Mr. Lafleur’s argument, finding that “while an individual may be entitled to have driving privileges reinstated, the validity of the civil suspension under the Tests for Suspected Drunken Drivers Law must still be determined.”

Thereafter, Mr. Lafleur filed a petition in the district court seeking review of the administrative law judge’s decision. At a hearing, the parties briefly presented the testimony of Mr. Lafleur and Trooper Williams, and submitted evidence into the record. Mr. Lafleur again contended that the district attorney’s refusal to | ¡¡prosecute the charges mandated that his driving privileges be immediately reinstated. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found that because “[tjhere was no conviction, therefore, there is no suspension, there is no disqualification.” Accordingly, the district court ordered that Mr. Lafleur’s driving privileges be reinstated.

DPSC appeals, asserting that the district court erred in ordering the reinstatement of Mr. Lafleur’s commercial driver’s license.

Discussion

On appeal, the parties’ arguments focus on La.R.S. 32:414.2’s requirement, in part, that the person whose driving privileges are suspended be convicted of one of the offenses listed therein. DPSC contends that the administrative law judge’s adjudication constitutes a “conviction” pursuant to La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(9)(a). Mr. Lafleur disputes that contention and argues that the district court’s de novo review vacated the administrative law judge’s decision.

Louisiana has enacted two statutory schemes concerning the “suspension of driving privileges for persons who drive while intoxicated or under suspicion of doing so.” Walker v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, 589 So.2d 622, 624 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991). Those schemes, codified at La.R.S. 32:661-670 and at La.R.S. 32:414-415.1, permit DPSC to suspend the driving privileges of those persons meeting the statutory requirements contained therein. Id. However, although both schemes contain provisions concerning suspension of driving privileges based on driving while intoxicated or the suspicion thereof, “the two schemes are parallel, they are not integrated. The two statutory schemes are separate and distinct.” Id. The procedures delineated in La.R.S. 32:667-670 concern those who have been arrested upon suspicion of driving while intoxicated, while La.R.S. 32:414-415.1 concerns Rthose who have been convicted of and sentenced for, among other offenses, operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

Pursuant to La.R.S. 32:667(A), when a person is placed under arrest for a violation of La.R.S. 14:98, La.R.S. 14:98.1, or a similar parish or municipal ordinance, and that person “either refuses to submit to an approved chemical test for intoxication, or submits to such test and such test results show a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or above by weight,” the arresting officer is required to seize the person’s driver’s license and issue a temporary license that notifies the person that they may make a written request to DPSC for an administrative hearing in accordance with La.R.S. 32:668. If that person fails to timely make the written request, the person’s license shall be suspended pursuant to the provisions of La.R.S. 32:667(B).

If the person requests an administrative hearing, one shall be provided pursuant to La.R.S. 32:668. The scope of the hearing pursuant to La.R.S. 32:668(A) is limited to:

(1) Whether a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person, regardless of age, had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state, or had been driving, ... while under the influence of either alcoholic beverages or any abused substance or controlled dangerous substance as set forth in R.S. 40:964.
(2) Whether the person was placed under arrest.
(3) Whether he was advised by the officer as provided in R.S. 32:661.
(4) Whether he voluntarily submitted to an approved chemical test and whether the test resulted in a blood alcohol reading of 0.08 percent or above by weight....
(5) Whether he refused to submit to the test upon the request of the officer.
|s(6) Such additional matters as may relate to the legal rights of the person, including compliance with regulations promulgated by the Department of Public Safety and Correction and rights afforded to the person by law or jurisprudence.

The person may seek further review of the suspension of their driving privileges by filing a petition in the district court, “in the same manner and under the same conditions as is provided in R.S. 32:414.” La. R.S. 32:668(C).

However, we observe that La.R.S. 32:667(H)(1) provides, in relevant part, that:

When any person’s driver’s license has been seized, suspended, or revoked, and the seizure, suspension, or revocation is connected to a charge or charges of violation of a criminal law, and the charge or charges do not result in a conviction, plea of guilty, or bond forfeiture, the person charged shall have his license immediately reinstated and shall not be required to pay any reinstatement fee if at the time for the reinstatement of driver’s license, it can be shown that the criminal charges have been dismissed or that there has been a permanent refusal to charge a crime by the appropriate prosecutor or there has been an acquittal.

In contrast, La.R.S. 32:414 addresses the suspension of driving privileges after a conviction for certain offenses, stating, in part, that DPSC:

shall suspend the license of any person for a period of twelve months upon receiving, from any district, city, or municipal court ... satisfactory evidence of the conviction or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and sentence thereupon ... of any such person charged with ... operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of beverages of high alcoholic content, of low alcoholic content, of narcotic drugs, or of central nervous system stimulants.

La.R.S. 32:414(A)(l)(a). Pursuant to La. R.S. 32:414(F)(4), any person whose license is suspended shall have the right to seek a hearing in the district court to determine whether the license is subject to suspension. Review in the district court is de novo. Henry v. State, Dept. of Pub. Safety, 01-103 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/27/01), 788 So.2d 1286.

IfiSimilarly, La.R.S. 32:414.2 specifically addresses those cases where a person holding a commercial driver’s license has been convicted of certain offenses. Specifically, La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(l)(a) states, in relevant part, that:

[A] person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for committing any offense specified in this Section.... The department shall suspend, revoke, or cancel the commercial driving privileges of a person who is disqualified to drive pursuant to this section.... If a driver is suspended or revoked from operating a Class “D” or “E” motor vehicle, he shall also be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle.

A “conviction” is defined in La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(9)(a) as:

an unvacated adjudication of guilt or a determination in a court of original jurisdiction or by an authorized administrative tribunal that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law.... A conviction shall occur regardless of whether a person is referred to a remedial or pretrial diversion program as an alternative to the imposition of a penalty, fine, or other sanction.

Further, La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(l)(b)(ii) provides that, if a person has been disqualified from driving a commercial vehicle, once the suspension, revocation, or cancellation resulting from the disqualifying offense has expired, that person shall be issued a Class “D” or “E” driver’s license, provided that the person’s Class “D” or “E” driving privileges are still valid.

DPSC argues that Austin v. Department of Public Safety, Office of Motor Vehicles, 46,654 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/2/11), 77 So.3d 474, is applicable to the facts of this case. Therein, Mr. Austin was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated after he refused to take a chemical intoxication test. Accordingly, DPSC suspended Mr. Austin’s driving privileges and further declared that Mr. Austin was ineligible for commercial driving privileges for one year. Mr. Austin sought an administrative hearing and the suspension was affirmed by the administrative law judge. However, Mr. Austin was ultimately acquitted of the ^driving while intoxicated charge and DPSC reinstated his Class “E” driver’s license, but refused to return his commercial driver’s license. Mr. Austin filed suit, and the district court ordered DPSC to reinstate Mr. Austin’s commercial driver’s license. Id.

On appeal, the second circuit found that the legislature intended “to hold individuals with a CDL to a zero tolerance standard as far as alcohol/drug use and driving.” Austin, 77 So.3d at 476. The second circuit noted that La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(d) penalized the refusal to submit to an alcohol concentration or drug test for commercial driver’s license holders, whether they were driving a commercial motor vehicle or a noncommercial vehicle. Id. Thus, even though “it seem[ed] harsh to penalize Austin for refusal to submit to the blood test when he was ultimately acquitted of the crime of DWI,” because Mr. Austin had refused to submit to the chemical intoxication test, the second circuit reinstated the disqualification of Mr. Austin’s commercial driving privileges. Id. at 476.

Mr. Lafieur relies on Brooks v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 11-71 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/11), 66 So.3d 1236, writ denied, 11-1977 (La.11/14/11), 75 So.3d 948, for the proposition that an adjudication is required before DPSC can suspend his commercial driving privileges pursuant to La.R.S. 32:414.2. In Brooks, Mr. Brooks was arrested after an intoxilyzer test indicated that his blood alcohol content was 0.123%, and Mr. Brooks’ commercial driver’s license was seized pursuant to La.R.S. 32:667. Mr. Brooks requested an administrative hearing. However, after the district attorney’s office dismissed the charges against him, Mr. Brooks moved to dismiss the administrative hearing. Thereafter, Mr. Brooks sought review of his suspension in the district court, arguing that La.R.S. 32:667 required a conviction before a person’s license is ^suspended. The district court ultimately found in Mr. Brooks’ favor, and ordered DPSC to reinstate Mr. Brooks’ commercial driver’s license. Id.

On appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the district court’s order, noting that La. R.S. 32:667(H) requires that a person’s license be reinstated when that person can demonstrate that the prosecuting authority has “either dismissed the charges against him or permanently refused to prosecute or that he has been acquitted.” Brooks, 66 So.3d at 1238. Thus, there was no statutory authority for suspension of Mr. Brooks’ driving privileges under La. R.S. 32:661-670. Further, DPSC contended that suspension was appropriate under La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(l)(b)(i), which addresses disqualification of commercial driving privileges, stating that, “[a] disqualification shall be imposed even if the conviction is set aside or dismissed pursuant to any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless the conviction is set aside or dismissed because of an appeal of the conviction.” However, the court found that “[t]he statute does not provide for disqualification when the charges are dismissed, but rather if the conviction is dismissed.” Id. at 1289. The court also noted that the definition of “conviction” in La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(9)(a) did not include dismissal of the charges by the district attorney, except in cases of pretrial diversion. Id. The court noted that there was no evidence that Mr. Brooks had been placed in a pretrial diversion program. Id. Finally, the court noted that Mr. Brooks had not been adjudicated “by any tribunal as having violated any law.” Id. at 1240.

According to the record, after Trooper Williams arrested Mr. Lafleur for driving while intoxicated, he seized Mr. Lafleur’s driver’s license pursuant to La.R.S. 82:667. Trooper Williams also notified Mr. Lafleur about his right to an administrative hearing, and Mr. Lafleur exercised his right to do so. The | ¡¡administrative law judge’s reasons indicate that the administrative law judge reviewed Mr. Lafleur’s license suspension pursuant to La.R.S. 32:668, and found that DPSC had satisfied the requirements of that statute. Accordingly, the administrative law judge affirmed DPSC’s suspension of Mr. Lafleur’s driving privileges. However, after Mr. Lafleur sought further review of the suspension in the district court, the district judge relied on Brooks, 66 So.3d 1236, and ordered that Mr. Lafleur’s driving privileges be reinstated.

We find no error in the trial court’s judgment. The record indicates that Mr. Lafleur’s license was seized pursuant to La.R.S. 32:667 after his arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. However, the district attorney declined to pursue criminal charges against Mr. Lafleur on May 24, 2012. Accordingly, Mr. Lafleur was entitled to reinstatement of his driving privileges pursuant to La.R.S. 32:667(H)(1) at that time.

However, we must also examine whether DPSC had the authority to suspend Mr. Lafleur’s license pursuant to the statutory scheme delineated in La.R.S. 32:414-415.1. DPSC argues that the decision by the administrative law judge constituted a conviction as defined by La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(9)(a). We reject this contention. The scope of administrative review for suspensions pursuant to La.R.S. 32:667 does not require that DPSC prove that the person was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See La.R.S. 14:98. Instead, La.R.S. 32:668 requires DPSC to prove that the “law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person ... had been driving ... while under the influence of either | inalcoholic beverages or any abused substance or controlled dangerous substance.” La.R.S. 32:668(A)(1) (emphasis added). DPSC must also address several other elements, including whether the person submitted to an approved chemical test with results of 0.08 percent or greater blood alcohol content or whether the person refused the test. Id. Further, pursuant to Brooks, 66 So.3d 1236, where there is no administrative adjudication' and the district attorney declines to pursue prosecution, DPSC must reinstate a person’s commercial driving privileges. To impose additional civil penalties because a person sought an administrative hearing on the suspension of their driving privileges would be an absurd result. See Credit v. Richland Parish Sch. Bd., 11-1003 (La.3/13/12), 85 So.3d 669.

Additionally, pursuant to La.R.S. 32:414.2(A)(9)(a), a remedial or pretrial diversion program is considered a conviction. After reviewing the record, we find no indication that Mr. Lafleur was placed in such a program. We observe that, pursuant to La.R.S. 15:578.1, when a person is arrested on charges for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, “[t]he arrest record and placement into the pretrial diversion or intervention program shall become a public record when the person successfully completes the pretrial diversion or intervention program or is terminated from the program.”

Thus, pursuant to our review of the record, we find no basis for the suspension of Mr. Lafleur’s driving privileges under the provisions of either La.R.S. 32:661-670 or La.R.S. 32:414-415.1. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment ordering DPSC to reinstate Mr. Lafleur’s driving privileges. This assignment of error is without merit.

InDECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles, to reinstate the driving privileges of the appellee, Bernard B. Lafleur. The costs of this appeal are allocated to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles, in the amount of $1,003.32.

AFFIRMED.

      . In its appellate brief, DPSC does not contest that the district attorney's office declined to prosecute the charges against Mr. Lafleur in the manner contemplated by La.R.S. 32:667(H)(1).

      . We also note that the standard of proof for criminal convictions is beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Kennerson, 96-1518 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367. However, a license suspension proceeding is "a civil action amenable to all of the ordinary rules of procedure and proof.” Meyer v. State, Dept. of Pub. Safety License Control & Driver Improvement Div., 312 So.2d 289, 292 (La.1975).