author: LAMAR, Justice, KITCHENS, Justice,

text:
    Robert POWELL and Continental Rails and Excavating, Inc. v. Sheila McLAIN.
    No. 2011-IA-00631-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Dec. 13, 2012.

      Robert S. Addison, Steven J. Griffin, Jackson, attorneys for appellants.
    Don H. Evans, Matt Newman, Christie Evans Ogden, Jackson, attorneys for ap-pellee.
   LAMAR, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. In this interlocutory appeal, we address whether the Circuit Court of Simpson County erred in ordering Defendants to produce a recorded statement and a privilege log of all documents withheld on the basis of privilege and relevance. We find that the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering Defendants to produce the recorded statement without any analysis of their claim of work-product privilege. Additionally, we find that the circuit court erred by granting Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery without conducting an item-by-item analysis of each objection. Therefore, we vacate the circuit court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2. This case arises from an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Sheila McLain collided with the rear of a parked tractor-trailer. The tractor-trailer was owned by Continental Rails & Excavating and was operated by Robert Powell, a Continental employee, at the time of the accident. According to McLain, the tractor-trailer was parked in a lane of travel without any warning devices in place. McLain alleges that Powell was taking a nap in the truck at the time of the accident, but Powell testified in a deposition that he had just stopped the truck and was in the process of placing warning devices when the accident occurred.

¶ 3. Shortly after the accident, McLain retained attorney Don Evans to represent her. On October 23, 2008, Evans sent a letter to Hartford Insurance Co., Continental’s insurer, advising Hartford that he represented McLain. On December 4, 2008, an agent for Hartford took a recorded statement from Powell regarding the accident.

¶ 4. On May 19, 2010, McLain brought suit against both Continental and Powell, alleging that she had sustained various injuries as a result of the accident. During litigation, discovery disputes arose between the parties. Specifically, McLain requested that Continental and Powell produce various documents, including the recorded statement Powell gave Hartford on December 4, as well as medical records related to Powell’s drug and alcohol tests taken as part of his employment with Continental over the past three years. Defendants responded that the recorded statement was protected by the work-product privilege and that several of the other documents requested were privileged and/or not relevant. McLain filed a motion to compel production of the documents.

¶ 5. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to compel on April 1, 2011. As to the recorded statement, the circuit court judge immediately held that it was discoverable, before any arguments had been made:

Mr. Newman [attorney for Plaintiff]: The issue is whether or not the defendant’s driver’s statement that he made to his insurance company is discoverable.
The Court: Yes, it is.

However, Defendants’ attorney argued that they had notice of potential litigation at the time the statement was taken. Specifically, the following exchange occurred:

Mr. Griffin [Defendants’ attorney]: Well, Your Honor, I’m claiming that this statement was taken in anticipation of litigation. It was done after the plaintiff gave notice that she was filing a claim against my clients and after that point went and got the statement of our driver.
(Court viewing the statement)
The Court: Show me what he’s talking about. I don’t want to read the whole thing.
Mr. Griffin: Well, I’m just showing that this is a notice of representation letter sent by Don Evans to Hartford Insurance, and this is a transcript of Mr. Powell’s recorded statement that was taken on December 4, 2008, and that notice of representation letter was sent on October 23, 2008. It’s [sic] argument is that that statement was taken in anticipation of litigation, which is not discoverable.
The Court: Do you deny that it’s in the discretion of the Court to allow it or disallow it?
Mr. Griffin: Your Honor, it’s up to your discretion.
The Court: Right. I’m going to make you produce it.

¶ 6. As to the other documents withheld on grounds of Powell’s medical privilege and relevance, the circuit court judge ruled in part as follows, without any discussion as to the specific requests for production or the specific materials being withheld:

The Court: I don’t like — I don’t like getting privileged materials if they have any relevance to the facts of the case. Very few things are privileged. The medical privilege is even waived in these type cases, and that’s one of your most valuable that you have. So I’m going to find for the plaintiff on that one too.

Counsel for Defendants clarified as follows:

Mr. Griffin: Your Honor, just to be clear, you are wanting us to produce to the plaintiff a privilege log, and that basically entails going through our entire defense file and the insurance claim file and listing every document that we have.
The Court: Yeah, he’s entitled to the claim file, yeah.

¶ 7. McLain’s attorney also asked the trial court to order Defendants to produce all the drug and alcohol tests that Powell had taken as a requirement of his driving job for three years prior to the accident. The circuit court judge asked McLain’s attorney whether he had any reason to believe Powell was under the influence at the time of the accident. McLain’s attorney admitted that no drug test was taken after the accident but represented it was his belief that the driver was asleep in the truck, implying that Powell might have been sleeping because he was intoxicated. McLain’s attorney further explained his reason for requesting the test records as follows:

The company had, and it’s in their policy, a zero tolerance policy regarding alcohol and drug use. So we feel that we are entitled to any tests and the results that were taken by the defendant driver while he was employed there, because if he took a drug test and tested positive and they allowed him to continue driving, they were in direct violation of their company’s policy.

¶ 8. The circuit court judge then found that the tests were discoverable, although they might not be admissible. At that point, Defendants’ attorney again brought up his concern about Powell’s medical privilege. The circuit court then questioned him as followed:

The Court: Hold on just a second. Let me ask you a question. Why do you have a problem turning that over here? Mr. Griffin: Well, the thing is, even though the plaintiff has waived her medical privilege because she’s put her medical condition into issue in this case, our driver—
he hasn’t waived his medical privilege in this case. He hasn’t asserted his medical condition—
The Court: He doesn’t have to waive his medical privilege. The question is, why do you have a problem giving him the results of any drug or alcohol tests that was taken by your company in the past three years?
Mr. Griffin: Well, just based on the fact that he has not waived his medical privilege and the fact that there’s—
The Court: He ain’t got no medical privilege here. That’s not the issue.
Mr. Griffin: And there’s no evidence whatsoever that he was not [sic ] intoxicated at that time.
The Court: That’s not the issue. He doesn’t have to waive his medical privilege. The issue is whether or not he violated the law. Okay.
Mr. Griffin: Right.
The Court: Another issue is whether or not he was driving while violating the law.
Mr. Griffin: And we’ve already disclosed—
The Court: Whoa, uh, uh,—
Mr. Griffin: Sorry.
The Court: And did the company know he was driving if he was in fact violating the law? Now, if the company doesn’t have anything to worry about, give them the tests. If the company does have something to worry about, I would be up there arguing just like you are. So I’m going to allow the plaintiff to discover that. Your driver is not waiving his medical privilege. I don’t expect him to do that. Okay?

¶ 9. The circuit court ultimately ordered Defendants to produce Powell’s recorded statement and a privilege log listing every document withheld on the basis of relevance or privilege, as well as other documents. The circuit court’s order did not address the requests and interrogatories individually and did not include any basis for the circuit court’s decision. Defendants petitioned this Court for interlocutory appeal, which we granted. On appeal, Defendants argue the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering them to (1) produce Powell’s recorded statement, “taken by their insurer nearly two months after receiving a notice of representation letter from Plaintiffs counsel regarding Plaintiffs claim against them,” and (2) by “ordering Defendants to produce a privilege log listing every document in their possession not disclosed due to medical privilege or relevance.” We vacate and remand.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. Standard of review

¶ 10. “The standard of review used in considering a trial judge’s ruling regarding discovery is abuse of discretion.” However, “as a general rule, this Court has declared that it ‘is not about to become involved in wholesale granting of interlocutory appeals of civil discovery disputes.’ ” A limited exception exists for situations involving claims of privilege, “ “where correction of any error on appeal from final judgment would be futile. If the matter thought privileged is ordered disclosed and is in fact disclosed, our later reversal would be founded on the Humpty Dumpty syndrome.’ ”

II. Whether the circuit court erred when it ordered Defendants to produce Powell’s recorded statement.

¶ 11. Defendants argue that Powell’s recorded statement is protected from disclosure under the work-product privilege because it was taken by their insurance representative with an eye toward litigation. The work-product doctrine, found at Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(8), provides as follows:

[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without due hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.

Thus, we must first determine whether the statement was prepared in “anticipation of litigation.”

¶ 12. In Haynes v. Anderson, we specifically addressed whether documents prepared by defendant’s insurer, after it had received a representation letter from plaintiffs attorney but before plaintiff filed suit, were protected by work-product privilege. We first explained that the work-product privilege covers documents assembled by insurance representatives. We also held that “one may anticipate litigation prior to [a] complaint actually being filed,” and that, “as a general rule, the material sought to be discovered, to come within the work product privilege, must have been prepared with ‘an eye to litigation’ and not ‘in the ordinary course’ of business.”

¶ 13. We ultimately concluded that, in cases in which a defendant asserts work-product privilege as to documents prepared by his insurer, “a case by case approach is the only real approach which seems to us to make any real sense, even though paradoxically, insurance company investigations of accidents typically encompass ‘routine’ investigations with an ‘eye toward litigation.’” We also held that, “in using this approach, our courts should consider, ‘the nature of the documents, the nature of the litigation [and investigation], the relationship between the parties, and other facts peculiar to the case.’ ” Although we recognized that it would “be hard to dispute [insurer’s] claim that it acted thereafter with an eye toward litigation” after receiving notice that a plaintiff was represented, we left for the trial court:

[T]he determination of whether any investigation conducted prior to the filing of the complaint was in anticipation of litigation, and whether anything in the file of [insurer], regardless of when gathered, is privileged work product. What is prepared with an eye toward litigation, and not in the ordinary course of business, is a matter which the trial court should consider in more detail using a case by case, item by item, approach.

¶ 14. In this case, as in Haynes, it is hard to dispute Defendants’ claim that Powell’s recorded statement taken by their insurer was prepared with an “eye toward litigation,” as it was undisputedly taken after Defendants had received a representation letter from McLain’s attorney. However, we have held explicitly that it is for the trial court to determine when documents are prepared with an eye toward litigation and not in the ordinary course of business. We also have made clear that the trial court should consider the specific documents sought to be protected on a case-by-case basis, employing a detailed analysis and considering such factors as the relationship between the parties, the nature of the documents, etc. It is clear from the record that the circuit court in this case did not consider any of these factors. Rather, the circuit court judge immediately held that the statement was discoverable without hearing any argument from the parties. After Defendants’ counsel continued to argue that the statement was protected, the circuit court judge stated he “did not want to read the whole thing,” concluded that it was in his discretion whether to order Defendants to produce it, and ordered it produced without any consideration of whether it was prepared with an “eye toward litigation.”

¶ 15. We find that the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering Powell’s recorded statement to be produced without conducting a detailed analysis of Defendants’ claim of work-product privilege. Therefore, we vacate the order of the circuit court and remand for the circuit court to conduct the detailed analysis discussed above.

¶ 16. Furthermore, should the circuit court determine that Powell’s recorded statement was taken with an eye toward litigation, and thus constitutes work product, the circuit court must continue the analysis under Mississippi Rules Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) to determine whether McLain has shown “substantial need of the materials in the preparation of [her] case and that [she] is unable without due hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” Even if McLain makes a showing of substantial need for the statement and undue hardship as required under the rule, the circuit court still must protect documents that reveal “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney.” In this case, the work-product privilege applies to documents prepared by Defendants’ insurer in the same manner as if the documents were prepared by their attorney; therefore, the circuit court must protect any portions of the recorded statement that reveal “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories” of Hartford.

III. Whether the circuit court erred in ordering Defendants to produce a privilege log detailing every document withheld on the basis of relevance or medical privilege.

¶ 17. Defendants argue that the circuit court’s order requiring them to produce a privilege log of all documents withheld on the basis of relevance or privilege is impermissibly vague, overly broad, and unduly burdensome. Defendants also argue that the circuit court’s order would require them to search “the files of these Defendants for documents that are medically privileged, which have nothing to do with the merits of this lawsuit.”

¶ 18. The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, in general, “parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of any party.” Thus, parties generally may not obtain discovery of any matter that is privileged or not relevant. However, a party asserting privilege as a basis to withhold requested documents from production has a responsibility to “review the requested documents and specifically identify those documents and portions of documents for which it, in good faith, claims are privileged.”

¶ 19. As to claims of medical privilege, Rule 503 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides, in pertinent part, that “a patient has a right to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing ... knowledge derived by the physician or psychotherapist by virtue of his professional relationship with the patient.” The rules also provide that a party’s medical privilege is waived to the extent he puts his medical condition at issue. Obviously, this defendant did not place his medical condition at issue and he did not waive his right to medical privilege, even as to relevant medical information.

¶ 20. Defendants have an obligation to identify specifically every relevant document withheld on the basis of privilege so the circuit court is able to make an informed decision on a motion to compel. The circuit court has an obligation to conduct an in camera review of every requested document withheld on the basis of privilege and to make detailed findings as to whether any documents requested are discoverable. This should be done on the record, stating the basis for each decision. We have held clearly that “blanket” orders compelling production of documents are not sufficient. To be clear, a party does not waive his medical privilege by virtue of being named a defendant to a lawsuit, and the circuit court cannot compel a party to produce documents covered by medical privilege.

¶ 21. In this case, the order compelling production does not contain findings as to each document requested and does not sufficiently state the basis for the circuit court’s order to compel. However, the trial court — not this Court — is in the best position to analyze parties’ civil discovery disputes. Indeed, we have held that “[p]retrial discovery is governed by flexible rules well within the administrative capacity of our trial courts.” Therefore, we decline to engage in an analysis of whether Defendants should or should not be compelled to produce each item requested, as that analysis is best left for the circuit court. For these reasons, we find the circuit court erred in ordering the items requested to be produced without sufficiently analyzing each item and each claim of privilege, and we remand this case to the circuit court with instructions to conduct a careful and detailed in camera review of all documents over which privilege is asserted. The circuit court should make specific findings on the record “carefully considering whether to allow discovery, and stating the rule or exception which provides the basis for the decision.”

CONCLUSION

¶ 22. We find that the Circuit Court of Simpson County abused its discretion by ordering Defendants to produce Powell’s recorded statement without conducting an analysis of whether the statement was compiled in anticipation of litigation. We further find that the circuit court erred by granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel without conducting an item-by-item analysis of each objection. Therefore, we vacate the circuit court’s order and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 23. VACATED AND REMANDED.

CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH AND PIERCE, JJ„ CONCUR. KITCHENS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER AND KING, JJ. WALLER, C.J., AND DICKINSON, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

KITCHENS, Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶ 24. To be clear, this Court granted the defendants’ petition for interlocutory appeal in part, “solely on the issues of (1) the recorded statement of Robert Powell and (2) the privilege log.” Powell v. McClain, 105 So.3d 808 (Miss.2012). By vacating the trial court’s order in toto, the majority opinion goes beyond the scope of our order granting interlocutory review. Because I would affirm the portion of the trial court’s order regarding the privilege log, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

¶ 25. The majority holds that the trial court “erred by granting Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery without conducting an item-by-item analysis of each objection.” Maj. Op. ¶ 1. But, the trial court had ordered the defendants to (Emphasis added.) This language does not require the defendants to produce anything they claim to be beyond the scope of discovery. Instead, the trial court ordered the defendants to prepare a privilege log, in anticipation of the type of in camera review described by the majority opinion in this case. A party claiming documents are not discoverable on the basis of privilege or work product must make its objections with specificity, and sweeping and general assertions of privilege have been said to “border on the frivolous.” Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213, 1247 (Miss.2005). Recognizing that a privilege log lessens the trial judge’s burden by requiring counsel to fulfill his or her “professional responsibility” to offer good faith, specific objections, this Court has ordered a party to produce a privilege log on remand. Id. at 1247-48. We cannot hold the trial court in error for not “conducting an item-by-item analysis of each objection,” when he ordered a privilege log to elicit “item-by-item” objections. Maj. Op. ¶ 21.

Produce a privilege log identifying all documents withheld from production based upon your claim of medical privilege or relevance. The log should describe the withheld documents or other information specifically so that the Plaintiff can make an intelligent decision as to whether or not said document(s) or information should be pursued for an in-camera inspection by the Court.

¶ 26. Finally, the majority opinion’s admonition to the trial court regarding a defendant’s medical privilege is superfluous given that the defendants have not been ordered to produce any medical records. There is no reason for us to suspect that the trial judge is unaware of this well-known privilege, and there is nothing in the record before us indicating that “medical records” related to some doctor-patient privilege of Powell’s are in dispute. I respectfully cannot concur in any suggestion that drug and alcohol testing as a condition of employment are subject to some medical privilege, especially when these records are not before us for review. Because I would affirm the trial judge’s order regarding the privilege log, without any analysis of the doctor-patient privilege, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

CHANDLER AND KING, JJ„ JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . Mississippi United Methodist Conference v. Brown, 911 So.2d 478, 481 (Miss.2005) (citing Boutwell v. Boutwell, 829 So.2d 1216, 1223 (Miss.2002)).

      . Haynes v. Anderson, 597 So.2d 615, 617 (Miss.1992) (quoting In re Knapp, 536 So.2d 1330 (Miss.1988)).

      . Haynes, 597 So.2d at 617 (quoting In re Knapp, 536 So.2d at 1333).

      . Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

      . Haynes, 597 So.2d at 616.

      . Id. at 618 ("[T]hat the file was assembled by an insurance adjuster as opposed to [defendant’s] attorney is irrelevant.”).

      . Id.

      . Id. (quoting Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Harris, 488 F.Supp. 1019, 1026 (S.D.N.Y.1980)).

      . Haynes, 597 So.2d at 619.

      . Id. (quoting Pete Rinaldi’s Fast Foods, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 123 F.R.D. 198, 202 (M.D.N.C.1988)).

      . Haynes, 597 So.2d at 619.

      . Hewes v. Langston, 853 So.2d 1237, 1245-56 (Miss.2003).

      . Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).

      . Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213, 1248 (Miss.2005).

      . Miss. R. Evid. 503(b).

      . Miss. R. Evid. 503(d)(f) ("Any party to an action or proceeding subject to these rules who by his or her pleadings places in issue any aspect of his or her physical, mental or emotional condition thereby and to that extent only waives the privilege otherwise recognized by this rule.”). See also Scott v. Flynt, 704 So.2d 998, 1003 (Miss.1996).

      . See Hewes v. Langston, 853 So.2d 1237, 1250 (Miss.2003) ("when objections to discovery of specific documents are made, the trial court should deal with each item on a case-by-case basis, carefully considering whether to allow discovery, and stating the rule or exception which provides the basis for the decision”).

      . Brown, 911 So.2d at 481.

      . Haynes, 597 So.2d at 617 (citations omitted).

      . Hewes, 853 So.2d at 1250.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WALLER, Chief Justice, CHANDLER, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    ROUNDSTONE DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. CITY OF NATCHEZ, Mississippi and the Mayor & Board of Aldermen of the City of Natchez, Mississippi.
    No. 2010-CT-00274-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Jan. 17, 2013.

      Michael V. Cory, Jr., Dale Danks, Jr., Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
    Everett T. Sanders, attorney for appel-lees.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WALLER, Chief Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Roundstone Development, LLC, sought to develop an affordable-housing subdivision in the City of Natchez. The land on which it sought to do so had two different zoning classifications: O-L (Open-Land) and R-l (Single-Family Residential). The City’s Planning Commission denied Roundstone’s site plan; it found that the O-L area must be rezoned R-l before the development could be approved. The Mayor and Board of Alderman then denied Roundstone’s rezoning request. The Circuit Court of Adams County and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the City’s decision. We granted certiorari to address: (1) whether the City erred in requiring that the O-L area be rezoned R-1 and (2) whether the City erred in failing to grant Roundstone’s rezoning request. We find that the City’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance to require rezoning from O-L to R-l was not manifestly unreasonable and that it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the rezoning. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Roundstone sought to develop a subdivision called Audubon Terrace in Natchez, Mississippi. The development was to consist of sixty-five single-family homes. It was to be financed, in part, through a tax-credit program with the Mississippi Home Corporation (MHC). MHC requires that all homes built with tax credits be high-quality homes. The subdivision provided a lease-purchase plan by which the homes would be leased for fifteen years. At the end of the fifteen-year period, the residents would have the option to buy the homes at a discounted price.

¶ 3. The site where Roundstone sought to build the subdivision was zoned O-L (Open-Land) and R-l (Single-Family Residential). O-L districts are of open character.

¶ 4. Roundstone claims that it received and relied upon three letters prior to purchasing the site. On February 10, 2006, Andrew L. Smith, Planning Director, wrote a letter to David Strange of the Neighborhood Development Alliance, LLC. Strange, according to Roundstone, previously had worked on the Audubon Terrace development. The record indicates that Strange had owned the land before Roundstone purchased it. The letter stated:

The [Audubon Terrace] project is zoned R-l (Single Family) Residential District according to the Official Zoning Map of the City of Natchez. The use of the property as single-family development is a permitted use under the sites [sic] R-l zoning classification.
Any new construction must be in accordance with the respective subdivision regulations and building codes of the City....

On December 21, 2006, Dennis E. Story, Director of Planning and Zoning, wrote another letter to Strange. That letter stated:

The referenced property (at the terminus of Lafayette Street in Concorde Addition Subdivision) is zoned “R-l” (Single-Family) Residential District, according to the Official Zoning Map of the City of Natchez. The use of the property for a single-family development is a permitted use under the R-l zoning classification....

And finally, on May 16, 2007, Walter Huston, Land Use Planner, wrote a letter to “Mr. Phillips” of the SunAmerica Housing Fund, LP, which was Roundstone’s lender. It stated similarly:

Please be advised that: (i) the [Audubon Terrace project] is zoned R-l. (Single-Family Residential District) which zoning allows single-family use as a matter of right and is within the city limits of Natchez, Mississippi, (ii) the Project is not located within an overlay zone dis-. trict (such as, for example a PUD or an historical district), and (iii) there are no violations of zoning law, or non-conforming uses and the Project is in compliance with all applicable zoning and subdivision laws, ordinances and regulations (including without limitation, all those establishing or relating to parking requirements). Further, there are no requirements which must be satisfied in order for the Project to fully comply with applicable zoning and subdivision laws, ordinances, regulations and parking requirements....

These three letters, it turned out, were incorrect about the land’s zoning status.

¶ 5. Roundstone completed its Site Plan Review Application on August 14, 2007, and its Subdivision Application on September 9, 2007. Both applications noted that the property was currently zoned R-l and O-L.

¶ 6. The City’s Site Plan Review Committee approved the site plan and subdivision plat on September 12, 2007. But, on September 20, 2007, the City’s Planning Commission declined to approve the site plan and subdivision plat. Instead, the Planning Commission tabled the site plan until the property was rezoned from O-L to R-l and a traffic study was completed.

¶ 7. Roundstone submitted an application to the Planning Commission to rezone the property. The Planning Commission denied the rezoning request, and Round-stone appealed to the Mayor and Board of Aldermen.

¶ 8. The Board considered Roundstone’s zoning request on February 16, 2008. Roundstone’s attorney and a MHC representative spoke at the hearing. Following their presentations, concerned citizens were allowed to speak. A majority of those citizens opposed the development. Ultimately, the Board voted unanimously to affirm the Commission’s decision.

¶ 9. Roundstone appealed the Board’s decision to the Circuit Court of Adams County. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the Board, finding that it “was fairly debatable and supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.”

¶ 10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in a seven-two decision. Roundstone Dev., LLC v. City of Natchez, 105 So.3d 342 (Miss.Ct.App.2011). We granted certiorari to address the propriety of the City’s denial of Roundstone’s site plan and rezoning request.

DISCUSSION

I. The City’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance to require rezoning from O-L to R-l was not manifestly unreasonable.

¶ 11. Roundstone argues that the approval of a site plan is ministerial in nature: The plan must be approved if all requirements are met. Roundstone insists that its plan met the City’s zoning requirements because single-family homes are permitted uses in O-L zones; therefore, the City had no grounds to deny approval and require rezoning.

¶ 12. Even if site-plan approval is ministerial in nature, as Roundstone contends, approval is not required unless the site plan complies with the zoning ordinance. The City found that Roundstone’s site plan did not. The City interpreted its ordinance to require that O-L districts be reclassified before being subdivided into urban building sites for single-family homes. And, as the Court of Appeals stated, “[t]he language of the ordinance is ... flexible enough to accommodate the City’s interpretation.” Roundstone Dev., LLC, 105 So.3d at 346.

¶ 13. On one hand, Roundstone is correct that single-family dwellings are a permitted use in O-L districts. Yet, at the same time, the O-L ordinance also could be interpreted as requiring that those districts be reclassified. It states that:

[O-L] districts are composed mainly of unsubdivided lands that are vacant or in agricultural or forestry uses, with some dwellings and some accessory uses. The regulations are designed to protect the essentially open character of the districts by prohibiting the establishment of scattered uses that are unrelated to any general plan of development and that might inhibit the best future urban utilization of the land. It is intended that land in these districts will be reclassified to its appropriate residential, commercial, and industrial category in accordance with the amendment procedure set forth herein whenever such land is subdivided into urban building sites.

City of Natchez Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations § IV(1).

¶ 14. A plausible interpretation of the O-L ordinance is that reclassification could be required prior to the land being subdivided. First, the last sentence states that reclassification is intended whenever an 0-L district is subdivided into an urban building site. Id. It does not state that reclassification is required per se, but it provides that reclassification is intended. Further, the phrase “whenever such land is subdivided” is ambiguous: It could mean that reclassification should occur after the land has been subdivided, as Roundstone asserts, but it also could mean prior to or shortly before any subdivision. Second, the ordinance states that “[t]he regulations [of O-L districts] are designed to protect the essentially open character of the districts by prohibiting the establishment of scattered uses that are unrelated to any general plan of development and that might inhibit the best future urban utilization of the land.” Id. By requiring reclassification before a large project, the City is able to ensure that the proposed use fits within the City’s general plan of development and that it would not inhibit the best future urban utilization of the land.

¶ 15. Local authorities’ construction of zoning ordinances is given great weight unless their construction is manifestly unreasonable. Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So.3d 25, 40 (Miss.2010) (quoting Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Scales, 578 So.2d 275, 279 (Miss.1991)). We cannot say that the City’s interpretation of the ordinance here was manifestly unreasonable. And, under that interpretation, Roundstone’s site plan failed to meet the zoning requirements. The City’s decision to deny the site plan and require rezoning, therefore, was not improper.

II. The City’s decision to deny Roundstone’s rezoning request was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without a substantial basis.

¶ 16. Zoning issues are legislative in nature. Thomas v. Bd. of Supervisors of Panola County, 45 So.3d 1173, 1180 (Miss.2010) (citing Luter v. Hammon, 529 So.2d 625, 628 (Miss.1988)). Zoning decisions by boards of supervisors will “‘not be set aside unless [they are] clearly shown to be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or [are] illegal, or without a substantial evidentiary basis.’” Thomas, 45 So.3d at 1180 (quoting Faircloth v. Lyles, 592 So.2d 941, 943 (Miss.1991)). Then-decisions will not be disturbed if the issue is “fairly debatable.” Thomas, 45 So.3d at 1181 (citing Childs v. Hancock County Bd. of Supervisors, 1 So.3d 855, 859 (Miss.2009)).

¶ 17. To reclassify property, the party seeking reclassification must show, by clear and convincing evidence, either “that (1) a mistake in the original zoning occurred; or (2) a change in the character of the neighborhood occurred that justified rezoning, and a public need existed for the rezoning.” Thomas, 45 So.3d at 1181 (citation omitted). Changes must be made after careful consideration because investments in land and property are significant financial decisions, and a landowner should be able to rely upon a zoning plan to maintain the use and value of his property. See Town of Florence v. Sea Lands, Ltd., 759 So.2d 1221, 1228-29 (Miss.2000).

¶ 18. Roundstone argues that the Court of Appeals, in addressing this particular issue, added a new step to the traditional zoning analysis. The Court of Appeals noted that the ordinance amendment procedure stated that the ordinance could be amended only under certain conditions. Roundstone Dev., LLC, 105 So.3d at 346-47. One of those conditions was that “[t]he subdivision or imminent subdivision of open land into urban building sites makes reclassification necessary and desirable.” Id. (quoting City of Natchez Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations § XV(1) (emphasis added). Based on that language, the Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he only question under the ordinance was whether reclassification was ‘necessary and desirable.’ ” Roundstone Dev., LLC, 105 So.3d at 347. “That phrase,” the court added, “confers substantial discretion on the Board to reject or deny an application to reclassify O-L areas.” Id.

¶ 19. We agree with Roundstone that a necessary-and-desirable analysis is not proper. A traditional analysis — whether there was a prior mistake or whether there has been a change in the character of the neighborhood combined with public need — is proper, even under these facts.

¶ 20. There is no contention in this case that there was a mistake in the original zoning. The sole issue, rather, is whether the character of the neighborhood had changed to such an extent as to justify reclassification from O-L to R-l, and whether a public need for rezoning existed.

¶ 21. Here, the Board determined effectively that no change had occurred in the character of the neighborhood and that there was no public need for rezoning. The minutes of the Board meeting showed three concerns that were raised by Board members and local citizens: (1) environmental concerns that the land had been contaminated by a chemical spill in prior years, (2) traffic congestion, and (3) the high density of rental houses in the area, which would have a negative impact on the use and enjoyment of surrounding properties. ■ Roundstone asserts that it countered the first two concerns. It addressed the environmental concerns by hiring a private company to perform environmental tests. Those tests, Roundstone stated, did not raise substantial concerns about the safety of the land, apart from the presence of old railway ties that had been treated with toxic creosote. Additionally, the City’s engineers had performed a traffic study which, according to Roundstone, showed that the development would have no material effect on traffic congestion. As to the third concern, Roundstone contends that worries about the development’s impact on surrounding properties was attributable to class and/or racial animus.

¶ 22. In determining the factual issues before it, the Board was not bound by the results of the environmental test or the traffic study. Rather, it was free “to consider the statements expressed by all the landowners at the hearing, as well as to call upon their own common knowledge and experience in their town.” Bd. of Aldermen of Town of Bay Springs v. Jenkins, 423 So.2d 1323, 1327 (Miss.1982). This Court has said that such considerations are “sound and practical” and should be respected unless the findings are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Id.

¶ 23. Here, the Board used its common knowledge and familiarity with its municipality in reaching its decision. It heard from many citizens who strongly opposed the development. Furthermore, the traffic study itself did not necessarily dispel concerns about congestion. The study considered two possible ingress/egress scenarios. The first option “would increase traffic on Old Washington Road to an average daily count from 1317 vehicles to 1937 vehicles per day.” That option was not recommended. The second option distributed traffic to multiple streets. Old Washington Road would go from 1,317 to 1,627 vehicles per day, and Kelly Avenue from 1,518 to 1,673; also, traffic on Oriole Terrace would increase by 310 vehicles per day. The study then concluded that “[t]hese streets are comparable to other similar arterial and collector streets such as Ratcliff with 1100 average cars per day, Auburn Ave[.]with 3500 average cars per day, and Miller Ave[.] with 1900 average cars per day.” The significance of the traffic increases under either option is debatable, however. Even a slight increase in traffic could be significant, depending upon the circumstances surrounding that particular street or area. One Board member, for example, said that “only one car can travel at a time” on Old Washington Road. Further, Roundstone acknowledged at the hearing that some individuals had disputed the accuracy of the traffic study on the basis that the traffic counters had not been placed in the right locations.

¶ 24. Like the Court of Appeals, we are unpersuaded that racial and/or class animus played a role in the Board’s decision. Roundstone has not offered any proof that the Board’s decision was discriminatory or motivated by class, race, or any other animus.

¶ 25. We find that the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without a substantial basis.

CONCLUSION

¶ 26. We find that the City’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance was not manifestly unreasonable and that its decision to deny Roundstone’s rezoning request was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without a substantial basis. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court of Adams County and the Court of Appeals.

¶ 27. AFFIRMED.

RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. CHANDLER, J„ DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DICKINSON, P.J. COLEMAN, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

CHANDLER, Justice,

dissenting:

¶ 28. I do not agree with the majority’s analysis. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The Court of Appeals’ dissent correctly focused on the denial of the site-plan application and found it unnecessary to decide the zoning issue. In likening the present case to Vineyard Investments, LLC v. City of Madison, 999 So.2d 438, 442 (Miss.Ct.App.2009), the Court of Appeals’ dissent opined that the approval of the site plan and subdivision plat is a ministerial act, as opposed to the quasilegislative decisions of rezoning applications. Thus, because Roundstone had met all zoning and building requirements, the denial of approval of the site plan and subdivision plat by the Board was an abuse of its discretion. Roundstone Dev., LLC v. City of Natchez, 105 So.3d 342, 351-52 (Miss.Ct.App.2011). Concluding that the denial of the rezoning did not impact the approval of the submitted site plan and subdivision plat, the dissent found the denial of the application to be dispositive. I agree with this sound reasoning set forth by Judge Carlton in her dissent.

¶ 29. This Court has declared that consideration of building-permit applications is a ministerial decision that must be approved if all requirements are met. See Thompson v. Mayfield, 204 So.2d 878, 880 (Miss.1967) (holding that “the issuance of [building permits] was purely ministerial and did not involve the exercise of discretion on the part of the City Council, since all of the requirements of existing building codes and zoning ordinances had been met”); Vineyard, 999 So.2d at 440-41 (holding that the City did not have discretion to deny site building permit until a retailer’s permit could be obtained, since building permit approval is a ministerial task). Further, in Berry v. Embrey, 238 Miss. 819, 120 So.2d 165, 167 (1960), this Court recognized that “building and zoning regulations are distinct from each other” and concluded that a building permit that conformed with the building regulations could not be denied for a proposed use if the area is not zoned against such use. See Vineyard, 999 So.2d at 440.

¶ 30. Today we are faced with a different issue, because this case concerns site-plan approval. In Hillside Terrace, L.P., v. City of Gulfport, 18 So.3d 339, 345 (Miss.Ct.App.2009), the Court of Appeals affirmed the City of Gulfport’s decision to deny site-plan approval to a land developer. In that case, the developer was seeking site-plan approval “to construct a mul-ti-family housing development utilizing low-income housing tax credits” in a B-2 zone. Id. at 341. Gulfport’s Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance allowed multi-family housing to be built in B-2 zones upon approval by the Planning Commission. Id. at 342. Despite the land developer meeting the requirements of the ordinance, Gulfport refused to grant the site-plan application due to possible drainage issues since part of the subdivision’s location was in a flood zone. Id. at 342-43. Additionally, Gulfport considered testimony that the low-income housing would result in “ ‘an atmosphere for the cultivation of crime’ ” and the need for increased fire and police protection. Id. at 343-44. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the site-plan application and concluded that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious because the Commission and Council could consider their own common knowledge when deciding a municipal order. Id. at 343-344.

¶ 31. Meanwhile, in Old Canton Hills Homeowners Association v. Mayor and City Council of the City of Jackson, 749 So.2d 54, 56 (Miss.1999), this Court considered a zoning case in which site-plan approval of a planned unit development was “contingent upon the completion of twenty-three requirements.” Id. at 56. The Jackson City Council initially conducted a public hearing at which the application was unanimously approved, and the decision was affirmed by the Hinds County Circuit Court. Id. On appeal, this Court noted that such conditions were the standard practice for planned-unit developments. Id. at 59. Moreover, the Court mentioned that planned-unit developments are “subject to restrictions” by their very nature. Id. This Court ultimately affirmed the city council’s decision to rezone the property, stating that the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or fairly debatable. Id. at 63.

¶ 32. The site-plan approvals in Hillside and Old Canton Hills are distinguishable from the present case. Hillside involved an ordinance that was not “Permitted Use by Right,” but instead was “Permitted Upon Approval.” In other words, the ordinance explicitly provided for discretion. But here, the ordinance provides for no such discretion, but rather permits single-family households as matter of right. Similarly, Old Canton Hills involved a particular type of development (planned-unit development) that normally requires that certain conditions are satisfied, unlike the subdivision development that is the subject of the present case.

¶ 33. I would find that, where the applicable ordinance provides no discretion, site-plan and subdivision-plat approvals are ministerial functions akin to approval of building permits. Building permits and site plans are governed by detailed ordinances. Similar to the improper denial of a building permit in Vineyard, the City of Natchez’s refusal to approve Roundstone’s site-plan and subdivision-plat application until the land could be rezoned constituted an arbitrary, capricious decision beyond the ministerial nature of site-plan approval.

¶ 34. The majority finds that this would deprive local authorities of their right to interpret zoning ordinances. While I understand the majority’s concern with preserving local authorities’ discretion, the consequences of the present case are not far-reaching. Today we are faced with a unique situation, in which O-L zones and R-l zones are virtually interchangeable, making it unnecessary for the City to rezone. I also disagree with the majority’s finding that the ordinance on O-L districts was ambiguous. The ordinance states that “[i]t is intended that land in [O-L] districts will be reclassified to its appropriate residential, commercial, and industrial category ... whenever such land is subdivided into urban building sites.” City of Natchez Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations IV(1) (emphasis added). While the majority claims that districts can be reclassified before subdivision, the language in the ordinance makes it clear that rezoning will happen after the land is subdivided. Subdivision into urban building sites is regulated by the “Use by Right” language provided in the City’s zoning chart. The chart specifically allows R-l zones and O-L zones “Use by Right” for single-family dwellings. Therefore, since the land has been subdivided, the City must reclassify the O-L land to R-l.

¶ 35. Furthermore, the zoning issue need not be resolved, because the approval of the site plan and subdivision plat is dispositive of the case. The City’s letter from May 16, 2007, acknowledged that there were no zoning violations. In addition, staff for the Commission specifically stated that Roundstone had satisfied all site-plan recommendations and requirements. Because approval of the site plan does not require rezoning, and because the current zoning permits single-family households as a matter of right, the proposed site plan complies with existing zoning and building ordinances. Thus, no rezoning is necessary.

¶ 36. I would find that, in this case, the site-plan and subdivision-plat approval is a ministerial task. The City of Natchez arbitrarily and capriciously denied the site-plan and subdivision-plat approval without a legally valid reason. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand this case to the circuit court.

DICKINSON, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

      . The Court of Appeals' opinion stated: "Roundstone claims the letters were provided to it and its lenders, but none of the letters were addressed to Roundstone. The record does not show what relationship, if any, Roundstone had with the recipients of the letters.” Roundstone Dev., LLC v. City of Natchez, 105 So.3d 342, 344 (Miss.Ct.App.2011). In its petition for writ of certiorari, Roundstone asserts that the Court of Appeals’ opinion conflicts with the facts and trivializes the importance of these three letters. The record is clear, Roundstone says, that the May 16, 2007, letter was to Roundstone’s lender and that the two other letters were to Strange, who previously had worked on the development.
      We disagree with Roundstone's characterization of the Court of Appeals’ opinion on this point. The Court of Appeals was correct that none of the letters was addressed to Roundstone itself. Moreover, it is clear that Roundstone knew of the property’s partial OL designation when it filed its site-plan review and subdivision-development applications.


author: IRVING, P.J.,

text:
    Freddie L. KNOX, Tyangela Knox, Yolanda Knox, Natasha Knox, Freddie L. Knox, as the Natural Father and Legal Guardian of Kenyatta Knox, Jeremy Knox, Kishun Knox, Freddie L. Knox, as The Administrator of the Estate of Mary L. Knox, being all the Wrongful Death Heirs of Mary L. Knox, Freddie L. Knox, as The Administrator of the Estate of Lakidra Ramone Knox, being all the Wrongful Death Heirs of Lakidra Ramone Knox, Fredrick Knox, Markeya Knox, Walter Watson and Yolanda Knox, as the Administrator of the Estate of Deliya Watson, being all the Wrongful Death Heirs of Deliya Watson, Appellants v. Russell MAHALITC d/b/a Magnolia Plantation, Appellee.
    No. 2009-CA-01401-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 29, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 2012.
    Oby T. Rogers, Collins, Eddie J. Ab-deen, Thomas S. Moore, attorneys for appellants.
    Bradley F. Hathaway, Greenville, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., BARNES and MAXWELL, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal arises from a civil case filed by Yolanda Knox and the members of her family who constitute the wrongful-death heirs of three individuals who were killed in a car accident (collectively referred to as the Knoxes). The Knoxes filed their complaint in the Washington County Circuit Court against Russell Ma-halite, doing business as Magnolia Plantation. Mahalite filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. Feeling aggrieved, the Knoxes appeal and assert that the granting of summary judgment was in error for the following reasons: (1) they had viable claims that were not considered by the circuit court; (2) Mahalite had a duty to properly equip and maintain the trailer that Yolanda collided with; (3) they presented sufficient evidence to defeat Mahalitc’s motion for summary judgment; and (4) they had a viable jury question regarding whether Mahalite was negligent. We consider these contentions as the single issue of whether summary judgment was appropriate.

¶ 2. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

FACTS

¶ 3. On October 7, 2006, Yolanda was driving a vehicle on Highway 16 in Is-saquena County, Mississippi, when she rear-ended a tractor trailer driven by David McCoy. McCoy had initiated a turn off of the highway and had almost cleared the highway at the time of the accident. From the record, it appears that Yolanda did not see the trailer until immediately before she collided with it; therefore, she was going at a high rate of speed at the time of the impact and did not have time to brake before hitting McCoy’s trailer. Yolanda’s mother, sister, and daughter were killed in the accident. Mahalite owned the trailer and had loaned it to GM Farms, McCoy’s employer. GM Farms is not affiliated with Mahalite in any way. The Knoxes sued Mahalite, initially alleging that he was responsible for the accident as McCoy’s employer. The complaint also alleged that Mahalite was liable as the actual owner of the trailer for failing to outfit the trailer with the proper safety equipment, such as functioning taillights and reflectors. After it became apparent that McCoy was not Mahalitc’s employee, the Knoxes abandoned the portion of their complaint that attempted to hold Mahalite liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

¶ 4. Mahalite filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that he was not liable for the accident. The Knoxes submitted two color photographs in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the circuit court found in Mahal-ite’s favor.

¶ 5. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issue.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE

¶ 6. We review a grant of summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. Buckel v. Chaney, 47 So.3d 148, 152 (¶ 9) (Miss.2010). The burden of proof and conditions under which summary judgment is appropriate are well established:

The party requesting summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Watson Quality Ford, Inc. v. Casanova, 999 So.2d 830, 833 [(¶ 7)] (Miss.2008). When the moving party has supported its motion in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings; his response must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Moreover, summary judgment “is appropriate when the non-moving party has failed to ‘make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ” Watson Quality Ford, Inc., 999 So.2d at 83[3 (¶7)]. “Mere general allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts will not prevent the award of summary judgment.” Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983).

Id. at 153 (¶ 10).

¶ 7. The Knoxes’ claims are based on theories of negligence. In order to prove negligence, a plaintiff must show “duty, breach, causation, and damages.” Duckworth v. Warren, 10 So.3d 433, 440 (¶ 23) (Miss.2009) (quoting Todd v. First Baptist Church of West Point, 993 So.2d 827, 829 (¶10) (Miss.2008)). However, even if a party is negligent, he is not hable to the plaintiff unless the negligence is “the proximate cause of the injury.” Utz v. Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc., 32 So.3d 450, 466 (¶ 41) (Miss.2010) (citing Jones v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 822 So.2d 946, 948 (¶7) (Miss.2002)). “Proximate cause requires the fact finder to find that the negligence was both the cause in fact and the legal cause of the damage.” City of Jackson v. Spann, 4 So.3d 1029, 1033 (¶ 11) (Miss.2009) (citing Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So.2d 1267, 1277 (¶ 31) (Miss.2007)).

¶ 8. The Knoxes filed their complaint against a number of entities, including Ma-halitc (as a representative of Magnolia Plantation), McCoy, “the entity ... who ... owned ... the commercial vehicle,” “the entity ... who ... maintained the commercial vehicle,” “the entity ... who ... equipped the commercial vehicle,” “the entity ... other than those described above whose negligence, wantonness, failure to act, breach of duty[,] or other wrongful conduct caused or contributed to the occurrence made [sic] the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims,” and “the entity ... who ... owned, leased[,] or rented the trailer....” The complaint addressed Mahalitc specifically, stating that he “does business as Magnolia Plantation.... Magnolia was the employer of McCoy on the occasion of the incident [sic] made the basis of this lawsuit.” The first allegation of the complaint stated that “McCoy, Magnolia[,] and various fictitiously described Defendants did wrongfully and negligently: ... maintain the commercial vehicle, including the equipment thereon, that was involved in the occurrence ...; equip the commercial vehicle that was involved ...; [and] violate Mississippi law....” Therefore, we note that the Knoxes’ complaint properly raised the question of whether Mahalitc, as the owner of the trailer, was negligent for failing to properly equip it. Likewise, Ma-halitc’s motion for summary judgment asked that summary judgment be granted “on all claims and in regards to all damages and relief sued for herein.” The circuit court granted summary judgment as to all claims advanced by the Knoxes.

¶ 9. The Knoxes presented little evidence in opposition to summary judgment, essentially only offering two color photographs. The photographs were offered without an accompanying affidavit. The condition of the photographs in the appellate record is too poor to make out any details; the Knoxes filed a motion requesting that the record be supplemented with the same color photographs that were submitted to the circuit court, but the circuit court denied that motion. The Knoxes have appealed that decision separately. The Knoxes contend that the photographs would show that the tractor trailer was not equipped with the proper lights and reflectors. After the motion for summary judgment was granted, the Knoxes filed a Rule 59 motion, urging reconsideration of the circuit court’s decision. Attached to this motion was a partial deposition transcript taken from Yolanda. The circuit court properly disregarded the deposition transcript as evidence that was available prior to the summary judgment hearing.

¶ 10. The Knoxes contend that the photographs alone should have been sufficient to overcome Mahalitc’s motion for summary judgment. The Knoxes argue that there is no reason why photographs cannot be sufficient to prove a genuine issue of material fact. However, the photographs presented by the Knoxes in this case do not prove a genuine issue of material fact. Even if the photographs were of sufficient quality for this Court to determine that the trailer in question lacked the proper equipment, the Knoxes have failed to show that the lack of proper equipment caused the accident. For the photographs to be sufficient to overcome summary judgment, they would have had to have shown both the lack of proper equipment and that the missing equipment caused the accident in question.

¶ 11. Both Mahalitc and the Knoxes have presented arguments regarding whether Mahalitc had a duty to properly equip the trailer. We note that there is authority supporting both positions. However, we find that we need not reach the question of whether Mahalitc had a duty to properly equip the trailer, because the Knoxes have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the vehicle’s equipment (or lack thereof) was a proximate cause of the accident. No evidence whatsoever was presented to suggest that Yolanda would not have hit McCoy’s trailer had it been equipped differently. Even in the deposition excerpt that was presented with the Rule 59 motion, Yolanda never explained why she failed to see the trailer.

¶ 12. The Knoxes contend that causation is a factual matter that should have been heard by a jury. It is true that: “While duty and causation both involve foreseeability, duty is an issue of law, and causation is generally a matter for the jury.” Rein v. Benchmark Constr. Co., 865 So.2d 1134, 1143 (¶30) (Miss.2004) (quoting Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 174 (¶ 43) (Miss.1999)). However, a plaintiff must still produce a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation in order to reach a jury. For example, in Smith ex rel. Smith v. Clement, 983 So.2d 285, 290 (¶ 20) (Miss.2008), the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment upon finding that the plaintiff could not prove causation. See also Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 964-66 (¶¶ 42-50) (Miss.2007). The photographs in this case did nothing to prove causation. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted.

¶ 13. In short, summary judgment was properly granted because the Knoxes did not present a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the condition of the trailer was a proximate cause of the accident. Therefore, whether Mahalitc had a duty to properly equip the trailer is moot. Accordingly, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Rule 59(e) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment. However, such a motion is proper only when there is: "(1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) ... new evidence not previously available, [or] (3)[the] need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Bang v. Pittman, 749 So.2d 47, 52-53 (¶ 29) (Miss.1999) (overruled on other grounds) (citing Lockett v. Puckett, 988 F.Supp. 1019, 1021 (S.D.Miss.1997)).