text:
    In re Syed A. SALAT.
    No. 2013-OB-2619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 2014.
   ON APPLICATION FOR READMISSION

PER CURIAM.

| TIn this matter, petitioner, Syed A. Sa-lat, a disbarred attorney, applies for readmission to the bar after three previous denials. For the reasons set forth, we again deny his application, and we shall permanently prohibit him from reapplying in the future.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1992, petitioner, with the cooperation of an employee of the East Baton Rouge Parish Clerk of Court’s office, entered into a scheme to alter the filing dates on six lawsuits to make it appear as if the suits had been filed within the applicable prescriptive period. Petitioner was later criminally charged in the matter. He was convicted of six counts of filing false public records and sentenced to two years imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal and this court denied his application for writs. State v. Salat, 95-0072 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/4/96), 672 So.2d 333, writ denied, 96-1116 (La.10/4/96), 679 So.2d 1378.

Shortly after his conviction, we placed petitioner on interim suspension. In re: Salat, 94-0705 (La.4/29/94), 637 So.2d 454. While the criminal matter was pending on appeal, petitioner filed a petition for consent disbarment. On April 21, 1995, we granted the petition and disbarred petitioner, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension. In re: Salat, 95-0751 (La.4/21/95), 653 So.2d 548.

|2In April 2012, petitioner filed the instant application for readmission. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed an objection to the application. The matter was then considered by a hearing committee, which recommended readmission be denied because, among other concerns, petitioner did not make full restitution to his victims and he does not possess the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law in Louisiana. The disciplinary board likewise recommended readmission be denied. Petitioner has objected to the board’s recommendation, raising as error the board’s finding that he did not meet his burden of proof.

DISCUSSION

Since his 1995 disbarment, petitioner has applied for readmission to the practice of law in 1999, 2002, and 2007. We denied all of these applications. In re: Salat, 00-1814 (La.9/22/00), 768 So.2d 31; In re: Salat, 04-2249 (La.11/19/04), 888 So.2d 199; In re: Salat, 08-1078 (La.8/29/08), 989 So.2d 91. A review of the prior readmission proceedings reveals the applications were rejected based upon a combination of factors, most notably petitioner’s failure to make a reasonable, good faith effort at restitution, submission of false and forged documents with his second application for readmission, and submission of false statements on a 2002 application for a notarial commission in another state.

The record of this instant application reveals petitioner has again failed to satisfy his burden of proof on readmission. Specifically, the hearing committee made a finding of fact that petitioner failed to make full restitution to his victims because he failed to make any interest payments. Most significantly, the hearing committee made a finding that petitioner has not accepted responsibility for his misconduct, explaining that “even after more than 20 years, he still wants to argue semantics about his actions.” Although the disciplinary board rejected this conclusion, our review of the record reveals the hearing committee’s factual |3findings were based on its credibility determinations and are not manifestly erroneous.

Based on our review of the record, we find petitioner has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he possesses the requisite competence, honesty, and integrity to practice law in this state. In light of the egregious nature of petitioner’s conduct, including his post-disbarment pattern of deceitful actions occurring over many years, it is abundantly clear petitioner lacks the moral fitness we demand of lawyers admitted in Louisiana.

While we have traditionally allowed disbarred attorneys to apply for readmission, we have made it clear there is no absolute right on the part of a disbarred attorney to seek readmission. Rather, in In re: Laudumiey & Mann, 03-0234 (La.6/27/03), 849 So.2d 515, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1048, 124 S.Ct. 814, 157 L.Ed.2d 697 (2003), we explained that considering our absolute discretion over readmission, we have “always had the unfettered authority to refuse readmission to disbarred attorneys, including the right to do so on a permanent basis.” 03-0234 at p. 10, 849 So.2d at 522 [emphasis added].

Considering the totality of the facts of this case, we can conceive of no circumstance under which we would ever readmit petitioner to the practice of law in Louisiana. In light of petitioner’s inability to demonstrate moral fitness over the course of four applications for readmission, any further applications for readmission would be pointless.

Accordingly, we will deny petitioner’s application for readmission. Furthermore, exercising our plenary power over the practice of law, we hereby order that no further applications for readmission by petitioner shall be permitted.

I ¿DECREE

After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude that petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving that he has satisfied the criteria for readmission. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). Accordingly, it is ordered that the application for readmission be denied. We further order that petitioner shall be permanently precluded from seeking readmission in the future.

READMISSION DENIED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Gary P. DUPLECHAIN.
    No. 2013-B-2423.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

11 This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Gary P. Duplechain, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

FORMAL CHARGES

Respondent operated a real estate title company under the name GPD Title, LLC (“GPD Title”) from January 2005 until August 2010. Between January 2006 and June 2010, GPD Title acted as an agent for Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“Commonwealth”). Under that agency relationship, GPD Title closed real estate transactions, collected title insurance premiums in connection with the closings, and remitted 20% of the collected premiums to Commonwealth. On June 3, 2010, a routine audit of GPD Title by Commonwealth revealed a shortage of approximately $5,000 in GPD Title’s escrow account. Respondent subsequently admitted that he used funds from the escrow account to pay $1,963 in abstract costs for a closing which had not yet been funded and that he paid his employee’s salaries using $1,050 drawn oh the account in July 2009, and $2,000 drawn on the account in March 2010.

|,DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In June 2012, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct, as set forth above, violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Respondent was served with the formal charges via certified mail but failed to answer. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(8). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee made factual findings consistent with the factual allegations set forth above. The committee also found that respondent has not paid restitution, although he indicated that he was in the process of resolving the unpaid escrow balance funds. Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The committee further determined that respondent intentionally converted client funds, causing injury by depriving the client of those funds. Citing the |3ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, as well as this court’s prior jurisprudence involving conversion of client funds, the committee determined that the baseline sanction ranges from suspension to disbarment.

The sole aggravating factor recognized by the committee is indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, the committee recognized the absence of a prior disciplinary record. The committee also noted:

He was both open and honest with regard to admissions of guilt and his declining to [oppose] the formal charges against him. Finally, the Respondent did point out in his statements that he used approximately $8,000.00 of the converted funds not for his own personal use but to pay salaries of his employees who were in necessitous circumstances.

Based on this court’s prior jurisprudence involving similar misconduct, the ABA Standards, and the facts of this case, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the record, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges, which were deemed admitted, and/or by the evidence submitted in support of the allegations. The board also determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The board further determined that respondent violated duties owed to his client and the legal profession. He knowingly failed to remit title insurance premiums owed to his former client, Commonwealth, and used those funds to pay |4employee salaries and abstract costs for a closing which had not yet been funded. To date, respondent has not returned these funds to Commonwealth, causing actual harm by depriving the company of approximately $5,000. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that the baseline sanction is disbarment.

The board found the following aggravating factors present: indifference to making restitution and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1979). The board found the following mitigating factors present: absence of a prior disciplinary record and full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceeding.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board found that the instant matter is most similar to In re: Graham, 02-2789 (La.1/31/03), 841 So.2d 707, wherein the court imposed a three-year suspension upon an attorney who failed to remit funds to third-party medical providers, converted those funds, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. The attorney had not provided restitution to the medical providers and no mitigating factors were present.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, as well as the jurisprudence of the court, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years. The board also recommended that respondent be ordered to 15pay the full amount of restitution owed to Commonwealth, and that he be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent used his client’s funds to pay his business operating expenses, including employee salaries as well as the abstract and title search fees associated with another client’s real estate venture. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged by the ODC.

| fiHaving found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987).

In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), we set forth guidelines for imposing discipline in a conversion case:

In a typical case of disbarment for violation of DR 9-102 [now Rule 1.15], one or more of the following elements are usually present: the lawyer acts in bad faith and intends a result inconsistent with his client’s interest; the lawyer commits forgery or other fraudulent acts in connection with the violation; the magnitude or the duration of the deprivation is extensive; the magnitude of the damage or risk of damage, expense and inconvenience caused the client is great; the lawyer either fails to make full restitution or does so tardily after extended pressure of disciplinary or legal proceedings.
A three year suspension from practice typically results in cases involving similar but less aggravated factors. In such cases the lawyer is guilty of at least a high degree of negligence in causing his client’s funds to be withdrawn or retained in violation of the disciplinary rule. He usually does not commit other fraudulent acts in connection therewith. The attorney usually benefits from the infraction but, in contrast with disbarment cases, the client may not be greatly harmed or exposed to great risk of harm. The attorney fully reimburses or pays his client the funds due without the necessity of extensive disciplinary or legal proceedings.
A suspension from practice of eighteen months or two years will typically result where the facts are appropriate for a three-year suspension, except that there are significant mitigating circumstances; or where the facts are appropriate for a one-year suspension, except that there are significant aggravating circumstances.
A suspension from practice of one year or less will typically result where the negligence in withdrawing or retaining client funds is not gross or of a high degree. No other fraudulent acts are committed in connection with the violation of the disciplinary rule. There is no serious |7harm or threat of harm to the client. Full restitution is made promptly, usually before any legal proceeding or disciplinary complaint is made.

Hinrichs, 486 So.2d at 122-123 (citations omitted).

The deemed admitted facts in this case establish that respondent used approximately $5,000 from his title company’s escrow account to pay his business operating expenses. Respondent has not made restitution to Commonwealth for the converted funds. Given these facts, this case falls on the higher end of the Hinrichs range, i.e., disbarment or a three-year suspension. Based on the jurisprudence and the circumstances of this case, we agree with the committee and the board that a three-year suspension is appropriate.

Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for three years.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Gary P. Duple-chain, Louisiana Bar Roll number 5201, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for three years. It is further ordered that respondent shall pay restitution to Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company in the amount of $5,013 plus legal interest. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . In December 2011, the ODC took respondent’s sworn statement, at which time he stated, "I'm still trying to resolve the issue of repaying [Commonwealth] back the money but I have not been able to do so at this time.”

      . See Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), which sets forth general guidelines for evaluating disciplinary cases involving conversion and commingling of funds entrusted to a lawyer.

      . The board also cited In re: Roberson, 09-1741 (La. 1/8/10), 26 So.3d 124, wherein the court imposed a one year and one day suspension, with all but three months deferred, subject to a two-year period of probation with conditions, upon an attorney who negligently failed to timely remit funds to a third-party medical provider and knowingly converted client and third-party funds when he used trust account funds to pay for office expenses. The attorney made full restitution shortly after the complaint was filed and several mitigating factors were present. The board further cited In re: Cooper, 12-0599 (La.6/15/12), 90 So.3d 1023, wherein the court imposed a two-year suspension upon an attorney who commingled client and third-party funds with her personal funds and failed to timely pay $6,400 owed to her clients’ medical provider. In aggravation, the court found that the attorney was indifferent to making restitution. In mitigation, the court considered her absence of a disciplinary record and inexperience in the practice of law.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. I.C.S. State of Louisiana v. C.M.S.
    No. 2013-CK-1023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re S., C.M.; S., I.C. et al.;—Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 188,383, 188,384; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 47,829-KA, 47,830-KA.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren RAVIS, III a/k/a Warren C. Reavis, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1639.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Warren Ravis, III a/k/a Warren C. Reavis, III; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 514-692; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0741.

Writ granted. If it has not already done so, the district court is ordered to supply relator with a copy of the documents which he requested and to which he is entitled. See State ex rel. Simmons v. State, 93-0275 (La.12/16/94), 647 So.2d 1094.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alvin HARVEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1640.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Harvey, Alvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 165,623; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-861-KH.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    Carolyn HUNT v. BRASWELL DRYWALL AND PAINT and Louisiana Construction and Industry SIF.
    No. 2013-CC-2727.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Construction and Industry SIF; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, Office of Workers Compensation 1st District East, No. 12-08945; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-817-WCW.

Granted. Under the facts presented, we find relator has shown good cause for production of claimant’s tax returns. See Stolzle v. Safety & Systems Assurance Consultants, Inc., 02-1197 (La.5/24/02), 819 So.2d 287. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation is reinstated.

HUGHES, J„ would deny.


text:
    Calvin BRASWELL, Jr. v. BRASWELL DRYWALL AND PAINT and Louisiana Construction and Industry SIF.
    No. 2013-CC-2729.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Construction and Industry SIF; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, Office of Workers Compensation 1st District East, No. 12-02961; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-818-WCW.

Granted. Under the facts presented, we find relator has shown good cause for production of claimant’s tax returns. See Stolzle v. Safety & Systems Assurance Consultants, Inc., 02-1197 (La.5/24/02), 819 So.2d 287. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation is reinstated.

HUGHES, J„ would deny.


text:
    Brian J. MULLER v. BERGERON MOTORS, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0077.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Nissan North America, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 641-800; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-900.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-107.
    No. 2013-OB-2784.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Noel, Reginald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-107.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-111.
    No. 2013-OB-2822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Rodgers, Gary; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-lll.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-106.
    No. 2013-OB-2882.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Jones, Lee Ester; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-106.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Houston JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1120.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Jackson, Houston; Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 15, 2013; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 98-4959; Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-221.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brandon Scott LAVERGNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1357.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Lavergne, Brandon Scott; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 15, 2013; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 138234; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-00315.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rickey BARNES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Barnes, Rickey; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated November 22, 2013, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 170,796; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,139-KH C/W 48,242-KH.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcus EVANS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Evans, Marcus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 07-07-0393; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1909.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick WOODBERRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1463.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Woodberry, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 512-931; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0684.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of D.M.
    No. 2013-CK-1562.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re D.M.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, No. 09-JU-923; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-787.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex. rel. John MURPHY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1585.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Murphy, John; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 08-3088; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-424.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Steven LANGLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1586.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Langley, Steven; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 311949, 311619, 311428, 311429; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-01471.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric MATTHEWS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Matthews, Eric; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 370-853; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0699.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael MOLINA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Molina, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 01-5628; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-433.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carl JORDAN.
    No. 2013-K-1628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 480-879; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0930.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James DUNN, Sr.
    No. 2013-KO-1633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Dunn Sr., James; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 04-09-0903; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1820.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willard HALL.
    No. 2013-K-1646.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Hall, Willard; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 11 CR8 111954; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1812.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Freddie Lee TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Taylor, Freddie Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Winn, 8th Judicial District Court, No. 39,921; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,772-KH.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kirk MOSBY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1655.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Mosby, Kirk; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 236-03; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0802.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leon HOWARD.
    No. 2013-K-1662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 503^141; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1117.

Denied.

VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rocky BOURG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1665.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Bourg, Rocky; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-K-3432; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00370.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Labarrie Dediric WATSON.
    No. 2013-KO-1676.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In Re Watson, Labarrie Dediric; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 299,550; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,980-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph L. CAMMATTE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1690.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Cammatte, Joseph L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 08-5790; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-440.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael G. DUNN, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-1691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Dunn Jr., Michael G.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 491-522; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1116.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David FAVORITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1693.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Favorite, David; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 314992; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00598.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tony DeCLOUES (DeClues) v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1694.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Tony DeCloues (DeCIues); — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 485-036; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0782.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nathal TRAHAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1695.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Trahan, Nathal; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 120612,124756; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00044.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jim HOWARD, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1697.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Howard Jr., Jim; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 67007; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-01346.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David Wayne POYDRAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1699.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Poydras, David Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 52685; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-01427.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Felton READO, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Reado Jr., Felton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 1678-91; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00007.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodolfo MARTINEZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1707.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Martinez, Rodolfo; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C86-5322-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00168.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1708.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2008-C-453603; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0740.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky CARTHAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Carthan, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. CR 196-98; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00046.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 98-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward McGARY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1710.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In're McGary, Edward; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 53149; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0741.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcus ARTIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1711.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Artis, Marcus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 95-3570; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00035.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ben H. SCOTT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1712.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Scott, Ben H.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 04-1277; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH^68.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph V. FOSTER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Foster Jr., Joseph V.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 78,649; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-500-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darren BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1714.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Brown, Darren; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 702738; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0671.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kendrich THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1721.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Thomas, Kendrich; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 462-419 C/W 462-420; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0827.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael MARTIN.
    No. 2013-KO-1744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Martin, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 11-1192; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-34.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Labarrie Dediric WATSON.
    No. 2013-K-1788.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Watson, Labarrie Dediric; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 299,550; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,980-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Warren LESTER, et al. v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Chevron USA, Inc., Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc., Alpha Technical Services, Inc., OFS Inc., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2397.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Crowley, Timothy; Gros, II, John; Liberta, Jeffrey; Schwary, Ronald; Williams, Alan; Williams, Earl; Williams, Eliot; Williams, Ronald; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2002-19657; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1709.

Denied.


text:
    Phyllis TEBAULT, et al. as Heirs of Thelma Jackson v. EAST JEFFERSON GENERAL HOSPITAL.
    No. 2013-CC-2411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re East Jefferson General Hospital;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 708-607; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-722.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    Warren LESTER, et al. v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2013-C-2465.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Exxon Mobil Corporation; Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2002-19657; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1709.

Denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    Paigetamica CARTER v. QUACHITA PARISH SCHOOL SYSTEM.
    No. 2013-CC-2590.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Carter, Paigetamica; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 122,993; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48864-CW.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant:


text:
    Alfreda Melerine PIZANI, et al. v. ST. BERNARD PARISH, et al.
    No. 2013-OC-2601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Alfreda Melerine Pizani, et al.; Juan, Avis Melerine; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Exceptions of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and/or No Right or Cause of Action, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 109,548; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-1084.

Denied.


text:
    ZACHARY HOUSING PARTNERS, L.L.C. v. The CITY OF ZACHARY; Francis Nezianya, Brandon Noel, John Coghlan, Dan Wallis, and Tommy Womack, all in their Capacities as Members of the City Council of the City of Zachary; and David Amrhein, in his Capacity as the Mayor of the City of Zachary.
    No. 2013-C-2615.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re The City of Zachary; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 613,155; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1952.

Denied.


text:
    Scott C. FRANK v. LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR EXAMINERS.
    No. 2013-C-2617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Scott, Frank C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 607,567; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 2040.

Denied.


text:
    Eola L. MOORE, et vir. v. WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2013-CC-2630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re World Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2012-8252; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00848.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    Frances R. DETRAZ v. BANC ONE SECURITIES CORP., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Detraz, Frances R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court-Div. F, No. C-20107723; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-191.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Frank BERNAT.
    No. 2013-C-2640.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Bernat, Henry A.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 39,178; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-277.

Denied.


text:
    Phyliss J. GREEN v. EVANGELINE PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 2013-C-2642.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Green, Phyliss J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 69,746; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-274.

Denied.


text:
    Herbert M. GRAVES v. Linden BABIN, Mockler Beverage Company and XL Specialty Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-CC-2656.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Murphy, Peyton P.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 601,451; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1217.

Denied.


text:
    Dolores RAGAN, et al. v. The ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF the ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW ORLEANS d/b/a Saint Scholastica Academy.
    No. 2013-CC-2660.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re The Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans D/B/A Saint Scholastica Academy; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2013-06545; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1322.

Denied.

VICTORY, KNOLL and CLARK, JJ, would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy A. ST. PAUL.
    No. 2013-KK-2677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re St. Paul, Roy A.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. F1877219; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-K-752.

Denied.

HUGHES, J„ would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sergio VASQUEZ.
    No. 2013-KK-2679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 497-977; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1169.

Denied.


text:
    Kamithia D. PENTON v. Michael A. CASTELLANO, Kelly Beason Castellano Hudson, the Caddo Parish School Board, and Pamela S. Bloomer.
    No. 2013-C-2687.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Penton, Kamithia D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 554,384; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-433-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    RAIN CII CARBON, LLC v. TURNER INDUSTRIES GROUP, LLC, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2689.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Rain CII Carbon LLC; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2013-1325; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CW 13-00999, CW 13-00858.

Denied.


text:
    Jessie COLE and Gwen Cole v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2697.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Arch Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 85,441; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-01170.

Denied.


text:
    Shelia GODEAUX v. LAMMICO, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Acadiana Endoscopy Center; J. Patrick Herrington, M.D.; Lammico, et al.; Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co.;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2010-7973 G; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00874.

Denied.


text:
    Terrance T. BROWN v. Wilson RAMBO and Dennis James Waldron.
    No. 2013-CP-2704.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Brown, Terrance T.; — -Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2013-1726; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,912-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Brandon Wade HIRSTIUS v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
    No. 2013-C-2709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Hirstius, Brandon Wade; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2011-12625; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 2104.

Denied.


text:
    Kamithia D. PENTON v. Michael A. CASTELLANO, Kelly Beason Castellano Hudson, the Caddo Parish School Board, and Pamela S. Bloomer.
    No. 2013-C-2725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Castellano, Michael A.; State Farm Fire and Casualty Company; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 554,384; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,433-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Natsha McFarland, Wife of/and Jeramaine BUCKLEY, Sr., Individually and on behalf of their Minor Children, Ja’Niya Buckley, Ja’Sha Buckley and Jermaine Anthony Buckley, Jr.; Mary McCray, Wife of/and Clarence McCray v. ACE AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, City of Slidell, Slidell Police Department and Jeffrey Khars.
    No. 2013-CC-2749.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Buckley, Jeramaine; McCray, Clarence; McCray, Mary; McFarland, Natsha et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2012-15773; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1167.

Denied.


text:
    Trudy M. WHITE v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE/Parish of East Baton Rouge.
    No. 2013-C-2750.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re White, Trudy M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 585,984; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0502.

Denied.


text:
    Cody JOHNSON v. TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA INC. et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2752.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Anesthesia Consultants of the South, LLC.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2010-10624; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1235.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.-


text:
    RAIN CII CARBON, LLC v. TURNER INDUSTRIES GROUP, LLC, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Rain CII Carbon LLC; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2013-1325; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW13-01181.

Denied.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of J.N.
    No. 2013-CJ-2842.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   In re Department of Children & Family Services; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Juvenile Court of Orleans Parish, No. 2013-228-01-NA-A; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1565.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Khalfani M. KAMAU, Appellant.
    No. 47,328-KH.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    July 26, 2012.

      Khalfani M. Kamau, In Proper Person.
    Schuyler Marvin, District Attorney, for Appellee.
    Before STEWART, LOLLEY & SEXTON (Pro Tempore), JJ.
   JjWRIT GRANTED, CONVICTION VACATED, REMANDED.

This matter comes before the court on a petition for post-conviction relief filed by Khalfani M. Kamau following his October 25, 2007 conviction on various drug related charges. This Court affirmed the applicant’s convictions and sentences in State v. Khalfani, 43,647 (La.App.2d Cir.10/29/08), 998 So.2d 756, writ denied, 2009-0267 (La.11/6/09), 21 So.3d 305. His petition for post-conviction relief raised, among other things, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, applicant alleged that his trial counsel erred in failing to object to a jurisdietionally deficient bill of information, failing to object to the trial court’s charging of the jury with non-responsive verdicts, and in failing to object to his sentencing under an improper verdict. The trial court denied this claim, holding that the applicant had failed to meet his burden of showing a reasonable probability that but for his trial counsel’s errors the result of the proceedings would have been different. We disagree.

To understand the full breadth of errors made by defendant’s counsel, the state and the trial court in the proceedings leading to this defendant’s conviction, a detailed review of the procedural history is necessary. Kamau was initially charged under two separate bills of information with two separate drug-related violations, possession with intent to distribute a [¿‘Schedule II” controlled dangerous substance (MDMA) and possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (cocaine). The state subsequently amended both bills, the former to add a count of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (Methamphetamine) and the latter to amend the existing charge to read as follows:

Did knowingly or intentionally possess with the intent to distribute a schedule II controlled dangerous substance, namely over 200 grams of cocaine in violation of the provisions of LRS 40:967 A(l), F(l)(b).

To the extent that this amendment intended to charge the defendant with possession with the intent to distribute 200 grams or more of cocaine, there is no such crime. No motion to quash the bill of information was ever filed on the defendant’s behalf.

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense it was required to find that: 1) he knowingly possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it; and 2) that the amount of cocaine possessed was 200 grams or more. The instructions also charged the jury as to three responsive verdicts:

1.) Attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute;
2.) Possession of cocaine; and,
3.) Attempted possession.

None of the instructions on any of these responsive verdicts contained a requirement that the jury find the defendant possessed 200 grams or more of cocaine in order to find him guilty. Nevertheless, the verdict forms supplied to the jury contained the following options on the cocaine charge:

1. We, the jury, find the defendant guilty.
2. We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of Attempted Possession with Intent to Distribute of a Schedule II, Controlled Dangerous Substance, namely, over 200 grams of Cocaine.
3. We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of Possession of a Schedule II, Controlled Dangerous Substance, namely, over 200 grams of Cocaine.
4. We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of Attempted Possession of a Schedule II, Controlled Dangerous Substance, namely, over 200 grams of Cocaine.
5.We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty.

laWhen the defendant raised the issue on appeal that the third of these options was not a proper responsive verdict, this court noted that because his trial counsel had not raised the issue below, it could not be raised on appeal.

The jury form reflects that the jury circled the third of these options and that was the verdict read in open court. After the verdict was read, an on-the-record discussion between the trial judge and counsel ensued wherein an attempt was made to decipher the meaning of the jury’s verdict on the cocaine charge. At the conclusion of the discussion, the court and counsel agreed that the “200 grams” element was not meant to be on the jury form and that the jury’s verdict was for simple possession. The jury was then brought back into the courtroom and polled on whether their verdict was for “Possession of Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substance, namely Cocaine.” Because the weight element went unmentioned, it is not evident whether or not the jury understood that the weight element was purposely being omitted.

On January 25, 2008, the defendant was sentenced on the cocaine conviction to 20 years at hard labor, with all but 15 years suspended and the first ten years to be served without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. He was also ordered to pay a $100,000 fine. If the defendant was convicted of simple possession, this sentence is not legal. The sentence could only be deemed legal if the defendant was convicted of possession of 200 grams or more of cocaine. The señ-tencing transcript reflects that no objection was made by defendant’s counsel to the legality of the sentence being imposed.

The right of a defendant in a criminal proceeding to the effective assistance of counsel is mandated by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State v. King, 2006-1903 (La.10/16/07), 969 So.2d 1228; State v. Wry, 591 So.2d 774 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991). A claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is analyzed under the two-prong test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

To establish that his attorney was ineffective, the defendant first must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. The relevant inquiry is whether counsel’s representation fell below the standard of reasonableness and competency as required by prevailing professional standards demanded for attorneys in criminal cases. Strickland, supra. The |4assessment of an attorney’s performance requires his conduct to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the occurrence. A reviewing court must give great deference to trial counsel’s judgment, tactical decisions, and trial strategy, strongly presuming he has exercised reasonable professional judgment. State v. Grant, 41,745 (La.App.2d Cir.4/4/07), 954 So.2d 823, writ denied, 2007-1193 (La.12/7/07), 969 So.2d 629; State v. Moore, 575 So.2d 928 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991). Also State v. Tilmon, 38,003 (La.App.2d Cir.04/14/04), 870 So.2d 607, writ denied, 2004-2011 (La.12/17/04), 888 So.2d 866.

Second, the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense. This element requires a showing the errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, i.e., a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, supra. The defendant must prove actual prejudice before relief will be granted. It is not sufficient for the defendant to show the error had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings. Rather, he must show that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland supra; State v. Pratt, 26,862 (La.App.2d Cir.4/5/95), 653 So.2d 174, writ denied, 95-1398 (La.11/3/95), 662 So.2d 9. A defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must identify certain acts or omissions by counsel which led to the claim; general statements and conclusory charges will not suffice. Strickland, supra; State v. Jordan, 35,643 (La.App.2d Cir.4/3/02), 813 So.2d 1123, writ denied, 2002-1570 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1067. In State v. Allen, 2003-2418 (La.6/29/05), 913 So.2d 788, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1132, 126 S.Ct. 2023, 164 L.Ed.2d 787, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that “the failure to object to a valid error may be the proper subject of a post conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

On its face, the aforementioned procedural history shows that defendant’s trial counsel failed to object on numerous occasions to valid errors.' The result was an insolubly ambiguous verdict on which even the trial judge and counsel were unclear in the immediate aftermath of its rendering. Furthermore, while the jury’s intent appears to have been to convict the defendant of a responsive verdict, his sentence reflects punishment under the most severe grade of the potential crimes with which he was conceivably charged, possession of 200 grams or more of cocaine. Given that the jury’s verdict indicates an intent to exercise some degree of leniency by returning a purportedly lesser verdict, there appears to be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

We find, therefore, that in regard to his conviction on the possession of cocaine charge, the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Accordingly, the |fidefendant’s conviction in lower court docket number 140,035 on the cocaine related charge is vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court.

      . The state also amended the existing charge to reflect that MDMA is actually a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance.

      . La. R.S. 40:967(C) provides the sentencing range for an offender convicted of simple possession of cocaine as imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than 5 years and a fine of not more than $5,000.

      . An offender convicted of possession of 200 grams or more is subject to imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than thirty years with the first ten to be served without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence and a fine of not less than $100,000 nor more than $350,000. La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(b) & La. R.S. 40:967(G).