text:
    In re John E. DEMORUELLE.
    No. 2013-OB-1783.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 4, 2013.
   ON APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT

PER CURIAM.

I,This proceeding arises out of an application for reinstatement filed by petitioner, John E. Demoruelle, an attorney currently suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In In re: Demoruelle, 08-2356 (La.4/24/09), 9 So.3d 94, we imposed a two-year suspension upon petitioner for failing to maintain adequate accounting records for a trust, failing to keep his client informed about the financial status of the trust, failing to obtain approval of the fee he charged as compensation for his duties as trustee, and allowing his professional judgment to be compromised by the requests of other parties. In a separate matter, petitioner failed to communicate with a client, neglected her legal matter, and failed to provide her with an accounting and a refund of any unearned fees.

Petitioner subsequently filed an application for reinstatement with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The ODC took no position regarding the application for reinstatement. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

^Following the hearing, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law, subject to conditions. Neither petitioner nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

After considering the record in its entirety, we will adopt the committee’s recommendation and reinstate petitioner to the practice of law. As found by the committee, the record provides clear and convincing evidence of petitioner’s compliance with the reinstatement criteria. Under these circumstances, petitioner has shown that he possesses the requisite competence, honesty, and integrity to be reinstated to the practice of law. Nevertheless, we find further precautions are warranted to insure that the public will be protected upon petitioner’s return to practice. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(J).

Accordingly, we will grant the petition for reinstatement and reinstate petitioner to the practice of law, subject to the following conditions:

1. Petitioner shall limit his practice to criminal defense law with the Allen Parish Public Defender’s Program and civil cases involving property matters, successions, and notary work; and
2. A supervising attorney shall monitor petitioner’s law practice for compliance with trust account rules, accounting procedures, and office management.

Any failure of petitioner to comply with these conditions may be grounds for immediately placing him on interim suspension.

DECREE

Upon review of the recommendation of the hearing committee, and considering the record, it is ordered that John E. Demoruelle, Louisiana Bar Roll number 4860, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject |sto the conditions set forth herein. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.

HUGHES, J., would deny.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of J.M.
    No. 2013-CK-1717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 20, 2013.
   In re M., J.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge Juvenile Court, No. 103577-B.

Granted. To be consolidated on the Court’s docket with State in the Interest of J.M., No. 2013-KA-1772.


text:
    Angelo ALBERS, as Natural Tutrix of Minor Children, Anthony Albers and John Patrick Albers v. VINA FAMILY MEDICINE CLINIC, Dr. Joseph Braud, Dr. William Kortum, Dr. Kenneth Williams, Station Trinity Urgent Care, Inc. and Dr. Eric Aimes.
    No. 2013-C-1480.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 27, 2013.
   In re Albers, Angelo et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2009-07368; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1484.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0707.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 7, 2013.
   In re Jones, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 12-4246; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-201.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a post-conviction application filed on or about August 13, 2012. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. If the relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William WINESBERRY.
    No. 2013-KK-2360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 8, 2013.
   In re Winesberry, William; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 515-724; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1217.

Stay denied. Writ denied on the showing made.

KNOLL, J., would simply deny writ.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthias FRANCOIS.
    No. 2013-OK-1927.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2013.
   In re Francois, Matthias; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Jefferson, Jefferson Parish Second City Court, No. S124703.

Denied as premature.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthias FRANCOIS.
    No. 2013-OK-2096.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2013.
   In re Francois, Matthias; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 12-5376.

Denied as premature.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Obadiah G. FRANCOIS.
    No. 2013-OK-2097.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 10, 2013.
   In re Francois, Obadiah G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Jefferson, Jefferson Parish Second City Court, No. S1242703.

Denied as premature.


text:
    In re Michael J. RILEY, Sr.
    No. 2013-OB-1475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; — Other; Applying For Findings and Recommendations (Readmission) Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 09-DB-037.

Rehearing denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Charles H. THIBODEAUX v. MARITIME SYSTEMS, INC.
    No. 2012-C-0419.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Thibodeaux, Charles H.; — Plaintiff; applying for reconsideration of this court’s action dated April 9, 2012, Parish of St. Tammany, City Court of Slidell, No. 2007 C 04317; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 1316.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    Linda DAY, Aimee Gaudet, David Shackelford, Henry Schexnayder, III, Had Properties, L.L.C. and SKR Construction, L.L.C. v. NORTHROP GRUMAN SHIP SYSTEMS, INC., Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Cos-Mar Company, Gatx Terminals Corporation, Trinity Industries, Inc., Port Allen Marine Service, Inc., Cenac Towing Co., L.L.C., BASF Corporation, Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services, Inc., Brown & Root, Inc., Novartis Corporation, Lethyl Corporation, Exxonmobil Oil Corporation, Swepi, LP, Shell Offshore, Inc, Shell Oil Company, Southern Scrap Material, Co., L.L.C. G & H Management Company, SBP Exploration and Production Inc., Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, L.L.C., Dutchtown Oil Reclamation Site Participation Agreement, Dutchtown Oil Reclamation Site Committee, Ascension Holding, L.L.C., Dutchtown Oil Treatment Site Participating Group, James Glorioso, Inc.
    No. 2013-CC-0952.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Day, Linda; Gaudet, Aimee;— Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 91,049; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 0154.

Application for reconsideration not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6. Application for writ of mandamus denied. See La. Const. Art. V., § 2; Union Sawmill Co. v. Summit Lumber Co., 117 La. 643, 42 So. 195 (1906).

KNOLL, J. and HUGHES, J., recused.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David Lee HILL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1081.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Hill, David Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated July 31, 2013; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 305,-050; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,159-KH.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allen L. MARTIN.
    No. 2013-KO-0589.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Martin, Allen L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 26434; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1024.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brandon NEWTON.
    No. 2013-K-0595.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 16048-10; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-510.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Percy CAGE.
    No. 2013-KO-0597.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Cage, Percy; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 10-09-0994; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0710.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James D. ROSS.
    No. 2013-KO-0598.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Ross, James D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 450000; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1023.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond PRICE, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-0599.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Price Jr., Raymond; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 502,217; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0992.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dashain MOORE.
    No. 2013-KO-0600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Moore, Dashain; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 14563; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0876.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnathan C. THOMAS.
    No. 2013-KO-0607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Thomas, Johnathan C.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 277,217; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,821-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin MEREDITH.
    No. 2013-K-0622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Meredith, Kevin; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 498-234; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0885.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nolan GRIMES.
    No. 2013-KO-0625.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Grimes, Nolan; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 481-110; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0984.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cody YELVERTON.
    No. 2013-KO-0629.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Yelverton, Cody; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 10-5750; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-745.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Harold J. BUNCH.
    No. 2013-KO-0632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Bunch, Harold J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 10 CR8 111246; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0431.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bruce C. WALLACE.
    No. 2013-K-0646.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Wallace, Bruce; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 09-5870; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-594.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin J. BRYANT.
    No. 2013-K-0648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Bryant, Calvin J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 11-781; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-591.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Timothy LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0815.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Lewis, Timothy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 85398; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0157.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antonio JENKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Jenkins, Antonio; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 04-08-0695; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA1063.

Denied.


text:
    Gary BOUDREAUX v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 2013-CI-0928.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Boudreaux, Gary; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 603,295; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0910.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Duberney MORA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0936.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Mora, Duberney; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 00-6001; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-122 C/W 13-KH-138.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie POGUE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0948.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Pogue, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 980,480; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0305.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex. rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry HALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0949.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Hall, Jerry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 420-889; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0051.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.9; State ex rel. Glovar v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 691; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    Joshua GONZALES v. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KP-0968.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Gonzales, Joshua; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 04-8166; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-05.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lester GEORGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0980.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Lester, George; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 08-4785; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-125.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cecil Cleo JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0981.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Jones, Cecil Cleo; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 99-F-0038; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-250-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2830 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael DORSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0982.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Dorsey, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 348109; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0246.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas LeBEAU v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0983.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re LeBeau, Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 93-684; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-146.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony GRAFFIA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0984.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Graffia, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 04-3331; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-252.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent L. JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0985.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Johnson, Vincent L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Eaton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 11-83-0424; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0206.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clovis M. JULIEN, Jr v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0986.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Julien Jr., Clovis M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 15-437,15-439.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph V. FOSTER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0992.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Foster Jr., Joseph V.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish, of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 123,292.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick WOODBERRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0993.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Woodberry, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div, I, No. 512-931; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0394.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Maurice GIBBS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0998.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Gibbs, Maurice; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 255-403.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles MARSHALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Marshall, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 2098-76, 3022-76, 3024-76.

Denied. See State ex rel. Brown v. State, 03-2568, (La.3/26/04), 870 So.2d 976; State ex rel. Degreat v. State, 98-0690 (La.7/2/98), 724 So.2d 205; State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wayne L. BUTLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1013.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Butler, Wayne L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div., No. 490-042; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0141.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James L. CASS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Cass, James L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 260,683; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-285-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew D. WETZEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1030.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Wetzel, Andrew D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 455768; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0255.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerman JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1031.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Jones, Jerman; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 08-6355; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-200.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; see also State ex rel. Hall v. State, 99-0326 (La.9/24/99), 871 So.2d 1071.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andris SINEGAL, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Sinegal Jr., Andris; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 105635; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00529.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.3/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David A. JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1040.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Jones, David A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 95550; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00243.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James Anthony COFFMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1095.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Coffman, James Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 148,794; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,316-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony ARMSTRONG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1096.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Armstrong, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 82,953; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-00719.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles Edward GRACE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1034.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Grace, Charles Edward; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 78232-FA; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00241.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Douglas BARNES.
    No. 2013-KP-1289.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Barnes, Douglas; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 07-99-0348; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0339.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George WHITE.
    No. 2013-KP-1293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re White, George; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Grant, 35th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 08-079; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 12-01207.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    PHILLIPS’ BAR & RESTAURANT, INC. and Paul F. Ippolito v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2013-C-1410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re 733 Cherokee Street, LLC; Ippolito, Paul F.; Phillips’ Bar & Restaurant, Inc; — Other(s); Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2007-04321; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1396.

Denied.


text:
    Philip J. CAMBRE v. ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH.
    No. 2013-C-1415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Cambre, Philip J.; Dutch Bayou Development, Co., Inc.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 54,197; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-590.

Denied.


text:
    PHILLIPS’ BAR & RESTAURANT, INC. and Paul F. Ippolito v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2013-C-1417.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re City of New Orleans; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2007-4321; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1396.

Denied.


text:
    Paul SMITH v. JEFFERSON PARISH.
    No. 2013-CC-1526.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Smith, Paul; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 710-497; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-317.

Denied.


text:
    Yana ANDERSON v. OCHSNER HEALTH SYSTEM and Ochsner Clinic Foundation.
    No. 2013-CC-1542.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Ochsner Clinic Foundation; Ochs-ner Health System, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 719-175; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-C-364.

Denied.


text:
    Betty ISAAC v. REMINGTON COLLEGE.
    No. 2013-C-1597.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Isaac, Betty; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. C-20104910; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-178.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of M.A.
    No. 2013-CJ-1625.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re Loretta Alfonso; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review City of Slidell Juvenile Division, No. 2011 JS 5375; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CJ 0267.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marlow D. WASHINGTON.
    No. 2013-KK-2137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 05-08-0418; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0938.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of H.W.
    No. 2013-CJ-2217.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 11, 2013.
   In re H.W.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. J-10740; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CJ 0231.

Denied.


author: PAINTER, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Adam HERPIN.
    No. 13-295.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 9, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 13, 2013.
    Barry J. Sallinger, Attorney at Law, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant-Appellant, Adam Herpin.
    Michael Harson, District Attorney, Aimee F. Hebert, Assistant District Attorney, Abbeville, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Court composed of BILLY HOWARD EZELL, J. DAVID PAINTER, and JAMES T. GENOVESE, Judges.
   PAINTER, Judge.

_JjAdam Herpin appeals the judgment of the Kaplan City Court denying his Motion and Order to Set Conviction Aside, Dismiss Prosecution and Expunge Records. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

Herpin was charge with first offense operating a vehicle under the influence of alcoholic beverages on February 23, 2011. On July 21, 2011, he entered a plea of no contest to the charge. On September 20, 2012, Herpin filed the above referenced motion. A hearing was held on October 18, 2012, and the motion was denied on November 15, 2012. Herpin appeals.

DISCUSSION

The trial court found that Herpin’s application for expungement was premature. Both at the trial court level and on appeal, Herpin asserts that La.Code Crim.P. art. 894 and La.R.S. 44:9(A)(1) apply to allow his conviction to be set aside and expunged.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894 provides for setting aside a conviction, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article to the contrary, when a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor, except criminal neglect of family, or stalking, the court may suspend the imposition or the execution of the whole or any part of the sentence imposed, provided suspension is not prohibited by law, and place the defendant on unsupervised probation or probation supervised by a probation office, agency, or officer designated by the court, other than the division of probation and parole of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, upon such conditions as the court may fix. Such suspension of sentence and probation shall be for a period of two years or such shorter period as the court may specify.
B. (1) When the imposition of sentence has been deferred by the court, as authorized by this Article, and the court finds at the | gconclusion of the period of deferral that the defendant has not been convicted of any other offense during the period of the deferred sentence, and that no criminal charge is pending against him, the court may set the conviction aside and dismiss the prosecution. However, prior to setting aside any conviction and dismissing the prosecution for any charge for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, the court shall require proof in the form of a certified letter from the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, office of motor vehicles, that the requirements of Paragraph A(5) of this Article have been complied with.

The record herein indicates that Her-pin’s conviction was set aside and dismissed on July 21, 2011.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 44:9(A)(1) provides that:

A. (1) Any person who has been arrested for the violation of a municipal or parish ordinance or for violation of a state statute which is classified as a misdemeanor may make a written motion to the district, parish, or city court in which the violation was prosecuted or to the district court located in the parish in which he was arrested, for expungement of the arrest record, under either of the following conditions:
(a) The time limitation for the institution of prosecution on the offense has expired, and no prosecution has been instituted; or
(b) If prosecution has been instituted, and such proceedings have been finally disposed of by dismissal, sustaining of a motion to quash, or acquittal.

This provision, according to its clear language, applies when a person has been arrested for a misdemeanor and when the prosecution has not been timely instituted or when it was disposed of by dismissal, a successful motion to quash, or acquittal. It does not apply where, as here, the defendant was convicted of the offense but the conviction was dismissed in accordance with the special provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894 B.(l).

The trial court correctly found that where a conviction has been obtained, La. R.S. 44:9(A)(5) applied to prevent expungement until five years have passed form the time of the completion of sentence and the filing of the motion to expunge. That section of the statute provides that:

la(5)(a) Any person who has been convicted for the violation of a municipal or parish ordinance, a traffic violation, or for violation of a state statute which is classified as a misdemeanor may make a written motion to the district, parish, or city court in which the violation was prosecuted or to the district court located in the parish in which he was arrested, for expungement of the arrest record if five or more years has elapsed between the date of the motion and the successful completion of any sentence, deferred adjudication, or period of probation or parole. Notwithstanding the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 892.1 or 894, or any other provision of law to the contrary regarding the set aside of a conviction or the dismissal of a prosecution, an expungement shall occur only once with respect to any person during a five-year period, except in the case of a misdemeanor offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated which may occur only once with respect to any person during a ten-year period.

The record reflects that only fourteen months passed between completion of the sentence and the filing of the motion to expunge. Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly denied the motion for ex-pungement as premature.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendant-Appellant, Adam Herpin.

AFFIRMED.


author: GENOVESE, Judge.

text:
    Terry BARRON v. David BARRON.
    No. 13-450.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 9, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 13, 2013.

      Susan Ford Fiser, Alexandria, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Terry Barron.
    Richard E. Lee, Pineville, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellant, David Barron.
    Court composed of BILLY HOWARD EZELL, J. DAVID PAINTER, and JAMES T. GENOVESE, Judges.
   GENOVESE, Judge.

h Defendant, David Barron, appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding his former spouse, Plaintiff, Terry Barron, $1,500.00 per month in final periodic spousal support. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and render.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Terry Barron and David Barron were married on January 7, 1977. After thirty-four years of marriage, the parties separated. Terry filed for divorce on November 18, 2011, and later filed a rule for final periodic support. Pursuant to a consent judgment, Terry was awarded the exclusive use of the family home and was ordered to pay the note on same. On August 6, 2012, the parties were divorced. A hearing was held on the issues of fault and final periodic support sought by Terry.

In Written Reasons for Judgment dated January 24, 2013, the trial court found Terry free from fault and awarded her $1,500.00 per month in final periodic support. David appeals that judgment only as to the issue of support.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, David contends that “[t]he [tjrial [cjourt committed legal error when [it] awarded [Terry] final spousal support in excess of 1/3 of [his] net monthly income.” Additionally, David asserts that “[t]he [t]rial [e]ourt committed manifest error when it awarded [Terry] $1,500.00 a month final spousal support when the record (P-2) clearly shows that the income of [Terry] exceeds her monthly expenditures by $301.05.”

LAW AND DISCUSSION
The standard of review applicable in reviewing an award of final support is “three-tiered.” Baggett v. Baggett, 96-453, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/23/97), 693 So.2d 264, 266.
LFirst, we must determine whether the trial judge correctly applied the proper legal standard or standards. We do not defer to the discretion or judgment of the trial judge on issues of law. Second, we must examine the trial judge’s findings of fact. We will not overturn the trial judge’s factual determinations unless, in light of the record taken as a whole, they are manifestly erroneous (or clearly wrong). Third, we must examine the propriety of the alimony[, i.e., final support,] award. If it is within legal limits and based on facts supported by the record, we will not alter the amount of the award in the absence of an abuse of the trial judge’s great discretion to set such awards.
Davy v. Davy, 469 So.2d 481, 482 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985) (parenthetical in original).

Wiley v. Wiley, 10-1306, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 58 So.3d 1104, 1106-07.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 111 states that the trial court may award final periodic support to a party who is in need of support and who is free from fault prior to the filing of the divorce. Relative to final periodic support, La.Civ.Code art. 112 provides as follows:

A. When a spouse has not been at fault and is in need of support, based on the needs of that party and the ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be awarded final periodic support in accordance with Paragraph B of this Article.
B. The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the amount and duration of final support. Those factors may include:
(1) The income and means of the parties, including the liquidity of such means.
(2) The financial obligations of the parties.
(3) The earning capacity of the parties.
(4) The effect of custody of children upon a party’s earning capacity.
(5) The time necessary for the claimant to acquire appropriate education, training, or employment.
(6) The health and age of the parties.
|⅞(7) The duration of the marriage.
(8) The tax consequences to either or both parties.
C. The sum awarded under this Article shall not exceed one-third of the obligor’s net income.

In this case, the trial court stated that it “considered] factors 1, 2, 3, 7[J and 8 as relevant factors in determining the final support award” and ultimately awarded Terry final periodic support in the amount of $1,500.00. Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that the $1,500.00 award of final periodic support exceeded one-third of David’s net income, contrary to La.Civ.Code art. 112(C), and explained its ruling as follows:

In the present case, the [c]ourt finds the following circumstances relevant in awarding Ms. Barron spousal support that exceeds the statutory limit: First, Mr. Barron lives in a home that he does not pay rent or has a mortgage on, while Ms. Barron is paying the entire mortgage on the martial [sic] home. Second, the Barron’s daughter and her husband, both of whom are adults and both of whom do not have any debilitating illness or infirmity rendering them incapable of working, live in his home. While the [e]ourt is unsure if the daughter or son-in-law contributes to the household, the [c]ourt assumes they do not as it was not brought up at trial nor evidenced in his expense sheet. Further, Mr. Barron lists as his car expense a total amount of $766.99, which seems a bit high to this [c]ourt.
While the [c]ourt notes that it has exceeded the amount to be awarded, it feels justified in awarding such amount to Ms. Barron, as it has been evidenced through affidavits and testimony that she is the only party paying the community debts, is in need because of those debts, and Mr. Barron is in such a position to and has the ability to pay.

On appeal, David argues that the trial court erred in awarding Terry $1,500.00 in final periodic support since her purported deficit as computed on her income and expense affidavit was actually substantially less, considering “the mortgage on the home was fully paid by September of 2012 and did not exist when the Written Reasons were handed down January 24, 2013[.]” We agree, but only 14to the extent that the trial court failed to consider the impending pay-off of this indebtedness on the home in its calculation.

Terry’s monthly income and expense affidavit prepared on August 6, 2012, and made part of the note of evidence in this case, includes the house note of $1,009.06 as a monthly expenditure. However, a July 13, 2012 statement from the mortgagor reflects a total principal balance on the mortgage of $2,817.07 and an escrow balance of $1,762.48. In her affidavit, Terry admits and contends that she pays the monthly mortgage on the house of $1,009.06. Therefore, the evidence in the record establishes that the mortgage on the home had to have been paid off months before the trial court issued written reasons in this case.

The trial court failed to consider and/or address the minimal balance and impending pay-off of the indebtedness on the home. Though that issue was not specifically litigated, that factor is critical to an accurate mathematical determination of final periodic support in this case and is readily gleaned from the record of these proceedings. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2164 mandates that “[t]he appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.”

For these reasons, we find the award of final periodic support based upon and reflecting the $1,009.06 monthly house note payment by Terry as an expense to her to be manifestly erroneous, and we reverse same. Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 112(C), and based on the evidence presented, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s award of final periodic support to Terry, but find that said final periodic support may not exceed one-third of David’s net income, which amount, according to the trial court’s Written Reasons for Judgment, was fixed at $1,060.00.

|fiDECREE

For the reasons assigned, we affirm the trial court’s award of final periodic support in favor of Terry Barron; we reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding her final periodic support in the amount of $1,500.00 per month; and, we render judgment herein ordering David Barron to pay final periodic support to Terry Barron in the amount of $1,060.00, effective September 1, 2012. The costs of this appeal are assessed equally among the parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.


author: GREMILLION, Judge.

text:
    Lenora KRIELOW v. R & H SUPPLY, INC.
    No. 13-217.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 9, 2013.

      Louis Clayton Burgess, Attorney at Law, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Lenora Krielow.
    Jennie Porche Pellegrin, Jacelyn C. Bridges Laborde & Neuner, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, R & H Supply, Inc.
    Rachel Steely Gardere, Wynne, Sewell, LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant/Appel-lee, R & H Supply, Inc.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

[jLenora Krielow appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of her former employer, R & H Supply, Inc., dismissing her wrongful termination suit. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS

On October 23, 2008, Matt Young, Managing Partner of Mangrove Equity Partners (MEP), hired Krielow as Chief Financial Officer of R & H Supply, Inc., the assets of which MEP was purchasing from R & H’s majority owner, Mike Richardson. That sale was completed on October 31, 2008. Richardson remained affiliated with R & H as its president until April 2009. Roger Bates, a partner in MEP, assumed interim presidency of R & H after Richardson resigned.

Relations between Krielow and Bates were strained. Krielow was overseeing the implementation of new accounting software that Bates felt was handled poorly. Krielow indicated in her correspondence that she was given insufficient resources to perform her assigned responsibilities. Ultimately, Krielow’s employment was terminated. She maintains that her firing was in retaliation for bringing two issues to Bates’s attention: a surplus of warehoused stock that, if properly accounted for, would result in additional compensation being paid to Richardson; and the company operating software with too few licenses for the number of users.

Krielow filed a petition for damages, and alleging breach of her employment contract and violation of La.R.S. 23:967, designed to protect so-called “whistleblow-ers” from discrimination for bringing to light illegal activities of the employer. R & H filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Krielow was fired for incompetence. In support thereof, R & H offered the affidavit of Bates |2with annexed exhibits, the deposition of Krielow, and the affidavit of Irene Novick, a regional manager for R & H to whom Krielow had expressed deep misgivings about the financial viability of R & H. Krielow opposed the motion for summary judgment and affixed as her sole exhibit the letter from Young offering her the job.

The trial court granted R & H’s motion. It found that Krielow had failed to assert any violation of Louisiana law on R & H’s part. Krielow’s employment was presumed to be for a term, and the fact that Young had stated Krielow’s salary and bonus basis for 2009 and 2010 did not overcome the presumption. This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Krielow maintains that the trial court erred in granting R & H’s summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed.

ANALYSIS

An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as would a trial court. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors, of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). Summary judgment is governed by La. Code Civ.P. arts. 966 and 967. Article 966(c)(2), as amended by Act 483 of 1997, provides that while the burden of proving entitlement to summary judgment rests with the mover, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movers burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential facts of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to |sproduce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821 (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606.

An employer is prohibited from taking reprisal against an employee

who in good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation of law:
(1) Discloses or threatens to disclose a workplace act or practice that is in violation of state law ...
(3) Objects to or refuses to participate in an employment act or practice that is in violation of law.

La.R.S. 23:967. This statute “supports actions by plaintiffs who are aware of a workplace practice or act in which a violation of law actually occurred.” Hale v. Touro Infirmary, 04-3, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/3/04), 886 So.2d 1210, 1215, writ denied, 05-103 (La.3/24/05), 896 So.2d 1036.

[T]he Whistleblower Statute only offers protection to a specific class of employees: those employees who face “reprisals” from their employers based solely upon an employee’s knowledge of an illegal workplace practice and his refusal to participate in the practice or intention to report it. Therefore, the language of the statute leads us to the conclusion that a violation of law must be established by a plaintiff under the Whistle-blower Statute in order to prevail on the merits of the case.

Id.

Krielow, in response to questioning, testified that she did not know whether Richardson was aware of the surplus stock. She did not discuss the surplus stock with Richardson, nor did she threaten to discuss it with him. Similarly, Krielow did not think the company had a sufficient number of software licenses to support the number of users operating the software. However, she worked with R & H’s IT contractor to procure the appropriate number of licenses. She testified that she thought the situation had been rectified. She did not report the license issue to the |4software copyright owner or to any authority, nor did she threaten to report it. In short, Krielow failed to support her claims that R & H committed any illegal act or that she was a whistleblower for purposes of maintaining a cause of action under La. R.S. 23:967.

With regard to the contention that Krielow was hired for a term, we also affirm the trial court’s decision. There is a presumption that employment is at will, and the party relying on an alleged contract of employment for a fixed term bears “the burden of proving that there was a meeting of the minds on the length of time of employment.” Reyes-Silva v. Drillchem Drilling Solutions, LLC., 10-1017, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/11), 56 So.3d 1173, 1178, writ denied, 11-0732 (La.5/20/11), 63 So.3d 983. Krielow offered no evidence other than Young’s letter extending an offer of employment to her. That letter did outline the compensation she would receive for 2009 and 2010. However, it also stated that her compensation bonus was subject to meeting certain goals, and that her employment in general was contingent upon the completion of Richardson’s sale to MEP. R & H produced a signed acknowledgement of receipt of Krielow’s copy of company policies in which she also acknowledged that her employment was at-will. Krielow offered no other evidence that she was employed for a term and nothing that disputes her ac-knowledgement that she was employed at-will.

CONCLUSION

In order to avail herself of the protections of La.R.S. 23:967, an employee must demonstrate knowledge of a practice that would be unlawful under Louisiana law. She must at least threaten to disclose the practice or refuse to participate in the unlawful practice. R & H successfully proved that Krielow made no threats to disclose any unlawful practice. It also successfully proved that Krielow’s [ ^employment was at-will. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are taxed to plaintifi/appellant, Lenora Krielow.

AFFIRMED.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey Joseph CRAIG.
    No. 13-226.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 9, 2013.

      Annette Fuller Roach, Louisiana Appellate Project, Lake Charles, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Corey Joseph Craig.
    James P. Lemoine, Disrict Attorney, Thirty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Jimmy D. White, Assistant District Attorney, Colfax, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

_|jln January 2009, the victim, Matthew Cannon, walked into his home in Grant Parish after work. While his home computer was wanning up, he entered his bathroom and brushed his teeth. After he finished, he walked toward his bedroom and noticed there were objects on his bed that he did not place there. He also saw that his gun cabinet had been emptied. He then looked to his right, into his son’s bedroom, and saw a masked man with a gun. The gunman fired from close range, and the victim dropped to the floor, thinking he had been shot.

Cannon then managed to scramble out of the house. The gunman also left the house, apparently by another exit. The victim saw the gunman outside and recognized him as Defendant because he had removed his mask. Defendant was Cannon’s neighbor. Defendant ran toward his family home while the victim ran to another neighbor’s house. The gunman shot at the victim one more time from his family’s driveway, then walked toward his house. The victim reached his other neighbor’s back door; they supplied him with a telephone, and he called 911.

The State filed a bill of information charging Defendant, Corey Joseph Craig, with aggravated burglary, a violation of La.R.S. 14:60; armed robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:64; attempted armed robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:64; attempted first degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:30; and obstruction of justice, a violation of La.R.S. 14:130.1, all in connection with the above described events.

Defendant moved for the appointment of a sanity commission; the trial court granted the motion and held a hearing. It found that Defendant had the mental capacity to assist his defense. The court arraigned him at that time. He subsequently waived his right to a jury trial.

| gAfter trial had begun, the court conducted another hearing on Defendant’s competency and found no reasonable ground for appointment of another sanity commission. Defendant took a writ of review, which this court denied. State v. Craig, 11-240 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/28/11) (an unpublished opinion). At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, attempted armed robbery, and attempted first degree murder. He was found not guilty on the two remaining charges.

The court sentenced Defendant to thirty years at hard labor for aggravated burglary; thirty years at hard labor, with the first five years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for attempted armed robbery; and thirty years at hard labor, with the first ten years to be served without benefits, for attempted first degree murder.

Defendant now appeals, assigning five errors regarding his conviction and sentencing.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In his first assignment of error, Defendant argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to uphold his conviction for attempted armed robbery. The analysis for such a claim is settled and has been explained by this court:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Armed robbery is defined by La.R.S. 14:64(A): “Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” Attempt is defined by La.R.S. 14:27(A):

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

In delivering its verdict on the offense at issue, the trial court stated:

The [SJtate has alleged that Mr. Craig had the specific intent to commit robbery. Mr. Craig’s statement to the police was that he intended to lie and wait for Mr. Cannon to come home, secure him, obtain his ATM card and his pin number, steal his truck, go to Mr. Cannon’s bank and take money and go from there. At a minimum, that is an attempt to commit Armed Robbery. The evidence also shows that once Mr. Craig entered the home, that he broke into a locked gun cabinet and removed various items.... With respect to the crime of Armed Robbery, it is the Court’s opinion that Mr. Craig did intend to commit Armed Robber[y]. I think he had — the state admitted notes that were found that indicated planning. I think the statement that was presented, or description that was presented, was a casing of the place. Mr. Craig was taking notes of Mr. Cannon’s goings and comings. Mr. Craig had assembled various items on the couch in the living room, apparently indicating that was where he planned to extract the pin number and information and ATM card from Mr. Cannon. It is clear to the Court that Mr. Craig intended to attempt and [sic] Armed Robbery of Mr. Cannon. The way the events occurred, the Court is not of the opinion that anything was actually taken from the immediate person of Mr. Cannon. Those items were all retrieved prior to Mr. Cannon entering the residence. However, it is clear that the [State] has proven an attempted [sic] to commit Armed Robbery.

^Defendant's specific claim is that the evidence did not demonstrate that he took any steps in furtherance of an armed robbery; thus, the conviction rested upon the trial court’s use of Defendant’s description of his plan to rob the victim. Part of that plan was to bind the victim with duct tape, but the record, including crime scene photographs, does not demonstrate that duct tape was found at the scene. Defendant notes the following long-standing jurisprudence:

In the trial of every criminal case the State, to warrant a legal conviction of an accused, must prove the corpus delicti, or the fact that a crime has been committed. Without such proof no conviction will be permitted to stand. Under-hill, Criminal Evidence, sec. 35, p. 42 (4th ed.1935), states the rule as follows:
“Proof of the corpus delicti is essential to a conviction, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and must exclude every hypothesis other than that a crime was committed in order to convict.”
The same authority in discussing the fact that the corpus delicti may be proved by circumstantial evidence says:
“The corpus delicti, and all the elements thereof, may be proved by circumstantial evidence, from which the jury may reasonably infer that a crime has been committed. Such evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, and be convincing to a moral certainty; and such proof of corpus delicti must be most convincing and satisfactory proof compatible with the nature of the case.” Id., sec. 37, p. 45.
[I]t is the general rule both under statutes and at common law that an extrajudicial confession does not warrant a conviction unless it is corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti”. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law s 839, p. 1472.

State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 571-73, 108 So.2d 233, 236 (La.1959).

As the State points out, the evidence demonstrates acts in furtherance of attempted armed robbery and, thus, the corpus delicti of that crime. Defendant had removed the victim’s firearms from a gun cabinet, loaded them, and strategically placed them in various locations in the house before the victim came home. | ^Arguably, there was a completed armed robbery in this case because Defendant took the victim’s pistol, and his act of firing at the victim facilitated the taking. However, as seen earlier, the trial court made a specific finding that a completed crime had not been proven.

Defendant fled after his shot missed the victim. However, his actions up to that point constituted acts in furtherance of an armed robbery. Had the bullet found its mark, Defendant could have taken all the firearms he had removed from the cabinet and any other items he wished. For the reasons discussed, this assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In his second assignment of error, Defendant argues that his convictions for attempted first degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and aggravated burglary violated constitutional protections against double jeopardy.

Defendant cites an earlier decision by this court:

The Double Jeopardy provisions in the state and federal constitutions protect a defendant from both a second prosecution for the same offense and multiple punishments for the same criminal act. U.S. Const. amend. V; La. Const. art. 1, § 15; State v. Doughty, 379 So.2d 1088 (La.1980). When proof of a felony is an essential element of first degree murder, double jeopardy precludes the conviction and punishment of the defendant for both murder and the underlying felony. State v. Cox, 07-774 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/4/09), 4 So.3d 998, writ denied, 08-602 (La.9/4/09), 17 So.3d 948. However, an accused who commits separate and distinct offenses during the same criminal episode or transaction may be convicted and sentenced for each offense without violating the prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Williams, 05-1338 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 924 So.2d 1159, writ denied, 06-1471 (La.12/15/06), 944 So.2d 1284.
IfiAs explained above, in this case, the State prosecuted and charged the defendant with first degree murder based upon the underlying offense of armed robbery or aggravated burglary. While in brief the defendant contends that the jury based its first degree murder conviction on the underlying offense of armed robbery, the jury’s intent in rendering its verdict, specifically which offense it attributed to fulfill the elements of first degree murder, cannot be discerned from the record before us. Nevertheless, the convictions can be upheld if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory. Cox, 4 So.3d 998. Here, it is clear that the defendant’s protection from double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted and sentenced to first degree murder, armed robbery, and aggravated burglary. However, the trial court imposed the proper remedy by vacating the conviction and sentence for aggravated burglary, the less severely punishable offense. Doughty, 379 So.2d 1088; State ex rel. Adams v. Butler, 558 So.2d 552 (La.1990); Cox, 4 So.3d 998; State v. Pittman, 95-382 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/1/96), 683 So.2d 748; State v. Head, 598 So.2d 1202 (La.App. 5 Cir.1992).
Additionally, the record supports a determination that under the facts of this case, armed robbery and first degree murder were separate and distinct offenses and thus do not violate double jeopardy.

State v. Ramsdell, 09-1510, pp. 10-12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/10), 47 So.3d 78, 85-86.

In the present case, the State concedes the presence of double jeopardy and recognizes that one of the convictions must be vacated as a consequence. Specifically, both the State and Defendant suggest that the aggravated burglary conviction should be vacated, since it is the least severely punishable offense. We disagree, finding instead that the conviction for attempted armed robbery must be vacated because, unlike the aggravated burglary conviction, it was not a separate and distinct offense.

The trial court based the murder conviction on the commission of both aggravated burglary and attempted armed robbery, but it needed only to be based on one. We choose to vacate the conviction for attempted armed robbery as a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy because we find that the crime |7of armed robbery was far more intertwined with the crime of attempted murder, and that the crime of attempted burglary was a separate and distinct crime.

There is an established line of jurisprudence that shows aggravated burglary offenses can be separated from factually-related other offenses. See State v. Anderson, 499 So.2d 1252 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1986), writ denied, 503 So.2d 490 (La.1987), State v. Davis, 09-1061 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 36 So.3d 351, State v. Tyler, 11-1256, pp. 12-16 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/12), 93 So.3d 670, 678-81, writ denied, 12-1260 (La.2/8/13), 107 So.3d 643.

Just as courts have separated burglaries from subsequent rapes for double jeopardy purposes, burglaries may be similarly separated from subsequent murders and attempted murders. Burglaries may be chronologically or temporally separated from subsequent but otherwise factually related offenses. In other words, by the time the defendant commits the subsequent offense, the burglary is a completed and, thus separate, crime.

Applying the reasoning in Tyler to the present case, the aggravated burglary was a completed offense before the victim even entered the house. Thus, it did not fall within the sphere of constitutional double jeopardy protection. The attempted armed robbery, however, was integral to the attempted first degree murder and is the underlying offense which supports the attempted murder conviction. Thus, the conviction for the attempted armed robbery must be vacated because “double jeopardy precludes the conviction and punishment of the defendant for both murder and the underlying felony.” Ramsdell, 47 So.3d at 85.

| «ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

Because it invites discussion of a predicate issue, we address the fourth assignment out of order. In his fourth assignment, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by determining that he was competent to stand trial.

Prior to trial, the court conducted a competency hearing on June 3, 2010, and July 19, 2010; on the latter date, the trial court ruled that Defendant was competent to assist in his defense. However, after trial began on February 15, 2011, newly-appointed defense counsel filed another motion contesting Defendant’s capacity, which was heard on February 24, 2011.

At the hearing, only two witnesses testified. The first, Dr. Daniel Lanowski, previously examined Defendant on February 7, 2011, and again on February 14, 2011; and Grant Parish Deputy Brad Suddeth, assigned as warden of the detention facility where Defendant is being housed, testified regarding his observations and interactions with Defendant while in his custody. After hearing from both witnesses, the trial court ruled that there were no grounds for appointment of a new sanity commission and again ruled that Defendant was capable of assisting at trial.

Trial was continued until March 14, 2011, to permit Defendant to file a writ in this court. This court issued a stay order, but ultimately determined that there was no error in the trial court’s ruling. State v. Craig, 11-240 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/11) (unpublished opinion). Thus, Defendant’s assignment essentially re-visits the 2011 ruling.

This court has stated:

Although a defendant may seek review of a pretrial ruling even after a pretrial supervisory writ application is denied, when the defendant does not present any additional evidence on this issue after the pretrial ruling, the issue can be rejected. State v. Hebert, 97-1742 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/98), 716 So.2d 63, writ denied, 98-1813 (La.11/13/98), 730 So.2d 455, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1072, 120 S.Ct. 1685, 146 L.Ed.2d 492 (2000) (quoting State v. Magee, 93-643, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94), 643 So.2d 497, 499)...., “[jjudicial efficiency demands that this court accord great deference to its pre-trial decision unless it is apparent that the determination was patently erroneous and produced unjust results.” Hebert, 716 So.2d at 68. Our review of the record reveals no additional evidence for the defendant’s allegations of prose-cutorial misconduct which would support his pretrial motions.

State v. Perry, 12-298, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/12), 101 So.3d 575, 580, writ denied, 12-2657 (La.5/24/13), 116 So.3d 659.

Defendant now notes that the colloquy of his waiver of jury trial indicates that he had difficulty deciding whether to make the waiver. Also, the trial court took note of his “significant mental issues” during sentencing. However, these points do not constitute new evidence of the kind contemplated by Perry. Defendant made his waiver months before this court’s writ ruling, and sentencing factors do not provide a reason to revisit the conduct of the trial. During sentencing, the court reiterated its conclusions that Defendant knew right from wrong and was competent to stand trial. For the reasons discussed, this assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

In his third assignment of error, Defendant questions whether he made a valid waiver of the right to a trial by jury, especially in light of indications in the record that he may have substandard learning ability. Assertions regarding his possible mental difficulties were mentioned in the previous discussion of the fourth assignment of error.

Defendant quotes the waiver colloquy at length; we note the pertinent exchange:

|10BY THE COURT: Okay. And, sir, do you understand that you have the right to be tried by a jury on those charges?
BY MR. CRAIG: A jury?
BY MR. HIGGINS: A jury, twelve people, they sit up here and they can judge you or we can have the Judge judge you.
BY MR. CRAIG: It don’t matter to me.
BY MR. HIGGINS: Okay.
BYTHE COURT: Sir?
BY MR. CRAIG: It don’t bother me.
BY MR. HIGGINS: It doesn’t matter to him.
BY THE COURT: It doesn’t bother you, okay. Sir, do you wish to be tried by a Judge or a jury?
BY MR. HIGGINS: Judge.
BY MR. CRAIG: I don’t know.
BY MR. HIGGINS: The Judge is what I advise.
BY MR. CRAIG: Judge, yeah.
BY THE COURT: Okay. Are you going to accept Mr. Higgins’ recommendation of a judge trial?
BY MR. CRAIG: What did you say?
BY THE COURT: Are you going to follow Mr. Higgins’ advice and have a judge trial or do you wish to be tried by a jury?
BY MR. CRAIG: I don’t know what I want to be tried by.
BY THE COURT: Okay. Well, sir, you need to decide today.
BY MR. CRAIG: Well, by you then.
BY THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. HIGGINS: Very good.
|„BY MR. WHITE: Judge, the only thing I would request is a boykinization on the jury situation involving his education and ability to understand what a jury is. I haven’t talked to him. I don’t know that he ...
BY THE COURT: Mr. Craig, what was your highest level of school?
BY MR. CRAIG: I don’t know. I’m not that good in school.
BY THE COURT: [Ojkay. Do you know the last grade that you passed?
BY MR. CRAIG: Seventh.
BY THE COURT: Seventh?
BY MR. CRAIG: But I ain’t did nothing in there.
BY THE COURT: Sir?
BY MR. CRAIG: I ain’t did nothing in there though.
BY THE COURT: Mr. Craig, do you know what a jury is?
BY MR. CRAIG: (NO VERBAL RESPONSE HEARD)
BY THE COURT: Sir, do you understand that a jury would be people from this parish who are over the age of 18, who would sit ...
BY MR. HIGGINS: He’s nodding his, so he ...
BY THE COURT: I need you to answer. Do you understand that they would be sitting in those chairs right there and they would hear everything that is presented in this case and they would make a decision as to whether or not you were innocent or guilty, instead of me making that decision. Do you understand that, sir?
BY MR. CRAIG: (NO VERBAL RESPONSE HEARD)
BY THE COURT: I need you to verbalize your answer, sir.
BY MR. CRAIG: Uh-huh. (INDICATES ‘TES”)
|12BY THE COURT: I need you to say your answer.
BY MR. CRAIG: Yeah, I understand.
BY THE COURT: Okay. So, do you understand that you could have people from anywhere in Grant Parish that would come up here, they would get picked. Mr. Higgins would have an opportunity to try to pick the ones he wants, Mr. White would try to pick the ones that he wants, get them up in that panel and they would be the ones that would decide your innocence or guilt. Now, would you prefer me to do that or them to do that?
BY MR. CRAIG: I guess they can do it, the jury thing.
BY MR. HIGGINS: A what? A judge thing?
BY MR. CRAIG: I don’t know.
BY MR. HIGGINS: What I’m advising you to do, as your attorney, is I believe because of the facts of your case and the nature of your case and what I intend to put on as evidence, that includes psychiatric ... includes doctors. I think that Judge Willett is in a better position to understand what the psychiatrists say, than a jury does. Does that make sense?
BY MR. CRAIG: Yes, sir.
BY MR. HIGGINS: Okay. But, that’s what I’d like to do.
BY THE COURT: Mr. White, do you have any questions you wish to ask Mr. Craig?
BY MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor. I believe that’s sufficient.
BY THE COURT: And, Mr. Craig, do you wish to be tried by me or a jury? BY MR. CRAIG: By you.

In a first circuit case involving an argument similar to the one now advanced, the court stated:

liSA defendant may waive his right to a jury trial and elect to be tried by the judge. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 780(A). Generally, the waiver is to be entered at arraignment. However, the trial judge may accept a waiver of a jury trial at any time prior to the commencement of trial. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 780(B). A waiver of trial by jury is valid only if the defendant acted voluntarily and knowingly. See State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475, 486 (La.1983). A waiver of this right is never presumed. State v. Brooks, 2001-1138, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/28/02), 814 So.2d 72, 76, writ denied, 2002-1215 (La.11/22/02), 829 So.2d 1037. However, no special form is required for a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial. State v. Gamble, 504 So.2d 1100, 1102 (La.App. 5th Cir.1987).
The record in this case reflects that on April 20, 2009, the day before his trial, the court noted on the record that defense counsel mentioned the possibility of the defendant waiving his right to a jury trial. The defendant responded affirmatively when the court asked if he had participated in discussions regarding a jury waiver with his attorney. The defendant stated that he wanted to waive his jury-trial right. Before accepting the waiver, the trial judge conducted a colloquy to establish the defendant’s competency to waive his right to a jury trial. The judge explained that the defendant was charged with two felonies and thus, he had the right to elect to have a jury hear his case or to have the case decided by the judge. The defendant indicated that he understood this right. Next, the court asked, “Now do you know what a jury is? Do you understand what a jury is?” To this, the defendant replied, “No.” The judge explained:
If you have a jury trial, you would have twelve people, twelve citizens who would hear the evidence from the witness stand and they would make the decision whether or not you are guilty or you are innocent of the charge of armed robbery and whether or not you are guilty or innocent of the charge of aggravated battery. They would make the decision about your guilt. I would sentence you. Okay.
So you understand what a jury does? It’s twelve people who are selected, twelve citizens, and they listen to the evidence and they decide whether or not you’re guilty or innocent.
If you have a trial with a Judge, I’m the Judge, I’m the person that listens to the evidence, and I decide whether or not you’re guilty or innocent.
|14Po you understand the difference between the two?
The defendant indicated that he understood the court’s explanation. After reviewing the bill of information and conferring with his attorney, the defendant advised the court that he wished to waive his right to a jury and proceed with a bench trial.
Upon reviewing the entirety of the jury trial waiver proceedings in this case, we find that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to be tried by a jury and elected to be tried by the trial judge. Once the defendant indicated that he did not fully understand the role of a jury, the court thoroughly explained the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial in basic terminology.Thus, considering the colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant, as well as the defendant’s demonstrated awareness of the proceedings, we find that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.

State v. Coleman, 09-1388, pp. 3-6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/12/10), 35 So.3d 1096, 1098-99, writ denied, 10-894 (La.4/29/11), 62 So.3d 103. As noted in the discussion of the fourth assignment of error, the trial court found Defendant competent to assist in his defense.

The colloquy regarding his waiver of the right to trial by jury is similar to the one analyzed in Coleman. This court is favorably impressed by Defendant’s on-the-record discussion with his counsel regarding the specific rationale for choosing to waive the jury. Thus, we find that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIVE

In his final assignment of error, Defendant argues, as he did below, that his sentences are excessive. Because we have vacated the armed robbery conviction and sentence, only the sentences for attempted first degree murder and aggravated burglary are at issue. Defendant was sentenced to thirty years at hard labor for attempted first degree murder, with the first ten years to be served without benefit |1sof parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. For aggravated burglary, Defendant was sentenced to thirty years at hard labor, to run concurrently.

Defendant acknowledges that the sentencing range for attempted first degree murder is ten to fifty years. La.R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a), La.R.S. 14:30. Thus, he received a mid-range sentence for this offense. The potential term for aggravated burglary is one to thirty years. Therefore, he received the maximum sentence available for that crime. La.R.S. 14:60. Among other arguments, Defendant claims that he is not the “worst kind of offender”; thus, the maximum sentence was inappropriate. Preliminarily, the fact that the trial court meted out three concurrent thirty-year sentences in this case suggests its assessment that thirty years was an appropriate benchmark of punishment for Defendant’s actions, rather than a conclusion that he was the worst kind of offender regarding aggravated burglary. The court was also explicitly concerned about the safety of the public.

This court has previously explained the analysis for an excessive-sentence claim:

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const, art. I, § 20 prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. “ ‘[T]he exces-siveness of a sentence becomes a question of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdiction of this court.’ ” State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993) (quoting State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 764 (La.1979)). Still, the trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and, absent a manifest abuse of that discretion, we will not deem as excessive a sentence imposed within statutory limits. State v. Pyke, 95-919 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 713. However, “[mjaximum sentences are reserved for the most serious violations and the worst offenders.” State v. Farhood, 02-490, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/03), 844 So.2d 217, 225. The only relevant question for us to consider on review is not whether another sentence would be more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its broad discretion in sentencing a defendant. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).
|1fiThe fifth circuit, in [State v.] Lisotta, [98-646 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98)] 726 So.2d [57] at 58, stated that the reviewing court should consider three factors in reviewing the trial court’s sentencing discretion:
1. The nature of the crime,
2. The nature and background of the offender, and
3. The sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts.

State v. Whatley, 03-1275, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 955, 958-59.

Regarding the nature of the crime and the nature and background of the offender, we note the trial court’s reasoning:

BY THE COURT: The Court has studied the pre-sentence investigation. I’ve also reviewed the medical reports prepared by Doctors Binns, Piland, and Lanowski. The Court also received a letter from Mr. Craig’s mother, which I have reviewed. The Court does note that Mr. Craig does have significant mental issues which have seriously affected his intellectual development. The Court also notes that the medical records indicate that his mother and family have diligently tried to attend to his mental illnesses from an early age. That is somewhat unusual. Often times we have people that get into trouble, they want to blame the fact that they did what they did on the mental illness and they want the [S]tate to then try to help them. Mr. Craig’s family has tried to help him. The Court also notes that Mr. Craig is a very young man. The Court does consider his age and his mental ability as mitigating factors. However, the Court also notes that he has been treated by numerous facilities and physicians and has received significant counseling, throughout his young age, that has not seemed to prevent these type of incidences [sic]. The Court has considered these matters as well as the nature of the present offenses, in light of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Article 894.1. The Court makes the following findings regarding sentence: Mr. Craig is a 19-year-old male who has a history of mental illness, including, ADHD, Conduct Disorder, Impulse Control, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, Psychosis, Hallucinations, Bipolar and, according to Dr. Lanowski, shows elements of a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by severe impairments of social interactions and unrealistic interests. This Court and the Appellate Courts have previously examined the issues of Mr. Craig’s competency to stand trial and his ability to distinguish between right and wrong. Therefore, I do not intend to revisit those issues. As I indicated, I do consider Mr. Craig’s age and mental deficiencies as significant mitigating factors. However, Mr. Craig has a history of planning and 117attempting to carry out serious criminal activity. The pre-sen-tence investigation references a proceeding where Mr. Craig stole his grandfather’s truck and a gun in an effort to drive to Alabama to kill someone who had offended him online. Fortunately, Mr. Craig was apprehended in Alabama when his truck broke down. Twelve days after his release from the state’s custody, Mr. Craig attempted to carry out a plan to break into Mr. Cannon’s home, rob him at gun point, and use the stolen money to flee the country. Mr. Cannon arrived home early which disrupted Mr. Craig’s plan, which resulted in Mr. Craig firing a shot at Mr. Cannon at point blank range and fleeing into the woods. Through his counsel and correspondence to this Court, Mr. Craig and his family have appealed to the Court that Mr. Craig needs psychiatric treatment, not imprisonment. As I indicated, Mr. Craig’s family has tried to get him psychiatric treatment. In light of that treatment, Mr. Craig is still a danger to himself and those around him. While I am sympathetic to Mr. Craig’s family, I am equally sympathetic to Mr. Cannon for the ordeal that he endured. Mr. Cannon was the victim in this case, not Mr. Craig. I am not a mental health expert. That’s why we have experts to come and give us their opinions. It is my ley [sic] opinion, based on the testimony that we have received, that as a result of Mr. Craig’s mental illnesses that he does not comprehend fully the consequences of his actions. I would equate it to a 6-year-old with a pellet gun. A 6-year-old doesn’t understand that a pellet gun can put someone’s eye out. The problem with Mr. Craig is he’s smart enough to carry things out. He’s smart enough to plan elaborate criminal activity that is extremely dangerous to other people. I do hope that Mr. Craig receives mental health treatment in the future, but, society has a right to be protected from dangerous individuals such as Mr. Craig.

Clearly, the first two factors of the What-ley/Lisotta analysis weigh against Defendant, in light of the facts recited by the trial court.

Regarding the sentences imposed for similar crimes, Defendant cites jurisprudence that is more relevant to attempted second degree murder than to the current crimes. In State v. Sibley, 09-1104 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/10), 41 So.3d 581, a majority of this court upheld concurrent thirty-year sentences for attempted first degree murder and armed robbery for a defendant diagnosed with mental illness. During the crimes, he held a gun to one victim’s head and shot another in the leg. Id. at 586-87.

|1RIn the case noted below, the defendant’s use of violence contributed to this court’s affirmance of his maximum sentence for aggravated burglary:

[T]he trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion when it sentenced Defendant to thirty years at hard labor considering the circumstance of the case and Defendant’s criminal history. As noted by the trial court, Defendant is a five-time felony offender and has an extensive arrest record. In State v. Thompson, 39,454, 39,455 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1268, cited by the trial court in the present case as a comparison, Thompson was convicted of aggravated burglary and received the maximum sentence of thirty years. The second circuit affirmed the sentence, noting that Thompson was a four-time felony offender and had a lengthy criminal past. The second circuit further stated, “Defendant was the worst type of offender. The crimes were committed in a manner that endangered the lives of several people and with total disregard for public safety ... it was clear that [Thompson] had not benefited from his previous incarcerations and that, this time, he would be sent away to serve the interest of public safety.” Id. at 1285.
Under the circumstances of the case as set forth by the trial court above and considering Defendant’s extensive criminal history, Defendant’s maximum sentence was not such that would shock this court’s sense of justice. Accordingly, there is no merit to this claim.

State v. Brandenburg, 06-1158 pp. 30-31 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07) 949 So.2d 625, 646, writ denied, 07-538 (La.10/26/07), 966 So.2d 571, and writ denied, 07-614 (La.10/26/07), 966 So.2d 573.

In State v. Thompson, 39,454, 39,455 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1268, the defendant received fifty years for attempted first degree murder and thirty years for aggravated burglary. The court affirmed the sentences, explaining:

After conviction, the trial court ordered a presentence investigation report of Defendant which revealed an extensive criminal history and that he was a fourth-felony offender. The trial court sentenced Defendant to the maximum sentence of 50 years at hard labor on the attempted first-degree murder conviction and the maximum sentence of 30 years on the aggravated burglary conviction.
In sentencing Defendant to the maximum sentences allowed, the trial court found that these were the most serious violations of the offenses; and, given his lengthy criminal past, Defendant was the worst type of offender.Given the language of Grissom, supra, and Guzman, supra, h9and Defendant’s history, we find that the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion in imposing the maximum sentences; and that the sentences do not shock the sense of justice. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.

Thompson, 894 So.2d at 1285. The fourth circuit sustained maximum sentences for two aggravated burglaries that were connected with two rapes. State v. Scott, 598 So.2d 704, 711 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991).

Although none of the jurisprudence cited is exactly on all fours with the present case, a common thread repeated is that maximum sentences may be upheld for aggravated burglaries that are associated with other violent offenses. Also, the cases show the sentences at issue does not fall “outside the norms of Louisiana jurisprudence[.]” State v. Office, 07-198, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 967 So.2d 1185, 1194, writ denied, 07-2274 (La.4/18/08), 978 So.2d 348.

In the present case, Defendant shot at the victim from close range; only the latter’s good fortune (or the former’s poor aim) prevented this from being a murder case. Also, Defendant had recently made threats of violence toward another person in a separate incident and took actions to make good on that threat. Thus, Defendant’s sentences for attempted first degree murder and aggravated burglary are affirmed. A standard Whatley /Lisotta analysis supports this conclusion, and Defendant’s attempt to kill the victim, coupled with his apparent propensity for violence, ranks him among the worst kind of offenders for the crime of aggravated burglary. For the reasons discussed, this assignment lacks merit.

LqDECREE

Defendant’s convictions and sentences for attempted first degree murder and aggravated burglary are affirmed. The conviction and sentence for attempted armed robbery are vacated, as the conviction violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES FOR ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER AND AGGRAVATED BATTERY ARE AFFIRMED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR ATTEMPTED ARMED ROBBERY IS VACATED.

      . "Louisiana jurisprudence does not distinguish between the armed robbery which occurs before the killing of the victim and the robbery of the victim whom the defendant has already killed. State v. Kirkpatrick, 443 So.2d 546 (La.1983).” State v. Goodley, 01-77, p. 10 (La.6/21/02) 820 So.2d 478, 484.

      . Although the Scott court’s dispositional language indicates that all the sentences were to be set aside, its discussion clearly indicates that the aggravated burglary sentences were not excessive.