author: GREMILLION, Judge. PICKETT, J.,

text:
    STATE in the Interest of G.E.K. & C.E.S. State in the Interest of I.B.W.
    No. 14-681, 14-682.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Jan. 14, 2015.

      Thomas G. Wilson, Attorney at Law, LA, for appellant, A.V. (mother).
    Robert L. Kennedy, Attorney at Law, LA, for appellee, B.H.W. (father).
    James P. Lemoine, District. Attorney, Thirty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Colfax, LA, for appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Guy R. Lain, Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services, Vidalia, LA, for appellee, State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services.
    Renee P. Cote, Legal Services of North Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for appellees, G.E.K. (child), C.S. (child), I.W. (child).
    Joseph P. Beck, III, Attorney at Law, Ball, LA, for appellee, S.K. (father).
    Jessica Firment, Attorney at Law, Alexandria, LA, for intervenors/appellees, J.V. (intervenor), H.V. (intervenor).

      Carolyn 0. Hines, Attorney at Law, Alexandria, LA, for appellant, A.V. (mother).
    Court composed of JIMMIE C. PETERS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

|TIn this consolidated case, the mother, A.V., appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to her three children, G.E.K, C.E.S., and I.B.W. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2010, the State, through the Department of Children and Family Services, (DCFS) received a report that A.V. was in the hospital due to a drug overdose. At that time, A.V. had only one child, G.E.K., born January 13, 2009. A.V. was referred to substance abuse treatment and offered other services from DCFS. In September 2011, DCFS received a report that a second child, C.E.S., was born substance-exposed on September 6, 2011. In an effort to keep the family unified, A.V. and her children were provided various services including daily daycare for the children and substance abuse treatment for A.V. However, A.V. failed to attend substance abuse treatment after numerous attempts by DCFS. The State filed a petition to declare a minor to be a child in need of care in July 2012. Following an August 8, 2012 hearing, A.V. was arrested on outstanding warrants, and G.E.K. and C.E.S. were placed in foster care. At a continued custody hearing on September 12, 2012, all parties stipulated that G.E.K. and C.E.S. were children in need of care. While G.E.K. and C.E.S. were in the State’s custody, A.V. gave 12birth to a third child, I.B.W., on February 14, 2013. The State filed a petition to adjudicate I.B.W. in need of care due to high risk, and he was placed in foster care on February 28, 2013.,

The children were continued in the State’s custody following a March 6, 2013 hearing in which the trial court found that A.V. had made inadequate progress in meeting reunification goals. Thereafter, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights and certification of minor children for adoption on November 5, 2013. On February 5, 2014, the same day as the hearing on the termination, A.V.’s counsel filed a motion to continue, which was denied. Following the hearing, the trial court terminated A.V.’s parental rights to her three children, freeing them for adoption. A.V. now appeals and assigns as error:

(1) The trial court was in error in terminating [A.V.’s] parental rights to G.E.K., C.E.S. and - I.B.W., for the State of Louisiana failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there had been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services and there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or conduct in the near future, as mandated by Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1035.
(2) The trial court erred in its ruling that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the minor child, as mandated by Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1037(A).
|¡(3) The trial court erred in not granting the court appointed attorney for [A.V.] a continuance to prepare for the termination proceeding.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

We have stated that “[pjarental rights to the care, custody, and management of children is a fundamental liberty interest warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the law.” In re J.K., 97-336, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 1154, 1156. See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Accordingly, a parent has a strong interest in the accuracy of a decision to terminate her rights. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., NC, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Thus, the Louisiana legislature has imposed strict standards that require the State to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds for termination under La.Ch.Code art. 1015 before a judgment can be issued terminating parental rights. In re J.K., 702 So.2d 1154.

This analysis requires a balancing of the child’s interests and the parent’s interests; however, it has been repeatedly held that the interests of the child are paramount to that of the parent. In re J.A., 99-2905 (La.1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806. In that case, the supreme court stated:

The fundamental purpose of involuntary termination proceedings is to provide the greatest possible protection to a child whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide adequate care for his physical, emotional, and mental health needs and adequate rearing by providing an expeditious judicial process for the termination of. all parental rights and responsibilities and to achieve permanency and stability for the child. The focus of an involuntary termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of the child for all legal relations with the parents to be terminated. As such, the primary concern of the courts and the State remains to secure the best interest for the 'child, including termination of parental rights if justifiable grounds exist and are proven. Nonetheless, courts must proceed with care and caution as the permanent termination of the legal relationship existing between natural parents and the child is one of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens.

\Jd. at 811 (citation omitted).

The trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights will not be reversed by the appellate court unless it is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. In re V.F.R., 01-1041 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/13/02), 815 So.2d 1035, writ denied, 02-797 (La.4/12/02), 813 So.2d 412.

Loüisiana Children’s Code Article 1015(5) sets forth the following as grounds for involuntary termination:

Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1036(C) states:

Under Article 1015(5), lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:
(1) The parent’s failure to attend court-approved scheduled visitations with the child.
(2) The parent’s failure to communicate with the child.
(3) The parent’s failure to keep the department apprised of the parent’s whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent’s ability to comply with the case plan for services.
(4) The parent’s failure to contribute to the costs of the child’s foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case plan.
(5) The parent’s repeated failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan.
(6) The parent’s lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification.
|s(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.

Louisiana Children’s Code article 1037(B) further requires that the trial court find that the termination be in the best interests of the children and that the trial court provide written findings.

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of A.V. should be terminated because:

The State further proved abandonment by [A.V.] and [the father]. The Court finds that [A.V.] and [the father] have abandoned [G.E.K], [C.E.S.], and [I.B.W.] by failing, as of the time of the filing of the termination petition, to provide significant contributions to the children’s care and support. Respondent [the father] has further abandoned [G.E.K], [C.E.S.] and [I.B.W.] by failing to maintain significant contact with the children by visiting or communicating for a six consecutive month period. The State has further proved that [A.V.] and [the father] have not substantially complied with their case plans and there is no reasonable expectation of their rehabilitation in the near future. Despite the efforts of Petitioner, the Respondents [A.V.] and [the father] have failed and/or refused to adequately participate in the services provided to them; and/or have failed/refused to substantially comply with the case plans for services which have been previously filed by the Department and approved by this Honorable Court as necessary for the safe return of the minor children. Despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the condition or conduct of [A.V.] and [the father] in the near future, considering the children’s ages and their need for a safe, stable and permanent home. The Court considered, in accordance with LA ChC Art. 1037(A), the bond of [G.E.K.], [C.E.S.] and [I.B.W.] with their caregivers and all other evidence presented to, determine the best interest of each child. The Court finds that the termination of the Respondents’ parental rights is in the best interest of [G.E.K.], [C.E.S.] and [I.B.W.] because of them need for a safe, stable and nurturing permanent placement.

A.V. claims that the State failed to meets its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination was warranted because, despite A.V.’s ongoing substance abuse problems, she had completed some aspects of her case plan.

| (iThe significant requirements of the State’s case plan for A.V. included that she not use any illegal narcotics or prescription medications that were not directly prescribed to her, that she request non-narcotic prescription medication, and that she participate in a substance abuse evaluation and any recommended treatment. She would further submit to drug screens; refusal to participate resulted in a default positive drug screen. A.V. was to maintain safe and appropriate housing for at least six months, and to obtain and maintain a legal source of income to provide for her family’s basic needs. She was to attend parenting classes, domestic violence classes, and submit to a mental health evaluation. Further, she was to pay $10 per month, if unemployed, and $25 per month, if employed, in child support.

Evidence and Testimony

Several case plan reviews are in the record. A July 9, 2013 case plan review indicated that A.V. had failed to meet the housing, employment/income, and child support payment requirements. However, A.V. maintained contact with DCFS and attended all court hearings and visits with the children. Regarding her drug use, A.V.’s progress was noted:

[A.V.] took a drug screen on January 25, 2013 and tested positive for Suboxone. She has a prescription for this narcotic. The Agency received a Notification of Non-Compliance on February 22, 2013 concerning [A.V.]. The reasons for noncompliance were failure to attend required group and/or individual sessions, failure to maintaine [sic] adequate progress toward treatment goals and/or objectives, and failure to maintain abstinence form [sic] alcohol/other drugs, as evidenced by positive drug screens. [A.V.] had a negative drug sreen [sic] on February 25, 2013. On March 4, 2013 [A.V.] tested positive for Suboxon [sic]. She has a prescription for this narcotic. Also on March 4, 2013 [A.V.] and the clinician at Grant Addictive Disorders signed a contract. The contract stated that [A.V.] agreed to fully participate in outpatient treatment at Grant Adictive [sic] Disorders. She agreed to attend any and all outpatient group and individual sessions as well as submit to random urine screens when required. 17Supervisor requested [A.V.] to take a drug screen after court on April 24, 2013. A.V. did not comply. This is considered a positive. On April 30, 2013 [A.V.] tested positive for Suboxone. She has a prescription for this narcotic. On May 3, 2013 [A.V.] tested positive for Suboxone. She has a prescription for this narcotic. On May 29, 2013 the Agency received a letter of Notification of Termination at Grant Addictive Disorder concerning [A.V.]. The leter [sic] stated that [A.V.] has been given several opportunities to attend outpatient treatment and cooperate with the program and she has [sic] failed to do so. On June 17, 2013 [A.V.] had a negative drug screen.

The case plan further stated that DCFS had received a letter on March 1, 2013 from AV.’s physician indicating that he had no intention of weaning A.V. off of Suboxone at that time. A July 12, 2013 judicial review report submitted to the trial court discussed AV.’s compliance and again reiterated A.V.’s failure to comply with the demands of Grant Addictive Disorders Clinic. This report states:

Please see below for drug screen dates and what she tested positive for:

1/25/13 Suboxone
2/25/13 Negative
3/04/13 Suboxone
4/24/13 Agency requested drug screen after court, [A.V.] did not submit to it.
4/30/13 Suboxone
5/03/13 Suboxone
6/17/13 Negative
The Agency has major concerns of [A.V.] taking Suboxone considering the length of time she has been on this narcotic medication. However, the Agency received a letter dated March 1, 2013 from Dr. Seki. He stated he has no intentions to wean her off of Suboxone at this time. He stated she is “doing exceptionally well as evidenced by being tested negative for drugs and attendance to NA/AA meetings.” [A.V.] signed a consent form to release her records from Dr. Seki’s office. The records were sent to our office in February 2013 as well as the following drug screens.

This review also noted that on July 3, 2013, at a parenting class A.V. was attending, a caseworker called 911 emergency services to transport A.V. to the hospital because she was not “doing well” and almost dropped I.B.W. The caseworker reported that A.V. admitted that she relapsed the night before because |sshe was very depressed over the fact that her brother was trying to take her children from her. By July 9, 2013, the case plan cover sheet lists adoption of the children as the primary goal.

Testimony from the March 6, 2013 hearing included the following. Don Jones, a child welfare specialist with DCFS, testified regarding the removal of I.B.W. shortly after birth. Jones noted that A.V.’s “primary issue seems to be substance abuse.” Although I.B.W. was born healthy and had no withdrawal symptoms, he did have Suboxone in his system, which had been prescribed to A.V. At the initial meeting with A.V., Jones found that I.B.W. was not in present danger. However, following a staff meeting, it was determined that I.B.W. was in impending' danger because of A.V.’s “noncompliance with the agency as reported by foster care and her extensive history with substance abuse.”

Lori Bardwell, Child Welfare Supervisor for the Grant and Rapides Parish DCFS, testified regarding the removal of I.B.W.:

Mr. Jones reported back to me that he had frankly discussed with [A.V.] and her current paramour that the importance of them working with the agency; that she had the two children in foster care already; that she was lacking in working her case plan and that was very serious: He further discussed that they needed to do everything that the agency requested; that we would be closely watching and monitoring them and that should they not do anything that the agency requested that we would immediately remove the child.

Bardwell testified that A.V. did report for a drug screen as requested and tested positive for Suboxone. However, Bardwell stated that “[d]ue to [A.V.’s] noncompliance with her family services and her current foster care case plan, and her paramour’s unwillingness to go for his drug screen, we concluded that it was in the child’s best interest that he entered into foster care.”

|9Debra Fairelbth, a domestic violence advocate, testified that she had provided A.V. with domestic violence counseling and parenting sessions. since late November 2012. Faircloth stated that A.V.’s behavior and appearance was always appropriate and that she never appeared to be impaired.

A.V. testified that she is actively working her case plan and that the she is only taking her prescribed medication Subox-one. She said that she lives with her fiancé, B.W. A.V. said that she does not work but has applied for Supplemental Security Income. She testified that she was in a car accident in 2000, and that her addiction to pain medication resulted.

February 5, 20H Hearing

Bardwell testified regarding A.V.’s history with DCFS, starting with the 2010 incident in which she overdosed. A.V.’s case was closed, and she was referred for services. In September 2011, C.E.S. was born exposed to Lortab, and A.V. tested positive for marijuana, Klonopin, and opiates. At that time, the family was placed in family services, which is an intensive intervention program that seeks to maintain the family unit. However, the children entered foster care on August 8, 2012, due to A.V.’s noncompliance with her case plan and her arrest on outstanding warrants. Bardwell said that A.V. participated in all five family team conferences in which her case plan was discussed. Bard-well then reviewed A.V.’s case plans and A.V.’s failures to meet her case plan by failing to obtain a legal source of income, failing to maintain safe and appropriate housing, and failing to complete any substance abuse treatment. Bardwell then reviewed A.V.’s drug screens as follows:

4/2012 Soma, Xanax, Suboxone, but had prescriptions for Hydrocodone and Suboxone.

| iq6/22/2012 Suboxone, Klonopin, and Hydrocone, but had prescriptions for all three.

8/15/2012 Suboxone and Klonopin, which were prescribed, and Xanax and morphine, which were not prescribed.

9/06/2012 Suboxone and Klonopin, which were prescribed, and Soma and Xanax, which were not prescribed.

9/07/2012 10/11/2012 Marijuana and Benzodiazepines, not prescribed. Suboxone, prescribed.

11/01/12 Suboxone and Klonopin (prescribed), Soma and Xanax (not prescribed).

12/13/12 Suboxone (prescribed).

1/03/13 Opiates, hydrocodone and Soma (not prescribed).

1/17/13 Refused drug screen (automatically deemed positive).

1/25/13 Suboxone (prescribed).

2/25/13 Negative.

3/04/13 Suboxone (prescribed).

4/24/13 Refused drug screen (automatically deemed positive).

4/30/13 Suboxone (prescribed).

5/03/13 Suboxone (prescribed).

6/17/13 Negative.

8/23/13 Negative.

Bardwell testified that all three children have thrived in their foster home placements. She said that all three children get together at least once per month because the foster mothers have become friends. She said that the foster parents desire to adopt the children if they are freed for adoption.

Candace Gillette, Child Welfare Specialist, became the foster care worker for the children in February 2013. Gillette essentially reiterated Bardwell’s_|_utestimony that A.V. was non-compliant with her substance abuse treatment. A.V. attended five of sixteen parenting classes. She was briefly employed at Jordache, but never supplied any proof of employment. She sometimes lived with her boyfriend, B.W., and sometimes lived with her mother, M.V. However, the caseworkers were not allowed inside either residence. M.V.’s home was found to be unsuitable by the agency. Although A.V. claimed to have made some of the child support payments, she never provided proof of those payments to Gillette.

Gillette stated that the children are “doing great” in their foster home placements. G.E.K. is in pre-k and will start playing t-ball in the spring, and C.E.S. “says a lot of words” and likes to play in the dirt and jump on his little trampoline. I.B.W. is pulling up now and crawls everywhere. Gillette said the kids are bonded with their respective foster parents. She said that G.E.K. refers to her foster parents as “momma” and “daddy” although the foster mother continues to tell G.E.K. that A.V. is also her “momma.” Gillette stressed the need for permanency for these children, as they all have spent the majority or the entirety of their lives in foster care.

Gillette discussed the home where A.V. normally resides; her mother’s home. Although she has never been able to conduct an in-home study because they are either not there or refuse entry; Gillette testified as to the exterior conditions of the home. Photos were submitted evidencing piles of furniture, junk, garbage, and debris piled up on the porch and outside the home. Both Bardwell and Gillette testified that beside her substance abuse issues, A.V.’s mother is her biggest problem, and she enables the drug use and takes over and controls A.V.’s visitations with the children.

112Kati Wolf, a counselor-in-training at the Grant Addictive Disorders Clinic, testified regarding A.V.’s attendance at outpatient treatment. Wolf stated that A.V. has been enrolled in the program several times but has. never completed treatment. She stated that the drug screens A.V. submitted to were negative for illegal substances; however, A.V. only arrived for testing sporadically when the tests were meant to be given weekly.

Kimberly Chellette, who was employed by the Volunteers of America, completed three “visit coachings” with A.V. and five of sixteen parenting classes. Chellette was able to observe A.V. in the presence of her children and noted that she “struggles” and “needs constant help.” Chellette then described the July 3, 2013 incident in which 911 had to be called and A.V. taken to a local hospital. Chellette’s last contact with A.V. was on July 17, 2013, despite repeated attempts to provide continued services to her.

A.V.’s application for supplemental security income was admitted into evidence along with an August 6, 2013 letter from the administrator of church-run recovery group which A.V. had attended every Saturday for about a month. A.V.’s mother was also involved in the group. The program administrator noted that he was “convinced of both ladiesf] sincerity in their desire to pursue recovery for their family through this program.”

Compliance with Case Plan

More than a year after her children were removed from her care, A.V. had failed to completely accomplish any of the goals set forth in the case plan pertaining to the root of her problems — her substance abuse. She further had no income, no stable housing, produced no evidence that she paid the support required, or was in any way capable of caring for her three children. The trial court did not | ^manifestly err in its factual determination that A.V. failed to make the $10.00 monthly payments. A.V. claimed to have made payments and testified that she was instructed to keep copies of the payments, but was unable to produce any records of payment. Although A.V. maintained contact with the agency and visited with her children, these two factors are simply insufficient to find substantial compliance with the State’s case plan. Although it is debatable whether this should be the case, the law does not require that the clear and convincing evidence of failure to comply pertain only to the main issue that usually initiated the removal in the first place (i.e. drug use). Clear and convincing evidence of failure to meet any of La.Ch.Code art. 1015 grounds is sufficient. In In re R.E. & R.C., 12-196 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 91 So.3d 1282, a panel of this court addressed circumstances very similar to the ones at hand. There, the youngest child was born after the oldest two had already been removed, and the mother’s rights to all three children were terminated even though less than a year elapsed since the youngest child had been out of the mother’s custody. Moreover, the mother’s problems were rooted in her substance abuse, yet, we found no error in the trial court’s finding that failure to provide significant contributions to the child’s care ($10.00 monthly payment) was a ground for termination.

Nevertheless, the fundamental problem preventing reunification in this case is A.V.’s. substance abuse. A.V. makes a large issue of the fact that she was prescribed the Suboxone which was often found in her drug screens. The issue of whether the State’s demand that she request non-narcotic medication should supersede her physician’s judgment in continuing to prescribe Suboxone is of no moment. A.V. continued to test positive for various other non-prescribed illegal substances, refused drug screening which are automatically deemed positive, and | Marrived for testing at her leisure rather than when scheduled. Moreover, she refused to complete any outpatient or inpatient substance abuse treatment. A parent who is serious about having her children returned, regardless of their addictions, should attend the treatment requested and provided for by the state. A.V. offers no valid reasons why this treatment, either inpatient or outpatient, could not be accomplished, particularly in light of the fact that she has no job that she needs to tend to. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that A.V. failed to substantially comply with her case plan, particularly the requirements set forth in La.Ch.Code art. 1036(C)(4), (5), (6), and (7). This assignment of error is without merit.

Reasonable Lack of Expectation of Significant Improvement

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1036(D) states:

Under Article 1015(5), lack of any reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the near future may be evidenced by one or more of the following:
(1) Any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance abuse, or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable or incapable of exercising parental, responsibilities without exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious harm, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.
(2) A pattern of repeated incarceration of the parent that has rendered the parent unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or emotional needs of the child for extended periods ■ of time.
(3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

A.V. argues that there is a reasonable expectation of reformation. Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1036(C) illustrates the considerations that the trial court takes in determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of reformation. In re S.M., 98-922 (La.10/20/98), 719 So.2d 445. Mere cooperation with DCFS is inadequate; the parents must show improvement over time, even if all of the problems that caused the removal have not been eliminated. Id. This requires that the parents significantly modify the behavior that caused the removal. Id.

Perhaps it could be argued that A.V. has shown some improvement regarding her addiction because she has tested negative for illegal substances from January to August 2013. However, A.V. did continue to test positive for Suboxone. She further missed screenings or arrived at screenings when she deemed fit, presumably when she knew she would test negative. This is too little, too late. Moreover, there is no indication that A.V. will be able to provide for any of the children’s most basic needs including food, clothing, or shelter. Considering the multiple hurdles that A.V. has yet to overcome, the trial court did not err in finding that there is no chance of reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the future.

Best Interests

A.V. argues that the State “failed to put on any factual testimony, expert or otherwise ... as to how this termination would benefit the minor child [sic] or in the alternative, how a refusal to terminate the mother’s parental rights would harm the child [sic].” We disagree. Numerous state employees testified. The State has been involved with A.V. beginning in 2010, and has offered its services and various programs to no avail. We cannot see how the trial court could err in finding that it would be in the best interests of the children to permanently be adopted in the stable homes they have resided in rather than subject to a succession of boyfriends, residences (the fallback residence being deemed unfit), and the neglect of their mother who failed to make any substantial progress in meeting any | ,„of the case plan goals. The trial court found that it would be in the best interests of these children, who have had stable homes in which they have thrived, to maintain the permanency they have achieved in their foster placement. We agree and find no error in that finding. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Continuance

Louisiana Children’s Code article 1082 states:

Upon a showing of good cause and notice to the opposing party, the court may grant, deny, or restrict a requested continuance of the proceeding. The court shall avoid delays in resolving the status of the parent and in achieving permanency for the child.

A.V. argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance on the day of trial. A.V.’s most recent counsel was appointed on January 9, 2014, but only filed his motion on the eve of the hearing. We find no error in the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance. Counsel had ample time to assemble a witness list and the trial court did not err in finding that the best interests of the children, the oldest two who had been in the State’s care of for over two years, would not be served by another continuance. A.V. offered no indication what these witnesses could have provided to refute the fact that she failed to complete her case plan or that there was a significant expectation of reformation in the future. This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court terminating A.V.’s parental rights to her three children, G.E.K., C.E.S., and I.B.W., is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

PICKETT, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns written reasons.

PICKETT, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

|,I concur in the opinion of the majority insofar as it affirms the judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of the mother to the two older children, G.E.K. and C.E.S. (docket number 14-681). I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion terminating the parental rights of the mother to the infant I.B.W. (docket number 14-682).

In my opinion, the state simply piggybacked the case of the third child onto the open case involving the older children. There was never an independent case plan addressing I.B.W.’s needs, his name was simply added to the existing case plan of his siblings. I believe the nature of these cases is so serious that such shortcuts should not be taken before terminating parental rights. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in 14-681 and reverse the judgment of the trial court in 14-682.

I have reviewed this court’s opinion in State in the Interest of R.E., 12-196 (La.App. 8 Cir. 6/6/12), 91 So.3d 1282. In that case, the judge entered a separate order allowing the state to proceed with the termination proceeding even though one year had not elapsed since the child had been in the state’s custody. I have also reviewed State in the Interest of CM., 11-54 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/11), 68 So.3d 47, with which I simply disagree.

|2The mother in this case has shown herself to be incapable of staying off drugs long enough to care for her children. But she is entitled to the full protection of the law before her parental rights are terminated by the state. I.B.W. has been in foster care and is not in any danger from his mother at this time. Our statutes provide for an expedited process when other children have been terminated, or the state could have simply waited a couple more months to allow the requisite time to lapse.

      . This case, 14-681, In re G.E.K. and C.E.S., is consolidated with 14-682, In re I.B.W.

        . Pursuant to Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2, initials are used throughout to protect the identity of the minors.

      . A.V.'s brother, R.J.V., and sister-in-law, H.S.V., filed a motion to intervene in October 2012, to facilitate the child in need of care plan and insure that the best interests of the minor children are met. The intervenors, thereafter, filed an opposition to case plan and for other relief urging that the children be placed in their home rather than in the home of foster parents. The State opposed the intervention and filed a peremptory exception to opposition to case plan.

      . On October 15, 2012, the presiding judge, Judge Warren D. Willett, recused himself because he was related to the foster parents, attended church with the Intervenors, having served on committees with R.J.V., a deacon in the church, and attended Sunday school classes with him.

      . Although C.E.S. and I.B.W. have different legal fathers as noted on their birth certificates, DNA testing revealed that S.K., the father of G.E.K., is also the father C.E.S. and I.B.W.

      . I.B.W. was placed in a different foster home than G.E.K. and C.E.S.

      . A.V. appealed the adjudication of I.B.W. as a child in need of care. A panel of this court affirmed the trial court's adjudication of I.B.W. as in need of care. In re I.B.W., 13-517 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), 124 So.3d 567.

      . The motion to intervene was granted at this hearing.

      . It was at this hearing that docket number J-2674, In the Interest of G.E.K. and C.E.S., and docket number J-2737, In the Interest of I.B.W., were consolidated.

      . The petition notes that the State sought permission to terminate A.V.’s rights to I.B.W. pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5) even though he had not been in the State’s care for over a year. We have held that both a petition to terminate and termination is appropriate when the child has been out of the mother's custody for less than a year when conditions for termination have been met pertaining to older children. See In the Interest of R.E., 12-196 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 91 So.3d 1282 and In the Interest of C.M., 11-54 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/11), 68 So.3d 47.

      . Suboxone is used to treat opiate addiction.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LAMAR, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Holly Kathleen Jenkins McKNIGHT v. Walter Calvin JENKINS.
    No. 2011-CT-00206-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Feb. 14, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied May 23, 2013.
    Jerry Wesley Hisaw, Southaven, James R. Franks, Jr., William R. Wheeler, Jr., attorneys for appellant.
    Joy W. Graves, Starkville, Malenda Harris Meacham, Hernando, attorneys for ap-pellee.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAMAR, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Holly McKnight and Walter Jenkins were married from April 24, 1972, until June 3, 2004. The parties have one daughter who was born on April 26, 1996. After the parties divorced in 2004, they initially shared joint legal custody of their child, with Holly having physical custody. After four years, Walter filed a Petition for Contempt, Modification of Custody and Temporary Visitation. Following a hearing on September 23, 2008, custody was modified to give legal and physical custody to Walter, with Holly having regular visitation. The modified custody order, which was entered on October 16, 2008, is the controlling custody order. Two months after custody was modified, Walter filed a new Petition for Contempt, Modification of Visitation and Temporary Relief in which he accused Holly of not returning all of their child’s belongings and sought to make Holly’s visitation limited and supervised. As a result, the parties entered into an Agreed Preliminary Injunction, which indefinitely suspended Holly’s visitation. A year after the agreed injunction was entered suspending Holly’s visitation, Holly moved to change physical and legal custody back to her, with Walter having visitation. A hearing was conducted on August 27, 2010, on Walter’s contempt petition and on Holly’s petition to modify custody. Prior to the hearing, Walter had moved to amend his contempt petition to allege Holly had violated the custody order by failing to pay her half of their child’s “medical bills.” His motion to amend was not heard or granted before the August 2010 hearing. After the hearing, the chancellor denied Holly’s petition for modification of custody and child support, held her in contempt, and required her to pay Walter more than $21,000 and the guardian ad litem almost $5,000. The judgment awarded to Walter included $1,200 for one-half of Dr. Rosenberg’s September 23, 2008, court-appearance fee and $2,500 for Walter’s attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the related contempt action.

¶ 2. Holly appealed, alleging the chancellor erred by: 1) not modifying custody, 2) finding her in contempt, 3) not finding Walter in contempt, 4) not awarding her attorneys’ fees and assessing her some of Walter’s attorneys’ fees and the guardian ad litem’s fees, 5) excluding evidence preceding the October 2008 custody order, and 6) restricting certain witnesses’ testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor on all issues. This Court granted Holly’s petition for certiorari.

Analysis

¶ 3. After review, we affirm the Court of Appeals and the trial court on all issues except the contempt judgment against Holly and the related attorney’s fees award. Holly was held in contempt for violating a custody order provision that required her to pay for one half of her child’s “reasonable and necessary medical expenses.” Notably, Walter never filed a contempt petition accusing Holly of such a violation. He did move to amend his December 29, 2008, motion for contempt to allege generically that Holly wrongfully had refused to pay her share of their child’s medical bills, but his motion was not heard before the August 27, 2010, hearing, and his Petition for Contempt was never amended.

¶ 4. At the August 2010 hearing, Walter alleged that Holly had failed to pay her share of three medical bills: a dentist bill, an eye-care bill, and Dr. Rosenberger’s court-appearance fee for the September 2008 hearing. The chancellor found that Holly was not in contempt for failing to pay her half of the first two bills because there was no evidence that Walter had informed her of the bills. However, the chancellor did find Holly in contempt for failing to pay $1,200 toward Dr. Rosenber-ger’s court-appearance fee.

¶ 5. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor based on Holly’s admitted refusal to pay the bill but failed to consider: 1) whether Walter was procedurally barred from recovering on a claim he did not plead and 2) whether Holly’s refusal to pay the bill constituted a willful and deliberate violation of a court order. An analysis of either question would have led the Court of Appeals to reach a different result.

1. Whether Walter was procedurally barred from recovering on a contempt claim he did not plead.

¶ 6. To recover on a contempt claim, a party must first plead it in a complaint or petition. Walter admittedly did not plead a contempt claim based on Holly’s refusal to pay Dr. Rosenberg’s bill, and his counsel told the chancellor that she was not trying to hold Holly in contempt for her refusal, stating: “Let me ask you [Holly] about medical bills, and while it’s not — I’m not asking that you be held in contempt of it because that wasn’t pled for, but there are outstanding medical bills that you’ve not paid.” The chancellor also acknowledged that Walter’s failure to plead a contempt claim based on Holly’s alleged nonpayment of medical bills precluded him from recovering on such a claim, stating “the award of any [medical bills], if they’re not specifically pled at this time as that would be a contempt which requires specific pleading, would not be granted by the Court.” But then the chancellor acted to the contrary by holding Holly in contempt for failing to pay Dr. Rosenberg’s bill and awarding Walter $3,700 ($1,200 for Dr. Rosenberg’s court-appearance fee and $2,500 for attorney’s fees Walter incurred bringing the contempt action). Since Walter failed to plead the contempt claim which serves as the basis for the judgment, the contempt judgment against Holly must be reversed and vacated.

2. Whether Holly’s refusal to pay the bill was contemptuous.

¶ 7. However, even if Walter was not procedurally barred from recovering on the unpleaded claim, Holly should not have been held in contempt. To be found in contempt, a party has to willfully and deliberately violate a court order. A party does not willfully and deliberately violate an order if the order is unclear or if the party commits a violation based on a genuine misinterpretation of the order. Moreover, a party’s reliance on its counsel’s advice is sufficient to make a party’s violation not willful or deliberate.

¶ 8. Here, the chancellor held Holly had violated the custody order that required her to pay one-half of her child’s “reasonable and necessary medical expenses” by refusing to pay her child’s doctor’s court-appearance fee. Holly’s uncon-tradicted testimony was that she did not pay the bill because she believed it to be a litigation expense incurred by Walter, not a medical expense of their child, since she did not arrange for or agree to Dr. Rosenberg’s court appearance. And this belief was formed, at least in part, based on the advice of her attorney. As a result, Holly’s alleged violation of the custody order was not willful and deliberate, and the contempt judgment against her should be reversed. Moreover, the fee charged by Dr. Rosenberg to testify is more akin to a litigation expense than a medical expense of the child’s and should not be assessed to Holly under the medical-expense provision of the custody order.

Conclusion

¶ 9. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and reverse in part. We affirm the chancellor’s decision to deny Holly’s petition for custody and childsup-port modification and find that it was within his discretion to require her to pay the guardian ad litem’s fees. However, the chancellor erred when he held Holly in contempt for her failure to pay Dr. Rosenberg’s court-appearance fee and ordered her to pay a $3,700 judgment ($1,200 for the fee and $2,500 for Walter’s attorney’s fees). Therefore, the contempt judgment against Holly is vacated. The award in favor of Walter is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order reducing the amount awarded to Walter by $3,700. The remainder of the chancery court’s judgment is affirmed.

¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT OF THE DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . McKnight v. Jenkins, 155 So.3d 784 (Miss.Ct.App.2012).

      . Miss. R. Civ. P. 81(d)(3) (stating a contempt claim is to be raised by complaint or petition rather than by motion).

      . R.K. v. J.K., 946 So.2d 764, 778 (Miss.2007).

      . Cossitt v. Cossitt, 975 So.2d 274, 279 (Miss.Ct.App.2008).

      . R.K., 946 So.2d at 778.

      . See Hunt v. Asanov, 975 So.2d 899 (Miss.Ct.App.2008) (holding a father was not in contempt for failing to pay the required amount of child support when there was confusion between the parties as to which of two child support orders governed the father’s obligation); Harmon v. Yarbrough, 767 So.2d 1069 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (holding a father was not in contempt for failing to pay the full cost of his daughter’s college education when there was a genuine dispute between the parties as to the meaning of "college expenses” in the governing divorce decree).


author: KITCHENS, Justice, LAMAR, Justice,

text:
    Angela Denise JOHNSON a/k/a Angela Johnson v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2010-CT-01978-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    March 13, 2014.

      Cynthia Ann Stewart, attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, John R. Henry, Jr., attorneys for appellee.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KITCHENS, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. A Neshoba County jury convicted Angela Johnson of one count of possession of methamphetamine, one count of possession of precursor chemicals, and one count of false pretense. The Court of Appeals affirmed Johnson’s convictions, and this Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether admission into evidence of two search warrants and an underlying facts-and-circumstances affidavit which included hearsay statements attributed to a confidential informant constituted reversible error. Because we find error, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Circuit Court of Neshoba County for a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 9, 2010, Neshoba County Deputy Sheriff Ralph Sciple received information from a confidential informant that Johnson was in possession of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals in her home in Philadelphia, Mississippi. Officer Sciple was also told that individuals were making false identification cards in order to buy precursor chemicals. Based on this information, two search warrants were issued. One search warrant targeted the methamphetamine and precursor chemicals on the premises, and a second search warrant targeted the computers and equipment used to make forgeries.
On January 10, 2010, at 10:40 p.m., the search warrants were executed. The adults present when the search warrant was executed were Johnson, Calvin Johnson, and Kenneth Brian Stevens. They were taken to the living room and given a Miranda warning. Johnson stated that she understood the warning. Inside of the home, officers found two laptop computers. On one computer, a Dell, the screen was open. The officers observed a picture of a Nebraska driver’s license showing an individual who Officer Sciple “knew didn’t live in Nebraska.” The picture was. of Alicia Wells, a Neshoba County resident. The other computer, a Toshiba, was closed and connected to a charger. Officer Sci-ple questioned Johnson regarding the computers. She stated the Dell computer was hers, and the Toshiba computer belonged to Stevens. Officer Sciple also found a document on Johnson’s computer detailing how to make false identification cards. In addition to the computers, eleven identification cards were found in a purse in the residence. Nine of the identification cards purported to show a photograph of Johnson. One was Johnson’s actual driver’s license, two of them were fake Nebraska driver’s licenses, and the rest were fake Mississippi identification cards or driver’s licenses.
During the search, officers found a box located in the computer room containing an Instant Ice compress, pseudoephed-rine pills, and lithium batteries. A bottle of drain cleaner was discovered in the master bathroom of the house. A can of Coleman camp fuel was retrieved from the laundry room of the residence. Finally, a bag of fertilizer was found outside the front door of the home. A forensic scientist with the Mississippi Crime Lab testified at trial and stated the items collected all contained chemicals in commonly found precursors used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine.
During the search, the officers also found two empty ziplock bags and a third ziplock bag containing a “crystal[-]like substance.” The forensic scientist testified regarding the testing of the ziplock bags at the crime lab. According to the scientist, one ziplock bag contained methamphetamine, and the two empty ziplock bags tested positive for trace amounts of methamphetamine.
Johnson, Calvin, and Stevens were all arrested on January 10, 2010, the night the warrant was executed. On January 12, 2010, Officer Sciple interviewed Johnson. Before any questioning, he advised Johnson of her Miranda rights, and she signed a waiver. She then made certain confessions to Officer Sci-ple, which he condensed into written statements signed by Johnson. In the first statement, Johnson acknowledged that she was in possession of methamphetamine. In the second statement, she admitted that she-had bought Clari-tin-D and that Stevens had bought pseudoephedrine. They planned to take the pills out of the county for someone else to make methamphetamine. Johnson claimed she only intended to use the medicine and never planned to make the methamphetamine herself. In her final statement, she stated that she had used a false identification card with a Social Security number that was not her own.
On May 4, 2010, the grand jury indicted Johnson for Count I, possession of methamphetamine; Count II, possession of precursor chemicals; and Count III, false pretense. The trial began on November 11, 2010.

Johnson v. State, 155 So.3d 822, 824-26 (Miss.Ct.App.2013).

¶ 2. The search warrants and accompanying documents were introduced by the State and admitted as substantive evidence at trial. Each included the following statement by the issuing justice court judge: “WHEREAS RALPH SCIPLE KNOWN TO ME TO BE A CREDIBLE PERSON, HAS THIS DAY MADE COMPLAINT ON OATH BEFORE ME AS FOLLOWS .... This Court, having examined and considered the Affidavit, and also having heard all considered evidence in support thereof from the affiant named therein does find that probable cause for the issuance of a Search Warrant does exist.”

¶3. Attached to each search warrant was an underlying facts-and-circumstances affidavit, which included the curriculum vitae of Officer Sciple:

Affiant, Ralph Sciple has been in law enforcement since 1980. Sciple has served as Constable in Kemper County for 12 years, served with the DeKalb Police Department for 8 years, several of those years as Chief of Police and served as Sheriff of Kemper County for 1½ years. Sciple is presently serving with the Neshoba County Sheriffs Department where he has been for the past 10 plus years and has been an Investigator for over 9 of those years. Sciple is a certified law enforcement officer and a graduate of the Mississippi Law Enforcement Training Academy in Pearl, Mississippi and has attended numerous in service training on the subject of criminal investigations. Sciple has effected numerous felony arrests and investigated numerous cases. Sciple has applied for and received many search warrants in his career.

¶ 4. The underlying facts-and-circumstances affidavit attached to the search warrant for methamphetamine and precursor materials included the following:

Inv. Sciple has received information for the past several days from a confidential informant that Inv. Sciple knows to be a credible person and has given creditable information in the past that has led to arrest and convictions that Methamphetamine was being made at 10132 county road 369 at the residence of Angela D. Johnson. On this day 01-09-10 the same informant gave the following information that he/she saw lithium batteries, fertilizer, camp fuel, drain cleaner and plastic tubing at the residence of 10132 county road 369. The informant stated there was always- Methamphetamine at the residence. On 01-09-10 Inv. Sciple began preparing an affidavit for Search Warrant, with supportive Underlying Facts and Circumstances, this being within the past 24 hours. It is based on these facts that your affiant respectfully request a search warrant be issued for this residence, 10132 Road 369 Philadelphia, MS 39350 to include all persons, outbuildings and vehicles.

¶ 5. Similarly, the underlying facts-and-circumstances affidavit attached to the search warrant for fake IDs and fake ID manufacturing equipment stated:

Inv. Sciple has received information for the past several days from a confidential informant that Inv. Sciple knows to be a credible person and has given credible information in the past that has led to arrest and convictions that Fake ID’s were being made at 10132 county road 369 Philadelphia, MS 39350 at the residence of Angela D. Johnson. On this day 01-09-10 the same informant gave the following information that he/she saw Fake ID’s made and other names on fake ID’s at the residence of 10132 county road 369 Philadelphia, MS 39350. On 01-09-10 Inv. Sciple began preparing an affidavit for Search Warrant, with supportive Underlying Facts and Circumstances, this being within the past 24 hours. It is based on these facts that your affiant respectfully request a search warrant be issued for this residence, 10132 Road 369 Philadelphia, MS 39350 to include all persons, outbuildings and vehicles.

¶ 6. At trial, Johnson moved to suppress the search warrants on grounds of staleness and unreliability. Johnson objected repeatedly on the same grounds, and she renewed her previous objections in a motion for directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, overruled the objections, and denied the motion for directed verdict. On direct appeal, Johnson challenged the search warrants, arguing that their admission at trial:

(1) allowed the informant to testify via hearsay that methamphetamine was being manufactured at the residence, (2) violated her right to confront the witness, (3) constituted “other crime evidence” inadmissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (4) permitted Officer Sciple to vouch for the credibility of the informant.

Johnson, 155 So.3d at 826. The Court of Appeals held that the issues were procedurally barred because they were not raised before the trial court. Johnson, 155 So.3d at 827. See Walker v. State, 913 So.2d 198, 217 (Miss.2005) (“Failure to raise an issue at trial bars consideration on an appellate level.”); Montana v. State, 822 So.2d 954, 959 (Miss.2002) (“asserting grounds for an objection on appeal that differs from the ground given for the objection at the trial level does not properly preserve the objection for appellate review”). Johnson raises the same four issues regarding the admission of the search warrants in her petition for writ of certio-rari.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7. It is almost unknown to the jurisprudence of this State for a search warrant to be admitted at trial as substantive evidence against a criminal defendant. Indeed, in the instances in which the Court has considered this question, it has deemed reversal to have been warranted. In Sisk v. State, 290 So.2d 608, 610-11 (Miss.1974), this Court held that “[t]he validity of the search warrant, the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result of the search were matters of law to be determined by the trial court” and were “not questions to be determined by the jury.” Id. at 610. See also Hayes v. State, 348 So.2d 432, 433 (Miss.1977); Holt v. State, 348 So.2d 434, 438-39 (Miss.1977).

¶ 8. As in Sisk, the receipt into evidence of the search warrants in the case before us “allowed the state to get into evidence hearsay statements which deprived [Johnson] of the right of confrontation and cross examination.” Sisk, 290 So.2d at 610-11. However, as the Court of Appeals recognized, this assignment of error was not properly raised on appeal, since Johnson objected only on the grounds of staleness and reliability at trial. Johnson, 155 So.3d at 826-27. While Johnson did not properly object at trial to the admission of the search warrants, the doctrine of plain error allows this Court to consider:

obvious error which was not properly raised by the defendant and which affects a defendant’s fundamental, substantive right. For the plain-error doctrine to apply, there must have been an error that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Burdette v. State, 110 So.3d 296, 303 (Miss.2013) (quoting Conners v. State, 92 So.3d 676, 682 (Miss.2012)). Here, Johnson asserts violation of a “fundamental, substantive right,” namely, the “right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against [her].” Corbin v. State, 74 So.3d 333, 337-38 (Miss.2011) (“A violation of the Confrontation Clause is a violation of a ‘fundamental, substantive right’ which seriously affects the ‘fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ”) (quoting Smith v. State, 986 So.2d 290, 294 (Miss.2008); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, 518 (1993)). “This Court reviews de novo a Confrontation Clause objection.” Smith, 986 So.2d at 296.

¶ 9. Both the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 3, Section 26, of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi provide a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted by the witnesses against him.” According to this Court and the United States Supreme Court, the Confrontation Clause:

(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the -witness to submit to cross-examination, the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.

Id. (quoting Lee v. Ill., 476 U.S. 530, 540, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986)).

¶ 10. “In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial can be admitted, in accordance with common law, only where the declar-ant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Smith, 986 So.2d at 296 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court distinguished between testimonial and non-testimonial statements, and this Court adopted the distinction: “[n]ontestimonial hearsay is subject to evidentiary rules concerning reliability,” while “testimonial hearsay must be filtered through the Confrontation Clause.” Smith, 986 So.2d at 296-97 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354).

¶ 11. While the Supreme Court declined to provide a clear definition of “testimonial statements,” the Court stated that the term extends “at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court provided further guidance on the testimonial/nontes-timonial dichotomy in Davis v. Washington, holding that:

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). The Davis Court further defined “testimony” as “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 824, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354).

¶ 12; As Officer Sciple- attests in his underlying facts-and-circumstances affidavits, the confidential informant informed him that “Methamphetamine was being made at 10132 county road 369 at the residence of Angela Johnson” and that “Fake ID’s were being made at 10132 county road 369 Philadelphia, MS 39350 at the residence of Angela D. Johnson.” Both statements constitute testimonial hearsay, since Officer Sciple’s primary purpose in obtaining them was “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” The search warrant materials in effect allowed the unseen, unknown, and unsworn confidential informant to testify against Johnson, without any opportunity for cross examination by the accused. We therefore find that admission of such statements at trial offends the Confrontation Clauses of our federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Miss. Const, art. 3, § 26.

¶ 13. Nevertheless, the finding of a Confrontation Clause violation does not complete this Court’s inquiry. “Having determined that a defendant’s right of confrontation was violated, we do not recognize plain error unless ‘the error resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” Burdette, 110 So.3d at 296 (quoting Con-ners, 92 So.3d at 684). Where constitutional errors do “not prejudice the outcome of the trial,” there can be “no manifest miscarriage of justice.” Burdette, 110 So.3d at 305. When this Court has addressed the admission into evidence of search warrants and related documents at trial, it has reacted with strong disapproval. See Sisk, 290 So.2d at 608, 610-11 (Where the testimony of the officer “together with the affidavit and search warrant” were admitted into evidence, this Court unanimously reversed, holding that: “[t]he affidavit and search warrant, if the search were made by authority of a search warrant, must be produced and made a part of the record, but the documents are not for the consideration of the jury.”) (emphasis added). In the present case, the documents should have been marked for identification but not admitted into evidence.

¶ 14. Likewise, where a search warrant including an underlying-facts-and-circumstances affidavit went to the jury, this Court emphatically held that “[t]he introduction of the hearsay evidence, the underlying facts and circumstances, in the affidavit was gross error” and “served no procedural or justifiable purpose.... ” Hayes, 348 So.2d at 433 (emphasis added). The Court reversed and remanded, holding that the “likely effect” of the admission of the search warrant and underlying-facts-and-circumstances affidavit, “whether intended or not, was to prejudice the jury by violating the appellant’s constitutional right of being confronted by the witnesses testifying against him.” Id. (emphasis added). On the same day that Hayes was decided, this Court also rendered its decision in Holt, 348 So.2d at 434. In Holt, the Court held that admission of the search warrant, including a facts-and-circumstances affidavit, was reversible error because “the objectionable evidence linked the defendant to a known criminal, indicating guilt by association.” Id. at 439. As in Sisk, the Court held in Holt that “[i]t is the judge’s responsibility to determine the admissibility of the fruits of the search not the jury.” Id.

¶ 15. Confrontation Clause violations occurred in Sisk, Hayes, and Holt, as in the present case. In those cases we reversed, not only because of the violation of the defendants’ confrontation rights, but also because search warrants, including affidavits attesting to specific underlying facts and circumstances not appropriate for the consideration of the jury, contained other, highly prejudicial information. In Sisk, for instance, the Court articulated that, in addition to the Confrontation Clause problems, “the affidavit contained statements of another crime for which appellant had not been tried, the conviction of another crime[,] and a reputation as a known pusher of drugs.” Sisk, 290 So.2d at 611. This Court opined in those cases that the purpose of the search warrant documents was for the judge to ascertain admissibility of the fruits of the search, not evidence for the jury to consider in its determination of the guilt vel non of the accused. See id. (“We think that this clearly demonstrates the reason why the legality of the search is and should be a matter of law to be determined by the court and not one for the jury to decide.”).

¶ 16. In the present case, not only did Officer Sciple’s tribute to the confidential informant go to the jury; but also, the attached affidavit of the underlying facts and circumstances strongly suggested to the jury that the defendant should be convicted in this instance because the “creditable information” of the confidential informant previously “led to arrest and convictions that Methamphetamine was being made ... at the residence of Angela D. Johnson.” Further, much of the underlying-facts-and-circumstances affidavit of Officer Sciple bolstered his own credibility by detailing his extensive experience and training as a peace officer. In fact, the first page of each of the three search warrants issued by the justice court judge declares that “Ralph Sciple [is] known to me to be a credible person.” Therefore, through the search warrants, the issuing judge vouched for the credibility of Officer Sciple, the witness, who provided key testimony on behalf of the State at trial, thus infusing inadmissible character evidence into the State’s case. Moreover, there was no way for the defendant to cross examine the absent justice court judge. Considering the totality of the content of the search warrants, and the accompanying facts-and-circumstances affidavits attached thereto, the trial judge improperly admitted those documents as substantive evidence against Johnson.

¶ 17. The dissent posits harmless error, finding no “manifest miscarriage of justice as the properly admitted evidence against Johnson, namely her three statements along with the physical evidence found at her home, was overwhelming.” Had the prejudicial material come before the jury in the form of testimonial or tangible evidence, its admission possibly could have been harmless. In Burdette, for instance, the testimony of a detective regarding “purported statements of unidentified” employees of a gun manufacturer and the detective’s statements concerning the content of a crime lab report constituted hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause. Burdette, 110 So.3d at 303. Because “the parties at trial were in agreement that Burdette shot Smith at point-blank range,” this Court held that the constitutional error was harmless, as the evidence against Burdette was overwhelming. Id. at 304. Unlike Burdette, where testimonial evidence admitted in violation only of the Confrontation Clause was considered, in this case, the jury saw and considered as substantive evidence the search warrants for Johnson’s home, which contained multiple pieces of information highly prejudicial to her, most of which was otherwise inadmissible.

¶ 18. Similarly, in Conners, this Court held that the admission of a ballistics report and a toxicology report violated the Confrontation Clause but constituted mere harmless error, since that “evidence was largely cumulative of other evidence before the jury,” and thus, “the error in admitting the reports in violation of Conners’s right to confront the analysts was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Conners,- 92 So.3d at 684-85. But, again, as in Bur-dette, the issue was whether hearsay reports admitted in violation only of the Confrontation Clause amounted to plain error, not whether, as here, admission of search warrant documents containing multiple pieces of highly prejudicial information amounted to plain error. Regardless of the strength of the State’s properly admitted evidence, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of such documents did not prejudice Johnson.

CONCLUSION

¶ 19. After indictment, search warrant documents bear upon the legal issues of admissibility and relevancy, which are for judicial determination. These are in nowise jury issues. Jurors are concerned with the evidence itself, e.g., the fruits of a search, and they are to decide its weight and sufficiency. We can never know what tipped the balance for this jury. But it is clear that the trial court committed plain error which resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice by allowing search warrants and accompanying facts-and-circumstances affidavits, containing information highly prejudicial to Johnson’s case, to be considered by the jurors as they deliberated. The documents thus admitted could be read and reread by the jurors. They were clothed with official status and bore the seal of a court. A local judge for whom some of the jurors may have voted gave a strong, written endorsement of Officer Sciple, the State’s principal witness. Who among us is wise enough to know that these powerful and partisan papers had no effect on the jury’s verdict? We therefore reverse and remand to the Circuit Court of Neshoba County for a- new trial consistent with this decision.

¶ 20. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. LAMAR, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY RANDOLPH, P.J., CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ.

LAMAR, Justice,

dissenting:

¶ 21. I agree with the majority that it was error for the State to introduce into evidence two search warrants and their affidavits containing the underlying facts and circumstances. I also agree that the defendant “did not properly object at trial to the admission of the search warrants” and therefore, if error is found, it must be considered plain error. However, “[this Court do]es not recognize plain error unless the error resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice,” which occurs only if the error prejudiced the disposition of the case. Prejudice is often lacking when the weight of the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming. A thorough review of the record in this case leads me to conclude that the error here did not result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, as the properly admitted evidence against Johnson, namely her three statements along with the physical evidence found at her home, was overwhelming.

Count One: Possession of Methamphetamine

¶ 22. The State was required to prove that Johnson knowingly or intentionally possessed less than .1 gram of methamphetamine. See Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(1)(A) (Rev.2013). In her statement that was placed into evidence, Johnson admitted that “the meth that was found in my purse was mine. No one else knew it was there. The purse it was found in was a[sic] alligator skin purse.” Jamie Johnson, a forensic scientist with the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, confirmed that the substance found in Johnson’s purse was methamphetamine.

Count Tivo: Possession of Precursors

¶ 23. The State was required to prove that

[Johnson] knowingly or intentionally purchase[d], possessed], transferred], manufacture^], attempted] to manufacture or distribute any two (2) or more of the listed precursor chemicals or drugs in any amount, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that the listed precursor chemical or drug will be used to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance.

Miss.Code Ann. § 41 — 29—313(l)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2013). Johnson admitted that “[o]n Sunday [the] 10th of January 2010[,] I bought Claritin D at Wal-Mart, and Brian Stephens bought a twenty-count box of pseu-doephedrine at Wal-Mart” and that she “was going to take the pills out of the county for someone to make meth for me to use. I was not going to cook the meth but I was going to use it.” Claritin D contains pseudoephedrine, which is a listed precursor chemical for methamphetamine. Miss.Code Ann. § 41 — 29—313(1)(b)(iv) (Rev.2013). Officer Ralph Sciple testified that the pills Johnson confessed to possessing were found in a box with an Instant Ice compress and lithium batteries. Jamie Johnson testified that lithium and ammonium nitrate, a chemical in the Instant Ice compress, both are listed precursor chemicals for methamphetamine. Miss.Code Ann. § 41 — 29—313(l)(b)(iii, vii) (Rev.2013).

Count Three: Fake IDs

¶ 24. The State had to prove that Johnson made or caused to be made “any false statement or representation as to h[er] or another person’s or entity’s identity, social security account number, credit card number, debit card number or other identifying information for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining or with the intent to obtain goods, services or any thing of value.” Miss.Code Ann. § 97-19-85 (Rev. 2006). Johnson admitted that, “on Sunday[,] the 10th of January[,] I went to Wal-mart and I used an ID that had Angela Carlton SSN XXX-XX-XXXX and bought a 10 part pack of Clarion-D [sic]. The SSN on the ID was not my SSN.”

¶ 25. Johnson admitted every element of all three charges, and her statements were admitted at trial. These statements, coupled with the forensic and physical evidence, are overwhelming evidence of Johnson’s'guilt. Therefore, I decline to recognize the admission of the search warrants as plain error, because their admission did not cause a manifest miscarriage of justice. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

RANDOLPH, P.J., CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . Facts are taken verbatim from the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

      . Johnson also argued on direct appeal that "the jury instruction for Count II did not advise the jury that it must be unanimous on the identity of the precursor materials,” that "the trial court erred by failing to suppress her statements,” and that "her conviction and sentence should be reversed based on cumulative error.” Johnson, 155 So.3d at 824. We find Johnson’s challenge to the admission of the search warrants, the sole issue raised in her petition for writ of certiorari, to be dis-positive.

      . The affidavit in the present case proclaimed: ‘‘there was always Methamphetamine at the residence.” (Emphasis added.)

      . If, as the dissent states, the "properly admitted evidence against Johnson ... was overwhelming,” this Court can divine no reason for the State to have offered the search warrants and an accompanying facts-and-circumstances affidavit as evidence. Surely the prosecutor would not have sought admission of this material in the absence of a belief that it would strengthen the State's case.

      . Burdette v. State, 110 So.3d 296, 304-05 (quoting Conners v. State, 92 So.3d 676, 684 (Miss.2012)) (internal quotations omitted).

      . Burdette, 110 So.3d at 304-05. See also Smith v. State, 986 So.2d 290, 300-01 (Miss.2008), and Clark v. State, 891 So.2d 136, 141 (Miss.2004).

      . In the record, Kenneth Brian Stevens is referred to as Brian Stephens as well as Kenneth Stevens.


author: RANDOLPH, Presiding Justice,

text:
    COLUMBUS CHEER COMPANY v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, Mississippi, Mayor Robert Smith, Sr., Columbus, Municipal School District, Dr. Del Phillips, Dr. Martha Liddell, Tommy Prude, Alma Turner, Currie Fisher, Bruce Hanson and Glenn Lautzenhiser.
    No. 2013-CA-00518-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Oct. 23, 2014.

      Richard Shane McLaughlin, Nicole H. McLaughlin, Tupelo, attorneys for appellant.
    Michael D. Chase, Jeffrey Johnson Tur-nage, Christopher D. Hemphill, Columbus, attorneys for appellees.
    Before RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR and KITCHENS, JJ.
   RANDOLPH, Presiding Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Columbus Cheer Company (“CCC”) entered into a rental contract for the use of school facilities. Subsequently, CCC was informed that Columbus Municipal School District (“CMSD”) would not honor the contract with CCC. Thereafter, CCC filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi. The complaint is styled CCC as plaintiff. The first sentence of paragraph I, Parties, reads verbatim, “[p]laintiff Columbus Cheer Company is a profit corporation licensed to due [sic] business in the state of Mississippi....” The prayer seeks judgment for plaintiff, i.e., CCC. Defendants filed their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting that CCC was an administratively dissolved corporation; therefore, CCC could not have entered into a valid contract with CMSD, and CCC did not possess the requisite legal status to initiate suit. The trial court entered an order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

¶2. Aggrieved, CCC filed an appeal with this Court. The following issues are before this Court on appeal:

I. Whether a dissolved corporation may pursue a legal action; and if not,
II. Can the corporation’s shareholders pursue the same action in their own name?

¶ 3. We conclude the answer to both inquiries is no.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4. When reviewing the trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment, this Court employs a de novo review. Lee v. Golden Triangle Planning & Dev. Dist., 797 So.2d 845, 847 (Miss.2001) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriately granted when the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law” because no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 56(c); Cothern v. Vickers, Inc., 759 So.2d 1241, 1245 (Miss.2000)). All evidentiary materials are considered, which includes “admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc.” Lee, 797 So.2d at 847 (citation omitted).

I.

¶ 5. CCC argues before this Court that, regardless of its prior self-identification as a “profit corporation,” CCC is, in actuality, an unincorporated business. At the trial-court hearing, CCC unsuccessfully argued that, because of the corporation’s administrative dissolution, CCC automatically transformed into a sole proprietorship. Both arguments are unavailing.

¶ 6. Mississippi Code Section 79-4-14.21(f) reads, “[a] corporation that has been administratively dissolved may not maintain any action, suit or proceeding in any court of this state until the corporation is reinstated.” Miss.Code Ann. § 79^4-14.21(f) (Rev. 2013). A plain reading of Mississippi Code Section 79-4-14.21 specifies that administratively dissolved corporations continue to exist regarding agreements established prior to dissolution and for the purposes of defending the corporation in actions stemming from such agreements. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-4-14.21(e)-(f) (Rev. 2013) (emphasis added). However, administratively dissolved corporations cannot “maintain” a legal action. Id.

¶ 7. In Galen, a Mississippi corporation initiated suit after submitting bids for a potential contract in which a competing corporation was awarded the contract. Galen Med. Assocs., Inc., 74 Fed.Cl. at 378-79. The United States Court of Federal Claims, applying Mississippi law, determined that Galen lacked standing to bring legal action and was incapable of contracting because the corporation had been administratively dissolved pursuant to Mississippi Code Sections 79-4-14.20 and 79-4-14.21. Id. at 380-81. The court further found that Galen’s actions were in no way associated with “winding up” the corporation. Id. at 381.

¶ 8. CCC does not deny that it was administratively dissolved in December 2010. Further, CCC does not allege that its actions were in any way related to the “winding up” of the corporation. See Miss. Code Ann. § 79^4-14.21(c) (Rev. 2013). Rather, CCC now argues that it never initiated legal action as a corporation. CCC argues that it was initiating action as an “unincorporated partnership.” CCC previously identified itself as a “profit corporation.” Only after Defendants filed their motions to dismiss or for summary judgment did CCC seek to amend its complaint to identify itself as a “sole-proprietorship company.” Based on the record before us, it is clear that CCC initiated legal action as Columbus Cheer Company, a profit corporation, a standing it did not enjoy. By statute, CCC had no right to pursue this legal action while the corporation was administratively dissolved. Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-14.21(f) (Rev. 2013).

II.

¶ 9. As quoted supra, CCC commenced legal action against Defendants to enforce a contract entered into by CCC. No allegation was made that the putative shareholders of CCC, Monique or Tony, entered into a contract with Defendants. Defendants cite Superior Boat Works, Inc., applying Mississippi law, which holds that neither the president nor the shareholders of Superior Boat Works, Inc., an administratively dissolved corporation, could pursue a legal action on a contract that was entered into by the corporation. 4H Constr. Corp. v. Superior Boat Works, Inc., 659 F.Supp.2d 774, 779 (N.D.Miss.2009). Superior Boat Works, Inc., relied on Bruno v. Southeastern Services Inc., in which this Court stated:

We adopt the rule in Mississippi that an action to redress injuries to a corporation, whether arising in contract or in tort cannot be maintained by a stockholder in his own name, but must be brought by the corporation because the action belongs to the corporation and not the individual stockholders whose rights are merely derivative. The rule applies even though the complaining stockholder owns all or substantially all of the stock of the corporation.

Bruno v. Southeastern Servs., Inc., 385 So.2d 620, 622 (Miss.1980) (citations omitted).

¶ 10. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied CCC’s motion to amend its complaint to add them as party-plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

¶ 11. The trial court found that CCC had initiated this legal action as a corporation, after the corporation had been administratively dissolved. As neither CCC nor its shareholders could legally file suit, a grant of summary judgment to Defendants was warranted. We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Lowndes County.

¶ 12. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

      . It is undisputed that CCC was a registered corporation, created July 31, 2009. It is also undisputed that CCC was administratively dissolved on December 6, 2010. Monique Montgomery, co-owner with husband Tony of CCC, is the attorney of record and filed the subject complaint.

      . In part, the trial court relied on the former Mississippi Code Section 79-4-14.21(c), which stated that an administratively dissolved corporation:
      continues its corporate existence but may not cany on any business except that necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs....

        Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. U.S., 74 Fed.Cl. 377, 380 (Fed.Cl.2006) (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 79-4-14.21(c) [(2006)]).