author: PER CURIAM. CANADY, J.,

text:
    James SOPER, et al., Petitioners, v. TIRE KINGDOM, INC., Respondent.
    No. SC11-1462.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 24, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied May 1, 2013.
    Stephen F. Rosenthal of Podhurst Or-seck, P.A., Miami, FL and Seth Eric Miles of Grossman Roth, P.A., Coral Gables, FL and Jon Michael Herskowitz of Baron & Herskowitz, Miami, FL, for Petitioners.
    Elliot H. Scherker of Greenberg Trau-rig, P.A., Miami, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Dishkin, et al., 81 So.3d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), which is in express and direct conflict with this Court’s decision in Sosa v. Safeway Premium Finance Co., 73 So.3d 91 (Fla.2011). We quash the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Dishkin with instructions to remand to the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s decision in Sosa.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, C.J., concurs.

CANADY, J.,

dissenting.

Because I conclude that we should recede from our decision in Sosa v. Safeway Premium Finance Co., 73 So.3d 91 (2011), I would not quash the Third District’s decision on review. Sosa marked a sea change in Florida’s law governing class actions. The majority’s decision here illustrates the deleterious consequences of Sosa in expanding class actions to contexts where they should not be available. I therefore dissent.

The Sosa majority’s decision misapplied Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(a). The Sosa majority erred in concluding that the class representative was not required to show that he had a valid claim and in concluding that the trial court properly did not consider factual differences relevant to the defendant’s liability to different members of the putative class.

The Sosa majority concluded that even though Sosa brought a statutory claim that required proof that Safeway “knowingly” violated section 627.840(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), he did not need to provide proof that “Safeway ‘knowingly’ overcharged him in the motion for class certification.” Sosa, 73 So.3d at 105. With regard to the commonality requirement, the Sosa majority stated that

Sosa and the putative class members satisfied rule 1.220(a)’s commonality requirement because their claims arose from the same course of conduct and routine billing practice by Safeway and were based on the same legal theory, i.e., Safeway knowingly overcharged Sosa and the class members in contravention of sections 627.840 and 627.885.

Id. at 107. Thus, the majority concluded: “Whether Safeway in fact engaged in the common course of conduct that resulted in the overcharges as alleged is a fact question reserved for the jury and does not negate the trial court’s determination that, if proven, Safeway’s common business practice would have injured Sosa and the putative class members....” Id. at 111. The Sosa majority stated that it was improper to consider “the possibility of mere factual differences in the individual circumstances surrounding each of the putative class members’ claims and the variances in defenses to them.” Id. at 110.

The commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 — which is similar to the commonality requirement of rule 1.220(a) — was the focus of a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. In Wal-Marb Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011), the Supreme Court concluded that the certification of a plaintiff class consisting of female Wal-Mart employees “who allege[d] that the discretion exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion matters violate[d] Title VII by discriminating against women,” id. at 2547, was not proper because it did not satisfy the commonality requirement of rule 23. Id. The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the commonality requirement is often misread because “any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common ‘questions.’ ” Id. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 97, 131-132 (2009)). “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’- This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)).

Next, the Supreme Court explained what the plaintiff must show in order to attain class certification. The Court stated:

Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule — that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc. We recognized in Falcon that “sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,” and that certification is proper only if “the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Frequently that “rigorous analysis” will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. That cannot be helped. “[T]he class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action.”

Id. at 2551-52 (citations omitted).

With regard to what the putative class in Wal-Mart was required to allege for commonality prior to being certified, the Supreme Court stated that

proof of commonality necessarily overlaps With respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination. That is so because, in resolving an individual’s Title VII claim, the crux of the inquiry is the reason for a particular employment decision. Here respondents wish to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.

Id. at 2552 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

The majority’s commonality analysis in Sosa cannot be reconciled with the reasoning of Wal-Mart. We should have concluded that Sosa was required to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Safeway “knowingly” overcharged members of the putative class prior to attaining class certification. This was not merely a question of fact to be determined in the future when addressing the merits. It should also have been part of the preliminary legal analysis to determine whether the class certification requirements were satisfied. We should not have brushed aside the different factual circumstances related to the claims of various members of the putative class. The “mere factual differences” referred to by the majority were differences between facts that establish liability in some cases and facts that negate liability in others cases.

In the case before us, the classes certified by the trial court include

purchasers of Tire Kingdom automotive repair services — one class of statewide customers and the other a Miami-Dade County class — who either (1) “used or benefited” from a discount coupon that failed to disclose the store would add a “shop fee” to the discounted price advertised on the coupon or (2) were “overcharged” for a service at Tire Kingdom by the “imposition of a shop fee based upon a percentage of the retail price of the service, rather than the advertised or charged price,” in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), §§ 501.201-.213, Fla. Stat. (2006), the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act, §§ 559.901-.9241, Fla. Stat. (2006), and the Miami-Dade County Vehicle Repair Ordinance, §§ 8A-161.1-.S7 Miami-Dade County Code. Each of these enactments makes unfair or deceptive acts or practices unlawful.

Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Dishkin, 81 So.3d 437, 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (footnotes omitted). The Third District noted that “a properly pled and proven consumer claim for damages under FDUTPA ... requires proof of: (1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.” Id. at 448 (citing Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). There is no reason to question the Third District’s ruling that the commonality requirement was not satisfied in this case where “each class member’s Tire Kingdom experience — including the precise language of each advertisement, the class member’s awareness of Tire Kingdom’s shop-fee signage, and the class member’s conversations with Tire Kingdom employees — would have to be explored to determine Tire Kingdom’s liability to each class member.” Id. at 449.

As the Third District observed, this is a case “where no one set of operative facts establishes liability, where no single proximate cause applies to each defendant, and where individual issues outnumber common issues.” Id. at 451. We have no basis for concluding that this case is appropriate for consideration as a class action.

Accordingly, I would recede from Sosa. Based on the record before us, there is no basis for quashing the Third District’s decision in Tire Kingdom. I therefore dissent.

POLSTON, C.J., concurs.

      . The majority has chosen to quash the Third District’s decision without allowing briefing by the parties on the merits.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.140.
    No. SC12-619.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 7, 2013.
    Alexandra V. Rieman, Chair, Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Keith H. Park, Past Chair, Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, West Palm Beach, Florida; John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Jodi Jennings, Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

The Florida Bar’s Rules of Judicial Administration Committee (RJA Committee) has filed an out-of-cycle report proposing amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.140 (Amending Rules of Court). We adopt the amendments as proposed by the RJA Committee and further amend rule 2.140 on our own motion. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.140(d), (e).

As proposed by the RJA Committee, we add new subdivision (a)(7) to rule 2.140. The new subdivision provides a procedure for addressing rules referrals from the Court asking the RJA Committee to coordinate the submission of a joint report of proposed rule amendments from multiple committees. Under the new procedure, an ad hoc committee comprised of the subcommittee chairs handling the referral for the affected rules committees will be created. The ad hoc committee will be responsible for preparing the joint report and distributing the report to the various committees for review and comment. The RJA Committee will be responsible for filing the final comprehensive report with the Court. Also, as proposed by the RJA Committee, the order of existing subdivisions (a)(5) and (a)(6) is reversed.

On our own motion, we amend subdivisions (b) (Schedule for Rules Proposals), (e) (Emergency Recommendations by Committee), and (f) (Request by Court) of rule 2.140 to require committee reports and proposed rule changes to conform to the Guidelines for Rules Submissions approved by administrative order. We also amend subdivision (b)(4) to emphasize that, consistent with the requirements set forth in the Guidelines, a report proposing rule amendments must contain “a narrative description of how each amendment changes the language of the rule and a thorough discussion of the reason for each change.”

It is crucial that The Florida Bar rules committees provide the Court with thorough, comprehensive reports that adequately explain each proposed rule amendment. The Court can adopt proposed amendments more quickly when it can readily understand how each rule is being changed and the reasons for each change. If the Court has a clear understanding of proposed rule amendments, it also can better ensure the overall quality of the rules of court. Central to this effort are The Florida Bar staff liaisons to the rules committees who work closely with the committees in drafting proposed amendments and with the committee chairs in preparing reports to the Court. We take this opportunity to thank the Bar staff liaisons for their invaluable role in ensuring that the committees’ submissions comply with the Guidelines for Rules Submissions. And, we counsel all committee chairs to look to the Bar staff liaisons for guidance on the procedural requirements for rules submissions.

Accordingly, we amend Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.140 as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struek-through type. These amendments shall become effective immediately upon the release of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 2.140. AMENDING RULES OF COURT

(a) Amendments Generally. The following procedure shall be followed for consideration of rule amendments generally other than those adopted under subdivisions (d), (e), (f), and (g):

(1) — (4) [No Change]

(5) The Rules of Judicial Administration Committee shall also serve as -a rules — coordinating—committee, Each rules committee shall have at least 1 of ■its members appointed to-the Rules-of Judicial Administration Committee -to serve as liaison. — All committees shall provide a ■copy of any proposed rules changes to-the-Rules of Judicial Administration Committee within 30 days of a committee’s affirmative.vote- to recommend the proposed change-to the-supreme court. — The Rules of Judicial Administration Committee-shall then-refer all proposed-r-ules changes to those rules committees-that might be-affected by-the^ proposed change. The committees shall consider and vote on each proposal. The committees may originate proposals and are charged with the duty of regular review and reevaluation of the rules to advance orderly and inexpensive procedures in the administration of .justice. The committees may accept or reject proposed amendments or may amend proposals. The committees shall keep minutes of their activities, which minutes shall reflect the action taken on each proposal. Copies of the minutes shall be furnished to the clerk of the supreme court, to the board of governors of The Florida Bar, and to the proponent of any proposal considered at the meeting.

(6) The committees shall-consider-and vote on-each-proposal- — The-committees may originate-proposals and are charged with-the duty of regular — review—and roovaluation of the rules to-advance orderly and-inespensive procedures in the administration-of justice, — The-committees — may accept or —rejeet proposed amendments--or may amend proposals. The committees -shall -keep minutes-of their-activities, which minutes shall re-fleet the action taken-on-éach proposal. Copies of the minutes-shall be furnished to-the clerk of the-supreme court, to the board of governor-s-of The Florida-Bar> and-to the proponent-of- any proposal considered at the meeting. The Rules of Judicial Administration Committee shall also serve as a rules coordinating committee. Each rules committee shall have at least 1 of its members appointed to the Rules of Judicial Administration Committee to serve as liaison. All committees shall provide a copy of any proposed rules changes to the Rules of Judicial Administration Committee within 30 days of a committee’s affirmative vote to recommend the proposed change to the supreme court. The Rules of Judicial Administration Committee shall then refer all proposed rules changes to those rules committees that might be affected by the proposed change.

(7) Whenever the Rules of Judicial Administration Committee receives a request to coordinate the submission of a single comprehensive report of proposed rule amendments on behalf of multiple rules committees, the general procedure shall be as follows:

(A) The subcommittee chairs handling the matter for each committee will constitute an ad hoc committee to discuss the various committees’ recommendations and to formulate time frames for the joint response. The chair of the ad hoc committee will be the assigned Rules of Judicial Administration Committee subcommittee chair.

(B) At the conclusion of the work of the ad hoc committee, a proposed joint response will be prepared by the ad hoc committee and distributed to the committee chairs for each committee’s review and final comments.

(C)The Rules of Judicial Administration Committee shall be responsible for filing the comprehensive final report.

(b) Schedule for Rules Proposals.

(l)-(3) [No Change]

(4) No later than February 1 of each reporting year, each committee shall file a report of its proposed rule changes with the supreme court. Each committee may amend its recommendations to coincide with the recommendations of the board of governors or may decline to do so or may amend its recommendations in another manner. Any such amendments shall also be reported to the supreme court. The report and proposed rule changes m'ust conform to the Guidelines for Rules Submissions approved by administrative order and posted on the Internet websites of the supreme court and The Florida Bar. Consistent with the requirements that are fully set forth in the Guidelines, Tthe report shall include:

(A) a list of the proposed changes, together with a detailed explanation of each proposal that includes a narrative description of how each amendment changes the language of the rule and a thorough discussion of the reason for each change and the name and address of the proponent.of each change-if-other than the-rules commit-

(B) the final numerical voting record of the proposals in the committee;

(C) the name and address of the proponent of each change, if other than the rules committee;

(CD) a report of the action taken by the committee on comments submitted in accordance with subdivision (b)(2);

(D-E) a report of the action and voting record of the board of governors;

(EF) any dissenting views of the committee and, if available, of the board; and

(EG) an appendix containing all comments submitted to the committee, all relevant background documents, and a two-column chart setting forth the proposed changes in legislative format in the first column and a brief explanation of each change in the second column.

The report and the proposed rule changes shall be filed with the supreme court, in legislative format, both on paper and in an electronic format approved by the supreme court.

(5)-(7) [No Change]

(c)-(d) [No Change]

(e) Emergency Recommendations by Committee. If, in the opinion of a committee, a proposal is of an emergency nature, and the board of governors concurs, proposals may be made, at any time to the supreme court. The report and proposed rule changes must conform to the Guidelines for Rules Submissions approved by administrative order and posted on the Internet websites of the supreme court and The Florida Bar. If the court agrees that an emergency exists, the court may set a time for oral argument and consideration of the proposal. Notice of the hearing on the proposals and a copy of the proposals shall be furnished to the affected committee chair and vice chair, the executive director of The Florida Bar, all members of the Judicial Management Council, the clerk and chief judge of each district court of appeal, the clerk and chief judge of each judicial circuit, the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, the President of the Florida Senate, the chairs of the House and Senate committees as designated by the Speaker and the President, and any person who has asked in writing filed with the clerk of the supreme court for a copy of the notice. The clerk may provide the notice electronically. The recommendations or a resume of them shall be published on the Internet websites of the supreme court and The Florida Bar, and in the Florida Bar Journal or Florida Bar News before the hearing. Notice of the hearing shall also be published on the Internet websites of the supreme court and The Florida Bar, and in the Florida Bar Journal or Florida Bar News.

(f) Request by Court. The supreme court may direct special consideration of a proposal at times other than those specified in this rule and may require a committee to report its recommendation with the recommendations of the board of governors. All requests or submissions by a rules committee made in connection with a request under this subdivision shall be filed with the clerk of the supreme court. The report and proposed rule changes must conform to the Guidelines for Rules Submissions approved by administrative order and posted on the Internet websites of the supreme court and The Florida Bar. The supreme court may set oral argument on the report at any time. Notice of the hearing on the proposals and a copy of the proposals shall be furnished to the affected committee chair and vice chair, the executive director of The Florida Bar, all members of the Judicial Management Council, the clerk and chief judge of each district court of appeal, the clerk and chief judge of each judicial circuit, the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, the President of the Florida Senate, the chairs of the House and Senate committees as designated by the Speaker and the President, and any person who has asked in writing filed with the clerk of the supreme court for a copy of the notice. The clerk may provide the notice electronically. The recommendations or a resume of them shall be published on the Internet websites of the supreme court and The Florida Bar, and in the Florida Bar Journal or Florida Bar News before the hearing. Notice of the hearing shall also be published on the Internet websites of the supreme court and The Florida Bar, and in the Florida Bar Journal or Florida Bar News.

(g)-(h) [No Change]

Committee Notes

[No Change]

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

      . Currently, the Guidelines for Rules Submissions, as approved by the Court, can be found in In re Guidelines for Rules Submissions, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC06-14 (June 14, 2006).


text:
    Douglas Blaine MATTHEWS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC10-1771.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 21, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied May 9, 2013.

      Paula C. Coffman and Jeffrey Duane Deen of the Office of Criminal Conflict & Civil Regional, Orlando, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Katherine Maria Diamandis, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Douglas Blaine Matthews appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of death. For the reasons stated below, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

On the evening of February 20, 2008, Daytona Beach Police Department officers responded to a call that a man was outside an apartment building asking for help. When they arrived on the scene, officers discovered Kirk Zoeller sitting in front of an open apartment door, nonresponsive, covered in blood, and gasping for air with blood pulsing from his neck. The officers entered the apartment and found blood covering the floor and walls. While clearing the apartment, officers discovered Donna Trujillo’s body on the bed in the bedroom. The officer who found Trujillo testified that she could not see her body from the main room of the apartment, which consisted of an open kitchen and living room, and that she stood in the bedroom doorway for 10 to 15 seconds before noticing the body because most of it was covered with a pillow. Zoeller and Trujillo were pronounced dead at the scene. According to the medical examiner, both victims had been stabbed to death.

Later that evening, acting on a tip, officers went to the home of Theresa Teague. Teague allowed the officers into her home and consented to a search. Inside, officers saw bloody sneakers and jeans in plain view on the floor and found Matthews, dressed only in boxers and socks, hiding under a pile of clothes in the bedroom. Officers obtained and executed a search warrant for Teague’s home and found a bloody shirt in a clear plastic bag and Kirk Zoeller’s wallet together inside a different bag.

Matthews made a statement to police detectives outside of Teague’s house, which Matthews’ trial counsel admitted into evidence at trial. Matthews told detectives that Kirk Zoeller killed Donna Trujillo and attacked him over drugs. Once detectives informed Matthews that Zoeller was dead, Matthews stated that he killed Zoeller in self-defense.

Matthews was indicted for the first-degree premeditated and felony murders of Kirk Zoeller' and Donna Trujillo and for burglary while armed.

During the guilt phase, Justin Wagner, who sold drugs from and was present in Trujillo’s apartment when she and Kirk Zoeller were killed, testified. Wagner explained that Matthews, Zoeller, and Trujillo went into the bedroom of Trujillo’s apartment together. A few minutes later, Wagner said that he heard everyone “freaking out” and screaming and saw Matthews chase Zoeller out of the bedroom with a knife. Wagner testified that Matthews was clearly the aggressor. Before Wagner fled the apartment in fear for his life, he testified that he saw Matthews on top of Zoeller, repeatedly stabbing Zoeller and pulling him back as Zoeller, who was begging for help, tried to flee the apartment. Wagner also testified that he saw Matthews with a big buck knife on the day Zoeller and Trujillo were killed and that they had used Matthews’ knife to cut crack cocaine together earlier that • day. Wagner further testified that, after witnessing Matthews attack Zoeller, he fled to Theresa Teague’s home but hid outside when he heard Matthews arrive. While hiding, Wagner said he saw Matthews remove his shirt and put it in a clear plastic bag outside of Teague’s house.

Theresa Teague also testified to incriminating statements that Matthews made to her on the night Kirk Zoeller and Donna Trujillo were killed. Teague said that, before the police arrived at her home looking for Matthews, she and Matthews went outside after they saw police and helicopter search lights and Matthews said, “That’s for me.” When Teague pressed him for details, she said that Matthews told her that he “ran into a couple of people that probably wish they had not run into him that evening” and that he “just eliminated a couple of problems.” In addition, Teague testified that she had given Matthews a knife about nine to twelve inches long days before Zoeller and Trujillo were killed.

The crime scene investigator testified that he collected the bloody sneakers, bloody jeans, bloody shirt, and Kirk Zoel-ler’s wallet from Theresa Teague’s home and that he found a traffic citation with Matthews’ name on it inside the pocket of the jeans. He also testified that he took pictures of Matthews the day of his arrest and that Matthews did not have any knife cuts or fresh injuries on his body.

Testimony linked the bloody clothes and shoes to Matthews. The DNA analyst testified that “wearer” DNA on the bloody shirt and sneakers matched Matthews’ DNA and that- the blood on the shirt, jeans, and sneakers matched Kirk Zoel-ler’s. She also testified that swabs from four of Matthews’ fingers revealed blood that matched Zoeller’s and that one of the swabs also contained blood that was a possible match to Donna Trujillo’s. The police officer who issued the traffic citation found in the pocket of the bloody jeans identified Matthews as the person to whom he had issued the citation.

The medical examiner testified that Kirk Zoeller had been stabbed to death and that he had 24 stab wounds to the head, neck, chest, and back and two defensive wounds on his forearms. She testified that Zoel-ler’s stab wounds were up to six inches deep and that one wound was inflicted with such force that the tip of the knife broke off in his skull. The medical examiner also testified that Donna Trujillo had been similarly stabbed to death and that she had 11 stab wounds to the head, neck, and chest. The medical examiner testified that, in her experience, it was unusual for stabbing victims to have stab wounds to their heads. She also testified that both victims would have felt pain as they were being stabbed and would have remained conscious for a period of minutes before passing out due to blood loss and then would have remained alive for an additional period of minutes before their deaths.

Matthews testified that he acted in self-defense. He admitted to doing drugs on the day Donna Trujillo and Kirk Zoeller were killed and stated that he went to Trujillo’s apartment with Justin Wagner to trade cocaine for morphine pills. However, Matthews testified that Zoeller and Trujillo wei’e arguing and went into the bedroom together while he stayed in the living area of the apartment’s main room with Wagner. Matthews said it then got quiet and Zoeller came out of the bedroom into the main room of the apartment and started a fight with him over drugs. Matthews denied having a knife and denied that Theresa Teague ever gave him a knife. Matthews testified that Zoeller had the knife and that he took it away from Zoeller while they were fighting. At some point during their fight, Matthews said that he pinned Zoeller against the wall and saw Donna Trujillo’s body on the bed. At that point, Matthews testified that he became afraid for his life because he saw what Kirk Zoeller did to Donna Trujillo. Then, Matthews testified that Zoeller kicked him and he “blacked out,” “snapped,” and started swinging at, but not stabbing, Zoeller. Matthews also claimed that several of the photographs in evidence taken by the crime scene investigator showed injuries he suffered during his fight with Zoeller, including a cut on his abdomen.

In addition, Matthews testified that he dropped the knife inside the front door of Donna Trujillo’s apartment and fled to Theresa Teague’s home, where he washed the blood off of his body in her bathroom. On cross-examination, Matthews acknowledged that he failed to include in his statement to detectives that he was injured during his fight with Kirk Zoeller and that he had “blacked out.” But he denied taking Kirk Zoeller’s wallet and testified that he did not know how his bloody shirt ended up in a bag with Zoeller’s wallet inside Teague’s home. Matthews also admitted to removing his clothes, hiding from police, and telling Teague that the police and helicopter lights were for him. However, he denied that he made the statements to Teague about “run[ning] into a couple of people” and “eliminating] a couple of problems.”

The jury found Matthews guilty of the first-degree premeditated and felony murder of Kirk Zoeller, of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter of Donna Trujillo, and of burglary while armed.

At the penalty phase, the State presented the testimony of several of Zoeller’s friends and family, Matthews’ probation officer, a North Carolina deputy, and the victim of a robbery that Matthews committed in North Carolina. The probation officer testified that, at the time of Zoeller’s murder, Matthews was on felony probation for cocaine possession, and the State introduced the related judgment. The North Carolina deputy testified that Matthews confessed to robbing a convenience store in 1999, and the State introduced the judgment and sentence related to that felony conviction. The victim of an unrelated 2002 robbery testified that Matthews beat and urinated on him in his own home, robbed him, and left him bloody and unconscious on the floor, and the State introduced the judgment and sentence related to that felony conviction.

The defense, during the penalty phase, presented the testimony of several members of Matthews’ family, Matthews’ childhood friend, and two expert witnesses — a psychiatrist and a neuropsychologist. Matthews’ family testified that he is a loving person who had a difficult childhood filled with behavioral and mental health problems for which he received counseling and medication and was sent to camps and a group home. They also testified that Matthews sufféred head injuries from a traumatic birth, from a childhood bicycle accident, and from being beaten with a brick. In addition, Matthews’ brother testified that a stepfather physically abused Matthews.

The psychiatrist testified that Matthews was diagnosed with ADHD, conduct disorder, depression, and dysthymia as a child, for which he was prescribed Prozac and Ritalin. He also testified that Matthews has a family history of mental illness, was exposed to violence as a child, had possible head trauma but did not appear to have severe cognitive defects, and has a history of alcohol and drug abuse, including in the days before and on the night of Kirk Zoel-ler’s murder. The psychiatrist diagnosed Matthews with antisocial personality disorder and said he believed that Matthews also suffers from bipolar disorder but that he could not make that diagnosis because he did not observe Matthews in a manic state. However, the psychiatrist testified that the jail was medicating Matthews with Risperdal and Depakene, which are used to treat bipolar disorder. The psychiatrist testified that he did not disagree that Matthews knew right from wrong'when he committed the murder, and he agreed that Matthews could choose to abide by the law and not to commit murder. The neuropsy-chologist téstified that Matthews has an I.Q. of 104 and, though he has mild attentional issues, Matthews has no major cognitive problems.

The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of 10-2, and a Spencer hearing was held. At the Spencer hearing, the mother of Matthews’ child testified that Matthews has a loving and positive relationship with their son and asked the court to spare Matthews’ life.

The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Matthews to death, concluding that the aggravating circumstances “far outweigh” the mitigating circumstances. The court also sentenced Matthews to life imprisonment for burglary while armed and to fifteen years for manslaughter, both sentences to be served consecutively with the death sentence.

II. ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL

Matthews raises constitutional challenges on appeal, all of which he acknowledges that this Court has previously rejected. We reject them here as well.

Two of Matthews’ challenges are based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and we need not reach the merits of these claims because the jury convicted Matthews of burglary while armed, thereby establishing the aggravator of committed during the course of a felony. See Baker v. State, 71 So.3d 802, 824 (Fla.2011) (“Ring is not implicated when the trial court has found as an aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed in the course of a felony.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1639, 182 L.Ed.2d 238 (2012). In addition, Matthews’ aggravators of prior violent felony and under sentence of imprisonment (felony probation) preclude Ring’s application. See Hodges v. State, 55 So.3d 515, 540 (Fla.2010) (“This Court has repeatedly held that Ring does not apply to cases where the prior violent felony ... or the under-sentence-of-imprisonment aggravating factor is applicable.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 164, 181 L.Ed.2d 77 (2011). Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of Matthews’ Ring claims.

Matthews also challenges the constitutionality of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) and in the course of a felony aggra-vators and jury instructions. Because we have consistently upheld the constitutionality of these aggravators and instructions against identical challenges and Matthews provides no reason why we should depart from our precedent, we deny Matthews’ claims. See Ault v. State, 866 So.2d 674, 686 (Fla.2008) (rejecting argument that in the course of a felony aggravator “is unconstitutional because it constitutes an automatic aggravator and does not narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”); Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 134 (Fla.2001) (recognizing the consistency with which we have upheld the constitutionality of the HAC aggravator instruction); Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla.1997) (explaining that the in the course of a felony aggravator narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty because it does not apply to all felony convictions); Merck v. State, 664 So.2d 989, 941, 943 (Fla.1995) (holding HAC instruction is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).

III. SUFFICIENCY

“[Tjhis Court has a mandatory obligation to independently review the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a sentence of death has been imposed.” Miller v. State, 42 So.3d 204, 227 (Fla.2010), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 935, 178 L.Ed.2d 776 (2011); see also Fla. R.App. P. 9.142(a)(5). To conduct this review, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655, 674 (Fla.2006).

Here, we conclude thát competent, substantial evidence supports Matthews’ murder conviction. See Davis v. State, 2 So.3d 952, 966-67 (Fla.2008) (“In appeals where the death penalty has been imposed, this Court independently reviews the record to confirm that the jury’s verdict is supported by competent, substantial evidence.”). For example, Justin Wagner testified that he saw Matthews chasing and on top of Kirk Zoeller, repeatedly stabbing him with a knife, and pulling him back as Zoeller tried to flee and begged for help. The medical examiner’s testimony confirmed that Zoeller had been stabbed 24 times and that Zoeller had defensive wounds on his forearms. Moreover, Wagner testified that Matthews was clearly the aggressor and that he saw Matthews with a knife earlier the same day. Theresa Teague further testified that she gave Matthews a knife days before the murder. Teague also testified that Matthews told her on the night of the murder that he had “run into a couple of people that probably wished they had not run into him” and that he had “eliminated a couple of problems.”

Further, DNA testing results linked the bloody shirt and shoes to Matthews and indicated that, the blood on Matthews’ shirt, shoes, and jeans matched Zoeller’s. In addition, the crime scene investigator found ,a traffic citation with Matthews’ name on it inside the pocket of the bloody jeans, and the police officer who issued the citation identified Matthews as the person to whom he issued the citation. Moreover, the DNA analyst testified that swabs from four of Matthews’ fingers taken hours after the murder revealed blood that matched Zoeller’s. Finally, Zoeller’s wallet was found in a bag with Matthews’ bloody shirt inside of Teague’s home.

Based on the totality of the evidence, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Zoeller’s murder was premeditated and that his death occurred during the commission of a felony. See Rodgers, 948 So.2d at 674. Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Matthews’ conviction for first-degree murder.

IV. PROPORTIONALITY

Regardless of whether a defendant raises proportionality on appeal, this Court reviews the proportionality of each death sentence “to determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the [death] sentence.” Anderson v. State, 841 So.2d 390, 407-08 (Fla.2003) (citations omitted). In conducting its proportionality review, this Court does not compare the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Crook v. State, 908 So.2d 350, 356 (Fla.2005). Rather, “the Court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine if death is warranted in comparison to other cases where the sentence of death has been upheld.” Pham v. State, 70 So.3d 485, 500 (Fla.2011), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1752, 182 L.Ed.2d 541 (2012) (quoting England v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 408 (Fla.2006)). In addition, this Court has recognized that, “[qualitatively, prior violent felony and HAC are among the weightiest aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.” Hodges, 55 So.3d at 542.

Matthews’ case involves a murder by stabbing for which the jury recommended death by a vote of 10-2. The trial court found four aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (extremely great weight); (2) prior violent felony (great weight); (3) in the course of a burglary/for pecuniary gain (considered as one aggravator and given significant weight); and (4) committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and on felony probation (little weight). The trial court found two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little weight); and (2) substantially impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to requirements of law (little weight). In addition, the trial court found 38 non-statutory mitigating circumstances, such as the defendant had a long history of mental health problems (great weight); the defendant was high on hallucinogenics, cocaine, and pot on the night of the murder (significant weight); the defendant was severely beaten with a brick in 2002 and hospitalized (some weight); and the defendant has the capacity to maintain loving relationships with family members before and during incarceration (slight weight).

Under the totality of the circumstances, Matthews’ death sentence is proportional in relation to other death sentences that this Court has upheld. For example, in Davis, 2 So.3d at 955, we upheld the death penalty in two stabbing murders where the trial court found and gave great weight to the aggravators (prior violent felony, in the course of a felony, HAC, and CCP), while affording slight to some weight to multiple mitigators, including: the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal'activity (little weight); the capital felonies were committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (some weight); the defendant’s age (some weight); the defendant was loved by his friends and family (slight weight); the defendant suffered from ADHD or ADD as a child (little weight); the defendant suffered from congenital, organic brain damage in the frontal lobe (some weight); the defendant suffered from significant cognitive and memory deficits (little weight); the defendant had the support of his family and friends (slight weight); and the defendant suffered physical and emotional abuse as a child (some weight). See also Walker v. State, 957 So.2d 560 (Fla.2007) (death sentence proportionate in drug-related murder where trial court found and gave great weight to HAC, CCP, and in the course of a felony aggravators with several mitigating circumstances, including that the defendant suffered from bipolar disorder and was on drugs the day of the murder (moderate weight)); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33 (Fla.2003) (death sentence proportionate in stabbing murder where trial court found aggravators of pri- or violent felony, felony murder merged with pecuniary gain, and HAC and several nonstatutory mitigators, which were afforded very little to great weight, including: physically and emotionally abusive childhood; history of drug and alcohol abuse; defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at time of crime; mutual care and love with friends and family; and defendant was treated unfavorably by others and had troubled childhood); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970 (Fla.2001) (death sentence proportionate for stabbing murder where trial court found prior violent felony and HAC aggravators and statutory mitigators of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to requirements of law, and the defendant’s age at the time of the offense); Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637 (Fla.1995) (death penalty proportionate for stabbing murder where trial court found prior violent felony, commission of a murder for financial gain, and HAC aggrava-tors and determined that each aggravator, alone, outweighed the mitigators, including: defendant was raised in a single-parent household; defendant had an excellent relationship with other family members; defendant showed love and affection to his children; and defendant had demonstrated artistic talent).

Accordingly, Matthews’ sentence is proportional.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Matthews’ conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of death.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

      . Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993).

      . The trial court found the following aggrava-tors: (1) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (extremely great weight); (2) Matthews had been previously convicted of two prior unconnected violent felonies (great weight); (3) Matthews committed the capital felony while he was engaged in the commission of a burglary and Matthews committed the capital felony for pecuniary gain (considered as one aggravator and given significant weight); and (4) Matthews was on felony probation at the time of the -capital felony (little weight).

      . The trial court found two statutory miti-gators: (1) the capital felony was committed while Matthews was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little weight); and (2) Matthews’ substantially impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law (little weight). In addition, the trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigators; (1) long history of mental health problems (great weight); (2) treated for mental health issues from 1994 through 2005 (great weight); (3) suffered a head injury from a bicycle fall (some weight); (4) grew up without a true father figure (slight weight); (5) loved by his mother (slight weight); (6) loved by his brothers and sister (slight weight); (7) capacity to maintain loving relationships with family members before and during incarceration (slight weight); (8) has a young daughter (slight weight); (9) has the capacity to have long lasting relationships with friends (slight weight); (10) exhibited good behavior during trial (slight weight); (11) receivéd a-G.E.D. (slight weight); (12) long history of abusing multiple types of illegal drugs (slight weight); (13) was high on hallucinogenics, cocaine, and pot on the night of the murder (significant weight); (14) has drawn multiple pictures of his niece and daughter (slight weight); (15) was remorseful and apologized in court (slight weight); (16) had a traumatic birth that included a head injury (slight weight); (17) medicated with Ritalin and Prozac as a child (slight weight); (18) physically abused by his step dad as a young child (slight weight); (19) severely beaten with a brick in 2002 and hospitalized (some weight); (20) received a certification of recognition for an art exhibit (slight weight); (21) has a graduation certificate from the South Fork school (slight weight); (22) bullied by others because of a stuttering problem (slight weight); (23) went to counseling starting at age nine (some weight); (24) diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder as a child (slight weight); (25) put in a residential group home as a child (some weight); (26) put in a camp program as a child (slight weight); (27) was in R.O.T.C. while in school (slight weight); (28) received a certificate of award from middle school (slight weight); (29) received the Young Citizen Award/Officer Friendly Program (slight weight); (30) received a certificate of completion from the D.A.R.E. program (slight weight); (31) made the honor roll in 1997 twice (slight weight); (32) assisted a friend with finding a lost pet (slight weight); (33) is known as a good hearted person by a long-time friend (slight weight); (34) raised in a single parent home with little adult supervision (slight weight); (35) assisted his brother by stopping someone from hurting his brother (slight weight); (36) witnessed violent behavior in the home while growing up (some weight); (37) has a long history of prior drug abuse (some weight); and (38) is receiving medication for a bipolar disorder (some weight).

      . Matthews' Ring challenges are (i) that the death qualification of his jury violated his constitutional rights because the death penalty cannot lawfully be imposed in his case under Ring as the statutory aggravating circumstances authorizing imposition of the death penalty were not alleged in the indictment and determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and (ii) that Florida's death penalty statute and procedure are unconstitutional under Ring.

      . Matthews claims that the HAC aggravator and instruction are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and applied in an arbitrary manner, and that the in the course of a felony aggravator and instruction automatically expand instead of narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty in violation of the constitution.

      . Matthews made a belated argument in his reply brief that his death sentence is not proportionate because his crime is not among the most aggravated and least mitigated.

      . This finding was based on convictions for two prior, unconnected robberies.