author:
      BRYAN, Justice.
     BOLIN, Justice MURDOCK, Justice MOORE, Chief Justice

text:
    Michael D. BEAM v. Ellen Ann Beam TAYLOR et al
    1120678 and 1120679.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
    Brandon C. Stone and D. Jason Britt of Stone & Britt, LLC, Millbrook, for appellant.
    Jack Owen of Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak, P.A., Montgomery, for appellee James D. Beam.
    Joseph A. Fawal of Fawal & Spina, Birmingham, for appellees Ellen Ann Beam Taylor and Carol Sue Beam Rickels.
   BRYAN, Justice.

In appeal no. 1120678, Michael D. Beam appeals from orders entered by the Chil-ton Circuit Court in a conservatorship proceeding. In appeal no. 1120679, Michael appeals a will-contest proceeding that is currently pending in the Chilton Circuit Court. For the reasons set forth herein, we dismiss both of Michael’s appeals.

Procedural History

On November 18, 2004, Willodene Beam, the wife of James Troy Beam, and Michael, one of James and Willodene’s sons, were appointed by the Chilton Probate Court as co-guardians of James and co-conservators of his estate. Before that, the probate court had appointed Fletcher D. Green as James’s guardian ad litem. In January 2008, Willodene died, and, in March 2008, Michael was appointed as James’s sole guardian and conservator. On March 31, 2008, at Michael’s request, the Chilton Probate Court appointed Janice Hull to conduct an accounting of any and all financial transactions handled by Michael and Willodene from the date of their appointment on November 18, 2004, through March 20, 2008. In January 2009, James died and Fletcher Green, James’s guardian ad litem, filed a motion for a final settlement of the conservatorship. On February 2, 2009, at Michael’s request, the Chilton Probate Court ordered James’s conservatorship to employ the accounting firm of Hull & Russell, P.C., to “perform and complete the final accounting” that was required following James’s death. See § 26-5-7, Ala.Code 1975 (providing that “a final settlement of the conservator-ship must be made” upon the death of the ward).

On January 26, 2009, James Daniel Beam (“Jim”), another son of James and Willodene, petitioned the Chilton Probate Court to probate James’s will. On February 18, 2009, Ellen Ann Beam Taylor and Carol Sue Beam Rickels, James and Willo-dene’s daughters, filed a will contest, a petition for appointment of a special administrator ad colligendum, and a “notice of removal” of the will contest pursuant to § 43-8-198, Ala.Code 1975. On the same day, the Chilton Probate Court entered an order transferring the will-contest proceeding to the Chilton Circuit Court; that action was assigned case no. CV-09-0025. On May 21, 2009, the Chilton Circuit Court entered an order appointing David Karn as a special administrator ad colligendum in the will-contest proceeding.

In August 2009, Karn filed a motion in the Chilton Probate Court to remove the conservatorship to the Chilton Circuit Court. Karn’s motion stated that his request was made pursuant to § 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, and he attached an affidavit stating that he was the administrator ad colligendum for the estate of James Troy Beam and that, in his opinion, the conser-vatorship could best be administered in the Chilton Circuit Court. On August 5, 2009, the Chilton Probate Court entered an order purporting to “transfer and remove” the conservatorship action to the Chilton Circuit Court. On August 27, 2009, the Chilton Probate Court transferred the con-servatorship file to the Chilton Circuit Court, and, on the same day, the Chilton Circuit Court assigned that action case no. CV-09-0114. The Chilton Circuit Court (“the circuit court”) immediately ordered Michael “to provide a full statutory accounting of the conservatorship of James Troy Beam.” On August 31, 2009, at the request of Carol Sue and Ellen Ann, the circuit court consolidated the conservator-ship action and the will-contest action.

On November 10, 2009, Michael filed in the circuit court a “Petition for Final Settlement of Conservatorship!;] Claim by Conservator for Compensation!; and] Claim by Conservator for Reimbursement.” Michael asked the circuit court to accept Hull’s accounting for the period between November 18, 2004, and March 31, 2008, and to accept the final accounting attached to his petition for the period from March 31, 2008, through February 28, 2009. Michael requested, among other things, “fair and just compensation to the Conservator for the faithful execution of his duties as Conservator”; an award “to the Conservator of reimbursement for those funds expended by him individually for benefit of [James] and [Willodene] during the period of the Conservatorship”; and “reasonable compensation for the personal services the Conservator performed for the benefit of [James] and [Willodene] during the period of the Conservatorship.”

Jim filed an objection to Michael’s petition for final settlement of the conservator-ship estate, arguing (1) that the petition did not contain the vouchers required by statute, (2) that the accounting submitted was “confusing, incomplete, and fail[ed] to account for all receipts and disbursements of the Conservator,” and (3) that the accounting submitted contained “claims for compensation and reimbursements ... which are exorbitant, not supported by vouchers or other records, and on their face are contradictory of other disbursements asserted in the accounting.” Ellen Ann and Carol Sue also filed an objection to Michael’s final settlement of the conser-vatorship and to Michael’s claim for compensation and reimbursement. They alleged, among other things, that Michael’s final accounting was inconsistent with pri- or records he had produced and included numerous cash disbursements for which there was no explanation. On September 20, 2010, Ellen Ann and Carol Sue also filed a petition to assess liability against Michael as the conservator of James’s estate.

The circuit court conducted an ore tenus hearing on Michael’s petition for final settlement, and the objections thereto, on August 24, 2011. On February 8, 2012, the circuit court entered an “Order on Petition for Approval of Conservator’s Accounting, Claim for Compensation and Claim for Reimbursement.” The circuit court purported to enter a judgment in favor of James’s estate and against Michael in the amount of $352,205, plus the costs of the proceeding. The circuit court also purported to rule on Michael’s request for compensation and reimbursement of expenses, and it reserved ruling on a request for attorney fees by Jim, Ellen Ann, and Carol Sue.

In May 2012, Jim, Ellen Ann, and Carol Sue filed petitions seeking attorney fees related to their objections to Michael’s petition for final settlement. Michael objected to the requests for attorney fees and filed a “motion to reopen and reconsider order on petition for approval of conservator’s accounting.” On September 25, 2012, the circuit court conducted a hearing and entered an order denying Michael’s motion to reopen and reconsider the order “for approval of conservator’s accounting.”

On October 2, 2012, the circuit court entered an order awarding Ellen Ann, Carol Sue, and Jim attorney fees they had incurred in contesting Michael’s final settlement of James’s conservatorship. The attorney for Ellen Ann and Carol Sue was awarded $25,000; the attorney for Jim was awarded $14,763.87. The circuit court ordered the administrator ad colligendum to pay those amounts from the estate in trust to the attorneys. The circuit court then entered a judgment in favor of James’s estate against Michael in the sum of $39,763.87 to reimburse the estate for the attorney fees and expenses awarded to Ellen Ann, Carol Sue, and Jim.

On October 25, 2012, within 30 days of the entry of the October 2, 2012, order, Michael filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., challenging, among other things, the assessment of attorney fees. Michael’s motion was denied by operation of law on January 23, 2013. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. On March 5, 2013, within 42 days of the day his postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law, Michael filed a notice of appeal in case no. CV-09-0144, the conser-vatorship proceeding (appeal no. 1120678), as well as in case no. CV-09-0025, the will-contest proceeding (appeal no. 1120679). This Court consolidated Michael’s appeals on June 10, 2013, for the purpose of writing one opinion.

Jurisdiction

It is well settled that, except in limited circumstances not applicable here, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal taken from a nonfinal judgment. See, e.g., James v. Rane, 8 So.3d 286, 288 (Ala.2008)(holding that this Court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a nonfinal judgment); and Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So.2d 354, 362 (Ala.2004) (“When it is determined that an order appealed from is not a final judgment, it is the duty of the Court to dismiss the appeal ex mero motu.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is undisputed that the circuit court has not entered a final judgment, or even conducted a trial, in case no. CV-09-0025, the will-contest proceeding. Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal taken from a nonfinal judgment, Michael’s appeal in case no. 1120679 is due to be dismissed. See James, 8 So.3d at 288.

Regarding appeal no. 1120678, Michael’s appeal from the conservatorship proceeding (case no. CV-09-0114), we conclude, for the reasons set forth herein, that the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the conservator-ship proceeding, that the circuit court’s orders in case no. CV-09-0144 are therefore void, and that appeal no. 1120678 is also due to be dismissed.

“The court of probate from which the appointment of a conservator is derived has jurisdiction of the settlement, partial or final, of the accounts of the conservator.” § 26-5-1, Ala.Code 1975. The circuit court purportedly gained subject-matter jurisdiction over the conservatorship proceeding after the probate court granted the administrator ad colligendum’s petition to remove the conservatorship, allegedly pursuant to § 26-2-2, Ala. Code 1975, which provided the sole basis for the circuit court to obtain jurisdiction over the pending conservatorship proceeding in this case. Section 26-2-2 states:

“The administration or conduct of any guardianship or conservatorship of a minor or incapacitated person may be removed from the probate court to the circuit court, at any time before the final settlement thereof by the guardian or conservator of any such guardianship or conservatorship or guardian ad litem or next friend of such ward or anyone entitled to support out of the estate of such ward without assigning any special equity, and an order of removal must be made by the court or judge upon the filing of a sworn petition by any such guardian or conservator or guardian ad litem or next friend for the ward or such person entitled to support out of the estate of such ward, reciting in what capacity the petitioner acts and that in the opinion of the petitioner such guardianship or conservatorship can be better administered in the circuit court than in the probate court.”

This Court has recognized that “a marked similarity exists between the language of § 26-2-2 and the language of Ala.Code 1975, § 12-11-41, which governs the removal of the administration of a decedent’s estate from the probate court to the circuit court.” Ex parte Casey, 88 So.3d 822, 828 (Ala.2012) (plurality opinion). Section 12-11-41, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

“The administration of any estate may be removed from the probate court to the circuit court at any time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor, administrator or administrator with the will annexed of any such estate, without assigning any special equity; and an order of removal must be made by the court, upon the filing of a sworn petition by any such heir, devisee, legatee, dis-tributee, executor, administrator or administrator with the will annexed of any such estate, reciting that the petitioner is such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor, administrator or administrator with the will annexed and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such estate can be better administered in the circuit court than in the probate court.”

In Casey, this Court held that the circuit court did not have authority to remove “ ‘the administration or conduct of [a] guardianship or conservatorship’” pursuant to § 26-2-2 because, at the time the petition for removal was filed in and granted by the circuit court, the probate court had not yet “aet[ed] upon” the petition for letters of guardianship and conservator-ship by creating a guardianship or conser-vatorship. 88 So.3d at 829. We reached that conclusion after comparing the language of § 26-2-2 and § 12 — 11—41 and analogizing cases interpreting § 12 — 11—41 that concluded that the administration of an estate is subject to removal pursuant to § 12-11-41 only after the probate court “act[s] upon” a petition to administer an estate. 88 So.3d at 829 (citing Ex parte Smith, 619 So.2d 1374, 1376 (Ala.1993)).

In DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So.3d 814 (Ala.2011), this Court concluded that the circuit court did not obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over the administration of an estate pursuant to § 12-11-41 because, at the time the estate administration was purportedly removed to the circuit court, the administration of the estate had not yet been initiated in the probate court and because the circuit court never “enter[ed] an order purporting to remove the administration of the estate from probate court.” 68 So.3d at 822. In DuBose, as in the present case, the petition for removal was filed in and was granted by the probate court, instead of the circuit court. This Court, in DuBose, stated that “the filing of a petition for removal in the circuit court and the entry of an order of removal by that court are prerequisites to that court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the administration of an estate pursuant to § 12 — 11— 41.” Id. (final emphasis original). Thus, we concluded in DuBose that the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the administration of the estate, that the judgment entered by the circuit court was void, and that the appeal was due to be dismissed.

Because the language from § 26-2-2 mirrors the language in § 12-11-41, we conclude here, as we did in DuBose, that the “filing of a petition for removal in the circuit court and the entry of an order of removal by that court are prerequisites to that court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over” a conservatorship proceeding under § 26-2-2. DuBose, 68 So.3d at 822 (emphasis added) (“ ‘ “ ‘Unless expressly authorized so to do, a court has no authority to transfer a cause from itself to another court, and thereby give the other court possession of the case to hear and determine it, although the other court would have had jurisdiction of the cause if it had come to it by due process.’ 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 502, p. 769(quoting Allen v. Zickos, 37 Ala.App. 361, 364, 68 So.2d 841, 843 (1953), and citing Ex parte Boykin, 611 So.2d 322, 326 (Ala.1992))). This conclusion is consis- - tent with prior decisions of this Court applying § 26-2-2, which note that the proper procedure is for the petition for removal to be filed in and granted by the circuit court. See, e.g., Ex parte Casey, 88 So.3d at 826-27 (noting that a petition for removal pursuant to § 26-2-2 was filed in the circuit court and granted by that court); Fuller v. Jackson, 519 So.2d 936, 937 (Ala.1988) (same); and McNairy v. McNairy, 416 So.2d 735, 735-36 (Ala.1982) (same). Thus, because in this case a petition for removal was not filed in the circuit court and “at no time did the circuit court enter an order purporting to remove the [conser-vatorship proceeding] from the probate court,” DuBose, 68 So.3d at 822, we conclude that the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the con-servatorship proceeding.

Furthermore, we note that the petition for removal was filed by Karn, the administrator ad colligendum of James’s estate, and that Karn does not fall within the category of persons who may file a petition for removal pursuant to § 26-2-2 “without assigning any special equity.” Section 26-2-2 provides that a petition for removal, without assigning any special equity, may be filed only by “the guardian or conservator ... or guardian ad litem or next friend of such ward or anyone entitled to support out of the estate of such ward.” Karn did not assign any special equity in his petition for removal. He simply stated that, in his opinion, “the conservatorship can best be administered in the Circuit Court of Chilton County under the Rules of Civil Procedure.” This Court has held that a petition for removal filed in and granted by the circuit court was insufficient to convey subject-matter jurisdiction to the circuit court when the petitioner did not fall within the category of parties set forth in § 26-2-2 and no special equity had been assigned in the petition for removal. See Smith v. Smith, 248 Ala. 49, 51, 26 So.2d 571, 571 (1946) (holding that the next of kin of a deceased ward did not have the absolute right to remove the administration of a guardianship proceeding from the probate court to the circuit court because the predecessor statute to § 26-2-2 did not include next of kin in the list of persons granted that absolute right). Thus we conclude that Karn’s petition for removal, even if it had been properly filed in and granted by the circuit court, was insufficient to support removal of the conserva-torship to the circuit court because Earn did not assign any special equity to support the petition for removal and he was not included in the list of persons in § 26-2-2 who may petition for the removal of the conservatorship proceeding without assigning special equity.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the conserva-torship proceeding and that the orders entered by the circuit court in case no. CV-09-0144 are void and therefore due to be vacated. Because a void order will not support an appeal, we dismiss appeal no. 1120678 and direct the circuit court to vacate the orders entered in case no. CV-09-0144. See Hunt Transition & Inaugural Fund, Inc. v. Grenier, 782 So.2d 270, 274 (Ala.2000). We note that, because the circuit court never obtained jurisdiction over the conservatorship proceeding, jurisdiction over that proceeding remains in the probate court.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, these appeals are dismissed.

1120678 — APPEAL DISMISSED.

STUART, PARKER, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur:

BOLIN and MURDOCK, JJ., concur specially.

MOORE, C.J., dissents.

1120679 — APPEAL DISMISSED.

MOORE, C.J., and STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.

BOLIN, Justice

(concurring specially in case no. 1120678).

I concur fully with main opinion. I write specially to elaborate on the definition of “remove” as it relates to the removal of the administration of a conservator-ship or guardianship proceeding from the probate court to the circuit court, pursuant to § 26-2-2, Ala.Code 1975:

“The administration or conduct of any guardianship or conservatorship of a minor or incapacitated person may be removed from the probate court to the circuit court, at any time before the final settlement thereof by the guardian or conservator of any such guardianship or conservatorship or guardian ad litem or next friend of such ward or anyone entitled to support out of the estate of such ward without assigning any special equity, and an order of removal must be made by the court or judge upon the filing of a sworn petition by any such guardian or conservator or guardian ad litem or next friend for the ward or such person entitled to support out of the estate of such ward, reciting in what capacity the petitioner acts and that in . the opinion of the petitioner such guardianship or conservatorship can be better administered in the circuit court than in the probate court.”

(Emphasis added.)

It is important to note that the above statute is located in Chapter 2 of Title 26, Ala.Code 1975, the main chapter that provided for the “Appointment of Guardians” before the enactment of Act No. 87-590, Ala. Acts 1987, which is codified in Chapter 2A of Title 26, and substantially based upon the Uniform Probate Code, Article V, Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 (1982 edition), and cited as the Alabama Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act. I further note that even though § 26-2A-20(3), Ala.Code 1975, the definition section of the Alabama Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, § 26-2A-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, referred to above (“the Act”) defines “court” as “[a] probate court of this state,” this definition of “court” as being a “probate court” applies only to guardianship and protective proceedings under Chapter 2A. The Act not only did not supersede Chapter 2 but it also made no attempt to include any provision pertaining to removals addressed by § 26-2-2. Therefore, § 26-2-2 is not a part of “the Act” and is the only statute providing for the removal of guardianships or protective proceedings from the probate court to the circuit court. I further point out that the Comment to § 26-2A-31, Ala.Code 1975, setting out subject-matter jurisdiction of the Act, states that “[t]he subject matter jurisdiction described in this section affects the jurisdiction of the probate court only insofar as it applies to proceedings under this chapter and it does not purport to otherwise expand the jurisdiction of probate courts as established in other law.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 12-11-30(4), Ala.Code 1975, provides that the circuit court exercises a general superintendence over the probate court, not the other way around. Although the removal statute does not expressly state that the petition for removal of the guardianship or conservatorship proceeding be filed in and ordered by the circuit court, it is apparent from decades of caselaw that the practice and procedure has been that a petition for removal is properly filed in, and if appropriate granted by, the circuit court. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 248 Ala. 49, 51, 26 So.2d 571, 571 (1946)(“The proceedings here complain of an order of the circuit court in equity removing the administration of the guardianship ... from the probate to the equity court.”); Ex parte Garrison, 260 Ala. 379, 380, 71 So.2d 33, 35 (1954)(“Mrs. J.J. Burnett filed a petition in the Circuit Court ..., asking for an order transferring the guardianship ... to the aforesaid equity court.... [A]n order was entered [by the Circuit Court] removing the aforesaid guardianship from the Probate Court to the Circuit Court, in Equity.”); Fuller v. Jackson, 519 So.2d 936, 937 (Ala.l988)(“Fuller ... petitioned the Jefferson Circuit Court to remove the guard-ianships ... to the Jefferson Circuit Court.”); Ex parte Coffee Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 771 So.2d 485, 486 (Ala.2000)(noting that “Nichols ... filed ... a petition to remove the administration of the conservatorship to the circuit court” and that “[t]he circuit court removed the case”); and Ex parte Casey, 88 So.3d 822, 826-27 (Ala.2012)(“Jo Ann filed a ‘Petition for Removal/Transfer’ in the circuit court.... [T]he circuit court entered an order granting [the] petition to remove the guardianship proceeding from the probate court to the circuit court.”); cf., however, Scott v. Kelley, 745 So.2d 872 (Ala.Civ.App.1999), a case in which the probate judge signed an order removing the case from the probate court to the circuit court. However, the probate court’s unchallenged removal order in Kelley is an aberration and a clear deviation from settled law, as can be seen from the other cited cases.

The above cases, which involve removals pursuant to § 26-2-2 both before and after the effective date of the Act, demonstrate that the petition for removal of a conserva-torship from the probate court to the circuit court has always been filed in, and relief on such petition, if any, ordered by, the circuit court. Regarding the Act and its failure to incorporate § 26-2-2 or a like removal provision, see Ex parte Casey, 88 So.3d at 828 n. 5:

“When the Alabama Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act (‘[the Act]’) was enacted in 1987, § 26-2-2 was amended to reflect the terminology used in [the Act]. Compare § 26-2-2, Ala.Code 1975, as amended, 1987 Ala. Acts, No. 87-590, with Tit. 21, § 26, Ala.Code 1940 (1958 Recomp.) (‘The administration or conduct of any guardianship of a minor or person of unsound mind may be removed....;’), the language of which remained unchanged when Tit. 21, § 26, was first recodified as § 26-2-2 in 1975.”

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1099 (1969) defines the term “remove” as to “take away.” Clearly, the probate court, under § 26-2-2, does not take the case away from itself and give it to the circuit court. To do so would impose upon the probate court itself the illogical duty of ordering that the “guardianship or conservatorship can better be administered in the circuit court than in the probate court.” Rather, it is the circuit court that takes jurisdiction of the conservatorship or guardianship from the probate court, the court of original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ex parte Terry, 957 So.2d 455, 459 (Ala.2006)(regardihg a petition to remove the administration of an estate from the probate court to the circuit court, this Court stated that “the circuit court failed to enter the order necessary to take jurisdiction of the estate from the probate court” (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, persons having standing under § 26-2-2 to remove a conservator-ship or guardianship proceeding from the probate court to the circuit court do so by filing a petition for removal with the circuit court. The circuit court, if removal is appropriate, will then order the case removed from the jurisdiction of the probate court.

MURDOCK, Justice

(concurring specially in case no. 1120678).

I agree with the conclusion in the main opinion that the failure of the circuit court to have entered an order of removal means that the circuit court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the conservator-ship. I write separately to state that my concurrence with the analysis of the main opinion should not be read as expressing any view as to whether, even if the circuit court had entered the order of removal here, it would have acquired jurisdiction over the conservatorship. Compare Ala. Code 1975, § 26-2-2 (providing that the administration of a guardianship or conser-vatorship “may be removed from the probate court to the circuit court, at any time before the final settlement thereof’), with Ala.Code 1975, § 12-11-41 (providing that the administration of a decedent’s estate “may be removed from the probate court to the circuit court at any time before a final settlement thereof’); see also, e.g., Mobbs v. Scott, 233 Ala. 70, 71, 169 So. 698, 699 (1936) (stating, in regard to the precursor to § 12-11-41: “It is settled that said statute ‘does not contemplate “the ouster of the jurisdiction of the probate courts, where that court has actually entered upon the exercise of its jurisdiction in and for a final settlement of estates.” ... The words “at any time before a final settlement,” found in the removal act, mean before proceedings for settlement begin, not before they are completed.’” (citation omitted)).

MOORE, Chief Justice

(dissenting in case no. 1120678).

I respectfully dissent. For the reasons that follow, I believe the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this con-servatorship.

I. Statutory Construction

The language of § 26-2-2, Ala.Code 1975, does not expressly require that the petition to remove the conservatorship be filed in, and the removal order entered by, the circuit court. The statute reads:

“[A]n order of removal must be made by the court or judge upon the filing of a sworn petition by any such guardian or conservator or guardian ad litem or next friend for the ward or such person entitled to support out of the estate of such ward, reciting in what capacity the petitioner acts and that in the opinion of the petitioner such guardianship or conser-vatorship can be better administered in the circuit court than in the probate court.”

§ 26-2-2, Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added). The majority’s construction of this statute goes beyond the plain language of the statute.

The majority opinion states that this Court has recognized that “ ‘a marked similarity exists between the language of § 26-2-2 and the language of Ala.Code 1975, § 12-11-41, which governs the removal of the administration of a decedent’s estate from the probate court to the circuit court.’ ” 149 So.3d at 575 (quoting Ex parte Casey, 88 So.3d 822, 828 (Ala.2012) (plurality opinion)). The similarity of the language, however, does not require us to read words into § 26-2-2. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court must “ascertain and effectuate” the intent of the legislature. Darks Dairy, Inc. v. Alabama Dairy Comm’n, 367 So.2d 1378,1380 (Ala.1979). For this task,

“we must look to the entire Act instead of isolated phrases or clauses; and words are given their plain and usual meaning. Moreover, just as statutes dealing with the same subject are in pari materia and should be construed together, parts of the same statute are in pari materia and each part is entitled to equal weight.”

367 So.2d at 1380-81 (citations omitted). Both § 26-2-2 and § 12-11-41 provide for the removal of proceedings from the probate court. However, the statutes are in separate chapters of the Code, are codified from separate acts, and pertain to different subjects; they should not be construed together.

Section 12-11^1 provides that “an order of removal must be made by the court,” without indicating which court. Section 12-11-41 is found in Title 12, Chapter 11, Article 2, of the Code of Alabama 1975, which concerns the jurisdiction of circuit courts. Thus, I agree that the petition for removal of estates should be filed in, and the petition granted by, the circuit court.

Section 26-2-2 states that “an order of removal must be made by the court or judge,” without indicating which court, or which judge. Section 26-2-2 is found in Title 26, Chapter 2, of the Code of Alabama 1975, which lays out procedures for probate courts, not circuit courts. I conclude that, with reference to this specific statutory title and chapter, “the court or the judge” in § 26-2-2 refers to the probate court and probate judge, not the circuit court.

II. The Nature of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The majority opinion concludes “that the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the conservator-ship proceeding.” 149 So.3d at 576. Both the probate court and the circuit court have subject-matter jurisdiction over this conservatorship, that is, “^jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought.” Black’s Law Dictionary 931 (9th ed. 2009). Subject-matter jurisdiction “concerns a court’s power to decide certain types of cases.” Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 538 (Ala.2006). The probate court has original and general jurisdiction over conservatorships. See §§ 26-5-1 and 12-13-l(b)(6), Ala.Code 1975. The circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, see § 12-1-2, Ala.Code 1975. General jurisdiction is “[a] court’s authority to hear a wide range of cases, civil or criminal, that arise within its geographic area.” Black’s Law Dictionary 929 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).

The majority opinion has confused subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the power to decide certain types of cases, with a procedural issue. The circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, regardless of whether the administrator ad colligendum filed the petition to remove the conservatorship in the circuit court or in the probate court.

III. Precedent Does Not Support the Majority Opinion

The majority opinion relies upon the plurality opinion of Ex parte Casey, 88 So.3d 822, 824 (Ala.2012). “The prece-dential value of the reasoning in a plurality opinion is questionable at best.” Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc., 789 So.2d 842, 845 (Ala.2001). The Casey opinion concluded that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to remove a guardianship from the probate court because

“the probate court ha[d] not entered an order creating a guardianship or conser-vatorship for Jo Ann. Logically, because no guardianship or conservatorship has been created for Jo Ann, there is no ‘administration or conduct’ of such guardianship or conservatorship to be removed from the probate court to the circuit court.”

88 So.3d at 830 (emphasis added). Here, the probate court created and then began administration of the conservatorship before ordering it removed to circuit court. Thus, the key fact in Casey on subject-matter jurisdiction is not present in this case. This difference, coupled with the limited precedential value of Casey, makes questionable Casey ⅛ support for the majority opinion.

The majority opinion also relies on DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So.3d 814, 821 (Ala. 2011). Like the court in Casey, the probate court in DuBose did not initiate the administration of an estate. We concluded that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because “there was no pending estate administration that [the circuit court] could have removed from the probate court pursuant to § 12-11-41.” 68 So.3d at 822.

The majority opinion relies upon this statement from DuBose: “ ‘[T]he filing of a petition for removal in the circuit court and the entry of an order of removal by that court are prerequisites to that court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the administration of an estate pursuant to § 12-11-41.’ ” 149 So.3d at 576 (quoting DuBose, 68 So.3d at 822). This statement in Du-Bose was a hypothetical contained in dicta. The majority opinion applies this dicta and concludes that the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the administrator filed the petition for removal in the probate court, which court entered the order of removal. As explained above, § 12-11-41 requires the petition for removal of the administration of an estate to be filed in the circuit court, but § 26-2-2 does not require the same procedure for the removal of a conserva- torship. DuBose thus gives only questionable support to the majority opinion.

The majority opinion also cites Smith v. Smith, 248 Ala. 49, 51, 26 So.2d 571 (1946) (next of kin of deceased ward did not have an absolute right to removal, in the absence of a special equity). In Smith, the guardian objected to the next of kin’s petitioning for the removal of a guardianship to the circuit court. Unlike Smith, the parties here have not objected to how the conservatorship was removed to the circuit court. The parties also did not object that the administrator ad colligendum is not on the list of persons who may petition for removal without assigning special equity. These procedural irregularities under § 26-2-2 do not affect the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

VI. Conclusion

For these reasons, I believe this Court has improperly dismissed the appeal in case no. 1120678 and improperly ordered the circuit court’s orders below 'vacated.

      . This case was assigned to Justice Bryan on November 19, 2013.

      . We note that § 43-8-198 provides for the transfer, as opposed to the removal, of a will contest to the circuit court from the probate court.

      . Although the probate court ordered an accounting for the period ending March 20, 2008, Michael filed an accounting for the period ending March 31, 2008.

      . The circuit court also purportedly entered a judgment in favor of James's estáte against Western Surety Company, the surety of Michael’s conservator’s bond, in the amount of the $50,000 bond.

      . It is possible that Michael filed a notice of appeal in the will-contest proceeding because some of the circuit court’s orders, including the February 8, 2012, order, which concerned only the conservatorship proceeding, were entered in both case no. CV-09-0114 (the con-servatorship proceeding) and case no. CV-09-0025 (the will-contest proceeding). We note that, although the will-contest proceeding and the conservatorship proceeding were consolidated in the circuit court, the will-contest proceeding and the conservatorship proceeding maintained separate identities and required the entry of separate judgments. See Ex parte 3M Co., 42 So.3d 1228, 1231 n. 4 (Ala.2010).

        . That this statement is dicta is plain from these remarks: "Moreover, even were we to conclude that the administration of the estate was pending in the probate court when the Washington Circuit Court purported to assume jurisdiction over it, it does not appear that Sullivan's heirs filed their transfer/removal petition in the circuit court, and at no time did the circuit court enter an order purporting to remove the administration of the estate from the probate court.” DuBose, 68 So.3d at 822 (first emphasis added).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WISE, Justice. MAIN, Justice PARKER, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ex parte Zeke AULL. (In re Reed Collar and Bonnie Collar, as parents of Gilbert Collar, a minor, deceased v. University of South Alabama et al.)
    1120641.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Feb. 14, 2014.

      Michael E. Upchurch and David A. Strassburg, Jr., of Frazer, Greene, Up-church & Baker, LLC, Mobile, for petitioner.
    Jere L. Beasley, J. Cole Portis, and Benjamin L. Locklar of Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., Montgomery; and Charles J. Potts and Joshua Briskman of Briskman & Binion, P.C., Mobile, for respondents.
   WISE, Justice.

The respondents, Reed Collar and Bonnie Collar, as the parents of Gilbert Collar, a deceased minor, sued the University of South Alabama (“the University”); Zeke Aull, the chief of police for the University; Trevis Austin,, a police officer for the University; and fictitiously named defendants, asserting claims arising from Gilbert’s death on the University’s campus in Mobile. Chief Aull filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him, on the basis that he was immune from suit pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const, of 1901, and that, to the extent the complaint could be read as asserting a claim against him in his individual capacity, that claim was due to be dismissed on the ground of State-agent immunity. The trial court denied Chief Aull’s motion to dismiss, and Chief Aull filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting this .Court to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing the claims asserted against him. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

In October 2012, Gilbert was a student at the University. During the early morning hours of October 6, 2012, Gilbert and some other students were talking outside a dormitory at the University. The complaint alleges:

“At some point while they were talking, Gilbert Collar was given a substance that is believed to have included illegal drugs.
“11. Gilbert Collar had a sudden and immediate reaction to the substance he ingested. The reaction caused him either to become extremely hot or to believe that he was very hot. Gilbert Collar lost the ability to fully understand his actions and to reason. As a result, Gilbert Collar took off his clothes and began running into and out of traffic on the campus of the University of South Alabama.”

The complaint also alleges that Gilbert subsequently went to the University’s police station and began hitting the windows of the police station. Gilbert started to walk away from the building but came back and started hitting the door of the police station. Gilbert then again walked away from the police station.

At that time, Officer Austin and a dispatcher were inside the police station. Officer Austin came out of the police station through the door Gilbert had hit, with his weapon drawn. After Officer Austin called to Gilbert, Gilbert started to advance toward the police station and “immediately began acting in an erratic manner.” The complaint further alleges:

“Officer Austin began backing up and Gilbert Collar continued to move toward him, crouching down, jumping up and bounding around....
... At no point during the ensuing moments did Gilbert Collar ever touch Officer Austin. On one or more occasions, Gilbert Collar went to the ground and put distance between himself and Officer Austin.
“... When Gilbert Collar was a few feet from Officer Austin, and for unexplainable reasons, Officer Austin shot Gilbert Collar. After being shot, Gilbert Collar rose to his feet and walked a short distance before he fell to the ground for the last time and died.
“... Literally seconds after Officer Austin fired the fatal shot, other police officers arrived at the station and were prepared to assist to control the situation and arrest Gilbert Collar, if necessary.
“... Even though Officer Austin had at his disposal less lethal means of force, namely, his physical ability, a baton and pepper spray, he was not provided with option of a [T]aser, a weapon known to be effective for controlling subjects who are acting irrationally for some reason.
“... Defendants Chief Zeke Aull, the University of South Alabama, and others, including Fictitious Parties A-L, failed to provide a [Tjaser, a non-lethal weapon to its police officers, including Officer Austin.”

On December 3, 2012, the Collars sued the University, Chief Aull, Officer Austin, and fictitiously named parties. Count one of the complaint sought injunctive relief from the University and Chief Aull in the form of requiring specific training and equipment for police officers on the University’s campus. Count three alleged negligence claims against the University, Chief Aull, and fictitiously named parties A-L and sought monetary damages. Counts two and four alleged that Officer Austin negligently used excessive force against Gilbert and that, in using excessive deadly force, Officer Austin acted wilfully, beyond his authority, and/or under a mistaken interpretation of existing laws. Finally, count five raised negligence claims against fictitiously named parties M-Z.

On December 18, 2012, the University filed a motion to dismiss the Collars’ claims against it on the ground that it was entitled to State immunity pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const, of 1901. The trial court subsequently granted the University’s motion.

On December 27, 2012, Chief Aull filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him. In his motion, Chief Aull asserted that he also was immune from suit pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const, of 1901. He also asserted that, to the extent the complaint could be read as asserting a claim against him in his individual capacity, that claim was due to be dismissed on the ground of State-agent immunity. On February 8, 2013, the trial court entered an order denying Chief Aull’s motion to dismiss. On March 4, 2013, Chief Aull filed his petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

“ As this Court has consistently held, the writ of mandamus is a
“ ‘ “ ‘drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ ”
‘Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.2002) (quoting Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.1993)). “ ‘In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss by means of a mandamus petition, we do not change our standard of review....’” Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 937 So.2d 56, 57 (Ala.2006) (quoting Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928, 931 (Ala.2003)).
“ ‘ “In Newman v. Savas, 878 So.2d 1147 (Ala.2003), this Court set out the standard of review of a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction:
“ ‘ “ ‘A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed without a presumption of correctness. Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993). This Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Creóla Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So.2d 285, 288 (Ala.2002). Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail but whether the pleader may possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So.2d at 299.’
“ ‘ “878 So.2d at 1148-49.”
‘Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So.2d 557, 563 (Ala.2005). We construe all doubts regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Drummond Co., 937 So.2d at 58.’
“Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 20-21 (Ala.2007).”

Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 978 So.2d 718, 720 (Ala.2007).

“The issue of immunity is a jurisdictional one. ‘This constitutionally guaranteed principle of sovereign immunity, acting as a jurisdictional bar, precludes a court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction, a court has no power to act and must dismiss the action.’ Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So.2d 432, 435 (2001). Therefore, a court’s failure to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity may properly be addressed by a petition for the writ of mandamus. See Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 810-11 (Ala.2002).”

Ex parte Murphy, 72 So.3d 1202, 1205 (Ala.2011).

With regard to claims against State officials in their official capacity, this Court has stated:

“ ‘ “It is settled beyond cavil that State officials cannot be sued for damages in their official capacities. Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep’t of Human Res., 835 So.2d 131, 132-33 (Ala.2002).” Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d [675,] 681 [ (Ala.2010) ].’
“Ex parte Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 88 So.3d 837, 842 (Ala.2012). In Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc., 81 So.3d 326, 332 (Ala.2011), this Court stated:
“ ‘This Court has held that the immunity afforded the State by § 14 applies to instrumentalities of the State and State officers sued in their official capacities when such an action is effectively an action against the State. Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d 257, 261 (Ala.2003). We have specifically “extended the restriction on suits against the State found in § 14 ‘to the state’s institutions of higher learning’ and ha[ve] held those institutions absolutely immune from suit as agencies of the State.” Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So.2d 105, 109 (Ala.2006) (quoting Taylor v. Troy State Univ., 437 So.2d 472, 474 (Ala.1983)). This § 14 bar also prohibits “actions against officers, trustees, and employees of state universities in their official capacities.” Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So.2d 867, 873 (Ala.2004).’

“In Alabama Department of Transportation v. Harbert International, Inc., 990 So.2d 831, 839-840 (Ala.2008), this Court stated:

“ ‘To determine whether an action against a State officer is, in fact, one against the State, this Court considers
“ ‘ “whether ‘a result favorable to the plaintiff would directly affect a contract or property right of the State,’ Mitchell [v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801, 806 (Ala.1992)], whether the defendant is simply a ‘conduit’ through - which the plaintiff seeks recovery of damages from the State, Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770, 784 (Ala.1988), and whether ‘a judgment against the officer would directly affect the financial status of the State treasury,’ Lyons [v. River Road Constr., Inc.], 858 So.2d [257] at 261 [ (Ala.2003) ].”
‘Haley [v. Barbour County ], 885 So.2d [783] at 788 [ (Ala,2004) ]. Additionally, “[i]n determining whether an action against a state officer is barred by § 14, the Court considers the nature of the suit or the relief demanded, not the character of the office of the person against whom the suit is brought.” Ex parte Carter, 395 So.2d 65, 67-68 (Ala.1980).’

“This Court also noted in Harbert that the immunity afforded State officers sued in their official capacities is not unlimited:

“ ‘ “[Section 14] immunity from suit does not extend, in all instances, to officers of the State acting in their official capacity. Unzicker v. State, 346 So.2d 931 (Ala.1977). In limited circumstances the writ of mandamus will lie to require action of state officials. This is true where discretion is exhausted and that which remains to be done is a ministerial act. See Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co., Inc., 353 So.2d 779 (Ala.1977); Tennessee & Coosa R.R. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371 (1860). Action may be enjoined if illegal, fraudulent, unauthorized, done in bad faith or under a mistaken interpretation of law. Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery Co., 280 Ala. 635, 197 So.2d 428 (1967). If judgment or discretion is abused, and exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner, mandamus will lie to compel a proper exercise thereof. The writ will not lie to direct the manner of exercising discretion and neither will it lie to compel the performance of a duty in a certain manner where the performance of that duty rests upon an ascertainment of facts, or the existence of conditions, to be determined by an officer in his judgment or discretion. See Barnes v. State, 274 Ala. 705, 151 So.2d 619 (1963).” “ ‘McDowell-Purcell, Inc. v. Bass, 370 So.2d 942, 944 (Ala.1979).
“ ‘Moreover, certain causes of action are not barred by § 14:
“ ‘ “ ‘There are four general categories of actions which in Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So.2d 677 (1971), we stated do not come within the prohibition of § 14: (1) actions brought to compel State officials to perform their legal duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel State officials to perform ministerial acts; and (4) actions brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act ... seeking construction of a statute and its application in a given situation. 287 Ala. at 229-230, 250 So.2d 677. Other actions which are not prohibited by § 14 are: (5) valid inverse condemnation actions brought against State officials in their representative capacity; and (6) actions for injunction or damages brought against State officials in their representative capacity and individually where it was alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority or in a mistaken interpretation of law. Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 280 Ala. [635] at 639, 197 So.2d 428 [ (1967) ]; Unzicker v. State, 346 So.2d 931, 933 (Ala.1977); Engelhardt v. Jenkins, 273 Ala. 352, 141 So.2d 193 (1962).’ ”•
‘Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 937 So.2d 56, 58 (Ala.2006) (quoting [Ex parte ] Carter, 395 So.2d [65,] 68 [ (Ala.1980) ]) (emphasis omitted). These actions are sometimes referred to as “exceptions” to § 14; however, in actuality these actions are simply not considered to be actions “‘against the State’ for § 14 purposes.” Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002). This Court has qualified those “exceptions,” noting that “ ‘[a]n action is one against the [S]tate when a favorable result for the plaintiff would directly affect a contract or property right of the State, or would result in the plaintiff’s recovery of money from the [S]tate.’” Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So.2d 867, 873 (Ala.2004) (quoting Shoals Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross, 674 So.2d 1311, 1314 (Ala.Civ.App.1995)) (emphasis added in Jones).’
990 So.2d at 839-40.”

Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119,1130-32 (Ala.2013). This Court further clarified the sixth “exception” to immunity as follows:

“Indeed, it is well established that actions for damages against State agents in their official or representative capacities are considered actions to recover money from the State and are barred by State immunity under § 14. Harris v. Owens, 105 So.3d 430 (Ala.2012); Ex parte Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., [88 So.3d 837 (Ala.2012) ]; Vandenberg v. Aramark Educ. Servs., Inc., [81 So.3d 326 (Ala.2011) ]; Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d 675 (Ala.2010); Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d 257, 261 (Ala.2003); Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep’t of Human Res., 835 So.2d 131, 132-33 (Ala.2002); Ex parte Mobile Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 815 So.2d 527 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Butts, [775 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000) ]; Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Forensic Scis., 709 So.2d 455 (Ala.1997); Ex parte Franklin Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 674 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Ala.1996); and Alabama State Docks v. Saxon, 631 So.2d 943, 946 (Ala.1994). Accordingly, to the extent the sixth ‘exception’ can be read as allowing ‘actions for ... damages [to be] brought against State officials in their representative capacity,’ it is an incorrect statement of the law as it pertains to State immunity under § 14.
“The sixth ‘exception,’ as currently set forth in [Alabama Department of Transportation v.] Harbert [International, Inc., 990 So.2d 831 (Ala.2008),] and other authorities, can also be read as allowing ‘actions for injunction ... [to be] brought against State officials in their representative capacity and individually where it was alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law.’ Harbert, 990 So.2d at 840. To the extent that the sixth ‘exception’ as it is now formulated can be read as allowing actions for injunctive relief against State officials or agents in their individual capacity, it is an incorrect statement of the law because ‘a suit for injunctive relief against a State official in his or her individual capacity would be meaningless. This is so because State officials act for and represent the State only in their official capacities.’ Ex parte Dickson, 46 So.3d 468, 474 (Ala. 2010).
“The sixth ‘exception,’ as currently formulated, also allows ‘actions for damages, [to be] brought against State officials ... individually where it was alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority or in a mistaken interpretation of law.’ Harbert, 990 So.2d at 840. ‘This Court has recognized that a state officer or employee may not escape individual tort liability by “ ‘arguing that his mere status as a state official cloaks him with the state’s constitutional immunity.’ ” ’ Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 83 (Ala.1989) (quoting Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770, 781 (Ala.1988), quoting in turn Tort Liability of State Officials in Alabama, 35 Ala. L.Rev. 153 (1984)). ‘Clearly, a state officer or employee is not protected by § 14 when he acts willfully, maliciously, illegally, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.’ Phillips, 555 So.2d at 83. However, actions against State officials or agents in their individual capacities are not without limits. ‘State officers and employees, in their official capacities and individually, also are absolutely immune from suit when the action is, in effect, one against the State.’ Phillips, 555 So.2d at 83. In addition, as discussed in further detail below, a State official or agent may be entitled to State-agent immunity pursuant to Ex parte Cran-man, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), as to actions asserted against him or her in his or her individual capacity.
“Accordingly, based on the foregoing considerations, this Court today restates the sixth ‘exception’ to the bar of State immunity under § 14 as follows:
“ ‘(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State officials in their representative capacity where it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So.2d 428 (1967), and (b) actions for damages brought against State officials in their individual capacity where it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, subject to the limitation that the action not be, in effect, one against the State. Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 83 (Ala.1989).’ ”

Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d at 1140-41.

Discussion

Chief Aull argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss counts one and three of the complaint against him on the ground of State immunity.

A. Count One — Injunctive Relief

Chief Aull contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss count one against him, which sought in-junctive relief. Specifically, he asserts that the Collars’ request for injunctive relief did not fall within any of the “exceptions” to § 14 immunity because, he says, it was, in effect, an impermissible claim for monetary damages against the State. Count one asserts:

“28. Police departments on university campuses throughout the State of Alabama require their police officers to attend an approved police academy and receive, at least, minimum standards training from an accredited peace officer training facility. After completion of an accredited police academy, the individual police departments are required to provide follow-up and continued training to its officers.
“30. The University of South Alabama is required by law to take all meaningful measures to ensure that its police officers have adequate training, including how to effectuate a lawful arrest or to restrain a person.
“31. The University of South Alabama is also required by law to provide adequate equipment to its police officers to ensure that they can perform their jobs in a manner to effectuate lawful arrests.
“32. Chief Aull, in his capacity as the chief of police of the University of South Alabama Police Department, is required to ensure that the campus police officers are adequately trained and equipped to carry out their duties as police officers.
“33. The University of South Alabama and Chief Aull failed to provide adequate training to Officer Austin and also failed to provide him with a [Tjaser.
“34. Pursuant to well-established Alabama law, it is essential that police officers employed by the University of South Alabama receive adequate training and are provided appropriate equipment in order to ensure that students and other persons are not seriously injured or killed by police officers employed by the University of South Alabama.
“35. Injunctive relief is needed so that no others will be shot or killed on the campus of the University of South Alabama by officers using excessive force. Immediate and irreparable injury will occur without injunctive relief. The failure of the Court to issue injunc-tive relief could result in imminent and irreparable injury and harm to others. The benefit to the public greatly exceeds the burden to the State by issuance of the sought-after relief.
“WHEREFORE, [the Collars] request that this Court enter an Order for injunctive relief as follows:
“A. Requiring all police officers at the University of South Alabama to receive additional training on the means and methods to adequately control subjects utilizing the least restrictive and harmful means; and
“B. Requiring the University of South Alabama and Chief Aull to provide all necessary equipment, including [TJasers, to the police officers at the University and to provide concomitant training on the safe and appropriate use of [T]asers.
“C. Granting such other relief as may be necessary and appropriate.”

Before we reach Chief Aull’s claim that he is entitled to dismissal of count one on the ground of State immunity, we must first determine whether the Collars have standing to pursue their claim for injunctive relief against Chief Aull.

“ ‘ “Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the litigation.” National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994). “ ‘[L]aek of standing [is] a jurisdictional defect.’ ” State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Ala.1999) (quoting Tyler House Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 38 Fed.Cl. 1, 7 (Fed.C1.1997)). “[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.” Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala.1987).’
“Ex parte Fort James Operating Co., 871 So.2d 51, 54 (Ala.2003).”

Miller v. Riley, 37 So.3d 768, 772 (Ala. 2009).

In Ex parte Alabama Educational Television Commission, [Ms. 1111494, Sept. 27, 2013] — So.3d — (Ala.2013), this Court addressed whether Allan Pizzato, the former executive director of Alabama Public Television (“APT”), and Pauline Howland, the former deputy director and chief financial officer of APT, had standing to pursue claims against APT for violations of the Open Meetings Act, § 36-25A-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. The facts in that case indicated that, at the quarterly meeting of the Alabama Educational Television Commission (“the Commission”), held on June 12, 2012, the Commission voted to go into executive session to discuss Pizzato’s character and job performance. After the Commission returned to its regular meeting, both Pizzato’s employment and How-land’s employment were terminated. On July 11, 2012, Pizzato requested material from the Commission pursuant to the Open Records Act, § 36-12-40 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Subsequently, Pizzato sued the Commission and its commissioners, alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act and the Open Records Act. The Commission and the commissioners moved to dismiss Pizzato’s claims against them. They argued, among other things, that Pizzato did not have standing to bring a claim under the Open Meetings Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss to the extent Pizzato sought the civil fines provided for in the Open Meetings Act and to the extent Pizzato sought declaratory and/or injunctive relief against the Commission and against the commissioners in their official capacities. Pizzato later filed a second amended complaint in which he added Howland as a plaintiff. Subsequently, the Commission moved the trial court to certify three controlling questions of law for an immediate permissive appeal. One of those questions was “whether § 36-25A-9(a), Ala.Code 1975, gave Pizzato and Howard standing to bring their claims.” — So.3d at-. The trial court denied the motion for a permissive appeal, and the Commission and the commissioners petitioned for a writ of mandamus. In the main opinion, this Court addressed the standing issue as follows:

“The Commission and the Commissioners argue that although § 36-25A-9(a) allows for enforcement by ‘any Alabama citizen,’ a plaintiff must still satisfy the three requirements for standing set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
“In Lujan, the United States Supreme Court stated:
“‘Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” ’
504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
“This Court has adopted the Lujan test as the means of determining standing in Alabama. See Ex paHe King, 50 So.3d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2010) (‘Traditionally, Alabama courts have focused primarily on the injury claimed by the aggrieved party to determine whether that party has standing; however, in 2003 this Court adopted the following, more precise, rule regarding standing based upon the test used by the Supreme Court of the United States: “A party establishes standing to bring a ... challenge ... when it demonstrates the existence of (1) an actual, concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’ — ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’; (2) a ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” ’ (quoting Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Henri-Duval Winery, L.L.C., 890 So.2d 70, 74 (Ala.2003), quoting in turn Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61)). See also Muhammad v. Ford, 986 So.2d 1158, 1162 (Ala.2007) (stating that, ‘[i]n [Henri-Duval], this Court adopted a more precise rule regarding standing articulated by the United States Supreme Court’ in Lujan); Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, 904 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Ala.2004) (stating that the Court in Henri-Duval had ‘effectively restated’ the standard for standing, using the three-pronged test from Lu-jan ).
“Applying the Lujan test here, we conclude that Pizzato and Howland do not have standing to bring this action because they have failed to demonstrate ‘a likelihood that [their alleged] injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” ’ Henri-Duval, supra. Pizzato and Howland argue that they were injured by the Commission’s termination of their employment and that that ‘termination was the direct result and consequence of the Commissioners’ violation of the Open Meetings Act.’ Pizzato and Howland’s brief, at 21. They also argue:
‘“Pizzato amended his complaint to seek the relief mandated by statute and by the Circuit Court. Pizzato is both a citizen and the former Executive Director of APT, and his termination resulted directly from a violation of the Open Meetings Act. As such, he has every right to demand the civil fines specified in Ala.Code § 36-25A-9(g) in addition to whatever other relief the Circuit Court deems appropriate.’
“Pizzato and Howland’s brief, at 23.
“In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 186, 120 S.Ct, 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000), the Supreme Court held that civil penalties can serve as redress for standing purposes ‘[t]o the extent that they encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from committing future ones.’ The Supreme Court distinguished Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 106, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), stating:
‘“Steel Co. established that citizen suitors lack standing to seek civil penalties for violations that have abated by the time of suit. We specifically noted in that case that there was no allegation in the complaint of any continuing or imminent violation, and that no basis for such an allegation appeared to exist.’
“Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 187 (citation omitted).
“Here, the only specific relief Pizzato and Howland requested was the civil fines provided for in § 36-25A-9(g). Like the injury in Steel Co., however, the alleged injury here was caused by an alleged one-time violation of the Open Meetings Act that was wholly past when Pizzato and Howland’s action was filed. Pizzato and Howland have not alleged any ‘continuing or imminent violation,’ nor does any ‘basis for such an allegation appear to exist.’ Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 187. Thus, as in Steel Co., Pizzato and Howland’s request for civil fines ‘seeks not remediation of [their] injury ... but vindication of the rule of law.’ Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106. In fact, Pizzato and Howland argue:
“ ‘To argue as [the Commission and the Commissioners] have argued that Pizzato has suffered no redressable injury is to argue that there is no public policy interest or value to an injured party in seeing wrongdoers held accountable for failing to follow the law. Hearing such an argument advanced by [the Commission and the Commissioners] is offensive to those who believe their government can— and should — do better. This callous and nonchalant attitude towards a clear violation of the law is indicative of the very reason this action must be maintained. Even if such a judgment will not make Pizzato whole, the value of enforcing the law cannot be viewed through the narrow lens of costs and benefits to those wronged by the violation. The significance and value of requiring Commissioners to comply with the Open Meetings Act includes the significance and value to Pizzato, but encompasses the general public as well. The fact that such value evades easy quantification by [the Commission and the Commissioners] does not diminish its importance.’
“Pizzato and Howland’s brief, at 23-24. Fines sought for such purposes do not satisfy the redressability prong of the Lujan test. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107 (‘Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement.’). Thus, Pizzato and Howland have failed to establish standing under the Lujan test for their claims against the Commission and the Commissioners.”

(Footnotes omitted.)

In the present case, count one of the complaint alleged that the relief requested “is needed so that no others will be shot or killed on the campus of the University of South Alabama by officers using excessive force.... The failure of the Court to issue injunctive relief could result in imminent and irreparable injury and harm to others.” (Emphasis added.) We empathize with the Collars’ desire to prevent future injury and future harm to others under similar circumstances. However, the fact remains that, as was the case in Ex parte Alabama Educational Television Commission, the Collars cannot satisfy the re-dressability requirement of the test established in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), as to their claim for injunctive relief. Providing additional training and “Tasers” to the University’s law-enforcement officers will not remedy the injury suffered by the Collars in this case. Therefore, the Collars have not established that, under Lujan, they have standing to pursue their claims against Chief Aull for injunctive relief. Thus, Chief Aull is entitled to the dismissal of count one of the complaint.

B. ■Count Three — Negligence Claim

Chief Aull argues that, under § 14, he is immune from suit as to the Collars’ claim seeking money damages against him in his official capacity. In count three, the Collars alleged that the University, Chief Aull, and fictitiously named parties A-L had breached their duties to the general public:

“a. By failing to provide adequate training to Officer Austin and its other police officers, namely, training that he, as a sworn officer, is not to use force greater than that necessary to effectuate an arrest and/or to use the least damaging or deadly means of force as the situation presents;
“b. By failing to provide adequate training to Officer Austin and its other police officers to use physical and verbal means to control a subject who is under the influence of alcohol or drugs or who is mentally unstable, or, only when appropriate, to use his baton or pepper spray to control a situation, such as the one at issue in this ease;
“c. By failing to provide adequate training to Officer Austin and its other police officers to call for and wait for assistance from other officers, employees of the University or citizens in order to effectuate an arrest without the use of deadly force; and
“d. By failing to provide Officer Austin and its other officers with [Tjasers and with adequate training in the use and implementation of [Tjasers to assist with arresting subjects who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol or who are mentally unstable.”

Count three further alleges that the University, Chief Aull, and the fictitiously named parties had “negligently acted or negligently failed to act, thereby creating circumstances which proximately caused the death of Gilbert Collar” and sought damages from the University, Chief Aull, and the fictitiously named parties.

As this Court stated in Ex parte Moul-ton: ' “[Ijt is well established that actions for damages against State agents in their official or representative capacities are considered actions to recover money from the State and are barred by State immunity under § 14.” 116 So.3d at 1140. Therefore, Chief Aull is entitled to State immunity as to the Collars’ claims seeking monetary damages against him in his official capacity, and there is no possibility that the Collars might possibly prevail on such a claim. Thus, Chief Aull is entitled to the dismissal of the negligence claim asserted in count three. See Ex parte Burnell, 90 So.3d 708 (Ala.2012) (holding that the defendant had established a clear legal right to the dismissal of the complaint against him because the claims in the complaint were barred by the doctrine of State immunity and because the defendant was acting in the line and scope of his duties as a deputy sheriff at the time the plaintiff was injured); Ex parte Murphy, supra (holding that the director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety had a clear legal right to the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims seeking monetary damages against him in his official capacity because the claims were barred by the doctrine of State immunity).

Conclusion

Chief Aull has a clear legal right to the dismissal of counts one and three of the complaint against him. Therefore, we grant Chief Aull’s petition for a writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to vacate its order denying Chief Aull’s motion to dismiss and to grant Chief Aull’s motion to dismiss counts one and three of the complaint against him.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

MURDOCK and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

MAIN, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.

BOLIN, J., concurs in the result.

PARKER, J., concurs in the result in part and dissents in part.

MOORE, C.J., dissents.

STUART, J., recuses herself.

MAIN, Justice

(concurring in part and concurring in the result).

As to Part B of the “Discussion” section of the main opinion, which addresses count three of the complaint, the negligence claim, I concur. However, as to Part A, which addresses count one, the claim seeking injunctive relief, I concur only in the result because I dissented in Ex parte Alabama Educational Television Commission, [Ms. 1111494, Sept. 27, 2013] — So.3d — (Ala.2013), a case heavily relied upon by the main opinion.

PARKER, Justice

(concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).

I concur only in the result as to that part of the main opinion addressing count one — the claim for injunctive relief — and ordering the dismissal of that claim because I dissented in Ex parte Alabama Educational Television Commission, [Ms. 1111494, Sept. 27, 2013] — So.3d — (Ala.2013), a case on which the main opinion relies. I dissent from that part of the main opinion addressing count three — the negligence claim.

      . See infra note 2.

      . In their opposition to the motion to dismiss and in their brief to this Court, the Collars state generally that they are suing Chief Aull in both his official and his individual capacities. They also assert that Chief Aull is not entitled to State-agent immunity as to the individual-capacity claims against him because, they say, he acted beyond his authority and failed to discharge his duties pursuant to specific rules and regulations. However, the Collars did not indicate anywhere in the complaint that they were suing Chief Aull in his individual capacity or that they were attempting to recover money damages from Chief Aull's personal assets.
      "A claim against an employee in his or her individual capacity, however, does not seek to recover damages from the governmental entity. See Gamble v. Florida Dep't of Flealth & Rehabilitative Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1513 (11th Cir.1986) ('Whether a state officer is being sued for damages in an official or an individual capacity is not mere semantics; the question is whether the plaintiff is reasonably seeking relief from the state coffers or from the individual’s assets.’ (quoted in Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So.2d 105, 110 (Ala.2006))).”

        Sutiles v. Roy, 75 So.3d 90, 98 (Ala.2010). Additionally, in count four of their complaint, which alleged claims against Officer Austin, the Collars specifically allege: "Officer Austin acted beyond his authority as a sworn police officer by failing to discharge his duties, pursuant to the specific and detailed rules and regulations, including the policies and procedures of his own department and the policies and procedures established by State law.” However, the complaint did not include any such allegations against Chief Aull. Further, the only reference to Chief Aull’s capacity is included in count one, which alleged:
      "Chief Aull, in his capacity as the chief of police of the University of South Alabama Police Department, is required to ensure that [officers] can perform their jobs in a manner to effectuate lawful arrests.”

        Thus, the complaint does not state a claim against Chief Aull in his individual capacity. Cf. Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So.2d 105, 110 (Ala.2006) (holding that “the nature of the claims" against one of the defendants and "the course of the proceedings” showed that the plaintiffs in that case were proceeding against that defendant in her official capacity). Accordingly, we pretermit any discussion regarding whether Chief Aull, in his individual capacity, would be entitled to State-agent immunity.