author: GARRETT, J.

text:
    Angela SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Reginald SCOTT, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 48,716-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 15, 2014.
    Louis Granderson Scott, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Dimos, Erskine, Burkett & Garner, LLP, Monroe, by Robert L. Garner, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Before CARAWAY, LOLLEY and GARRETT, JJ.
   GARRETT, J.

11 Reginald Scott appeals from a city court eviction judgment rendered in favor of his former wife. For the reasons given below, we reverse and vacate the city court judgment because the city court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute.

FACTS

Reginald and Angela Scott, a married couple, bought a house on South Grand Street in Monroe in August 2003. They failed to pay the 2004 city property taxes and the property was adjudicated to Delores Manuel for $223.40 at the tax sale held on June 29, 2005. The Scotts were divorced by judgment rendered on February 25, 2011. On April 25, 2012, Ms. Manuel executed a quitclaim deed conveying all of her right, title and interest in and to the property to Mrs. Scott, without any warranty of title and without any amount of consideration being shown on the deed.

On March 22, 2013, Mrs. Scott filed a rule for eviction in Monroe City Court to remove Mr. Scott from the house. She alleged that she acquired the property as a single woman after the divorce, and Mr. Scott has no ownership interest in it. Mrs. Scott also asserted that Ms. Manuel had record title to the property when she quit-claimed it to Mrs. Scott in 2012 since the three-year redemptive period had run out. Mrs. Scott alleged that written notice to vacate the property had been given to Mr. Scott but he refused to comply.

The matter was tried as a summary proceeding in Monroe City Court on April 3, 2013. At the outset, Mr. Scott, who was unrepresented, informed the court that Mrs. Scott had tried to evict him twice the previous month before a different city court judge, but both times the judge dismissed |gthe case for lack of jurisdiction and advised Mrs. Scott that the appropriate forum for the dispute was district court. Mrs. Scott’s attorney argued that in the previous court appearances Mrs. Scott had been proceeding in proper person and had been unable to show that she alone owned the property. However, the attorney was not present during the earlier proceedings and had no first-hand knowledge of the reasoning behind the two prior dismissals. Without addressing the legal effect of the prior dismissals, the city court judge proceeded to hear evidence on the instant rule to evict.

Mrs. Scott testified that after she moved out of the house, the taxes were not paid and the house was sold at a tax sale. She stated that she began talking to Ms. Manuel in 2010 to verify her husband’s claims that he was making payments to redeem the house from Ms. Manuel. After she learned from Ms. Manuel that he had stopped after making only one payment, she began paying to acquire the house for herself. However, she received legal advice that if she made the payments while she and Mr. Scott were still married, “it would just go back to the way it was.” Mrs. Scott reached an agreement with Ms. Manuel whereby Ms. Manuel allowed her to wait until after the divorce to make the final payments. Mrs. Scott testified that she and her husband divorced in February 2011, and there was no community property settlement because they no longer owned the house or any other community property at the time she filed for divorce. After the divorce, Mrs. Scott resumed making payments, ultimately paying Ms. Manuel a total of $1,045 to reimburse her for the property taxes she had paid over the years.

According to Mrs. Scott’s testimony, at the time she began making payments, Mr. Scott was not living in the house. He moved back in only Rafter she paid Ms. Manuel and she told him that she intended to live there herself.

Mr. Scott testified that after the 2005 tax sale, he reached an agreement with Ms. Manuel whereby he would pay her the amounts she had paid in order to redeem the property for his family. Ms. Manuel acknowledged that she did receive one payment in the amount of $180 from Mr. Scott. Although he promised her repeatedly that he would make additional payments, Ms. Manuel testified that he failed to do so. Later Mrs. Scott visited her and offered to pay. Although Ms. Manuel tried to call Mr. Scott and give him another chance to pay, she was unable to contact him. Consequently, she accepted payment from Mrs. Scott. Ms. Manuel testified that she and Mrs. Scott went to a lawyer and had the quitclaim deed to Mrs. Scott prepared and executed.

During cross-examination by Mrs. Scott’s lawyer, Ms. Manuel stated that the $180 payment from Mr. Scott was not rent, but repayment of the taxes she had paid on the house. She also stated that the one payment made by Mr. Scott was before the Scotts’ divorce. She denied any written agreement between herself and Mr. Scott to sell the property back to him. She testified that she was aware that the couple was divorced when she quitclaimed the house to Mrs. Scott and that she intended to convey it to Mrs. Scott alone. She further testified that she had paid more than $1,000 in taxes and that she only sought to recoup what she spent.

The city court judge granted judgment in Mrs. Scott’s favor and signed a judgment of eviction on April 3, 2013, ordering Mr. Scott to vacate the premises within 24 hours. A return filed in the record showed that the Reviction judgment was served at the residence that same day. Also that same day, Mr. Scott — now represented by counsel — filed a petition for appeal. He asserted that the community property between the parties was never divided and that the quitclaim deed did not grant full title to Mrs. Scott. He further argued that the two prior eviction cases based on the same facts had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by another city court judge. He was granted a sus-pensive appeal on April 4, 2013; however, the record does not indicate that he posted the appeal bond.

Mrs. Scott then obtained a warrant for possession on April 5, 2013. On April 8, 2013, the warrant of possession was received by a deputy city marshal. The record indicates that a deputy city marshal evicted Mr. Scott on April 19, 2013, with a notation that Mrs. Scott had given him time to move and that Mr. Scott had removed all of his items from the residence.

LAW

Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties, and to grant the relief to which they are entitled. La. C.C.P. art. 1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C.C.P. art. 2. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. A judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void. La. C.C.P. art. 3.

| sCity courts have limited jurisdiction. La. C.C.P. art. 4832. The subject matter jurisdiction of city courts is limited by the amount in dispute and by the nature of the proceeding. La. C.C.P. art. 4841. In relevant part, La. C.C.P. art. 4847 provides:

A. Except as otherwise provided by law, a ... city court has no jurisdiction in any of the following cases or proceedings:
(1) A case involving title to immovable property.
(4) A claim for annulment of marriage, divorce, separation of property, or alimony.
B. In addition, city courts shall not have jurisdiction in ... partition proceedings.

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of an action, even by the court on its own motion. Northeast Realty v. Jackson, 36,276 (La.App.2d Cir.8/14/02), 824 So.2d 1264; PTS Physical Therapy Serv., Inc. v. Magnolia Rehab. Serv., Inc., 40,558 (La.App.2d Cir.1/27/06), 920 So.2d 997.

An eviction proceeding is not a proper or appropriate place to determine title, where the defendant has a semblance of title. Northeast Realty v. Jackson, supra. Summary eviction procedure is not appropriate to try disputed title to property but is designed for situations where the possessor has no semblance of claim to title or possession. Northeast Realty v. Jackson, supra; Moody Inv. Corp. v. Occupants of 901 E. 70th St., 43,396 (La.App.2d Cir.8/13/08), 990 So.2d 119. If title to immovable property is in dispute, the city court lacks jurisdiction over the case. La. C.C.P. art. 4847; Moody Inv. Corp. v. Occupants of 901 E. 70th St., supra.

| fiEviction is a proper remedy for use by an owner of immovable property, who wishes to evict the occupant therefrom, after the purpose of the occupancy has ceased. La. C.C.P. art. 4702 provides the basis for this remedy and was designed to give an owner of immovable property summary means to evict an occupant without fulfilling the burden and delay required in a petitory action. La. C.C.P. art. 4705 expressly states that the eviction procedure shall not be construed to conflict -with the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles relating to actions to determine ownership or possession. Northeast Realty v. Jackson, supra; PTS Physical Therapy Serv., Inc. v. Magnolia Rehab. Serv., Inc., supra.

In an eviction proceeding against an occupant, the petitioner is required to make a prima facie showing of title to the property, prove that the defendant is an occupant as defined in La. C.C.P. art. 4704, and show that the purpose of the occupancy has ceased. Moody Inv. Corp. v. Occupants of 901 E. 70th St., supra.

In some instances, a purchase by a co-owner from a third-party tax sale adjudica-tee outside the redemptive period may inure to the benefit of the other co-owners and provide a redemptive effect. See Liner v. Lewis, 34,746 (La.App.2d Cir.6/22/01), 792 So.2d 822, writ denied, 2001-2547 (La.12/7/01), 803 So.2d 972, and cases discussed therein. Also, La. R.S. 47:2209, which was added by Acts 2008, No. 819, provides:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, when a tax debtor or an owner participates, directly or indirectly, in a post-adjudication sale or donation during or subsequent to expiration of the redemptive period, it shall be treated as a redemption, and the tax debtor or owner shall be required to pay all taxes and costs in accordance with all laws applicable to redemptions. However, if the property is redeemed, all mortgages, liens, privileges, and other 17encumbrances affecting the property prior to the sale shall remain in full force and effect with the same validity and priority as if the sale had not occurred.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Scott argues that the city court lacked jurisdiction because the matter involved community property and disputed ownership of immovable property. We agree.

The instant case presents a surprisingly complex factual situation. After the marital home was sold in the tax sale to Ms. Manuel, both spouses made payments to the tax sale purchaser to redeem the property. The community property regime may have still been in existence when some of the payments were made. Mr. Scott negotiated a deal with Ms. Manuel to redeem the property on behalf of his family and made a payment to her pursuant to that agreement. Thereafter, Mrs. Scott made a separate agreement with Ms. Manuel to make payments to acquire the house for herself. The record also shows that Mrs. Scott did not pay Ms. Manuel the fair market value of the property but only reimbursed her for the sums she expended on the taxes for it. Furthermore, nothing in this record suggests that Ms. Manuel ever filed an action to quiet her tax title. Obviously, all of these factors give rise to serious and as yet unresolved questions about the disputed title to the property; the obligations owed by spouses and former spouses with regard to community property; obligations between co-owners; rights of co-owners; and a myriad of other legal issues pertaining to immovable property.

|sDue to the unusual and disputed title issues presented under the circumstances of this case, we find that the city court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under La. C.C.P. art. 4847. Summary eviction procedure is not appropriate to try disputed title to property but is designed only for situations where the defendant has no semblance of claim to title or possession. Because this complex factual and legal situation does not readily support the conclusion that Mr. Scott has no semblance of claim to title, the summary eviction procedure utilized by Mrs. Scott in city court was not appropriate as the city court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we must reverse and vacate the city court judgment of eviction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the city court granting eviction in favor of the plaintiff is reversed and vacated. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellee, Angela Scott.

REVERSED.

      . No brief was filed on behalf of Mrs. Scott.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Felinda P. THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GM BENEFITS & SERVICE CENTER, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 48,718-WCA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 15, 2014.

      Davis Law Office, LLC, by: S.P. Davis, Sr., Kharmen Davis, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    J. Martin Lattier, Shreveport, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, MOORE and GARRETT, JJ.
   GARRETT, J.

hThe claimant, Felinda P. Thomas, appeals from a judgment dismissing her worker’s compensation claim with prejudice. The worker’s compensation judge (WCJ) determined in the proceedings below that the claimant failed to prove that a compensable accident occurred. After a thorough review of the entire record, including the voluminous exhibits, we conclude that the WCJ did not commit manifest error in ruling that the claimant failed to prove that she sustained a work-related injury. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

The claimant began working for GM in 1995. Immediately prior to 2011, her job title on the assembly line at the Shreveport plant was a “carpet assist,” meaning that she helped the carpet installer. This job involved repetitive work and moving carpet that weighed about 20 pounds. In January 2011, GM began to institute a policy to rotate each employee to a second job for at least one hour per 10-hour shift. The claimant’s rotation job was as an “IP install,” which involved installing instrument panels or dashboards. If the hoist was working properly, she was not required to physically lift the instrument panel, which weighed about 25 to 30 pounds, to place it on studs before bolting it down.

On June 11, 2011, the date of the alleged injury, the claimant was working at the IP installer job when the hoist allegedly malfunctioned. She testified that she had to physically lift and position instrument panels five or six times. According to the claimant’s testimony, this activity caused her to injure her left shoulder and neck.

|2On June 15, 2011, the claimant had an appointment with Dr. Karl Bilderback, an orthopedic surgeon, in connection with an assessment for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. She did not mention an accident on June 11, 2011, to Dr. Bilderback, who noted on her physical exam that the claimant was “in no distress.”

GM’s internal medical records show that the claimant reported right shoulder pain to a company nurse on June 16, 2011. In an accident/illness report filled out by the claimant in her own handwriting, she gave an accident date of “6/16/11” and also stated that she reported the accident to her supervisor and to GM’s medical clinic on that same date. She specifically stated that the injury occurred when she pushed on the instrument panel with her right shoulder and that the part of her body which was injured was her right shoulder. This document was signed by the claimant and dated June 16, 2011.

On June 20, 2011, the claimant returned to GM’s medical office complaining of left shoulder pain. Subsequently, on July 11, 2011, she filled out another accident/illness report in which she stated that the accident occurred and was reported to her supervisor on June 11, 2011, and then reported to GM’s medical clinic on June 16, 2011. In this report, she asserted that she injured her left shoulder.

On July 12, 2011, the claimant was seen for left shoulder and neck pain by Dr. Steven Atchison, an orthopedic surgeon. She recounted to him that the pain began after she had “a change on her job.... She states she has |sbeen doing a job where she can tolerate but now she has added a different activity, which is causing an increase pain [sic].” Dr. Atchison testified that the claimant never stated that she suffered a specific injury and that he had no idea whether her complaints were caused by her employment with GM. Although an MRI he ordered in October 2011 showed a left rotator cuff tear, he admitted that there was no way to determine whether it was traumatic or degenerative.

In January 2012, Dr. Atchison referred the claimant to another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. John David Googe. In turn, Dr. Googe sent her to see Dr. Eubulus Kerr, an orthopedic spine surgeon. Her chief complaint to Dr. Kerr was severe neck pain that radiated down her left upper extremity across her left shoulder into her left forearm. In February 2012, he performed a cervical diskectomy and fusion on the claimant. According to Dr. Kerr’s preop history and physical report, the claimant recounted that her pain began on September 9, 2011, “when she was at work doing a car park job.” He testified that he understood the pain began when she was doing a carpet job, but did not know what that entailed. He could not say whether the neck injury was related to her employment. Dr. Kerr further testified that she never mentioned a June 2011 work injury.

On November 29, 2011, the claimant filed a disputed claim for compensation alleging that she injured her left shoulder, neck and left arm 14on June 11, 2011, when .she lifted a vehicle dashboard into place because the “Horse Machine” (i.e., the mechanical hoist machine) was not operating. She asserted that no wage benefits had been paid and no medical treatment had been authorized. She asked for penalties and attorney fees on the basis that the employer arbitrarily and capriciously denied her claims.

On December 7, 2011, the claimant filed an amended disputed claim for compensation wherein she also requested reimbursement for all personal medical expenses she paid and for reinstatement of six weeks of leave time and vacation time. Three days before trial, she sought to amend her claim yet again to allege a second' accident on September 9, 2011. GM objected, and the motion to amend was denied as untimely.

Trial was held on December 3, 2012. The claimant objected to the introduction of many of her past medical records on grounds of relevancy. However, the WCJ overruled the objection, noting that the issue went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. During her testimony, the claimant declared that she had not received any treatment for her left shoulder at any time prior to June 11, 2011. GM’s counsel then impeached her with numerous incidents when she had complaints of left shoulder pain for which she sought treatment. These occasions dated back as far as 1998; one was as recent as February 2011.

In addition to her own testimony, the claimant presented the testimony of two of her treating physicians, Dr. Atchison and Dr. Kerr. The employer elicited testimony from Richard Mark Johnson, a GM labor relations representative, to introduce evidence pertaining to the claimant’s | fiemployment history. Subsequent to trial, GM was allowed to depose Dr. Googe and introduce his deposition into the record.

On March 6, 2013, the WCJ issued written reasons for judgment dismissing the claimant’s demands. It is abundantly clear that the WCJ undertook an exhaustive review of the voluminous exhibits which were introduced into evidence along with the depositions. The WCJ noted that during the claimant’s lengthy employment with GM, she had reported a wide variety of injuries and medical conditions, some of which were not work-related. Her medical records disclosed treatment for, among other maladies, carpal tunnel symptoms, neck pain, back pain, right shoulder pain, and foot pain. At trial and in discussions with her doctors, the claimant denied prior injury to her left shoulder. However, the WCJ found that her medical records contained 14 references to pre-accident left shoulder pain, beginning in 1998.

The WCJ meticulously reviewed the facts surrounding the alleged accident. The medical records from the GM plant indicated that the claimant initially sought treatment on June 16, 2011, for an injury she reported as occurring to her right shoulder on that date. She subsequently filed a new incident report stating she injured her left shoulder on June 11, 2011. The medical evidence admitted at trial showed that when the | (¡claimant saw Dr. Atchison in July 2011 and Dr. Googe in January 2012, she did not refer to a specific incident causing her left shoulder complaint. When the claimant saw Dr. Kerr, who performed cervical surgery on her in February 2012, she related her neck pain to a “car park job” at GM on September 9, 2011. Also, she failed to mention any accident or a left shoulder injury when she saw Dr. Bilderback on June 15, 2011, four days after the alleged accident.

Based upon this evidence, the WCJ concluded that the claimant failed to carry her burden of proving a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. He found her credibility “questionable.” Among the factors the WCJ considered in reaching this conclusion were her material alterations of the date of injury and the shoulder allegedly injured; her denial of prior left shoulder injuries despite numerous medical records to the contrary; her failure to mention the alleged accident to Dr. Bilderback when she saw him four days after the alleged injury; and her failure to produce any witness verifying her account of the accident. The WCJ specifically found that, not only did substantial evidence discredit or cast doubt upon the claimant’s account, but that the circumstances following the alleged accident “actually discredited” her testimony.

Judgment dismissing the claimant’s demands with prejudice and at her expense was signed on March 6, 2013.

The claimant appeals.

IvLAW

The plaintiff in a worker’s compensation action bears the burden of establishing the causation of an injury to a work-related accident by a preponderance of the evidence. Harrison v. Madison Parish Sch. Bd., 47,496 (La.App.2d Cir.11/21/12), 108 So.3d 153. A work-related accident is an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration. La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

On appeal, factual findings in worker’s compensation cases are subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Banks v. Indus. Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 96-2840 (La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 551; Alley v. Perini/O & G Indus., 44,268 (La.App.2d Cir.5/13/09), 12 So.3d 427. In applying this standard, an appellate court must determine not whether the factfinder was right or wrong, but whether the factfin-der’s conclusion was reasonable. Stobart v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993); Harrison v. Madison Parish Sch. Bd., supra.

While the worker’s testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge the burden of proving a work-related accident, it will be inadequate where (1) other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker’s version of the incident; or (2) the worker’s testimony is not corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. Such corroboration may include medical evidence and the testimony of a spouse, fellow workers, or friends. Slater v. Mid-South Extrusion, 43,343 (La.App.2d Cir.8/13/08), 989 So.2d 252. In determining whether a worker has satisfied the burden of proof, the trier of fact is expected to focus on the issue of credibility because, absent contradictory circumstances and evidence, a claimant’s testimony is accorded great weight. Longoria v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 37,975 (La.App.2d Cir.12/19/03), 862 So.2d 1172, writ denied, 2004-0157 (La.4/23/04), 870 So.2d 299.

A claimant’s lack of credibility on factual issues can serve to diminish the veracity of her complaints to a physician. Green v. Thompson Home Health, 46,593 (La.App.2d Cir.9/21/11), 73 So.3d 490, writ denied, 2011-2460 (La.1/20/12), 78 So.3d 143.

Whether the claimant has carried the burden of proof and whether testimony is credible are questions of fact to be determined by the WCJ. Nivens v. Fields, 46,524 (La.App.2d Cir.11/16/11), 79 So.3d 1144. The trial court is in a superior position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses than is the appellate court. Lewis v. Chateau D’Arbonne Nurse Care Ctr., 38,394 (La.App.2d Cir.4/7/04), 870 So.2d 515. The trier of fact’s determinations as to whether the worker’s testimony is credible and whether the worker discharged the burden of proof are factual determinations, not to be disturbed upon review unless clearly wrong. Green v. Thompson Home Health, supra.

Where the factfinder’s conclusions are based on determinations regarding credibility of the witnesses, the manifest error standard demands great deference to the trier of fact because only the trier of fact can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the | listener’s understanding and belief in what is said. Daniels v. Hemphill Const. Co., 45,946 (La.App.2d Cir.1/26/11), 57 So.3d 428, writ denied, 2011-0633 (La.5/6/11), 62 So.3d 128. When there are two permissible views of the evidence, a factfinder’s choice between them can never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Scott v. Super One Foods, 45,636 (La.App.2d Cir.9/29/10), 48 So.3d 1133.

DISCUSSION

The claimant contends that the WCJ erred in finding that she failed to show that she suffered a compensable injury. She claims that the “undisputed” facts show that she suffered a work-related injury on June 11, 2011, and that the WCJ erred in giving too much weight to “irrelevant” facts regarding her prior injuries. The claimant also criticizes the WCJ’s determination that she lacked credibility. In contravention, GM argues that the WCJ did not commit manifest error in dismissing the claimant’s case, citing its many discrepancies.

We note at the outset that there were no witnesses to the claimant’s alleged accident. This fact makes the claimant’s credibility an issue of vital importance in the WCJ’s analysis of her assertion of a work-related injury and his determination that her claims were not worthy of belief.

Even the date of the alleged injury is mired in controversy. The claimant originally gave the date of this event as June 16, 2011, in her first accident report. She then changed it to June 11, 2011, in her amended report. Notably, she made no mention of any such accident to Dr. Bilder-back, who examined her on June 15, 2011 — four days after she purportedly suffered the injury and the day before she felt sufficiently |ininjured to seek assistance at the GM medical clinic — and he noted in his report that she was not in any distress. To confuse matters even more, when the claimant saw Dr. Bilderback again several months later, she recounted to him that she suffered an injury the day after she last saw him, which would have been June 16, 2011. At trial, the claimant steadfastly maintained that she was injured on June 11, 2011.

Furthermore, the shoulder that the claimant purportedly injured is equally controverted. In her first accident report and in the medical records documenting her first visit to the GM medical clinic, the injured shoulder is described as her right one. In her subsequent report and medical visits, the left shoulder is given as the injured body part.

These disputed components of the claimant’s allegations — the date of the injury and the body part injured — are not inconsequential details. The fact that the claimant herself gave such inconsistent accounts of the circumstances surrounding her supposed accident strains credulity.

Another element adversely affecting the claimant’s credibility was her own testimony that she had never sought treatment for her left shoulder before the instant “accident.” Her own medical records directly contradicted and disproved this declaration. As painstakingly recounted in the WCJ’s excellent written reasons, medical personnel noted the claimant’s complaints of left or bilateral shoulder pain on no less than 14 occasions. The first documented complaint was in 1998; the most recent one was only four months before the June 2011 incident asserted by the claimant.

| ^Finally, in assessing the claimant’s credibility, we note that the WCJ also had the added benefit of observing the her demeanor, an advantage of which this reviewing court is deprived.

Given the numerous conflicts in the evidence, we are unable to find that the WCJ was clearly wrong in finding that the claimant lacked credibility and that she failed to carry her burden of proving her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Finding no manifest error, we affirm the WCJ’s decision dismissing the claimant’s demands against her employer.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the ruling of the worker’s compensation judge. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the claimant, Felinda P. Thomas.

AFFIRMED.

      . When she saw Dr. Bilderback again in April 2012, however, she reported that the day after her June 15, 2011, appointment, she injured her left shoulder at work while lifting carpet.

      . The preop report was under Dr. Kerr’s signature. In another report with the same date which was also under the signature of Dr. Kerr’s physician's assistant, the history recounted is that the pain started in "September of 2009, when she was at work doing a carpet job.”

      . In his deposition, Dr. Googe testified that the claimant did not relate a specific cause of her June 2011 left shoulder pain or a prior history of left shoulder pain. Like Dr. Atchi-son, he opined that the cause of her pain could have been degenerative or induced by trauma. He also concurred in Dr. Atchison’s statement that there was no objective evidence, only the claimant's subjective complaints, that related the left shoulder pain to her occupation.

      . The claimant complained of left or bilateral shoulder pain to her primary physician, Dr. K.R. Singh, on five occasions between 1998 and 2008. The GM medical records showed complaints of left or bilateral shoulder pain on five occasions between 2001 and February 2011. Between 2007 and 2009, the claimant sought treatment for left or bilateral shoulder pain at four other medical facilities.


author: MOORE, J.

text:
    GREENWOOD COMMUNITY CENTER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Frank CALEP, et al., Defendant-Appellees.
    No. 48,737-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 15, 2014.

      Aliene D. Fields, In Proper Person, for Appellant.
    Shuey, Smith, LLC, Shreveport, by Richard E. Hiller, for Appellees.
    Before WILLIAMS, MOORE and GARRETT, JJ.
   MOORE, J.

|, Aliene Fields, in proper person, appeals a judgment rejecting the petition of Greenwood Community Center (“GCC”) for declaratory judgment that an act of cash sale was null and void, and ordering GCC to pay the defendants’ attorney fees. We affirm.

Factual Background

Ms. Fields testified that she was “president manager” of GCC, a corporation that she founded when “God gave me the plan.” In 1988, GCC bought a tract of land, some 6⅜ acres, on Greenwood-Springridge Road in southern Caddo Parish, from Frank S. Messinger for $39,000. The deed recited that GCC paid $10,000 and that Messinger granted a mortgage for the balance, $29,000. At some point GCC put up a building on the property to serve as the community center.

The contested cash sale took place in December 1991. Ms. Fields’s sister, Mattie Calep, and her husband, Frank (residents of Chicago), made out a check to Messinger for $25,000 and sent it to Wayne Webb, an attorney and notary in west Shreveport. (Webb testified that he had known the lender, Messinger, for years.) Webb jotted on the check, “The mortgage note will be released for cancellation.” On December 30, 1991, Webb notarized the act of cash sale from GCC to the Caleps for the stated price of $25,000. Webb did not specifically recall the closing, but testified that because he did not know Ms. Fields, he would have asked to see her driver’s license before she signed; he added that the two witnesses to the sale were secretaries in his and an adjacent office. He was positive that Ms. Fields came to his office and signed the sale on behalf of GCC. He also testified that he did not think GCC actually received any cash but was merely | ^relieved of the balance on the mortgage. The act of sale was recorded December 31, 1991. Webb also notarized an assignment of the mortgage note from Messinger to the Caleps; this was recorded March 11,1992.

According to Ms. Fields, the Caleps never took possession of the property. In her view, the $25,000 they sent to Messinger was their gift to GCC and the church. However, in August 1998, Webb advised Ms. Fields by letter that the Caleps claimed ownership of the property and that she and “anyone acting on behalf of’ GCC should stay off.

Procedural History

In August 2011, GCC, acting through counsel but “represented herein” by Ms. Fields, filed this suit against the Caleps, alleging that the 1991 cash sale was “fraudulent” and that GCC had been in peaceful possession of the property ever since; in the alternative, she alleged GCC held title by acquisitive prescription. She demanded a declaratory judgment that the 1991 cash sale was null and void, and that GCC was owner of the property.

The Caleps filed a general denial and, almost a year later, a motion for summary judgment. They showed that the 1991 cash sale, as a notarial act, was self-proving, and that Ms. Fields had raised only conclusory allegations of fraud. In support, they attached Webb’s affidavit, confirming that Ms. Fields indeed signed the 1991 cash sale; and their own affidavit, stating that they had made no misrepresentations to Ms. Fields, and had been paying property taxes on the tract since December 30, 1991. They also attached a certified copy of a resolution of GCC’s board of directors, dated January 2, 1992, authorizing Ms. Fields to sell the property to the Caleps for $25,000, |sand ratifying her prior act of signing on behalf of the corporation. The resolution is signed by GCC’s secretary, Michelle Caldwell.

Ms. Fields opposed the motion, asserting that the $25,000 was a gift from the Caleps, and reiterating that the 1991 cash sale was fraudulent. In support, she attached her own affidavit, stating that until her sister (Mrs. Calep) contacted her within the last year, she had no idea the Caleps were claiming ownership of the property; she always “maintained that title was listed” under GCC; she “did not knowingly transfer title” to the Caleps; and she “did not sign and would not have signed” such documents.

On the strength of Ms. Fields’s attachments, the district court denied the motion for summary judgment.

Two months later, the Caleps filed the instant rule for sanctions and attorney fees. They asserted that the 1991 cash sale was self-proving and supported by the board’s resolution; Ms. Fields made an affidavit simply denying that she signed it, but because the evidence was overwhelming that she did, her affidavit had no evi-dentiary support and was raised for an improper purpose, La. C.C.P. art. 863 D. They attached their attorney’s affidavit of fees totaling $12,120.40.

Action in the District Court

At a hearing on February 11, 2013, the court stated without objection that it would try the entire matter: if Ms. Fields offered no proof that her signature on the 1991 cash sale was a forgery, the court would grant the rule, impose sanctions and dismiss GCC’s suit for declaratory judgment. The court also stated that the Caleps were not present when the 1991 cash sale was executed, so Ms. Fields would have to show who had a motive to Lforge her signature to it.

The Caleps’ only witness was the attorney, Wayne Webb, who testified as outlined above. He confirmed that he notarized the 1991 cash sale and would have made Ms. Fields present her identification before signing, so he was certain that she actually signed it.

Ms. Fields also testified as outlined above, maintaining resolutely that she did not sign the 1991 cash sale, it was “false,” and she disagreed with Webb’s testimony. She insisted that the $25,000 was a gift for the church’s work, nothing more. Questioned by the court, she admitted not knowing who forged her name, but “someone messed me up.” She also asserted that the corporate resolution was “falsely done,” but admitted it was signed by the secretary. She explicitly conceded she had no expert witness to say the signatures were forged.

Ms. Fields also called a character witness, Danny Wilburn, who said that she has a reputation for honesty in the community. Neither side called the Caleps from Chicago.

The court ruled from the bench that it had denied the Caleps’ motion for summary judgment because of Ms. Fields’s affidavit; however, after hearing the testimony, the court felt that with the passage of time Ms. Fields had mischaracterized the events of December 1991. She failed to prove a forgery, especially who would have done it or had the motivation to do it. The court found the corporate resolution decisive. The court granted the rule for sanctions and dismissed GCC’s claim for declaratory judgment. Later, judgment was rendered to that effect, ordering GCC to pay $12,120.40 for the Caleps’ attorney fees.

lfiMs. Fields, pro se, filed a motion for suspensive appeal. The Caleps later moved to dismiss the appeal for failure to post the $13,000 bond. The court ultimately converted it to a devolutive appeal.

GCC’s counsel then filed a motion to withdraw, which this court granted on August 20, 2013. Ms. Fields has proceeded in proper person.

The Parties’ Positions

By handwritten pro se brief, Ms. Fields gives a history of GCC, stressing its strong community involvement. On the merits, she argues, “Aliene Fields did not sale [sic ] the property” to the Caleps and “did not sign any deed in Mr. Webb [sic] office.” She contends that her “name was type [sic ] in by someone,” Webb’s testimony was not true, the Caleps failed to testify, the corporate resolution ratifying the sale “is fraud,” and the Caleps “never told me what they were doing.” Attached to her brief are documents not in the record, including a printout from the Louisiana Secretary of State showing that GCC is a nonprofit corporation in good standing; an uncertified statement from Michelle Caldwell Dickerson, GCC’s secretary, that she did not witness or sign any paperwork or contracts regarding the sale of the property; and copies of newspaper articles extolling GCC’s work.

Ms. Dickerson has also filed a pro se brief, largely reiterating Ms. Fields’s factual (and off-the-record) contentions. She urges that all the board approved was to let the Caleps take a $25,000 tax writeoff for paying the mortgage; they never told the board they intended to buy the property. She also asserts the judgment is unsound because the Caleps did not testify |6as to the source of the original documents, and asks this court to render judgment declaring GCC the owner of the property.

The Caleps respond that the 1991 cash sale, as an authentic act, constitutes full proof of the agreement, La. C.C. art. 1885, and anyone attacking an authentic act must bring “strong proof’ of its invalidity, Ritz v. Ritz, 95-683 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/13/95), 666 So.2d 1181, writ denied, 96-0131 (La.3/8/96), 669 So.2d 395. Aside from Ms. Fields’s testimony, GCC produced not one shred of evidence that the 1991 cash sale was fraudulent; by contrast, the Caleps offered the testimony of Webb, who established that Ms. Fields signed the 1991 cash sale; the resolution confirming the sale; and the mortgage assignment. They also suggest that the action was prescribed, as Webb notified Ms. Fields of the Caleps’ claims in August 1998 but suit was not filed until August 2011. Finally, they show that GCC is a corporation, but Ms. Fields appealed in her own name, not on behalf of the corporation, and she lacks standing to appeal. Deal v. Lexing-Powell, 36,168 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/16/02), 824 So.2d 541, writ not cons., 2004-0165 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 836; Seelig v. Kit World Super Store, 97-1592 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/21/98), 705 So.2d 806. They urge that the judgment be affirmed or the appeal dismissed.

Discussion

We note at the outset that Ms. Fields’s brief does not comply with URCA 2-12.4 in numerous particulars: it does not specify or allege errors, make arguments confined strictly to the issues of the case, or provide citations to the record or authorities relied on. In the interest of justice, however, this court will read pro se filings indulgently and attempt to |7construe a brief as though assignments were properly raised. Capital One NA v. Walters, 47,157 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/20/12), 94 So.3d 972; Graham v. McKinney Nissan, 39,656 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/29/05), 907 So.2d 213. We therefore decline to reject the brief for noncompliance. We also find that Ms. Fields took this pro se appeal around the time her lawyer withdrew; as a non-lawyer, Ms. Fields perhaps did not appreciate the need to designate the corporation, and not herself, as the appellant. On these unique facts, we decline to dismiss the appeal as “of no legal effect,” a result suggested in Deal v. Lexing-Powell, supra.

However, even with the leeway or patience extended to a pro se litigant in the form of liberally construed pleadings, the pro se claimant is required to meet her burden of proof. Manichia v. Mahoney, 2010-0087 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/4/10), 45 So.3d 618, writ denied, 2010-2259 (La.11/24/10), 50 So.3d 829. On close review, we detect no manifest error in the district court’s findings.

The 1991 cash sale is an authentic act. An authentic act constitutes full proof of the agreement it contains, as against the parties, their heirs, and successors by universal or particular title. La. C.C. art. 1835; Succession of Robinson, 94-2229 (La.5/22/95), 654 So.2d 682. A person denying the validity of her signature on an authentic act bears the burden of proving the forgery. Szmyd v. Wingate, 341 So.2d 1271 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ not cons., 344 So.2d 3 (1977); Coleman v. Egle, 376 So.2d 983 (La.App. 1 Cir.1979), writ denied, 379 So.2d 15 (1980); Thompson v. Woods, 525 So.2d 174 (La.App. 3 Cir.1988). The trial court’s findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless they are manifestly erroneous or plainly wrong. Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2009-1869 (La.3/16/10), 31 So.3d 996.

The 1991 cash sale is an authentic act and proves its contents: that GCC sold to the Caleps the described property for $25,000. In addition, the notary testified that he required people to present identification before signing documents; he was certain that Ms. Fields did so and actually signed the cash sale. The resolution of GCC’s board fully corroborates the sale, stating that the property is “to be sold” by GCC to the Caleps for $25,000. The assignment of the mortgage note from the original lender to the Caleps, as well as Webb’s 1988 letter to Ms. Fields, further support the fact of the sale. In opposition, Ms. Fields offered only her own testimony, a recollection of events some 21 years earlier and reasonably discounted by the district court. She provided no forensic evidence of a forgery, and no theory of who might have forged her name, or when or how it could have happened. It is true that the Caleps did not testify, but the burden of calling them fell on Ms. Fields, as she was alleging forgery. She failed to do so. On this record, the district court was not plainly wrong to reject the claim of forgery, dismiss the demand for declaratory judgment, and assess attorney fees under La. C.C.P. art. 863 D.

Conclusion

For the reasons expressed, the judgment is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by the appellant, Greenwood Community Center.

AFFIRMED.


author: ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge.

text:
    A.P.E., INC. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, New Orleans Police Department and Mary Kay Kleinpeter-Zamora.
    No. 2013-CA-1091.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Jan. 15, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 4, 2014.

      Ernest Aloysius Burguieres, III, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/App ellant.
    Christy C. Harowski, Assistant City Attorney, Sharonda R. Williams, City Attorney, City of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge JOY COSSICH LOBRANO, Judge ROSEMARY LEDET).
   ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge.

11 This is a public bid dispute. From the trial court’s judgment denying its application for a preliminary injunction, A.P.E., Inc. appeals. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the City of New Orleans’ solicitation of public bids for New Orleans Police Department uniforms and related equipment (the “NOPD Uniforms Contract”). The bid was for a requirements contract — the bidders were required to commit to supply the requested uniform items, as required during the term of the contract, at a specific price. Although the initial bid invitation set the bid submission deadline as November 8, 2012, an addendum changed the deadline to December 4, 2012.

A.P.E. and Signal 26, Inc., d/b/a Code 3 Supply (“Signal 26”), submitted the only two bids. After the bids were submitted, A.P.E. raised several questions | regarding Signal 26’s bid. Among the questions was whether Signal 26 had a disqualifying conflict of interest under New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777, which provides that “[n]o city officer or employee shall have a financial interest in any contract with the city.” As explained below, the conflict, as A.P.E. communicated to the City in correspondence and e-mails, was that, at the time the bids were submitted, a shareholder of Signal 26, Rebekah Hoffacker, was married to a NOPD officer.

On January 18, 2013, Ms. Hoffacker, sold her shares of Signal 26 stock to Rachel Hurst, the other co-owner of Signal 26, for $30,000. The sale was a credit sale; in exchange for the stock, Ms. Hoffacker received a promissory note for $30,000, which was payable in monthly installments of $2,500.

|sOn February 21, 2013, the City notified Signal 26, by letter, that it was the successful bidder. The letter also stated that the award was subject to Signal 26 signing a formal contract with the City.

On March 19, 2013, A.P.E. filed this suit for injunctive and other relief. In its petition, A.P.E. averred:

• On or about December 7, 2012 plaintiff sent a letter to Mary Kay Kleinpeter-Zamora, Chief Procurement Officer for the City of New Orleans in which plaintiff informed the City one of the bidders, Code 3 of New Orleans, listed as one of its members, a person who was believed to be married to a New Orleans police officer. Furthermore, Code 3 of New Orleans also advertised in several online outlets and print media that “Code 3 is owned and operated by N.O.P.D. officers and/or their families” and that “Code 3 is owned by the family of a fellow 26” (police radio call number indicating a police officer). Plaintiff pointed out that this relationship appeared to violate the City’s Ordinance 2-777, “Prohibited Financial Interests.”
• On or about January 22, 2013 plaintiff sent a letter to Mary Kay Kleinpeter-Zamora Chief Procurement Officer for the City of New Orleans ... pointing] out that there now appeared to be two names associated with the apparent low bidder, Signal 26, Inc. which submitted the bid and Code 3 Supply, which was identified on the non-collusion affidavit attached to the Signal 26[bid]. Code 3 Supply was not named on Attachment “C”, nor did it supply a Tax Clearance Form.
• On or about January 23, 2013 plaintiff sent a letter to Mary Kay Kleinpeter-Zamora, Chief Procurement Officer for the City of New Orleans in which plaintiff reviewed the Tax Clearance Form submitted by Signal 26 which identified Rebekah Hoffacker as the person at Signal 26 attesting that all taxes had been paid. Upon information and belief, plaintiff is informed that Rebekah Hoffacker is married to Charles Hoffacker, who is currently believed to be a New Orleans police officer. This would appear to be in conflict with the City’s ordinance regarding doing business with City employees or their families, Sect. 2-777.
|4* Shortly thereafter, the Louisiana Secretary of State’s corporation division revealed that Rebekah Hoffacker had resigned as an officer of Signal 26.
• On or about February 19, 2013 plaintiff sent a ... letter to Mary Kay Kleinpeter-Zamora, Chief Procurement Officer for the City of New Orleans in which plaintiff provided a recap of the ... prior communications and the discrepancies in the Signal 26 bid.

A.P.E. requested a preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the City from awarding the NOPD Uniform Contract. It further requested that its bid be declared the lowest responsive bidder on the NOPD Uniform Contract. Alternatively, A.P.E. requested that the City’s acceptance of a bid from Signal 26 — a bidder that had an apparent conflict under the City’s own code — be declared a nullity requiring a new bid.

Following a hearing, the trial court, on June 6, 2013, rendered judgment finding that A.P.E. “failed to prove any violation of the Public Bid Law” and that it “failed to make the required showing that it is entitled to the relief sought and that it will likely prevail on the merits.” The trial court thus denied A.P.E.’s application for a preliminary injunction. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A trial court has great discretion in deciding whether to grant or to deny a preliminary injunction; hence, a trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction should not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of the trial court’s great | .^discretion. Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 00-1146, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/3/01), 798 So.2d 1167, 1171; HCNO Services, Inc. v. Secure Computing Systems, Inc., 96-1693, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/23/97), 693 So.2d 835, 841. This court in Moretco, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Council, 12-0430, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/6/13), 112 So.3d 287, 290, summarized the applicable principles governing preliminary injunctions as follows:

A preliminary injunction is an interlocutory procedural device designed to preserve the status quo as it exists between the parties pending trial on the merits. Sessions, Fishman & Nathan, L.L.P. v. Salas, 2004-1790 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/25/05), 905 So.2d 373, 377. To prevail in the trial court on a petition for preliminary injunction, the petitioner is required to establish by prima facie evidence that: (1) it will suffer irreparable injury, loss, or damage if the injunction is not issued; (2) it is entitled to the relief sought; and (3) it will likely prevail on the merits of the case. Limousine Livery, Ltd. v. A Airport Limousine Serv., L.L.C, 2007-1379 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/08), 980 So.2d 780, 783. A showing of irreparable injury is not required in cases where the conduct sought to be restrained is unlawful, such as when the conduct constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law. Asaro v. City of New Orleans, 2010-0572, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/22/10), 54 So.3d 1214, 1217, writ denied, 2011-0353 (La.4/1/11), 60 So.3d 1257.

A.P.E. contends that it was not required to establish irreparable injury to obtain a preliminary injunction since Signal 26’s bid •violated two prohibitory laws: the Public Bid Law and New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777. Both the Public Bid Law and the New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777 are prohibitory laws. “Louisiana’s Public Bid Law, set forth in LSA-R.S. 38:2212 et seq., is a prohibitory law founded on public policy.” Broadmoor, L.L.C. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 04-0211, 04-0212, p. 6 (La.3/18/04), 867 So.2d 651, 656. Likewise, the New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777, as A.P.E. points out, is a prohibitory law founded on public policy. See La. C.C. art. 7, cmt. (d) (noting that the term “prohibitory law” means “rules of public order” and “laws for the preservation of public order”).

A contract in violation of a prohibitory law is an absolute nullity. Executone of Cent. Louisiana, Inc. v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 99-2819, p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/11/01), 798 So.2d 987, 993; La. C.C. art. 7; La. C.C. art. 2030. Although A.P.E. contends that Signal 26 violated the Public Bid Law in numerous respects, we find the issue of whether there was a violation of New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777 dispositive.

A.P.E. emphasizes that the City has acknowledged that Ms. Hoffacker’s ownership interest in Signal 26 at the time the bid was submitted was a prohibited financial interest in violation of New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777. At the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the City acknowledged that when A.P.E. alerted it to the potential financial conflict, it informed Signal 26 of the conflict and instructed Signal 26 that it had to resolve the conflict before the bid was awarded or it would not be awarded the bid. Likewise, the City’s procurement officer, Ms. Kleinpeter-Za-mora, attested in her affidavit that:

Prior to the bid award, my office received information from A.P.E., Inc. that Signal 26 was owned by the family of a police officer. Upon investigation, my office determined that Rebekah Hoffacker, a Signal 26 minority shareholder, was married to an NOPD officer. When informed of the financial conflict, Ms. Hoffacker sold |7her minority share of Signal 26 stock. Because the conflict was resolved prior to the bid award, it is my understanding that no violation occurred.

The City’s position is thus that the sale of the stock before the bid was awarded eliminated any financial conflict of interest under New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777. Stated otherwise, the City’s position is that given the language of the ordinance — providing that a violation occurs when a City employee gains a financial benefit in connection with a City “contract” — it follows that “[ijmplicitly, there is no violation if such a conflict is removed prior to the execution of the contract, as it was here.” We disagree.

Agreeing with A.P.E., we find the relevant time to examine the bidder’s qualifications is at the time the bid is submitted. See A.M.E. Disaster Recovery Services, Inc. v. St. John Baptist Parish School Bd., 10-500, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/23/10), 54 So.3d 719, 723 (affirming disqualification of bidder and noting that subsequent events did “not diminish the grounds for disqualification which existed at the time the bid was submitted”); see also Grady Crawford Const., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 11-0377, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/17/11), 76 So.3d 513, 520 (holding that bidder’s failure to have a contractor’s license at the time the bid was submitted disqualified bidder despite the reinstatement of bidder’s license before the bid was awarded). Given this principle, the legal issue to be decided is whether Ms. Hoffacker’s ownership of stock in Signal 26 at the time the bid was submitted falls within the scope of the prohibited financial interest under New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777.

This court reviews legal issues using a de novo standard of review. See 2400 Canal, LLC v. Board of Sup’rs of Louisiana State University Agr. and Mechanical College, 12-0220-0222, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/7/12), 105 So.3d 819, 824. “When |8considering legal issues, the appellate court assigns no special weight to the trial court and, instead, conducts a de novo review of questions of law and renders judgment on the record.” 2400 Canal, 12-0220 at p. 5, 105 So.3d at 824 (quoting Roger A. Stetter, LA. PRAC. CIV. APP. § 10:53 (2011 ed.)).

Resolution of the legal issue presented in this case turns on the meaning of the term “contract” as used in New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777. As noted, the City’s position is that the term refers to an executed, completed contract. Although there is no Louisiana jurisprudence on point, a similar contention — that a completed contractual agreement was required for a conflict of interest violation — was rejected by the court in People v. Savaiano, 66 Ill.2d 7, 14-15, 3 Ill.Dec. 836, 359 N.E.2d 475, 479 (1976).

In the Savaiano case, the conflict of interest provision at issue was a criminal statute outlawing a public official from having a prohibited financial interest. Rejecting the defendant’s argument that a completed contract was an essential element of the offense, the court reasoned as follows:

To claim that appellant’s violation of the law does not occur until a contract has been entered into would emaciate the statute and vitiate its legislative purpose. The law would no longer effectively deter a self-dealing official, in the capacity of his position, from engaging in negotiations with other parties for the purpose of purchasing property in which he also had a personal interest. This would permit that official to sell his interest at a time when the | amaking of the contract had advanced to a point where it assuredly would be executed. Since he could personally guarantee to the prospective buyer that the contract would be executed, both could profit from the transaction. The purpose of all statutory construction is to give the law the effect that was intended by the legislation.

Savaiano, 66 Ill.2d 7, 14-15, 3 Ill.Dec. 836, 359 N.E.2d 475, 479 (1976).

Likewise, the strict construction of New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777 advanced by the City in this case is inconsistent with the purpose of the ordinance, which is a code of ethics provision. The purpose of a code of ethics provision is “to prevent public officers and employees from becoming involved in conflicts of interest. It is not merely wrongdoing, but even the potential therefor, that the Code seeks to avoid.” In re Sea Shell, Inc., 509 So.2d 90, 91 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987) (affirming a finding that a corporation wholly owned by a parish president’s siblings violated the ethics code by entering into a contract with the parish to supply shell). To advance this purpose, conflict of interest provisions generally have been strictly construed. 3 Eugene McQuillin, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12:173.22 (3rd ed.2012) (“McQuillin ”) (noting that “[t]he general rule is that there should be strict enforcement of conflict of interest statutes so as to provide a strong disincentive for officers who might be tempted to take personal advantage of their public offices.”)

For these reasons, we find the City’s argument that the word “contract” in New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777 should be construed to refer solely to a completed contractual agreement unpersuasive. The word “contract,” as used in the ordinance, was not intended in the contract law sense; rather, it was intended to have a broader meaning, encompassing the solicitation of bids. Our finding is buttressed by the following commentary:

hnFor there to be a conflict over a contract, there must first be a contract. ... The meaning of a contract “made” by a municipal officer within the intendment of a statute prohibiting city officers from being financially interested in contracts made by them in their official capacity encompasses preliminary discussions, negotiations, compromises, reasoning, planning, drawing of plans and specifications and the solicitation of bids.

McQuillin, supra (citing MillBrae Ass’n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262 Cal.App.2d 222, 237, 69 Cal.Rptr. 251, 262 (1968)); see also Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 571, 375 P.2d 289, 292, 25 Cal.Rptr. 441, 444 (1962) (rejecting a narrow and technical interpretation of the word “made” and construing its statutory meaning “to encompass the planning, preliminary discussions, compromises, drawing of plans and specifications and solicitation of bids”).

Summarizing, we reject the City’s invitation to narrowly construe the term “contract” in New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777 as cabined to a completed contractual agreement. We construe the term “contract” in the ■ ordinance as encompassing the submission of bids. Therefore, we find that Signal 26 was disqualified from bidding on the NOPD Uniform Contract. We further find that Signal 26’s bid was an absolute nullity and that the contract must be rebid. For these reasons, we find the trial court erred in failing to grant the alternative relief requested by A.P.E. — a declaration that Signal 26’s bid was a nullity and that the contract must be rebid.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

| REVERSED.

      . The actual bidder was Signal 26, Inc.; however, the bid was awarded to "Signal 26, Inc. (Code 3 Supply).” Signal 26 is also referred to in the record as "Signal 26, d/b/a Code 3 Supply.” In its petition, A.P.E. alleged that Signal 26 used two different names — Signal 26 and Code 3 — both of which appear to be registered with the Louisiana Secretary of State. It further alleged that the bid was submitted under one business name and supporting affidavits were submitted under another name. Given our finding that Signal 26, Inc. was disqualified from bidding, we find it unnecessary to address the distinction between the two entities — Signal 26, Inc. and Code 3 Supply.

      . Although A.P.E. also raised several alleged errors in Signal 26’s bid, we limit our analysis to the disqualifying conflict of interest under New Orleans Municipal Code Section 2-777, which we find dispositive.

      .New Orleans Municipal Code Section 2-777 provides in full:
      No city officer or employee shall have a financial interest in any contract with the city, and no contract for professional or other services shall be awarded on the basis of fee kickbacks. For purposes of this section, the word "contract” shall include remunerative contracts to provide goods or services to the city or for public work and shall not include:
      (1) A contract with the city which a city official or employee is required to enter in order to receive state or federally-funded grants, loans or other public assistance, or

        (2) A sale of abandoned property, as defined by R.S. 33:4720.12(1), to a city employee, when said sale is approved by the mayor, the director of the department by which the employee is employed, and the city attorney, and when such sale is for the purpose of rehabilitation.

      . Signal 26's bid totaled $4,801.94; A.P.E.’s bid totaled $6 076.59.

      . On February 18, 2013, A.P.E. sent Ms. Kleinpeter-Zamora an e-mail reiterating its concerns — that "the Signal 26 or Code 3’s submission (dependent upon which piece of paper in their submission you chose) contained numerous discrepancies” and that the owner of both of those entities are “family members of City of New Orleans employees, and to award the contract to them would be a direct violation of the City of New Orleans ordinances.”

      . On April 2, 2013, the trial court issued an order requiring that the request for a preliminary injunction be heard on verified pleadings and affidavits without live testimony. On May 7, 2013, a hearing was held on A.P.E.'s application for preliminary injunction and motion to permit live testimony. On May 31, 2013, another hearing was held on A.P.E.’s motion to supplement the record. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3609, the trial court denied A.P.E.’s motion to permit live testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing. The trial court also denied A.P.E.’s motion to supplement the record, but the court allowed A.P.E. to proffer the excluded evidence.

      . La. C.C. art. 7 provides that “[pjersons may not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an absolute nullity.” La. C.C. art. 7.

      . La. C.C. Art. 2030 provides:
      A contract is absolutely null when it violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral. A contract that is absolutely null may not be confirmed.
      Absolute nullity may be invoked by any person or may be declared by the court on its own initiative.

      . At oral argument before this court, the City's attorney acknowledged that New Orleans City Ordinance § 2-777 is a conflict of interest provision.

      . The criminal statute at issue provided:
      No person holding any office, either by election or appointment under the laws or constitution of this state, may be in any manner interested, either directly or indi-
      rectly, in his own name or in the name of any other person, association, trust or corporation, in any contract or the performance of any work in the making or letting of which such officer may be called upon to act or vote.

        People v. Savaiano, 66 Ill.2d 7, 10, 359 N.E.2d 475, 477, 3 Ill.Dec. 836, 838 (1976).

      . Given this finding, it is unnecessary for us to address the alternative issue A.P.E. raises of whether the credit sale of the stock was sufficient to divest Ms. Hoffacker of her financial interest in Signal 26 or whether it merely transformed her into a “creditor,” which would also be a prohibited financial interest.