text:
    Dawn Olmstead LAVIOLETTE v. Rocky James LAVIOLETTE.
    No. 12-1209.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 6, 2013.

      Peter C. Piccione, Jr., Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Rocky James Laviol-ette.
    Katherine Lynn Hurst, Lafayette, LA, for PlaintiffiAppellee, Dawn Olmstead La-violette.
    Randy M. Guidry, Durio, McGoffin, Stagg & Ackermann, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Dawn Olmstead Laviol-ette.
    Court composed of MARC T. AMY, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and JOHN E. CONERY, Judges.
   AMY, Judge.

|,After the parties’ divorce, the plaintiff filed a motion to enforce an extra-judicial agreement that the couple executed prior to the granting of the divorce. At the hearing on the matter, the defendant admitted signing the document, but disputed that it was an agreement as to the division of their property. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, partitioning the property in line with the agreement. The defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of partition, but vacate as null the amended judgment of partition.

Factual and Procedural Background

Dawn Laviolette filed a petition for divorce from her husband, Rocky Laviolette, in January 2011. Prior to the judgment of divorce ultimately entered in August 2011, Mr. and Ms. Laviolette began addressing the division of their property, including the immovable property accumulated during their marriage. It is undisputed that, in doing so, the parties signed two documents regarding the ownership of the property. The latter document, entitled “Joint Stipulation of Community Property and Descriptive List,” was notarized and filed with the clerk of court.

Thereafter, in February 2012, Ms. La-violette filed a “Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and for Judgment Approving and Homologating Agreement,” alleging that that the parties had “engaged in extensive negotiations and entered into a transaction and compromise of all community property issues and reduced that compromise to writing consistent with La. C.C. Arts. 3071 and 3072.” In the motion, Ms. Laviolette addressed both documents referenced above, and asserted that the initial “written compromise agreement” of April 20, 2011 was subsequently reduced to the more formal “joint stipulation of community property |2and descriptive list” of May 12, 2011. Ms. Laviolette moved for a judgment approving of the latter document, which she attached to her pleading. Mr. Laviolette objected to the motion, suggesting that the agreement was without legal effect.

At the resulting hearing, Mr. Laviolette admitted having signed the May 2011 agreement. However, he asserted that the document was only meant for the parties’ evaluation of the appraisals of the property and not for partition purposes. He further denied having reviewed the document in detail before signing it. Much of the testimony was directed to the May 2011 agreement’s designation of Ms. Laviolette as the sole owner of a Carenero residence and its further declaration that:

This residence is not considered community property. Dawn Michelle Olmstead Laviolette is the exclusive, sole owner of this residence as it was acquired with funds she received from a personal injury claim and is hereby excluded. Dawn Michelle Olmstead Laviolette will receive all proceeds from the sale of this property.

Ms. Laviolette suggested in her testimony that, although the settlement agreement had been at Mr. Laviolette’s urging, he no longer wished to abide by the agreement after the above-described residence was destroyed by fire and insurance proceeds became available.

After hearing the parties’ testimony, the trial court concluded that the May 2011 agreement constituted an extrajudicial contract between the parties wherein they agreed as to the disposition of their property. The trial court ultimately signed a judgment of partition, in which it declared that “the transaction and compromise pursuant to La.C.C. Art. 3071 as stipulated by the parties in the May 11, 2011 Joint Stipulation of Community Property and Descriptive List is hereby implemented and made Judgment of this Court[.]” The judgment listed the property assigned to Reach party. Like the May 2011 agreement, the judgment conveyed the Caren-ero residence to Ms. Laviolette and reproduced the paragraph indicating that:

This residence is not considered community property. Dawn Michelle Olmstead Laviolette is the exclusive, sole owner of this residence as it was acquired with funds she received from a personal injury claim and is hereby excluded. Dawn Michelle Olmstead Laviolette will receive all proceeds from the sale of this property.

In an amended judgment, the trial court included a provision making the judgment’s conveyances of movable and immovable property “retroactive to May 11, 2011, the date of their settlement agreement.” The trial court subsequently denied Mr. Laviolette’s motion for new trial, an aspect of which challenged the amended judgment as an impermissive alteration to a final judgment under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951.

Mr. Laviolette appeals.

Discussion

Effect of the Extra-JudiciaZ Document

In his brief to this court, Mr. Laviolette asserts that the trial court impermissibly gave effect to the May 2011 document. He contends that numerous provisions of both the Louisiana Civil Code and the revised statutes regarding the partition of community property prohibit the method approved of by the trial court. Having reviewed these arguments, however, we find no error in the judgment rendered by the trial court.

We first address Mr. Laviolette’s contention that the trial court’s acceptance of the May 2011 document permitted a circumvention of the rules of partition, namely La.R.S. 9:2801, which provides, in part, as follows:

A. When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the matrimonial regime, or from the co-_Jownership4 of former community property following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a proceeding, which shall be conducted in accordance with the following rules....

We find no merit in Mr. Laviolette’s claim under this provision as the first clause of Paragraph A specifically provides for the remedy of La.R.S. 9:2801, “[w]hen the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising [ ] from the matrimonial regime[.]” Given both the testamentary and documentary evidence before the trial court, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s recognition that the April and May 2011 documents sufficiently evidenced the parties’ mutual agreement to settle their property dispute. Neither do we find error in the trial court’s consideration of the parties’ intent, as evidenced by the documents, in rendering the ultimate 1 judgment of partition and incidental matters. Notably, Mr. Laviolette does not here dispute that he signed the documents now at issue.

Mr. Laviolette further contends that the trial court erred in accepting the May 2011 document, since it was confected prior to divorce and was without court approval. In support of his brief argument in this regard, Mr. Laviolette references La.R.S. 9:2802, which provides that: “No judgment of partition shall be rendered unless rendered in conjunction with, or subsequent to, the judgment which has the effect of terminating the matrimonial regime.” He notes that trial court had not terminated the matrimonial regime at the time the May 2011 document was executed. While Mr. Laviolette’s statement is accurate in that the matrimonial regime had not been terminated at the time the parties executed the agreement, La.R.S. 9:2802 does not require that it had to be. Instead, the trial court’s actions were consistent with the above-excerpted provision as it rendered the judgment of partition subsequent to the judgment of divorce, i.e., the judgment having “the effect of terminating the matrimonial regime.”

Next, Mr. Laviolette points to La.Civ.Code art. 2329 for the proposition that the trial court should have placed no weight on the May 2011 document, as there was no contemporaneous judicial approval. However, Article 2329 provides:

Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement before or during marriage as to all matters that are not prohibited by public policy.

Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modifies or terminates a matrimonial regime during marriage only upon joint petition and a finding by the court that this serves their best interests and that they understand the governing principles and rules. They may, however, subject themselves to the legal regime by a matrimonial agreement at any time without court approval.

| ¿During the first year after moving into and acquiring a domicile in this state, spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement without court approval.

Thus, Article 2329 specifically permits spouses to enter into a matrimonial agreement during marriage, as long as the subject matter is not prohibited by public policy. See also Succession of Faget, 10-0188 (La.11/30/10), 53 So.3d 414. Certainly, the trial court could have viewed the agreement as a matrimonial agreement, insofar as it established “a regime of separation of property or modified] or termi-nat[ed] the legal regime.” La.Civ.Code art. 2328. Spouses may use a matrimonial agreement to establish “a regime of separation of property or modify the legal regime as provided by law.” Id. Provisions of a legal regime not included or modified by a matrimonial agreement retain their force and effect. Id.

Returning to Mr. Laviolette’s argument under La.Civ.Code art. 2329, we observe that it is only when a matrimonial agreement modifies or terminates a matrimonial regime during marriage that the related court consideration urged by Mr. Laviolette must follow, as seen by reference to the Article above. In Succession of Faget, 53 So.3d 414, the supreme court considered an agreement which pertained to the classification of only a single, discreet asset and determined that it constituted only a matrimonial agreement under Article 2328. Insofar as the matrimonial agreement “did not purport to and will not govern future acquisitions!!,]” it was not one which required court approval pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2329. Id. at 419. Similarly, in this case, the May 2011 document lists various assets, both movable and immovable, and does not purport to alter acquisitions pending the ultimate disposition of the property. Rather, the document lists specific assets, and designates to whom they will be apportioned.

l7We note, too, that the form used by the parties satisfies the requirements of La.Civ.Code art. 2331, which provides that: “A matrimonial agreement may be executed by the spouses before or during marriage. It shall be made by authentic act or by an act under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses.” Although the parties acknowledge that the May 2011 document was not an authentic act, as the two-witness requirement of La. Civ. Code art. 1833 was not satisfied, it was, however, under private signature and acknowledged by each spouse. Both parties identified their signatures at trial.

Furthermore, we observe that La. Civ. Code art. 2336 specifically allows spouses to contractually classify property as desired, in part, as follows:

During the existence of the community property regime, the spouses may, without couH approval, voluntarily partition the community property in whole or in part. In such a case, the things that each spouse acquires are separate property. The partition is effective toward third persons when filed for registry in the matter provided by Article 2332.

(Emphasis added.) See also Succession of Faget, 53 So.3d 414.

In short, we find no error in the trial court’s consideration of the parties’ May 2011 agreement in rendering its judgment of partition. Mr. Laviolette’s arguments in this regard lack merit.

Amended Judgment and Motion for New Trial

The initial judgment in this case was rendered on March 9, 2012. Subsequently, and acting upon Ms. Laviolette’s “Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Judgment of Partition,” the trial court rendered an amended judgment which included the following paragraph:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all property, both movable and immovable conveyed between the respective parties, Dawn Michelle Olmstead Laviolette and Rocky |RJames Laviolette, is conveyed between each other retroactive to May 11, 2011, the date of their settlement agreement.

The parties dispute in brief whether this amendment to the judgment was permissible as an alteration of phraseology or whether it constituted an impermissible substantive alteration of the judgment under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951. It seems clear that the addition of this provision was substantive in nature, and not one merely altering phraseology, particularly considering Ms. Laviolette’s ex parte motion, which urged the trial court to “clarify ownership of each parties [sic] respective property rights conveyed to each other under the May 11, 2011 settlement agreement[.]” Accordingly, we find that the amended judgment of March 14, 2011 constitutes a nullity under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951. We therefore vacate that judgment.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s Judgment of Partition and Incidental Matters is affirmed. The Amended Judgment of Partition and Incidental Matters if vacated as null. In light of this disposition, costs of this proceeding are assessed equally to the appellant, Rocky James Laviolette, and to the appellee, Dawn Olmstead Laviolette.

AFFIRMED. AMENDED JUDGMENT VACATED AS NULL.

      . The May 2011 document provides the following introductory paragraphs:
      BEFORE the undersigned Notaries Public, personally came and appeared, Plaintiff, Dawn Michelle Olmstead Laviolette, and Defendant, Rocky James Laviolette, who after being duly sworn, stated as follows:
      That Plaintiff and Defendant desire to settle amicably, without the need for any judicial proceedings which involve the said issues; that in order to do so, and in consideration of their mutual agreement to amicably resolve said issues, they thereby jointly stipulate to all of the following

        An Agreement was entered into on April 25, 2011 by and between Rocky James La-violette and Dawn Michelle Olmstead La-violette, which agreement is a settlement of community property and assets. Said Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”) is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
      The April 2011 document referenced in paragraph 1 was attached to the May 2011 document and sets forth introductory language as follows:
      This is an agreement written and binding, between ROCKY JAMES LAVIOLETTE and DAWN MICHELLE OLMSTEAD LAVIOL-ETTE. Who were legally separated on January 21, 2011. Below is an agreement both parties mutually agreed upon to separate community assets acquired during their 29 years of marriage.

      . Article 1951 provides that: "A final judgment may be amended by the trial court at any time, with or without notice, on its own motion or on motion of any party. (1) To alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance[.]”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GREMILLION, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Justin James KELLY v. Staci Marie KELLY.
    No. 12-1230.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 6, 2013.

      K. Ray Rush, Attorney at Law, Oakdale, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Justin James Kelly.
    Chad Guidry, Attorney at Law, Kinder, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Staci Marie Kelly.
    Court composed of MARC T. AMY, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and JOHN E. CONERY, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

hThe defendant-appellant, Staci Marie Kelly, appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding primary domiciliary custody of the minor child to the defendant/appellee, Justin James Kelly. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Justin and Staci were married in September 2004. One child was born of the marriage, Aubrey, whose birthday is July 5, 2007. Justin filed for divorce in August 2011, requesting joint custody naming him the domiciliary parent. In August 2012, Staci filed a Motion for In-Camera Inspection of a juvenile proceeding initiated by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in December 2011. Staci urged that the “allegations regarding child custody which are at issue in the current case are identical to those alleged and addressed in the juvenile proceeding, J-2011-106.”

Following an August 2012 hearing, the trial court entered a Judgment on Rule awarding joint custody of the child designating Justin as the domiciliary parent and awarding Staci visitation every other weekend. Staci now appeals.

ISSUES

Staci assigns as error:

1. Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred or abused its discretion in awarding joint custody with Mr. Kelly designated as the domiciliary and in its physical custody allocation.
2. Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred in ruling that the documents contained in the 38rd Judicial District Court’s Juvenile Docket no J-2011-106 were inadmissible in the present case.

[¡.EVIDENCE

The only matters before the court at the August 18, 2012 hearing were child custody, child support, and tax deductions. The parties were not divorced at the time of this hearing.

Staci testified Aubrey was six years old at the time of trial and had a thirteen-year-old half brother. She said that Aubrey had resided in Elizabeth, Louisiana, her entire life and that Justin’s parents, Ken and Vickie Kelly, lived two houses down from their marital residence. Staci said that Aubrey spent a lot of time with her grandparents.

Staci admitted to “absenting herself’ from her children over the course of five days in March 2011. She rented an apartment in Pineville, Louisiana, in May 2011, and was away from her children for a period of time in May and June. She further admitted to having an affair with a man named Kurt beginning in August 2011.

Staci admitted to repeatedly whipping Aubrey on her behind on May 20, 2011, such that marks and bruises remained because she “was trying to get her to go to bed and take her nap.” She admitted to having an anger management problem and physically fighting with her husband and other adults, including Kelly, Kurt’s wife. This incident occurred in front her children, and she received a citation for disturbing the peace. She admitted to later confronting Kelly and being rude to her at her place of employment, Dollar General, by inquiring if they were hiring.

Staci admitted that she caused Aubrey to be late for school so many times in prekindergarten and kindergarten that she was contacted by the District Attorney’s office.

LStaci then discussed a November 12, 2012 incident in which her son called 911 because she refused to unlock the bathroom door. She denied that she was suicidal.

Staci testified that she occasionally smoked marijuana and took prescribed Ativan and Lortab “when she was on her cycle.” She was also taking Celexa for anxiety and depression. Additionally, she was taking Adderall.

In another incident in early December 2011, Staci admitted to setting a community-owned camper on fire that was being stored on Ken and Vickie’s property because she was mad at Justin. Later that month, she saw Justin leaving a restaurant in Alexandria, Louisiana and began following him and honking her horn at him. She further admitted to “violently striking” her then-twelve-year-old son on December 20, 2011, with her hand, busting his lip and causing it to bleed. She admitted to sitting on top of him. Staci’s mother came and got the boy and took him to the doctor.

On December 27, 2011, DCFS removed Aubrey and her half brother from Staci’s home. Aubrey was placed in the custody of Justin’s parents while her half brother went to Staci’s mother’s "house. At this point in time, Justin was living in Alexandria with his girlfriend. Staci testified that DCFS required that she take education classes on the effects of drug use, undergo family assessments, and complete a ten-week anger management course. She stated that she successfully completed the classes. Over a six-month period from December 2011 through August 2012, Staci said that Aubrey had slept over at her house about five times.

Staci said she was currently residing in Woodworth, Louisiana in a three-bedroom trailer with her son. She said that she had no family or friends there and did not attend church there. She said Aubrey would attend school in Woodworth if she were granted domiciliary custody. Staci said she received her associates 14degree in May 2012, and was working at Cabrini Hospital as a nurse. She said she works thirty-six to forty hours a week in twelve-hour shifts earning $21.75 per hour.

Staci said that Woodworth is about thirty minutes from Elizabeth. She testified that the Kellys allow her to see Aubrey. She said that Aubrey has lived with her half brother her entire life prior to DCFS taking the children away.

Vickie Kelly testified regarding various incidents that Staci admitted to. Vickie kept a calendar of all the days Staci was absent from Aubrey, which amounted to several days in March, May, June, August, October, and November 2011. Vickie said that Staci had never been on a single field trip with Aubrey nor did she take her to her first day of kindergarten. She said that Aubrey was now in first grade at the same school she attended for pre-kinder-garten and kindergarten. Vickie was of the opinion that Staci had become obsessed with Kurt, even admitting to her that she would die for him. She testified that Aubrey’s behind was solid purple from the whipping, and that Staci had beaten her son several times in Vickie’s presence. Vickie discussed an incident that occurred the week before when they were leaving the courthouse. Staci confronted Justin and was verbally enticing him to hit her. Vickie said she was very angry, just like before.

Vickie said that Aubrey is very happy living in Elizabeth, but Vickie wants Aubrey to have a great relationship with her mother whom she loves. Aubrey regularly attends church in Elizabeth. Vickie said Justin lives in the former marital home next door with his girlfriend, Amy Jowers.

Ken testified to an incident he witnessed involving Staci’s son. He said that Staci was “very aggressive” and “very mean” and hit him with her fist. He further testified that he witnessed Staci hitting Justin with a closed fist. Ken stated that after leaving court the week before, Staci “got up in to Justin’s face and started ^hollering and screaming at him for him to hit her.” Ken said that he and Vickie would care for Aubrey on the occasions when Justin is away due to his work schedule. Both Ken and Vickie admitted that they had allowed Staci to see Aubrey and keep her overnight several times in the past two weeks leading up to trial.

Justin, who was twenty-eight at the time of trial, testified that he had worked for Baker Hughes INTEQ for the past five years as a MWD, or the person that conducts measurements while drilling on a rig. He admitted his work schedule is erratic, as he travels to different locations to complete jobs that vary in length. He said that usually he is at work, away from home, for approximately two weeks and home for two weeks. Due to the family situation he has recently negotiated a working condition that he cannot be more than two hours away from home. A letter from Baker Hughes agreeing to this was admitted into evidence. Justin said that once DCFS became involved, he was also required to complete the programs due to his occasional synthetic marijuana usage. He successfully completed the program and denies any current usage of synthetic marijuana.

Justin testified that his new girlfriend has been living with him for a month-and-a-half. He said they had been dating for four months, but had known each other for twelve years. Justin’s paycheck stub was submitted into evidence indicating an income for 2011 of over $115,000.

Jackie Pitre, Staci’s mother, testified that Staci’s behavior had improved since DCFS became involved. She said that Staci was under a lot of stress dealing with the separation from Justin, living in Elizabeth near Justin’s parents, and attending school. Jackie said she has no concerns now that Staci is able to care for her kids, and Aubrey wants to be with Staci and misses her half brother. She admitted that Aubrey has lived her entire life in Elizabeth, has friends there, and | ^attends school and church there. She further admitted on cross-examination that she and Staci had fist fights in the past when Staci was younger.

Dwight Pitre, Staci’s father, testified that since DCFS’s involvement, Staci has “calmed down a lot” and is not exhibiting the same kind of angry behavior. He did not feel that Aubrey would be in danger if she resided with Staci.

DISCUSSION

Custody

The law is well-settled that the trial court’s finding in custody matters is entitled to great weight on appeal because it is in a superior position to assess the best interests of the child based on the testimony of the witnesses and parties. AEB v. JBE, 99-2668 (La.11/30/99), 752 So.2d 756. On appeal, we will not reverse a trial court’s custody ruling in the absence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Id. The best interests of the child are of the utmost importance. La.Civ. Code art. 131; Deason v. Deason, 99-1811 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/00), 759 So.2d 219. In considering the child’s best interests, pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 134, the court may consider the following factors:

(1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.
(2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.
(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
(4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.
(5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
(6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.
|7(7) The mental and physical health of each party.
(8) The home, school, and community history of the child.
(9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
(10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party.
(11) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.

At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court awarded joint custody to the parties and discussed the Article 134 factors. It found that factors one and two equally favored both parents. Regarding factor three, the trial court found that Justin was in a better position to provide simply because he makes substantially more money than Staci. The trial court found that factor number four was significant, stating:

I think that one is a no-brainer. I think if anyone is being reasonable that they will fully understand that Aubrey has lived her whole life in Elizabeth. All of her family, — well, most of the family support she has enjoyed is there, as well as her school, her friends, her church family, things such as that are there. And so, really, that favors her staying or that the father be given custody to maintain that.

The trial court did not find factors five or six to be significant. The trial court expressed some reservations about Staci’s mental health, noting her sometimes aggressive and violent tendencies, and found that factor seven would be favorable to the father. Factor eight would favor the father as discussed above. The trial court found the child was too young to express a preference pursuant to factor nine. It found that both parents would facilitate a relationship under factor ten and that factor eleven was not a concern. Regarding the care previously exercised, the trial court found that both parties cared for Aubrey, but obviously Ronce DCFS became involved, the grandparents stepped in. The trial court ultimately concluded that domiciliary custody would be awarded to Justin.

Having reviewed the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding. Staci strongly argues that Aubrey will be deprived of seeing her half brother with whom she was raised with her entire life. We agree that is an unfortunate circumstance arising from the custody arrangement, but not one that outweighs the other concerns expressed by the trial court.

Clearly, Aubrey’s support system is in Elizabeth. The biggest factor against having Justin named the primary domiciliary parent is his unpredictable work schedule. However, it was well-established that Justin’s parents live right next door, have a long-standing and close relationship with Aubrey, have cared for Aubrey extensively in the past, and would care for Aubrey in his absence. Moreover, it was clear that Ken and Vickie had every intention of facilitating a close relationship between Aubrey and Staci. Additionally, it was clear from the testimony that Staci had no reservations about leaving Aubrey in her grandparents’ care for extended periods of time, even when Justin was away at work.

There were no allegations that Justin was ever violent toward Aubrey or her half brother. On the other hand, Staci readily admitted the violence she displayed toward her children. While it is true that Staci completed a ten-hour anger management course as required by DCFS, she was still exhibiting angry and volatile behavior toward Justin in the presence of Aubrey just a week before as the parties left the courthouse. Considering those facts and the mental health reservations noted by the trial court, the trial court did not err in finding it was in Aubrey’s best interest to grant Justin primary domiciliary status. This assignment of error is without merit.

| ¡⅜Admissibility of Document

At the end of the hearing, Staci’s counsel moved to have the entire DCFS record submitted into evidence. The trial court denied the motion noting ‘You have already gone through the case plan with the people, I mean with each of the parties. And so, there is really no need for it.

I know the case very well.” We agree. Admission of the document into evidence seems redundant at best since all the parties testified openly to DCFS’s involvement and the outcome. Staci offers no argument as to what these documents would prove in her favor. Moreover, a trial court’s discretion in whether to admit certain evidence will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Miles, 402 So.2d 644 (La.1981). Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court awarding joint custody with primary domiciliary status given to the plaintiff/appellee, Justin James Kelly, is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendant/appellant, Staci Mari Kelly.

AFFIRMED.

      . In October 2012, Justin filed a Petition for Judgment of Divorce in Accordance with La. C.C.P. Art. 3952 urging that 365 days had elapsed since die service of die petition for divorce in August 2011. A hearing was scheduled for November 7, 2012.

      . The judge in this matter also presided over the juvenile matter.


author: GENOVESE, Judge.

text:
    Carol THOMAS v. LAFAYETTE PARISH SCHOOL SYSTEM.
    No. WCA 13-91.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 6, 2013.

      Mark Louis Riley, Glenn Armentor Corp., Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Carol Thomas.
    Dawn L. Morris, The Dill Firm, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Lafayette Parish School System.
    Court composed of JIMMIE C. PETERS, JAMES T. GENOVESE, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   GENOVESE, Judge.

|, This court issued, sua sponte, a rule ordering the Plaintiff-Appellant, Carol Thomas, to show cause, by brief only, why the appeal in this case should not be dismissed for having been taken from a judgment lacking the proper decretal language. In response, Plaintiff asks that this court convert the instant appeal into an application for supervisory writ. For the reasons assigned, we dismiss this appeal, deny the motion to convert, and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with this court’s ruling.

This ease involves a workers’ compensation claim which Plaintiff filed alleging that she sustained injuries when she tripped and fell during the course and scope of her employment with Defendant, the Lafayette Parish School Board. On August 8, 2012, Defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the motion was heard on September 7, 2012. On October 29, 2012, the workers’ compensation court signed a judgment granting Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. The notice of judgment was mailed on the same day. On December 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for appeal, and the workers’ compensation court signed the order of appeal on December 20, 2012. The appeal record was lodged in this court on January 29, 2013. As stated above, upon the lodging of the record in this appeal, this court issued a rule for the Plaintiff to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as having been taken from a judgment lacking the proper decretal language.

The judgment at issue reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Lafayette Parish School Board’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted.

|2In her response to this court’s rule to show cause order, Plaintiff argues that the above language complies with the requirements for a final judgment. However, we note that this court has stated that “[a] valid judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. A final appealable judgment must contain decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied.” State v. White, 05-718 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 921 So.2d 1144, 1146. Moreover, a judgment cannot require reference to extrinsic documents or pleadings in order to discern the court’s ruling. Vanderbrook v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., 2001-809 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 906.

In the instant case, it is unclear from the face of the judgment whether the granting of Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment results in the dismissal of all or only some of Plaintiffs claims against Defendant. This information, which is necessary for a determination of whether an appealable judgment has been rendered in this case, cannot be ascertained without referring to other pleadings in the record. Therefore, we find that the judgment at issue in the instant appeal is ambiguous and lacks appropriate decretal language. See Johnson v. Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church, 2005-337 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/06), 934 So.2d 66. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand this case to the workers’ compensation court for further proceedings in accordance with this ruling.

Additionally, we note that in her response to this court’s rule to show cause order, Plaintiff asks this court to covert the instant appeal into an application for supervisory writ. However, we find that if the judgment at issue dismisses all of Plaintiffs claims against Defendant and terminates the litigation, then the exercise of this court’s supervisory jurisdiction is not warranted because the judgment | Sdismissing Plaintiffs claims would be a final, appealable judgment. Appellate courts generally will not exercise their supervisory jurisdiction when an adequate remedy exists by appeal. Douglass v. Alton Ochsner Medical Found., 96-2825 (La.6/13/97), 695 So.2d 953. Also, we note that the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915 does not apply to workers’ compensation cases. See Rhodes v. Lewis, 2001-1989 (La.5/14/02), 817 So.2d 64. Therefore, even if this court found that the judgment at issue dismisses only some of Plaintiffs claims, that partial judgment would not be susceptible to being designated immediately appealable pursuant to Article 1915. Rather, the proper appellate remedy would be an appeal upon rendition of a final judgment at the completion of the case.

MOTION TO CONVERT APPEAL TO A WRIT DENIED. APPEAL DISMISSED AND REMANDED.


author: PAINTER, Judge.

text:
    CROSSTEX LIG, L.L.C. v. John M. CLARK, Peter Clark, James Melvin Clark, Gabriel Clark, Taraletha Turner Burnett, American General Financial Services of Louisiana, Inc. a/k/a American General Finance, Inc., Courtesy Chevrolet Inc., dba Chevy Land, State of Louisiana-Department of Social Services, George D. Blewer, Ronnie G. Blewer, James Copellar, Jr., Linda G. Boyd, Rocky Glenn Carney, Magnolia Steel and Supply, LLC, Four-F Enterprises, Inc., Natchitoches Tax Commission, Denise Moon, Bank of Coushatta, Mikes Auto Sales, Inc., and James Copellar, Jr.
    No. 12-315.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 6, 2013.
    James Melvin Clark, Natchitoches, LA, Defendant-Appellant Pro Se.
    J. Todd Benson, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Crosstex LIG, LLC.
    Kent Gill, Shreveport, LA, for Defendant-Appellee, Mike’s Auto Sales.
    Daniel T. Murchison, Jr., Natchitoches, LA, for Defendants-Appellees, Four-F Enterprises & Ronnie G. Blewer.
    Robert E. Bethard, Coushatta, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Bank of Coushatta.
    J.Q. Davis, Coushatta, LA, for Defendant-Appellee, Rocky Glenn Carney d/b/a Magnolia Steel and Supply.

      J. Christian Henry, Natchitoches, LA, for Defendanb-Appellee, Denise Moon.
    George L. Celles, IV, Natchitoches, LA, for Defendant-Appellee, Taraletha Burnett.
    James Rex Fair, Jr., Natchitoches, LA, for DefendanL-Appellee, Linda Boyd.
    Gabriel Clark, Natchitoches, LA, Defen-danb-Appellee Pro se.
    Peter Clark, Campti, LA, Defendant-Appellee Pro Se.
    Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, MARC T. AMY, and J. DAVID PAINTER, Judges.
   PAINTER, Judge.

| ¶ Defendant-Appellant, John M. Clark, appeals the trial court’s ruling ordering certain property owned in indivisión with Plaintiff, Crosstex, LIG, L.L.C. (Crosstex) to be partitioned by licitation. Finding that the appeal is moot, we dismiss it.

FACTS

In 1959, John and Mary Clark bought a tract of land in Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana. John Clark died intestate in 1988, and Mary died, also intestate, in 2006. They were survived by their children, John M. Clark, Joseph Clark, James Abraham Clark, James M. Clark, Gabriel Clark, Doris Clark Rachel, and Peter Clark. In 2010, Crosstex bought Joseph, James Abraham, and Doris’s interests in the property.

In March 2011, Crosstex filed this action to partition the property. The court found that the property was not susceptible of partition in kind and ordered partition by licitation. A trial was held on September 23, 2011, and on that same day, the court signed a judgment ordering a partition by licitation. Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial or Hearing and for Temporary Restraining Order in the Form of a Preliminary Injunction. The motion was denied, and Appellant filed a timely motion for a suspensive appeal. However, the appeal was converted from a suspensive to a devolutive appeal due to failure to post an appeal bond.

The property was sold at sheriffs sale on April 4, 2012, where Crosstex bought the property.

DISCUSSION

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in ordering a partition by licitation. Crosstex argues that the appeal is moot and should be dismissed.

|A moot case is one which seeks a judgment or decree which, when rendered, can give no practical relief.” United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Hall, 97-2525, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 722 So.2d 48, 50.
It is well established that appellate courts will not render advisory opinions from which no practical results can follow. United Teachers of New Orleans v. Orleans Parish School Board, 355 So.2d 899 (La.1978). As a result, Courts have established the rule that moot questions will not be considered on appeal. State ex rel. Guste v. Louisiana [Milk] Commission, 297 So.2d 750 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1974). So strong is this prohibition that an appellate Court, as a matter of judicial economy, has a right to consider the possibility of mootness on its own motion and to dismiss the appeal if the matter has become moot. Au-coin v. Evangeline Parish Police Jury, 338 So.2d 789 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1976); Cain v. Board of Swpemsors, Ouachita Parish, 335 So.2d 711 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1976).

Wood v. Fontenot, 04-1174, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 896 So.2d 323, 325-326, writ deniedi City of New Iberia v. New Iberia Fire and Police Civil Serv. Bd., 05-801 (La.5/13/05), 902 So.2d 1023, (citing Whitney Nat. Bank of Neiv Orleans v. Poydras Center Assoc., 468 So.2d 1246, 1248-49 (La.App. 4 Cir.1985)).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 4607 provides that:

When a partition is to be made by licitation, the sale shall be conducted at public auction and after the advertisements required for judicial sales under execution. All counsel of record, including curators appointed to represent absentee defendants, and persons appearing in proper person shall be given notice of the sale date. At any time prior to the sale, the parties may agree upon a nonjudicial partition.

A judicial or sheriffs sale, if the proper formalities are observed, transfers the property sold to the purchaser as completely as if the owner had sold it himself. However, it transfers only the actual rights held by the debtor. See La.R.S. 9:3170.

This court in Cooley v. Merriman, 590 So.2d 718, 720 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991) (citation omitted), explained that: “Louisiana law is settled that a judgment ordering a sale to effect a partition is executory after the expiration of the delay for |3a suspen-sive appeal, and all power to prevent the execution of the judgment is lost.”

In Hagstette v. Wadsworth, 220 La. 666, 57 So.2d 222, 224 (1952), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

[A] sale made under the mandate of the court to effect a partition is of the same nature and character as other judicial sales and is governed by the same rules.... [T]he judgment ordering the sale to effect a partition becomes execu-tory ten days after it is signed and that after the expiration of the delay for a suspensive appeal, while the party cast has the right to a devolutive appeal within one year, all power to oppose or prevent the execution of the judgment is lost. If the party cast fails to protect his rights by suspending the execution of the judgment in the manner prescribed by law, the court can not undo what has already been done by virtue of the judgment while it was executory. It was pointed out therein that such a sale in pursuance of a mandate of court transfers the property as completely as if the owner had sold it himself

Thus, the judgment of the trial court ordering the property to be partitioned by licitation became executory after the appeal was converted from suspensive to devolutive. The fact that the sale has occurred renders moot Appellant’s devolu-tive appeal of the order that the property be partitioned- by licitation. See Messer v. Harris, 442 So.2d 1284 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1983) and Devall v. Derail, 153 So.2d 114 (La.App. 1 Cir.1963).

As was stated by this court in City Finance Co., Etc. v. Johnson, 410 So.2d 1189 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982), in a case involving a devolutive appeal from a trial court’s denial of injunctive relief to stop a marshall’s sale “we know of no order or judgment this court could render which would grant appellant the relief she seeks or undo that which has already been done.”

Messer, 442 So.2d at 1286.

1 CONCLUSION

Since the issue raised by Appellant’s is moot, we dismiss the appeal. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL DISMISSED.