author: ROBERT M. MURPHY, Judge.

text:
    Placide J. JUMONVILLE, III v. CITY OF KENNER and Kenner Mayor Michael S. Yenni.
    No. 13-CA-793.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    March 26, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied April 25, 2014.

      Jan P. Jumonville, Attorney at Law, Covington, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Patricia S. LeBlane, Deborah A. Villio, Attorneys at Law, LeBlane Butler LLC, Metairie, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appel-lee.
    Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, ROBERT M. MURPHY, and STEPHEN J. WINDHORST.
   ROBERT M. MURPHY, Judge.

| ¡.Placide J. Jumonville, III (“appellant”) appeals the trial court’s April 24, 2013 judgment affirming the Kenner City Council’s April 4, 2013 Resolution to demolish his Kenner residential property (the “property”) at 50 Granada Drive. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant has been the sole owner of the property at issue, including improvements thereon, a house and garage, since September 22, 2004, when his parents donated the property to him. On March 1, 2013, appellee Kenner Mayor Michael S. Yenni sent a certified letter to appellant alleging the property to be a serious public hazard, unsafe and dangerous, and recommended for demolition. The letter contained an order to show cause why the structure should not be condemned with an April 4, 2013 date for public hearing before the Kenner City Council.

|sOn March 27, 2013, Inspector John Osterhold issued three summonses citing appellant’s mother and counsel, Jan P. Ju-monville, for nine misdemeanor Kenner code violations including rebar rods coming out from the side of building, substandard structure, mold, foundation and roof violations.

Public hearing. At the April 4, 2013 hearing, the Council reviewed photographs of the property dated February 28, 2013; 65 photographs taken the same day as the hearing to show the condition of the property on that date; and the report of Civil Engineer Frank T. Liang, Vice-President of Digital Engineering. Kenner Code Enforcement Director Tamithia Shaw read the report and summonses into the record.

The City and Mayor argued that the property was dilapidated and an endangerment to the public welfare. Appellees argued their action in passing the Resolution to demolish the property was justified under City of Kenner Ordinance 5-63, infra.

Following the April 4, 2013 hearing, the Kenner Council unanimously passed Resolution No. B-16353, declaring the Granada property a public hazard and ordered the structures at 50 Granada Drive demolished. The Council did not choose to grant appellant the option of making repairs.

Trial de novo. On April 9, 2013, appellant filed a petition for injunction, judicial review, damages, and trial de novo in the district court, according to the appellate procedure as outlined in La. R.S. 33:4764.

On April 23, 2013, the district court at a bench trial heard testimony of appellees’ witnesses: Kenner Mayor Michael Yenni; Kenner Councilman Keith Reynaud of the particular district where the property is located; Inspector John fyOsterhold, and Engineer Liang. Appellant’s father Plac-ide J. Jumonville, Jr. testified on the absent appellant’s behalf through power of attorney.

Relying on Tatum v. Village of Converse, 440 So.2d 1354 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983), writ denied, 444 So.2d 121 (La.1984), the trial court restricted admissible evidence to that submitted prior to the Council’s action taken on the date of the hearing. The court’s sole inquiry was as to the condition of the property on April 4, 2013. The court’s stated objective was to determine whether the Council had sufficient evidence to order the demolition of the subject property. Accordingly, the trial court did not permit plaintiffs expert, Engineer Leonard Quick, to testify on the appeal of the Council’s action as he did not testify at the Council hearing, except on matters pertaining to injunctive relief, an issue jurisdictionally reserved to the district court and which was not addressed before the Council. Likewise, engineer Liang was permitted to testify as to the conditions of his hiring as the City’s expert, the use of his seal, and his report, read at the Council hearing.

The trial judge defined trial de novo in terms of the admissible evidence under Tatum, supra:

A trial de novo means that all the evidence has to come in anew, but it’s still the question before the Court as whether or not the Council had sufficient evidence to act as it did at the time it passed the resolution. Everything that has happened subsequent to that really isn’t relevant to the particular proceeding.
You can’t impose knowledge on the Council that happened three weeks after they passed the resolution.

|BMayor Yenni and Engineer Liang testified in the trial court confirming the selection of Digital Engineering’s selection and authorization by the City to inspect the property and prepare a written report, the presentation of this report to the Council, and introduction at trial. Digital Engineering V-P Liang reported that the “structure is a serious public hazard” and recommended to “have it abated by demolition or brought up to Kenner City Code or ordinance.” Liang’s report found the structures substandard by reason of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation and abandonment. Liang’s report, quoted above, had been presented to the Council by Ken-ner Code Enforcement Director Tamithia Shaw and considered without Liang’s appearance. Appellant’s questioning of Liang’s selection and authority to inspect and report on the property at issue under La. R.S. 33:4762(A)(2) necessitated review of the Mayor’s testimony regarding Digital Engineering/ Liang’s selection. This Court deems irrelevant all testimony not offered or available on the date of the Council hearing except as earlier described.

Mayor Yenni also presented 65 photographs taken the day of the hearing and admitted into evidence without objection. Mayor Yenni and Councilman Keith Rey-naud testified as to the numerous public complaints over more than a decade that each had received and as to the volume of files each had accumulated in the course of business regarding the condition of appellant’s property. Mayor Yenni had previously been Kenner’s Chief Administrative Office and thus had personal knowledge of the property.

Appellant objected to evidence of complaints; the trial court overruled objections and allowed the evidence to demonstrate the complaints’ having been subsequently referred to Kenner Code Enforcement office for inspection; and to demonstrate the weight of the evidence of this property’s long-term static condition.

| ^Appellant, through his father, contended that the structures in question were sound and secure. He contended that the visible appearance or condition of the bottom of the siding in no way affected the integrity of the building. He admitted that no utilities are connected to the house and that the house has been uninhabited for years. Appellant testified that the holes along the slab were caused by subsidence and are present throughout Kenner.

Appellant responds that that he cleaned the yard, removed the offending fence, signed a contract for “cosmetic garage repairs” with Home Renovation Plus, and orally contracted with Castillo Construction for repairs to the house, with a written contract soon to follow the hearing date. Appellant complains that he received photos from October 2, 2012 to October 11, 2012, over four months old. He further contended that the City of Kenner entered the property and house without notice or request and thus violated his constitutional rights.

On April 23, 2013, the trial court affirmed the ruling of the Kenner City Council, denied appellant’s relief, and assigned oral reasons. The appellant voluntarily dismissed his petition for injunction without prejudice. On April 24, 2013, the trial court signed a written judgment and designated the Judgment as final.

The trial court found “there was sufficient evidence for the City Council to take the position it took.” In its judgment, the court stated that it did not take into consideration the misdemeanor summonses, as it found “there was sufficient evidence on other grounds.”

| tAppeal. On May 22, 2013 appellant timely filed a petition for suspensive and/or devolutive appeal. La. R.S. 33:4763, et seq. The trial court granted the suspensive appeal on posting of a $9,000.00 bond.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1.The trial court erred in finding ap-pellees had complied with the procedure for condemning and ordering demolition of a structure under Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4762.

2. The trial court erred in limiting the evidence to exhibits introduced and witnesses at the Council Hearing.

3. The trial court erred in finding the Council had sufficient evidence to demolish plaintiffs structures.

4. The trial court erred in allowing irrelevant hearsay evidence of unsupported complaints.

5. The trial court erred in admitting and considering evidence obtained in violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights to be free of an unlawful search and seizure.

6. The trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs evidence, Plaintiffs Proffer 1, while taking judicial notice of a suit filed 16 years ago when he was not owner and seven years ago on issues unrelated to the present case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court in this matter conducted a de novo review of the Kenner City Council resolution to determine whether the Council had sufficient evidence to enact Resolution B-16353 as of April 4, 2013. Tatum, supra.

In order to reverse a factfinder’s determination — here sufficiency of the evidence — an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the factfinder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Wiley v. Lipka, 42,794 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/6/08), 975 So.2d 726, writ denied, 08-0541 (La.5/2/08), 979 So.2d 1284.

|sIn reviewing the evidentiary rulings of a trial court, the appellate court must consider whether the particular ruling complained of was erroneous, and if so, whether the error prejudiced the complainant’s case, with reversal warranted only if the error prejudiced the complainant’s case. Crisler v. Paige One, Inc., 42,563 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08), 974 So.2d 125.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In his assignment of emr number one, the appellant contends that appellees failed to comply with the statutory procedure for condemning and ordering the demolition of a structure under La. R.S. 33:4761 et seq. The applicable statutes that follow grant a municipality the power to condemn structures which are in a dangerous condition that endanger the public welfare after affording procedural due process of sufficient notice and a public hearing.

La. R.S. 33:4761 provides that:

[t]he governing authority of any parish or municipality may condemn and cause to be demolished or removed any building or structure within the parish or municipality when it is in a dilapidated and dangerous condition which endangers the public welfare. (Emphasis added).

The statute provides due process protections of sufficient notice, here, more than ten days in advance of the hearing by certified mail, and a hearing before a structure can be condemned. La. R.S. 33:4762 provides in pertinent part:

(A)(2) Before the parish or municipal governing authority may condemn any building or structure, there shall be submitted to it a written report recommending the demolition or removal or the building signed by some parish or city official or other person authorized to act in such matters for the parish or municipality. The parish president, police jury, mayor, or chief executive shall thereupon serve notice on the owner of the building or structure requiring him to show cause at a meeting of the governing authority, regular or special, why the building or structure should not be condemned. The date and hour of the meeting shall be stated in the notice which shall be served at least ten days prior to the date of the hearing, except in case of grave public emergency.... |9(2)(a) The notice may be served by mailing it via the United States Postal Service, by either registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the owner at the owner’s last known address.
(b) Service by registered or certified mail shall be considered personal service if the certified return receipt or the return form is signed by the addressee. Service by registered or certified mail shall be considered domiciliary service if the certified return receipt or the return form is signed by anyone other than the addressee. (Emphasis added).

If the governing body then finds the structures at issue are in a dangerous condition, it may order condemnation or allow the owner the option to repair the dangerous conditions. La. R.S. 33:4763 provides that permissive option to the municipality:

A. After the hearing, if, in the opinion of the parish or municipal governing authority the facts justify if, an order shall be entered condemning the building and ordering that it be demolished or removed within a certain delay. If repairs will correct the dilapidated, dangerous, or unsafe condition, the parish or municipal governing authority may grant the owner the option of making such repairs, but in such case the general nature or extent of the repairs to be made, the time thereof, and the defects to be corrected shall be specified in the decision of the governing body.
B. The decision and order of the parish or municipal governing authority shall be in -writing and shall be final unless appealed from within five days as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis added).

La. R.S. 33:4764 provides that the appeal shall be filed in the district court.

(A) The owner ... may appeal from the decision of the parish or municipal governing authority to the district court having jurisdiction over the property. The appeal shall be made by the filing of a suit against the parish or municipality, setting forth the reasons why the decision or order of the governing body is illegal or improper, and the issue shall be tried de novo and by preference in the district court. Where a grave public emergency has been declared by the parish or municipal governing authority, the owner of the building who desires to prevent the demolition or removal thereof must file his petition within forty-eight hours and must, at the time of the filing of the petition, furnish such bond as may be fixed by the district judge to cover any damage that might be caused by the condition of the building. (Emphasis added).

1 inKenner Municipal Code of Ordinances 5-63, entitled Substandard Buildings Declared Nuisances, provides for demolition or removal of hazards or public nuisances, as follows:

All buildings or structures, and all parts thereof, which, after inspection, are found not to meet the minimum housing standards of this article by virtue of being unsafe, unsanitary, unfit for human habitation, or not provided with adequate egress; or which constitute a fire hazard, or are otherwise dangerous to human life; or which in relation to existing use constitute a hazard to safety or health by reason of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment; are hereby declared to be public nuisances and shall be abated by repair, rehabilitation, demolition or removal. Demolition or removal shall be in accordance with R.S. 33:4761 et seq. (Emphasis added).

Notice and hearing were not contested. Appellant did contest, however, appellees’ compliance with La. R.S. 4762(A)(2)’s requirement that “there must be a written report recommending demolition or removal by some city official or other person authorized to act in such matters by the municipality.” (Emphasis added). Appellant contended that Liang was not properly authorized to inspect and report in this matter, and his report was therefore not in compliance with La. R.S! 33:4762. Appellant argued that this lack of authority rendered the City’s resolution without effect. Appellant relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Housemaster Corp. v. City of Kenner, 374 So.2d 1240, 1243 (La.1979), which required strict compliance with the statutory requirements of sufficient notice and public hearing before a structure can be ordered demolished.

Appellees contended conversely that they have met each statutory requirement to have the property demolished. The Mayor testified that the City through Code Enforcement hired Digital Engineering to inspect the property and structures at 50 Granada, that its engineer (V-P) Liang performed the inspection on February 27, 2013 and submitted a •written report to the City on February 28, 2018. In that report, Liang “found the structure to be substandard by reasons of | ninadequate maintenance, dilapidation and abandonment” and recommended that the building be declared a nuisance and demolished or abated.

We find Housemaster, swpra, applicable as it requires strict compliance with the statute to demolish a structure without compensation. On de novo review, we find that appellees have nonetheless strictly complied with the applicable statutes and jurisprudence. Engineer Liang had the City’s authority to inspect the subject property and to render a written report. He complied with his assignment and recommended abatement or demolition, the threshold determination for the City to take up the matter of demolition or repair of the property under La. R.S. 33:4763(A) at a public hearing.

We further find that considering the record in this proceeding, the relevant testimony taken, the photographs offered in evidence at the trial court, and the Engineer’s report, all depicting the property’s condition on April 4, 2013, the trial court did not err in finding the municipality met its burden of proving sufficient evidence of dilapidated and hazardous structures at 50 Granada Drive.

Accordingly, assignment of error number one lacks merit.

In his assignment of error number two, appellant contends that the trial court erred in limiting the evidence to exhibits introduced and witnesses or their representatives who testified at the Council Hearing. For example, appellant complains that the trial court did not let Leonard C. Quick, an expert in civil and structural engineering and forensic engineer, testify and that the trial court did not admit evidence of a denial of a 2006 permit to repair the property. In summary, appellant contends that the trial court denied his right to have the whole case retried as if there had been no prior hearing. Appel-lees respond that because Quick [ 12was not available, did not testify, nor present a report at the Council hearing, his testimony should not be allowed at the trial court.

Appellant cites Tatum, supra, for a different reason than that offered by appel-lees. Appellant argues that Tatum required that he should have been allowed to make repairs, in lieu of demolition, as the property did not threaten the public welfare. In Tatum, the owners received additional time to make repairs before a rescheduled meeting to take up the demolition issue. The owners made substantial repairs before the meeting occurred. Without notice to the owners, the Council voted to condemn. The repairs were considered in Tatum because of the notice issue. These facts are inapposite, however, to the instant facts, as appellant made no repairs, substantial or otherwise, prior to the Council resolution on April 4, 2013; appellant argued he was merely in the process of contracting for future repair work.

Appellees’ reliance on Tatum, supra, correctly establishes that the determinative factor for the admissible evidence is the state of the property on the date the Council acted. The trial judge agreed with appellees that he “only need[ed] to know what was in front of the council; he recognized the appeal as a de novo hearing with regards to whether or not the Council had sufficient evidence.” We agree with the trial judge’s determination of relevant evidence and exclusion of evidence or testimony not presented or not available on the date of the Council hearing with the exceptions noted.

The Council has a statutory mandate to minimize public nuisances and protect public welfare. La. R.S. 38:4761 et seq. The City has the burden to show there was sufficient evidence in order for the Council to enact the Resolution. Automated Bldg. Corp. v. City of Bossier City, 530 So.2d 671 (La.App. 2 Cir.1988), writ denied, 533 So.2d 358 (La.1988). Appellant is not prejudiced as he | ishad an opportunity to present his expert and investigative materials at the Council proceeding. Additionally, appellant has not shown or alleged to the district court or in this appeal that expert testimony was unobtainable with due diligence on the hearing date.

Over appellant’s objection, the trial judge also took judicial notice without request of prior published cases involving this property’s condition as permitted by La. C.E. art. 202. These cases involved the City of Kenner and appellant’s parents, including his father, currently his attorney-in-fact. In City of Kenner v. Jumonville, 97-125 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/27/97), 701 So.2d 223, writ denied, 97-2890 (La.1/30/98), 709 So.2d 718, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 953, 118 S.Ct. 2371, 141 L.Ed.2d 739 (1998), this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment ordering the Jumonvilles to complete renovations to the same Granada property in accordance with a consent agreement between the Jumonvilles and the City of Kenner. The same opinion affirmed two rulings of the district court holding the Jumonvilles in contempt for failure to comply with the consent judgment. In City of Kenner v. Jumonville, 00-1696 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/01), 793 So.2d 574, the Jumonvilles appealed a judgment of the district court ordering them to pay fines for their failure to complete renovations in accordance with their permit. This evidence supports the conclusion that at minimum this same property, subject to transfer between family members, (1) has not been in compliance with permits and consent judgments; and (2) has been the subject of litigation. See also City of Kenner v. Jumonville, 05-860 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/28/06), 927 So.2d 574 (affirming violations of City ordinances; taking judicial notice of prior Jumonville cases; and noting appellant’s absence in that proceeding when he was living in China).

Appellant proffered evidence of a 2006 building permit application. The trial court denied the admission of this evidence as irrelevant to its review of the 114condition of the structure on April 4, 2013. Again, we find the trial court was not erroneous in limiting the admission of evidence of proposed work as opposed to the actual condition of the property on the hearing date. See Tatum, supra.

Based on Tatum, we find that the trial court did not err in limiting the exhibits and witnesses to those presented at the Council hearing.

Accordingly, assignment of error number two lacks merit.

In his assignment of error number three, appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding the Council had sufficient evidence to demolish appellant’s structures.

In support of his position, appellant also cites the provisions in the Louisiana Constitution, which provide at Art. I, Sec. 4:

(A) Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power. [Emphasis added].
(B)(1) Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes
and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit ... (2) As used in Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph and in Article VI, Section 23 of this Constitution, “public purpose” shall be limited to the following:
⅜ * *
(c) Removal of a threat to public health and safety caused by the existing use or disuse of the property.
La. R.S. 33:4763(A) provides in part: After the hearing, if, in the opinion of the parish or municipal governing authority the facts justify it, an order shall be entered condemning the building and ordering that it be demolished or removed within a certain delay.

Whether a taking occurred is a factual finding subject to the manifest error standard of review. LaSalle v. Iberia Par. Council, 99-216 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/99), 741 So.2d 812. However, based on the nature of the condemnation 1 ^proceeding, where the structure endangering the public welfare may be either demolished or abated, the landowner is not deprived of all economically beneficial uses of the land so as to constitute a taking. Id. at 818; La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 4.

We find that the trial court did not manifestly err in its conclusion that the property on April 4, 2013 was in a dilapidated and defective condition which endangered the public welfare. Based on the foregoing discussion, we find that the City of Kenner, the governing body, bore the burden of proving the structures were in a dilapidated and dangerous condition which endangered the public welfare. Tatum, supra. It met this burden through evidence of photographs taken that day, Liang’s expert engineering report, and the trial court’s taking of judicial notice of the property’s long history of neglect, code violations and abandonment. We find that the evidence adduced at trial supports the trial court’s factual findings.

Assignment of error number three lacks merit.

In his assignment of error number four, appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing irrelevant hearsay evidence of unsupported complaints. The appellate court must determine whether the particular evidentiary ruling was erroneous, and if so, whether the ruling prejudiced the party’s case. Crisler, supra.

Kenner public officials Mayor Yenni and Councilman Reynaud were each personally familiar with the status of the property. Mayor Yenni was Kenner’s Chief Administrative Officer prior to his election as mayor, and Councilman Reynaud’s district includes the Driftwood Subdivision containing the property at issue. These witnesses thus testified from personal knowledge regarding cases and complaints. The complained-of testimony is further not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather are business records kept in the ordinary course of business, to show how complaints were directed, how long they existed, and most notably, whether they were ever resolved by Code Enforcement, the Council, |¡ (¡contempt proceedings in the District Court, or by the appellate process. We find no error in the trial court’s admitting evidence and statements regarding complaints through the Mayor and Councilman. Additionally even if there was error, there is no prejudice, as the complaints substantiate the judicial notice taken of the published litigious history of the property at issue.

Accordingly, assignment of error number four lacks merit.

In his assignment of error number five, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights to be free from an unlawful search and seizure. Appellant contends the City Attorney, its trial counsel, Code Enforcement officials, and engineer Liang entered the property and dwelling without consent and violated his right to privacy when there was no exigency to do so.

The appellees respond that the Constitution protects only against unreasonable searches and seizures and that in the instant matter, the property has been unoccupied since 1995, without utilities, and unsecured, thus making any inspection of the vacant property reasonable. Significantly, the appellees note there was no contemporaneous objection by appellant to the admissibility of the 65 photographs taken the day of the hearing. These photographs include those taken inside the structure.

Without contemporaneous objection, assignment of error number five lacks merit.

In his assignment of error number six, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s evidence, Proffer 1, while taking judicial notice of a suit filed 16 years ago when he was not owner, although his parents were, and one seven years ago on issues unrelated to the present case.

|17This issue has been discussed previously in this Court’s applying Tatum’s mandate to restrict relevant evidence to the condition of the property on the date of the hearing. On the issue of proposed work, the trial court admitted evidence of contracts pending on the Council hearing date of April 4, 2018; it did not permit introduction of anticipated work seven years ago or after the date of the hearing.

We find this sixth assignment of error lacks merit.

Based on the foregoing, we find the City of Kenner has met its burden to establish there was sufficient evidence in order for the Council to enact the ordinance. Automated Building Corp., supra.

DECREE

After a thorough review of the trial court record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

      . Testimony was required at the district court level to create a record for review of witnesses who testified before the Council.

      . Appellant complained in his brief that the trial court permitted testimony by Councilman Reynaud, Liang, and Osterhold when they did not testify at the Council hearing. This argument lacks merit: (1) there was no contemporaneous objection; (2) Kenner Councilman Reynaud was at the dais at the Kenner Council hearing and offered the resolution at issue pertaining to his district; (3) Osterhold’s testimony is not being considered on this appeal; and (4) Liang’s testimony is considered only as to his report read at the Council hearing, and as to his hiring and his seal, issues posed by appellant.

      . Appellant dismissed his claim for injunctive relief after the trial court ruled on the sufficiency of the evidence.

      . On June 3, 2013, the appellees hied a motion to traverse the validity and sufficiency of the bond and to dismiss the appeal. After a hearing, the trial court found appellant's bond to be sufficient and denied appellees’ motions to traverse and to dismiss.

      . La. Const. Art. 5, Sec. 16(B) provides that the "district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.”

      . We further find that the trial court did not manifestly err in finding Liang’s report to be complete despite absence of an engineer’s seal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: McClendon, j.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Christopher J. BOURGEOIS v. Dana A. Benintende BOURGEOIS.
    No. 2013 CA 0038.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Sept. 13, 2013.

      P. David Carollo, Slidell, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Christopher J. Bourgeois.
    Elizabeth S. Robins, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellant, Dana A. Benintende Bourgeois.
    Before: PETTIGREW, McDONALD, and McClendon, jj.
   McClendon, j.

|2In this appeal, we review a judgment that granted a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum and for sanctions. For the following reasons, we amend, and, as amended, affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Christopher J. Bourgeois filed a petition for divorce from Dana Benintende Bourgeois on September 25, 2009. The divorce was granted on January 10, 2011, and the parties were awarded joint custody of their three children. In response to a motion to modify child support filed by Mr. Bourgeois, Ms. Bourgeois sought the financial records of Mr. Bourgeois. On April 2, 2012, she filed a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum upon Regions Bank for the banking records of Mr. Bourgeois commencing January 1, 2011. On April 3, 2012, in connection with the subpoena duces tecum request, Ms. Bourgeois filed into the record a notice of records deposition to Regions Bank.

Also, on April 3, 2012, Ms. Bourgeois filed a motion to compel, asserting that on January 3, 2012, she served upon Mr. Bourgeois Interrogatories and Requests for Production. Ms. Bourgeois contended that Mr. Bourgeois did not respond to the discovery requests until the afternoon of February 28, 2012, and that the discovery responses “were wholly insufficient.” Ms. Bourgeois continued:

[Mr. Bourgeois’] responses included claims that documents had already been produced, which in fact had not been produced, and promises were made to supplement the discovery, which was never done. Additionally, responses to Interrogatories were insufficient, including requests for contact information that would have allowed [Ms. Bourgeois] to conduct further discovery of employers, and financial accounts of [Mr. Bourgeois], which are central issues in [Ms. Bourgeois’] rule for reduction in child support. The discovery insufficiencies were discussed at the February 29, 2012 [hearing on the parties’ objections to the hearing officer’s report], to which [Mr. Bourgeois’] counsel confirmed that no further discovery responses would be provided and [Ms. Bourgeois’] recourse would be a Motion to Compel.

|sMs. Bourgeois further alleged that Mr. Bourgeois had failed to provide any supplemental responses to the interrogatories and requests for production of documents, other than the original responses provided on February 28, 2012.

In response, on April 19, 2012, Mr. Bourgeois filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum and for Sanctions asserting that Ms. Bourgeois failed to follow the requirements for the production of bank records as set forth in LSA-R.S. 6:333. Mr. Bourgeois also maintained that the motion to compel was ambiguous, failed to address the sufficiency of any of his discovery responses, and was filed without attempting to schedule a 10.1 conference to discuss any discovery concerns. Mr. Bourgeois stated that at no time between the delivery of the discovery responses on February 28, 2012, and April 12, 2012, when he received the motion to compel and the subpoena duces tecum requests, did his counsel receive a letter or telephone call in relation to the sufficiency of his discovery responses or the scheduling of a 10.1 conference. Mr. Bourgeois asserted that the motion to compel was presented for an improper purpose, such as, to upset the trial date or to needlessly increase the cost of the litigation. He further asserted that the motion was not warranted by existing law, and he sought attorney fees and costs incurred in connection therewith.

The matter came for hearing on June 4, 2012, on Mr. Bourgeois’s Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum and for Sanctions. Oral argument was presented, and the trial court took the matter under advisement. On July 3, |42012, the trial court issued its written reasons for judgment, granting the motion to quash and motion for sanctions. Ms. Bourgeois’ attorney, Elizabeth S. Robins, was sanctioned in the amount of $1,928.25, representing attorney fees and costs incurred by Mr. Bourgeois in response to the subpoena duces tecum and the motion to compel. Judgment in conformity with the reasons was signed on July 18, 2012, and Ms. Bourgeois appealed.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Quash

In her appeal, Ms. Bourgeois initially asserts that the trial court erred in granting the motion to quash, as there was no procedural error in her request for the subpoena duces tecum to the bank and the bank records requested were highly relevant and not confidential.

The exclusive method for obtaining records from a bank is found in LSA-R.S. 6:383. Dana Johno, LLC v. Centennial Ins. Co., 04-1658 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/1/04), 891 So.2d 32, 34. Subsection C allows a bank to disclose financial records pursuant to a disclosure demand, but only if the statutory requirements are met prior to such disclosure. Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:333 provides, in pertinent part:

C. A bank may disclose financial records pursuant to a disclosure demand if each of the following conditions are met:
(1) The disclosure demand is served on the bank’s president, one of the bank’s registered agents for service of process, or, if applicable, on the bank’s counsel of record unless such service on such individuals is expressly waived by the bank.
(2) Prior to the return date, the person requesting the issuance of the disclosure demand furnishes the bank with an affidavit certifying both of the following:
(a) That such disclosure demand, or a certified copy thereof, has also been personally served upon each customer named in the disclosure demand to whom the financial records being sought pertain or upon such customer’s counsel of record in accordance with Subsection D of this Section.
(b) That such service was made at least fifteen business days prior to the return date.
| s(3) The bank has not received written notice that a customer to whom the financial records pertain has taken legal action to enjoin or otherwise restrain the release of the financial records.
D. Service of a disclosure demand, or certified copy thereof, on any customer shall be made by utilizing any applicable method for service of citation on said customer authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure, including Articles 1281 through 1265. However, any such service may be made by an individual who is not a party and who is at least eighteen years of age, rather than by the sheriff. Service on any customer’s counsel of record shall be made by personal service in the office of such counsel of record on either his secretary, as defined in Code of Civil Procedure Article 1235(C), or any partner or office associate of such counsel of record. Service on a customer or on his counsel of record may be made within or without the state of Louisiana.

In its written reasons, the trial court found no proof that the disclosure demand was personally served upon the customer, Mr. Bourgeois, or his counsel of record, as required by the statute. The court stated that “[m]ailing a copy of the letter requesting the subpoena duces tecum to [Mr. Bourgeois’] counsel of record does not comply with the statute as the statute specifically requires service of the disclosure demand through the Sheriff or a private process server.” Additionally, the trial court found no proof that the disclosure demand was personally served upon either Mr. Bourgeois or his counsel of record at least fifteen days prior to the return date as required by the statute. Lastly, the trial court found that no evidence was offered showing that Ms. Bourgeois or her counsel served Regions Bank with the affidavit required under LSA-R.S. 6:333C(2). Finding that Ms. Bourgeois failed to comply with the requirements of LSA-R.S. 6:333, the trial court granted the motion to quash.

It is well-settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La.2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735. Upon our thorough review of the record we find no manifest error in the factual findings of the trial court. Accordingly, we find no error in the granting of the motion to quash.

| ^Motion for Sanctions

The trial court awarded $1,928.25 as sanctions, which represented attorney fees in the amount of $1,662.50 and $265.75 in costs relating to the motion to compel and the subpoena duces tecum issued to Regions Bank. Further, the court did not impose the sanction against Ms. Bourgeois, but against her attorney, Ms. Robins. Ms. Bourgeois contends that the trial court erred in improperly sanctioning her counsel pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 863, because Article 863 does not apply to subpoena requests, as they are not “pleadings,” and Article 863 is used in only exceptional circumstances. Ms. Bourgeois also complains about the amount of the sanctions ordered.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 863 authorizes a court to impose sanctions upon an attorney, or a represented party, who signs pleadings without making an objective reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law. Brown v. Sanders, 06-1171 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/23/07), 960 So.2d 931, 934. A trial court’s determination regarding the imposition of sanctions is subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Once the trial court finds a violation of LSA-C.C.P. art. 863 and imposes sanctions, the determination of the type and/or amount of the sanction is reviewed on appeal utilizing the abuse of discretion standard. Slaughter v. Board of Sup’rs of Southern University and Agr. and Mechanical College, 10-1114 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/2/11), 76 So.3d 465, 469-70, unit denied, 11-2112 (La.1/13/12), 77 So.3d 970.

To impose sanctions, a trial court must find that one of the affirmative duties imposed by Article 863 has been violated. Slaughter, 76 So.3d at 470. Article 863 provides, in pertinent part:

B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or certificate, except as otherwise provided by law, but the signature of an attorney or party shall constitute a certification by him that he has read the pleading, and that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, he certifies all of the following:
(1) The pleading is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.
|7(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the pleading has evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual assertion, is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual assertion is warranted by the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a lack of information or belief....
D. If, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, the court determines that a certification has been made in violation of the provisions of this Article, the court shall impose upon the person who made the certification or the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, including reasonable attorney fees.
E. A sanction authorized in Paragraph D shall be imposed only after a hearing at which any party or his counsel may present any evidence or argument relevant to the issue of imposition of the sanction....
G. If the court imposes a sanction, it shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of the provisions of this Article and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.

Article 863 does not empower a trial court to impose sanctions simply because a particular argument or ground for relief is subsequently found to be unjustified; failure to prevail does not trigger an award of sanctions. The article is intended to be used only in exceptional circumstances; where there is even the slightest justification for the assertion of a legal right, sanctions are not warranted. Slaughter, 76 So.3d at 470.

In ruling on the motion for sanctions, the trial court noted that the motion to compel was filed after Ms. Bourgeois received the discovery responses. The trial court stated that the two bases for the motion to compel were that no contact information was provided about Mr. Bourgeois’ employers and that no financial accounts were produced. The trial court, however, found that the responses provided sufficient information concerning Mr. Bourgeois’ employers that would have allowed Ms. Bourgeois to issue subpoenas to them, which she, |sin fact, did. The court also stated that, even though Ms. Bourgeois’ motion to compel did not specify what she meant by “financial accounts,” it would read the term broadly to include both credit card statements and bank accounts. The court found that Mr. Bourgeois’ responses included information concerning credit card statements, tax returns, and bank accounts. The court then stated that because there was no further specification as to how the discovery responses were insufficient and there was no notice to Mr. Bourgeois as to how he might have been able to cure the deficiencies beyond what he had already produced, it found that the motion to compel was filed frivolously and for the purpose of needlessly increasing the cost of litigation.

The trial court then stated:

[Mr. Bourgeois] is entitled to an award of sanctions for the amount of money he has incurred for the needless increase in the cost of this litigation. The Court notes that the Motion to Compel was filed after responses were provided by [Mr. Bourgeois] but no discovery conference was held after receipt of the responses and no specification given to [Mr. Bourgeois] as to how to cure the perceived but unstated deficiencies. Additionally, the Court finds that the failure to comply with the clearly stated requirements of Louisiana Revised Statute 6:333 is without excuse. The statute is clear and unambiguous.

Having thoroughly the record in this matter, we can find no manifest error in the trial court’s award of sanctions pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 863 for the filing of the motion to compel. A reasonable factual basis exists for the trial court’s decision, and we cannot say that it is was clearly wrong.

However, Ms. Bourgeois argues that an award of sanctions pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 863 applies only to pleadings and that the trial court erred in imposing sanctions pursuant to Article 863 for the subpoena duces tecum requests. We agree. Article 863, by its very terms, does not apply when the signature is affixed to a document that is not a pleading. According to LSA-C.C.P. art. 852, pleadings in civil actions consist of “petitions, exceptions, written motions, and answers.” Because a letter requesting a subpoena duces tecum and a notice of deposition do not fall within one of these categories, LSA-C.C.P. art. 863 does not apply to these requests. See Maxie v. McCormick, 95-1105 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/23/96), 669 So.2d 562, 564.

Nevertheless, LSA-C.C.P. art. 1420 allows for the imposition of sanctions when an attorney or party has signed a request for discovery, or response or objection thereto, in violation of the certifications listed in Article 1420. Maxie, 669 So.2d at 564. Although the trial court erred in imposing sanctions for the discovery requests under LSA-C.C.P. art. 863, upon our review of the record, we find that the notice of deposition and the letter requesting the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, both signed by Ms. Robins, are requests for discovery sanctionable under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1420. See Maxie, 669 So.2d at 564-65. The trial court found the failure to comply with the clear requirements of LSA-R.S. 6:383 was without excuse. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we find hnno error in the trial court’s award of sanctions regarding the notice of deposition and the letter requesting the issuance of a subpoena duces te-cum.

Ms. Bourgeois next complains about the amount of the sanctions, asserting that the trial court erred in including $525.00 in attorney fees from Mr. Bourgeois’ February 2012 bill when those fees were incurred by Mr. Bourgeois prior to her motion to compel and requests for subpoenas duces tecum. Ms. Bourgeois also contends that the trial court erred in failing to reduce the award by the $592.00 amount in attorney fees assessed against Mr. Bourgeois, which he never paid.

We agree with Ms. Bourgeois that the $525.00 amount in attorney fees was improperly awarded to Mr. Bourgeois. In its written reasons, the trial court stated that the sanctions amount represented the attorney fees and costs Mr. Bourgeois incurred in connection with responding to the subpoena duces tecum and the motion to compel. However, the $525.00 amount was billed on February 29, 2012, for a pretrial conference and hearing on a motion to continue, scheduled on that date. Additionally, Ms. Bourgeois did not request the issuance of her subpoena duces tecum and did not file her motion to compel until April of 2012. We find that the trial court abused its discretion in including the $525.00 amount in its award of sanctions. Accordingly, we deduct that amount from the award of sanctions.

As to the $592.00 amount that Ms. Bourgeois asserts was owed but never paid by Mr. Bourgeois, we note that this issue was not raised at the trial court level. Because this argument was not raised in the trial court, we decline to address it for the first time on appeal. See Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we amend the July 18, 2012 judgment of the trial court and reduce the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by Mr. Bourgeois by $525.00 to $1403.25. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall be shared equally by the parties.

JUDGMENT AMENDED, AND, AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.

PETTIGREW, J., Concurs.

      . Ms. Bourgeois contended that Mr. Bourgeois voluntarily left his employment and that he had funds available for the payment of child support.

      . A 10.1 conference refers to Rule 10.1 of the Louisiana District Court Rules, which provides, in pertinent part:
      (a) Before filing any motion to compel discovery, the moving party or attorney shall confer in person or by telephone with the opposing party or counsel for the purpose of amicably resolving the discovery dispute. The moving party or attorney shall attempt to arrange a suitable conference date with the opposing party or counsel and confirm the date by written notice sent at least five (5) days before the conference date, unless an earlier date is agreed upon or good cause exists for a shorter time period. If by telephone, the conference shall be initiated by the person seeking the discovery responses.
      (b) No counsel for a party shall file, nor shall any clerk set for hearing, any motion to compel discovery unless accompanied by a "Rule 10.1 Certificate of Conference" ...
      (c) If the court finds that the patties or counsel have failed to confer in good faith, or have willfully failed to confer, the court may impose, at its discretion, sanctions on the non-conferring party, including attorney fees and costs.

      . Also see Rule 10.1(c) of the Louisiana District Court Rules regarding the imposition of sanctions on a non-conferring party.

      . Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1420 provides, in pertinent part:
      A. Every request for discovery, or response or objection thereto, made by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his Individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state his address.
      B. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the request, response, or objection is:

        (1) Consistent with all the rules of discovery and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
      (2) Not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and
      (3) Not unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. ...
      D. If, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, the court determines that a certification has been made in violation of the provisions of this Article, the court shall impose upon the person who made the certification or the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the request, response, or objection, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
      E. A sanction authorized in Paragraph D shall be imposed only after a hearing at which any party or his counsel may present any evidence or argument relevant to the issue of imposition of the sanction.

      . We note that while the trial court’s written reasons for judgment refer only to Article 863, and do not mention Article 1420, the judgment from which Ms. Bourgeois appeals does not refer to either Article 863 or Article 1420. Appeals are taken from judgments, not the reasons for judgment. Davis v. Farm Fresh Food Supplier, 02-1401 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/28/03), 844 So.2d 352, 353-54.


author: WELCH, J.

text:
    Betty HOOPER, John Hooper, Darryl Cleveland and Michael Mannino v. WISTERIA LAKES SUBDIVISION, CJS Development, Calvin Blount and Steve Cantu.
    No. 2013 CA 0050.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Sept. 13, 2013.

      Michael J. Uter, Baton Rouge, LA, for Appellees Plaintiffs, Betsy and John Hooper.
    Daniel A. Reed, Baton Rouge, LA, for Appellant Defendant, CJS Development, LLC.
    Thomas D. Fazio, Baton Rouge, LA, for Appellants Defendants, Betty LeSage Thompson and the Successors of Thelma Helen LeSage Summers and Alice Fay Bennett LeSage.
    Before WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, and CRAIN, JJ.
   WELCH, J.

Un this boundary dispute, the defendant/record owner of certain immovable property, CJS Development, L.L.C. (“CJS”), and the third party defendants/former record owners of that same property, Leo Summers as successor to Thelma Helen LeSage Summers, Betty Rose LeSage Thompson and Tonya Faye LeSage as successor to Alice Faye Bennett LeSage (collectively “the LeSage defendants”), appeal a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs/owners of adjoining immovable property, Betsy Hooper and John Hooper (collectively “the Hoopers”), declaring that the Hoopers acquired ownership of a portion of CJS’s property by thirty-year acquisitive prescription and awarding damages to the Hoopers for CJS’s removal of trees from their property. The Hoopers have answered the appeal seeking treble damages. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and deny the answer to appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By act of sale dated April 8,1961, Henry W. Hooper, plaintiff John Hooper’s father, acquired a tract of immovable property in East Baton Rouge Parish from Laurence L. Summers. By act of sale dated July 12, 1965, Betsy Hooper (then “Betsy His-song”) acquired a tract of immovable property in East Baton Rouge Parish adjacent to the properly owned by Henry Hooper. Betsy Hooper has owned and lived on that property continuously since that date. Eventually, Betsy Hooper married John Hooper. Following the death of Henry Hooper, Henry Hooper’s tract of immovable property was conveyed by the other |sheirs of Henry Hooper to the Hoopers by act of cash sale dated June 1992. Together, these two properties comprise the Hooper property.

By act of cash sale dated September 1, 2006, CJS acquired from the LeSage defendants 52.37 acres of immovable property in East Baton Rouge Parish. This property is adjacent to and contiguous with the Hooper property as well as property owned by Alvin McCloud, Michael Mannino, and Darryl Cleveland. CJS, through its members, Calvin Blount and Steve Cantu purchased the property from the LeSage defendants with the intent to develop it as Wisteria Lakes Subdivision.

Shortly after purchasing the property, a dispute arose between CJS and the Hoo-pers regarding the ownership of approximately ⅜ of an acre that was located between the record boundary of the Hooper property and an old fence line, which the Hoopers believed was the boundary between their property and the LeSage property (now owned by CJS). Apparently, the old fence line had been constructed around 1931 by Philo and Pinkie LeSage in order to keep cattle on the LeSage property and had been constructed in a straight line along (or close to) the entire boundary of the LeSage property, except at the boundary of what is now the Hooper property, where the fence was constructed well inside the boundary line. Thus, the Hoo-pers’ claimed that the old fence line was the boundary between the two properties.

Notwithstanding the boundary dispute, CJS began clearing trees from the property. Therefore, on December 15, 2006, the Hoopers filed a petition for | ¿injunction and to stop the development of the subdivision against CJS, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Cantu, and Wisteria Lakes Subdivision. In the petition, the Hoopers alleged that although CJS asserted ownership of the disputed area by virtue of a title presented to them at the purchase of the property, they had acquired ownership of the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription, having corporeally possessed the property for more than thirty years in accordance with La. C.C. art. 3486, et seq. Accordingly, the Hoopers requested a temporary restraining order and thereafter, an injunction to enjoin the defendants from any further action on the disputed area.

In response, CJS filed a third-party demand for warranty of title against the LeSage defendants, seeking, in the event of an eviction from the disputed area of the property by the Hoopers, to recover the purchase price (or a portion thereof), as well as to recover any other damages sustained by CJS. Thereafter, CJS recommenced clearing trees from the property. The Hoopers then filed an amended petition, seeking damages for the removal of trees from the property in the amount of three times the market value of the trees, ie., treble damages.

Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Hoopers and against CJS, finding that the Hoopers had proven their claim of thirty-year acquisitive prescription to the disputed area. Additionally, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Hoopers and against CJS, in the amount of $12,500.00, plus judicial interest from the date of demand, representing damages caused to the Hoo-pers’ property (ie., the removal of trees) by CJS. Lastly, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the third-party demand of CJS against the LeSage defendants.

IsA judgment in accordance with the trial court’s ruling was signed on May 3, 2012, and it is from this judgment that CJS and the LeSage defendants have appealed. On appeal, CJS contends that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that the Hoopers had carried their burden of proving continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal adverse possession of land outside the survey boundaries described in their deeds (ie., the disputed area) for any period of thirty years; (2) finding that CJS and its predecessors in title had not possessed the disputed area with just title for ten years prior to the action being filed; (3) finding that the trees removed from the disputed property had a value separate and apart from the value of the immovable property on which the trees were located or their value as timber; (4) permitting an urban forester to offer opinion evidence on the “evaluation of trees”; and (5) dismissing CJS’s third-party demand against the LeSage defendants where the sale document on which it was based was introduced into evidence.

On appeal, the LeSage defendants contend that the trial court erred in finding that the Hoopers acquired any portion of the property sold by the LeSage defendants to CJS by thirty-year acquisitive prescription. Additionally, the Hoopers have answered the appeal seeking an award of treble damages and to cast individual defendants, Mr. Blount and Mr. Cantu, solidarily liable with CJS for all damages.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Boundary Action and Acquisitive Prescription

In a boundary action, the court shall render a judgment fixing the boundary between contiguous lands in accordance with the ownership or possession of the parties. La. C.C.P. art. 3693. The boundary shall be fixed according to ownership of the parties; however, if neither party proves ownership, the boundary shall be fixed according to the limits established by possession. La. C.C. art. 792. In a boundary action, “[a] party that proves ownership by an unbroken chain of | fitransfers from a previous owner or by virtue from a more ancient title from a common author prevails, unless the adverse party proves ownership by acquisitive prescription.” King’s Farm, Inc. v. Concordia Parish Police Jury, 97-1056 (La.App. 3rd Cir.3/6/98), 709 So.2d 953, 956, unit denied, 98-1450 (La.9/18/98), 724 So.2d 748, (quoting Yiannopoulos, Property § 268, 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 527 (3rd ed.1991)). Thus, ownership of immovable property under record title may be eclipsed and superseded by ownership acquired under prescriptive title. Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 2002-2498 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/7/03), 862 So.2d 1010, 1015, writ denied, 2004-0447 (La.4/2/04), 869 So.2d 889.

Under the codal provisions on acquisitive prescription, a possessor lacking good faith and/or just title may acquire prescriptive title to land by corporeally possessing a tract for thirty years with the intent to possess as owner. Id. Corporeal possession is the exercise of physical acts of use, detention, or enjoyment over a thing. La. C.C. art. 3425. Thirty years of corporeal possession confers prescriptive title upon the possessor only when it is continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal, and confers title only to such immovable property as is actually corporeally possessed. Secret Cove, L.L.C., 862 So.2d at 1015; see also La. C.C. arts. 3424, 3426, 3476, 3486, 3487, and 3488.

For purposes of acquisitive prescription without title, possession extends only to that which has been actually possessed. La. C.C. art. 3487. Actual possession must be either inch-by-inch possession or possession within enclosures. Secret Cove, L.L.C., 862 So.2d at 1015. According to well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence, an enclosure is any natural or artificial boundary. Id., citing La. C.C. art. 3426, comment (d). The party who does not hold title to the disputed tract has the burden of proving actual possession within enclosures sufficient to establish the limits of possession with certainty, by either natural or artificial marks, giving 17notice to the world of the extent of possession exercised. Secret Cove, L.L.C., 862 So.2d at 1015.

One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he began to possess in the name of and for another. La. C.C. art. 3427. The intent to possess as owner may be inferred from all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Secret Cove, L.L.C., 862 So.2d at 1015.

Under La. C.C. art. 794, a title holder may acquire more land than his title calls for by possessing property beyond his title for thirty years without interruption and within visible bounds. Such a title holder may attain the thirty-year possessory period — which is necessary to perfect prescriptive title in the absence of good faith and just title — by “tacking” on to the possession of his ancestor in title. La. C.C. arts. 794 and 3442; Secret Cove, L.L.C., 862 So.2d at 1015-1016. Under La. C.C. art. 794, the privity of title between the possessor and his ancestor in title need not extend to the property to which the possessor asserts prescriptive title; under this article, the juridical link, or written instrument that passes to the possessor from his ancestor-in-title need not encompass or include the particular property to which the possessor claims prescriptive title. Secret Cove, L.L.C., 862 So.2d at 1016.

Whether a party has possessed property for purposes of thirty-year acquisitive prescription is a factual determination by the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong. Id. Additionally, boundary location is a question of fact, and the determination of its location by the trial court should not be reversed absent manifest error. Id. Where factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the trier of fact’s findings demand great deference and are virtually never manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of Rfact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Id. It is only when documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness’s story or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable fact-finder would not credit the witness’s story, that the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness, even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844-845. But where such factors are not present, and a fact-finder’s finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell, 549 So.2d at 845.

In this case, the trial court provided written reasons for judgment as follows:

The court could reiterate verbatim the testimonial and documentary evidence that was presented at trial, but more practical is to conclude what the evidence has revealed to the court. The court in review of all the evidence presented finds that the plaintiffs have proven by a preponderance of the evidence actual, clear and open possession of the area in dispute for greater than 30 years. There is an abundance of evidence to conclude that the plaintiff[s’] possession was both continuous and interrupted [sic ] beyond the required 30-year acquisitive prescription period required by law to acquire ownership. The Hooper[s] openly possessed the property to the tree/fence line since 1965.... There was no evidence of any substance to rebut this established fact.
The court concludes that the plaintiffs have acquired the strip of land in dispute by acquisitive prescription.

Both CJS and the LeSage defendants contend that the trial court erred in finding that the Hoopers acquired any portion of the property sold by the LeSage defendants to CJS by thirty-year acquisitive prescription. Specifically, both argue that the Hoopers did not carry their burden of proving continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal adverse possession of land outside the survey boundaries described in their deeds for any period of thirty years.

|sBased on our review of the evidence in this case, we find that the trial court’s factual finding that the Hoopers possessed the disputed area up to the old fence line as owners for thirty years to be reasonably supported by the testimony of Betsy Hooper, John Hooper, Michael Hooper, Casey McCoun, Alvin McCloud, Terry Summers, and Michael Mannino, and it is not clearly wrong. The testimony established that Betsy Hooper has lived on the Hooper property (or a part thereof) since 1965. The Hoopers and all the owners of neighboring property have always considered the old fence line to be the boundary between the Hooper property (and former Summers property) and the LeSage property. The testimony also established that the Hoopers, including Henry Hooper, continuously possessed and exercised rights of possession over the property to the fence line. The evidence established that Betsy Hooper considered the area in dispute to be her “backyard,” that her children played in the “backyard” (the area in dispute) up to the fence line, that family gatherings and volleyball games were held in the area in dispute, and that there was a clothesline in the disputed area. The testimony further established that the Hoopers maintained the Hooper property and the property up to the fence line by planting a garden and trees in the disputed area and mowing the grass up to the fence line. Thus, we must conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the nature and extent of that possession satisfied the requirements of acquisitive prescription.

We also agree with the trial court that neither CJS nor the LeSage defendants produced any competent evidence to contradict the evidence offered by the Hoo-pers or to establish that the old fence line was not considered the boundary between the LeSage and Hooper property. CJS and the LeSage defendants point to |1t1a 1994 survey commissioned and recorded by the Hoopers, which depicted the boundary between the Hooper property and the LeSage property at the record boundary. However, Betsy Hooper testified that the purpose of that survey was to re-subdivide the Hooper property by cutting out a tract of land, which was on the opposite side of the Hooper property as the area in dispute, to be conveyed to their daughter for the construction of a home.

CJS and the LeSage defendants also point to two inquiries by John Hooper— one to Mr. Leo Summers (married to one of the LeSage defendants) and one to Mr. Brandon Rogillio (the real estate agent for the sale of the LeSage property to CJS)— wherein John Hooper inquired about purchasing some of the LeSage property. However, these inquiries were not ac-knowledgements that the disputed area was not possessed as owner by the Hoo-pers, but merely an expression of interest in purchasing an undesignated portion of the LeSage property. Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s judgment on acquisitive prescription and the boundary fixed between the Hooper property and the property of CJS.

Damages

In addition to finding that the Hoopers proved ownership of the disputed area by thirty-year acquisitive prescription, the trial court also awarded damages for the fair market value of the trees that CJS removed from the area in dispute. Specifically, with regard to damages, the trial court’s reasons for judgment provide:

The question then becomes to what extent the plaintiffs were damaged as a result of the defendants!’] removal of trees on the strip of land that was in dispute. Evidence suggests that the defendants were notified sometime in 2006 of a potential dispute over the boundary line and that in December of 2006[,] the defendants began removing trees from the area. There is a dispute as to how much the defendants] actually [k]new of the boundary dispute prior to the tree removals in December 2006 and February 2007. There is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant’s had Inknowledge of the dispute over the boundary prior to the removal of trees in February 2007. There should have been a halt to all tree removal sometime after receiving notice in December of 2006. The action taken by the defendants up until December 2006 was done with them believing that they had the right to do so. Up to that point[,] they relied upon what a survey revealed.
The court concludes that the plaintiffs ... have suffered damages due to the removal of trees inside of the area in dispute. The court has considered the testimony of Dr. Malcolm Guidry, the plaintiffs’] forestry expert in determining a fair and just award to compensate them for their los[s]. After review of the testimony and law, the court believes that the fair market value of the plaintiffs’] loss amounts to the sum of $12,500.00. The defendants shall pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of damages plus judicial interest from the date of demand.

CJS first contends that the trial court erred in awarding damages because the trees did not have a value separate and apart from the value of the immovable property on which they were located or their value as timber. CJS argues that in Louisiana, all property is either movable or immovable. See La. C.C. art. 475. CJS further argues that standing trees are im-movables, and, when owned by the owner of the land on which they sit, are considered component parts of the land, whereas cut trees, or logs, are immovables. See La. C.C. arts. 468 and 464. Thus, CJS contends that standing trees only have value in two ways — either they enhance the value of the land on which they sit or they have potential value for sale as timber, and in this case, there was no proof of either.

However, the trial court’s reasons for judgment reflect that it was awarding damages for the removal or destruction of trees that were on the Hooper side of the fence line in the area in dispute after this boundary action was filed by the Hoopers. The trial court found that although CJS had been in good faith in initially tearing down trees in December 2006 (even though they may have been aware of a potential dispute over the boundary line), at the time they re-commenced removing trees in February 2007, CJS had actual knowledge of the boundary dispute, and were thus liable for the damage they caused. Thus, it appears the damages awarded by the trial court were based on general tort law, ie., the tort of trespass, |12and La. R.S. 3:4278.1. See La. C.C. art. 2315; Callison v. Livingston Timber, Inc., 2002-1323 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/9/03), 849 So.2d 649, 652.

A person injured by trespass or the fault of another is entitled to full indemnification for the damages caused. Callison, 849 So.2d at 652. Where there is a legal right to recovery, but the damages cannot be exactly estimated, the courts have reasonable discretion to assess same based upon all the facts and circumstances. Id. Damages are recoverable even though the tortfeasor acts in good faith. Id.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 3:4278.1 provides, in part:

A.(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to cut, fell, destroy, remove, or to divert for sale or use, any trees, or to authorize or direct his agent or employee to cut, fell, destroy, remove, or to divert for sale or use, any trees, growing or lying on the land of another, without the consent of, or in accordance with the direction of, the owner or legal possessor, or in accordance with specific terms of a legal contract or agreement.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any co-owner or co-heir to cut, fell, destroy, remove, or to divert for sale or use, any trees, or to authorize or direct his agent or employee to cut, fell, destroy, remove, or to divert for sale or use, any trees, growing or lying on co-owned land, without the consent of, or in accordance with the direction of, the other co-owners or coheirs, or in accordance with specific terms of a legal contract or agreement. The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply to the sale of an undivided timber interest pursuant to R.S, 3:4278.2.
B. Whoever willfully and intentionally violates the provisions of Subsection A of this Section shall be liable to the owner, co-owner, co-heir, or legal possessor of the trees for civil damages in the amount of three times the fair market value of the trees cut, felled, destroyed, removed, or diverted, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs.
C. Whoever violates the provisions of Subsection A of this Section in good faith shall be liable to the owner, co-owner, co-heir, or legal possessor of the trees for three times the fair market value of the trees cut, felled, destroyed, removed, or diverted, if circumstances prove that the violator should have been aware that his actions were without | isthe consent or direction of the owner, co-owner, co-heir, or legal possessor of the trees.
D. If a good faith violator of Subsection A of this Section fails to make payment under the requirements of this Section within thirty days after notification and demand by the owner, co-owner, co-heir, or legal possessor, the violator shall also be responsible for the reasonable attorney fees and costs of the owner, co-owner, co-heir, or legal possessor.

In addition to the amount recoverable under La. R.S. 3:4278.1, damages are recoverable, if supported by the record, for the costs of removing stumps and clearing the land after a timber trespass, reforestation, loss of aesthetic value/buffer zone, and mental anguish. Callison, 849 So.2d at 652.

Appellate review of general damage awards is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its great discretion. Id. at 655. The adequacy or inadequacy of an award should be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case under review. Id. Abuse of discretion must be clearly demonstrated before an appellate court may tamper with an award of damages. Id.

Herein, after considering the testimony of Dr. Malcolm Guidry, the plaintiffs’ expert in the field of urban forestry and the evaluation of trees, the trial court determined that the fair and just award to the Hoopers to compensate them for their loss was $12,500.00. CJS contends that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Malcolm Guidry to offer expert opinion testimony regarding the value of the trees removed from the disputed area and in relying on his testimony in awarding damages to the Hoopers.

It is well settled that a trial court is accorded broad discretion in determining whether expert opinion evidence should be held admissible and its decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 2009-0267 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/11/09), 22 So.Bd 997, 1000. Furthermore, the trial court is free to accept or reject in whole or in part the testimony of any witness. Callison, 849 So.2d at 653-654.

According to Dr. Guidry’s testimony, he has a bachelor’s degree in general agriculture, a master’s degree in horticultural plant science, a master’s degree in urban forestry, and a doctorate of education in plant sciences, and he has previously been accepted as an expert in Louisiana courts on several occasions. Dr. Guidry identified 20 trees that were lost or destroyed from the area in dispute or Hooper property by CJS. Dr. Guidry opined that the trees had an average value of $1,800.00 each.

Based on Dr. Guidry’s qualifications and the evidence in the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its vast discretion in allowing Dr. Guidry to offer expert opinion evidence on urban forestry and on the value of the destroyed trees or in relying on Dr. Guidry’s testimony to determine the appropriate amount of damages sustained by the Hoopers. From the testimony of the Hoopers and Dr. Guidry, as well as the photographic evidence offered by the Hoopers, the Hoopers lost a significant number of trees as a result of CJS’s actions and further, the destruction or loss of those trees from their property (the area in dispute) caused the Hoopers aesthetic loss in that there are no trees along their boundary or no buffer zone between their property and new homes being constructed adjacent to their property in Wisteria Lakes Subdivision. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court’s award of damages in the amount of $12,500.00 was an abuse of its vast discretion.

In the Hoopers’ answer to appeal, they contend that pursuant to La. R.S. 3:4278.1, the trial court should have awarded them treble damages for their loss. As set forth above, La. R.S. 3:4278.1 provides for an award of treble damages for 11F,willfully and intentionally cutting or destroying the trees belonging to another, or for good faith violators, “if circumstances prove that the violator should have been aware that his actions were without the consent or direction of the owner ... or legal possessor of the trees.” La. R.S. 3:4278.1(C). The trial court denied the Hoopers’ demand for treble damages, and in doing so, implicity concluded either that CJS’s actions were not willful or intentional or that the evidence did not support the conclusion that CJS should have known that it crossed onto the Hoopers property. Notably, the trial court described CJS’s behavior warranting the award of damages as “negligent removal of trees and brush from the area in dispute after having been placed on actual notice of the plaintiff[s’] claims to the property where the trees and bushes were removed.” Since the treble damages provisions of La. R.S. 3:4278.1 are punitive in nature, they must be strictly construed; it is only when a party clearly violates its provisions that the party will be assessed the severe penalty of treble damages. Callison, 849 So.2d at 656. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of the Hoopers’ claim for treble damages.

The Hoopers also contend that the trial court erred in not holding Mr. Blount and Mr. Cantu personally liable for their damages. Mr. Blount and Mr. Cantu are members of CJS. CJS is a limited liability company, which is a separate legal entity from its members. See Charming Charlie, Inc. v. Perkins Rowe Associates, L.L.C., 2011-2254 (La.App. 1st Cir.7/10/12), 97 So.3d 595, 598. The evidence in the record revealed that all actions taken by Mr. Blount and Mr. Cantu with regard to the Hoopers’ property or the area in dispute were in their capacities as members or agents of CJS. Hence, they are not personally liable for any debt, | ^obligation or liability of CJS. See La. R.S. 12:1320(A) and (B). Additionally, no evidence was offered by the plaintiffs to establish that either Mr. Blount or Mr. Cantu engaged in or committed fraudulent or ultra vires acts or otherwise acted in a manner so as to warrant piercing the corporate veil of CJS. See La. R.S. 12:1320(D); Charming Charlie, Inc., 97 So.3d at 598; Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Company, Inc., 590 So.2d 1164, 1168-69 (La.1991). Accordingly, the trial court properly declined to cast the individual defendants, Mr. Blount and Mr. Cantu, solidarity liable with CJS for all damages.

Third-Party Demand

As previously set forth, CJS filed a third-party demand asserting a warranty-of-title claim against the LeSage defendants, seeking to recover a portion of the purchase price for the property it did not receive, as well as to recover any other damages sustained by CJS. The trial court denied and dismissed CJS’s third-party demand for the following reasons:

The court awarded damages to the plaintiffs] for CJS’s negligent removal of trees and brush from the area in dispute after having been placed on actual notice of the plaintiffs’] claims to the property where the trees and bushes were removed. The damages awarded by this court had nothing to do with CJS’s reliance upon warranty of title. In addition, the [c]ourt finds that [the] defendant failed to submit sufficient evidence at the trial showing liability on behalf of the third-party defendant.

In CJS’s last assignment of error, it contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its third-party demand because the sale document on which the sale was based was introduced into evidence, and that if CJS did not get title to all of the property it purchased pursuant to that sale, it was entitled to reimbursement from the LeSage defendants for the value of the property it did not receive. CJS claims that it paid $16,000.00 per acre for the LeSage property, and that based upon that price, it should receive $4,000.00 for the acre in dispute that it did not receive. Additionally, CJS claims that since the purchase of the property included the trees, 117to the extent the trees had a separate value, it was also entitled to reimbursement from the LeSage defendants for that value, ie., the sum of damages awarded in favor of the Hoopers.

According to the act of cash sale between CJS and the LeSage defendants, the LeSage defendants:

declared that for and in consideration of the price and sum of Eight Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty and 00/100 ($887,920.00), receipt of which is acknowledged by [the LeS-age defendants, the LeSage defendants] hereby sells and delivers with full warranty of title and subrogation to all rights and actions of warranty [the LeS-age defendants] may have unto:
[CJS] ... the following described property the possession and delivery of which [CJS] acknowledges[.]

The act of cash sale then sets forth the legal description for the 52.37 acre tract of land known as the LeSage property.

In the event there is a shortage or surplus of land that the seller was obligated to deliver to the buyer, the rights of the parties are governed by La. C.C. arts. 2492 and 2494. Louisiana Civil Code article 2492 provides:

If the sale of an immovable has been made with indication of the extent of the premises at the rate of so much per measure, but the seller is unable to deliver the full extent specified in the contract, the price must be proportionately reduced.
If the extent delivered by the seller is greater than that specified in the contract, the buyer must pay to the seller a proportionate supplement of the price. The buyer may recede from the sale when the actual extent of the immovable sold exceeds by more than one twentieth the extent specified in the contract.

Additionally, La. C.C. art. 2494 provides:

When the sale of an immovable has been made with indication of the extent of the premises, but for a lump price, the expression of the measure does not give the seller the right to a proportionate increase of the price, nor does it give the buyer the right to a proportionate diminution of the price, unless there is a surplus, or a shortage, of more than one twentieth of the extent specified in the act of sale.
When the surplus is such as to give the seller the right to an increase of the price the buyer has the option either to pay that increase or to recede from the contract.

[ 1sAlthough CJS claims that it paid $16,000.00 per acre for the LeSage property, the act of cash sale between the LeS-age defendants and CJS does not specify a price per measure. Rather, the act of sale indicates the extent of the premises for the lump sum of $837,920.00. Therefore, CJS’s rights with respect to the LeSage defendants are governed by La. C.C. art. 2494.

According to the record, the disputed area comprised of ⅜ of an acre out of a sale of 52.37 acres. Since the shortage of property conveyed to CJS by the LeSage defendants as a result of acquisitive prescription by the Hoopers was not more than one twentieth of the extent specified in the sale, CJS was not entitled to a reduction in the purchase price. See La.C.C. art 2494. To the extent that CJS claims that it should be reimbursed for the value of trees, ie., the damages it was ordered to pay the Hoopers for the removal of the trees, the trial court’s reasons for judgment specifically stated that CJS was cast for such damages because CJS removed the trees after it acquired knowledge of the boundary dispute by the Hoopers and that the award of damages to the Hoopers was independent of any warranty of title from the LeSage defendants. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment denying and dismissing the third-party claim of CJS against the LeS-age defendants.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the May 3, 2012 judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the answer to appeal is denied. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendant/appellant, CJS Development, L.L.C.

AFFIRMED; ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.

      . Thelma Helen LeSage Summers is now deceased.

      . Alice Faye Bennet LeSage is now deceased.

      . After this act of sale, Laurence Summers remained the owner of several adjacent tracts of land. Laurence Summers is also the ancestor-in-title to the property owned by Betsy Hooper, hereinafter described.

      . According to the act of sale, this piece of immovable property was acquired by Betsy Hooper and her then husband, Myron E. His-song. Betsy Hooper testified at trial that she received her husband's interest in this property pursuant to a community property settlement.

      . The act of cash sale does not disclose the date in June that it was executed on; however, the act of sale was filed and recorded on June 25, 1992.

      . Apparently, the LeSage defendants acquired this property from Philo and Pinkie LeSage.

      . These properties are comprised of property that was formerly owned by the Summers family.

      . A boundary dispute also arose between CJS and Darryl Cleveland and Michael Mannino. Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Mannino also maintained that the old fence line was the boundary between their property and the LeS-age/CJS property. However, in that area, the old fence line was along (or close to) the record boundary between the properties.

      . Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Mannino were also plaintiffs in the petition. Apparently, Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Mannino resolved their boundary dispute with CJS; however, the record does not contain a dismissal of their claims.

      .According to the minutes of the trial court, the hearing on the request for injunctive relief was continued without date.

      . We also find that the trial court’s apparent application of the legal principles of "tacking” under La. C.C. art. 794 was also correct, thereby allowing the possession beyond the title of Henry Hooper to be added to that of Betsy and John Hooper to reach the requisite thirty years for ownership under acquisitive prescription.

      . The tort of trespass is defined as the unlawful physical invasion of the property or possession of another. Versai Management, Inc. v. Monticello Forest Products Corporation, 479 So.2d 477, 482. In addition, it is a tort (sometimes called timber trespass) to convert or cut, fell, destroy, or remove any trees growing or lying on the land of another, without the consent of the owner or legal possessor. Id. (citing former La. R.S. 56:1478.1(A), redesignated as La. R.S. 3:4278.1 by 1987 La. Acts, No. 144.)

      . Specifically, Dr. Guidry identified three crepe myrtles of mature size, three dogwoods of mature size, four pine trees that ranged in trunk size from 14-18 inches, four pecan trees that ranged in trunk size from 14-24 inches, and six oak trees that ranged in trunk size from 18-45 inches.

      . The trial court’s written reasons for judgment and the judgment were silent with respect to the Hoopers' request for treble damages. Silence in a judgment as to any issue that was placed before the court is deemed a rejection of that demand or issue. Hayes v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 2006-0553 (La. App. 1st Cir.8/15/07), 970 So.2d 547, 554 n. 9, writ denied, 2007-2258 (La.1/25/08), 973 So.2d 758. Thus, the silence in the judgment as to the Hoopers’ request for treble damages is deemed a denial of that request for relief.

      . We also note that there was no testimony presented by CJS that it would not have bought the 52.37 acres without the area in dispute. Additionally, there was no testimony that CJS could not develop the number of lots it intended to develop as a result of the loss of the ⅛ of an acre area in dispute. See La. C.C. arts. 1948, et seq.