author: ROBERTS, J.,

text:
    Pamela Ann Little STENNIS, Appellant v. T.L. STENNIS, III, Appellee.
    No. 2011-CA-01604-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 19, 2013.

      David W. Crane, attorney for appellant.
    Thomas Wright Teel, Biloxi, attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, C.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Pamela Anne Little Stennis (Pam) claims the Harrison County Chancery Court erred when it distributed the proceeds of the sale of the home that she and her brother, Thomas L. Stennis III (Todd), owned as joint tenants. Pam also claims the chancellor should have awarded her a setoff for rent during the time that Todd was the sole occupant of the house after he “constructively evicted” her. Pam also claims the chancellor should have awarded her a setoff for one-half of the insurance proceeds related to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. This case centers on the partition of a 4,823 square foot house in Gulfport, Mississippi. Pam and Todd’s father, Thomas Stennis II, died in 1991. Pam and Todd’s mother, Patsy Stennis, died in 1995. Patsy deeded the house jointly to Pam and Todd. There was no mortgage on the house.

¶ 3. Todd lived in the house consistently after his and Pam’s mother died. When Pam and Todd acquired the title to the house in 1997, Pam was living in New York City. Todd had exclusive use of the house. Even so, Pam paid one-half of the household expenses other than utilities.

¶ 4. In 2002, Pam moved to Gulfport. She and Todd both lived in the house. She continued to pay one-half of the expenses, and she also began to pay one-half of the utilities. In September 2002, Todd took out a $190,000 mortgage on the home. Sixty percent of the borrowed money went toward renovations. Todd used the remaining forty percent of the borrowed money for his own personal use, such as the restoration of a car. The monthly mortgage payment was $1,600. $960 of each mortgage payment was for the home renovations, so Pam paid one-half of that figure each month. Stated differently, Pam paid $480 of the monthly mortgage payment and Todd paid the remainder, since almost one-half of the mortgage payment was attributable to money that did not benefit the house.

¶ 5. From the time that Pam moved into the house until early 2004, Pam and Todd’s relationship became increasingly strained and hostile. One volatile argument ensued after Pam moved some of her furniture into the house and rearranged some of the furniture and artwork in the common areas of the house. Additionally, Pam testified that Todd refused to allow her to park her car in either of the spaces in the two-car garage. According to Pam, Todd reacted violently when she moved a desk in one of the rooms. In April 2004, Pam moved out. She stopped contributing to the house expenses in May 2004.

¶ 6. Todd married his wife, Vanessa, in July 2004. Vanessa and her dog moved into the house with Todd. Pam testified that she tried to return to the house in August or September 2004, but she was not welcome at the house. According to Todd, Pam was welcome to return to the house, but her dog could not come with her. Todd also told Pam that she would have to resume paying her share of the house expenses. Pam never moved back into the house. In December 2004, Pam filed her complaint.

¶ 7. Todd responded and argued that the house should be sold by a commissioner’s sale on the courthouse steps. Todd also filed a counterclaim for Pam’s share of the house expenses. In response, Pam argued that the house should be sold on the open real-estate market to maximize the proceeds of the sale. Pam further argued that she was entitled to one-half of the rental value of the house after she moved out in early 2004.

¶ 8. The house was damaged when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in August 2005. The proceedings were delayed based on the damage Hurricane Katrina caused both to the home and the Gulf Coast in general. Pam later claimed that she was entitled to one-half of the insurance proceeds from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.

¶ 9. In October 2009, the chancellor entered an order that the house would be listed on the open real-estate market for one hundred twenty days. If the house did not sell within that time, a special commissioner was to sell it by auction. The order also notes that Pam and Todd had yet to divide the personal property within the house.

¶ 10. The house did not sell within the time provided in the chancellor’s order. Consequently, the special commissioner auctioned the home. Todd bought the house for $404,000. Meanwhile, Pam and Todd divided the personal property within the house.

¶ 11. The chancellor distributed the proceeds of the sale after paying off the remaining balance of the 2003 mortgage. The chancellor held that Todd was not obligated to pay Pam one-half of the rental value of the home after Pam moved out in April 2004. However, the chancellor also held that Pam was obligated to pay Todd one-half of the house expenses from the time that she moved out. Pam’s share of those expenses totaled approximately $73,400. Ultimately, Pam received approximately $76,700 from the proceeds of the sale, and Todd received approximately $48,600. Finally, the chancellor held that Pam was not entitled to one-half of the insurance proceeds from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina except any insurance proceeds that might be disbursed on outstanding claims after March 9, 2010. Pam appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12. “The standard of review for property partition cases is whether this Court finds manifest error in the decision of the chancellor[;] only then will this Court reverse the findings of the chancellor.” Georgian v. Harrington, 990 So.2d 813, 815 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2008) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. RENT

¶ 13. Pam sought to recover rent from Todd. Specifically, Pam sought one-half of the rental value of the house from the time she moved out in April 2004 until Todd purchased the home in March 2010. Initially, the chancellor held that Pam was not entitled to rent because she never requested such relief in her pleadings.

¶ 14. After Pam filed a motion for reconsideration, the chancellor held that Pam was not entitled to rent from Todd because Pam could have returned to the house after she moved out in April 2004, but she chose not to do so. The chancellor also noted that Pam had failed to prove that Todd “constructively evicted” her from the house. Finally, the chancellor noted that he had requested information regarding the rental value of the house, but he had never received that information. Consequently, the chancellor denied Pam’s motion for reconsideration.

¶ 15. Pam argues that the chancellor erred when he held that she was not entitled to rent because she did not request rent in her pleadings. However, based on the chancellor’s reasoning in his order denying Pam’s motion for reconsideration, it is clear that the chancellor based his decision on the evidence rather than the absence of a request for rent in Pam’s pleadings.

¶ 16. Pam argued that Todd had “constructively evicted” her from the house. Pam claimed that Todd mistreated her and that he was hostile toward her. As the chancellor noted, “[c]onstructive eviction is normally found in the context of landlord/tenant cases.” A more appropriate legal term for Pam’s allegation is that Todd had committed “ouster.” “An ouster is the wrongful dispossession or exclusion by one tenant in common of his cotenants from the common property of which they are entitled to possession.... It does not necessarily imply an act accompanied by force.” Cheeks v. Herrington, 523 So.2d 1033, 1036 (Miss.1988) (citation omitted).

¶ 17. There is no question that Pam and Todd did not get along well. Pam testified that living with Todd “was quite volatile,” that “there was a great deal of anger there,” and that they “did not get along under the same roof.” Todd’s testimony indicated that Pam’s version of events was sensationalized. According to Todd, he and Pam “definitely” had “an occasional shouting match.” Todd’s wife, Vanessa, testified that Pam was “passive-aggressive” toward Todd. According to Vanessa, she once heard Pam say, “I’m going to get [Todd] one of these days; he’s going to regret it; I’m going to get him.”

¶ 18. Pam testified that Todd yelled at her “a great deal,” that there “was a great deal of brow beating,” and that she “lived in a constant panic attack [that she would do something that] would set him off.” Pam’s friend, Edward Cullin, testified that he saw Todd “become extremely angry [and] agitated,” and it got “progressively worse up until the point where [Cullin] was concerned about [Pam].” Cullin described Todd as “filled with rage. Rage that I felt was unwarranted at the time. It was excessive. And I thought that — I was concerned about [Pam’s] well[-]being with [Todd] being as upset as he did get at her.” Cullin further testified that Todd used expletives excessively and that he screamed them at Pam “very, very loudly.”

¶ 19. According to Pam, Todd behaved violently on occasion, which Todd denied. Pam testified that Todd grabbed her and left a handprint on her arm once after Pam “missed dusting a desk in his room.” Cullin also testified that he saw bruises on Pam’s arms. And Todd’s wife, Vanessa, testified that she was not aware of any violent altercations. But according to Pam, “one of the ugliest situations ... [she had] ever witnessed” occurred after she moved a desk before Todd considered a refinished floor to have adequately cured. Pam testified that:

Well, in the middle of the night[,] he came in my room and ... jerked me out of my bed by my arm, and told me that I was never to move anything again.... I had a Great Dane at the time, and the dog did what he was supposed to do[;] he was putting himself between me and my brother, and he threatened to send the dog to the great dog house in the sky. [Todd said] [t]hat I better do something with that dog. And it was one of the ugliest scenes I think I’ve ever had to witness. It scared the unmitigated hell out of me.

¶ 20. Pam testified that Todd would not allow her to exercise dominion over the house. It was undisputed that Todd would not allow Pam to park in either of the two spaces in the garage because he “was utilizing those two stalls.” According to Pam, she “couldn’t move anything [in the house] from the place it had been for the last ten years.” On cross-examination, Pam added that Todd would not allow her to hang a plant on the back porch or hang a painting in the dining room. She used her bedroom as a private apartment, and she “very seldom used the common rooms in the house.” Based on Pam’s characterization, she “was an unwelcome guest in [her] own home.”

¶ 21. One event seems to have resulted in a particularly volatile disagreement. Todd testified that Pam told him that she would be moving some furniture from her New York apartment into her room at the house while he was out of town. Todd did not object to that. However, according to Todd, when he returned from his trip, he discovered that “the entire house had been rearranged to accommodate virtually all of [Pam’s] New York City apartment furniture, as well as her artwork.” Todd said that Pam rearranging the furniture “created a serious argument between the two of us.”

¶ 22. Ultimately, Pam moved out of the house in April 2004. Pam explained that she “needed to have sanctuary” and that she “had to leave to keep her own sanity intact.” Pam also testified twice that she “didn’t even want to be around [Todd].” Todd testified that he did not ask Pam to leave. Pam stopped paying her share of the expenses related to the house after she left. Pam attempted to move back into the house during August or September 2004. According to Todd, he did not object to Pam moving back into the house. However, Todd insisted that Pam pay her share of the house expenses, including the arrearage that resulted after Pam stopped paying in April 2004. Pam did not move back into the house.

¶ 23. As the chancellor noted, Pam and Todd had split the expenses related to the maintenance of the house from the time they acquired joint title after their mother died in 1995 until Pam left the house in April 2004. The chancellor also noted that Pam only sought to obtain one-half of the house’s rental value after her dispute with Todd arose. From Pam’s perspective, she only sought rent after Todd effectively forbade her from exercising any real dominion over the house.

¶ 24. A portion of the chancellor’s decision was based on a lack of information regarding the rental value of the house. During a preliminary hearing, the chancellor announced that “Mr. Molyneaux” would be providing information as to the house’s rental value. The record does not contain any such information from Mr. Molyneaux. However, exhibit fourteen was a letter dated September 1, 2009, from realtor Jane Anne Sawyer addressed to Pam’s lawyer with a carbon copy to the chancellor. Within that letter, Sawyer stated that “the house would rent for about $2,500.00 per month.” Sawyer added that the “rental market in this price range is almost nonexistent presently.” Consequently, the record contained at least some evidence regarding the house’s estimated rental value.

¶ 25. Be that as it may, we must find manifest error to reverse the chancellor’s judgment. See Robberson v. Burton, 790 So.2d 226, 228 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2001). Despite the availability of evidence regarding the house’s rental value, we do not find that the chancellor committed manifest error. There was evidence to support the chancellor’s conclusion that Pam was not “constructively evicted” — or more appropriately, ousted — from the house. The chancellor had the authority to “adjust the equities between [Pam and Todd] and determine all claims of the ... coten-ants .... ” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-21-9 (Rev. 2004). Although reasonable minds could weigh the evidence in Pam’s favor and conclude that Todd was hostile toward Pam and that he refused to allow her to exercise dominion over aspects of the house, “this Court may not intercede simply to substitute our collective opinion for that of the chancellor.” Hammers v. Hammers, 890 So.2d 944, 950 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citation omitted). Pam stopped paying her share of the house expenses when she moved out in April 2004. The chancellor awarded Todd a set-off equivalent to the value of Pam’s half of the expenses from the time that Pam moved out until Todd bought the house in 2010. In effect, Pam paid her share of the expenses. However, as the chancellor noted, Pam was living in New York when her and Todd’s mother passed away in 1995. Pam began living in the house along with Todd during late 2001 or early 2002. Pam paid one-half of the house expenses from the time she and Todd acquired the house until she moved out in April 2004. Pam never sought to recover rent from Todd while she was living in New York. Based on the fact that Pam had not previously sought rent from Todd when she was not living in the house, it was within the chancellor’s discretion to find that Pam was not entitled to recover a setoff for rent. It follows that we find no merit to this issue.

II. INSURANCE PROCEEDS

¶ 26. The chancellor held that Pam was not entitled to any of the money that State Farm paid to Todd and Trust-mark Bank as a result of the claim for damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. However, the chancellor also held that Pam was “entitled to [one-half] of any and all monies paid by State Farm as a result of a claim for Katrina damage from and after March 9, 2010.” Pam claims the chancellor should have awarded her one-half of the insurance proceeds that were intended to repair damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.

¶ 27. As of the date of the September 2010 hearing, State Farm had paid $117,456.48 related to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. The evidence presented demonstrated that the insurance proceeds went back into the house. As of the final hearing date, the house still needed substantial repairs to the roof and one wall. Pam argued that Todd had ineffectively managed the insurance proceeds in an effort to prevent the house from selling on the open market or receiving higher bids during the special commissioner’s auction. Among other things, Todd argued that Pam should not receive one-half of the insurance proceeds because she stopped contributing to the insurance premiums after she moved out. However, Pam essentially paid her share of the insurance premiums when the chancellor awarded Todd a setoff for Pam’s share of the house expenses. In any event, it was within the chancellor’s discretion to find that the insurance proceeds went back into the house and that Pam received her portion of the insurance proceeds through her share of the proceeds that resulted from Todd’s purchase of the house. We find no merit to this issue.

¶ 28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. ISHEE AND JAMES, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MAIN, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ex parte EAST ALABAMA MEDICAL CENTER. (In re John Tinney v. East Alabama Medical Center).
    1111364.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Oct. 19, 2012.

      Joshua J. Jackson of Samford & Den-son, LLP, Opelika, for petitioner.
    John A. Tinney, Roanoke, for respondent.
   MAIN, Justice.

East Alabama Medical Center (“EAMC”) petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Randolph Circuit Court to transfer the action filed against it by John Tinney to the Lee Circuit Court. For the reasons set out below, we grant the petition and issue the writ.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Tinney represented Jerry Benefield in a personal-injury action arising out of a motor-vehicle accident. Benefield was treated at EAMC for injuries he sustained in the accident. EAMC filed a hospital lien in Lee County for $3,361 against any recovery Benefield might receive in settlement of his personal-injury action. Tinney recovered a settlement for Benefield. As part of the settlement, Progressive Insurance Company issued a check made payable to EAMC and Tinney in the amount of $3,361.

On October 14, 2011, Tinney filed the underlying lawsuit against EAMC in the Randolph Circuit Court, claiming that he had asked EAMC to allow him to receive 40% of the lien check as an attorney fee but that EAMC “failed and refused to negotiate the check or to agree on a division of the money.” On November 18, 2011, EAMC moved to transfer the action to Lee County, citing § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, and stating that its principal office is located in Opelika, Lee County; that Lee County is where all actions taken by EAMC, such as telephone calls and letters, occurred; and that EAMC has no facilities and does no business by agent in Randolph County. In support of its motion for a change of venue, EAMC filed an affidavit of its president, Terry Andrus. According to Andrus, EAMC is an Alabama corporation that has its principal office in Opelika, Lee County. Further, Andrus stated, EAMC has no facilities in Randolph County and has not done business by agent in Randolph County. EAMC also filed an affidavit of its business-office supervisor, Sandra Davis. According to Davis, “[a]ll actions taken by EAMC and it employees with respect to Jerry Benefield or his lawyer[,] John Tinney[,] took place in Lee County, Alabama.” Davis further stated that all communications regarding the delinquent account, the hospital lien, and any reduction in the lien amount occurred in Lee County and that no activities occurred in Randolph County.

Tinney did not file a response in opposition to EAMC’s motion for a change of venue. On February 16, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on the venue question. On June 6, 2012, the trial court denied EAMC’s motion for a change of venue without stating any ground. The trial court’s order stated in its entirety: “Motion having been made to transfer venue in the above case and the Court having considered the same, the motion is due to be denied.” EAMC timely petitioned this Court for mandamus relief.

II. Standard of Review

“‘The proper method for obtaining review of a denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.’ Ex parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So.2d 886, 888 (Ala.2000). ‘Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala.1995). Moreover, our review is limited to those facts that were before the trial court. Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 788, 789 (Ala.1998).
‘“The burden of proving improper venue is on the party raising the issue and on review of an order transferring or refusing to transfer, a writ of mandamus will not be granted unless there is a clear showing of error on the part of the trial judge.’ Ex parte Finance America Corp., 507 So.2d 458, 460 (Ala.1987). In addition, this Court is bound by the record, and it cannot consider a statement or evidence in a party’s brief that was not before the trial court. Ex parte American Res. Ins. Co., 663 So.2d 932, 936 (Ala.1995).”

Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So.2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.2002). Thus, if EAMC made a prima facie showing that venue in Randolph County was improper, the burden then shifted to Tinney to rebut that showing. Ex parte Movie Gallery, Inc., 31 So.3d 104, 109 (Ala.2009).

III. Analysis

EAMC contends in its petition for a writ of mandamus that “[t]he only proper venue is Lee County” and that “Randolph County is an improper venue for the claims against EAMC.” Section 6-3-7, AIa.Code 1975, governs venue for actions against corporate defendants. That section provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) All civil actions against corporations may be brought in any of the following counties:
“(1) In the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of real property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
“(2) In the county of the corporation’s principal office in this state; or
“(3) In the county in which the plaintiff resided, or if the plaintiff is an entity other than an individual, where the plaintiff had its principal office in this state, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, if such corporation does business by agent in the county of the plaintiff’s residence; or
“(4) If subdivisions (1), (2), or (3) do not apply, in any county in which the corporation was doing business by agent at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.”

EAMC argues that venue is not proper in Randolph County under any of the subsections of § 6-3-7(a).

A. Section 6-3-7(a)(1)

Section 6-3-7(a)(l) provides, in part, that a corporation may be sued “[i]n the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” EAMC argues that “the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” refers to the actions or omissions of the defendant. This Court so held in Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc., 74 So.3d 940 (Ala.2011):

“This Court has construed ‘the events or omissions giving rise to the claim’ to refer to the wrongful acts or omissions of the corporate defendant. Ex parte Volvo Trucks North America, Inc., 954 So.2d 583, 587 (Ala.2006); Ex parte Suzuki Mobile, Inc., 940 So.2d 1007, 1010 (Ala.2006); and Ex parte Pikeville Country Club, 844 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Ala.2002).”

74 So.3d at 943. Tinney’s complaint states that EAMC “failed and refused to negotiate the check or to agree on a division of the money with [Tinney].” However, Davis testified that EAMC took no action in Randolph County and that all of EAMC’s actions relative to Benefield or Tinney took place in Lee County. Moreover, Tinney does not argue that venue is proper in Randolph County pursuant to subsection (a)(1). Venue, therefore, is not proper in Randolph County under § 6-3-7(a)(1).

B. Section 6-3-7(a)(2)

It is undisputed that the materials before this Court show that EAMC’s principal office is in Lee County. Venue, therefore, is not proper in Randolph County under § 6-3-7(a)(2).

C. Section 6-3-7(a) (3)

The only contested issue before this Court is whether EAMC does business by agent in Randolph County within the language of § 6-3-7(a)(3) and, thus, whether venue under subsection (a)(3) is proper in Randolph County. Section 6-3-7(a)(3) provides that a corporation may be sued “[i]n the county in which the plaintiff resided ... at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, if such corporation does business by agent in the county of the plaintiffs residence.” According to An-drus’s affidavit, EAMC has not done business by agent in Randolph County, the county where Tinney resides. Andrus’s affidavit was sufficient to make a prima facie showing that EAMC does not do business in Randolph County, thereby shifting to Tinney the burden of proving that EAMC does in fact conduct business by agent in Randolph County. Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, 74 So.3d at 943 (citing Ex parte Citizens State Bank, 989 So.2d 507, 508 (Ala.2008)).

In his answer in opposition to the mandamus petition, Tinney contends that EAMC does business in Randolph County through a subsidiary, East Alabama Heart and Vascular Consultations, LLC, which has a clinic in Randolph County, and through Dr. David G. Holmes, a cardiologist on the medical staff of EAMC in Opelika, Lee County, who also treats patients at the clinic in Randolph County. With his answer in response to the mandamus petition, Tinney filed an exhibit referred to as “Business Entity Details” from the Secretary of State’s Web site showing that EAMC is the manager of a limited-liability company named “East Alabama Heart and Vascular Consultations, LLC.” The exhibit, however, does not list the address of the LLC as being in Randolph County — the principal address on the form is shown as “Not Provided.” Instead, Tinney simply asserts in his response to the mandamus petition that the entity is a clinic located in Roanoke, Randolph County. Tinney also attached EAMC’s “Medical Staff Directory 2012” as an exhibit to his answer in response to the mandamus petition. He claimed that Dr. David G. Holmes practices at EAMC in Opelika and also treats patients at the clinic in Randolph County, which is an affiliate of EAMC.

Tinney, however, offered no evidence in the trial court in opposition to the motion for a change of venue indicating that EAMC does business by agent in Randolph County. The exhibits Tinney attached to his answer in response to the mandamus petition were not presented to the trial court. It is well settled that, “in a mandamus proceeding, this Court will not consider evidence not presented to the trial court.” Ex parte Cincinnati Ins. Co., 51 So.3d 298, 310 (Ala.2010). See Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co., 772 So.2d 437, 442 (Ala.2000) (“ ‘On review by mandamus, we must look at only those facts before the trial court.’ ” (quoting Ex parte Baker, 459 So.2d 873, 876 (Ala.1984))). “[T]his Court is bound by the [materials before it], and it cannot consider a statement or evidence in a party’s brief that was not before the trial court.” Ex parte Pike Fabrication, 859 So.2d at 1091. Accordingly, we have not considered those exhibits attached to Tin-ney’s answer in response to the mandamus petition. See Ex parte Pike Fabrication, 859 So.2d at 1091, and Verbena United Methodist Church, 953 So.2d 395, 399 (Ala.2006) (refusing to consider an affidavit submitted in opposition to a mandamus petition because the affidavit was not before the trial court when that court rendered the decision under review). Venue, therefore, is not proper in Randolph County under § 6-3-7(a)(3).

D. Section 6-3-7(a)(i)

This Court held in Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed that “the ‘“catch-all” venue provision, § 6-3-7(a)(4), applies only if no county would be a proper forum under the other three corporate-venue provisions.’ Ex parte Siemag, Inc., 53 So.3d 974, 980 n. 3 (Ala.Civ.App.2010).” 74 So.3d at 942. Venue, therefore, is not proper in Randolph County under § 6-3-7(a)(4).

IV. Conclusion

EAMC has proved that venue is not proper in Randolph County under any of the subsections of § 6 — 3—7(a); therefore, the trial court clearly erred in denying EAMC’s motion to transfer the case to Lee County. Because EAMC has shown that it has a clear legal right to have this action transferred to Lee County, we grant EAMC’s petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the Randolph Circuit Court to vacate its order denying EAMC’s motion to transfer and to enter an order transferring the action to Lee County.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

MALONE, C.J., and WOODALL and BOLIN, JJ., concur.

MURDOCK, J., concurs in the result.

      . On mandamus review, this Court has consistently stated that we will not consider materials that have not been before the trial court. See, e.g. Ex parte Wright Bros. Constr. Co., 88 So.3d 817, 820 (Ala.2012); Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc., 72 So.3d 1, 2 (Ala.2011); Ex parte Ford Motor Co., 47 So.3d 234, 241 (Ala.2010); and Ex parte ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 933 So.2d 343, 345 (Ala.2006).


author: MOORE, Chief Justice

text:
    Del MARSH et al. v. Lynn PETTWAY.
    1120658.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 13, 2013.
   MOORE, Chief Justice

(concurring specially).

I agree with my colleagues that the temporary restraining order entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court should be vacated and that both the underlying case and this appeal should be dismissed. I write specially to explain that the members of the Alabama Legislature and their actions taken in the legislative process are immune from attack and that the judicial branch has no authority to interfere.

I. Separation of Powers

“It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free Country should inspire caution in those entrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective Constitutional spheres; avoiding in the exercise of the Powers of one department to encroach upon another.” George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), in Matthew Spalding & Patrick J. Garrity, A Sacred Union of Citizens 182 (1996). Embodying this nonencroachment principle, the Alabama Constitution commands that “the judicial [department] shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them.... ” Ala. Const.1901, art. III, § 43. See In re R.B.J., 675 So.2d 457, 458 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (“The separation of powers doctrine ... is incorporated in Ala. Const.1901, Art. Ill, § 42 and § 43.”). The Constitution further commands that “[t]he powers of the government ... shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body-” Ala. Const.1901, art. Ill, § 42. “The words ‘distinct’ and ‘separate’ are devoid of meaning if one branch can arbitrarily impose restrictions on another branch.” Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 446 (Ala.1987).

By enjoining the legislative process itself, rather than a duly enacted law, the circuit judge in this case violated the separation-of-powers provision of the Alabama Constitution. “Every bill which shall have passed-both houses of the legislature ... shall be presented to the governor....” Ala. Const.1901, art. V, § 125. By prohibiting the clerk of the House of Representatives from presenting House Bill 84 to the governor for consideration, the trial court directly interrupted the legislative process.

The Alabama Constitution, which provides a detailed mandate for the enactment of legislation, see Ala. Const.1901, art. IV, §§ 61-64, 66, 70-71, does not provide for judicial review during the legislative process. Nor may courts force the legislature to obey its own rules. “ ‘Rules controlling legislative procedure are usually formulated or adopted by legislative bodies themselves, and the observance of such rules is a matter that is entirely subject to legislative control and discretion, and is not subject to review by the courts.’” Town of Brilliant v. City of Winfield, 752 So.2d 1192, 1198 (Ala.1999) (quoting 73 Am. Jur.2d Statutes § 49 (1974)).

The Alabama Constitution grants the legislature exclusive power over its own rules. “Each house shall have power to determine the rules of its own proceedings .... ” Ala. Const.1901, art. IV, § 53. See Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So.2d 204, 218 (Ala.2005) (“[T]he Constitution clearly grants to the legislature the power to determine the rules of its own proceedings.”).

“As a coordinate branch of government the Senate of Alabama has the right and power under the specific provisions of Section 53 of the Constitution to enact rules governing its proceedings. This power is unlimited except as controlled by other provisions of our Constitution. And unless controlled by other constitutional provisions the courts cannot look to the wisdom or folly, the advantages or disadvantages of the rules which a legislative body adopts to govern its own proceedings.”

Opinion of the Justices No. 185, 278 Ala. 522, 524-25, 179 So.2d 155, 157-58 (1965). Because the courts have no power to review legislative rules, they also lack the power to compel “ ‘the observance of such rules.’” Town of Brilliant, 752 So.2d at 1198 (quoting 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 49). Whether the legislature has followed its own rules “ ‘is not subject to review by the courts.’ ” Id.

Although judicial power is available to review a bill once enacted, the separation-of-powers provisions in the Alabama Constitution prohibit the judiciary from examining or coercing the legislative process itself. In Alabama Citizens Action Program v. Kennamer, 479 So.2d 1237 (Ala.1985), this Court “refus[ed] to enforce rules of the house of representatives,” id. at 1240, noting that it had “no authority to go beyond the legislative journals and look at extrinsic evidence attacking the regularity of the bill’s enactment.” Id. The judiciary has no power to judge the internal processes of the legislature, only its final product. Like a customer at a restaurant, it may judge the quality of the fare presented at its table but may not go into the kitchen and oversee the chefs preparation. Because courts may not scrutinize the process by which the legislature produces its results, the internal proceedings of the legislature, unless the Constitution commands otherwise, are not subject to judicial scrutiny. Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth., 912 So.2d at 220-21 (“[U]ncertainty and instability would result if ... the internal proceedings of the legislature when passing a bill were to be subject to judicial challenge.”).

II. Legislative Immunity

The Alabama Constitution provides: “Members of the legislature ... for any speech or debate in either house shall not be questioned in any other place.” Ala. Const.1901, art. IV, § 56 (entitled “Immunity of legislators”). Former Chief Justice Torbert, explicating the meaning of art. IV, § 56, in 1983, observed that § 56 was “virtually identical” to art. I, § 6, of the United States Constitution. Marion v. Hall, 429 So.2d 937, 944 (Ala.1983) (Tor-bert, C.J., concurring specially). Article I, § 6, provides that senators and representatives “for any Speech or Debate in either House ... shall not be questioned in any other Place.”

Chief Justice Torbert then quoted Supreme Court precedent on the import of the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution: “‘The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators.’ ” Marion, 429 So.2d at 944 (Torbert, C.J., concurring specially) (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 38 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971) (emphasis added)). Noting that “legislative immunity extends beyond mere statements made in the legislative chambers,” 429 So.2d at 944, Chief Justice Torbert quoted Brewster as follows: “ ‘It is beyond doubt that the Speech or Debate Clause protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process and into the motivation for those acts.’” Id. (quoting Brewster, 408 U.S. at 525.

Because the Speech or Debate Clause in the Alabama Constitution is identical in substance, and virtually identical in wording, to the federal Speech or Debate Clause, federal decisions construing the federal clause should be “highly persuasive” in understanding the meaning of § 56. See, e.g., City of Birmingham v. City of Fairfield, 396 So.2d 692, 696 (Ala.1981) (“We have said that since the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal decisions are highly persuasive when we are called upon to construe the Alabama Rules.”). Chief Justice Torbert in his special writing in Marion quoted further from Brewster:

“ ‘Careful examination of the decided cases reveals that the Court has regarded the protection as reaching only those things “generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it,” Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, [103 U.S. 168] at 204 [26 L.Ed. 377], or things “said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office,” Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).’ ”

Marion, 429 So.2d at 944 (quoting Brewster, 408 U.S. at 513. In Hillman v. Yarbrough, 936 So.2d 1056, 1062 (Ala.2006), this Court adopted the reasoning of Brewster, stating: “The Alabama Constitution of 1901, § 56, affords absolute legislative immunity to members of the legislature....” Id. Actions in legislative committee meetings are also covered by the privilege. ‘“To find that a committee’s investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.’ ” Marion, 429 So.2d at 945 (Torbert, C.J., concurring specially) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951)).

The “highly persuasive” federal precedent set out by Chief Justice Torbert in his special writing in Marion and quoted approvingly by this Court in Hillman should inform our interpretation of § 56 of the Alabama Constitution. The “integrity of the legislative process,” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507, is as important to Alabama as it is to the nation. Accordingly, under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Alabama Constitution, our state legislators are immune from all judicial “inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process.” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 525. This immunity extends to things “generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it,” Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1881), and thus includes the actions of the conference committee in this case and the votes taken on House Bill 84 by the House and the Senate. Any provision of the Open Meetings Act incompatible with this constitutional immunity of the legislature is inoperable. See Bassett v. Newton, 658 So.2d 398, 400 (Ala.1995) (“[T]he Alabama constitution has priority over the state Code.”). A remedy, if needed, lies not in the courts, but in the political processes.

III. Conclusion

Not only does the judiciary, under the doctrine of separation of powers, lack authority to interfere with the legislative process, but the legislators are also clothed by the Alabama Constitution with a cloak of immunity that shields them from judicial usurpation.

      . Early in our history Thomas Jefferson and James Madison explained the purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause:
      " 'That in order to give to the will of the people the influence it ought to have, and the information which may enable them to exercise it usefully, it was a part of the common-law, adopted as the law of this land, that their representatives, in the discharge of their functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the coordinate branches, Judiciary and Executive.' "

      Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 221, 232 (2003) (quoting Thomas Jefferson & James Madison, “Protest to the Virginia House of Delegates” in 8 Works of Thomas Jefferson 322-23 (1797), reprinted in 2 The Founders' Constitution 336 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987) (emphasis added)).


author: THOMAS, Judge.

text:
    Namath Joe JACKSON v. WAFF, LLC, and Huntsville Broadcasting Corporation.
    2110643.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Oct. 26, 2012.

      William J. Underwood, Tuscumbia, for appellant.
    R. Aaron Chastain of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham; and Scott Burnett Smith, Warne S. Heath, and Benjamin L. McArthur of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Huntsville, for ap-pellees.
   On Application for Rehearing

THOMAS, Judge.

The no-opinion order of affirmance of August 17, 2012, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

In early October 2010, a victim of a shooting gave a statement naming Namath Joe Jackson as the man who had shot the victim in the hand and had stolen his cellular telephone. On October 12, 2010, a report aired on television stations operated by WAFF, LLC, and Huntsville Broadcasting Corporation, (referred to collectively as “the television stations”), indicating that the local police authorities had named Jackson as a suspect in a shooting, requesting the public’s assistance in locating Jackson, and warning the public that the authorities considered Jackson to be armed and dangerous. The television stations rebroadcast the segment at least three times on different newscasts. In addition, the television stations also broad-casted a segment reporting Jackson’s apprehension by the authorities the following day. Ultimately, the charges brought against Jackson were dismissed because the investigation revealed that he had not been in the area when the shooting occurred and therefore could not have been the gunman. The television stations failed to broadcast a report on the dismissal of the charges against Jackson, despite his request in writing that they do so.

Jackson then sued the television stations in the Colbert Circuit Court, alleging that they had defamed him by reporting that he had been involved in a crime, by reporting that he was believed to be armed and dangerous, and by failing to report on the dismissal of the charges against him. Jackson attached to his complaint the letter he sent to the television stations requesting either a retraction or that they report on the dismissal of the charges against him and what appears to be the record of the entire criminal case against him, which was dismissed. The television stations moved to dismiss Jackson’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to Madison County. The television stations attached to their motions DVD recordings of the broadcasts that formed the basis of Jackson’s action against them.

In their motions to dismiss, the television stations argued first that Jackson had not alleged that they had published any false statements about him. The television stations further argued that their broadcasts were privileged under Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-11-161, which protects as privileged any “fair and impartial report” of, among other things, “the issuance of any warrant [or] the arrest of any person for any cause .... ” In response, Jackson amended his complaint to assert that, although the initial reporting of the police search for him, the criminal charges against him, and his arrest were privileged under § 13A-11-161, the television stations were no longer entitled to the privilege because either (1) they had failed to broadcast a report on the dismissal of the charges against Jackson, proving actual malice, or (2) they had failed to report on the dismissal of the charges and thus “removed” the privilege. Jackson also responded to the television stations’ motions to dismiss and filed his own affidavit in support of that response, in which he stated that he had requested that the television stations “print a retraction” and that the television stations had failed to do so despite being provided “information which they could use to clear [Jackson’s] name,” including the notes of the investigating officers who cleared him of the charges.

After the Colbert Circuit Court entered an order transferring the action to the Madison Circuit Court in June 2011, the Madison Circuit Court granted the television stations’ motions to dismiss in February 2012. Jackson timely appealed to this court. We affirm.

On appeal, Jackson argues that the television stations lost any privilege that they may have had under § 13A-11-161 by failing to report on the dismissal of the charges against him. He further argues that § 13A-11-161 provides a basis for a cause of action for the television stations’ failure, after request, to report on the dismissal of the charges against Jackson. The television stations argue that this court need not consider any possible limit to the privilege provided in § 13A-11-161 because Jackson’s claims fail because he did not allege that the broadcasts contained false statements. Furthermore, the television stations argue, § 13A-11-161 does not provide a private cause of action for defamation based on the failure to retract or to report on the conclusion of an investigation.

We first note that the trial court dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(6) and did not, as Jackson argues, enter a summary judgment in favor of the television stations. Although the television stations did include DVD recordings of the broadcasts at issue as exhibits to their motions to dismiss, the inclusion of those exhibits did not, in this case, convert the motions to dismiss into motions for a summary judgment. Because the exhibits provided by the television stations were “referred to in, and are central to, [Jackson’s] complaint,” the inclusion of those exhibits did not convert the motions to dismiss to motions for a summary judgment. Donoghue v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 838 So.2d 1032, 1035-36 (Ala.2002) (embracing and quoting the rule set out in Wilson v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Georgia, 716 So.2d 722, 726 (Ala.Civ.App.1998)). Our standard of review is, therefore, governed by the following:

“ ‘ “On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.], is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader’s favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [him] to relief. In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [he] may possibly prevail. We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” ’ ”

Donoghue, 838 So.2d at 1036 (quoting C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So.2d 98, 104 (Ala.1995), quoting in turn Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993)).

As noted above, Jackson alleged that the television stations had defamed him by broadcasting the reports of his being wanted by the police authorities, by reporting that he was considered armed and dangerous, and by broadcasting reports of his arrest.

“' “The elements of a cause of action for defamation are: 1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged communication of that statement to a third party; 3) fault amounting at least to negligence; and 4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm [ (per se) ] or the existence of special harm caused by the publication of the statement [(per quod) ].” ’ ”

Dudley v. Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc’y, 777 So.2d 135, 140 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (quoting Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619 So.2d 1280, 1289 (Ala.1993), quoting in turn MeCaig v. Talladega Publ’g Co., 544 So.2d 875, 877 (Ala.1989)).

Jackson’s main argument is that § 13A-11-161 does not serve to protect the television stations by making their reports privileged under the particular circumstances presented here; that is, Jackson argues that the statute does not protect the television stations because they failed to report on the dismissal of the charges against him. Jackson is correct that no Alabama case has ever construed the last portion of § 13A-11-161, which, at first read, does appear to support Jackson’s argument to a point. The statute reads, in its entirety:

“The publication of a fair and impartial report of the return of any indictment, the issuance of any warrant, the arrest of any person for any cause or the filing of any affidavit, pleading or other document in any criminal or civil proceeding in any court, or of a fair and impartial report of the contents thereof, or of any charge of crime made to any judicial officer or body, or of any report of any grand jury, or of any investigation made by any legislative committee, or other public body or officer, shall be privileged, unless it be proved that the same was published with actual malice, or that the defendant has refused or neglected to publish in the same manner in which the publication complained of appeared, a reasonable explanation or contradiction thereof by the plaintiff, or that the publisher has refused upon the written request of the plaintiff to publish the subsequent determination of such suit, action or investigation.”

§ 13A-11-161 (emphasis added). Although it does appear that the privilege provided in the statute would not exist if the publisher failed to publish the result of the investigation — “[t]he publication of a fair and impartial report of ... the issuance of any warrant [or] the arrest of any person for any cause ... shall be privileged, unless it be proved ... that the publisher has refused upon the written request of the plaintiff to publish the subsequent determination of such suit, action or investigation” — we agree with the television stations that we need not delve into the parameters of the fair-report statute to decide this case.

As the television stations argue, nowhere in Jackson’s complaint or amended complaint does he state that the statements made in the broadcasts were false. Indeed, in his amended complaint, Jackson admits that, at the time the broadcasts were made, the television stations were covered by the privilege extended under § 13A-11-161. Thus, we agree with the television stations that Jackson conceded that the broadcasts were “fair and impartial report[s]” of the charges against him and of his arrest on those charges. If the broadcasts were conceded to have been “fair and impartial report[s],” it follows that they were accurate statements made based on the information supplied by the police authorities during an investigation of a complaint arising from the shooting. See Wilson v. Birmingham, Post Co., 482 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Ala.1986) (finding the news report at issue in that case to be conditionally privileged under § 13A-11-161 because “it accurately reported] statements made by [witnesses] during an official police investigation, as reflected in the official police incident report”). Accurate or truthful statements — even those that might be negative in nature and harmful to one’s reputation — will not support a defamation claim. See Mooneyham v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 802 So.2d 200, 203 (Ala.2001) (affirming the dismissal of a defamation claim when the allegations were that the published statements were accurate at the time they were published). The trial court therefore properly dismissed Jackson’s defamation claims against both television stations.

Jackson’s other contention on appeal, based on his issue statement, is that § 13A-11-161 creates a private cause of action for “failure to retract” or, more properly in this case, “failure to report the subsequent determination of an investigation.” The cases from other jurisdictions that Jackson relies upon to support his argument do not involve the creation of a private cause of action in an Alabama statutory scheme; thus, we find them completely inapposite. Because of that failure, Jackson’s argument on this issue fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. Civ. App. We could affirm on this ground alone. See White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So.2d 1042, 1058 (Ala.2008).

However, the television stations have given us a merit-based ground for affirming the trial court’s judgment as to this issue. As the television stations point out, “[o]ne claiming a private right of action within a statutory scheme must show clear evidence of a legislative intent to impose civil liability for a violation of the statute.” American Auto. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 812 So.2d 309, 311 (Ala.2001). Jackson has not presented any evidence of a legislative intent to impose civil liability on media outlets who fail to report on the subsequent determination of a police investigation. To the extent Jackson argues that his action was premised on the television stations’ failure under § 13A-11-161 to report on the dismissal of the charges against him, he has clearly failed to state a claim for relief; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Jackson’s action insofar as it purports to be premised on § 13A-11-161. See C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So.2d at 102.

APPLICATION GRANTED; NO-OPINION ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE OF AUGUST 17, 2012, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, P.J. and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and MOORE, JJ., concur.

      . Jackson also sued a local newspaper, the Northwest Alabamian, and several fictitiously named parties. Jackson and the Northwest Alabamian reached a settlement and filed a joint stipulation of dismissal of the claims against the Northwest Alabamian. See Rule 41(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. Thus, the Northwest Alabamian is not a party to this appeal. Furthermore, no parties were substituted for the fictitiously named parties before the entry of the judgment dismissing the claims against the remaining defendants, the television stations. We note that the existence of the fictitiously named parties in Jackson’s complaint does not prevent finality of the judgment entered by the trial court. See Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Griffin v. Prime Healthcare Corp., 3 So.3d 892 n. 1 (Ala.Civ.App.2008).


author: PITTMAN, Judge.

text:
    Charles Lee ROBBINS, Sr. v. STATE of Alabama ex rel. Mary Beth Robbins PRIDDY.
    2110294.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Oct. 26, 2012.
    Sydney Goodwin Dean, Madison County Volunteer Lawyer Program, Huntsville, for appellant.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Sharon E. Ficquette, chief legal counsel, and Jennifer M. Bush, asst. atty. gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.
   PITTMAN, Judge.

Charles Lee Robbins, Sr. (“the father”), has appealed from an order entered by the Madison Circuit Court (“the trial court”) in garnishment proceedings initiated by the State of Alabama on the relation of the father’s former wife, Mary Beth Robbins Priddy (“the mother”), denying objections lodged by the father to the garnishment of his retirement benefits payable by the United States Social Security Administration (hereinafter “SSA” or “the garnishee”). Because the order as to which the father seeks appellate review is not a final judgment that will support an appeal, we dismiss the father’s appeal.

The marriage of the mother and the father was dissolved by a judgment of divorce entered by the trial court in 1988. Although that judgment does not appear in the record, it can be ascertained from subsequent filings that that judgment (a) awarded custody to the mother of the minor children born of that marriage in 1983 and 1985 and (b) directed the father to pay support for the children to the mother. In 1995, the trial court entered a judgment determining that the father owed the mother $743 in unreimbursed medical expenses incurred on the children’s behalf, but it did not alter any support provisions then in effect. As of September 1995, the father’s monthly child-support obligation was $750, but that obligation increased to $800 per month until the older child of the parties reached the age of majority in December 2002, after which the father was to pay $400 per month until the younger child reached the age of majority in June 2004. It is undisputed that the father did not make any payments toward satisfying the $743 medical-expense judgment until 2004, when he paid $181.07; further, the father did not pay monthly child support from September 1995 until June 2004 except for one full and three partial payments. By December 2009, the aggregate of the father’s unpaid monetary obligations to the mother, including postjudgment interest at 12 percent per annum, see Ala.Code 1975, § 8-8-10, before its 2011 amendment, had grown to over $167,000.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A), the State of Alabama provides services relating to the enforcement of child-support obligations upon application therefor. The State caused the issuance of an administrative income-withholding order (“IWO”) to SSA in August 2009 upon being notified that the father was receiving income from SSA. However, the father’s attorney at that time notified counsel for the State that an IWO was “not appropriate” because the mother’s and the father’s children had reached the age of majority. The State then notified SSA that withholding pursuant to the IWO should not continue.

Having released SSA from the IWO, the State next began to seek satisfaction of the father’s unpaid support obligation via garnishment. On February 4, 2010, an assistant district attorney filed in the trial court a “Process of Garnishment” form (Unified Judicial System Form C-21) directed to SSA in which it was averred that the father owed the mother $165,933.58 and that the garnishee should withhold compensation payable to the father to satisfy that obligation. The form also stated that the defendant (ie., the father) had the right to claim exemption from garnishment and that the plaintiff (ie., the mother) had the right to contest any exemption claim within 15 days after the filing of such a claim. The father filed an objection to garnishment in which he asserted that Social Security compensation was exempt from garnishment, to which the State replied that such benefits were susceptible to garnishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 659; the father later orally asserted a statute-of-limitations defense to the proposed garnishment at a hearing on the father’s objection. The trial court entered an order on April 2, 2010, determining that Social Security benefits were subject to garnish-merit but that garnishment could nonetheless not proceed because the underlying divorce judgment had not been revived. No appeal was taken from that order barring the garnishment from going forward.

In June 2010, the State filed a motion seeking revival of the underlying divorce judgment for the months of February 1990 through June 2004, the month of the younger child’s 19th birthday. That motion was granted by the trial court. Thereafter, on July 30, 2010, the State filed a second Form C-21 seeking a writ of garnishment directed to SSA; the father’s unpaid obligation was alleged in that form to have increased to $171,986.71. The father replied to the filing of the form by asserting that his Social Security benefits were exempt under federal and Alabama law and that the State’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, by res judicata, and by collateral estoppel; also, on September 17, 2010, he filed an exemption form in which he claimed to own personal property consisting of only a motor vehicle and clothing and asserted that his Social Security benefits were needed to pay for “necessaries.” The trial court thereafter granted a stay of the garnishment sought by the State. On October 6, 2010, more than 15 days after the father’s exemption filing, the State responded to that filing, and the father thereafter moved to dismiss the garnishment proceedings because the State had failed to respond within 15 days to his exemption filing. After a hearing, the trial court entered a judgment on December 21, 2010, granting the father’s motion to dismiss. No appeal was taken from that judgment.

On January 3, 2011, the State filed a third Form C-21; the father’s unpaid obligation was alleged in that form to be $171,986.71. SSA returned that form to the trial court and asserted that it was impossible, without provision of the father’s Social Security number, to determine whether the father’s benefits were due to be deemed subject to garnishment. The State then filed and caused to be served a corrected Form C-21 bearing the father’s Social Security number. On March 11, 2011, the father again filed a claim of exemption from garnishment, averring that the December 21, 2010, judgment barred further garnishment efforts; that, at his age (67 years) and economic status (unemployed and indigent), garnishment of his Social Security benefits would cause a “grave and undue financial hardship”; and that he continued to own $100 in personal effects and a motor vehicle in which he had no equity interest. On March 30, 2011, 19 days later, the father filed a motion to dismiss the State’s third garnishment attempt, averring that the State had again missed the 15-day deadline for responding to his exemption claim. That motion to dismiss was granted on April 8, 2011; again, no appeal was taken from the judgment finally disposing of the State’s third garnishment effort.

On April 12, 2011, the State filed a fourth Form C-21; the father’s unpaid obligation was alleged in that form to have increased to $175,408.29. The father filed, on May 5, 2011, another claim of exemption from garnishment, averring that the December 21, 2010, and April 8, 2011, judgments barred further garnishment efforts; that, at his age (67 years) and economic status (unemployed and indigent), garnishment of his Social Security benefits would cause a “grave and undue financial hardship”; and that he continued to own $100 in personal effects and a motor vehicle in which he had no equity interest. On this occasion, the State timely filed a contest of the father’s exemption claim on May 18, 2011, after which the trial court set a hearing in the case. The father filed a motion seeking dismissal of the State’s fourth garnishment effort as being barred by the doctrine of res judicata and reimbursement of $1,200 secured through an earlier IWO; the State and the father then filed additional papers supporting and opposing the propriety of garnishment of the father’s Social Security benefits. On August 11, 2011, the trial court entered an order denying the father’s motions and his exemption claim; however, that order did not direct SSA, the garnishee, to undertake any actions for the benefit of the State or the mother.

On August 30, 2011, the State, through a different district attorney, filed a fifth Form C-21, the father’s unpaid obligation was alleged in that form to have increased to $177,496.27. After that filing, the father filed a motion attacking the correctness of the trial court’s August 11, 2011, ruling on the State’s fourth garnishment effort and a motion to dismiss and a contest of garnishment directed to the State’s fifth garnishment effort; in his claim of exemption and motion to dismiss directed to the fifth garnishment form, the father averred, in addition to invoking any preclusive effects of the judgments on the State’s first through third garnishment efforts, that he had “received a tentative diagnosis of colon cancer, with metastasis into the liver and lungs” and that he was “the sole care provider for” his disabled current spouse (who, he said, had also been diagnosed with cancer and had required three major organ transplants). After further filings regarding the legal and factual soundness of the father’s attempts to resist the State’s fifth garnishment effort, the trial court issued an order on October 12, 2011, ruling against the father’s contest and claims of exemption; however, that order did not compel SSA as garnishee to undertake any actions on behalf of the State or the mother. The father’s motion to set aside that order was denied on November 15, 2011.

The father filed a notice of appeal on December 19, 2011, seeking review of the trial court’s denial of his objections and claims of exemption directed to the State’s fifth garnishment effort. After a review of the pertinent statutes and caselaw applicable to garnishment proceedings, we conclude that the father’s appeal is premature: there is, as of yet, no final judgment in the case in favor of the mother against SSA that aggrieves the father.

The principal body of statutes that govern garnishment proceedings in Alabama appears in Article 9 of Chapter 6 of Title 6 of the 1975 Alabama Code; such a proceeding typically has, as its goal, “to reach and subject money or effects of a defendant ... in the possession or under the control of a third person,” ie., a garnishee. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-370. Any plaintiff holding a judgment on which execution may issue may obtain process of garnishment by filing an affidavit stating, among other things, the amount due from the defendant and that the named garnishee is believed to be chargeable therefor. See Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-6-390 & 6-6-391. In such instances, however, Alabama’s garnishment statutes recognize that both the putative garnishee and the defendant are entitled to notice and an opportunity to appear as parties in interest entitled to assert their respective positions as to the plaintiff’s garnishment claim. See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-6-393, 6-6-394, 6-6-450, & 6-6-459. Alabama’s garnishment statutes further provide for the entry of a conditional judgment against a nonap-pearing and nonanswering garnishee and an additional period during which such a garnishee may appear before the conditional judgment is made an absolute judgment. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-457. In contrast, when a garnishee appears and answers the process of garnishment, the plaintiff may, by statute, controvert the answer within 30 days, after which a hearing on the controversy is to take place. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-458.

As to appeals, Alabama’s garnishment article states merely that “[a]n appeal lies ... at the instance of the plaintiff, the defendant, the garnishee, or the contestant, or claimant.” Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-464. The question of appellate jurisdiction under the predecessor to that statute was examined by our supreme court in Steiner Bros. v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 115 Ala. 379, 22 So. 30 (1897), in which that court indicated the necessity of a “final judgment or decree,” as is required in appeals generally, in order to support an appeal in a garnishment action and identified the classes of orders that would support an appeal:

“[T]he judgment rendered, as between the parties, the plaintiff instituting it, and the garnishee standing in the relation of a defendant, has all the properties and qualities of finality and conclusiveness of a judgment rendered in any other civil suit. A judgment against the garnishee in favor of the plaintiff, as finally and conclusively fixes and determines the liability of the garnishee and the rights of the plaintiff as if it had been rendered in a suit inter partes commenced in the ordinary mode of instituting civil suits; and such is in effect the declaration of the statute. A judgment against the plaintiff, discharging the garnishee [ — ] the only final judgment which can be rendered in his favor [ — ] as conclusively adjudges that he was not subject to the process, was not the debtor of the plaintiff, and had not possession, or custody, or control of effects of such debtor. Either judgment — the one in favor of the plaintiff, or that in favor of the garnishee — concludes the rights of the parties in respect to the cause of action involved — the matter of right asserted by the one and denied by the other.”

115 Ala. at 384, 22 So. at 31 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

Those principles were later applied in a setting similar to that present in this appeal in Edwards v. Edwards, 249 Ala. 350, 31 So.2d 69 (1947). In Edwards, the former wife was awarded periodic alimony pursuant to a 1929 judgment divorcing her from the former husband; although the former husband’s obligation was reduced in 1930 and 1933, it was not terminated. In 1945, the former wife sought to garnish the former husband’s wages earned from a railroad company; the former husband then filed a motion seeking to quash those garnishment proceedings. The trial eourt denied the former husband’s motion to quash without addressing the duty of the railroad company to withhold any portion of the former husband’s wages, after which the former husband attempted to appeal. Our supreme court dismissed the appeal, observing that “the only order made here was preliminary in character” and ruling that it “will not support an appeal.” 249 Ala. at 351-52, 31 So.2d at 70.

Both of the foregoing opinions were apparently overlooked by this court when it decided Ex parte Walters, 646 So.2d 154 (Ala.Civ.App.1994), in which we held, without citation to any authority other than § 6-6-464 itself, that mandamus to review a denial of a motion to quash a process of garnishment would not lie because another adequate remedy (ie., appeal) purportedly existed to review that denial. See 646 So.2d at 155. However, this court is bound, by statute, by the decisions of our supreme court, such as Steiner Bros. and Edwards, holding that appeal will he in garnishment proceedings only from judgments that finally adjudicate the rights of the plaintiff and the named garnishee with respect to each other. To the extent that it held otherwise, Ex parte Walters is hereby expressly overruled.

For all that appears in the record, as to both the fourth garnishment effort and the fifth garnishment effort undertaken by the State in this case, the trial court to date has, in effect, done nothing more than deny a defendant’s efforts to prevent the garnishment from proceeding to a final judgment; notably, SSA has not yet appeared in any capacity therein, and the State has not sought the entry of a conditional judgment or an absolute judgment against SSA. There is, therefore, currently no final judgment as to the fifth garnishment effort from which an appeal will lie. See Steiner Bros. and Edwards, supra. The father’s appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and BRYAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur.

      . At one time, Alabama law did not allow the use of an IWO as a tool to collect unpaid child-support obligations from nonpaying ob-ligors after the children who had been the subject of the underlying child-support awards had attained the age of majority. See W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777, 780 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), and Sheeley v. Chapman, 953 So.2d 1252, 1259. (Ala.Civ.App.2006). However, the statute relied upon in both W.L.S. and Sheeley, Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-60, was amended in 2009 so as to allow for the issuance of IWOs for "enforcement post-majority of arrearages accrued during minority” as well as accrued interest. See Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-60(10)c.

      . We note that, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., upon the issuance of this court’s certificate of judgment, the trial court’s August 11, 2011, and October 12, 2011, orders will again be "subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”