author: THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Warren Ray GAUTREAUX.
    No. 14-594.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Nov. 5, 2014.

      Edward John Marquet, Louisiana Appellant Project, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant-Warren Ray Gautreaux.
    Earl B. Taylor, District Attorney — 27th Judicial District, Jennifer Ardoin, Assistant District Attorney — 27th Judicial District, Opelousas, LA, for Plaintiff/Appel-lee-State of Louisiana.
    Warren Ray Gautreaux, Angola, LA, pro se.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JOHN D. SAUNDERS, and BILLY HOWARD EZELL, Judges.
   THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

1 ,The defendant, Warren Ray Gau-treaux, appeals his convictions of two counts of first degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with sentences running concurrently and credit for time served. Finding no merit to the defendant’s assignments of error, we affirm the convictions and sentences for two counts of first degree murder.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony not excepted under La Code Evid. art. 803;
(2) whether the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant’s attorney to ask the State’s witnesses whether they had pending criminal charges; and
(3) whether the trial court erred in not granting the defendant’s motions for a new trial.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant was convicted of the first degree stabbing murders of Youric and Mary Courville in their home at 231 Bou-dreaux Street, Eunice, Louisiana, on the evening of January 9, 2006. Mrs. Cour-ville was approximately seventy years old, and Mr. Courville was in his eighties. Their daughter found them the following day. Mr. Courville was lying in front of the refrigerator, and Mrs. Courville was lying in the doorway of her bedroom.

12An autopsy by Dr. Collie Trant revealed that Mrs. Courville died as a result of an incised wound to her left wrist that severed the artery and vein. Other cuts to her body occurred postmortem. She had bruises on the left side of her face, under both sides of her jaw, under her chin, on her left upper chest and left lower chest, on the backs of her hands and fingers, and on her left knee; she had abrasions on both knees. Mr. Courville died from a stab wound to the left chest that punctured the lobe of his left lung.

Four or five blocks away, at 210 College Road, a trailer occupied by Kenneth Dupre caught fire on the night of the stabbings. Defendant Gautreaux was living at the Dupre residence at the time. Dupre allegedly called Gautreaux’s ex-wife during the fire and told her his house was burning because Gautreaux had put a candle behind the recliner and caught the house on fire to hide evidence. Gautreaux’s ex-wife testified that she received two additional calls that night from Gautreaux during which he admitted killing an old couple.

In March 2012, Gautreaux was charged by indictment with two counts of first degree murder. He entered pleas of hot guilty. A notice of intent not to seek the death penalty was filed.

At trial in May 2013, the jury heard the testimony of three witnesses to whom Gau-treaux confessed the killings, one witness to whom he confessed causing harm with a knife and burning evidence, and three other witnesses with whom he discussed plans beforehand to steal money and drugs from an old couple in the neighborhood. Many of the testifying witnesses had a criminal history.

Following trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on each of the two counts of murder. Two motions for new trial were heard and denied.

lain March 2014, the defendant was sentenced to serve life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on each count, to run concurrently. Oral and written motions for reconsideration of sentence were denied.

On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony not within an exception stated in La.Code Evid. art. 803; in not allowing his trial attorney to examine the State’s witnesses regarding the existence of pending criminal charges; and in not granting a new trial to explore pending criminal charges of witnesses.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

TRIAL TESTIMONY

Trial testimony pertinent to the issues on appeal indicates that before dark on the evening of January 9, 2006, Gautreaux went to the residence of Holly Fogleman. Fogleman testified that Gautreaux said he wanted to get drugs and money. When Fogleman left to procure her own drugs, Gautreaux was still there, as was Ashley Taylor, a sixteen-year-old runaway who was staying with Fogleman. Taylor testified that Gautreaux said he knew of a house with an old couple who had money and drugs and that it would be an easy in- and-out job for him and another guy.

Brady Fuselier testified that he lived eight or nine blocks from the Courvilles. He stated that some time after 6:00 p.m., as he was walking to the store, he saw Gautreaux who told him of an old couple they could rob for pain 14killers and money. Gautreaux gave the location of the house which Fuselier said was about 200 yards away. Gautreaux asked Fuselier to assist him with the robbery. Fuselier said he was going home.

Charles Fontenot testified that he had known Gautreaux most of his life and that Gautreaux lived in Dupre’s house at the time of the killings. Fontenot said that Gautreaux was at Dupre’s house several days after the incident, and that, during this time, Gautreaux looked different. When Fontenot asked what was wrong, Gautreaux kept saying he could not believe what he had done and that he had hurt someone “real bad.” Fontenot further stated that Gautreaux said he and Quincy Ceasar went to the Courvilles’ house Sending for drugs and things got out of hand. Gautreaux said that he had hurt Mrs. Courville, that a knife was involved, that he and Ceasar had run back toward Dupre’s house, washed off in a coulee, and split up. Once back at Dupre’s house, Gautreaux said he changed clothes quickly and deliberately knocked over a candle to get rid of the evidence, specifically his clothes. Fontenot testified that Gautreaux threatened to hurt him if he told anyone.

Robert Kibodeaux testified that after the murders, he was in the Eunice jail with Gautreaux and asked him whether he had killed the Courvilles. Gautreaux initially responded, “don’t put me in that bind,” but later admitted that he had killed a man and burned the evidence. Kibodeaux testified that Gautreaux said he was paid twenty dollars to help the man hoe; he saw a wad of money and went back that night to ask for more money. Gautreaux was refused, but while there, he went inside to use the bathroom and unlocked a window. Later when both were out of jail, Kibodeaux said Gautreaux showed up at his house, and | r,Gautreaux admitted going into the Courville house through the window and killing both victims with a knife and burning his bloody clothes in the fire.

Jimmy Lee testified that he had also been in the Eunice jail with Gautreaux. Lee said Gautreaux admitted that he had done things he was not proud of; that he had met up with “Q” and they were looking for drugs and money; that they took care of business; and that Gautreaux ended up with a mouth full of rocks and cash in his pockets. Lee further testified that Gautreaux said he would not be caught because the knife was thrown in a house, and the house burned down.

Rita Labbe testified that she was briefly married to Gautreaux, that they had a daughter together and had ongoing visitation issues. On the night of the murders, Dupre called her, waking her up, and said excitedly, “My house is on fire, my house is burning.” Dupre told her that Gau-treaux put a candle behind the recliner and caught the house on fire “to hide the evidence.” Labbe testified that during this call she heard sirens and people screaming. She testified that she did not get up or look at the clock, but she usually went to bed between 9:30 and 10:00, and she thought the call came after 10:00. Labbe testified that Gautreaux called about a half hour later, telling her repeatedly that he had “messed up bad.” She responded that Dupre’s house was on fire, and Gautreaux said, “Yeah, his house is on fire.... [b]ut something bad happened .... I did something bad.” When Labbe asked what he had done, Gautreaux told her he had killed two old people.

Labbe testified that she did not go back to sleep after Dupre’s phone call. Around 11:30, Charles Fontenot called her and handed his phone to Gautreaux. Labbe was questioned about Warren Ray Gau-treaux’s call as follows:

Q. And what did Ray tell you this time?
|fiA. That he was very upset and he just said, “I messed up, I messed up.” And I said, “Well, why would you kill some old people like that?” He said, “Because I got caught.”
Q. And did he tell you what he got caught doing?
A. No, he just said, “I got caught.”
Q. Did he tell you how he killed them?
A. He said he stabbed them.
Q. Did he tell you why he stabbed them?
A. He told me because he got caught by them, they caught him in his house— in their house. He got caught.
Q. Did he say — did he say anything about what the old people might have said to him, or did when they caught him?
A. He said, “She wouldn’t shut up, she wouldn’t shut up, the f-bitch wouldn’t shut up.”
Q. Okay; and so what did he do?
A. He just kept stabbing her.
Q. That’s what he told you?
A. He choked her.
Q. And what did he — what did he say about the old man?
A. He walked in on him and he stabbed him, too. And I said, “I Don’t want to hear anymore [sic] of this” and I hung up.

Labbe testified that Gautreaux later denied the events. At some point, however, .he told her that he would never get caught because there was no murder weapon; that he got rid of his shoes, giving them to an inmate, and that his step-father brought him more shoes to the jail. Labbe further testified that, as long as |7she had known Gautreaux, he liked to wear FILA brand shoes, the same logo type found imprinted in the blood inside the Courville home. Labbe further testified that Gautreaux told her “he knew the Courvilles, and they were his friends.” Labbe said that she did not call the police after she spoke to Gautreaux as she was afraid that he would kill her, that he had tried to kill her in the past, and that he threatened her fiancé, Luke Gonzales, as well. Gonzales testified that Labbe handed him the phone during one conversation and that he heard Gautreaux threaten to kill Labbe if she talked to the police.

HEARSAY EXCEPTION

Gautreaux contends that the trial court erred in allowing Rita Labbe to testify about what Dupre told her on the phone the night the Courvilles were killed because Labbe’s testimony did not fall under one of the hearsay exceptions of La.Code Evid. art. 80S. We disagree. We find, as the trial court did, that Dupre’s comments were excited utterances, and therefore admissible under La.Code Evid. art. 803, which provides in pertinent part:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the de-clarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.

Kenneth “TT” Dupre was deceased at the time of trial. When the State attempted to question Labbe about what Dupre said to her when he called during the fire, defense counsel objected, stating that such testimony was hearsay. |sThe jury was removed from the courtroom, and the State continued to question Labbe about the phone call. The court heard argument regarding the admissibility of Labbe’s testimony and ruled that Dupre’s remarks were excited utterances under La.Code Evid. art. 803(2) even though they may have been made some time after the fire started. The trial court found that the conversation occurred while the fire was ongoing and allowed Labbe to testify as to what Dupre told her. The jury returned to the ■ courtroom and heard the following testimony:

Q. Okay; my question was, what woke you up that night?
A. The phone call.
Q. Okay; who was the phone call from?
A. “TT” [Kenneth Dupre].
Q. Okay;, and this is “TT.” [Y]ou said you’ve known for how long?
A. Twelve years.
Q. Okay; are you certain that' was “TT’s” voice?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Okay; and this phone call woke you up out of bed?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Okay; and when you answer the phone call, can you tell me, what did he say to you?
A. He was just yelling and he was very upset saying, his house was on fire, that it was burning down.
Q. It was burning down, what did you say?
A. I said, “For real?” I said, “Are you sure?”
Q. He said, “Yes, it’s burning down.” I said, “What happened?” He said, Boo-Boo [Gautreaux] had put a candle behind the recliner and caught it on fire.
Q. Okay.
| a A. And I asked him, “Why?” And he said, “Because.” And T said — he wouldn’t say at'first and I thought it was over drugs. He said, “No, it’s because he trying to hide evidence.”
Q. And that’s his words?
A. Yes.

Based upon this testimony, Dupre’s remarks about Gautreaux setting his house on fire and trying to hide evidence were excited utterances which are admissible under La.Code Evid. art. 808(2).

Gautreaux asserts that Dupre’s statement regarding the destruction of evidence was not contemporaneous with the event, and thus the trial court should have allowed the hearsay testimony regarding there being a fire and nothing more. We disagree. Article 803(1) requires a statement made while the declarant is perceiving the event, or immediately thereafter; but 803(2) requires only an excited utterance about a startling event made while the declarant is still under the stress of excitement caused by the event. Thus, 803(1) calls specifically for immediacy, while the focus in 803(2) is that the statement be close enough in time to be the result of a spontaneous reaction to the event and not the result of reflective thought. See State v. Griffin, 45,045 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/27/10), 30 So.3d 1039, writ denied, 10-447 (La.9/17/10), 45 So.3d 1043. We find no error in the trial court’s admission of Labbe’s testimony regarding the phone call because Dupre’s statements were excited utterances under La.Code Evid. art. 803(2).

Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court has long held that the admission of even hearsay testimony is harmless error where the effect is merely cumulative or corroborative of other testimony adduced at trial. State v. Johnson, 389 So.2d 1302 (La.1980). Here, Labbe’s testimony about Dupre’s phone call was cumulative of and corroborated by other testimony given before Labbe took the |instand. Fontenot had testified that Gautreaux said he had a bag of clothes in Dupre’s house, changed quickly, and deliberately knocked a candle down to burn evidence, specifically clothes. Kibodeaux testified that Gautreaux said he had burned evidence and had thrown his bloody clothes in a fire. Further, Lee testified that Gautreaux said he threw the knife in a house, and the house burned down. There was no objection to the testimony of Fontenot, Kibodeaux, or Lee. Thus, the record as a whole indicates that the introduction of Labbe’s testimony, even if considered partially improper, would have constituted harmless error. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PENDING CRIMINAL CHARGES

At trial, when a witness for the prosecution testifies against a criminal defendant, the defendant is allowed an opportunity to impeach the witness for bias by illuminating for the jury any motives that the witness might have for helping the prosecution make its case. Exposure of a witness’s motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); La. Const. art. 1, § 13; State v. Brady, 381 So.2d 819 (La.1980). However, the confrontation clause does not prevent a trial judge from imposing limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431. To the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based upon their concerns regarding harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, witness safety, and interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id.

|nA prosecution witness’s criminal history is often the subject of impeachment attempts. Here, during the testimony of prosecution witness Charles Fontenot, who was incarcerated at the time of his testimony, defense counsel sought to explore whether the State had offered him leniency on any pending charges that he might have had. When the State objected, the trial court cited La.Code Evid. art. 609.1 and ruled that inquiries into promises of help were allowed but not specific inquiries into pending charges. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 609.1 provides in pertinent part:

A. General criminal rule. In a criminal case, every witness by testifying subjects himself to examination relative to his criminal convictions, subject to limitations set forth below.
B. Convictions. Generally, only offenses for which the witness has been convicted are admissible upon the issue of his credibility, and no inquiry is permitted into matters for which there has only been an arrest, the issuance of an arrest warrant, an indictment, a prosecution, or an acquittal.

In this case, the trial court’s ruling based upon La.Code Evid. art. 609.1 occurred in chambers out of the hearing of the jury, where the following exchange occurred between counsel and the court:

MR. CLAIBORNE [defense counsel]: Your Honor, I feel that if this witness— you’re absolutely correct, prior convictions, you know, we can impeach him with that. But if there’s some possible inducement that this witness feels that he would receive with pending charges for his testimony, I think the jury needs to know that. And it’s highly relevant in this particular case, even though he has not been convicted at this time.
MR. RICHARD [prosecutor]: He asked — he was asked and answered if he received any help and so ...
hsTHE COURT: Well, I think there’s a way of doing it. The way of doing it is, is not to mention pending charges. The question is, have you been offered any help either now or in the future?

Gautreaux contends that through this ruling the trial court erroneously prevented defense counsel from cross-examining the State’s witnesses about pending criminal charges at the time of their testimony. While the general rule is that only convictions can be used to impeach credibility under La.Code Evid. art. 609.1, many cases have held that pending charges that have not resulted in a conviction may be used to show specific bias or interest in the outcome of a case. In State v. Vale, 95-1230, p. 4 (La.1/26/96), 666 So.2d 1070, 1072, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

[T]o the extent exposure of a witness’s motivation is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination, a witness’s “hope or knowledge that he will receive leniency from the state is highly relevant to establish his bias or interest.” State v. Brady, 381 So.2d 819, 822 (La.1980) (collecting cases); see also State v. Nash, 475 So.2d 752, 755-56 (La.1985) A witness’s bias or interest may arise from arrests or pending criminal charges, or the prospect of prosecution, even when he has made no agreements with the state regarding his conduct. Id.

In reconciling the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination with statutes limiting the scope of the examination, we turn to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Brady, 381 So.2d 819, which differentiated between eliciting general credibility impeachment testimony and cross-examination to show a particular bias or interest. When the impeachment of a witness is sought on grounds relevant to the witness’s credibility in general, the fact that the witness has been arrested or indicted is not logically relevant to such purpose, since an arrest or an indictment is only an accusation. Id. Hence, cross-examination is | ^limited to convictions (proven crimes) under La.Code Evid. art. 609.1. However, where the focus of the defense counsel’s questioning is to establish that the district attorney’s office may have leverage over a witness as a result of a pending charge, or that the witness might have assumed so, such cross-examination into pending charges is proper and is not precluded by statute. See Brady, 381 So.2d 819. This is true because the purpose of the cross-examination is to show the witness’s particular bias or interest in the outcome of the case, thus providing a reason why the credibility of the witness might be suspect in a particular case. Id.

Accordingly, here, where defense counsel explained to the trial judge in chambers that he wanted to pursue the line of questioning into pending criminal charges to discover a possible inducement that Mr. Fontenot might have for his testimony, under the line drawn by Brady, the mention of pending charges was not a forbidden area of inquiry.

However, the analysis does not end here. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431:

[T]he constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)] harmless-error analysis. The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Cf. Harrington [v. California], 395 U.S. [250], 254, 89 S.Ct. [1726], 1728 [23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969) ]; Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. [427], 432, 92 S.Ct. [1056], 1059 [31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972) ].

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 687, 106 S.Ct. 1431; See also State v. Vale, 666 So.2d 1070; State v. Williams, 03-1773 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/04), 878 So.2d 765; State v. Boswell, 96-801 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/97), 689 So.2d 627; State v. Quinn, 12-689 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/13), 123 So.3d 320, writ denied, 13-2193 (La.3/14/14), 134 So.3d 1195.

Here, as indicated, Charles Fontenot was incarcerated at the time of trial. He was questioned extensively by the State’s counsel and by the defense counsel regarding his criminal record and any inducement he may have had for giving his testimony. On direct examination by the State, Mr. Fontenot testified that he was imprisoned for several felonies, that his request for assistance was rejected by the State, and that he was never promised anything of value.

On cross-examination, Fontenot confirmed his felony convictions and the denial of his request for assistance. When asked about pending charges, the State objected, and the court instructed defense counsel in chambers: “The way of doing it is, is not to mention pending charges. The question is, have you been offered any help either now or in the future?” The parties returned to the courtroom and the jury, and the defendant’s counsel, Mr. Claiborne, continued the cross-examination as follows:

Q. So sir, at the time you gave your second statement on November 17, 2011, you did inquire about some possible help—
A. Yes, I did.
Q. —from the officers right, at that time?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. All right; are you aware that there is a reward in this case?
|,5A. No, I don’t.
Q. You were never told that?
THE COURT: Speak up.
A. No, sir, I don’t.
Q. Okay; you never heard that from anybody?
A. No, sir.

Mr. Fontenot was questioned in depth about his criminal record and the time he was still serving. During the course of his testimony, he was specifically asked repeatedly whether he had ever been promised leniency or a reward of any kind in exchange for his testimony. He answered in the negative eleven times.

When we apply these facts to the Van Arsdall factors — the importance of the witness’s testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case — we find only harmless error.

Clearly, the extent of the cross-examination permitted was extensive in this case. In fact, defense counsel could have asked Fontenot numerous other questions about inducements as the trial court allowed questions about any help offered “either now or in the future.” Further, defense counsel did not ask Fontenot about any hope that he would receive leniency in exchange for his testimony, which was not covered by the State’s objection. Between the State’s questions and the defense’s questions, Fontenot’s criminal record was repeatedly revealed and he answered in the negative about deals and inducements eleven times, in addition to repeatedly confirming prior responses.

lifiWith regard to defense counsel’s assertion that he was prohibited from asking all of the State’s witnesses about inducements related to pending charges, we note that Fogleman, Taylor, and Fuselier testified before Fontenot, and defense counsel did not attempt to ask those three witnesses about pending charges. Thus, any argument that the trial court prohibited the questioning of those witnesses about pending charges is unsupported. Likewise, there was not even an attempt to question witnesses testifying after Fonte-not about pending charges. Additionally, there was no proffer during the trial regarding charges pending against any witness.

Fontenot’s testimony was important to the State’s case because he testified that the Defendant told him that he killed the Courvilles. However, other testimony corroborates Fontenot’s testimony. Kibo-deaux testified that Gautreaux stated he went through a window of the Courville house looking for money and killed them both. Douglas Lancon, the forensic expert, opined that the perpetrator had gone through a window of the Courvilles’ home. Labbe testified that Gautreaux told her he killed two old people by stabbing them, and Dr. Collie Trant testified that the Courvilles died as the result of being stabbed.

Sheryl Comeaux, the Courvilles’ next-door neighbor with whom Gautreaux had lived for two weeks, testified that Gau-treaux knew the Courvilles. Labbe also testified that Gautreaux knew the Cour-villes. Fogleman testified that Gautreaux was looking for money and drugs the day before she found out the Courvilles were dead. Taylor testified that Gautreaux said he knew of a house where an old couple lived, and they had money and drugs. Fuselier testified that the night before he discovered the Courvilles had been killed, he encountered Gautreaux, who suggested they rob the two old people who lived behind the store because they had pain killers and money. Fuselier testified that the Courvilles’ |17home was approximately two hundred yards away. There was testimony from Kibodeaux and Lee that Gau-treaux destroyed evidence, including his clothing and a knife, in the fire at Dupre’s home. Thus, contrary to the defendant’s assertion, there was corroborating testimony from all of the witnesses regarding the material points.

The only contradiction that Gautreaux points to in Fontenot’s testimony is Fontenot’s statement that he had the conversation, wherein Gautreaux implicated himself, on January 13 or 14, 2006, and Gautreaux was incarcerated in the city jail on those dates. However, Fontenot testified that he was not sure of the actual date on which this conversation occurred. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court’s failure to allow defense counsel to specifically discuss pending charges in questioning Fontenot about deals and inducements related to his deeply discussed criminal record was harmless error. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL

Gautreaux contends that the trial court erred in not granting his motions for new trial where he was prejudiced because he was not allowed to ask the State’s witnesses if they had any pending criminal charges. “As a prerequisite for the granting of a motion for a new trial, a defendant must establish that he has suffered some injustice. C.Cr.P. 851.” State v. Burrell, 561 So.2d 692, 701 (La.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074, 111 S.Ct. 799, 112 L.Ed.2d 861 (1991).

The denial of a motion for new trial is not subject to appellate review except for an error of law. La.C.Cr.P. art. 858. Further, the ruling on a motion for a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Gerard, 96-366 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/14/96), 685 So.2d 253, 260. The merits of a motion for new trial must be viewed with extreme caution in the interest of preserving the finality of judgments. State v. Rodriguez, 02-334 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/14/03), 839 So.2d 106, 133, writ denied, 03-0482 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 972, 124 S.Ct. 444, 157 L.Ed.2d 321 (2003).

State v. Bibbins, 13-875, p. 20 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/9/14), 140 So.3d 153, 167.

Defense counsel filed a motion for new trial on July 1, 2013, asserting that the trial court had closed the door on examination concerning pending charges during Fontenot’s testimony, thus precluding him from inquiring about possible deals with Fontenot and the three witnesses who followed, Rita Labbe, Luke Gonzales, and Robert Kibodeaux. He asserted that Ki-bodeaux had an extensive criminal history with pending charges, and he attached Ki-bodeaux’s rap sheet.

Twelve days later, defense counsel filed another motion for new trial asserting that Brady Fuselier had pending charges and gave perjured testimony. He asserted that Fuselier had theft, disturbing the peace, and trespass charges pending; and that Kibodeaux had open charges for worthless checks, theft, aggravated assault, simple battery, and disturbing the peace. He further indicated that Gonzales had two disturbing the peace charges in 2012, and that Labbe had a charge for theft from 2011. Defense counsel argued that there was some motive >or incentive for all of the State’s witnesses to come forward, but he did not examine them on this issue because he felt that his questions would have been met with the same objection as his questioning with Fontenot. We note that defense counsel asked Rita Labbe about her convictions, but he did not even broach the subject of inducements or deals in exchange for her testimony.

The record reveals that the trial court specifically told defense counsel that he could ask whether any deal or special consideration was given either then |19or in the future in exchange for a witness’s testimony. In fact, the witnesses who were asked about inducements, Fogleman, Fuselier, Fontenot, and Kibodeaux, all testified that they were not offered anything in exchange for their testimony. While Fogleman and Fuselier testified that they were not offered any deals, they were not even asked about pending charges, and they testified before Fontenot and the trial court’s ruling on the issue. Defense counsel admitted that he had no proof that any deal had been made and indicated that it was a credibility call for the jury to decide whether a deal had been made.

The trial court responded that defense counsel did not follow up with questions about deals and that if he had done so and had shown that deals had been made, he would have been allowed to go into them. The trial court subsequently denied the motions for new trial, citing State v. Williams, 618 So.2d 606 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 625 So.2d 1060 (La.1993), which the trial court found similar to this case. The trial court stated:

The Court also notes that instructions were given on how to proceed in this matter. Counsel did not follow those instructions when we went back into open court and left the matter alone and did not pursue it and therefore the Court feels that was abandoned on that line of questioning, or any objections at that time were abandoned at that time.
The Court does not find that there is any basis in the last Motion for New Trial that was filed herein, including the fact that Mr. Gonzales’ record was not disclosed, again, primarily because he was never asked if he was convicted of a crime.

In State v. Williams, 618 So.2d 606, the case cited by the trial court, defense counsel attempted to impeach the confidential informant by showing that he cooperated with police under threat of prosecution. The trial court initially sustained the prosecution’s objection to this questioning. On appeal, the second |2ncircuit stated: “It is well settled that the possibility that the prosecution may have leverage over a witness due to the witness’ pending criminal charges is a valid area of cross examination.” Id. at 610. The second circuit then found that the trial court’s actions, if error, were at most harmless error:

Although the court initially sustained the state’s objection to this line of questioning, the record also reveals a later colloquy on this subject between the trial court and defense counsel. In this colloquy, the court clarified its ruling. The court stated, “Now, if you want to ask him questions about motivation [for his testimony] or other proper avenues of impeaching his testimony I have not prevented you from doing that.” However, defense counsel did not further pursue this line of questioning.

Id. at 610-11.

Here, the trial court in its initial ruling specifically told defense counsel that he could ask about inducements or deals offered “now or in the future,” and we have found that the admonishment not to mention the words pending charges was harmless error when applying the Van Arsdall criteria to the testimony in this case. Fon-tenot was asked repeatedly, without objection, about his criminal record, including whether he had asked about deals with police officers, detectives, and attorneys, whether he had received any deals, and whether he knew anything about a reward. He admitted that he had asked for help but testified that he was refused any deal, answering the question in the negative eleven times. The other witnesses were not asked about pending charges. Some were not even asked about deals or inducements. These omissions cannot be attributed to the trial court’s instruction.

Moreover, at the hearing on the motions for new trial, defense counsel discussed what charges he believed certain -witnesses had pending at the time of |2i trial, but he did not call those witnesses to testify at the hearing. While documents from open file discovery were introduced in an exhibit consisting of over 1,250 pages, neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel pointed to specific pages that prove the witnesses at issue had pending charges that could have been connected to their trial testimony. Some of the charges discussed at the hearing dated back to 1998, and the trial was in 2013.

In order to obtain a new trial, the defendant must show that an injustice has been done, and Mr. Gautreaux has failed to do so in this case. See La.Code Crim. art. 851; La.Code Crim.P. art. 921. A defendant’s mere speculation about a deal is not sufficient for obtaining a new trial. Cf. State v. Anderson, 390 So.2d 878 (La.1980). We find no error in the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motions fdr new trial.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the convictions and sentences of Warren Ray Gau-treaux, on two counts of first degree murder, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . Charles Fontenot also arrived at Fogleman’s apartment at some point.

      . Testimony indicated that Dupre’s trailer had no water and no electricity, and that candles were used for light.

      . There was evidence that the fire was called in at 9:15 p.m.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BROWN, Chief Judge. CARAWAY, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Derrick YOUNG, Sr., and Lawanda Young, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Children, Demeante Young, Derrick Young, Jr., Dorian Young, and Derrilon Young, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Johnny MARSH, City of Tallulah Fire Department, the City of Tallulah and XYZ Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants.
    No. 49,496-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 19, 2014.

      Carol Denise Powell-Lexing, for Appellants.
    Murphy, Rogers, Sloss & Gambel by: Ronald J. White, New Orleans, Law Offices of Mason L. Oswalt, Monroe, by Mason L. Oswalt, for Appellees.
    Before BROWN, STEWART, and CARAWAY, JJ.
   BROWN, Chief Judge.

| fin this action for damages arising out of an intersectional collision between two emergency responders, defendants, Johnny Marsh and the City of Tallulah, have appealed from the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Derrick Young, and his wife, Lawanda Young, and their four children. Defendants are contesting the trial court’s determination of liability and apportionment of fault, as well as the damages awarded to plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural Background

At approximately 6:45 a.m. on June 17, 2007, Madison Parish Sheriffs Deputy Derrick Young and Tallulah Fireman Johnny Marsh collided at the intersection of U.S. Hwys. 80 and 65 in Tallulah, Louisiana. Deputy Young was traveling south on Hwy. 65 in a sheriffs patrol car, and Marsh was traveling east on Hwy. 80 in a city fire truck. Both were responding to an emergency involving an overturned vehicle on Interstate 20 near the Mound exit. Dy. Young had activated his flashing lights and siren; his air conditioner was running, the windows in his patrol car were up, and his dispatch radio was on. The traffic control signal was green as he approached the intersection.

Fireman Marsh had activated the lights and siren on the fire truck he was driving. The truck was loaded with water and weighed approximately 25,000 lbs. Marsh’s speed was estimated to be 35-45 mph, and the posted speed limit was 25 mph. Marsh admitted that his traffic signal was red as he approached the intersection, and that his view to the left (north) was obstructed by a service station at the northwest corner of the intersection. 12As Marsh proceeded through the intersection, his fire truck’s front right bumper struck the rear right quarter corner panel of Dy. Young’s patrol car. Billy Zeigler, the state trooper who investigated the accident, noted that there were no skid marks prior to impact, which • indicated that the fire truck had not applied its brakes until after the impact. Trooper Zeigler further observed that there were 111 feet of skid marks made by the fire truck from the point of impact to the fire truck’s resting spot.

Deputy Young was seriously injured as a result of the accident. Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, Johnny Marsh, the City of Tallulah, the Madison Parish Police Jury (which was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment filed prior to trial), and XYZ Insurance Co. (although it was discovered prior to trial that the City of Tallulah was uninsured at the time of the accident). A bench trial was held on March 11, 2013. The trial court found that the June 17, 2007, accident was caused solely by the negligence of defendant, Johnny Marsh, a city employee, while in the course and scope of his employment with the Tallulah Fire Dept. The court awarded damages as follows:

Derrick Young:

General Damages-Cervical Injuries $300,000.00

General Damages-Lumbar Injuries $100,000.00

Past Medical Expenses , $169,353.20

Future Medical Expenses $61,347.20

Past Lost Wages $85,000.00

Future Lost Wages $345,000.00

Loss of Consortium

Lawanda Young: $75,000.00

Demeante Young: $25,000.00

Derrick Young, Jr: $25,000.00

Dorian Young: $25,000.00

Derillon Young: $25,000.00

| .¡Defendants have appealed, urging error in the finding and apportionment of fault, and the amounts awarded as damages.

Discussion

Liability and Apportionment of Fault

Defendants first assert that the trial court erred in assessing 100% of the fault to Marsh and the City of Tallulah. According to defendants, Marsh did not breach his duty of care as an emergency responder and should not have been assigned any fault. In the alternative, defendants contend that Dy. Young should have been assessed with some percentage of comparative fault.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, urge that the trial court correctly found that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of Marsh in running a red light while traveling at an excessive rate of speed in the city fire truck without first ascertaining that traffic favored with the green light (such as Dy. Young’s patrol car) was yielding to his fire truck.

Both parties involved. in this accident were drivers of emergency vehicles and therefore subject to the provisions of La. R.S. 32:24, which provides:

A. The driver or rider of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to, but not upon returning from, a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this Section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.
B. The driver or rider of an authorized emergency vehicle may do any of the following:
(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this Chapter.
L(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation.
(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property.
(4) Disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions.
C. The exceptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle or bicycle is making use of audible or visual signals, including the use of a peace officer cycle rider’s whistle, sufficient to warn motorists of their approach, except that a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle.
D. The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver or rider of an authorized vehicle from the duty to drive or ride with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver or rider from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.

As set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Lenard v. Dilley, 01-1522 (La.01/15/02), 805 So.2d 175, 177, La. R.S. 32:24 contains two alternate standards of care applicable to the driver, depending upon the circumstances. If subsections A, B and C of La. R.S. 32:24 are met, an emergency vehicle driver will be held liable only for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others. See Rabalais v. Nash, 06-0999 (La.03/09/07), 952 So.2d 653; Neloms v. Empire & Marine Insurance Co., 37,786 (La.App.2d Cir.10/16/03), 859 So.2d 225. However, if the emergency vehicle driver’s conduct does not fit subsections A, B and C, such driver’s actions will be gauged by the ordinary negligence standard. See Spears v. City of Scott, 05-0230 (La.App. 3d Cir.11/02/05), 915 So.2d 983, writ de nied, 05-2478 (La.03/31/06), 925 So.2d 1259. Subsection D of La. R.S. 32:24 states in part that a breach of the provisions IsSet forth in the statute do not relieve the driver of an authorized vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. The court in Lenard, supra, further held that whether the conduct of the emergency vehicle driver is to be gauged by a “reckless disregard” or “ordinary negligence” standard of care is a question to be determined by the trier of fact. Id., at 181.

Determinations of liability and allocations of comparative fault are factual findings made by the trial court. Dupree v. City of New Orleans, 99-3651 (La.08/31/00), 765 So.2d 1002; Theriot v. Lasseigne, 93-2661 (La.07/05/94), 640 So.2d 1305. It is well settled that a reviewing court may not disturb the factual findings of the trier of fact in the absence of manifest error. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government v. Person, 12-0307 (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 293; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). In Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330, 1333 (La.1978), the supreme court set forth a two-part test for the appellate review of facts: (1) the appellate court must find from the record that there is a reasonable basis for the finding of the trial court; and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. If the trial court’s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, supra; Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990). When there are two views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be | (¡manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State, Through Dept. of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993); Sistler, supra.

The trial court specifically found that:

Johnny Marsh and Derrick Young were each responding to an emergency in their respective vehicles. They each were entitled to the privileges afforded to them under La. R.S. 32:24 since they were each driving an authorized emergency vehicle. However, Marsh did not have the privilege afforded him under the statute at the time of the accident since he was approaching a red light and he did not slow down or stop so as not to endanger life or property. Likewise, he exceeded the maximum speed limit in a manner which endangered life and property. (La. R.S. 32:24(B)(2) and (B)(3).) Marsh breached the standard of ordinary negligence and is, therefore 100% liable for the cause of the accident with Young.

Regarding Dy. Young’s actions, the trial court found that:

Young with his emergency lights and siren operating, entered an intersection on a green light at a moderate speed. He maintained a general observation of the intersection but he was unable to see Marsh’s emergency lights because of the service station at the corner of the intersection until it was too late to avoid the collision. Young was unable to hear Marsh’s siren because he had the windows up in his vehicle, the air conditioner on, and his emergency siren engaged. Young was not negligent, did not drive without due regard for the safety of others, and did not contribute in any way to this accident. Marsh was the sole cause of the accident at issue and breached his duty to drive with due regard for the safety of others,

Having reviewed the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s liability and fault determinations. Marsh was driving a fire truck which was fully loaded with water and weighed approximately 25,000 lbs. He did not notice he had a red light until he was approximately 50-100 feet from the intersection and could not see the cross traffic adequately due to the gas station on the northwest corner of the intersection. Furthermore, he was exceeding the speed limit by at least ten miles per hour as he approached the red light, which, given the weight of the fire truck, did not 17give him adequate time to slow down or stop. The court correctly found that Marsh’s actions breached the standard of ordinary negligence and constituted the sole cause of the accident. The actions of Deputy Young, which fit into subsections A, B and C of La. R.S. 32:24, were subject to the “reckless disregard” standard, and as such, the trial court’s finding that Dy. Young did not breach this standard of care and therefore was not at fault is neither clearly wrong nor manifestly erroneous.

Damages

(1) General Damages: Derrick Young

Defendants next contend that the trial court’s award of general damages in the amount of $300,000 for Dy. Young’s cervical injuries and $100,000 for his lumbar injuries are excessive and should be reduced.

General damages are intended to compensate an injured plaintiff for mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, loss of gratification or intellectual or physical enjoyment, or other losses of lifestyle that cannot be measured definitively in terms of money. Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 00-0066 (La.10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670; Brown v. City of Monroe, 48,764 (La.App.2d Cir.02/26/14), 135 So.3d 792. The factors to be considered in assessing quantum of damages for pain and suffering are severity and duration. LeBlanc v. Stevenson, 00-0157 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 766. More specifically, the nature, relative severity, and extent of bodily injuries are qualitative factors that must first be considered by the trier of fact in awarding general damages. The duration of a plaintiffs injury symptoms and the duration of treatment are quantitative factors that 18must also be taken into account. Thongsavanh v. Schexnayder, 09-1462 (La.App. 1st Cir.05/07/10), 40 So.3d 989, writ denied, 10-1295 (La.09/24/10), 45 So.3d 1074.

The assessment of quantum, or the appropriate amount of damages, by a trial judge or jury is a factual determination entitled to great deference on review. Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-0492 (La.10/17/00), 774 So.2d 70. As such, the role of the appellate court in reviewing general damages is not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994). Before a trial court’s award of general damages can be questioned as excessive, the reviewing court looks first, not to prior awards, but to the individual circumstances of the instant case. Bouquet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 08-0309 (La.04/04/08), 979 So.2d 456. If there is no abuse of the trial court’s vast discretion, the damage award will not be disturbed by the reviewing court. Youn, supra; Hunt v. Long, 33,395 (La.App.2d Cir.06/21/00), 763 So.2d 811. As noted by the supreme court in Youn, supra, this vast discretion is such that the appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.

Deputy Young was taken from the accident site to the Madison Parish Hospital emergency room. He was diagnosed with cervical and lumbar injuries. Dy. Young began treatment with his family physician, Dr. Lawrence Chenier, who referred plaintiff for an MRI of his cervical spine on July 2, 2007. The MRI revealed a large herniated disc at C5-6 which 19was impinging on the spinal cord and the neurofora-men on the left side. Dr. Chenier treated Dy. Young for several months with no success, so he referred him to Dr. Anil Nanda at LSU Health Sciences Center in Shreveport for a neurosurgical evaluation. Dr. Nanda examined Dy. Young on October 9, 2007, and noted the herniated disc at C5-6. Dr. Nanda referred plaintiff for conservative treatment, to include physical therapy and epidural steroid injections.

A six-week physical therapy program Dy. Young participated in did not produce any substantial relief to his neck and back pain. Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Vince Forte with the Louisiana Pain Care Clinic in Monroe on January 15, 2008. Dr. Forte treated plaintiff with cervical epidural injections on February 28, March 11,- and March 27, 2008. Because these did not provide relief for plaintiff, Dr. Forte performed left cervical medial branch nerve blocks on Dy. Young on May 7 and August 5, 2008. Neck and back pain continued to plague plaintiff, so Dr. Forte attempted left radio frequency cervical medial branch neurotomies on September 28 and October 7, 2008. Dr. Forte’s notes from November 12, 2008, report that none of these surgical procedures alleviated Dy. Young’s pain and discomfort. No improvement was noted on visits to Dr. Forte on December 15, 2008, and February 18, 2009.

An MRI performed on April 21, 2009, showed either a prominent asymmetrical bulging disc or some degree of disc herniation at C5-6. Plaintiff returned to Dr. Nan-da on June 3, 2009, after all conservative treatment had proven to be unsuccessful, and Dr. Nanda recommended an 110anterior cervical fusion at C5-6. The anterior cervical discectomy with fusion and plating was performed by Dr. Nanda on August 15, 2009. A follow-up MRI on September 1, 2009, showed a herniated disc at C6-7, which Dr. Nanda opined was likely caused from the stress caused by the first surgery. Dy. Young underwent a second surgery on October 8, 2009. Dr. Nanda performed an anterior cervical fusion, discectomy, placement of a peek cage with bone morphogenic protein, placement of plates with screws through C5, 6 and 7, • and removal of the old plate at C5-6.

Plaintiffs cervical pain has improved somewhat after the second surgery, although he continues to suffer from occasional pain radiating from his neck. However, Dy. Young’s lower back pain has persisted since the accident on June 17, 2007. An MRI performed by Dr. Nanda on plaintiff’s lower back on February 3, 2010, showed a disc herniation at L5-S1 with impingement.

Dr. Nanda has recommended that plaintiff have two further surgical procedures: a left side discectomy at L5-S1 and a decompressive cervical laminectomy. As of trial, Dy. Young had not elected to have these surgeries. However, as noted infra, according to Dr. Nanda, it is more likely than not that plaintiff will need these procedures in the near future. Dy. Young’s pain is still ongoing; he is seven years post-accident and has yet to see significant recovery. He takes pain and anti-inflammatory medication on a daily basis to manage his pain and discomfort. Plaintiff is limited in the activities he can enjoy with his wife and children, and is bothered by neck and pain most of the time when he is not working. We do |nnot find the trial court’s general damage awards of $300,000 and $100,000 to be an abuse of its vast discretion.

(2) Special Damages: Derrick Young

Special damages are those which have a “ready market value,” such that the damages theoretically may be determined with relative certainty, including medical expenses and lost wages. Guillory v. Lee, 09-0075 (La.06/26/09), 16 So.3d 1104; McGee v. AC & S, Inc., 05-1036 (La.07/10/06), 933 So.2d 770; Barnes v. Riverwood Apartments Partnership, 43,-798 (La.App.2d Cir.02/04/09), 16 So.3d 361. An appellate court, in reviewing a trial court or jury’s factual conclusions with regard to special damages, must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the fact-finder’s conclusions, and the findings must be clearly wrong. Guillory, supra.

(A) Future Medical Expenses

Defendants argue that the trial court erred in awarding Dy. Young future medical expenses. According to defendants, while Dr. Nanda, Dy. Young’s neurosurgeon, did testify that Dy. Young was a candidate for further surgery, in response to a question from defense counsel, Dr. Nanda stated that it would depend on plaintiffs pain tolerance and his willingness to go through with another surgery, having been through two procedures already. Plaintiff therefore failed to show that these surgical procedures were “reasonably necessary.”

The recovery of future medical expenses is dependent upon the tort victim establishing the probability of the future medical expenses with | ^supporting medical testimony and estimations of their probable cost. Menard v. Lafayette Insurance Co., 09-1869 (La.03/16/10), 31 So.3d 996; Caskey v. Merrick Construction Co., Inc., 46,886 (La.App.2d Cir.03/14/12), 86 So.3d 186, writ denied, 12-0847 (La.06/01/12), 90 So.3d 442. Future medical expenses must be established with some degree of certainty. Id.

In the instant case, Dy. Young’s treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Anil Nanda, testified that it was his recommendation that Dy. Young undergo two more surgeries for injuries he sustained in the accident: specifically, a left side discectomy at L5-S1 and a decompressive cervical laminectomy. Dr. Nanda testified that the estimated cost of the two surgeries was $11,347.30, and the associated hospital charges were estimated to be $50,000, based upon the amounts charged by the hospital for Dy. Young’s previous surgeries. This figure, $61,347.20, was unrebutted, and is reasonable. See Daigle v. City of Shreveport, 46,429 (La.App.2d Cir.10/05/11), 78 So.3d 753, unit denied, 11-2472 (La.02/03/12), 79 So.3d 1027. It is understandable that plaintiff, having already had two surgeries, might feel some trepidation about undergoing two further procedures. Nonetheless, it was Dy. Young’s testimony that because he continues to suffer from neck and back pain, he plans to return to Dr. Nanda for the recommended surgeries. The trial court did not err in its award of future medical expenses to Dy. Young.

(B) Past Lost Wages and Future Loss of Earning Capacity

[ 1RA plaintiff seeking damages for past lost wages bears the burden of proving lost earnings, as well as the duration of time missed from work due to the accident. Boyette v. United States Automobile Association, 00-1918 (La.04/03/01), 783 So.2d 1276. The amount of lost earnings need not be proved with mathematical certainty, but by proof as reasonably establishes the claim, and such proof may consist only of the plaintiff’s own testimony. Driscoll v. S tucker, 04-0589 (La.01/19/05), 893 So.2d 32. The trier of fact has broad discretion in assessing awards for lost wages, but there must be a factual basis in the record for the award. Id.; Downs v. E.O.M. Entertainment, Inc., 43,654 (La.App.2d Cir.10/22/08), 997 So.2d 125.

The loss of future wages encompasses the loss of a plaintiffs earning potential — the loss or reduction of a person’s capability to do that for which he is equipped by nature, training and experience, and for which he may receive recompense. Travis v. Spitale’s Bar, Inc., 12-1366 (La.App. 1st Cir.08/14/13), 122 So.Sd 1118, writs denied, 13-2409, 13-2447 (La.01/10/14), 130 So.3d 327, 329. In determining a future loss of earning capacity award, factors to be considered are the plaintiffs physical condition before the injury, the plaintiffs past work history and work consistency, the amount the plaintiff would have earned absent the injury complained of, and the probability that the plaintiff would have continued to earn wages over the remainder of his working life. Starr v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transporation and Development, 46,226 (La.App.2d Cir.06/17/11), 70 So.3d 128, writs denied, 11-1835, 11-1952, 11-1625 (La.10/21/11), 73 So.3d 386, 387, 388, writ denied, 12-2146 (10/12/12), 98 So.3d 877; Brandao v. |14 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 35,-368 (La.App.2d Cir.12/19/01), 803 So.2d 1039, writ denied, 02-0493 (La.04/26/02), 814 So.2d 558; Rathey v. Priority EMS, Inc., 04-0199 (La.App. 4th Cir.01/12/05), 894 So.2d 438, writs denied, 05-0789, 05-0802 (La.05/06/05), 901 So.2d 1107, 1108.

Dy. Young testified that prior to his accident, he worked at Harrah’s Casino (off track betting) and Club Paradise as a security guard. Plaintiff stated that he earned approximately $1,000.00-$1,500.00 per month at these extra jobs. He also testified that he could not work as much overtime after the accident, and was unable to drive escort for high school teams traveling out of town or work security at basketball and football games. The trial court found that plaintiff had established past lost wages of $1,250 per month for 68 months, for a total of $85,000.00. This award is supported not only by plaintiffs testimony, but by the testimony of Mrs. Young and financial records as well. As for future loss of earnings, the trial court calculated that Dy. Young has 23 years remaining in his work life expectancy and determined that because of plaintiffs apparently permanent limitations, he would not be able to work the extra jobs in the future. We cannot say that this determination is clearly wrong, and will not disturb the trial court’s future loss of earnings award of $345,000.

(3) Loss of Consortium: Mrs. Young and four minor children

In this assignment of error, defendants assert that the trial court erred in awarding Dy. Young’s wife and four children damages for loss of consortium. In the alternative, defendants contend that the amounts awarded were excessive. In seeking a reduction in these awards, defendants |1sargue that, after the accident, Dy. Young’s work activities did not decrease. For example, plaintiff continued to work his full-time job at the sheriffs department, as well as his part-time jobs and some overtime hours patrolling and escorting buses to football and basketball games for local schools.

La. C.C. art. 2315(B) authorizes the recovery of monetary damages for loss of consortium, service and society by the spouse and children of an injured person. Smith v. Escalón, 48,129 (La.App.2d Cir.06/26/13), 117 So.3d 576. In general, a claim for loss of consortium has seven elements: (1) loss of love and affection; (2) loss of society and companionship; (3) impairment of sexual relations; (4) loss of performance of material services; (5) loss of financial support; (6) loss of aid and assistance; and (7) loss of fidelity. Smith, supra; Caskey, supra; McNeill v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 43,362 (La.App.2d Cir.06/11/08), 986 So.2d 905, writ denied, 08-1558 (La.10/10/08), 993 So.2d 1287; Etheredge v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co„ 35,832 (La.App.2d Cir.04/03/02), 814 So.2d 119. Damages for loss of consortium are general damages, the assessment of which the factfinder is given much discretion. La. C.C. art. 2324.1; McNeill, supra; Etheredge, supra.

The trial court awarded Mrs. Young $75,000 and each of the four children $25,000, finding that before the accident, Dy. Young had enjoyed a very active lifestyle with his wife and four young children, had performed most of the yard work and had been a “hands on” father. The court further noted that all of these activities were seriously curtailed after plaintiffs accident.

|1fiThe record supports the awards made by the trial court in this case. Mrs. Young testified that prior to his accident, plaintiff had been an excellent husband and father; if he was not working, he was home with his family, helping around the house or playing with the kids. After the accident, because of his injuries and level of pain and discomfort, when Dy. Young came home from work all he could do was rest on the couch or in his bed. Mrs. Young stated that her husband was like a “zombie” due to the medication he had to take because of pain. Dy. and Mrs. Young testified that because plaintiff could no longer work his extra jobs or overtime, finances were strained and there was a lot of stress on the couple’s relationship as a result. Both spouses also testified that the accident had a significant effect on their intimate relationship. Mrs. Young related that her husband’s mood was depressed and he never felt like doing anything after the accident. Dy. Young still suffers from chronic pain, which to this day affects his day-to-day activities. The seven years he has missed fully participating as a partner to his wife and parenting in his children’s lives will never be regained. This assignment of error is without merit.

Failure to Mitigate Damages

An injured party has a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages. Aisole v. Dean, 574 So.2d 1248 (La.1991); Britt v. City of Shreveport, 45,513 (La.App.2d Cir.11/03/10), 55 So.3d 76; Fletcher v. Simmons, 37,758 (La.App.2d Cir.10/29/03), 859 So.2d 292. The victim is not required to make substantial expenditures or incur substantial risk to avoid the consequences of the defendant’s conduct, but must use good 117sense, good faith and fair dealing once the damage has been inflicted. Campbell v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 528 So.2d 626 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988); Aultman v. Rinicker, 416 So.2d 641 (La.App. 2d Cir.1982).

In the instant case, defendants assert that Dy. Young failed to mitigate his damages. Specifically, defendants argue that because plaintiff continued to work his regular hours with the sheriffs department after the accident, he aggravated and/or contributed to his injuries. The record does not support this allegation. While Dy. Young testified that he worked his normal shift with the department as he was able after his accident, he stressed that most of the time he did so, he was in pain. As the sole source of financial support for his family, Dy. Young testified that felt like he had no choice but to work his regular hours with the sheriffs department. As it was, Dy. Young was unable to work his “extra” jobs, something that, in addition to his mounting medical bills and expenses, put significant financial strain on his family. See Etheredge, supra. It could even be argued that by continuing to work as a deputy, plaintiff was mitigating his damages; by doing so, he drastically reduced the amount he was entitled to claim for past lost wages.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

CARAWAY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written reasons.

CARAWAY, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

hi concur with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s overall judgment with the exception of the award of $345,000 for future lost wages. I dissent as to that award which must be lowered to account for the time value of money.

The trial court’s calculation was based upon the evidence that plaintiff would have been expected following the trial to earn $1,250 per month for the next 23 years or 276 months following the trial. The award of $345,000 was therefore calculated by $1,250 times 276. A lump sum award for damages that will arise in the future must be discounted to take into account the time value of money, i.e., money awarded today can be invested to earn a return. See, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983). In my opinion, this is an error patent in the financial mathematics of the trial court’s award. At a conservative minimum with an expected return of 4% per annum, the award should be discounted to $230,000. With this calculation error, the judgment should be amended.