author: ROBERTS, J.,

text:
    In the matter of the ESTATE OF Carl BLACK, Deceased: Ida M. Black, Julia Rosemary Black Burchfield, Kathy Ann Black May, Ivy Darlene Black Waltman, Martha Mildred Black Pruett, Betty Carol Black, Edith Louise Black Coogan, Willard Lee Black, John Wilson Black, Karl Lamar Black and Karol Addison Black, Appellants v. Jerry Michael Clark, The Administrator of the Estate of Carl Black, Deceased, Jerry M. Clark, Individually, and Shane M. Clark, Appellees.
    No. 2012-CA-01223-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 8, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 2014.
    Certiorari Denied April 3, 2014.

      Paul M. Neville, Louisville, attorney for appellants.
    John Dickson Mayo, James Mayo, attorneys for appellees.
    Before LEE, C.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Carl Black executed two wills, one in 2007 and another in 2009. The 2009 will expressly revoked all prior wills. Carl passed away, and one of the devisees of the 2009 will, his stepson, Jerry Clark, petitioned the Winston County Chancery Court to probate the 2009 will. Carl’s sister-in-law, Ida M. Black, counterclaimed, arguing she was wrongfully excluded from the 2009 will. Ida asserted the 2007 will should be given effect over the 2009 will. Jerry filed a motion to dismiss Ida’s counterclaim, and after a hearing, the chancery court granted Jerry’s motion to dismiss. Ida appeals, raising four issues that can be summarized as: whether the chancellor erred in finding the 2009 will unambiguous, thereby precluding consideration of parol evidence as to Carl’s intended disposition of his property. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. In 2007, Carl executed a will leaving his entire estate to his brother, Ivy Black. The will contained a savings clause that provided, if Ivy predeceased him, his entire estate would be left to Ivy’s wife, Ida. Ivy was named executor, with Ida as an alternate executor. Subsequently, in 2009, Carl executed a new will. This will was prepared by the same attorney who prepared the 2007 will. The 2009 will revoked all prior wills, and further changed the devisees. Under this new will, Ivy’s share was reduced, and Ivy, Jerry, and Jerry’s son, Shane Clark, were all left specific devises. Additionally, the will contained a remainder clause leaving the rest of the estate to Ivy, Jerry, and Shane to “share and share alike.” As in the 2007 will, Ivy was named as the executor. However, unlike the 2007 will, the 2009 will made no mention of Ida. Ida was not left a specific devise; nor was she named in the savings clause to take Ivy’s share in the event Ivy predeceased Carl; nor was she named as an alternate executor.

¶ 3. Ivy died on April 19, 2011, and Carl died four days later, on April 23, 2011. Jerry petitioned to probate the will. Ida counterclaimed and asserted the 2007 will, rather than the 2009 will, expressed Carl’s true intent as to the disposition of his estate. Basically, Ida asserted Carl could not have intended the share left to Ivy to pass to Ivy’s intestate heirs. After an evidentiary hearing, the chancery court dismissed Ida’s counterclaim. Ida filed a motion for reconsideration, and after another hearing, the chancery court denied the motion for reconsideration, leading to this appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶ 4. A chancellor’s factual findings •will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but if an erroneous legal standard is applied, appellate review is de novo. In re Estate of Langston, 57 So.3d 618, 619-20 (¶ 6) (Miss.2011).

¶ 5. If the language of a will only allows one interpretation as to how the testator’s property is distributed, the will is unambiguous, and courts may not consider parol evidence to determine the intent of the testator. Stovall v. Stovall, 860 So.2d 679, 681 (Miss.1978) (citing Seal v. Seal, 312 So.2d 19, 21 (Miss.1975)). Parol evidence may only be considered if the language of the will itself can be construed to result in more than one interpretation as to the disposition of property. Seal, 312 So.2d at 21. Applying the language of the 2009 will results in one, and only one, disposition of Carl’s estate, so the will is unambiguous. Therefore, applying de novo review as to the law, the chancellor did not err. Consequently, the only question before this Court is whether the chancellor committed manifest error, and whether there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s interpretation of the will itself.

¶ 6. The chancellor was concerned that it appeared Carl did not want any of his property to pass intestate, which was why he consulted an attorney to draft a will in the first place, and the 2007 will had a residuary clause that provided Ida would take Ivy’s place in the event Ivy predeceased Carl. Further, the chancellor found it inexplicable that Carl’s 2009 will did not contain such a residuary clause. The effect of not having a residuary clause in the 2009 will was that the share left to Ivy passed to Ivy’s intestate heirs. However, the chancellor also found that the will was not ambiguous, because there was only one possible interpretation of the will, and that interpretation resulted in Ivy’s share passing intestate. Therefore, the chancellor did not consider parol evidence as to what Carl intended. Ida argued in the chancery court, and argues to this Court, that this result ignores Carl’s intent for his property not to pass to intestate heirs. As the chancellor found, it is impossible to know exactly what Carl intended to happen to Ivy’s share in the event Ivy predeceased him. However, the chancellor correctly determined Carl’s intent was not properly an issue, because the legal operation of the words of the will itself allowed only one result as to how the estate is divided.

¶ 7. Ida contends her omission from the 2009 will was the result of Carl’s attorney’s advanced years. However, Ida did not assert any lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence by Carl’s attorney. Rather, her contention is simply that Carl’s attorney inadvertently omitted the savings clause from the 2007 will when drafting the 2009 will. This Court was presented a similar issue in In re Last Will & Testament of Roland, 920 So.2d 539 (Miss.Ct.App.2006). In that case, the attorney who drafted the wills of a married couple averred that the couple’s intent was to divide their total estate equally among their six children from previous marriages. Id. at 541 (¶ 10). However, regardless of the attorney’s intent, the plain language of the wills left the residual estate to the husband’s children only, since the wife predeceased the husband. Id. at 543 (¶ 12). Despite this inequality, we found parol evidence inadmissible because the language of the wills left only one readily ascertainable disposition of the estates of both parents. Id. at 541 — 42 (¶ 11). The same result applies in this case.

¶ 8. Therefore, we find no error of law or factual finding unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 9. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WINSTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.

      . This hearing was held upon Jerry’s Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The parties do not contend, nor brief, whether the chancellor impermissibly converted the hearing to a summary-judgment hearing.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GRIFFIS, P.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Richard CHAPMAN, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CP-00027-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 29, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied April 1, 2014.
    Richard Chapman, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES and JAMES, JJ.
   GRIFFIS, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Richard Chapman appeals the dismissal of his motion for post-conviction collateral relief (“PCCR”). The circuit court determined that Chapman’s motion was time-barred under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Supp.2013). In this appeal, Chapman contends that the dismissal was in error. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 1981, Chapman was indicted for committing the crimes of rape and armed robbery. He was convicted of rape on January 27, 1982, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On September 22, 1982, Chapman pled guilty to robbery without a firearm and was sentenced to serve ten years in prison. Chapman did not appeal either conviction.

¶ 8. On December 27, 2006, Chapman filed a PCCR motion. In this motion, he argued: (1) his “actual innocence” in regard to his rape conviction; (2) the circuit court’s failure to abide by Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 8.04 when the court accepted his guilty plea; (3) the State’s failure to preserve exculpatory evidence and his trial transcript; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. Chapman later amended the motion to add that: (1) his indictments in both the rape and robbery cases were defective; (2) the jury that convicted him of rape was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community; and (3) he is serving an “illegal sentence.” The circuit court ruled that the motion was time-barred, under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2), and no exception was applicable. The court summarily dismissed the motion without an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 4. Chapman appealed the dismissal of his motion and raised numerous issues. See Chapman v. State, 47 So.3d 203, 204-05 (¶ 1) (Miss.Ct.App.2010). However, this Court focused on the argument that the circuit court erred in the dismissal of his motion without consideration of the State’s alleged destruction of exculpatory evidence and the court’s failure to conduct an evi-dentiary hearing. Id. at 206 (¶ 7). This Court affirmed the dismissal of the motion and held that the motion was procedurally barred due to Chapman’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements for the contents of a PCCR motion; that the motion was time-barred due to the three-year statute of limitations; and that there was no evidence of the State’s bad faith destruction of exculpatory evidence. Chapman, 47 So.3d at 208-209 (¶¶ 17, 20, 23). His petition for certiorari was denied. Chapman v. State, 63 So.3d 1229 (Miss.2011).

¶ 5. On August 1, 2011, Chapman filed a motion styled as both a “Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Conviction” and a “Motion for Post-Conviction Relief.” In this motion, he included the same issues he argued in his first motion. The circuit court treated the motion as a PCCR motion, ruled that the motion was time-barred, and dismissed it.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. We will not reverse a trial court’s dismissal of a PCCR motion unless the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. Madden v. State, 75 So.3d 1130, 1131 (¶6) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citation omitted). When reviewing questions of law, this Court’s standard of review is de novo. Id. (citing Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (¶ 6) (Miss.1999)).

ANALYSIS

¶ 7. Chapman argues that the circuit court erred when it dismissed his motion as time-barred. The Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act provides:

A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the [PCCR mov-ant’s] direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi or, in case no appeal is taken, within three (3) years after the time for taking an appeal from the judgment of conviction or sentence has expired, or in case of a guilty plea, within three (3) years after the entry of the judgment of conviction.

Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). Chapman’s motion was filed ten years after the time for his direct appeal, well beyond the three-year statute of limitations.

¶ 8. Section 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2012) allows an exception from this bar where:

[T]here has been an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of [the PCCR mov-ant’s] conviction or sentence or that he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such been introduced at trial it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence ... Likewise excepted are those cases in which the [movant] claims that his sentence has expired or his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked. Likewise excepted are filings for post-conviction relief in capital cases which shall be made within one (1) year after conviction.

Chapman must prove that his case falls within one of these exceptions. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). The circuit court was correct to decide that Chapman’s appeal was time-barred.

¶ 9. Although the circuit court did not base its dismissal on this ground, Chapman’s motion was also procedurally barred as a successive writ. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-23(6) (Supp. 2013) provides that “any order dismissing the [PCCR movant’s] motion or otherwise denying relief under this article is a final judgment and shall be conclusive until reversed. It shall be a bar to a second or successive motion under this article.” As with the time-bar, exceptions are allowed for any intervening decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States or the State of Mississippi that would have affected the outcome of the case and for the discovery of new evidence unavailable at trial that would have affected the outcome. Id.

¶ 10. Chapman’s first PCCR motion was filed on December 27, 2006, and it was dismissed by the circuit court, which was affirmed by this Court. Chapman’s current motion, filed on August 1, 2011, was also procedurally barred as both time-barred and successive-writ barred.

¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.


author: MAXWELL, J.,

text:
    James Odell McLAMB a/k/a James Earl, Jr., a/k/a James O. McLamb, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CP-01746-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Nov. 5, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied April 1, 2014.

      James Odell McLamb, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Stephanie Breland Wood, attorney for appel-lee.
    Before LEE, C.J., MAXWELL and FAIR, JJ.
   MAXWELL, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. In James Odell McLamb’s fifth appellate challenge to his 1981 armed-robbery conviction, he argues his indictment was improperly amended. But the Mississippi Supreme Court already rejected this exact issue over three decades ago on direct appeal in McLamb I. Further impediments to our review are his failure to obtain permission from the supreme court to file this motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) — his fourth — and the fact that this motion is time-barred and successive-writ barred. Because of the jurisdictional and procedural defaults, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of McLamb’s PCR motion.

Facts, Procedural History, and Discussion

¶ 2. On February 19, 1981, McLamb was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. McLamb v. State, 410 So.2d 1318, 1320 (Miss.1982) (McLamb I). McLamb then filed a motion to vacate his sentence as a habitual offender, which the circuit court denied. And on appeal of the denial of that PCR motion, our supreme court found McLamb had been improperly sentenced to life imprisonment because neither of his two predicate convictions was a “violent” felony as required under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev.2007). McLamb v. State, 456 So.2d 743, 746 (Miss.1984) (McLamb II). So our supreme court granted McLamb’s motion for leave to file a motion to vacate his sentence as a habitual offender. Id. On May 7, 1985, the circuit court vacated McLamb’s life sentence, imposing instead a thirty-three-year sentence. On June 4, 1986, our supreme court handed down an opinion, which simply stated “AFFIRMED.” McLamb v. State, 490 So.2d 912 (Miss.1986) (McLamb III).

¶ 3. McLamb then filed a pro se emergency motion for state habeas corpus relief in the Rankin County Circuit Court. The circuit court treated this motion as a PCR motion. And since it was filed in the wrong county, the court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. McLamb appealed the dismissal of that PCR motion. McLamb v. State, 974 So.2d 935 (Miss.Ct.App.2008) (McLamb IV). In McLamb TV, we affirmed the dismissal of his PCR motion, noting it was time-barred, successive-writ barred, filed without permission of the supreme court, and filed in the wrong court. Id. at 938 (¶¶ 10-14). We also deemed McLamb’s appeal frivolous, and warned him that future bogus filings could result in sanctions. Id. at 939-40 (¶¶ 18-20).

¶ 4. McLamb has since filed at least three additional requests with our supreme court for leave to file a PCR motion, all of which have been denied by separate orders. In each order, the supreme court warned that future frivolous filings may result in sanctions.

¶ 5. On June 18, 2012, McLamb filed— without permission from our supreme court — his fourth PCR challenge to his 1981 judgment of conviction. He again argued the judgment was void because corrections were made to the listed dates of his predicate felonies in the indictment after the jury’s guilty verdict. On June 21, 2012, the circuit court entered an order, finding that the indictment issue was already raised and decided in McLamb I. See McLamb I, 410 So.2d at 1319-20. The circuit court further treated this motion as a PCR motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction because McLamb failed to obtain permission from our supreme court to file the motion as required under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-7 (Supp.2012). Finding the dismissal was appropriate, we affirm.

¶ 6. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COA-HOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO COAHOMA COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.

      . McLamb was previously convicted of breaking and entering and larceny in North Carolina.

      . McLamb’s PCR challenge is also time-barred and subsequent-writ barred. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-5(2) (Supp.2012) & 99-39-23(6) (Supp.2012).


text:
    Kyle JAMES, Appellant v. Jennifer JAMES, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CA-00658-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Nov. 26, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied March 18, 2014.

      Mark V. Knighten, attorney for appellant.

      Michael L. Fondren, Pascagoula, attorney for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., MAXWELL and FAIR, JJ.
   MAXWELL, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. A parent seeking modification of a previous child-custody order bears the initial burden of proving (1) a material change in circumstances adversely affecting his children’s welfare and (2) that a change of custody is in the child’s best interest. In this case, the chancellor determined a father petitioning for modification had not met this burden.

¶ 2. Though the maternal grandmother had falsely accused the father of sexually abusing his two sons, which led to criminal charges that were later dropped, the chancellor found that this circumstance, while adversely affecting the father, did not adversely affect the children. So the chancellor concluded changing custody was not in the children’s best interest. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s decision, we affirm the denial of the father’s petition to modify custody.

¶ 3. We also affirm the denial of his petition to hold the mother in contempt. While the chancellor did not expressly address each specific request for contempt and injunctive relief the father had made, we are instructed to assume he resolved these additional issues in favor of the mother, as appellee. And we likewise find no abuse of discretion in this decision.

Background

¶ 4. When Kyle James and Jennifer James divorced in December 2008, they agreed Jennifer would have primary physical custody of their two sons, then ages eight and three, and that Kyle would have visitation on alternating weekends. But in May 2010, Kyle petitioned the Jackson County Chancery Court to find Jennifer in contempt and to modify the boys’ custody so that he shared custody “50/50.” In his petition, Kyle alleged Jennifer had interfered with his scheduled visitation and efforts to be involved in the boys’ schoolwork. He also alleged Jennifer had allowed the boys to engaged in “dangerous” activities. Jennifer filed a counterclaim, asking that Kyle’s visitation be supervised. She asserted Kyle had been too rough physically when disciplining their sons.

¶ 5. While their requests were pending, Jennifer’s mother contacted the Department of Human Services (DHS) and reported Kyle had sexually abused his younger son-allegations later proven to be false. In response, Kyle filed a motion to enjoin Jennifer’s mother from contacting the boys. He also requested the court order a psychological examination of the boys and “clarify visitation.”

¶ 6. Kyle’s motions for an injunction against Jennifer’s mother, a psychological evaluation, and a clarification of visitation initially came before the court on a “motions day,” November 8, 2011. Because the chancellor quickly realized he would need to hear testimony before ruling on Kyle’s requests for a psychological exam and for an injunction against Jennifer’s mother, the chancellor postponed those issues to another hearing on December 20, 2011. But the chancellor temporarily ordered Jennifer’s mother to stay away from the boys until the hearing. The chancellor also ordered both parents not to discuss with the boys any of the custody issues, particularly the abuse allegations.

¶ 7. At the December 20, 2011 hearing, the chancellor lifted the injunction against Jennifer’s mother. But he reminded her she was ordered not to discuss with the boys any of the allegations she had made against Kyle. The chancellor also helped the parents negotiate a workable holiday-visitation plan. The chancellor did not, however, rule on Kyle’s request for a psychological examination because Kyle did not bring it up.

¶ 8. On February 7, 2011, the chancellor heard Kyle’s motion for custody modification, which Kyle had amended the month before, adding the fallout from false sexual-abuse allegations as an additional material change in circumstances adversely affecting the boys. On March 16, 2012, the chancellor entered a “Final Judgment,” specifically denying Kyle’s request for a modification of custody. While acknowledging that Jennifer had some parenting issues and that, because of the false sexual-abuse allegations, the boys had been subjected to examinations and interviews, the chancellor did not find a material change in circumstances adversely affecting the boys warranting a change in custody-

¶ 9. On April 12, 2012, Kyle filed a notice of appeal of the March 16 order.

Discussion

I. Modifícation of Custody

¶ 10. Our review of a chancellor’s child-custody decision is narrow. Mabus v. Mabus, 847 So.2d 815, 818 (¶ 8) (Miss.2003). “We will not disturb a chancellor’s factual findings unless the chancellor’s decision was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or the chancellor applied an improper legal standard.” Wilson v. Wilson, 79 So.3d 551, 560 (¶ 37) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citing Wallace v. Wallace, 12 So.3d 572, 575 (1112) (Miss.Ct.App.2009)). Nor will we substitute our judgment for the chancellor’s, “even if we disagree with the findings of fact and would arrive at a different conclusion.” Id. (quoting Coggin v. Coggin, 837 So.2d 772, 774 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2003)). But we do review the chancellor’s application and interpretation of the law de novo. Id.

¶ 11. Here, the chancellor applied the proper legal framework for resolving Kyle’s request to modify custody. “[T]o modify a previous child custody order, three distinct prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the party seeking the change bears the initial burden of proving there has been a material change in circumstances; (2) the change must be adverse to the child’s welfare; and (3) the chancellor must find a change in custody is in the best interest of the child.” Anderson v. Anderson, 961 So.2d 55, 58 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 799 So.2d 919, 922 (¶8) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)).

¶ 12. The chancellor found there was some evidence to support Kyle’s allegations that the first prerequisite — a material change in circumstances — had been met. The chancellor voiced concerns “that the younger child, who [was] six (6), should be in a car seat even now, and that the children have tardies [that] some may consider excessive.” The chancellor also acknowledged that the false sexual-abuse allegations had resulted in the children being interviewed and examined. But the chancellor found Kyle had failed to prove the second prerequisite — that Jennifer’s actions had an adverse affect on the children.

¶ 13. Though Jennifer frequently failed to get her sons to school on time, the chancellor did not find this fact justified uprooting the boys from their school and home community. And while the false sexual-abuse allegations certainly adversely affected Kyle, they did not adversely affect his sons. Consequently, the chancellor found it was not in the boys’ best interest to modify custody. So with Kyle also failing to show the third prerequisite, the chancellor denied Kyle’s modification request without further analysis. Cf. Anderson, 961 So.2d at 58 (¶ 6) (requiring the chancellor, if he finds all three prerequisites have been met, “to make on-the-record findings for each of the Albright factors”).

A. False Allegations of Sexual Abuse

¶ 14. On appeal, Kyle insists the chancellor reversibly erred by not finding the false allegations of sexual abuse warranted a change in custody. In support, he cites our recent Wilson opinion, in which we found no fault with the chancellor’s finding an adverse material change in circumstances based on the mother’s actions, which included falsely accusing the father of child abuse. Wilson, 79 So.3d at 563-64 (¶¶ 52-54). But in that case, there was proof of an adverse impact on the child. In Wilson, the child engaged in self-harm soon after visitation with her father had been cut off due to the allegations. Id. at 564 (¶ 54). Further, the false allegations were part of a larger pattern of behavior by the mother to alienate her child from her ex-husband, which the mother continued despite the high anxiety her daughter suffered because of it. Id.; see also Jernigan v. Jernigan, 830 So.2d 651, 652-54 (¶¶ 3-6) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (finding no error in the chancellor’s finding of a material change in circumstances based on the mother’s false allegations of child sexual abuse, which combined with other factors showed the mother was willing to sacrifice her child’s mental and emotional health in order to get custody).

¶ 15. Here, the chancellor did not find the allegations of sexual abuse were part of a pattern of behavior by Jennifer to alienate the boys from Kyle, let alone that Jennifer persisted in that pattern despite evidence the boys were being harmed. In fact, the chancellor did not find Jennifer was the one who falsely accused Kyle. Instead, it was her mother who made the bogus report to DHS. Cf. Morrow v. Morrow, 591 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss.1991) (“[O]nly parental behavior that poses a clear danger to the child’s mental or emotional health can justify a custody change.” (Emphasis added)). And we find the chancellor appropriately exercised his equitable powers by enjoining Jennifer’s mother, first, from seeing the boys, and then, after a more thorough hearing, from speaking to the boys about the allegations or otherwise interfering with custody and visitation matters.

¶ 16. Kyle argues that because Jennifer was complicit in her mother’s actions, the false allegations should be attributed to her. But even if this were so, we still find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s finding that the boys were not adversely affected. Beyond the boys having to be interviewed about the allegations, the chancellor found no harm. Instead, it was Kyle who bore the brunt of the consequences of his ex-mother-in-law’s actions. And to warrant a change in custody, the material change in circumstance “must be adverse to the child’s welfare.” Anderson, 961 So.2d at 58 (¶ 6) (emphasis added). It is not enough to show an adverse effect on the non-custodial parent.

¶ 17. Because Kyle has failed to show the chancellor’s finding — that the children’s welfare had not been adversely affected — was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, we will not disturb this decision on appeal. See Wilson, 79 So.3d at 560 (¶ 37).

B. Lack of Psychological Examination

¶ 18. Kyle claims he was hamstrung in his ability to prove an adverse effect on the boys because the chancellor “failed to grant” Ms motion for a psychological evaluation. But Kyle did not push for a hearing on his motion. Instead, when Kyle’s motion was first brought up on November 8, 2011, the chancellor was clear that he would not consider the motion without further evidence. And when the evidentiary hearing was held on December 20, 2011, Kyle neither brought the motion up for hearing nor reasserted his request that his boys be examined — despite knowing that the modification hearing was less than two months away. See Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So.2d 416, 423 (Miss.1985) (citations omitted) (“As a prerequisite to obtaining review in this Court, it is incumbent upon a litigant that he not only plead but press his point in the trial court.”). Because Kyle did not ask for definitive ruling on his request but instead proceeded to the final custody-modification hearing, we are instructed to assume he abandoned his request. See Cossitt v. Alfa Ins., 726 So.2d 132, 135 (¶ 12) (Miss.1998) (citations omitted) (“A motion that is not ruled upon is presumed abandoned”).

II. Other Requests for Relief

¶ 19. As a final procedural matter, we find the chancellor’s judgment was a final judgment, disposing of all of Kyle’s pending claims against Jennifer. In his brief, Kyle asserts that “there were other issues presented to the court for adjudication that were not ruled upon in the court’s Final Judgment.”

¶ 20. Kyle asks us to find “error” in the court’s failure to rule. But as a court of error correction, we can only find error in the decisions a lower court has made — we cannot find error in the failure to make a decision. If the lower court had not yet made a decision, the only assistance the appellate court may provide is mandamus — an order by the supreme court to make a ruling. See M.R.A.P. 15. We cannot “reverse” the absence of a ruling through an appeal.

¶ 21. We have, however, found the failure to rule on all pending issues in a domestic matter means the decision that was made was not a final, appealable judgment. E.g., R.A.S., Jr. v. S.S., 66 So.3d 1257, 1261 (¶¶ 19-20) (Miss.Ct.App.2011). This means, were Kyle’s assertion of unresolved issues correct, our course of action would be to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and not to find error.

¶22. But we find Kyle’s assertion is incorrect. Many of the purported unresolved claims were actually resolved in pri- or hearings — especially the December 20, 2011 hearing where many of the problems concerning Kyle’s visitation issues were addressed. And it also clear from the chancellor’s March 2012 order that he was denying all of Kyle’s pending claims against Jennifer, including his request that Jennifer be held in contempt for certain actions and enjoined from performing others.

¶ 23. In this order — labeled “Final Judgment” — the chancellor noted that, in addition to the motion to modify custody, “[vjarious other pleadings were filed and heard in this matter.” The chancellor issued this order after “[t]he final trial date [on] February 7, 2012.” While the chancellor’s order only discussed his factual findings regarding the denial of Kyle’s request to modify custody, it implicitly denied the remainder of Kyle’s requests.

¶ 24. If Kyle was unsatisfied that the order did not recite the chancellor’s findings regarding the denial of his requests for a citation of contempt and an injunction, he could have asked the chancellor to “find the facts specially and state separately [his] conclusions of law thereon” within ten days following the entry of the final judgment. M.R.C.P. 52. But Kyle did not. Instead, he filed a notice of appeal. See M.R.A.P. 3, 4.

¶ 25. On appeal, because “the chancellor made no specific finding[s] on [whether Jennifer’s alleged actions were true and warranted citation for contempt or an injunction], ‘we are required by our prior decisions and by sound institutional considerations to assume that the chancellor resolved all such fact issues in favor of [the] appellee’” — in this case, Jennifer. Wilburn v. Wilburn, 991 So.2d 1185, 1193 (¶ 19) (Miss.2008) (quoting Cheek v. Ricker, 481 So.2d 1139, 1143-44 (Miss.1983)). And because Kyle has not shown any reason why the chancellor erroneously favored Jennifer on these issues as well, we affirm the chancellor’s final judgment and his final resolution in favor of Jennifer on all of Kyle’s post-divorce claims.

¶ 26. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE, ROBERTS, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., AND BARNES, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

      . Due to the allegations of child sexual abuse, the chancellor sealed this case as confidential. The names of both parties have been changed to maintain confidentiality. See M.R.A.P. 48A.


author: JAMES, J., CARLTON, J.,

text:
    MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Self-Insured/Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics, Appellant v. Elisha ADCOX, Appellee.
    No. 2012-WC-01537-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Jan. 28, 2014.

      Joseph T. Wilkins III, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    John Hunter Stevens, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., ROBERTS and JAMES, JJ.
   JAMES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Mississippi Department of Public Safety/Bureau of Narcotics (MBN) appeals the Hinds County Circuit Court’s affirmance of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission’s decision, which awarded benefits to Elisha Adcox for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) resulting from her duties on the Mississippi Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. MBN raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court erred in affirming the Commission’s finding that Adcox’s Katrina experience caused her to suffer PTSD; and (2) whether the Commission erred in finding the medical testimony of Dr. Mark Webb unpersuasive.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Adcox began working as a contract agent with MBN in 1989, and became a full-time agent in 1993. Her work with MBN involved undercover operations, the execution of search warrants, participation in drug raids, making arrests, and testifying in court.

¶ 3. Adcox was treated for two weeks at an out-of-state facility for PTSD after her partner was shot during a raid in 1990, after which she returned to full duty. Ad-cox has been treated for chronic migraine headaches by Dr. Ruth Fredericks since 2001. In April 2003, Adcox injured her neck in a motor-vehicle accident. In 2004, Adcox was hospitalized after inhaling chemicals during a raid on a methamphetamine lab. Adcox testified that she did not miss any work during the period between her treatment for the 2003 neck injury and her assignment to duty on the Gulf Coast related to Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.

¶4. In August 2005, Adcox and other agents were sent to the Mississippi Gulf Coast to assist in Katrina relief efforts. Adcox arrived on the Coast the Saturday prior to Katrina’s landfall to assist local law enforcement with traffic control during the evacuation. Adcox and the other agents spent the duration of the storm at Camp Shelby outside Hattiesburg, Mississippi, returning to Gulfport, Mississippi, the morning after Katrina’s landfall. According to Adcox, her duties included assisting local law enforcement in providing security against looters, searching for and rescuing survivors, and searching for and recovering bodies.

¶ 5. Adcox testified that in 2006, she began having panic attacks and flashbacks of death and bodies from her Katrina experience and guilt over having to refuse food and water to Katrina survivors. Dr. Fredericks, who treated Adcox for a headache condition, suggested that Adcox seek psychiatric care for her post-Katrina difficulties. On January 24, 2006, Adcox began treatment at Region 8 Mental Health Center. There, Adcox was treated by Nina Williams, a licensed therapist, William Johnson, a psychiatric nurse practitioner, and Dr. Stanley Russell, a psychiatrist. Initially, Adcox was treated primarily by Williams, with regular oversight and evaluation by Dr. Russell. In April 2008, Johnson took over Dr. Russell’s care responsibilities in collaboration with Dr. Paul McGinnis, a psychiatrist. Following her initial visit, Adcox was diagnosed with PTSD by both Williams and Dr. Russell.

¶ 6. Adcox first filed a petition to controvert on June 1, 2006, alleging that, as of February 2005, her work had aggravated injuries to her head and neck originally incurred in a motor-vehicle accident on April 9, 2003. This claim was docketed as Claim J-5177. MBN answered with a denial.

¶ 7. Adcox then filed a petition to controvert on November 9, 2006, alleging a “continuing injury as of August 30, 2005, resulting from her service on the Mississippi Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.” This claim was docketed as Claim J-6249. MBN again answered with a denial. On January 25, 2007, Adcox filed an amended petition to controvert in which she expanded her description of her alleged injury of August 30, 2005, as follows: “Depression, post-traumatic stress disorder. Neck progressively getting worse. Recently became disabling. Especially in a[m]eth [l]ab bust .... and after working in Katrina aftermath.” Adcox erroneously cited February 2004 as the date of the “meth lab bust.” MBN answered with another denial.

¶8. On October 5, 2007, Adcox filed another amended petition to controvert in Claim J-6249, alleging that her Katrina duty had aggravated the neck injury from the March 9, 2003 motor-vehicle accident and caused her to suffer PTSD.

¶ 9. On March 11, 2008, MBN filed a motion to dismiss Claim J-5177, arguing that no injury had occurred in February 2005 and asserting that Adcox had confused her dates and must have intended to refer to the chemical-exposer incident that occurred during a February 5, 2004 drug bust for which no claim had been filed. MBN consulted Dr. Webb for a second opinion. Dr. Webb examined Adcox on January 7, 2009. Dr. Webb found that Adcox did not suffer from PTSD.

¶ 10. A hearing before an administrative judge (AJ) was set. Prior to the hearing, the parties agreed to the following stipulations: that Claim J-5177 would be voluntarily dismissed; that if Claim J-6249 was found to be compensable, Adcox would be entitled to the maximum amount of temporary total disability benefits; and that General Exhibits 1-12 were admissible in evidence.

¶ 11. A hearing before an AJ was held on September 28, 2009. At the hearing, the AJ heard testimony from Adcox and from Bobby Grimes, commander of enforcement at MBN from 2005 to 2006, who testified on behalf of MBN. After the hearing, the depositions of Dr. Russell, Johnson, and Williams were marked and admitted as General Exhibits 13-15, allowing the record to be closed as of November 2, 2009.

¶ 12. The AJ held that Adcox failed to prove that her work on the Gulf Coast aggravated or contributed to a worsening of preexisting headaches and neck pain, but Adcox did prove by clear and convincing evidence that her work on the Gulf Coast caused her to suffer PTSD. The AJ awarded Adcox permanent total disability benefits as a result of her PTSD. Both parties appealed and the Commission affirmed. MBN then appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed. MBN now appeals to this Court. Finding no error, we affirm.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13. This Court has summarized the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases:

The standard of review in appeals of workers’ compensation cases is limited; this Court must determine only whether the decision of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence and whether the law was correctly applied. The Commission sits as the ultimate finder of facts; its findings are subject to normal deferential standards upon review. Because our review is limited, we will only reverse the Commission’s rulings where findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence, matters of law are clearly erroneous, or the decision was arbitrary and capricious. This Court maintains a deferential standard even when we would have been persuaded to rule otherwise if we had been the fact-finder.

Brock v. Wal-Mart, 105 So.3d 1151, 1155 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

I. Whether the circuit court erred in affirming the Commission’s finding that Adcox’s Katrina experience caused her to suffer PTSD.

¶ 14. MBN argues that the circuit court erred in affirming the Commission’s finding that Adcox suffered from PTSD. Particularly, MBN asserts that Adcox does not fit the diagnostic criteria set out in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), in that her Katrina experience did not involve an actual threat of death or injury.

¶ 15. “When our standard of review is applied to any case involving the claim that a mental injury is compensable through worker’s compensation benefits, it dictates that there must be substantial evidence for the Commission’s finding that a claimant met the burden of proof.” Scott Colson’s Shop Inc. v. Harris, 67 So.3d 841, 848 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Hosp. Housekeeping Sys. Inc. v. Townsend, 993 So.2d 418, 425 (¶24) (Miss.Ct.App.2008)). In reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, “substantial evidence” is “something more than a ‘mere scintilla’ or suspicion.” Id. “Substantial evidence has also been defined as such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion .... [or] that which provides an adequate basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.” Id. (quotations omitted).

¶ 16. Adcox has raised a “mental/mental” claim for workers’ compensation. A mental/mental injury has been described as an injury “stemming from mental stimulus, ‘with no physical component in either the cause or the disabling consequence.’ ” Townsend, 993 So.2d at 424 n. 1 (quoting 8 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 56.06(3) (2000)). For an injury that is unaccompanied by physical trauma, the claimant “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she suffered from a disabling mental injury which was either caused, contributed to or aggravated by some unusual occurrence or untoward event in order to be compensable.” Daniels v. Peco Foods of Miss. Inc., 980 So.2d 360, 363 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2008) (quoting Kirk v. K-Mart Corp., 838 So.2d 1007, 1010 (¶ 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2003)). Stated another way, the claimant “must show [that] something more than the ordinary incidents of employment occurred.” Kirk, 838 So.2d at 1010 (¶ 17). Thus, Adcox is required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a casual link between her diagnosis of PTSD and her work-related Katrina experience. Harris, 67 So.3d at 848 (¶ 21). Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as

that weight of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts of the case.

Id. at 849 (¶ 21) (quoting Moran v. Fairley, 919 So.2d 969, 975 (¶24) (Miss.Ct.App.2005)).

¶ 17. Upon reviewing the record evidence and the Commission’s decision, within the bounds of the appropriate standard of review, we find that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s conclusion that Adcox presented clear and convincing evidence that her PTSD was casually connected to her Katrina experience.

¶ 18. Adcox testified that she arrived on the Coast in the days prior to Hurricane Katrina to assist in the evacuation. Upon returning to the Coast around 4 a.m. on August 30, 2005, she and other agents began assisting other law enforcement authorities by providing security against looters, conducting search and rescue, and recovering dead bodies. This continued for the next several days, with Adcox and other agents working twenty hours per day, during which time she was surrounded by the smell of death and dead bodies. Adcox stated she personally observed many dead bodies and, on one occasion, while climbing through the window of a house, stepped on a dead body. She at first slept on the floor of the command center, and later slept in her car in fear of rats and snakes. Adcox testified that in 2006, she began having panic attacks and flashbacks of death and dead bodies and of having to refuse food and water to Katrina survivors.

¶ 19. In his deposition testimony, Dr. Russell testified that Adcox began treatment at Region 8 Mental Health Center on January 24, 2006. Following her initial visit Adcox was diagnosed with PTSD. Dr. Russell explained that he applied the diag-nostie criteria set out in the DSM-IV and that Adcox unquestionably met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD, finding that her Katrina experience qualified as a traumatic event under the criteria. Particularly, Dr. Russell pointed to Adcox’s inadvertent discovery of a body in a vacant house as a “traumatic event for her.” Dr. Russell stated that Adcox’s Katrina experience was “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” combining with her preexisting headaches, neck pain, anxiety, and depression-rendering her disabled. Dr. Russell testified that his diagnosis was based on a reasonable degree of medical probability.

¶ 20. Dr. Russell also testified that he disagreed with the opinion of Dr. Webb, the psychiatrist engaged by MBN to evaluate Adcox. Dr. Russell stated that, in Ms opinion, Dr. Webb failed to consider the full range of diagnostic criteria set forth in the DSM-IV.

¶ 21. Williams also testified through deposition testimony. Williams stated that Adcox presented one of the most severe cases of PTSD she had ever seen as a therapist, and that Adcox would probably never be able to hold a full-time or part-time job.

¶ 22. The Commission found:

[Adcox’s] experience on the Coast post-Katrina involved unusual occurrences and/or untoward events beyond the ordinary experience of her employment, and she has proved by clear and convincing evidence, through her own testimony and the expert opinions of her primary treating mental health providers at Region 8, that she has suffered a compen-sable case of PTSD as a result of that Coast experience.

¶ 28. Considering this evidence, Adcox sufficiently demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, a casual link between her PTSD and her work-related Katrina experience. Accordingly, we find no error in the Commission’s finding of a compensa-ble mental injury. Thus this issue is without merit.

¶ 24. MBN also argues that Adcox’s current disability is attributable to her preexisting medical history rather than her Katrina experience. Having found that there was substantial evidence to supporting the Commission’s finding that Ad-cox suffered from PTSD as a result her work-related Katrina experience, we find this argument to be without merit.

II. Whether the Commission erred in finding the medical testimony of Dr. Webb unpersuasive.

¶25. MBN argues that Dr. Webb’s evaluation report should have been considered and given greater weight. Dr. Webb evaluated Adcox on behalf of MBN, and his independent medical evaluation was submitted into evidence. Dr. Webb found that Adcox’s disability arose from her long history of severe, chronic, and documented physical pain. Dr. Webb further concluded that Adcox was not suffering from PTSD, principally because, during her Katrina work, there was “no imminent danger to her or a loved one.” The AJ found that “as pointed out by both Dr. Russell and Ms. Williams, imminent danger to the patient or a loved one is not required for a diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-IV, so Dr. Webb’s opinion in that regard is without any probative value.” Likewise, the Commission found Dr. Webb’s testimony “unpersuasive at best.”

¶ 26. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “[w]here medical expert testimony is concerned, this Court has held that whenever the expert evidence is conflicting, the Court will affirm the Commission's judgment] whether the award is for or against the claimant.” Raytheon Aerospace Support Servs. v. Miller, 861 So.2d 330, 336 (¶ 13) (Miss.2003) (quoting Kersh v. Greenville Sheet Metal Works, 192 So.2d 266, 268 (Miss.1966)). Here, Dr. Webb’s opinion conflicts with the opinions of Dr. Russell and Williams. As stated above, we give deference to the decision of the Commission and will not disturb that decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Having found that the Commission’s decision to award Adcox benefits for PTSD resulting from her work during Hurricane Katrina was supported by substantial evidence, we find this issue to be without merit.

¶ 27. The dissenting opinion cites to our precedent in Barfield v. Mississippi State Hospital, 120 So.3d 461 (Miss.Ct.App.2013) and Harris, 67 So.3d 841. In both Barfield and Harris, the burden of proof for a compensable mental injury is clear and convincing evidence. We apply the same burden here. The AJ found that the claimant proved by clear and convincing evidence that her injury caused her to suffer PTSD. That finding was upheld by the Commission. Our decision in this case does not alter the burden of proof for a compensable mental injury.

¶ 28. The dissenting opinion asserts that Adcox failed to meet her burden of proof to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a casual connection between her mental injuries and her employment. In support of this argument, the dissenting opinion states that Adcox’s Katrina experience was not a qualifying event for PTSD as set forth in the diagnosis criteria in the DSM-IV because neither Adcox, her family members, nor close associates were under a direct threat of injury or death. However, direct threat of injury or death to the patient, the patient’s family members, or the patient’s close associates is not the only criteria set forth in DSM-IV. The DSM-IV also includes “witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another....” Both Williams and Dr. Russell testified that Adcox’s Katrina experience, especially her inadvertent discovery of a dead body in an abandoned building, was a qualifying traumatic experience for her. As to the medical opinion of Dr. Webb, the dissenting opinion would have us reject the medical testimony of Dr. Russell and Williams in favor of Dr. Webb. However, we again note that our standard of review is limited. As we have stated above, the Commission sits as the ultimate fact-finder, and we “maintain a deferential standard even when we would have been persuaded otherwise if we had been the fact-finder.” Brock, 105 So.3d at 1155 (¶ 10). Furthermore, as we note above, when expert medical testimony is conflicting, “the Court will affirm the Commission's judgment] whether the award is for or against the claimant.” Raytheon Aerospace Servs. v. Miller, 861 So.2d at 336 (¶ 13). Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 29. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ„ CONCUR. CARLTON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

CARLTON, J.,

dissenting:

¶ 30. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion and agree with the argument asserted by MBN that the evidence does not support a finding of PTSD. “When a claimant seeks benefits as a result of a compensable mental injury, the burden of proof is raised to clear and convincing evidence of a causal connection between the injury and employment.” Barfield v. Miss. State Hosp., 120 So.3d 461, 466 (¶ 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2013) (citation omitted). The claimant must show that the mental injury resulted from “something more than the ordinary incidents of employment.” Scott Colson’s Shop Inc. v. Harris, 67 So.3d 841, 848 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citation omitted).

¶ 31. As set forth in the DSM-IV, which is provided in the record, PTSD requires the following:

[DJirect personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate.

The DSM-IV also provides that a PTSD diagnosis requires that the “person’s response to the event must involve intense fear, helplessness, or horror.” Furthermore, “[t]he characteristic symptoms of PTSD resulting from the exposure to the extreme trauma include persistent reex-periencing of the traumatic event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent symptoms of increased arousal.”

¶ 32. The majority places great weight upon the diagnosis of Williams, a licensed marriage and family therapist, who treated Adeox under the supervision of Dr. Russell, a psychiatrist at Region 8 Mental Health Center. Williams diagnosed Adeox with PTSD on Adcox’s initial visit. Dr. Russell, Williams’s supervisor, confirmed the diagnosis the same day of the initial visit. Dr. Russell considered Adcox’s post-Hurricane Katrina experience to be the traumatic event that qualified the PTSD diagnosis, and in his deposition testimony, he attacked Dr. Webb’s diagnosis as not having considered the full range of diagnostic criteria for PTSD under the DSM-IV.

¶ 33. A review of the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD shows, however, that Adeox did not encounter a qualifying event with Hurricane Katrina. Neither Adeox nor her family members or close associates were under a direct threat of injury or death. Along with a team of other MBN agents, Adeox assisted in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. She therefore helped after the life-threatening risk of Hurricane Katrina had ended. She did not suffer a direct threat to herself, a loved one, or a close associate in that effort as required for the diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-IV.

¶ 34. In addition to the requirement of experiencing some traumatic threat of injury or death to the person, a loved one, or a close associate, the person’s response must also include an intense fear, helplessness, or horror. As noted earlier, the DSM-IV also provides that the symptoms resulting from exposure to such extreme trauma include persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent symptoms of increased arousal. As stated by Dr. Webb, however, the record shows that Adcox’s alleged qualifying event, her response, and her symptoms fail to meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD diagnosis.

¶ 35. While finding that Adcox’s diagnosis failed to constitute PTSD, Dr. Webb did find that Adeox possessed other issues, and he acknowledged that Adeox was on multiple pain and psychiatric medications that limited her concentration, mental agility, and alertness. He also noted that during their interview Adeox appeared overly medicated, held her head down mostly, and slurred her words. Dr. Webb recommended that Adcox undergo an inpatient intoxication program to assess her need for all the medications prescribed for her. Dr. Webb’s medical impression also noted that Adcox had Axis II histrionic personality traits; Axis III headaches, neck pain, shoulder pain, and increased weight; and Axis IV stressors involving a 1990 shooting and a 2003 motor-vehicle accident.

¶ 86. In finding that Adcox’s medical impression included headaches, neck pain, and histrionic personality traits, Dr. Webb applied the DSM-IV criteria and determined that Adcox’s post-Hurricane Katrina activities failed to constitute a qualifying event for purposes of a PTSD diagnosis. As acknowledged by Dr. Webb, Adcox certainly possesses other conditions with other diagnoses, but these do not include PTSD. The failure of the evidence to show that Adcox suffered PTSD from her post-Hurricane Katrina activities results in a lack of evidence of a causal connection between her mental injuries and her employment. Cf. Bayfield, 120 So.3d at 467 (¶ 20) (affirming the finding that a causal connection existed between the claimant’s PTSD and his employment). In conclusion, Adcox failed to meet her burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence a causal connection between her mental injuries and her employment. See Harris, 67 So.3d at 848 (¶ 19). Therefore, I would reverse the judgments of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission and the circuit court since the finding of PTSD and the decision to award benefits for that diagnosis was not supported by the evidence.

      . General Exhibits 1-12 consisted of Adcox’s video deposition and the medical records from several physicians. Many of the medical records were relevant to Adcox’s claim that her Katrina experience aggravated her preexisting headache and neck conditions. The AJ ultimately found that claim to be noncom-pensable, and that ruling is not before us on appeal. Relevant to the PTSD claim were the medical records of Dr. Russell (General Exhibits 8-10); the independent medical evaluation of Dr. Webb (General Exhibit 11); and Adcox’s video deposition (General Exhibit 12).


text:
    In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Frank LEWIS, Deceased: Franklin Lewis, Executor, Appellant v. Constance Slaughter Harvey and Robert M. Logan, Appellees.
    No. 2012-CA-01623-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 18, 2014.

      Orvis A. Shiyou Jr., Hattiesburg, Can-dance L. Rickman, attorneys for appellant.
    Ottowa E. Carter Jr., Robert M. Logan Jr., Jason Avery Mangum, Newton, attorneys for appellees.
    Before GRIFFIS, P. J., ISHEE and MAXWELL, JJ.
   MAXWELL, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. This is an appeal from an order entitled “Interim Judgment” that the chancellor entered in a guardianship-based fee dispute. While the chancellor decided the guardianship issue, there is no record that he resolved Appellees’ request to recoup attorneys’ fees spent defending an allegedly frivolous challenge by Appellant to recover legal fees already disbursed from the guardianship account. Because the “Interim Judgment” was interlocutory in nature and not a final, appealable judgment, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

A. Initial Guardianship Proceeding and First Appeal

¶ 2. On April 17, 2009, James Nelson filed a petition for appointment of a conservator over his longtime friend, Frank Lewis. On May 1, 2009, a hearing was held, which led to an agreed judgment being entered establishing a guardianship over Lewis. The chancellor appointed Lewis’s attorney, Constance Slaughter Harvey, as guardian of his estate. And he appointed Lewis’s son, Franklin Lewis (Junior), as guardian of his person. The chancellor awarded attorneys’ fees both to Harvey and to Nelson’s attorney, Robert Logan.

¶ 3. On June 4, 2009, Lewis, with new counsel, appealed, arguing statutory requirements establishing the guardianship had not been met since two adult relatives within the third degree of kinship of Lewis were not joined and properly noticed. See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-18-281 (Rev.2013). This court agreed and, on October 5, 2010, issued an opinion reversing the chancellor’s establishment of a guardianship for Lewis. In re Guardianship of Estate of Lewis, 45 So.3d 313, 318 (¶¶ 14-15) (Miss.Ct.App.2010). In doing so, we stayed the effects of our reversal and remanded the case to the chancellor “so that the statutory defects can be cured and another hearing conducted to determine if Lewis is in need of a guardian.” Id. at (¶ 15).

¶ 4. However, unbeknownst to this court, Lewis died during the pendency of his appeal.

B. Actions on Remand

¶ 5. Though Lewis had passed away, fee issues surrounding the guardianship lingered. And on April 8, 2011, Junior, as the executor of Lewis’s estate, filed a petition to recover funds he claimed were improperly disbursed and held in the guardianship account. He insisted all attorneys’ fees paid from the guardianship must be returned since the guardianship was reversed on appeal.

¶ 6. On July 25, 2012, the chancellor held a hearing on Junior’s petition. Several attorneys appeared to oppose Junior’s request to return attorneys’ fees. Recognizing the procedural quandary caused by Lewis’s death, the chancellor correctly found the guardianship issue was moot. But based on this court’s mandate and Junior’s petition to recoup attorneys’ fees already paid to Harvey, Logan, and one other attorney from the guardianship account, the chancellor conducted a hearing to determine if the May 2009 guardianship had indeed been necessary.

¶7. At the conclusion of the hearing, during which Harvey, Nelson, Junior, and Lewis’s brother, Tyler, all testified, the chancellor found the 2009 guardianship had been necessary for Lewis to carry out his affairs. And all parties agreed that, based on the chancellor’s finding, the request to recover attorneys’ fees disbursed by the guardianship account was moot.

¶ 8. At this point, the attorneys who had defended the necessity of the court-imposed guardianship argued that Junior’s petition to recoup the guardianship-based legal fees was frivolous. So they sought to recover attorneys’ fees incurred defending the petition.

¶ 9. Before deciding this last fee-related issue concerning the alleged frivolity of Junior’s petition, the chancellor wanted “proof that [the defending attorneys] expended funds for the purpose of defending th[e] petition” as “opposed to spending funds for the purpose of correcting the jurisdictional issues and making a new record” on the necessity of a guardianship. As the chancellor put it, the case was through “with the exception of a request for attorneys’ fees under the Litigation Accountability Act.” Thus, the chancellor still had to “determine whether ... this is a frivolous action.”

¶ 10. But rather than immediately decide the remaining legal-fees issue, the chancellor directed the parties to set the matter for a hearing on a future date. In response, Junior’s attorney asked the court to instead grant an interlocutory appeal of the guardianship issue. And the transcript shows the chancellor gave the attorneys a brief recess to confer about the prospects of Junior’s request for a piecemeal appeal. However, there is no indication in the record that the hearing ever resumed. Nor is there any record evidence that the chancellor decided the attorneys’ fees dispute or granted an interlocutory appeal of the guardianship finding. But there is a corresponding judgment in the record.

¶ 11. Less than a week after the hearing, on August 31, 2012, the chancery court entered an order labeled “Interim Judgment.” In this two-page judgment, which was signed by the chancellor, the words “THIS IS A FINAL JUDGMENT” were struck through with an ink pen. The judgment, which dismissed Junior’s petition, contained only findings about the necessity of the guardianship and Junior’s resulting concession that the challenge over fees spent from the guardianship account was moot. But the chancellor apparently did not adjudicate the Appellees’ requests for fees incurred in defending Junior’s petition.

¶ 12. After review, we find the self-described “Interim Judgment” is not a final, appealable judgment. We therefore confine our discussion to jurisdiction.

Discussion

¶ 13. We employ a de novo standard in reviewing jurisdictional issues. R.A.S. v. S.S., 66 So.3d 1257, 1259 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citing Calvert v. Griggs, 992 So.2d 627, 631 (¶9) (Miss.2008)). Although not raised by either party, we must examine the finality of a judgment on our own initiative. Id. (citing M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So.2d 897, 899 (¶4) (Miss.2006)).

¶ 14. “As a general rule, only final judgments are appealable.” Maurer v. Boyd, 111 So.3d 690, 693 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2013). See also Miss.Code Ann. § 9-3-9 (Rev.2002); Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-3 (Rev.2012); M.R.A.P. 5. “A final, appeal-able judgment is one that ‘adjudicates the merits of the controversy [and] settles all issues as to all the parties’ and requires no further action by the trial court.” Maurer, 111 So.3d at 693 (¶ 11) (quoting Walters v. Walters, 956 So.2d 1050, 1053 (¶8) (Miss.Ct.App.2007)). “When all the issues in a case or claims against all the parties are not resolved in a judgment, no appeal of right can be taken.” Thompson v. True Temper Sports, Inc., 74 So.3d 936, 938 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Williams v. Bud Wilson’s Mobile Home Serv., 887 So.2d 830, 832 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2004)).

¶ 15. It really cannot be argued that an order labeled “Interim Judgment” is a final, appealable judgment — particularly when the language “THIS IS A FINAL JUDGMENT” has been scratched out and initialed by the judge, and the judge has apparently not ruled on a pending issue. While there are exceptions to the final-judgment rule — including obtaining permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 or appealing from a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)-certified final judgment — none are applicable here.

¶ 16. Because there is no record evidence that the issue of attorneys’ fees incurred defending Junior’s allegedly frivolous petition was ever resolved, the “Interim Judgment” is not final and appealable. So we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 17. THIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J„ CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

      . On October 21, 2010, we entered an order taking note of the suggestion of death filed by Harvey but did not modify the October 5, 2010 opinion.

      . Junior alleged in his petition that the following attorneys' fees were improperly paid: $865 to Logan (Nelson’s attorney); $4,077.50 to Ottowa Carter (Harvey's attorney); and $10,189.30 to Harvey (Lewis’s attorney and guardian of Lewis’s estate).

      . The petition was filed against Logan, Carter, and Harvey, all of whom appeared to defend the award of attorneys’ fees. Attorney Jason Mangum was also present and representing Logan. Orvis Shiyou appeared representing Junior.

      .Once the chancellor determined the guardianship was valid, Junior's attorney maintained it was within the court’s "purview to award fees to [Harvey] for her services as the guardian[,] ... and the petition that we filed to recover funds I think would be moot because our petition was based on the fact that there was not a valid guardianship.... Thus it’s our position that the petition that we filed is now moot.”

      . Parties may appeal from an interlocutory order under certain circumstances, but only after obtaining permission from the trial court and our supreme court. M.R.A.P. 5. And under Rule 54(b), a trial judge “may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties” in an action. M.R.C.P. 54(b). But the judge may do so "only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment.” Id. Here, the chancellor made no such express determinations. And absent a Rule 54(b) certification, any judgment — regardless of how designated — is not final if it "adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties.” Id. See also M.R.C.P. 54(b) cmt.

      . Specifically, the chancellor determined Lewis "was in need of a guardian on May 7, 2009[,] and at all times thereafter.” The chancellor particularly emphasized that Lewis "was incompetent to manage his estate” and "was easily influenced and was, in fact, being influenced!,] which necessitated the appointment of a guardian.”
      As to Harvey’s role, the chancellor found a "de facto guardianship existed at all times relevant from May 7, 2009[,] until [Lewis's] death on July 20, 2010.” And in her capacity as guardian, Harvey "did all things necessary and proper for the maintenance of [Lewis] and the preservation of his estate." The judgment also reflected that Junior’s attorney agreed his petition to return attorneys’ fees disbursed from the guardianship account was moot based on the finding that the 2009 guardianship was necessary.


author: IRVING, P.J.,

text:
    Ricky Shannon PIERCE a/k/a Shannon Pierce a/k/a Ricky Pierce, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2012-KA-01470-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 18, 2014.

      Harvey Curtis Crowley, attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., ROBERTS and JAMES, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. A Coahoma County jury convicted Ricky Shannon Pierce of sexual battery. The circuit court sentenced Pierce, as a habitual offender, to thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without eligibility for parole or probation. Pierce filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial, which the circuit court denied. Feeling aggrieved, Pierce appeals and argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his sexual-battery conviction. We disagree; therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. Pierce and H.H. had communicated over the phone multiple times prior to the day of the incident giving rise to Pierce’s conviction. On the day of the incident, H.H. called Pierce, and Pierce asked if he could come to H.H.’s house to visit him. H.H. agreed, and told Pierce where he and his parents lived. Around midnight, Pierce located H.H.’s home and parked across the street from the house. Pierce told H.H. to come outside and to go around to the back of the house, which H.H. did. When H.H. met Pierce at the back of the house, Pierce began kissing him in the mouth. H.H. told Pierce that he was scared. Pierce then pulled down H.H.’s pants and licked his penis. H.H. told Pierce to stop and pulled his pants back up. Pierce then licked H.H.’s naval, grabbed H.H.’s foot, put it in his mouth, and tried to bite it.

¶ 3. Following the incident, Pierce started texting and calling H.H. Initially, H.H. did not respond to Pierce’s texts and phone calls. However, H.H. eventually talked to Pierce, who told him not to tell his parents about what happened. But H.H. had already done so, as he told his parents on the morning after the incident what had happened with Pierce.

¶4. During the trial, the prosecutor asked H.H. if he gave Pierce permission to kiss him or suck on his private parts, and H.H. responded that he did not. H.H. further testified that he was “telling [Pierce] to stop” throughout the incident.

¶ 5. Officer Romeisha Moore, with the Clarksdale Police Department, testified that on the night of the incident, she received a call around midnight about a suspicious vehicle parked on the street where H.H. lived. She stated that she was about to have the vehicle towed when Pierce, who had been sitting out on a nearby lawn with another male, walked from across the street to her vehicle. Officer Moore noted that when Pierce approached her, he seemed nervous and was sweating profusely. She added that once she told him to move his vehicle, he told her that he would move it and got in his vehicle.

¶ 6. Detective Nicholas Turner, also with the Clarksdale Police Department, testified that phone records, which he obtained during the investigation, showed several phone calls between H.H. and Pierce prior to the incident. He also stated that approximately ten calls between H.H. and Pierce were made after midnight on the night of the incident, with one call lasting for sixty-one minutes.

¶ 7. Pierce denied that anything happened between him and H.H. on the night of the incident. He stated that on that night, H.H. called him, and Pierce asked H.H. if he could come over to H.H.’s house. He testified that after H.H. agreed, he went to H.H.’s house and they just sat outside of the house and talked until Officer Moore arrived and asked him to move his vehicle. To explain his nervousness and sweating, Pierce testified that he suffers with tremors, which cause him to sweat and shake when he is in a hot environment. Pierce stated that he left H.H.’s house after Officer Moore asked him to move his vehicle. He also stated that, “from the phone records, [he] noticed that [there were] six calls placed by [H.H.] after [he] left. Three that night, and three the next day.”

¶ 8. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issue.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE

¶ 9. Pierce claims that the evidence is insufficient to support a sexual-battery conviction. When determining whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, “the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed”; otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (¶ 16) (Miss.2005) (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id.

¶ 10. Pierce first argues that the State failed to prove the lack-of-consent element of sexual battery. He claims that H.H. did not tell him to stop until after he licked H.H.’s penis, meaning that everything that occurred prior to H.H.’s telling him to stop was consensual and that nothing that occurred after that constituted sexual battery. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95(l)(a) (Rev.2006) provides that “[a] person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with ... [a]nother person without his or her consent[.]” It is undisputed that Pierce’s conduct with H.H. constitutes sexual penetration. See, e.g., Beasley v. State, 74 So.3d 357, 365 (¶ 37) (Miss.Ct.App.2010). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the “unsubstantiated and uncorroborated testimony of a victim [of a sex crime] is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if that testimony is not discredited or contradicted by other credible evidence[.]” Price v. State, 898 So.2d 641, 651 (¶ 23) (Miss.2005). H.H. testified that he never gave Pierce consent to lick his penis and that he was telling him to stop throughout the incident. Therefore, although H.H.’s testimony is unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, it supports the lack-of-consent element of Pierce’s sexual-battery conviction, as his testimony was not discredited or contradicted by other credible evidence.

¶ 11. Pierce also argues that H.H.’s testimony alone is insufficient to support the sexual-battery conviction because H.H.’s testimony was contradicted by: (1) Detective Turner’s testimony; (2) the lack of evidence that Pierce used force, violence, threats, or intimidation to coerce consent; (3) the lack of evidence or testimony that H.H. resisted; (4) the lack of physical evidence; (5) the lack of medical testimony to support H.H.’s testimony; (6) the lack of evidence that Pierce made in--criminating statements; and (7) the lack of other witnesses or evidence that corroborated H.H.’s lack of consent.

¶ 12. Pierce claims that Detective Turner’s testimony regarding the phone records showing the phone calls made between H.H. and Pierce contradict H.H.’s testimony that Pierce had repeatedly called H.H. immediately after the incident “to request that he keep the incident quiet.” However, while Detective Turner testified as to the number of phone calls made between H.H.’s cellular phone and Pierce’s cellular phone, he did not testify to the content of the conversations between H.H. and Pierce. Therefore, Detective Turner’s testimony did not contradict H.H.’s testimony.

¶ 13. Further, Pierce’s other claims of contradictory testimony or evidence are merely claims of lack of evidence. The supposition that the absence of evidence can be contradictory is nonsensical. Moreover, we have held that evidence of force and evidence of reasonable apprehension of force are not necessary elements of sexual battery. Brink v. State, 888 So.2d 437, 449 (¶ 33) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). Additionally, the existence of physical evidence is not a prerequisite to sustaining a conviction of sexual battery. Musgrove v. State, 866 So.2d 483, 485 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2003). Likewise, there is no requirement that evidence of sexual battery has to be corroborated and supported by medical evidence, testimony of other witnesses on the issue of consent, or incriminating statements of the defendant before a conviction for the offense will be allowed to stand. As stated, H.H.’s testimony alone is enough to sustain the conviction. Accordingly, we find that there is sufficient evidence to support Pierce’s sexual-battery conviction.

¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE, AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER, OF THIRTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO COAHOMA COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Due to the nature of the case, we use the victim's initials instead of his full name.

      . The incident occurred in July 2011.

      . The phone records were marked for identification but not entered into evidence.


text:
    In the Interest of J.C.M., a Minor.
    No. 2012-CA-01830-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 18, 2014.

      Earnestine Alexander, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    James A. Bobo, Brandon, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P. J., CARLTON and MAXWELL, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On October 30, 2012, the Pearl Municipal Youth Court adjudicated J.C.M. a delinquent child and ordered that he serve ninety days in the Rankin County Juvenile Detention Center with supervised probation thereafter. Feeling aggrieved, J.C.M. appeals and argues that the youth court erred by not providing specific findings of fact pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 43 — 21—605(l)(k) (Supp. 2013) and by imposing an unreasonable and inappropriate disposition.

¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. On August 20, 2012, twelve-year-old J.C.M. touched a female classmate’s breast during a physical education (P.E.) class at Pearl Junior High School in Pearl, Mississippi. The female classmate, B.G., reported J.C.M. to school authorities. J.C.M. was immediately suspended, taken to and detained at the Rankin County Juvenile Detention Center, and charged with disorderly conduct. He was released to his parents and placed on house arrest on August 22, 2012.

¶ 4. On October 30, 2012, the youth court held an adjudicatory hearing. During the hearing, the victim, the victim’s friend, and two of J.C.M.’s friends testified to their recollection of the events of August 20, 2012. B.G. testified that on August 20, 2012, she and her friend, B.S., were walking along the track in front of J.C.M. and his group of friends during P.E. class. B.G. stopped walking because her ankles started hurting, causing B.S., J.C.M., and his friends to walk ahead of her. According to B.G., J.C.M. approached her and introduced himself. While B.G. was talking to J.C.M., an unknown student brushed by B.G. Feeling that the student had gotten too close to her, B.G. commented that the student had gotten “too close to [her] breast[.]” When J.C.M. asked her what she said, she responded:

I was, like, nothing. He was, like, what did you say? Did you just say that you just got pushed in your breast, and I was, like, yeah. And then — and I said I don’t let anybody get close to me or nothing or let anybody touch me or look or anything, and he just started staring at me.... And then — and then he said the “D” word and said those things are huge and then he grabbed me after he was staring at me.

B.G. stated that she did not think J.C.M. touched her by accident and that she was offended by J.C.M. touching her in that manner. After J.C.M. touched her breast, B.G. punched J.C.M. and later told her teacher about the incident.

¶ 5. B.S. testified that when B.G.’s ankle started hurting, she walked ahead of B.G. to talk with another group of friends. When she finished talking with her friends, she turned around and went back to walk with B.G. When she got back to where B.G. was on the track, B.G. was talking with J.C.M. B.G. “told [J.C.M.] that, you know, that he can’t touch them, can’t, you know, look, and then that’s when it happened.” She was sure that she saw J.C.M. grab B.G.’s breast, and she saw B.G. hit J.C.M. in response.

¶ 6. J.G., a Mend of J.C.M.’s, testified that he was on the track during the day of the incident. He stated that he saw J.C.M. “touch” B.G. on her breast, and that he did not think that it was an accident. J.G. stated that he did not hear any conversation between B.G. and J.C.M. before J.C.M. touched B.G.’s breast.

¶ 7. J.H., a friend of J.C.M.’s, also testified at the adjudicatory hearing. J.H. stated that J.C.M. “came over and talked about how he hit [B.G.] in the breast and she was mad.” J.H. testified that J.C.M. was not the kind of person that would walk around hitting people. However, he did believe that J.C.M. hit B.G., just not on her breast.

¶8. J.C.M. testified that he did not touch B.G. on her breast. He stated that he was walking the track alone when B.G. approached him and asked him his name. According to J.C.M., B.G. hit him in the stomach and he “pushed her on her shoulder.”

¶ 9. The youth court adjudicated J.C.M. a delinquent child. The court stated that J.C.M. showed “absolutely no remorse” and that the court took J.C.M.’s lack of remorse into account when determining the disposition. The court ordered that J.C.M. spend ninety days in the detention center and be placed on supervised probation once released from the detention center, stating that the length of J.C.M.’s probation “depends on how he behaves.” J.C.M.’s attorney filed an emergency motion, requesting that J.C.M. be released from detention and placed with his parents. The youth court held a hearing on the motion and heard additional testimony from J.C.M., his parents, his middle-school principal, and his pastor. After the hearing, although still harboring some lingering doubts as to J.C.M.’s “rehabilitation and the safety of the community[,] particularly for the safety of [J.C.M.’s] victim and those witnesses that testified against [him],” the court ordered that J.C.M. be released from detention. J.C.M.’s remaining detention time was

suspended subject to (a) compliance with the terms of probation; (b) compliance with the terms of house arrest until released from house arrest by this Court; (c) successful completion of outpatient treatment; and (d) compliance with no contact, directly or indirectly, by the child or his parents with the victim and all witnesses (other than [J.C.M.’s] father and [J.C.M.’s] pastor) that testified at the adjudieat[ory] hearing.

¶ 10. As a separate issue, the City of Pearl, through its counsel, filed a motion to strike J.C.M.’s brief, alleging that the brief is highly disrespectful to and contemptuous of the youth court. See M.R.A.P. 28(1). The City additionally alleges that J.C.M.’s appeal is frivolous and requests that this Court assess damages to J.C.M.’s parents and his counsel as a result. See M.R.A.P. 38.

¶ 11. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

I. Sanctions

¶ 12. The City requests that this Court strike J.C.M.’s brief pursuant to Rule 28(Z) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 28(1) provides that “[a]ny brief containing language showing disrespect or contempt for the trial court will be stricken from the files, and the appropriate appellate court will take such further action as it may deem proper.” The City also requests that this Court assess damages to J.C.M.’s parents and J.C.M.’s attorney for filing a frivolous appeal pursuant to Rule 38 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. When determining if an appeal is frivolous, the inquiry is an objective one that turns on “whether a reasonable person would have any hope for success.” Harris v. Harris, 988 So.2d 376, 380 (¶ 16) (Miss.2008).

¶ 13. We decline both of the City’s requests, as J.C.M.’s brief is not contemptuous or disrespectful, and J.C.M.’s appeal is not frivolous. J.C.M.’s counsel has not cast her appellate arguments in a way to suggest any disrespect for the youth court. It is clear from the arguments, however, that counsel believes that J.C.M.’s punishment was unjustifiably harsh. Additionally, in light of the youth court’s failure to give a definite term for J.C.M.’s probation, we cannot say that J.C.M.’s appeal is frivolous. Therefore, sanctions against J.C.M.’s counsel and his parents are inappropriate.

II. Specific Findings of Fact

¶ 14. This Court’s review of cases from youth court is substantially limited. In re J.M.R., 852 So.2d 601, 603 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that, on appeal,

[appellate courts] consider all the evidence before the [y]outh [c]ourt in the light most favorable to the State. If the evidence so considered is opposed to the adjudication of the [y]outh [c]ourt with such force that reasonable [persons] could not have found as the [y]outh [c]ourt did beyond a reasonable doubt, [appellate courts] must reverse. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the adjudication of the [y]outh [c]ourt, evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, the [y]outh [e]ourt might reasonably have ruled as it did, [appellate courts] must affirm.

In re S.B., 566 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss.1990) (internal citations omitted).

¶ 15. J.C.M. argues that the youth court erred by not providing specific findings of fact pursuant to section 43-21-605(l)(k) prior to entering its disposition order. Based on the reading of the statute and J.C.M.’s argument in his brief, the proper reference statute is Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-605(l)(i) (Supp.2013), which provides that youth courts have the option to

[o]rder the child into a juvenile detention center operated by the county or into a juvenile detention center operated by any county with which the county in which the court is located has entered into a contract for the purpose of housing delinquents. The time period for detention cannot exceed ninety (90) days, and any detention exceeding forty-five (45) days shall be administratively reviewed by the youth court no later than forty-five (45) days after the entry of the order. At that time[,] the youth court counselor shall review the status of the youth in detention and shall report any concerns to the court. The youth court judge may order that the number of days specified in the detention order be served either throughout the week or on weekends only. No first-time nonviolent youth offender shall be committed to a detention center for a period in excess of ninety (90) days until all other options provided for in this section have been considered and the court makes a specific finding of fact by a preponderance of the evidence by assessing what is in the best rehabilitative interest of the child and the public safety of communities and that there is no reasonable alternative to a nonsecure setting and[,] therefore[,] commitment to a detention center is appropriate.

¶ 16. Here, the youth court did not order J.C.M. to serve in excess of ninety days in detention. Rather, the order provided that J.C.M. serve ninety days in detention. However, the court ordered that J.C.M. be released from detention prior to the expiration of the ninety days. Therefore, we find that section 43-21-605(1)(Z) is inapplicable. J.C.M.’s argument also mentions the youth court’s failure to provide specific findings of fact regarding the following factors:

(i) The disposition order is the least restrictive alternative appropriate to the best interest of the child and the community;
(ii) The disposition order allows the child to be in reasonable proximity to the family home community of each child given the dispositional alternatives available and the best interest of the child and the state; and
(iii)The disposition order provides that the court has considered the medical, educational, vocational, social[,] and psychological guidance, training, social education, counseling, substance abuse treatment[,] and other rehabilitative services required by that child as determined by the court[.]

Miss.Code Ann. § 43 — 21—605(1)(i). Additionally, J.C.M. argues that the youth court failed to enter findings of fact regarding the factors listed in Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-603(3) (Supp.2013) prior to entering its disposition order. The factors include:

(a) The nature of the offense;
(b) The manner in which the offense was committed;
(c) The nature and number of a child’s prior adjudicated offenses;
(d) The child’s need for care and assistance;
(e) The child’s current medical history, including medication and diagnosis;
(f) The child’s mental health history, which may include, but not be limited to, the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument version 2 (MAYSI-2);
(g) Copies of the child’s cumulative record from the last school of record, including special education records, if applicable;
(h) Recommendation from the school of record based on areas of remediation needed;
(i) Disciplinary records from the school of record; and
(j) Records of disciplinary actions outside of the school setting.

Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-603(3).

¶ 17. While the youth court’s order states that the court considered all of the above factors prior to the disposition, the court did not recite any specific facts in the order regarding its findings as to those factors. However, this was not error. Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-603(6) (Rev.2009) provides that the youth court is not allowed to include in its disposition order the very information that J.C.M. requests. Section 43-21-603(6) states that

[ajfter consideration of all the evidence and the relevant factors, the youth court shall enter a disposition order that shall not recite any of the facts or circumstances upon which the disposition is based, nor shall it recite that a child has been found guilty; but it shall recite that a child is found to be a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, a neglected child[,] or an abused child.

(Emphasis added). Therefore, the youth court did not err by not including any specific facts supporting the disposition in its order. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

III. Reasonable Disposition

¶ 18. J.C.M. alleges that the youth court’s disposition was not reasonable or appropriate. The disposition order provides as follows:

This court finds that this child has shown no remorse for his actions. This [cjourt finds by a preponderance of the evidence[,] by assessing what is in the best rehabilitative interest of the child and the public safety of communities and dispositional alternatives!;,] that there is no reasonable alternative to a nonsecure setting; and therefore[,] commitment to a detention center is appropriate. The child shall be committed for ninety (90) days in the Rankin County Juvenile Detention Center with credit given for any time detained prior to adjudication. After the child has been committed to detention for forty-five (45) days (including any pre-adjudication detention), this case shall be administratively reviewed by this court and[,] at that time[,] the youth court counselor shall review the status of the youth in detention and shall report any concerns to the court. Upon the child’s release from detention, he shall successfully complete supervised probation including, but not limited to, treatment.

¶ 19. It is undisputed that while J.C.M. began serving his ninety-day detention commitment, the youth court later released him from detention and suspended the unserved portion of the ninety-day commitment. Therefore, any argument that J.C.M.’s detention was unreasonable or inappropriate is now moot due to his release from detention and the youth court’s suspension of any unserved detention time. Additionally, we find no error with J.C.M.’s terms of probation. Our supreme court has stated that

[t]he Youth Court Act gives that tribunal the power to place a child under supervision in his own home or in that of a relative under such terms as the court shall determine and direct. Although criminal probation statutes are not pertinent to juveniles, they are relevant to the basic question of specificity of formulation of the conditions of probation. A standard condition which is frequently applied is that the probationer shall maintain good behavior, or similar statements such as lawful behavior, or violate no law. Such conditions have been almost universally upheld. They are no more vague or indefinite than the condition that the juvenile stay out of all trouble. Conditions of probation are frequently broadly phrased, since the many types of appropriate causes for revocation cannot be predicted.

In re Green, 203 So.2d 470, 472 (Miss.1967) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Based on our supreme court’s rationale in Green, we cannot say that J.C.M.’s supervised probation after his release from detention, though not limited in time, was an inappropriate or unreasonable disposition from the youth court. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

¶ 20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PEARL MUNICIPAL YOUTH COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ„ CONCUR.

      . We use initials to protect the minors involved in this matter.