text:
    FLAGLER HOSPITAL INC., Appellant, v. ASSOCIATION INSURANCE COMPANY, and Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation of the State of Florida, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-1229.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 12, 2014.
    Patrick John McGinley of Law Office of Patrick McGinley, Winter Park, for Appellant.
    Mari McCully, Tallahassee; Christopher Tice, Diane Tutt, and Shannon McKenna of Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow & Schefer, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

The Appellant, a health care provider, challenges a final order from the Workers’ Compensation Division of the Department for Financial Services (the Department), which found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. We AFFIRM because the Department lacks jurisdiction over a claim for the reimbursement of medical bills until the compensability of the claim is established. Compare Amerisure Ins. Co.-Fl. v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., 67 So.3d 353, 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding the Department does not have jurisdiction over medical provider’s claim for reimbursement of medical charges where compensability of injury for which services were provided is in dispute), with Bryan LGH Med. Ctr. v. Fla. Beauty Flora, 36 So.3d 795, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding Judge of Compensation Claims does not have jurisdiction over reimbursement dispute actionable under section 440.13(7)(a)). Here, because compensability has yet to be established, the health care provider’s claim does not fall within the Department’s jurisdiction. We find the Appellant’s constitutional challenges premised on the right to access to courts unavailing because the record before us fails to establish that the Appellant has been foreclosed from all other avenues of redress for its outstanding bills.

AFFIRMED.

BENTON, PADOVANO, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: THOMAS, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Robert L. SHAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-3058.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 12, 2014.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Colleen D. Mullen, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Lauren L. Brudnicki and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   THOMAS, J.

Following the denial of a motion to suppress, Appellant pled no contest to possession of cocaine, reserving the right to appeal the dispositive motion. On May 30, 2013, the trial court entered a final judgment, sentencing Appellant to five years in prison. Thereafter, on June 20, 2013 and June 24, 2013, Appellant filed motions to withdraw his plea of guilty. The trial court denied Appellant’s request to withdraw his plea, finding that the motions were untimely filed under rule 3.170(l) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

On appeal, the State properly concedes that the motions were not untimely filed. Rule 3.170(Z) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(l) Motion to Withdraw the Plea after Sentencing. A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere without expressly reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue may file a motion to withdraw the plea within thirty days after the rendition of the sentence, but only upon the grounds specified in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(a)-(e) except as provided by law.

Here, Appellant’s two motions to withdraw his plea of guilty were timely filed 21 and 25 days after the final judgment and sentence were entered in this case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to rule on Appellant’s motions. As we are reversing for the trial court to address the merits of Appellant’s motions to withdraw his plea, we do not reach the merits of Appellant’s motion to suppress.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

RAY and SWANSON, JJ„ concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND (BOARD), Appellant, v. Steven R. ANDREWS, Grove Properties Limited, A Florida Limited Partnership and John K. Aurell, As General Partner of Grove Properties Limited, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-5052.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 12, 2014.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Joseph A. Spejenkowski, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Steven R. Andrews, Ryan J. Andrews, Brian O. Finnerty, and Stephen Webster, of the Law Office of Steven Andrews, Tallahassee; James P. Judkins, of Judkins, Simpson, High & Schulte, Tallahassee; Frederick L. Aschauer, Jr. and Benjamin M. Melnick, Department of Environmental Protection, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the parties’ responses to the Court’s orders of October 28, 2018, and January 29, 2014, the Court has determined that the claim addressed by the lower tribunal in the order on appeal is inextricably intertwined with the claim left pending. Therefore, the order on appeal is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed as premature.

LEWIS, C. J., WETHERELL and ROWE, JJ., concur.


author: ROWE, J.

text:
    Gregory Tyrone ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-2289.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 14, 2014.
    Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   ROWE, J.

Gregory Tyrone Anderson challenges his conviction for sexual battery by arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing defense counsel from impeaching the victim’s testimony about the type of clothing she was wearing at the time of offense. Because this would have been improper impeachment on a collateral matter, we affirm.

Anderson and the victim were friends for a number of years prior to this incident. On the morning in question, the victim agreed to visit Anderson’s apartment. Anderson and the victim lay down on Anderson’s bed, and the victim testified that Anderson forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The victim testified during her deposition that she was wearing jogging clothes at the time of the attack. At trial during cross-examination, defense counsel asked the victim “And you were actually dressed in pajamas. Correct?” The victim denied wearing pajamas. Defense counsel then asked the court to allow her to display to the jury the clothing that the victim was wearing at the time of the offense to impeach the victim’s statement that she was not wearing pajamas. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel showed the proposed exhibit to the victim, the victim identified the items as being the clothing that she wore, and the victim asserted that they were not pajamas. The trial court sustained the State’s objection because it found that the line of questioning was impeachment on a collateral matter. The jury ultimately found Anderson guilty of sexual battery. Anderson asserts that the trial court should have permitted the impeachment of the victim with regard to the type of clothing she wore at the time of the incident. We disagree.

The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. McCray v. State, 919 So.2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that a witness’s credibility may be attacked by “[p]roof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached.” (Emphasis added). “An issue is collateral for purposes of impeachment by contradiction, if it cannot be introduced for any reason other than contradiction.” Griffin v. State, 827 So.2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (citing Lawson v. State, 651 So.2d 718, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). “Two types of evidence pass this test: (1) facts relevant to a particular issue; and (2) facts which discredit a witness by pointing out the witnesses] bias, corruption, or lack of competency.’ ” Foster v. State, 869 So.2d 743, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Lawson, 651 So.2d at 715).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow defense counsel to impeach the victim with regard to the type of clothing she was wearing at the time of the incident. This line of questioning was an attempt to impeach the victim on a collateral matter because defense counsel was seeking only to contradict the victim’s assertion that she was wearing jogging clothes, rather than pajamas. This evidence was not relevant to any issue in the case as it did not reflect on Anderson’s guilt or innocence. Moreover, the victim’s alleged false characterization of her clothing did not show bias, corruption, or lack of competency as a witness. Further, we agree with the trial court that allowing questions with regard to the victim’s clothing at the time of the incident may imper-missibly venture into areas prohibited by the Rape Shield Law.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to allow defense counsel to impeach the victim on this issue.

AFFIRMED.

MARSTILLER and RAY, JJ., concur.

      . Florida's Rape Shield Law prohibits "evidence presented for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the victim at the time of the offense incited the sexual battery...." § 794.022(3), Fla. Stat. (2011).


author: WETHERELL, J.

text:
    Jehu RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-681.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 14, 2014.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Maria Ines Súber, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Perrone, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   WETHERELL, J.

Appellant, Jehu Ramirez, was sentenced to consecutive terms of life in prison after being found guilty of sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation of a four-year-old girl, A.Z. Ramirez raises six issues on appeal, only two of which merit discussion: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting his confession into evidence without first determining that the confession was trustworthy as required by section 92.565, Florida Statutes; and (2) whether his dual convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We affirm the first issue because section 92.565 only applies where the State is unable to prove corpus delicti and, here, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish corpus delicti before introducing Ramirez’s confession. However, as to the second issue, we agree with Ramirez that his dual convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy under this court’s precedent. Accordingly, we reverse Ramirez’s conviction for lewd or lascivious molestation and remand to the trial court to vacate that conviction. We affirm the other issues raised by Ramirez without further comment.

Facts

On April 9, 2010, Ramirez’s girlfriend, Ana Salinas, was babysitting A.Z. at Salinas’ house while A.Z.’s mother was at work. Ramirez lived with Salinas and was the only adult male in the'house on that day. When AZ.’s mother picked her up, A.Z. told her that Ramirez touched her “vulva,” which was the word A.Z. used to refer to her vagina. Later that day, A.Z’s mother took A.Z. to the hospital where she was examined by a nurse practitioner. The examination did not find any evidence of sexual abuse, but A.Z.’s blood was found in her panties.

Several days later, A.Z. was interviewed by a member of the child protection team (CPT). A.Z. told the CPT interviewer that a man put his finger inside her “vulva” when she was at Salinas’ house while her mother was at work. She told the CPT interviewer that the incident happened in a bedroom while Salinas was cooking food for the other children at the house, and she explained that the man opened her legs and put his finger all the way inside of her. She also told the CPT interviewer that the man touched her “bumpie,” which was the word A.Z. used to describe her buttocks.

The following day, Ramirez was interviewed by a deputy with the Jacksonville Sheriffs Office. He initially denied touching A.Z. inappropriately, but he eventually admitted to sexually abusing her by putting his fingers inside her vagina. He stated that he was in his bedroom with A.Z. when the abuse occurred and his description of the incident matched the description given by A.Z. to the CPT interviewer. Ramirez was thereafter arrested and charged with sexual battery under section 794.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes, for “placing his fingers inside the vagina of A.Z.” and with lewd or lascivious molestation under section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes, for “touching] the breast, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of A.Z.”

The case went to trial in October 2012. The State’s first witness was A.Z., who was seven years old at the time of trial. She testified that, although she did not remember all of the details, she remembered that a man did something to her when she was four years old that she did not like. A.Z. testified that her mother was at work and that she was at her babysitter’s house when a man touched her on her front “private part” and put his fingers inside her “vulva.” She testified that it hurt and that she told her mother what happened when her mother picked her up that day even though the man told her not to tell anyone what happened. A.Z. described the man as having black hair and a dark tan, but she was not able to identify Ramirez as the man at trial.

The State next presented the testimony of A.Z.’s mother. The mother described what A.Z. told her when she picked up A.Z. from Salinas house on the day of the incident. She was also unable to identify Ramirez at trial because, even though she knew that Salinas’ boyfriend lived with her at the time of the incident, most of her contact was with Salinas.

The State next presented testimony of the CPT interviewer and played the video of the CPT interview for the jury. In the video, A.Z. described the incident at Salinas’ house when a man put his finger in her “vulva” and she also described how the man touched her “bumpie.”

The State then presented the testimony of the deputy who investigated the case and interviewed Ramirez. The deputy testified as to how Ramirez was identified as the likely perpetrator, but when the prosecutor started to question the deputy about his interview with Ramirez, defense counsel objected. Counsel argued that the State had not established a corpus delicti because no evidence was presented identifying Ramirez as the man who had inappropriately touched A.Z. Counsel also questioned the trustworthiness of the confession. The trial court overruled the objection and the deputy thereafter testified that, during the interview, Ramirez confessed to putting his fingers into A.Z.’s vagina. The video of Ramirez’s confession was also played for the jury.

Finally, the State presented the testimony of Salinas. She testified that Ramirez lived with her and that he was the only adult male present in the house on the day of the incident. However, she also testified that Ramirez was not alone with A.Z. on the day of the incident; that A.Z. was never in the bedroom where she claimed the incident occurred; and that A.Z. did not appear to be sad and was acting normal when her mother picked her up on the day of the incident.

In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the lewd or lascivious molestation count required the State to prove that Ramirez “touched the breasts, the genitals, genital area, or the buttocks ... any one of those ....” In arguing how the State met its burden of proof as to this count, the prosecutor told the jury that “[A.Z.] clearly demonstrated in her CPT video that [Ramirez’s] hand went inside her pants, it went inside her underwear, it went inside her vagina.” Defense counsel objected and, at sidebar, told the court that it was her understanding that “Count I [sexual battery] goes to the touching of the vagina, and Count II [lewd or lascivious molestation] goes to ... the touching of the buttocks.” The prosecutor responded that “Count I is the digital penetration and Count II is touching.” The trial court overruled the objection based upon the language of the information, which, in Count II, referred to touching of either genitals or buttocks. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor argued to the jury that in “Count I we had to prove he penetrated, and Count II we had to prove he just touched.”

The jury found Ramirez guilty as charged on both counts. The trial court sentenced Ramirez to consecutive terms of life in prison and designated him as a sexual predator. This appeal followed.

Analysis

In his first issue on appeal, Ramirez contends that the trial court erred in admitting his confession because the trial court did not find that the confession was trustworthy as required by section 92.565. We find no merit in this argument.

In criminal prosecutions, the State is required to prove corpus delicti independently of the defendant’s confession before the confession may be admitted into evidence. Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1317 (Fla.1997). To do so, the State must establish:

(1) that a crime of the type charged was committed; and (2) that the crime was committed through the criminal agency of another. In regard to the first part — that a crime was committed— each element of the relevant offense must be shown to exist. With respect to the second part — the criminal agency of another — the proof need not show the specific identity of the person who committed the crime. That is, it is not necessary to prove that the crime was committed by the defendant.

Id. (citations omitted); see also State v. Allen, 335 So.2d 823, 825 (Fla.1976) (explaining that corpus delicti can be established by circumstantial evidence and emphasizing that identification of the defendant is not a necessary predicate for the admission of a confession).

Section 92.565 provides an exception to the corpus delicti rule for criminal prosecutions of certain types of sexual abuse crimes. See Hobbs v. State, 999 So.2d 1025 (Fla.2008); Bradley v. State, 918 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The statute provides in pertinent part:

In any criminal action in which the defendant is charged with a crime against a victim under s. 794.011; s. 794.05; s. 800.04; s. 826.04; s. 827.03, involving sexual abuse; s. 827.04, involving sexual abuse; s. 827.071; or s. 847.0135(5), or any other crime involving sexual abuse of another, or with any attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes, the defendant’s memorialized confession or admission is admissible during trial without the state having to prove a corpus delicti of the crime if the court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the state is unable to show the existence of each element of the crime, and having so found, further finds that the defendant’s confession or admission is trustworthy.

§ 92.565(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added).

By its plain language, section 92.565 is only implicated when the State “is unable to show the existence of each element of the crime.” Thus, if the State is able to establish corpus delicti independently of the confession, the statute does not apply and it is “unnecessary for the trial court to test the reliability of the confession using the procedures outlined in section 92.565.” Tanzi v. State, 964 So.2d 106, 116 (Fla.2007). That is what happened here.

In this case, the State did not — and did not need to — rely on section 92.565 to introduce Ramirez’s confession because it was able to prove corpus delicti independently of, and prior to introducing the confession. Indeed, before the confession was admitted, the State had already presented direct evidence of each element of sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation through A.Z.’s testimony (at trial and through the CPT interview) that a man inserted his fingers into her vagina when she was four years old. See §§ 794.011(2)(a), 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat. Moreover, even though it was not required to do so in order to establish corpus de-licti, the State also had already presented circumstantial evidence that Ramirez was the man who committed the crimes against A.Z. since he was the only adult male living at the house where the incident occurred. Accordingly, because section 92.565 is not implicated in this case, the trial court properly admitted Ramirez’s confession without first determining its trustworthiness.

Turning to the second issue, Ramirez contends that his dual convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because, based upon how the case was argued to the jury, the lewd or lascivious molestation conviction was for the same vaginal touching that resulted in the vaginal penetration upon which the sexual battery conviction was based. The State does not take issue with this characterization of the case and effectively concedes that, based upon this court’s decisions in Smith v. State, 41 So.3d 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and Berlin v. State, 72 So.3d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), Ramirez’s dual convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. However, the State notes that the Fifth District certified conflict with Smith and Berlin in a case that is pending review at the Florida Supreme Court. See Roughton v. State, 92 So.3d 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), review pending Case No. SC12-1719.

In Smith, this court held, that the defendant’s conviction for lewd or lascivious molestation violated the prohibition against double jeopardy when the offense was based upon a single act of digital penetration that also resulted in a sexual battery conviction. See 41 So.3d at 1043. Likewise, in Berlin, we held that the defendant’s conviction for lewd or lascivious molestation violated the prohibition against double jeopardy where the offense was based upon the same act that resulted in his conviction for sexual battery. See 72 So.3d at 284. By contrast, in Roughton, the Fifth District held that the defendant’s dual convictions for sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because the offenses included different elements and none of the exceptions in section 775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes, applied. See 92 So.3d at 286-87.

Here, as in Smith and Berlin, Ramirez dual convictions resulted from the same act of touching/penetration. Indeed, even though there was some evidence that Ramirez also inappropriately touched A.Z.’s buttocks, the prosecutor made clear in her closing argument that the sexual battery charge was based on Ramirez inserting his fingers into A.Z.’s vagina and the lewd or lascivious molestation charge was based upon the same touching of the vagina. Accordingly, pursuant to Smith and Berlin, Ramirez’s conviction for lewd or lascivious molestation is barred by double jeopardy and must be reversed. We recognize that this holding conflicts with Roughton and, thus, we certify conflict with that decision.

Conclusion

In sum, for the reasons stated above, we reverse Ramirez’s conviction for lewd or lascivious molestation and remand to the trial court to vacate that conviction. We affirm Ramirez’s judgment and sentence in all other respects.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with directions; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

LEWIS, C.J., and ROWE, J., concur.

      . Prior to trial, the trial court held an eviden-tiary hearing and entered an order finding that the video and the hearsay statements made by A.Z. to the CPT interviewer were admissible under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes. Ramirez does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

      . The State does not argue that Smith and Berlin are wrongly decided or ask us to recede from those decisions and adopt the reasoning in Roughton. Instead, the State asks us to "stay [our] decision regarding this issue pending resolution of Roughton by the Supreme Court." We deny this request.


text:
    Mark GRIFFIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-1640.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 14, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richelle M. Marsico, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brittany Ann Rhodaback, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   WETHERELL, J.

After responding to an advertisement posted on the Craigslist website, Appellant communicated for several hours by email and text with undercover officers posing as a 14-year-old girl who was home alone. Appellant described in graphic detail the sexual acts he intended to perform on the girl and, after requesting the girl’s address for his GPS system, he drove to Panama City to what he thought was the girl’s house. Upon arrival, Appellant was arrested. He had condoms, Astroglide lubrication, and two cans of Mike’s Hard Lemonade in his possession.

Appellant was charged with one count of using a computer online service to solicit a person he believed to be a minor in order to commit an unlawful sexual act in violation of section 847.0135(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), and one count of traveling to meet a person he believed to be a minor in order to commit an unlawful sexual act in violation of section 847.0135(4)(a). The jury found Appellant guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced him to a term of 5 years in prison followed by 10 years of sex offender probation. On appeal, Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial following testimony that was susceptible to being construed as a comment on his right to remain silent, and (2) his dual convictions violate double jeopardy.

We summarily affirm the first issue because there is no reasonable probability that the single question and answer at issue affected the verdict; thus, any error in the denial of the motion for mistrial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ventura v. State, 29 So.3d 1086 (Fla.2010); State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).

We affirm the second issue based upon State v. Murphy, 124 So.3d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), in which this court held that dual convictions for solicitation of a minor and traveling to meet the minor do not violate double jeopardy because sections 847.0135(3) and (4) reflect a clear legislative intent to punish the offenses separately. Accord Cantrell v. State, No. 1D12-4952, 132 So.3d 931, 2014 WL 660193 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 21, 2014); Elsberry v. State, 130 So.3d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). We recognize that the Fourth District reached the opposite conclusion in Hartley v. State, 129 So.3d 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and accordingly we certify conflict with that decision. See also Pinder v. State, 128 So.3d 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (stating that the defendant’s convictions under sections 847.0135(3) and (4) would have violated double jeopardy but for the fact that the solicitation occurred over an eight-day period before the defendant traveled to meet the minor).

AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

LEWIS, C.J., and ROWE, J., concur.


text:
    Stewart LILKER, Appellant, v. SUWANNEE VALLEY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and Gwendolyn Pra, Administrator, in her official capacity as the Suwannee Valley Transit Authority’s Custodian of Records, Appellees.
    No. 1D13-3440.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 14, 2014.

      Kris B. Robinson and John J. Joyce, of Robinson Kennon & Kendron, P.A., Lake City, Florida, for Appellant.
    Cynthia S. Tunnicliff and Gerald D.N. Bryant of Pennington, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Stewart Lilker filed suit to compel the Suwannee Valley Transit Authority and its records custodian (collectively “the Authority”) to provide public records he had requested a few months earlier. The Authority admitted that the records were subject to disclosure, and after an eviden-tiary hearing, the court ordered the Authority to provide them to Mr. Lilker within forty-eight hours. The court declined, however, to award Mr. Lilker his attorney’s fees and costs under section 119.12, Florida Statutes (2012), because it determined that the Authority’s failure to furnish the records before Mr. Lilker filed suit was not an unlawful and willful refusal to comply with chapter 119. In so ruling, the court imposed a “willfulness” requirement not found in the statute, see Lee v. Bd. of Trustees, 113 So.3d 1010, 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), and did not definitively state whether it otherwise found a violation of the law. The proper question before the court on Mr. Lilker’s request for attorney’s fees and costs under section 119.12 was whether the Authority unlawfully refused to produce records, not whether any such refusal was willful. See Lee, 113 So.3d at 1010.

Unlawful refusal under section 119.12 includes not only affirmative refusal to produce records, but also unjustified delay in producing them. Office of State Attorney for Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. Gonzalez, 953 So.2d 759, 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Where delay is at issue, as here, the court must determine whether the delay was justified under the facts of the particular case. See Johnson v. Jarvis, 74 So.3d 168, 170-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). If not, the delay constitutes unlawful refusal. See id.; cf. Weeks v. Golden, 764 So.2d 633, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (reversing a trial court’s determination that certain records were exempt and directing the court to determine on remand whether the agency had “any legally acceptable excuse for failing to respond to [the] appellant’s public records request until after he had filed his petition seeking to compel compliance”).

In its oral pronouncement, the trial court noted an “obvious and clear conflict” in the testimony and evidence regarding the reason for the Authority’s failure to produce the records before Mr. Lilker filed suit, but it did not resolve this conflict. Under one view of the evidence, the Authority’s inaction was justified by Mr. Lilker’s own representations and therefore not unlawful. Under another view, the delay was not legally justified. Because the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard, it failed to make sufficient findings to indicate to us whether the Authority’s failure to produce the records constituted an unlawful refusal. As a result, we reverse and remand for the trial court to weigh the pertinent evidence and apply the proper legal standard to its resulting findings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

THOMAS, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


author: WOLF, J.

text:
    SYNOVUS BANK, Formerly Known as Columbus Bank and Trust Company, As Successor In Interest Through Name Change and By Merger With Coastal Bank And Trust of Florida, Successor By Merger to Bank of Pensacola, Successor By Merger to Horizon Bank of Florida, Appellant, v. Helen K. WALKER, Trustee of the C. David Walker Trust, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-5176.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 14, 2014.
    Philip A. Bates and Sarah S. Walton of Philip A. Bates, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
    Robert O. Beasley and Phillip A. Pugh of Litvak Beasley & Wilson, LLP, Pensacola, for Appellee.
   WOLF, J.

Synovus Bank challenges a final summary judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Helen K. Walker, trustee of the C. David Walker Trust. We affirm that portion of the summary judgment determining that a valid debt existed and the subordinate status of Synovus’ interest in the property. We conclude, however, that disputed issues of material fact exist concerning the extent certain rents received by the trust from the property at issue should be credited against the amount of outstanding debt. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings solely for the purpose of determining the amount by which the outstanding debt should be reduced.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

VAN NORTWICK and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Katina WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Natasha GONDER, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4382.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 18, 2014.
    Katina Williams, pro se, for Appellant.
    Natasha Gonder, pro se, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this case, Appellee was granted a petition for injunction against repeat violence for the keying of her car in May and August 2013. We reverse because not only was there a lack of competent substantial evidence as to the second act, but also, both acts do not constitute “violence” as contemplated by section 784.046(2), Florida Statutes.

In her petition, Appellee alleged that after a confrontation with Appellant at 3:00 a.m. one morning, she saw Appellant standing by her ear and subsequently discovered her car was keyed. Appellee further alleged that after having no contact with Appellant since June 24, 2013, she discovered her car was keyed again sometime in August 2013. At the hearing at which only Appellee appeared, she testified consistently with the allegations raised in the petition except that there was no testimony whatsoever about the second event.

Section 784.046(2), Florida Statutes (2013), creates a cause of action for an injunction for protection in cases of repeat violence. “Violence” means “any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death, by a person against any other person.” § 784.046(l)(a), Fla. Stat. Repeat violence means “two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respondent, one of which must have been within 6 months of the filing of the petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate family member.” § 784.046(l)(b), Fla. Stat.

Here, as contemplated by the statute, neither of the alleged acts of “violence” satisfied section 784.046(l)(a). In fact, the only “violence” either of the alleged acts could have come remotely close to satisfying is the “any other criminal offense”, which still would fail because the acts did not result in “physical injury or death.” Id. § 784.046(l)(a). Furthermore, except for the conclusory assumption made in the petition that Appellant must have keyed Appellee’s car in August 2013, no competent, substantial evidence was presented that Appellant committed the second act at all. See, e.g., Tiger v. Marcus, 37 So.3d 986, 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Marcus and his girlfriend, Rose Capote, testified that bricks were thrown through their apartment window, but they could not identify Tiger as the one responsible. And, while Marcus testified that Tiger verbally threatened him on August 7th, in the absence of some overt act demonstrating that violence is imminent, a verbal threat does not constitute an “assault.”). Under the circumstances, the petition was wrongly granted and so we reverse.

REVERSED.

THOMAS, MARSTILLER, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Anthony Ray TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-2495.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 18, 2014.
    Anthony Taylor, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The third amended petition seeking a belated appeal of the judgment and sentence rendered on or about March 8, 2013, in Bay County Circuit Court case number 12-674-CF, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal. If petitioner qualifies for the services of appointed counsel at public expense, the lower tribunal is directed to appoint counsel to represent him in the belated appeal authorized by this opinion.

WOLF, VAN NORTWICK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Vernon JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-0018.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 18, 2014.
    Vernon Jones, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brittany Ann Rhodaback, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the order denying motions for postconviction relief rendered on or about August 15, 2013, in Leon County Circuit Court case number 2007-CF-2969B, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal.

WOLF, VAN NORTWICK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Philip MONTELEPRE.
    No. 2013-B-3004.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| Respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which respondent admitted that he practiced law while ineligible to do so. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Philip Montelepre, Louisiana Bar Roll number 9562, be publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Murphy Fairfax BELL, Jr.
    No. 2014-B-0184.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

LThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent commingled personal funds with client funds in his trust account and converted client and third-party funds. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Murphy Fairfax Bell, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 24960, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Jeff David EASLEY.
    No. 2014-OB-0059.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   ON APPLICATION FOR READMISSION

PER CURIAM.

_JjThis proceeding arises out of an application for readmission filed by petitioner, Jeff David Easley, an attorney whose conditional admission to the practice of law in Louisiana was revoked in 2012.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner disclosed three alcohol-related arrests on his application to take the July 2011 Louisiana bar examination. Thereafter, we conditionally admitted him to the practice of law, subject to a two-year period of probation, during which he was required to comply with the terms of his contract with the Lawyers Assistance Program (“LAP”). In re: Easley, 11-2241 (La.10/18/11), 72 So.3d 846. On November 21, 2012, we revoked petitioner’s conditional admission after he violated the terms of his LAP contract by testing positive for alcohol use while under monitoring of that program. In re: Easley, 12-1565 (La.11/21/12), 104 So.3d 406.

Petitioner subsequently filed an application for readmission with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the readmission criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) took no position regarding the application for readmission. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

| ¡Among other evidence presented to the hearing committee, petitioner and his witnesses testified concerning his successful completion of a long-term inpatient program for treatment of substance dependence. In addition, petitioner testified that after he was discharged from the treatment program, he entered into a new five-year LAP agreement with which he has been in compliance since it was executed on October 2, 2012.

Following the hearing, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be readmitted to the practice of law, conditioned upon his continued compliance with his October 2, 2012 LAP agreement. Neither petitioner nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

After considering the record in its entirety, we will adopt the committee’s recommendation and readmit petitioner to the practice of law. As found by the committee, the record provides clear and convincing evidence of petitioner’s compliance with the readmission criteria. In particular, the record supports the finding that petitioner has not practiced law or engaged in additional misconduct since his conditional admission was revoked. Most significantly, though, petitioner has shown that he has been sober for more than one year and is likely to remain that way so long as he adheres to the requirements of his LAP contract. Under these circumstances, we find petitioner has shown that he possesses the requisite competence, honesty, and integrity to be readmitted to the practice of law.

Accordingly, we will readmit petitioner to the practice of law, subject to a period of probation to coincide with the remainder of his October 2, 2012 LAP agreement. In light of petitioner’s past conduct, we take this opportunity to caution him that that in the future we will expect nothing less than scrupulous adherence to the requirements of his LAP agreement. The ODC shall monitor petitioner’s compliance with his LAP agreement and notify this court of any violation, which Rmay be grounds for immediately transferring petitioner to disability inactive status, or placing him on interim suspension, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the recommendation of the hearing committee, and considering the record, it is ordered that Jeff David Easley, Louisiana Bar Roll number 34170, be immediately readmitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to the conditions set forth in this opinion. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.


text:
    In re Gregory J. LEWIS, Jr.
    No. 2014-B-0015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent misused his client trust account and failed to promptly remit funds owed to a third-party medical provider. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rules 1.15 and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Gregory J. Lewis, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 31000, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, fully deferred, subject to a one-year period of supervised probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Hugh D. ALDIGE.
    No. 2014-B-0016.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent notarized and caused to be filed into a succession proceeding an affidavit that he knew or should have known contained false information. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(b), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Hugh D. Aldige, Louisiana Bar Roll number 2368, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. It is further ordered that all but thirty days of the suspension shall be deferred and respondent shall be placed on unsupervised probation for six months, subject to the condition that any misconduct during this period may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension execu-tory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Michael L. JACKSON.
    No. 2014-B-0185.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

|, The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent commingled personal funds with client funds in his trust account and converted client and third-party funds. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Michael L. Jackson, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22805, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Danny Wayne SYLVESTER, Jr.
    No. 2014-OB-0183.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   ORDER

1/fhe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) is conducting an investigation into allegations that respondent improperly handled client funds. Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Danny Wayne Sylvester, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 24228, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Danny Wayne Sylvester, Jr. for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Danny Wayne Sylvester, Jr. shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Marcus R. Clark

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    Deborah POCHE v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 17, 2014.
   In re Trinity Industries, Inc., as the Successor in Interest to Fretna Machine & Iron Works, Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2013-02340; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0169.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Deborah POCHE v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0349.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 17, 2014.
   In re Trinity Industries, Inc., as the Successor in Interest to Fretna Machine & Iron Works, Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2013-02340; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0169.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Amparo F. BARBOSA v. Edson BARBOSA.
    No. 2014-CC-0280.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 19, 2014.
   In re Barbosa, Amparo F.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 13-1271; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0048.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION d/b/a Lake Charles Memorial Hospital (Kennen Daniel) v. POINT TO POINT DIRECTIONAL DRILLING, INC., et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 19, 2014.
   In re Point to Point Directional Drilling, Inc., et al.; The Gray Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 3, No. 18-00909; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW13-01394.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the stay.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jonathan McCLENDON.
    No. 2014-KK-0324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 19, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 517-706; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1454.

Writ denied. Stay denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Milton LOPEZ.
    No. 2013-KK-1315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Lopez, Milton;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 502-174; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 2043.

Granted. The judgments of the lower courts are reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered granting defendant’s motion to quash for the reasons assigned in State v. Sarrabea, 13-1271 (La.10/15/13), 126 So.3d 453, and defendant is ordered discharged from custody on the present charge under . La.R.S. 14:100.13.


text:
    ROBINSON VENTURES, L.L.C. v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2874.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Robinson Ventures, L.L.C.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2010-04016; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1219.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    Brian LEWIS v. BATON ROUGE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Baton Rouge Sheriff Department, Corporal Michael Godawa, Officer Lonny Miller, East Baton Rouge Prison.
    No. 2013-OC-2908.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In Re Lewis, Brian;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div., No. 603,093; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0969.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alexis SARRABEA.
    No. 2013-KA-1429.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. CR 136743; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 12-1013.

The state’s appeal is dismissed as moot. See State v. Sarrabea, 13-1271 (La.10/15/13), 126 So.3d 453.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jorge Luis ANAYA-ESPINO.
    No. 2013-KA-1566.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 301,325; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,025-KW. The state’s appeal is dismissed as moot. See State v. Sarrabea, 13-1271 (La.10/15/13), 126 So.3d 453.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ulises GOMEZ.
    No. 2013-KA-1567.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 137,796; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1357.

The state’s appeal is dismissed as moot. See State v. Sarrabea, 13-1271 (La.10/15/13), 126 So.3d 453.


text:
    In re Appeal for the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-082.
    No. 2013-OB-2914.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Oubre-Keller, Nechelle;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-082.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PBD-072.
    No. 2013-OB-2932.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Givens, Elaine W.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-072.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Joyce Nanine McCOOL.
    No. 2014-OB-0366.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re McCool, Joyce Nanine;—Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-DB-059.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert WILKINS.
    No. 2013-KK-2539.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Wilkins, Robert;—Defendant; Applying For Rehearing of this court’s action dated January 15, 2014, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 19337-04; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW13-01011.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Bernadette Gaines GILBERT.
    No. 2013-CC-2875.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Gilbert Jr., Dean E.;—Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div C, No. 2012-01923; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1177.

Stay and writ denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frederic Lubron BIRGANS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0884.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Birgans, Frederic Lubron;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 09-F0298; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,817-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James ODOMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Odoms, James;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 99-3820; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-191.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ulises GOMEZ.
    No. 2013-K-1468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In Re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 137,796; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1357.

Denied. The state’s application is denied for the reasons assigned in State v. Sarrabea, 13-1271 (La.10/15/13), 126 So.3d 453


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jorge Luis ANAYA-ESPINO.
    No. 2013-KK-1474.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 301,325; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,025-KW.

Denied. The state’s application is denied for the reasons assigned in State v. Sarrabea, 13-1271 (La.10/15/13), 126 So.3d 453.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael James LACOUR.
    No. 2013-K-1732.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Lacour, Michael James;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 309789; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 12-1255.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lester WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1770.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Williams, Lester;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 06-651; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 12-01345.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jovan BUTLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1776.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Butler, Jovan;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 97-5552; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-480.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2380 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; see also La.C.Cr.P. art 930.4(D).

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Patrick J. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1778.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Williams, Patrick J.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, Nos. 285,291, 283,-411; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 48,148-KH, 48,518-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rudolph WADE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1780.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Wade, Rudolph;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 467-716; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0809.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kerry MYERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1781.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Myers, Kerry;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 87-3280; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-457.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph V. FOSTER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1782.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Foster Jr., Joseph V.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 56,072; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,547-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Levell H. DOUGHTY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Doughty, Levell H.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 449-694; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0825.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1801.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re White, Christopher;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 374-791; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0822.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael J. DRIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1802.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Dright, Michael J.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 370-075; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0783.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy L. HARRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1803.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Harris, Troy L.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 480-306; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0797.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerome M. THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1820.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Thomas, Jerome M.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 9039-07; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00167.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Timothy WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1821.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Washington, Timothy;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 481-883; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0810.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles D. WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Washington, Charles D.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 08-0468, 08-0309, 09-0584; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00064.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert McQUEEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1823.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re McQueen, Robert;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 414477-2; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0614.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Drew Michael PIZZO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1824.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Pizzo, Drew Michael;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 88-876; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-467.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Chrishon M. ARCHIELD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1825.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Archield, Chrishon M.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. CR598-08; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00155.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Howard WEST v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1826.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re West, Howard;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 01-CR6-81009; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0881.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James BENNETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1828.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Bennett, James;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 571,863; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0641.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Douglas D. SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1842.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Smith, Douglas D.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 424757-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0748.

Denied. To the extent that relator seeks a cost estimate for documents to which he is entitled under the Public Record Law, he must first address his request to the records’ custodians. R.S. 44:31; R.S. 44:35; State ex rel. McKnight v. State, 98-2258 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/3/98), 742 So.2d 894.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bertram YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1846.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Young, Bertram;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 332025; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0644.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward SHREFFLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1849.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Shreffler, Edward;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 380891; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0687.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marlowe PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1850.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Parker, Marlowe E.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 513265; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0669.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Spencer WATTS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1857.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Watts, Spencer;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 497753; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0852.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John COOLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1858.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Cooley, John;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 358320; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0850.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William ANDERSON.
    No. 2013-KO-1861.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Anderson, William;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 09-2434; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-869.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Patrick D. DYAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1863.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Dyas, Patrick D.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 264,318; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,521-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; State v. Thomas, 08-2912, (La.10/16/09), 19 So.3d 466.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raymond ROCHON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1864.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Rochon, Raymond;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 201310207; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-00700.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alton HOLLOWAY.
    No. 2013-K-1875.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Holloway, Alton;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 486-477; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0926.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeremiah STRICKLAND.
    No. 2013-K-1886.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Strickland, Jeremiah;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 504-173; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0673.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Farrell M. ROCHELLE.
    No. 2013-K-1887.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Rochelle, Farrell M.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 10020316; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,984-KH.

Denied.


text:
    Leon A. CANNIZZARO, Jr., District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, on Behalf of the STATE of Louisiana v. AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY. American Bankers Insurance Company v. State of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-C-1929.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Surety Corporation of America Louisiana; Surety Corporation of America, et al.;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2009-09317 C/W 2009-10179; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1455 C/W 2012-CA-1456.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary SHURLEY.
    No. 2013-OK-1950.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Shurley, Gary;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 1200345; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0829.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bill Eric WINTERS.
    No. 2013-KO-1959.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Winters, Bill Eric;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. CR 123,989; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-581 C/W 12-205 C/W 13-303.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Aaron R. MERCADEL.
    No. 2013-KO-1995.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Mercadel, Aaron R.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 491,014; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0685.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeffrey CLARK.
    No. 2013-KK-2103.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Clark, Jeffrey;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. W04-3-77.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    John ROTONTI, et al. v. TAMKO BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-2443.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Tamko Building Products Inc.;-Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 13-4116; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-1170.

Denied.


text:
    QUESTAR EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION COMPANY v. WOODARD VILLA, INC. and Ernest Scott Woodard.
    No. 2013-C-2467.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Woodard Villa Inc et al.; Woodard, Ernest Scott;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 538,787; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,401-CA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nathaniel STEVENSON & Timothy McNeil.
    No. 2013-KK-2618.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 513-917; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1396.

Denied.


text:
    Donald K. GORDON, Jr. v. TURNER INDUSTRIES GROUP, LLC.
    No. 2013-C-2628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Turner Industries Group LLC;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist # 07, No. 11-02706; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-196.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    Peterson M. YOKUM, et al. v. NICHOLAS S. KARNO II, INC., et al. Peterson M. Yokum, et al. v. Nicholas S. Karno II, Inc., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Nicholas S. Karno, II, d/b/a Old Opera House;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2009-06340; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1736 C/W 2012-C-1656.

Denied.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    Kimberly COLLINS, Indiv., et al v. LOUISIANA STATE POLICE, et al.
    No. 2013-C-2726.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Department of Public Safety; State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana State Police; Trooper Jarett Dobson;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 20052426; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-412.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Jo Ann LOPEZ v. ISLE OF CAPRI CASINO.
    No. 2013-C-2833.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Pias, Scott J.;—Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District # 3, No. 12-02418; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-418.

Denied.


text:
    Kevin C. CURREY v. EXCELL CRANE & HYDRAULICS, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-C-2837.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Hercules Offshore Drilling Company L.L.C.; Hercules Offshore Inc.; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-20084468; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-466.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Seth FONTENOT.
    No. 2013-KK-2838.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Fontenot, Seth;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 140617; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 13-01205.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph Randall HEBERT v. LOUISIANA STATE RACING ASSOCIATION.
    No. 2013-CC-2839.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Louisiana State Racing Commission; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2012-4923; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-419.

Denied.