author:
GUIDRY, J.
     JOHNSON, C.J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony THOMAS.
    No. 2012-KP-1410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 4, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 2013.

      Louisiana Department of Justice, James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Terri Russo Lacy, Assistant Attorney General, East Baton Rouge District Attorney’s Office, Hillar Clement Moore, III, District Attorney, for Applicant.
    Manasseh, Gill, Knipe & Belanger, PLC, James Gordon Knipe, III, Baton Rouge, LA, for Respondent.
   GUIDRY, J.

|,We granted this writ application to review whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s application for post-conviction relief on grounds trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Finding defendant, Anthony Thomas, did not satisfy the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In early 1998, defendant, Anthony Thomas, began dating a young woman whom he met after repairing her car. Shortly thereafter, defendant began exhibiting violent behavior and the relationship began to deteriorate. Defendant had episodes during which he kicked holes in his girlfriend’s walls, ripped holes in her clothes, poured sugar on her carpet, and threw food at her. By mid-year 1998, defendant’s girlfriend had become fearful, telling family members that she was afraid for her safety, and eventually leaving her apartment and taking up residence at her mother’s house. However, despite her efforts to avoid defendant, he continued to stalk her. When his girlfriend returned to her apartment with her son, defendant was waiting there and forced his way into the home. Defendant told his girlfriend that he was going to have sex with her, pushed her to the floor and struck |2her. Out of fear she acquiesced to his demands. Defendant then instructed his girlfriend to remain in place while he went outside to turn his truck off. However, as soon as defendant was out of sight, she ran to a neighbor’s home and called police. When the police arrived, defendant’s girlfriend identified him as the perpetrator and he was arrested.

Following his arrest, defendant was charged with aggravated burglary. A jury found him guilty of the lesser and included offense of attempted aggravated burglary. Defendant was subsequently adjudicated a third felony offender and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

On appeal, the appellate court found that the prosecutor made an indirect reference to defendant’s failure to testify, in violation of La.C.Cr.P. art. 770(3). Finding a mistrial should have been granted, the court of appeal reversed defendant’s conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. State v. Thomas, 99-1500 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00) (unpublished).

In 2002, the State retried defendant on the original charge of aggravated burglary. Defendant waived his right to trial by jury and, after a bench trial, the court found him guilty of the lesser and included offense of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. The State again instituted habitual offender proceedings. The court adjudged defendant a third felony offender, and he was again sentenced |sto life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant appealed. The court of appeal once more reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial upon finding the State’s prosecution of defendant for aggravated burglary was jeopardy-barred. State v. Thomas, 04-2746 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/05), 912 So.2d 111 (unpublished). The court of appeal reasoned that the jury’s guilty verdict of attempted aggravated burglary at the first trial acted as an acquittal on the charge of aggravated burglary. Thus, on remand, defendant should not have been tried again for aggravated burglary. The appellate court found the second trial was required to be on the next most serious offense, attempted aggravated burglary. Further, based on La.C.Cr.P. art. 814(A)(48), the court of appeal found the verdict rendered by the trial court, unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, was invalid because it was not an acceptable responsive verdict for the charge of attempted aggravated burglary. Thomas, 04-2746, p. 1, 912 So.2d at 111.

This Court granted the State’s writ application, reverséd the decision of the court of appeal, and reinstated defendant’s conviction and sentence. State v. Thomas, 05-2373 (La.4/17/06), 926 So.2d 490. We reasoned, in relevant part:

[Rjeversal of defendant’s first conviction and sentence did not preclude the state from holding a second trial, only from seeking a conviction for aggravated burglary. ... The court of appeal therefore had no basis for vacating that verdict as unresponsive to the charge that it believed should have been brought, i.e., attempted aggravated burglary, because the verdict was not inherently tainted by virtue of its return in the trial of a jeopardy-barred offense.

Id. at 2, 926 So.2d at 491 (internal citations removed).

[ thereafter, defendant filed an application for post-conviction relief, including a claim that his counsel at the second trial was ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash the jeopardy-barred charge of aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing, which was held before a commissioner. An attorney was appointed to represent defendant during the proceeding. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified he was aware that defendant’s case was being tried a second time for the 1998 offense. Counsel testified generally that, given four months to prepare for trial, he spent very little time on procedural issues, and his objectives were to adequately investigate facts and witnesses, review the testimony of previous witnesses, and prepare for trial. Finally, counsel emphasized that he was responsible for raising the motion to quash on jeopardy grounds and that his failure to do so was an error.

Following the hearing, the commissioner recommended the trial court grant post-conviction relief based on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. The commissioner, reasoned that defendant had shown deficient performance because counsel had admitted that his failure to pursue this claim was a simple oversight and the omitted motion to quash based on double jeopardy grounds had undeniable merit. Further, the commissioner concluded that defendant had shown prejudice because counsel’s failure to file the meritorious motion to quash resulted in respondent being convicted of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, a responsive verdict that would not have been available had the State prosecuted defendant for attempted aggravated burglary, the “next most serious” charge below aggravated burglary. The trial court adopted the commissioner’s recommendation and entered an order accordingly.

The court of appeal denied the State’s writ application. State v. Thomas, 12-0477 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/21/12) (unpublished). The State filed the instant writ | ¿application, which we granted. State v. Thomas, 12-1410 (La.3/1/13), 108 So.3d 781.

DISCUSSION

“The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the States by the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the accused shall have the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions.” Missouri v. Frye, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1404, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012); State v. Messiah, 85-1659 (La.12/12/88), 538 So.2d 175, 185. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90, 76 S.Ct. 167, 170, 100 L.Ed. 77 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464-65, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S.Ct. 321, 322, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 53 S.Ct. 55, 59-60, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally governed by the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, and adopted by this Court in State v. Washington, 85-2339 (La.7/18/86), 491 So.2d 1337, 1339.

To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must first show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court further noted that “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error has no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Additionally, the Court reasoned “[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in | ¿counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.” Id. at 691-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, the Strickland Court held that the “defendant must [also] show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court further explained that in making a determination of ineffectiveness of counsel, “the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.” Id. at 696,104 S.Ct. 2052.

Regarding the “fundamental fairness of the proceeding,” the Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances a mere difference in outcome will not suffice to establish the required prejudice. In Lockhart v. Fretwell, the Court stated:

[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him.

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).

In the present case, the issue raised by the State is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s application for post-conviction relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that is, was counsel’s performance deficient and was the defendant prejudiced as a result.

|7Performance

First, we consider whether trial counsel’s performance fell below the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Strickland. Applying the relevant precedent to the facts of this case, we find counsel’s performance was below the objective standard of Strickland, thus constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.

The State contends trial counsel’s performance was not so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The State points out that a motion to quash could have been filed by any of the eight previous attorneys who represented defendant after his first conviction was reversed, or noted by the district attorney, or the trial court itself. Thus, the State argues because everyone missed the issue, failing to raise it was not unreasonable. Further, the State asserts trial counsel correctly prioritized fact investigation over research into procedural issues of this nature.

In contrast, defendant argues trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to quash asserting double jeopardy was unreasonable in light of the obvious merit of the issue. Further, defendant argues the State’s reliance on the failure of others to raise this issue is misplaced because such conduct is irrelevant in determining trial counsel’s duties under an objective standard of reasonableness.

We find no merit in the State’s argument. The Supreme Court has recognized generally that criminal defendants are entitled to expect that their counsel understand applicable constitutional law. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1362-63, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). It follows that failure to pursue meritorious claims and defenses, owing not to strategic considerations but to a misapprehension of controlling law or relevant facts generally, will be found deficient. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 993-94 (5th Cir.1979); Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Pa.Super.Ct.2003); State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 285, 787 A.2d 887, 897 (2002).

There is no doubt the double jeopardy issue had merit. Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 15 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee that no person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. In addition to the constitutional prohibition, the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides statutory protections from double jeopardy. Double jeopardy exists in a second trial when the charge in that trial is for the same offense for which defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial and acquitted. In this case, when defendant was found guilty of attempted aggravated burglary in the first trial, that verdict served as an acquittal for the offense of aggravated burglary. Thus, defendant was put in jeopardy a second time for the same offense when he was tried again for aggravated burglary.

Although the State attempts to justify counsel’s omission by arguing he made a reasonable choice to prioritize trial preparation, this argument overlooks [ 9the corollary that reasonable trial preparation steps would have led competent counsel to file a motion to quash based on double jeopardy grounds. Trial counsel testified that his failure to file a motion to quash was simply an oversight or omission. No assertion of strategy complicated this analysis. There is no question that failure to raise this defense was due to attorney error.

We also reject the State’s argument that deficient performance was not established in this case because counsel was only one of many who could have raised the double jeopardy issue. Counsel’s duty under the Sixth Amendment to act as advocate is not qualified or lessened by the obligations of others to ensure orderly and fair proceedings. A defendant need only show that his attorney, appointed to satisfy the State’s Sixth Amendment obligation, rendered performance that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See, e.g., Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 379, 106 S.Ct. 2574.

Thus, we find the trial court did not err in concluding that counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance as set out in Strickland.

Prejudice

Having found that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we must determine if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. To that end, defendant argues counsel’s error of allowing him to be twice placed in jeopardy for aggravated burglary was itself prejudicial. Defendant asserts he suffered prejudice because there is a reasonable probability he would not have been convicted of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling had counsel pursued a motion to quash. He argues the State would have charged him with attempted aggravated burglary, the next most severe available charge, and it would have | T nprecluded the verdict entered because it was not responsive to that charge. Moreover, defendant asserts, whether or not the State would seek habitual offender adjudication after a third trial is speculative and irrelevant. According to defendant, prejudice exists because he was twice placed on trial for the same offense.

Conversely, the State argues defendant cannot prove prejudice under Strickland. The State asserts the guilty verdict for unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling was a nonjeopardy-barred offense. The State contends it has sole authority in charging decisions, and there is no requirement that the second or subsequent charge must be responsive to the original charge or conviction in order to avoid double jeopardy. Thus, the State explains, it could have rebilled or reindicted defendant for unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling and the result would have been the same. Further, the State argues that regardless of which felony the defendant was ultimately convicted, whether it was a responsive verdict to attempted aggravated burglary or a different felony, defendant would have received the same life imprisonment sentence as a third offender under the habitual offender law. Accordingly, the State contends, the trial court erred in concluding defendant suffered prejudice because the outcome of this case would not have been different.

For reasons set out below, we find defendant’s argument unpersuasive given the circumstances of this case. Thus, we hold the trial court erred in finding defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland.

We previously determined in State v. Thomas that the return of a nonjeopardy-barred responsive verdict of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling cured the double jeopardy implications of retrying defendant for aggravated burglary following his acquittal on that charge when the jury returned a |nresponsive verdict of attempted aggravated burglary, subsequently reversed on appeal for trial error. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 598(A). We noted that the verdict for the lesser offense of unauthorized entry “was not inherently tainted by virtue of its return in the trial of a jeopardy-barred offense.” Thomas, 05-2373 at 2, 926 So.2d at 491 (citing Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 245, 106 S.Ct. 1032, 1037, 89 L.Ed.2d 187 (1986)). Defendant contends that, reframed as an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim satisfies in post-conviction proceedings the burden he did not carry on direct review of “demonstrate[ing] a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of the nonjeopardy-barred offense absent the presence of the jeopardy-barred offense.” Mathews, 475 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 1038. We disagree.

While defendant was entitled to be free from the jeopardy-barred prosecution (and also entitled to vindicate that freedom through a pretrial motion to quash), Morris v. Mathews holds that absent some showing that the fact-finder’s factual determinations were skewed by the jeopardy-barred prosecution, conviction on a lesser-included, nonjeopardy-barred offense suffices to remedy any double jeopardy violation inherent in a jeopardy-barred prosecution. Morris, 475 U.S. at 246-47, 106 S.Ct. at 1038. Thus, because the Constitution does not prohibit subjecting respondent to a second trial on a different offense, the only deprivation he suffered as a result of counsel’s omissions was deprivation of the right to challenge the constitutionality of his charging document. It is fatal to defendant’s claim that preservation of this issue would not have entitled him to the relief he seeks for counsel’s failure to preserve it. That is, if counsel had preserved the issue by an unsuccessful motion to quash in the trial court and the issue had been appealed, defendant would have found himself exactly where he did when his case was appealed, without relief. In contrast, where Sixth Amendment prejudice has 112been recognized from the failure to raise substantial double jeopardy issues, preservation of the meritorious claim leads to reversal. Allah, 170 N.J. at 286, 787 A.2d at 897. Indictment defects, such as improper selection of grand jury forepersons, can lead to reversal if properly preserved, but the failure to raise them has been deemed insufficient to establish Sixth Amendment prejudice. Pickney v. Cain, 337 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir.2003). A fortiori, this double jeopardy issue, which could not lead to reversal when raised sua sponte, need not lead to reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

When courts have recognized claims of ineffective counsel regarding jeopardy issues, they have involved total waiver of a claim that would have barred prosecution altogether for any crime related to the incident because they are uniquely incurable other than by reversal of conviction. See Allah, 170 N.J. at 287-90, 787 A.2d at 898-99 (waiver of jeopardy claim based on improper mistrial granted without manifest necessity was ineffective because it would bar prosecution totally and not merely halt prosecution). Significantly, the double jeopardy issue in this case has no potential to resolve defendant’s criminal prosecution, as the State could have simply amended the charging document to cure the defect identified. Defendant’s prejudice argument is thus wanting in light of the almost certain chance that he would have received the same habitual offender sentence, notwithstanding the filing of a timely motion to quash. To cure the double jeopardy defect in this case, the State could have simply amended the aggravated burglary charge downward to one that was responsive to the original indictment, or to another felony like unauthorized entry for which the evidence was sufficient. Additionally, given the prosecution’s previous assessment that defendant’s conduct on the night of the incident was “aggravated,” logic renders it probable that the State would have sought habitual offender sentencing no matter 11sfor what felony defendant was convicted. Thus, defendant cannot establish, as he must, that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the end result of the proceedings against him, life in prison as a third offender, would have been different. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. More to the point, it is not the State’s burden to disprove conjectured theories of prejudice. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. Strickland places the burden on the defendant, not the State, to show a “reasonable probability” that the result would have been different. Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 26-29, 130 S.Ct. 383, 390-91, 175 L.Ed.2d 328 (2009). Thus, it follows that the likelihood of the same sentence is relevant in this case.

The return of a guilty verdict of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling meant that defendant’s retrial on the barred charge of aggravated burglary ultimately did not deprive him of his substantive right not to be prosecuted and convicted twice for the same offense as a matter of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Mathews, 475 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 1038 (“[W]here it is clear that the jury necessarily found that the defendant’s conduct satisfies the elements of the lesser included offense, it would be incongruous always to order yet another trial as a means of curing a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”). Nor did it deprive defendant of a fact finder’s opportunity to consider under Louisiana’s system of responsive verdicts “a less drastic alternative than the choice between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal.” Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). The defendant may have been entitled to a different set of responsive verdicts as a statutory matter if counsel had filed a motion to quash, but he has not shown as a constitutional matter that the proceedings were thereby rendered fundamentally unfair or the verdict unreliable by “a breakdown in the adversarial process that our | ^system counts on to produce just results.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.

Accordingly, we hold that defendant ultimately fails to satisfy the two-part Strickland standard for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. That judgment is accordingly reversed and defendant’s conviction and sentence are reinstated.

REVERSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REINSTATED.

JOHNSON, Chief Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

KNOLL, Justice, dissents for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice JOHNSON.

Retired Judge ROBERT L. LOBRANO, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for WEIMER J., recused.

JOHNSON, C.J.,

dissents and assigns reasons.

hi respectfully dissent. In my view, defendant, Anthony Thomas, satisfied the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. I would affirm the ruling of the trial court granting defendant’s application for post-conviction relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

This case involves a clear double jeopardy violation. The majority concedes that defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to quash based on the double jeopardy violation was due to attorney error and constituted deficient performance. The majority then goes on to find that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the double jeopardy issue because it concludes the result of the trial would not have been different, absent this error. I disagree.

In making a determination of ineffectiveness of counsel, we are required to apply the straightforward outcome-determinative analysis set forth in Strickland. Citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, the majority states that the ultimate focus of our inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, and that a mere difference in |2outcome will not suffice to establish the required prejudice in some circumstances. However, the Supreme Court has made clear that cases such as Lock-hart are exceptions to the rule of Strickland. In Lockhart, the defendant was sentenced to death based on an aggravating circumstance that duplicated an element of the underlying felony. Before defendant’s trial, a federal appellate court held that such “double counting” was impermissible, but defendant’s counsel was not aware of the decision and failed to object. However, before defendant’s federal habeas corpus relief claim reached the Supreme Court, that appellate court case was overruled. Because the ineffectiveness of counsel had not deprived defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitled him, the Court concluded that, given the overriding interest in fundamental fairness, the likelihood of a different outcome attributable to an incorrect interpretation of the law should be regarded as potential windfall to the defendant, rather than the legitimate prejudice contemplated by Strickland.

Another example is demonstrated by Nix v. Whiteside, which involved a claim that counsel was ineffective because he refused to present a defense based on perjured testimony. The Court concluded that the defendant could not rely on any outcome-determinative effects of perjury to make his claim. The Court explained that even if a defendant’s false testimony might have persuaded the jury to acquit him, it is not fundamentally unfair to conclude that he was not prejudiced by counsel’s interference with his intended perjury.

In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court clarified that such cases do not justify a departure from the straightforward application of Strickland and do not | ..¡require a separate inquiry into fundamental fairness when a defendant can show their counsel was ineffective and that his ineffectiveness probably affected the outcome of the proceeding. More recently, in Lafler v. Cooper, the Court found an outcome determinative analysis appropriate to determine whether a defendant was prejudiced in plea negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had no baseline entitlement to receive a plea bargain. It further rejected the argument that the failure to convey a plea offer does not introduce reasonable doubt as to the verdict of guilty reached in a subsequent trial. The Court stated that “a reliable trial may not foreclose relief when counsel has failed to assert rights that may have altered the outcome.” The Court found that “prejudice can be shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence.”

In this case, defendant seeks relief from counsel’s failure to meet a valid legal standard, not from counsel’s refusal to violate it as in Nix. Nor would counsel’s assertion of the double jeopardy defense have resulted in an undeserved windfall for defendant, as in Lockhart. Thus, I find a straightforward application of Strickland is proper. Applying that standard to the facts of this case, it is clear defendant has satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland.

Strickland instructs that to prove prejudice, a defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In this case, when the defendant was found guilty after the first trial of attempted aggravated burglary, that verdict served as an acquittal of the 14offense of aggravated burglary. Thus, the state trying defendant again for aggravated burglary unquestionably constituted double jeopardy. Had counsel filed a motion to quash, we must assume the trial court would have granted it since defendant was clearly entitled to relief, and the state could not have tried defendant for aggravated burglary. If defendant had been tried for the next most serious offense of attempted aggravated burglary, he could not have been convicted for unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling because it is not a proper responsive verdict for an attempted aggravated burglary charge. Therefore, had defense counsel filed a motion to quash, raising what was clearly a meritorious double jeopardy defense, there is no doubt the outcome of the second trial would have been different.

The majority finds defendant’s prejudice argument wanting because of “the almost certain chance” defendant would have received the same habitual offender sentence of life in prison as a third offender, even if a motion to quash had been filed. This is purely speculative. I find it offensive to the criminal justice system to assume that defendant would have been convicted had he been tried on a proper charge under different circumstances, or that the state would have undoubtedly instituted habitual offender proceedings after a third trial. To conclude otherwise would essentially preconvict the defendant and deprive him of a trial on a proper charge. It is inappropriate to engage in such pure conjecture.

I also find prejudice is demonstrated by the unreliability of the outcome of the proceeding. In Price v. Georgia, the Supreme Court addressed the proper remedy when a defendant is retried for a jeopardy-barred offense. Price was tried for murder and convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. After that conviction was reversed on appeal, there was another trial for murder and another conviction of | Bthe lesser crime of manslaughter. The Court held that the second conviction could not stand because Price had been impliedly acquitted of murder at the first trial and could not be tried again on that charge. In so doing, the Court rejected the state’s contention that Price’s conviction on the lesser offense constituted harmless error:

The Double Jeopardy Clause, as we have noted, is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict. To be charged and to be subjected to a second trial for first-degree murder is an ordeal not to be viewed lightly. Further, and perhaps of more importance, we cannot determine whether or not the murder charge against petitioner induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence.

Thus, in Pnce, prejudice to the defendant was presumed because of the likelihood that the conviction for manslaughter had been influenced by the trial on the more serious murder charge. The same holds true in this case. Prejudice is presumed because of the likelihood that defendant’s conviction was influenced by trial on the more serious charge.

In previously reinstating defendant’s conviction, this court recognized the state’s error in retrying defendant for aggravated burglary, but considering defendant did not file a motion to quash that proceeding, we found the verdict of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling was not inherently tainted by virtue of its return in the trial of a jeopardy-barred offense. In so doing, we relied in part on Morris v. Mathews. In Morris, the Supreme Court distinguished and limited Price in cases where a defendant is charged with and convicted of a jeopardy-barred offense which is later reduced on appeal. In such cases, the Court held that the proper remedy is not always to order a new trial. The Court held that when a jeopardy-barred conviction is reduced to a conviction for a lesser included offense which is not jeopardy barred, |fithe burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of the nonjeopardy-barred offense absent the presence of the jeopardy-barred offense. The rationale for this distinction is that when a defendant is convicted of the greater charged offense, the jury necessarily finds all the elements of the lesser-included offense. Thus, it would be incongruous always to order yet another trial as a means of curing a double jeopardy violation.

While the majority relies heavily on Morris, in considering prejudice under Strickland, I find the facts of this case more in line with Price, and thus find its reasoning instructive. Defendant was tried for the jeopardy-barred offense of aggravated burglary, but found guilty of the lesser-included offense of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. As in Price, the fact that defendant was subjected to trial on a more serious charge inherently influenced the factfinder’s verdict. Counsel’s error also had consequences for defendant in terms of his sentencing exposure. Defendant was placed on trial for the more serious crime of aggravated burglary, which provides a sentence range of one to thirty years. Had Mr. Thomas been properly brought to trial on a charge of attempted aggravated burglary, he would have faced a much shorter sentence range of one to fifteen years. Had the state charged defendant with the offense of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, he would only have faced a sentence of one to six years. I recognize defendant was tried by the court, not a jury, thus theoretically reducing the risk that the verdict was influenced by the trial on a more serious charge or the exposure to a greater sentence. However, I also note it was the same trial judge who granted defendant relief and |7found he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Under these circumstances, I find counsel’s error, which subjected defendant to retrial on a more serious charge than was allowed, undermines confidence in the verdict.

For these reasons, I would affirm the ruling of the trial court.

       Retired Judge Robert L. Lobrano, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Weimer, J., recused.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art 770 provides, in pertinent part:
      Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to: ... (3) The failure of the defendant to testify in his own defense.

      . Defendant was not reindicted, nor was a new bill of information filed.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 814(A)(43) provides:
      The only responsive verdicts which may be rendered when the indictment charges [Attempted Aggravated Burglary] are: guilty; guilty of attempted simple burglary; guilty of attempted simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling; guilty of attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling; not guilty.

      . U.S. Const, amend. V provides, in pertinent part:
      nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb....
      Article 1, § 15 of the Louisiana Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
      No person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, except on his application for a new trial, when a mistrial is declared, or when a motion in arrest of judgment is sustained.

      .La.C.Cr.P. art. 591 provides:
      No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, except, when on his own motion, a new trial has been granted or judgment has been arrested, or where there has been a mistrial legally ordered under the provisions of Article 775 or ordered with the express consent of the defendant.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 596 provides, in pertinent part:
      Double jeopardy exists in a second trial only when the charge in that trial is: (1) Identical with or a different grade of the same offense for which the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial, whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered in the first trial as to the charge in the second trial.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 598(A) provides:
      When a person is found guilty of a lesser degree of the offense charges, the verdict or judgment of the court is an acquittal of all greater offenses charges in the indictment and the defendant cannot thereafter be tried for those offenses on a new trial.

      . 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

        . 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).

      . 475 U.S. 157, 175-76, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986).

      . 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

      . Id. at 393, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

      . — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d '398 (2012).

      . 132 S.Ct. at 1381.

      . Id. at 1387.

      . 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970).

      . 398 U.S. at 331, 90 S.Ct. 1757.

      .475 U.S. 237, 245, 106 S.Ct. 1032, 1037, 89 L.Ed.2d 187 (1986).

      . 475 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 1032.

      . La. R.S. 14:60.

      . La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

      . La. R.S. 14:62.3(B).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. WEIMER, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    VADA GROUP, LP v. John L. GLASER, April Marie Glaser Bergeron, Charity Ann Glaser, Pauline Marie Glaser, Angelle Aline Glaser, Theodore H. Glaser, III, Cynthia Long Steib, Charles R. Glaser, Audrey Glaser Browning, John Burton Prather, Jeanette Prather Heinen, Georgie Fay Prather, Cynthia Prather Robertson, Johnnie Prather Olinger, Yvonne Prather Cramer, Michael J. Cramer, Anthony E. Cramer, Rhena Vienne Cramer, Brent Beauvais, Cynthia Marie Beauvais, Jodie Henderson Williams, Sr., Charles G. Chauvin, Stacy Marie Chauvin Gueho, Gretchin Ann Chauvin Alleman, Jason Andrew Chauvin, Adair Chauvin Chutz, Shirley Ballard Elam, Frederick Domingue, Michael Northern, Sylvia Northern, Brenda Sam, and David Michael Moye.
    No. 2012-C-2064.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 6, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 2013.

      Ellison & Ellison, David McQuown Ellison, Jr., Baton Rouge, LA, for Applicant.
    James C. Dewey, New Roads, LA, Brent Barber Boxill, Becky Lynn Chustz, Breaz-eale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP, John Walton Barton, Jr., John Thomas Andrishok, Weill & Dunn, LLC, Richard S. Dunn, Baton Rouge, LA, Wall, Bullington & Cook, Guy Earl Wall, Sara Lewis, New Orleans, LA, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

_L¡This writ application was granted to determine a single issue. A thorough review of the record and arguments reveals that issue is not properly before this court. Accordingly, we recall this writ application.

WRIT GRANT RECALLED; WRIT DENIED.

WEIMER, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J.,

dissents.

|,I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to recall the writ. Having granted the writ, I would resolve this case on the merits based on the issues and the record properly before this court.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Christopher MINIAS.
    No. 2012-OB-1459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 20, 2013.
    Christopher Minias (In Proper Person), Dane S. Ciolino, for Applicant.
    Committee on Bar Admissions, Monique Rene Drake, Scheuermann & Jones, LLC, Lawrence Joseph Centola, Jr., for Respondent.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

|, Petitioner, Christopher A. Minias, failed the February 2012 Louisiana Bar Examination. Thereafter, the Committee on Bar Admissions (“Committee”) opposed petitioner’s application to sit for the July 2012 bar exam, on the ground that petitioner had cheated on the February exam by typing and saving his responses to the multiple choice questions on the Civil Code I examination after time was called.

Petitioner then applied to this court, seeking permission to sit for the July 2012 bar exam. We denied the application pending an investigation into the allegations against petitioner relating to his conduct during the February 2012 bar exam. In re: Minias, 12-1459 (La.6/28/12), 92 So.3d 343. We also appointed a commissioner to conduct a hearing in the matter, and our order provided that upon receipt of the commissioner’s report addressing his “specific findings with regard to the allegations against petitioner, ...” we would make a determination whether petitioner would be permitted to sit for a future bar examination.

The commissioner conducted a character and fitness hearing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9(D). At the conclusion of the hearing, the commissioner filed his report with this court, finding that petitioner did not act dishonestly in typing and saving his multiple choice responses after time was Rcalled because he had handwritten the responses onto his copy of the exam questions before time was called. The commissioner found credible petitioner’s explanation that he was not attempting to gain an undue advantage over the other examinees by his actions and concluded that petitioner had merely engaged in an ill-conceived effort to “preserve” his multiple choice responses on his USB key in the event he could persuade the Committee to grade them. Based on these findings, the commissioner recommended that petitioner be permitted to sit for the next available bar exam. The Committee objected to the commissioner’s recommendation, and oral argument was conducted before this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9(D)(11).

The undisputed facts in the record establish petitioner typed and saved his responses to the multiple choice questions on the February 2012 Civil Code I examination after time was called. Nonetheless, the objective facts in the record do not answer the critical question of whether petitioner acted with a dishonest state of mind or in hopes of gaining an unfair advantage. Resolution of this issue turns in large measure on petitioner’s credibility.

Following a lengthy hearing in the matter, which included petitioner’s testimony, the commissioner accepted petitioner’s version of events as credible and concluded that his actions may have been unwise but were not dishonest. We cannot say this credibility finding is clearly wrong. See In re: Hinson-Lyles, 02-2578, n. 6 (La.12/3/03), 864 So.2d 108. Accordingly, we will accept the commissioner’s recommendation and allow petitioner to sit for the next regularly scheduled bar examination.

JíjlECREE

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that the application by petitioner seeking permission to sit for the Louisiana Bar Examination be and hereby is granted.

      . At the conclusion of each separate subject matter examination, the candidates who are taking the bar exam with a laptop computer save their answers on a data storage device known as a "USB key,” which is then turned in to a bar admissions representative at the exam site for subsequent printing and grading of the responses by the Committee.

      . In reaching this conclusion, we take this opportunity to emphasize to petitioner and all other applicants to the Louisiana bar that it is unacceptable to disregard the instructions of the Committee staff during the administration of the bar examination. Although we accept petitioner’s explanation for his actions under the unique circumstances of this case, we caution that any applicant who fails to follow instructions during the bar examination will bear a heavy burden in order to establish that their actions do not reflect adversely on their good moral character.


text:
    Michael HINDELANG, III v. Regina Louviere HINDELANG.
    No. 2013-C-1135.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 20, 2013.
   PER CURIAM.

1/Writ application granted. Under Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4232, res judicata is still applicable in an action for final periodic support if the factual circumstance has already been litigated. The trial court did not err in finding that Ms. Hindelang’s action is barred by res judica-ta since the claims are identical. In 2009, Ms. Hindelang argued that she could not work due to her various physical and mental health conditions, including depression and bipolar disorder. The pleadings in the 2012 litigation offer no new claims or changes in circumstance. The trial court heard evidence and its ruling is subject to a manifest error analysis. At the original spousal support hearing Ms. Hindelang alleged her entitlement to support on the basis that she could not work because she suffered from, among other things, depression and bipolar disorder. Thus, the specific disabilities and/or medical conditions now claimed to seek an extension of the support previously awarded have been already actually litigated. This is not a case where a new injury or new disability occurring after the original award is alleged. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court, which granted Mr. Hindelang’s Exception of Res Judicata, is reinstated.


text:
    In re Maria del Carmen Calvo BROCE.
    No. 2013-B-1536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 20, 2013.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

liThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent commingled personal funds with client funds in her trust account. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Maria del Carmen Calvo Broce, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27193, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a two-year period of unsupervised probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


author: JOHNSON, Chief Justice. GUIDRY, Justice,

text:
    CATAHOULA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Catahoula Parish Police Jury v. LOUISIANA MACHINERY RENTALS, LLC. Catahoula Parish School Board, Catahoula Parish Police Jury v. Louisiana Machinery Company, LLC.
    No. 2012-C-2504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 2013.

      Rainer, Anding, McLindon & Talbot, Robert R. Rainer, Baton Rouge, Drew Michael Talbot, for Applicant.
    Jones Walker Waechter Poitevent Car-rere & Denegre, LLP, Jesse R. Adams, III, Andre Brian Burvant, Kathryn Scion-eaux Friel, Matthew Andrew Mantle, New Orleans, for Respondent.
   JOHNSON, Chief Justice.

11 Louisiana Machinery Company, L.L.C. and Louisiana Machinery Rentals, L.L.C. (collectively “the Companies”), Louisiana’s exclusive Caterpillar franchise dealers, sold, leased, and/or repaired Caterpillar equipment and machinery in parishes throughout Louisiana. Following a multi-parish audit, the taxing authorities from numerous parishes began tax collection proceedings against the Companies, alleging they incorrectly failed to charge and collect sales and use taxes from their customers on their taxable sales, leases, and/or repairs for certain tax periods, and that the Companies were liable for these taxes, penalties, and interest under the provisions of the Uniform Local Sales Tax Code (“ULSTC”).

In these cases, the tax collector for Ca-tahoula Parish obtained partial summary | judgments in the district court, declaring that the tax assessments it issued to the Companies are final and the executory judgments of the court and could not be challenged by the Companies. The Companies appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed the grants of partial summary judgment based on the deficiency of the notices of assessment and the lack of sufficient evidence to support the summary judgments.

From this adverse ruling, the tax collector applied for supervisory review to this court. We granted the tax collector’s writ application and consolidated the cases for argument with nearly identical eases emanating from the First Circuit, wherein that court affirmed the district court’s grants of summary judgment. We granted certio-rari to resolve this split in the circuits. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the court of appeal in this case.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Concordia Parish School Board (“Collector”) is the designated tax collector for the Catahoula Parish School Board and the Catahoula Parish Police Jury. A tax audit of the Companies revealed deficiencies for the period December 1, 2000, through June 30, 2007. On November 24, 2009, the Collector began the collection process by sending each of the Companies a notice of intent to assess additional taxes, penalties, and interest in accordance with La. R.S. 47:337.48(B). The | sCompanies did not protest this notice, as provided for by La. R.S. 47:337.49.

The Collector then formally assessed the taxes and issued each of the Companies a formal Notice of Assessment on December 24, 2009, pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.51. The Companies did not formally respond to the asséssments, but instead provided additional tax records to the auditors. The Collector reviewed the |4additional audit documentation and subsequently affirmed its findings. On February 22, 2010, the Collector issued a second formal Notice of Assessment-Extension (“first revised notices of assessments”) to the Companies pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.51. The first revised notices of assessments gave the Companies additional time to formally respond, but the Companies did not do so. The Companies again submitted additional records to the auditors. After the auditors reviewed this newly supplied information, the assessments were substantially reduced. On April 26, 2010, the Collector issued a third formal Notice of Assessment-Extension (“second revised notices of assessments”) to each of the Companies. The notices provided, in relevant part (emphasis in original):

NOTICE: As provided in LA R.S. 47:337.51 B, if you wish to protest, you have thirty (30) days from the date hereof to file with this office a written protest, signed by you or your duly authorized agent, which shall be under oath, fully disclosing the reasons therefor, and request a hearing.
If you do not timely file a written protest and request a hearing, you have sixty (60) calendar days from the date hereof to:
1) Pay the amount set forth herein above,
2) Pay the total amount set forth herein above under protest as provided in LA R.S. 47:337.63 and file suit for recovery within thirty (30) days of payment, or
3) Within thirty (30) days of receipt of this Notice of Assessment, file suit in any state court of competent jurisdiction contesting the final assessment, and in connection therewith, post a commercial bond or other security as provided in LA R.S. 47:337.64 in accordance with the procedures set forth therein.
Do not disregard this notice, failure to act within the time or manner provided will result in the assessment becoming final and enforceable by warrant for distraint. Additional penalties, interest and collection fees may be assessed at that time.
IMPORTANT: The collector may, in his discretion, proceed to enforce the collection of any taxes due by means of any of the following | ^remedies or procedures: (1) Assessment and distraint, as provided by R.S. 47:337.48 through 337.60, (2) Summary court proceeding, as provided in R.S. 47:337.61, (3) Ordinary suit under provisions of the general laws regulating actions for the enforcement of obligations, (4) Rule to cease business as provided in R.S. 47:337.33. The Collector by issuing this Notice does not waive the right to assert such other remedies.

The Companies did not respond to the second revised notices of assessments. On September 27, 2010, the Collector filed in the district court a Rule for Payment of Sales Tax against each Company as summary proceedings pursuant to local ordinances. The petitions asserted the Companies had failed to pay certain taxes and the Collector was entitled to payment of taxes, penalties, interest, and attorney fees. In response, the Companies filed exceptions, affirmative defenses, and answers.- On October 4, 2011, the Collector filed a Supplemental and Amending Petition for Rule to Show Cause in Summary Sales and Use Tax Proceeding against each of the Companies. The Collector amended its original petitions to allege the proceedings were also brought under the provisions of La. R.S. 47:337.33 and La. R.S. 47:337.61. The Collector alleged in detail the assessment procedures it followed, specifically asserting that the second revised notices of assessments were issued in accordance with all statutory requirements and because the Companies did not timely respond, the assessments were now final and an established liability equivalent to | judgments against the Companies. In addition to claiming the taxes due plus interest, the Collector sought-injunctions pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.33, enjoining the Companies from conducting business in the parish until payment was made in full, and further sought recognition of liens and privileges on the Companies’ property pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.65. The Companies filed exceptions, defenses, and answers to the supplemental and amending petitions, specifically asserting the notices of assessments did not comply with the requirements of La. R.S. 47:337.51 (A), and were therefore not final and enforceable.

The Collector subsequently filed motions for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that the second revised notices of assessments are final and the executory judgments of the court. Supported by the affidavit of Thomas H. O’Neal, Sales Tax Director for the Collector, the Collector argued that the uncontested material facts set forth in its supplemental and amending petitions entitled it to partial summary judgments. The Companies opposed the motions, arguing there were numerous disputed facts that precluded the entry of summary judgments. The Companies asserted the audits and subsequent assessments were fraught with errors and the Collector’s petitions were inadequate. The Companies further challenged the adequacy of Mr. O’Neal’s affidavit which was made “to the best of his knowledge and belief’ pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.61(4), rather than following the more 17stringent requirements for affidavits in summary judgment procedures pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966, et seq.

On January 5, 2012, the district court held a hearing on the motions for partial summary judgment. Based upon its determination that the second revised notices of assessments were sufficient, the district court granted partial summary judgment against each Company declaring the second revised notices of assessment final and the executory judgments of the court. The district court held the Companies were precluded from attacking the notices and ruled the Companies’ exceptions were moot. The Companies appealed.

The Third Circuit reversed. The court found the notices of assessments were deficient and the assessments invalid due to the failure of the notices to state that the Companies had sixty days from the date of the notices to request a hearing, as required by La. R.S. 47:337.51(A). Because the court found the written notices did not comply with La. R.S. 47:337.51(A), the court held they did not have the preclusive and legal effect of denying the Companies the right to present their defenses in response to the Collector’s claims, even in a summary proceeding.

The court went on to note that despite the invalid notices and invalid assessments, the Collector was still entitled to pursue summary proceedings in accordance with La. R.S. 47:337.61. However, the court held the Collector’s alternative attempt to proceed with summary proceedings under La. R.S. 47:337.61 was “tainted and thwarted” by the district court’s refusal to allow the Companies to | ^present their defenses to the Collector’s claims, which La. R.S. 47:337.61(2) specifically permits.

The court also found the district court erred in granting the Collector’s motions for partial summary judgment because the supporting affidavits were not based on personal knowledge, and genuine issues of material fact existed as to the amount of tax owed. Noting this matter came before the court in a summary judgment proceeding, the court reasoned that the affidavits, which were not based on personal knowledge, were inadmissible, and the grants of partial summary judgment improvident. The court concluded that should a summary judgment proceeding be implemented in summary proceedings under La. R.S. 47:337.61, the strict evidentiary requirements of a summary judgment proceeding must be followed. Thus, the court concluded that even assuming, arguendo, that the notices of assessments were satisfactory, the grants of summary judgment must be reversed as they were based on legally deficient affidavits and incompetent evidence.

We granted the Collector’s writ application following this adverse ruling from the Third Circuit.

DISCUSSION

This court applies a de novo standard of review in considering the lower courts’ rulings on summary judgment motions. Thus, we use the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. A | ncourt must grant a motion for summary judgment “[i]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Further, our decision in these cases is premised in part on the proper interpretation of parts of the ULSTC. Such considerations are questions of law and reviewed by this court under a de novo standard of review. After our review, we “render judgment on the record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the tribunals below. This court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the laws of this state.”

The ULSTC was enacted by the Legislature in 2003 for the primary purpose of “promoting uniformity to the extent possible in the assessment, collection, administration, and enforcement of the sales and use taxes imposed by taxing authorities and, by compiling them, making them readily available in one place in the revised statutes.” The ULSTC provides several enforcement mechanisms to a tax collector. A collector has authority to “take a rule on a taxpayer,” requiring the taxpayer to show cause why “he should not be ordered to cease from further pursuit of his business for failure to pay to the taxing authority amounts collected from others by his business as sales and use tax.” However, such rule may be taken • only for amounts due as a result of assessments or judgments which have become final and nonappealable. This collection procedure is in addition to any other collection [ ^procedures provided by law.

La. R.S. 47:337.45(A) provides alternative remedies or procedures that may be used by the tax collector: (1) assessment and distraint; (2) summary court proceeding; and (3j ordinary suit under the provisions of the general laws regulating actions for the enforcement of obligations. The collector may choose which of these procedures he will pursue in each case, and the counter-remedies and delays to which the taxpayer is entitled will be only those which are not inconsistent with the proceeding initiated by the tax collector. Taxpayers are entitled to proceed under the payment under protest procedure pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.63 in every case unless an assessment for the tax in question has become final or a suit involving the same tax obligation is pending against him. Additionally, the fact that the tax collector has initiated proceedings under the assessment and distraint procedure will not preclude him from thereafter proceeding by summary or ordinary court proceedings for the enforcement of the same tax obligation.

Relevant to our discussion is the assessment and distraint procedure. If a taxpayer’s return does not correctly compute his tax liability, the collector can begin the assessment and distraint procedure by determining the tax and sending a notice to the taxpayer setting out his determination and informing the taxpayer of his purpose to assess the amount so determined after thirty days from the date of the notice. A taxpayer may protest the proposed assessment within thirty days. The |T1protest must be in writing and fully disclose the reasons and substantiation. The collector is required to consider the protest and grant a hearing before making a final determination of tax, penalty and interest. After the expiration of thirty days from the date of the notice, the collector shall proceed to assess the tax, penalty, and interest. This assessment must be evidenced by a writing setting forth the name of the taxpayer, the amount determined to be due, the kind of tax, and the taxable period for which it is due. The assessment may confirm or modify the collector’s originally proposed assessment.

Having made the assessment, the collector must send a notice to the taxpayer pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.51, which sets forth the applicable time periods and remedies for a taxpayer to protest or challenge the assessment. When a taxpayer fails to pay the amount assessed, the collector may proceed to enforce the collection by distraint and sale.

In these cases, the Collector began the assessment and distraint procedure and issued notices of assessments pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337:51. However, rather than attempt to enforce collection by distraint and sale of the Companies’ property, the Collector chose to pursue summary proceedings pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.61 based on the alleged finality of the assessments. La. R.S. 47:337.45(B) expressly gives the Collector discretion to enforce and collect sales taxes by summary proceeding, even if the Collector' initiated proceedings under the assessment and dis-traint procedure. Additionally, because the summary proceeding is a separate and independent remedy available to the Collector, the Collector is not required to issue an assessment prior |12to bringing the summary proceeding. It logically follows that whether the notice of assessment satisfies the statutory requirements of La. R.S. 47:337.51 is generally irrelevant in a summary proceeding brought pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.61. However, in these cases, the motions for summary judgment filed by the Collector in the summary proceedings were based solely on the Collector’s- assertions that it followed the statutory requirements of the assessment procedure, including providing sufficient notice pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.51, and its assertions that because the Companies failed to respond to the notices of assessments, the assessments are final and equivalent to judgments against the Companies. Thus, based on the facts of this case, we are required to examine the notices of assessments and determine whether they were adequate.

The dispute in this writ application begins with the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 47:337.51. The function of statutory interpretation and the construction given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the Legislature. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will, and, thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. We have often noted the paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact the law. The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the Legislature. However, when the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as |13having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. Moreover, when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur, and the text of the law as a whole. Further, the Legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of well-settled principles of statutory construction. With these principles in mind, we examine the statute.

At the time the assessment notices were sent, La. R.S. 47:337.51 provided, in pertinent part (emphasis added):

A. Having assessed the amount determined to be due, the collector shall send a notice by certified mail to the taxpayer against whom the assessment is imposed at the address given in the last report filed by said taxpayer.... This notice shall inform the taxpayer of the assessment and that he has sixty calendar days from the date of the notice to (a) pay the amount of the assessment; (b) request a hearing with the collector; or (c) pay under protest in accordance with R.S, 47:337.63.
B. If any dealer shall be aggrieved by any findings or assessment of the collector, he may, within thirty days of the receipt of notice of the assessment or finding, file a protest with the collector in writing, signed by himself or his duly authorized agent, which shall be under oath and shall set forth the reason therefor, and may request a hearing. Thereafter, the collector shall grant a hearing to said dealer, if a hearing has been requested, and may make any order confirming, modifying or vacating any such finding or assessment. The filing of any such protest shall not abate any penalty for nonpayment, nor shall it stay the right of the taxing authority to collect the tax in any manner herein provided....

The Collector argues the Companies are “dealers,” not “taxpayers,” for 1 upurposes of this proceeding. According to the Collector, La. R.S. 47:337.51 contains different notice provisions for “taxpayers” and “dealers,” and the notices issued to the Companies notified them of the specific hearing remedy for “dealers” set forth in La. R.S. 47:337.51(B) (“Section B”). Further, the second revised notices of assessments actually exceeded the statutory notice requirements. The Collector points out that it sent three assessment notices to the, Companies, each of which contained identical information and notice of rights and remedies. Thus, it is absurd for the Companies to argue that adequate notice was not provided. According to the Collector, the record establishes that the three notices of assessments, taken together, provided the Companies with more notice and time to exercise more administrative protest and appeal rights than is required by that statute.

In opposition, the Companies argue the notices of assessments were not issued in accordance with statutory requirements. La. R.S. 47:337.51(A) (“Section A”) mandates that the notice advise the taxpayer that he has sixty days to request a hearing with the collector. Section B does not modify or supplement the notice required to be given under Section A. Section A provides the exclusive notice provision relating to the assessment of local sales and use taxes, and provides the exact and only mandatory notice that must be given to every “taxpayer,” even ones who can be further classified as “dealers,” when taxes have been assessed. Section B provides a separate written protest option to dealers who wish to protest any finding or assessment. The Companies assert the Collector’s notices failed to comply with Section A, and, thus, could not have the preclusive and legal effect of denying |1fithe Companies the right to present their defenses in response to the Collector’s claims.

We agree with the Companies’ position. There is no dispute the Collector properly sent the notices of assessments to the Companies at the proper addresses and that the Companies received the notices. The disputed issue is whether the notices provided the statutorily-required information. In Black v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., this court stated:

Words and phrases must be read with their context and construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. The word “shall” is mandatory and the word “may” is permissive. Further, every word, sentence, or provision in a law is presumed to be intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Consequently, courts are bound, if possible, to give effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause, or word as meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to and preserving all words can legitimately be found.

Breaking down the language of the statute, Section A provides that once a collector assesses the amount of tax determined to be due, “the collector shall send a notice by certified mail to the taxpayer against whom the assessment is imposed.... ” Further, Section A provides that this notice “shall inform the taxpayer of the assessment and that he has sixty calendar days from the date of the notice to ... request a hearing with the collector....” Given the clear and explicit language of the statute, the only conclusion is that Section A provides mandatory notice requirements that must be sent to all taxpayers against whom an assessment is imposed.

Despite the mandatory nature of this language, the Collector urges because the Companies are also dealers, the notice requirements are instead governed by Section B. Section B provides that “if any dealer shall be aggrieved by any findings or | ^assessment of the collector, he may, within thirty days of the receipt of notice of the assessment or finding, file a protest with the collector in writing ... and may request a hearing.” We do not find that Section B provides separate notice requirements for dealers. Notably, there is no separate assessment procedure for dealers. All taxpayers, including dealers, are assessed under the same procedural provisions of the ULSTC. Section B is not an alternative to Section A, nor does it contain specific provisions relative to notice. Had the Legislature not intended Section A to apply to dealers, it could have easily worded the statute to so provide. We read the language of Section B as providing additional rights and remedies to dealers who have additional duties and responsibilities as both the collector and remitter of taxes. Section B provides a separate protest procedure available to dealers who are aggrieved by any finding of a collector, not solely an assessment. These remedies can be utilized to protest findings a collector intends to enforce prospectively. It is not limited to situations where taxes are due.

Section A requires the notice inform the taxpayer it has sixty calendar days from the date of the notice to (1) pay the amount of the assessment; (2) request a hearing with the collector; or (3) pay the amount under protest in accordance with La. R.S. 47:337.63. The notices in this case did advise the Companies they had sixty days to pay the amount of the assessment or pay the amount under protest. However, the notices failed to advise the Companies they had sixty days to request a hearing with the Collector. Rather, the notices advised the Companies that pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.51(B), they had thirty days to file a written protest and request a hearing. Thus, because the notices failed to comply with the mandatory notice requirements of Section A, we find they were deficient. This court has referred to a final assessment as one that becomes due, collectible and enforceable by the Collector in h7any manner authorized by law. The Collector’s failure in this case to adhere to the strict mandatory requirements of La. R.S. 47:337.51(A) prevented the assessments from becoming final. Therefore, the Companies are not barred from presenting their defenses in response to the Collector’s claims.

The Collector argues the validity of the notice is a defense presented by the Companies which should not be considered because the Companies did not timely and properly plead this defense in the district court, as required by La. R.S. 47:337.61(2). That statute requires all defenses be made at one time and filed in court prior to the time fixed for hearing. The Collector notes the Companies failed to raise this defense until more than a year after the summary proceedings were originally set for hearing. Conversely, the Companies assert the validity of the assessments is not a defense, but an essential legal element of the Collector’s claim. Moreover, the Companies argue their defenses were timely filed in response to the Collector’s supplemental and amending petitions.

As previously stated, the Collector’s motions for partial summary judgment were based solely on the alleged finality of the assessments. Supported by the affidavit of its sales tax director under the authority of La. R.S. 47:337.61(4), the Collector essentially asserted it had properly followed the assessment procedure and had issued notices to the Companies in compliance with La. R.S. 47:337.51. And, because the Companies failed to respond to the notices of assessments, the Collector asserted the assessments had become final and could no longer be disputed by the Companies. Because the Collector’s claims are premised on its assertions that the assessments were final and thus equivalent to judgments, which cannot be challenged by the Companies, we find the issue of the validity of the notices of assessments 1 ^constituted an essential element of the Collector’s claims rather than strictly a defense asserted by the Companies.

This court recently held that summary judgments are not precluded in summary proceedings. Because we hold the assessments are not final, we must determine whether the Collector is entitled to partial summary judgments absent reliance on the assessments. Our review of the record compels us to find the court of appeal properly reversed the grants of partial summary judgment in this case. The district court issued partial summary judgments in favor of the Collector against each Company “declaring that the [second revised assessments]” in their respective sums plus penalties and interest as stated in the assessments, “is final and is the executory judgment of this Honorable Court, reserving the Collector its claim for reasonable attorney fees and audit costs to be determined in a subsequent summary proceeding.” However, because we have found the assessments are not final, the Collector was required to support its claims for taxes with evidence. The facts alleged in the Collector’s petitions and attested to by the supporting affidavit were incorrect relative to the adequacy of the notices of assessments and the finality of the assessments, thus they do not constitute a prima facie ease establishing the Companies owe the alleged tax amounts. Further, the Collector did not submit any additional documentation or other evidence to prove or support its tax claims. Under these factual circumstances, the Collector failed to prove the substance of its tax claims, and the district court erred in granting the motions for partial summary judgment. The court of appeal properly reversed these judgments and remanded the matters back to the district court.

Finally, considering our determination that the assessments were not final, we also find the district court erred in prohibiting the Companies from pursuing their | ^defenses and ruling the Companies’ exceptions were moot on that basis. Because this matter will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings, we address the issue of whether the Companies’ defenses were asserted timely. We have already determined that the issue of validity of the notices of assessments was not a defense in this case, but rather an element of the Collector’s claims based on alleged finality of the assessments. In addition to challenging the validity of the notices, the Companies asserted numerous defenses and exceptions in response to the Collector’s original and supplemental petitions. La. R.S. 47:337.61(2) requires all defenses to be “presented at one time” and filed “prior to the time fixed for the hearing;” otherwise, the court is prohibited from considering the defense.

In these cases, the Collector filed its original petitions on September 27, 2010, as summary proceedings to collect taxes brought solely pursuant to local ordinances. The hearing was initially set for November 8, 2010. The Companies filed exceptions and affirmative defenses on October 21, 2010. Because these defenses were asserted prior to the time fixed for the hearing, they were timely asserted. The Collector subsequently filed supplemental petitions on October 4, 2011, referencing for the first time the ULSTC and asserting that the proceedings were brought pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.61 and La. R.S. 47:337.33. The supplemental petitions also alleged for the first time that the Collector followed the assessment procedures and was entitled to judgments based on the finality of the assessments. A hearing was initially set for November 14, 2011. On November 10, 2011, the Companies filed exceptions and affirmative defenses relative to the supplemental petitions. We also find these exceptions and defenses were timely asserted. Although La. R.S. 47:337.61(2) requires defenses be presented “at one time,” the Collector’s supplemental petitions made new allegations and asserted for the first time claims based on the finality of the | ^assessments. Thus, any exception or defense based on the supplemental petitions could not have been presented at the same time as the originally-filed exceptions and defenses. Because the Companies’ asserted these defenses prior to the scheduled hearing date on the supplemental petitions, we find they were filed timely.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm. The court of appeal properly reversed the district court’s grants of partial summary judgment and remanded these matters to the district court for further proceedings.

DECREE

AFFIRMED.

GUIDRY, Justice,

dissents and assigns reasons.

|,I respectfully dissent from the majority decision today finding that the tax assessment notices sent to the defendant companies were null and void and without effect. This case concerns an effort by the plaintiff taxing authorities, generally referred to as the “Collector,” to collect sales and use taxes that the defendant companies allegedly failed to charge and collect from their customers on their taxable sales, leases, and/or repairs for certain tax periods. The defendant companies, the exclusive Caterpillar Tractor Company franchise dealers in Louisiana, sold, leased, and/or repaired Caterpillar equipment and machinery throughout the state. The Collector alleged the companies were liable for these taxes, as well as penalties and interest under the provisions of the Uniform Local Sales Tax Code (“ULSTC”).

| aWithin the ULSTC, La.Rev.Stat. 47:337.51 sets forth the requirements of the notice of assessment to be given by the Collector. A plain reading of La. Rev Stat. 47:337.51(A) and (B) reveals that “taxpayers” and “dealers” have different obligations under the statute. Paragraph A clearly is generally directed to all “taxpayers,” defined in La.Rev.Stat. 47:2(4) as “any person liable to pay a tax or file a return under any provision in which the word ‘taxpayer’ appears, regardless of whether such person has paid any tax or filed the required return.” Thus, the Collector must inform the “taxpayer” of the assessment and that he has sixty calendar days from the date of the notice to (a) pay the amount of the assessment, (b) request a hearing with the collector, or (c) pay under protest in accordance with La.Rev. Stat. 47:337.63.

Paragraph (B) of La.Rev.Stat. 47:337.51 is specifically directed to “dealers.” A “dealer” is defined in La.Rev.Stat. 47:301(4) as follows:

“Dealer” includes every person who manufactures or produces tangible personal property for sale at retail, for use, or consumption, or distribution, or for storage to be used or consumed in a taxing jurisdiction. “Dealer” is further defined to mean:
(a) Every person who imports, or causes to be imported, tangible personal property from any other state, foreign country, or other taxing jurisdiction for sale at retail, for use, or consumption, or distribution, or for storage to be used or consumed in a taxing jurisdiction.
(b) Every person who sells at retail, or who offers for sale at retail, or who has in his possession for sale at retail, or for use, or consumption, or distribution, or storage to be used or consumed in the taxing jurisdiction, tangible personal property as defined herein.
(c) Any person who has sold at retail, or used, or consumed, or distributed, or stored for use or consumption in the taxing jurisdiction, tangible personal property and who cannot prove that the tax levied by this Chapter has been paid on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, or the storage of said tangible personal property.
|s(d)(i) Any person who leases or rents tangible personal property for a consideration, permitting the use or possession of the said property without transferring title thereto.
(f) Any person, who sells or furnishes any of the services subject to tax under this Chapter.
(h) Any person engaging in business in the taxing jurisdiction.

There can be little doubt that the defendants in this case are “dealers” within the meaning of La.Rev.Stat. 47:301.

Paragraph (B) of La.Rev.Stat. 47:337.51 provides for different notice requirements and remedies for a “dealer” and places a different time limitation in which the “dealer” may request a hearing with the Collector. This court has repeatedly found that, as a general rule of statutory interpretation, a specific statute controls over a broader, more general statute. Burge v. State, 10-2229 (La.2/11/11), 54 So.3d 1110, 1113. Paragraph B of La.Rev. Stat. 47:337.51 specifically provides that “[i]f any dealer shall be aggrieved by any findings or assessments of the collector, he may, within thirty days of the receipt of notice of the assessment or finding, file a protest with the collector in writing, signed by himself or his duly authorized agent, which shall be under oath and shall set forth the reason therefor, and may request a hearing.” The time limitation for a “taxpayer” under La.Rev.Stat. 47:337.51(A) to respond to an assessment, including the request for a hearing with the collector, is “sixty calendar days from the date of the notice ...,” whereas a “dealer” is required to respond “within thirty days of the receipt of the notice of assessment....” As the majority notes, dealers have additional duties and responsibilities as both the collector and remitter of taxes, and Paragraph (B) does indeed grant dealers different rights and remedies |4from an ordinary “taxpayer,” However, in exchange for those additional rights and remedies, and presumably in light of the additional duties and responsibilities of a “dealer,” Paragraph (B) also specifies a different time period in which the dealers must respond to the assessment or finding of the collector. Such a reading, which the Collector here urges, is both logical and reasonable, gives full effect to both paragraphs, and certainly leads to no absurd results. It is well-settled as a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that “when a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” La. Civ.Code art. 9; McLane Southern, Inc. v. Bridges, 11-1141, pp. 5-6 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 479, 483.

In my view, the subject notices (the “second revised assessments”) issued by the Collector to these dealer defendants fully complied with the requirements of La.Rev.Stat. 47:337.51(A) and (B). As the majority finds, the notices advised the companies they had sixty days from the date of the notice to pay the amount of the assessment or pay the amount under protest, as required for every “taxpayer” including a “dealer.” The notices also complied with Paragraph B, in that they informed the defendant companies that pursuant to that paragraph, they had thirty days from receipt of the notice to file a written protest and request a hearing. The companies, however, did not respond within thirty days from the receipt of notice. Accordingly, I believe the trial court correctly found that these notices, specifically the second revised assessments, sufficiently ' complied with La.Rev.Stat. 47:337.51 (A) and (B), properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Collector declaring the . notices of assessment to be final and to establish liability for the tax assessed that may be collected either by distraint or through the judicial process. See La.Rev.Stat. 47:337.51(C). Therefore, the trial court correctly held |fithe Companies were precluded from attacking the notices of assessment. For these reasons, I would reverse the appellate court’s decision and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.1 et seq.

      . Catahoula Parish School Bd. v. Louisiana Machinery Rentals, LLC, 12-443, 12-444 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/24/12), 105 So.3d 169.

      . Catahoula Parish School Bd. v. Louisiana Machinery Rentals, LLC, 12-2504 (La.5/17/13), 118 So.3d 381.

      . Washington Parish Sheriff's Office v. Louisiana Machinery Co., LLC, 13-0583 (La.5/17/13), 118 So.3d 382.

      . The First Circuit case is resolved in separate opinion issued contemporaneously herewith.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.48(B) provides, in pertinent part: "If a return or report made and filed does not correctly compute the liability of the taxpayer, the collector shall cause an audit, investigation, or examination, as provided for by R.S. 47:337.35, to be made to determine the tax, penalty, and interest due. Having determined the amount of tax, penalty, and interest due, the collector shall send by mail a notice to the taxpayer ... setting out his determination and informing the person of his purpose to assess the amount so determined against him after thirty calendar days from the date of the notice.”

      . La. R.S. 47:337.49 provides, in pertinent part: "The taxpayer ... within thirty calendar days from the date of the notice provided in R.S. 47:337.48(B), may protest thereto. This protest must be in writing and should fully disclose the reasons, together with facts and figures in substantiation thereof, for objecting to the collector’s determination. The collector shall consider the protest, and shall grant a hearing thereon, before making a final determination of tax, penalty, and interest due.”

      .This statute was amended by Acts 2010, No. 1003, § 2, effective January 1, 2011. Because the notices of assessments were issued prior to the effective date of the amendment, the pre-2011 version of the statute is relevant. In 2009, La. R.S. 47:337.51 provided, in pertinent part:
      A. Having assessed the amount determined to be due, the collector shall send a notice by certified mail to the taxpayer against whom the assessment is imposed at the address given in the last report filed by said taxpayer, or to any address obtainable from any private entity which will provide such address free of charge or from any federal, state, or local government entity, including but not limited to the United States Postal Service or from the United States Postal Service certified software. If no report has been timely filed, the collector shall send a notice by certified mail to the taxpayer against whom the assessment is imposed at any address obtainable from any private entity which will provide such address free of charge or from any federal, state, or local government entity, including but not limited to the United States Postal Service or from the United States Postal Service certified software. This notice shall inform the taxpayer of the assessment and that he has sixty calendar days from the date of the notice to (a) pay the amount of the assessment; (b) request a hearing with the collector; or (c) pay under protest in accordance with R.S. 47:337.63.
      B. If any dealer shall be aggrieved by any findings or assessment of the collector, he may, within thirty days of the receipt of notice of the assessment or finding, file a protest with the collector in writing, signed by himself or his duly authorized agent, which shall be under oath and shall set forth the reason therefor, and may request a hearing. Thereafter, the collector shall grant a hearing to said dealer, if a hearing has been requested, and may make any order confirming, modifying or vacating any such finding or assessment. The filing of any such protest shall not abate any penalty for nonpayment, nor shall it stay the right of the taxing authority to collect the tax in any manner herein provided. Appeals from the decision of the collector shall be directed to any state, city or federal court of competent jurisdiction. This Section shall afford a legal remedy and right of action in any state, city or federal court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter for a full and complete adjudication of any and all questions arising in the enforcement of the local ordinance and this Chapter as to the legality of any tax accrued or accruing or the method of enforcement thereof.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.33(A)(1) provides: "On motion in a court of competent jurisdiction, the collector may take a rule on a taxpayer, to show cause in not less than two or more than ten days, exclusive of holidays, why the taxpayer should not be ordered to cease from further pursuit of his business for failure to pay to the taxing authority amounts collected from others by his business as sales and use tax, along with any interest, penalty, and costs related to such tax. Such rule may be taken only for amounts due as a result of assessments or judgments which have become final and nonappealable."

      . La. R.S. 47:337.61 provides, in pertinent part: "In addition to any other procedure provided in this Chapter or elsewhere in the laws of this state, and for the purpose of facilitating and expediting the determination and trial of all claims for taxes, penalties, interest, attorney fees, or other costs and charges arising, there is hereby provided a summary proceeding for the hearing and determination of all claims by or on behalf of the taxing authority, or by or on behalf of the collector, for taxes and for the penalties, interest, attorney fees, costs-or other charges due thereon, by preference in all courts, all as follows....”

      .La. R.S. 47:337.65 provides: “Except as is specifically provided in the laws regulating building and loan associations, any tax, penalty, interest, attorney fees, or other costs due shall operate as a lien, privilege and mortgage on all of the property of the tax debtor, both movable and immovable, which said lien, privilege and mortgage shall be enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction in an action, at law, or may be enforced as otherwise provided by this Chapter. The collector may cause notice of such lien, privilege and mortgage to be recorded at any time after the tax becomes due, whether assessed or not, and regardless of whether or not then payable, in the mortgage records of any parish wherein the collector has reason to believe the tax debtor owns property. The lien, privilege and mortgage created by this Section shall affect third parties only from the date of recordation and shall take their respective ranks by virtue of recordation.”

      . La. R.S. 47:337.61(4) provides: "Whenever the pleadings filed on behalf of the taxing authority, or on behalf of the collector, shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the collector or of one of his assistants or representatives or of the counsel or attorney filing the same, that the facts as alleged are true to the best of the affiant’s knowledge or belief, all of the facts alleged in said pleadings shall be accepted as prima facie true and as constituting a prima facie case, and the burden of proof to establish anything to the contrary shall rest wholly on the defendant or opposing party.”

      . La. C.C.P. art. 967 provides in relevant part: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”

      .La. R.S. 47:337.61(2) provides: "All defenses, whether by exception or to the merits, made or intended to be made to any such claim, must be presented at one time and filed in the court of original jurisdiction prior to the time fixed for the hearing, and no court shall consider any defense unless so presented and filed. This provision shall be construed to deny to any court the right to extend the time for pleading defenses, and no continuance shall be granted by any court to any defendant except for legal grounds set forth in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.”

      . Property Insurance Association of Louisiana v. Theriot, 09-1152 (La.3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1012, 1014.

      . Greemon v. City of Bossier City, 10-2828 (La.7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1263, 1267.

      . La. C.C.P. art. 966(B).

      . Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 09-0449 (La.10/20/09), 24 So.3d 813, 816.

      . Id.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.2(A)(l)(b).

      . La. R.S. 47:337.33(A)(1).

      . Id.

      . Lá. R.S. 47:337.33(A)(5).

      . La. R.S. 47:337.48-337.60.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.61.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.45(B).

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.48(B).

      . La. R.S. 47:337.49.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.50.

      . La. R.S. 47:337.56.

      . See Collector of Revenue v. Frost, 240 La. 1067, 127 So.2d 151, 153 (1961); Collector of Revenue v. Olvey, 238 La. 980, 117 So.2d 563, 567 (1959).

      . Red Stick Studio Development, L.L. C. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Economic Development, 10-0193 (La.1/19/11), 56 So.3d 181, 187 (citing M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 27).

        . Sultana Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 03-0360 (La.12/3/03) 860 So.2d 1112, 1119; State v. Bedford, 01-2298 (La.1/28/03), 838 So.2d 758, 760.

      . La. R.S. 47:301(4) defines- ''dealer,” in part, as "includ[ing] every person who manufactures or produces tangible personal property for sale at retail, for use, or consumption, or distribution, or for storage to be used or consumed in a taxing jurisdiction.” "Dealer” is further defined to mean: "(b) Every person who sells at retail, or who offers for sale at retail, or who has in his possession for sale at retail, or for use, or consumption, or distribution, or storage to be used or consumed in the taxing jurisdiction, tangible personal property as defined herein; (d)(i) Any person who leases or rents tangible personal property for a consideration, permitting the .use or possession of the said property without transferring title thereto; (f) Any person, who sells or furnishes any of the services subject to tax under this Chapter; (h) Any person engaging in business in the taxing jurisdiction.”

      . La. R.S. 47:2(4) defines a "taxpayer” as "any person liable to pay a tax or file a return under any provision in which the word 'taxpayer' appears, regardless of whether such person has paid any tax or filed the required return.”

      . 08-2670 (La.l 1/6/09), 25 So.3d 711, 717 (internal citations removed); see also La. R.S. 1:3.

      . See Ortlieb Press v. Mouton, 268 So.2d 85, 89 (La.App. 1 Cir.1972).

      . Caldwell Parish School Bd. v. Louisiana Machinery Co., LLC, 12-1383 (La.1/29/13), 110 So.3d 993, 1001.

      . Because the issues raised in the Collector’s other assignments of error are not necessary to our resolution of this matter, we pretermit their discussion.'