author: CARAWAY, J.

text:
    Brenda Hornsby DARDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Lennie F. DARDEN, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 48,971-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 14, 2014.

      Donald L. Kneipp, Monroe, for Appellant.
    Robert W. Sharp, Jr., Ruston, for Appel-lee.
    Before STEWART, CARAWAY and PITMAN, JJ.
   CARAWAY, J.

| tThis appeal concerns the trial court’s judgment in a community property partition. The former wife appeals the trial court’s valuation of a motor vehicle, determination that the parties remain co-owners of a mobile home in which the parties’ son resides, and allocation of household items in the former matrimonial home entirely to the former husband. The former wife also appeals the award for reimbursement to the former husband for debt payments made on a registered travel trailer after the termination of the community. Because we find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual determinations and no abuse of discretion in allocating the former community property, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Facts and Procedural Background

Lennie F. Darden, Jr., (“Lennie”) and Brenda Hornsby Darden (“Brenda”) were married on September 26, 1981. On November 5, 2009, Brenda filed a petition for divorce pursuant to Civil Code Article 102. Brenda later filed an amended petition seeking, among other things, a partition of former community property. A judgment of divorce was granted on December 16, 2010.

A special master was appointed on December 17, 2010, to make recommendations for allocation of assets and liabilities in the community property partition. Many community assets were included, such as immovable property, a backhoe, several vehicles, several tractors, a 401k plan, guns, and several bank accounts. Appraisers were appointed by the special master. After two hearings, the special master issued reasons and recommendations on May 18, 2012, and filed an amended recommendation |2on June 14, 2012. Both parties objected to the special master’s recommendations, and a trial was held on the objections on November 15, 2012.

The trial court, for the most part, adopted the recommendations of the special master, and a judgment was signed and filed partitioning the former community property on March 11, 2013. Lennie was allocated nearly all the property subject to the partition with the exception of two motor vehicles. Brenda was awarded an equalizing payment of $343,725.00. The court adopted the special master’s valuation of a 2006 Dodge Ram 3500 truck at $15,000. The trial court also adopted the recommendations for an award for reimbursement of payments Lennie made on a travel trailer after the termination of the community regime, but the court altered the amount to $3,482 from $4,239. The court also adopted the recommendation that the parties remain co-owners of a mobile home in which Lennie and Brenda’s son resides, and ordered neither to sell or encumber the property without the other’s consent. Finally, the court adopted the recommendation of the special master for the allocation of household items, which included allocating all movables to Lennie with the exception of Brenda’s jewelry and Precious Moments collection.

Brenda appeals, asserting error in the partition regarding the valuation of the 2006 Dodge truck, the reimbursement for the travel trailer, the allocation of ownership of the mobile home in Bossier Parish, and the allocation of the ownership of the household movables.

Community Property Partition Law

|sWhen the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the matrimonial regime, or from the co-ownership of former community property following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a community property partition. La. R.S. 9:2801(A).

The court shall determine the community assets and liabilities; the valuation of assets shall be determined at the trial on the merits. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(2). The court may appoint such experts pursuant to Articles 192 and 373 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure as it deems proper to assist the court in the settlement of the community and partition of community property, including the classification of assets as community or separate, the appraisal of community assets, the settlement of the claims of the parties, and the allocation of assets and liabilities to the parties. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(3).

The court shall value the assets as of the time of trial on the merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the parties. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(a). The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(b). The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of the community assets and liabilities. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(c). In the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of Lmoney, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall direct. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(d).

In valuing and allocating assets and liabilities to partition community property, a trial court is not required to accept at face value a spouse’s valuation of assets, debts, or claims against the community. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 35,833 (La.App.2d Cir.4/03/02), 813 So.2d 1232. Absent manifest error, a trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations made in the course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities in order to partition community property may not be set aside on appeal. Id. The trial court’s choice of one expert’s method of valuation over that of another will not be overturned unless it is manifestly erroneous. Ellington v. Ellington, 36,943 (La.App.2d Cir.3/18/03), 842 So.2d 1160.

If separate property of a spouse has been used either during the existence of the community property regime or thereafter to satisfy a community obligation, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used. La. C.C. art. 2365. If the community obligation was incurred to acquire ownership or use of a community corporeal movable required by law to be registered, and separate property of a spouse has been used after termination to satisfy that obligation, the reimbursement claim shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the claimant’s use after termination of the community property regime. Id. The value of that use and the amount of the claim for reimbursement accrued during use are presumed to be equal. Id. |5The burden of proof is on the party claiming reimbursement to show that separate funds existed and were used to satisfy the community obligation. Tippen v. Carroll, 47,415 (La.App.2d Cir.9/20/12), 105 So.3d 100.

Discussion

Brenda does not contest the broad ruling of the trial court by which Lennie received most of the community property and by which she was compensated for her share of the value by an equalizing payment. Even regarding the two primary property items in dispute, the Dodge truck and the travel trailer, Brenda does not contest Lennie’s receipt of full ownership of those items. She only contends that the values determined for that property was too low. We therefore consider each item in dispute as a separate matter which will not affect the broad ruling for partition. The 2006 Dodge Truck

Two appraisers were appointed by the special master to appraise all community property: one to appraise community movables, another to appraise the community immovables. The appraiser for the movable property personally examined the 2006 Dodge Ram 3500 and concluded that its value was $15,000. The only evidence that Brenda introduced for the trial court for a different value was an NADA price report for a 2006 Dodge Ram 3500 Mega Cab SLT 4WD HO T-diesel. The NADA report contained a value range of $22,825 to $29,875, with the lower value being a “Rough Trade-In” value for a truck with significant mechanical defects and considerable damage to the exterior. Brenda did not have an independent appraisal conducted for the truck.

|rTAt trial, the appraisal concerning the truck as recognized by the special master’s recommendation was introduced. The court-appointed appraiser was not called by Brenda as a witness in either the hearing before the special master or the trial court. The manner of the calculation for his appraisal was therefore not challenged. The appraiser personally inspected the vehicle. Thus, he provided the only expert opinion even though the NADA price information, relied upon by Brenda, also was allowed to be received into evidence.

On this record, we agree with the trial court’s reliance upon the work of the appraiser, who actually saw the vehicle. The court’s choice of that evidence has not been shown to present manifest error.

The Travel Trailer

The trial court effectively reimbursed Lennie one-half of the monthly payments he made on the travel trailer debt after termination of the community. Brenda thus received one-half of the value of the travel trailer less one-half of those monthly payments. Brenda objects to this calculation claiming that Lennie’s payments on the debt should be offset by his use of the travel trailer.

During the proceedings, Lennie testified that he had suffered a stroke and was unable to use most of the equipment on his property, including the travel trailer. Both parties testified that neither wanted the travel trailer; Brenda said she had no use for it, while Lennie said he was physically unable to use it. Lennie testified that the travel trailer has not been used since he and Brenda separated and that it has just been sitting on his property. He testified that he attempted to sell the travel trailer, but he was |7unable to do so because Brenda refused. Brenda testified she refused to sell the travel trailer because Lennie had only attempted to sell it to one potential purchaser for a value ($11,000) that she believed was less than it was worth ($18,000). The value assigned the travel trailer for the partition was $18,000.

The parties do not contest that the travel trailer is a registered corporeal movable that was purchased during the community property regime. Therefore, the obligation incurred to purchase the travel trailer was a community obligation and the travel trailer was community property. See La. C.C. arts. 2338 and 2340. Lennie proved that he made payments for 23 months on the note for the travel trailer totaling $6,964. Under the general rule of Article 2365, supra, Lennie is entitled to one-half of this payment, which the court calculated to be $3,482. However, because the travel trailer is a registered corporeal movable, his reimbursement claim shall be reduced by the value of his use of the travel trailer. However, Lennie testified that he never used the travel trailer, that he did not want it, and that it was merely parked since Brenda left the matrimonial home. Brenda did not present any evidence that Lennie actually used the travel trailer.

The rule concerning reimbursement for registered community corporeal movables is a codification of prior jurisprudence recognizing the inequity of allowing a spouse with the use of an automobile to obtain full reimbursement while contributing to its rapid and substantial decrease in value. La. C.C. art. 2365, Revision Comment (b) (2009). The trial court’s determination that Lennie did not use the movable property therefore allows | Rfor Lennie’s reimbursement of Brenda’s share of the debt. Finding no manifest error, we affirm this reimbursement award.

The Mobile Home

Brenda argues that the trial court committed manifest error by ordering that the mobile home remain co-owned by the parties, and she argues that their son’s interest in the property should be recognized, “as well.” The trial court ordered that neither party alienate or encumber the property without the other’s consent. She argues that because she and Lennie “donated” the property to their son, the trial court failed to recognize his interest. Lennie responds by conceding that he and Brenda bought the home for their son’s use and that he “has no objection to transferring title to him.”

We find no error in the trial court’s ruling leaving the parties as co-owners of the mobile home. Brenda retains the power to donate her undivided interest to her son. We do not view the trial court’s judgment as prohibiting such result since Lennie agrees that the interest of their son was their common objective.

The Household Items

Finally, Brenda argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allocating household items in the partition. She argues that the trial court should have allocated one-half of the contents to each party instead of awarding only her personal jewelry and Precious Moments collection to her. She requested a master bedroom suite, a table and six chairs, some ice | ¡¡chests, a weed eater, a KitchenAid stand, either a vacuum cleaner or shampooer, and a 46-inch television and entertainment center.

Lennie argues that Brenda departed the family home in October 2009 and took items from the home, such as her car, clothes and other personal effects, before an appraisal could be conducted. He argues that the in globo appraisal of the movables in the home was not manifestly erroneous and that the allocation of items in the home to him was not an abuse of discretion. The value of such appraisal was a determinant for the amount of Brenda’s equalizing payment award.

The appraiser of the movable property valued the assets in the home, but he gave only an aggregate value for them. It was within the court’s discretion to accept this valuation of the movables owned by the parties. Furthermore, the trial court has the discretion to allocate an asset in its entirety to one spouse or the other. However, in the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(d). Brenda did not receive the movables that she wished; however, she did not express a particular pressing need or emotional attachment to such items. Likewise, she did not directly challenge the appraised value of the household movables by evidence of the value of each item. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s acceptance of the appraised value of all household movables was not clearly wrong.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed to appellant.

ImAFFIRMED.

      . An obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation. La. C.C. art. 2360.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LOLLEY, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Louis J. BRADFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant v. WEBSTER PARISH POLICE JURY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 48,981-WCA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 14, 2014.

      Louis J. Bradford, pro se.
    Lunn, Irion, Salley, Carlisle, & Gardner, Shreveport, By: Walter S. Salley, for Ap-pellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, LOLLEY and PITMAN, JJ.
   LOLLEY, J.

| T Louis J. Bradford, appearing pro se, appeals a judgment from the Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 1W, Parish of Webster, State of Louisiana (“OWC”), in favor of the Webster Parish Police Jury. For the following reasons, we affirm the OWC’s judgment.

Facts

On December 9, 2011, while employed as a driver with the Webster Parish Police Jury (“WPPJ”), Bradford suffered a com-pensable work-related accident when a buzzard flew into the windshield of a vehicle he was driving and shattered pieces of glass into both of his eyes. Bradford was immediately taken to the Minden Medical Center where he received treatment for his injuries. Following his initial treatment with the Minden Medical Center, Bradford was examined by Dr. James Swearingen, who prescribed Alrex and Be-preve. Both medications were approved and paid for by the WPPJ’s insurer, the Louisiana Commerce and Trade Association Self Insurers Fund (“LCTA”).

Thereafter, Bradford became displeased with the care Dr. Swearingen was providing, and on March 6, 2012, he contacted the LCTA and requested to transfer his medical treatment to another eye physician, Dr. Bruce Henderson. Bradford completed the necessary form and confirmed this change with the WPPJ. Eventually, on March 28, 2012, Bradford was examined by Dr. Henderson, who prescribed an Ocudox kit. The Ocudox kit was approved and paid for by the LCTA on April 9, 2012.

In May 2012, and subsequent to his visit with Dr. Henderson, Bradford requested refills of the two medications prescribed by Dr. Swearingen. However, Bradford’s request was denied by the LCTA since |2his medical treatment had been transferred to Dr. Henderson, a new treating physician, who did not renew or prescribe Alrex and Bepreve.

As a result, Bradford filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation (Form 1008) against the WPPJ and the LCTA seeking approval for the refills of Alrex and Be-preve. In this same claim, Bradford also alleged that he was entitled to benefits stemming from an occupational disease. Following a bench trial, the workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”) rendered judgment in favor of the WPPJ finding that Bradford failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the medications prescribed by Dr. Swearingen were reasonably necessary as required by La. R.S. 23:1203. In particular, the WCJ noted that although Dr. Swearingen initially prescribed the medications, Bradford subsequently selected Dr. Henderson as his treating physician. Dr. Henderson did not prescribe Alrex or Bepreve, nor did his records indicate that Bradford should continue taking the medications. The WCJ also considered the fact that Bradford consulted a third physician who did not renew or prescribe Alrex or Bepreve.

In addition, the WCJ rejected Bradford’s claim for benefits for an occupational disease. More specifically, the WCJ explained that Bradford’s injury was not the result of an occupational disease; rather, it was the result of a work-related accident, which would likewise fall under the Workers’ Compensation Act. It is from this judgment that Bradford appeals.

| ^Discussion

On appeal, Bradford challenges the WCJ’s judgment denying the refills of medication prescribed by Dr. Swearingen. Bradford also alleges that the WCJ erred in failing to award benefits for an occupational disease.

Factual findings in workers’ compensation matters are subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of appellate review. Johnson v. T & J Hauling Co., 46,853 (La.App.2d Cir.01/25/12), 86 So.3d 1, writ denied, 2012-0657 (La.04/20/12), 85 So.3d 1276. In applying the manifest error or clearly wrong standard, the court must determine not whether the trier of fact was wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart v. State through Dep’t. of Trans. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). Whether the claimant has carried her burden of proof and whether testimony is credible are questions of fact to be determined by the WCJ. Taylor v. Hollywood Casino, 41,196 (La.App.2d Cir.06/28/06), 935 So.2d 293. The manifest error standard applies even when the WCJ’s decision is based upon written reports, records or depositions. Alexander v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 42,855 (La.App.2d Cir.01/09/08), 975 So.2d 100, writ denied, 2008-0503 (La.04/25/08), 978 So.2d 367.

Medical Expenses

It is well settled that an employer is obligated to furnish all necessary drugs, supplies, hospital care and services, medical and surgical treatment, and any nonmedical treatment recognized by the laws of this state as legal. La. R.S. 23:1203. A workers’ compensation claimant must prove that the medical expenses are reasonably necessary for the treatment of a medical 14condition caused by a work-related injury. Pardee v. Forest Haven Nursing Home, 42,321 (La.App.2d Cir.06/20/07) 960 So.2d 1216. The claimant must prove the necessity of the treatment and the causal connection between the treatment and the employment-related accident by a preponderance of the evidence. Taylor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 40,179 (La.App.2d Cir.09/21/05), 914 So.2d 579, writ not cons., 2006-0144 (La.04/17/06), 926 So.2d 500, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1157, 127 S.Ct. 982, 166 L.Ed.2d 783 (2007). Thus, the issue on appeal is whether the WCJ’s conclusion to deny Bradford’s request to refill the medications prescribed by Dr. Swearingen was a reasonable one. Considering the testimony and evidence in the record before us, we conclude it was.

As noted in the facts section of this opinion, Bradford initially sought treatment from Dr. Swearingen, who prescribed Alrex and Bepreve. Thereafter, Bradford complained that his treatment by Dr. Swearingen was ineffective, so he changed his treating physician to Dr. Henderson. Dr. Henderson did not prescribe Bepreve or Alrex, but instead prescribed an Ocudox kit. Nowhere in Dr. Henderson’s records did he renew the medications prescribed by Dr. Swearingen, nor did he recommend Bradford continue taking the medications as prescribed. In fact, Bradford sought treatment from a third physician who did not renew or prescribe Alrex or Bepreve. Consequently, because Bradford presented no relevant evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the refills of Bepreve and Alrex were reasonably necessary, we cannot say that the WCJ was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in denying Bradford’s claim.

Occupational Disease

|sWe also detect no error in the WCJ’s decision not to award benefits for an occupational disease. As noted by the WCJ, Bradford’s injuries do not meet the definition of an occupational disease pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1031.1. However, despite not qualifying as an occupational disease, Bradford’s compensable work-related injury will indeed be covered under the scheme provided for by the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Future Medical Treatment, Penalties, and Attorney Fees

As a final matter, we note that in the conclusion portion of his pro se appeal brief, Bradford requests future medical treatment for doctors, glasses, prescription medications, penalties, interest, pain and suffering, punitive damages, and attorney fees. However, Bradford did not brief this issue, nor was it ever raised at trial. In fact, Bradford never asserted a claim for future medical treatment, penalties, or attorney fees in his Form 1008 complaint. Therefore, this issue is not properly before this Court on appeal.

Nevertheless, recognizing Bradford’s pro se status, even if properly before this Court on appeal, we conclude that Bradford would not be entitled to future medical treatment, penalties, or attorney fees. First, pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1203, liability for medical expenses arises only as those expenses are incurred. Brown v. KTBS, Inc., 42,847 (La.App.2d Cir.01/09/08), 974 So.2d 784; writ denied, 2008-0353 (La.02/15/08), 974 So.2d 1279. Said differently, a claimant is not entitled to an award for future medical expenses, but the right to claim such expenses is always reserved to the claimant. Knotts v. Snelling Temporaries, 27,773 (La.App.2d Cir.12/06/95), 665 So.2d 657. Thus, Bradford is not entitled to an award for future medical expenses, but he may make a claim for any subsequent 1 ^medical expense reasonably necessary for the treatment of his work-related eye injury.

Second, the failure to provide payment of benefits will result in penalties and attorney fees “unless the claim is reasonably controverted or if such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or insurer had no control.” La. R.S. 23:1201 F(2); McCarroll v. Airport Shuttle Inc., 2000-1123 (La.11/28/00), 773 So.2d 694; J.P. Morgan Chase v. Louis, 44,309 (La.App.2d Cir.05/13/09), 12 So.3d 440. The phrase “reasonably controvert” means that the defendant must have “some valid reason or evidence on which to base his denial of benefits.” Dugan v. St. Francis Med. Center, 45,149 (La.App.2d Cir.04/14/10), 34 So.3d 1157, writ denied, 2010-1114 (La.09/03/10), 44 So.3d 685. Here, we conclude that the WPPJ properly controverted Bradford’s claim, when it pointed to specific evidence in support of its argument that the medications were not reasonably necessary. At the time the LCTA denied Bradford’s request it was apparent that Bradford had transferred his treatment to Dr. Henderson. Dr. Henderson did not renew the prescriptions, nor did he indicate that they were necessary for Bradford’s treatment.

Further, and for a different reason, Bradford is not entitled to attorney fees. Under Louisiana jurisprudence, recovery of attorney fees is not available to one who represents himself because he has incurred no out-of-pocket legal expenses. See Guidry v. Cytec Indus., 2000-197 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/11/00), 772 So.2d 194. Therefore, Bradford, as a pro se claimant, is not entitled to attorney fees.

Conclusion

|7So considering, the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation in favor of the Webster Parish Police Jury is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Louis J. Bradford.

AFFIRMED.


author: BROWN, Chief Judge.

text:
    SUCCESSION OF James Arnold CROWSON, Jr.
    No. 48,985-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 14, 2014.

      McMichael, Medlin, D’Anna, Wedge-worth & Lafargue, Shreveport, by James C. McMichael, Jr., William D. Medlin, for Appellant, James A. Crowson, III.
    The Parks Firm, LLC by Santi A. Parks, Bossier City, for-Plaintiff-Appellee, Jean McDonald Crowson.
    Hargove, Smelly, Strickland, & Langley, APLC, Shreveport, by Julianna P. Parks, Paul A. Strickland, for Defendant-Appel-lee, Green Oaks Farms, Inc.
    Before BROWN, WILLIAMS, and DREW, JJ.
   BROWN, Chief Judge.

| ¶ Plaintiff, James Arnold Crowson, III, son of decedent, James Arnold Crowson, Jr., sought to have a private sale of succession property vacated and the property returned to the succession. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant/administratrix, Jean Crowson, dismissing plaintiffs petition. In addition, the trial court granted an exception of peremption in favor of defendant/purchaser, Green Oak Farms, Inc. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural Background

James Arnold Crowson, Jr. (“decedent”) died September 29, 2003, in Shreveport, Louisiana. Decedent was married twice. His first marriage was to Marie Farmer, which ended in divorce in 1952. One child was born of this marriage, James Arnold Crowson, III (“Crowson, III”). Decedent’s second marriage was to Jean McDonald Crowson, who survives him. Four children were born of this marriage: Sara Jean Crowson Harville, Peggy Ruth Crow-son Cash, Ronald Lamar Crowson, and Charles Henry Crowson. Charles Henry Crowson died before decedent and was survived by two minor children, Charles Jeb Crowson and Caitlan Faith Crowson.

Although decedent executed a will, it was not dated, making it invalid. Thus, decedent died intestate. Three years after the death of decedent, Jean Crowson opened the current succession proceeding and was appointed administratrix.

Relevant to this appeal, the detailed descriptive list filed in the succession proceedings shows community property consisting of approximately 210 acres in Cad-do Parish, Louisiana, valued at $550,660.50. It is actually listed as two tracts: a 34.55 acre tract on which the family ^residence is located, and a 176.05 acre tract referred to as the farm. Decedent’s succession would own one-half of this property subject to the surviving spouse’s usufruct.

On June 13, 2008, Jean Crowson filed a Petition and Order for Authority to Convey Immovable Property at Private Sale— the 210 acres. The petition sought to convey the property at a private sale to Green Oaks Farm, Inc., (hereinafter “Green Oaks”) for the stated purpose of returning the property from its nominal owners (the decedent and Jean Crowson) to its true owner (Green Oaks). Green Oaks was a family corporation owned entirely by a 1969 trust in which the only shareholders were Jean Crowson’s four children. We note that the petition states that attached as an exhibit is a 1986 cash sale deed, which is relevant to these proceedings. Attached, however, is an unrelated mortgage executed by non-parties. Nonetheless, the trial court, ex parte, signed an order granting Jean Crowson the authority to sell the property at private sale. Thereafter, Jean Crowson advertised the sale of the property in the Shreveport Times on June 30, 2008, and July 22, 2008.

On June 2, 1986, Green Oaks sold by cash sale deed the 210 acres in Caddo Parish, Louisiana to decedent and his wife, Jean Crowson. The cash sale deed stated that “[t]his sale is made for the consideration of the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Six Hundred Sixty and 50/100 (270,660.50) Dollars cash in hand paid, the receipt which is hereby 1 ..¡acknowledged.” Executing the deed on behalf of Green Oaks was decedent, as chairman of the board, and Jean Crowson, as secretary/treasurer. Both decedent and Jean Crowson also executed the deed as purchasers. The deed was subsequently recorded that same day. ‘

According to Jean Crowson’s deposition testimony, “Whatever Jimmy needed to have money for, he used the land as his bank and he put the land up as collateral to get what he needed. And when the money was paid back, the land was put back in Green Oaks Farms’ name,” and “The only thing we owed Green Oaks Farms is we borrowed the land to borrow money for what Jimmy needed to buy other things.”

Since the trust could not borrow money, the trust’s property was sold to decedent and his wife who would then borrow funds from the Federal Land Bank. After the 1986 transfer of property from Green Oaks to decedent and Jean Crowson, they obtained a loan in the amount of $285,000 from the Federal Land Bank. According to the detailed descriptive list approximately $30,000 was still owed to the Federal Land Bank. Also listed on the detailed descriptive list is a $230,000 debt owed to Green Oaks. In 2008, the debt owed to the Federal Land Bank was fully paid, prompting Jean Crowson’s petition to convey the property back to Green Oaks.

|4On July 31, 2008, Judge Sexton signed a court order that authorized the conveyance of the property to Green Oaks. The conveyance was completed on August 5, 2008. Crowson, III, was unaware of the conveyance of the property to Green Oaks until sometime after the conveyance was finalized.

On October 1, 2008, Crowson, III, filed a motion to vacate the conveyance and to close the succession. Four months after the opening of the succession, Crowson, III, hired an attorney who requested that he be provided information about the conduct of the succession, including copies of any and all pleadings. Over the next two years, Crowson, III, and his counsel continued to seek information about the status of the succession, “particularly as regards the approximate intended date on which the succession would be closed and the intestate heirs put in possession.” Although Crowson, III, received all prior succession pleadings from Jean Crowson’s counsel, he received no service or notification of the Petition and Order To Convey Immovable Property at Private Sale in regards to the 210 acres. This omission occurred even though Crowson, Ill’s, counsel made numerous attempts to contact opposing counsel, including writing a letter dated July 8, 2008, seeking a status update, a time which falls between the first and second newspaper publication notices of the private sale.

In response to Crowson, Ill’s, motion seeking annulment of the sale, Jean Crow-son and the succession filed an exception based upon Crowson, Ill’s, failure to join Green Oaks as a necessary party. The exception was granted and Green Oaks was added by amended petition on April 2, 2009. Green Oaks then filed an exception of no cause of action, urging that as a 1 Bthird party, it was protected by the trial court’s order authorizing the conveyance, and stating that it could not be annulled absent a finding, under La. C.C.P. art. 2004, that the order was obtained by fraud or ill practices. This exception was heard by Judge Lafitte, and judgment granting the exception was issued. Crowson, III, was given 15 days to amend his pleadings. An amended petition alleging fraud or ill practices was timely filed. Specifically, the amended petition alleges that the transaction was a sham, as no consideration was paid, and that it was unauthorized by the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, Green Oaks filed an exception of peremption, and Jean Crowson filed a motion for summary judgment and exception of peremption. The motion for summary judgment and the exceptions of per-emption were heard by Judge Emanuel, and judgment granting Jean Crowson’s motion for summary judgment but denying her exception of peremption was rendered. The trial court also granted Green Oaks exception of peremption. As a result of these adverse rulings, Crowson, III, filed the instant appeal.

Discussion

We note from the outset that, in its oral reasons, the trial court twice denied Jean Crowson’s motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, the signed final judgment of the trial court granted Jean Crowson’s motion for summary judgment; the basis for this ruling is unclear. The trial court granted Green Oaks’ exception of peremption based upon the fact that plaintiff failed to bring forth a claim for fraud or ill practices against it within the one-year peremptive period set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 2004.

| Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Cote v. City of Shreveport, 46,571 (La.App.2d Cir.09/21/11), 73 So.3d 435. The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). The procedure is favored under Louisiana law and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. Id. Summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(B).

Jean Crowson argues that the succession representative is allowed to convey succession property to pay debts and legacies and for any other purpose with authorization by the court. She argues that she properly followed the requirements of advertising and sale as set out in the Code of Civil Procedure. She claims that an untimely objection by Crowson, III should be rejected.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 3281 provides that a succession representative who desires to sell succession property at private sale shall file a petition setting forth a description of the property, the price and conditions of and the reasons for the proposed sale. Notice of the application for authority to sell succession property at private sale shall be published at least twice for immovable property, in the manner provided by law. A court order shall not be required for the publication of the notice. La. C.C.P. art. 3282. The notice shall be published in the parish in which the succession 17proceeding is pending. When immovable property situated in another parish is to be sold, the notice shall also be published in the parish in which the property is situated. Id. The court may authorize a succession representative to sell succession property to pay debts and legacies or for any other purpose. La. C.C.P. art. 3261. The court may authorize a credit sale, specifying the terms and the security; otherwise, the sale shall be for cash. La. C.C.P. art. 3261. The notice shall state that any opposition to the proposed sale must be filed within seven days from the date of the last publication. La. C.C.P. art. 3282. (Emphasis added).

Jean Crowson cites In re Succession of Hollis, 987 So.2d 387, 43,315 (La.App.2d Cir.06/18/08), writ denied, 08-1632 (La.10/24/08), 992 So.2d 1035, in support of her claim that the opposition was untimely and should be rejected. The Hollis case is distinguishable. In Succession of Hollis, supra, all of the heirs were given prior notification and informed of the price and reason for the sales; no heir raised any objections. Additionally, actual monetary consideration was paid to the succession.

What distinguishes the case sub judice from Succession of Hollis, supra, is that several previous notification’s of other motions to sell mineral interests, which had no value, were sent to Crowson, III, and his attorney; however, no correspondence or notice of any kind was given to Crow-son, III, or his attorney in reference to the petition to sell the 210 acres for no monetary consideration. Under the circumstances of this case, this lack of notification appears to have been intentional. The simple fact is that the private sale of succession property to Green Oaks, which was solely owned [ 8by the four children of the succession representative, clearly alienated the property interests of an heir, Crowson, III. Crowson, Ill’s, interest was not converted to cash or land, it simply vanished. See Mayo v. Doherty, 952 So.2d 853, 06-1187 (La.App.3d Cir.03/07/07), writ denied, 07-0721 (La.05/18/07), 957 So.2d 155.

Crowson, III, contends on appeal that the conveyance at issue is not authorized by any provision of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, as it was made for no consideration, and, as such, the two-year prescriptive period set forth in La. R.S. 9:5632 is controlling. Thus, considering that Crowson, Ill’s, original, supplemental and amended motions were all filed within the two-year prescriptive period, he urges that the trial court erred in granting both the motion for summary judgment filed by Jean Crowson and the exception of peremption filed by Green Oaks.

La. R.S. 9:5632, entitled “Actions against succession representatives, tutors, and curators; defect in private sales or mortgages,” provides, in part:

(A). When the legal procedure is defective or does not comply with the requisites of law in the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of movable or immovable property made by a legal representative of a succession, minor, or interdict, provided an order of court has been entered authorizing such alienation, encumbrance, or lease, any action shall be prescribed against by those claiming such defect or lack of compliance after the lapse of two years from the time of making such alienation, encumbrance, or lease.

Furthermore, as it pertains to actions to set aside a sale of succession property because of a “informalities of legal procedure,” La. R.S. 9:5622 states, in pertinent part:

All informalities of legal procedure connected with or growing out of any sale at public auction or at private sale of real or personal property made by any sheriff of the Parishes of this State, licensed auctioneer, or other persons authorized by an order of the courts of this State, to sell 19at public auction or at private sale, shall be prescribed against by those claiming under such sale after the lapse of two years from the time of making said sale.

La. R.S. 9:1454.1 sets forth:

Any and all informalities of legal procedure connected with or growing out of any private sale of any succession property by executors or administrators ... authorized by an order of the courts of this state, to sell at private sale, shall be prescribed against by those claiming under such sale after the lapse of two years from the date of the sale; provided, that where any such informality of legal procedure has existed for a period of two years prior to July 27, 1960, an action to annul because of such informality must be brought within six months from and after July 27,1960.

In the case sub judice, the private sale of the 210 acres took place on August 5, 2008, for the stated purpose of vesting title in the rightful owner. Whether Green Oaks was the rightful owner is not before this court. The issue before this court is whether a “sale” for no cash consideration, and in which the petition to sell states no price or conditions, is an informality of legal procedure.

Both Jean Crowson and Green Oaks contend that, regardless of the lack of consideration, cause (and not consideration) is sufficient to obligate oneself. La. C.C.P. art. 1967. They assert that Jean Crowson’s desire as succession representative to return the property to its rightful owner was sufficient cause and that consideration was not required. Even though they posit that consideration is not required, Jean Crowson and Green Oaks alternatively argue that there was consideration for the conveyance: satisfaction of the $230,000 debt owed by the decedent to Green Oaks as listed in the detailed descriptive list. We note, however, that looking within the four corners of the 1986 cash sale deed, which was not attached to the | ^petition to sell the property as stated, Green Oaks acknowledged receipt of the full purchase price.

First, the Code of Civil Procedure clearly states that “Sales of succession property shall be for cash, unless ... the court authorizes credit sale.” La. C.C.P. art. 3263. (Emphasis added). The word “shall” is mandatory. La. R.S. 1:3. Here, defendants admit that there was no exchange of money. Second, a clear reading of the petition to sell reflects that the price and conditions of the sale, as required by La. C.C.P. art. 3281, were not set forth therein. At a minimum, these constitute informalities of legal procedure connected with or growing out of a private sale. As to defendants’ second, and alternative argument — that satisfaction of the $230,000 debt owed by the decedent to Green Oaks should be construed as consideration — we find that this was a sham transaction and it does not fall under the Code of Civil Procedure’s parameters for a private sale.

Accordingly, since the private sale of the immovable property occurred on August 5, 2008, and Crowson, Ill’s, motion seeking to annul the property transfer was filed on October 1, 2008, and all supplemental and amended motions were filed well within the two-year prescriptive periods set forth in La. R.S. 9:5632, 9:5622 and 9:1454.1, we find that the trial court erred in its granting of Jean Crowson’s motion for summary judgment and Green Oaks’ exception of peremption.

Conclusion

hiFor the reasons stated, the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Jean Crowson, individually and in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of James Arnold Crow-son, Jr., is hereby reversed. Likewise, the trial court’s sustaining of defendant, Green Oaks Farm, Inc.’s, peremptory exception of peremption is also reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed evenly to defendants.

      . On two prior occasions, August 2006 and January 2007, Jean Crowson petitioned the court for authority to sell immovable property at private sale. These petitions pertained to a gas well and multiple oil and gas leases. These transactions are not part of this nullification proceeding. In both of these petitions, Crowson, Ill’s, attorney was notified and implicitly acquiesced in the request.

      . In brief, Jean Crowson’s attorney states that a similar sale from Green Oaks to decedent and Jean Crowson for the purposes of obtaining a loan occurred in 1981. Plaintiff, however, asserts that unlike the present situation, in which the property remained in decedent's name for over 20 years, decedent and Jean Crowson transferred the property back to Green Oaks four days after receiving that loan.

      . The debt owed Green Oaks is confusing. It is listed on the detailed descriptive list, and Jean Crowson and Green Oaks rely on it for an alternative argument. In her deposition, however, Jean Crowson is somewhat contradictory. She states that the debt listed is "the money that we owed Green Oaks Farms for the land." Yet, she also seems to assert that they did not actually owe Green Oaks any money.

      . An administrator may transfer by giving in payment any succession property in satisfaction of secured or unsecured debts. La. C.C.P. art. 3295. To this end, he shall present to the judge a petition setting forth the nature of the property, the amount of the encumbrances if any, and the reasons why he deems it in the best interest of the succession to convey the property in satisfaction of the debt or debts. La. C.C.P. art. 3296.


author: MOORE, J.

text:
    TRANSPETCO I JOINT VENTURE, Wallace A. Stanberry & Stanberry Oil Company, Plaintiff-Appellees v. CLEARVIEW INVESTMENTS, LTD., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 48,987-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 14, 2014.

      Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, Shreveport, by Bernard S. Johnson, Kristina B. Gustavson, for Appellant.
    Pettiette, Armand, Dunkelman, Wood-ley, Byrd & Cromwell, Shreveport, by Edwin H. Byrd, III, for Appellees.
    Before WILLIAMS, STEWART and MOORE, JJ.
   MOORE, J.

| j Clearview Investments Ltd. appeals a judgment ordering it to pay Transpetco I Joint Venture, a joint venture of which Clearview was a member, $248,900 to restore Clearview’s negative capital account balance with the joint venture. Clearview contends that Transpetco’s accounting is wrong in that it illegally allocated 100% of its leasehold costs to Clearview’s predecessor in title in 1992; using the proper allocation of 62.5%, Clearview contends it had a positive capital account and Transpetco actually owes it $276,000. Transpetco answers the appeal, seeking additional attorney fees for the appeal. We affirm the judgment and award additional attorney fees.

Factual Background

In the 1970s, Shreveport oilmen Wallace Stanberry, Coster Gerard and Jim Ritchie developed a method of recovering oil by C02 injection. In April 1979 they formed Transpetco, with themselves as the operator and five corporations as nonoperators. The original agreement adopted COPAS, an accounting procedure common in the oil and gas industry. Notably, this states that statements rendered to nonoperators by the operator are conclusively presumed to be true and correct after 24 months unless the nonoperator makes a written demand for adjustment.

According to Stanberry, a dispute arose with two nonoperators, so the operator bought them out but needed additional cash to continue the joint venture. They solicited Dallas oilman Hal Pettigrew to join the venture; Stanberry was uncertain of the precise dates, but he testified that Pettigrew, through his company Cardox Recovery, infused a significant amount of cash and obtained a large percentage stake in the venture.

liiOn December 1, 1992, the members executed an amended agreement continuing the business but restating the ownership interests (62.5% to TPJV, one of Pet-tigrew’s business entities, 15% each to Ritchie and Gerard, and 7.5% to Stanber-ry), creating a capital account for each member and stating that if a member’s capital account was negative at the time of a liquidating event, obligating that member to restore its account to a zero balance. The amended agreement named Stanberry as the operator. He testified that as a condition of continued participation in the joint venture, Pettigrew demanded a greater tax benefit, specifically a 100% allocation of Transpetco’s leasehold costs to TPJV. Stanberry agreed, as Pettigrew already controlled a majority of the joint venture. Transpetco’s 1993 audit report, sent to all members, noted “the basis of leasehold costs (all allocated to TPJV Corporation)”; all subsequent audit reports contained a similar statement.

Effective January 1, 1993, TPJV assigned its interest in Transpetco to another Pettigrew entity, Americo, with a full assumption of TPJVs position in the joint venture. Later, in 1997, Americo changed its name to Clearview Investments Inc.

Transpetco’s 1996 audit report showed that Americo had depleted its leasehold costs through amortization and had begun to run a negative capital account balance. There was no demand on Americo (or, later, on Clearview) to make up the deficit, however, because no liquidating event had yet occurred. The record shows that through 2009, Clearview received monthly statements and annual audit reports, but never challenged its 100% allocation of leasehold costs or its negative capital account balance. | -According to Stanberry, Clearview and its predecessors received distributions of $9.24 million over the life of the joint venture.

In June 2009, the liquidating event occurred, as Transpetco sold all or substantially all its assets. Transpetco’s controller, Patrick Woodall, demanded payment of Clearview’s negative capital account balance of $248,900, with no response. Several followup demands were sent in late 2009 and early 2010, also with no response.

Procedural History

Transpetco and its operator, Stanberry, filed this suit against Clearview in July 2010, demanding payment of Clearview’s negative capital account balance, $248,900, and attorney fees and costs under the amended agreement. The petition alleged the facts summarized above, including an allegation that “the joint venturers agreed to particular allocations of profit or loss[.]”

Discovery was complex and disputed. Clearview’s longtime CPA, Ware Shipman, contended there was a discrepancy: Clear-view’s ownership position was only 62.5%, yet the joint venture had allocated to Clearview leasehold costs of 100%; he demanded many more tax records from 1992-1997 to resolve this. Clearview filed a reconventional demand urging that if Transpetco had correctly allocated only 62.5% of leasehold costs to Clearview starting in 1993, Clearview would actually have a positive capital account balance of $200,651. Moreover, Clearview alleged that under the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”), 26 U.S.C. §§ 743, 754, and a Treasury | ¿Regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.743-1 (“optional adjustment to basis of partnership property”), Transpetco was prohibited from allocating any more cost to a member than that member’s interest in the partnership capital.

Another discovery issue was Transpet-co’s effort to exclude the testimony of Pet-tigrew, the founder and key man in Clear-view and its predecessor entities, Cardox, Americo and TPJV. Pettigrew could have testified about the negotiations with the joint venture in 1992 and 1993 and whether he actually demanded a 100% allocation of leasehold costs as a condition of maintaining his 62.5% capital share of Tran-spetco. However, in late 2012 his health failed and he died prior to trial.

Action in the District Court

At trial in February 2013, Transpetco put on four witnesses.

Wallace Stanberry, Transpetco’s 88-year-old operator, testified that he invited Pettigrew to join the joint venture; in exchange for putting up the money, Petti-grew wanted a significant interest and disproportionate tax benefit. As a result, Pettigrew’s companies wound up with over 60% ownership, and with depletion of all leasehold costs, resulting in $9.2 million tax benefits over the life of the joint venture. Stanberry maintained that he complied with the amended agreement, filed all reports and tax returns timely, and that nobody ever contested any of his filings.

Patricia Jones, Stanberry’s executive vice-president, testified that Transpetco followed COPAS procedures and that she sent out monthly statements and annual reports, which nobody ever contested.

Patrick Woodall, Stanberry’s longtime accountant, testified that in 1.4992, TPJV put up $1.63 million, including leasehold costs of $1.28 million. This brought TPJV’s share of the joint venture’s oilfield assets to 62.5%, but TPJV received full allocation ,of leasehold costs, a major tax benefit. Woodall confirmed that using these numbers, Clearview went negative in 1996 and never restored its balance of $248,900. He also confirmed that he provided monthly data to Transpetco’s outside auditors.

C. Scott Massey, a CPA and attorney licensed in Texas, testified that he was Transpetco’s CPA for many years. He was not involved in the 1992 negotiations with Pettigrew and could not find any documentation of those dealings, but he recalled talking to Pettigrew’s CPA, Ship-man, about a § 754 declaration. He testified that members of a joint venture may agree to allocate costs as a tax benefit, and such “special allocations” are allowed. Although a 100% allocation of costs to one member was “a bit unusual,” it was correct and TPJV was fully aware of it. Massey added that TPJVs predecessor, Cardox, also had a 100% allocation of leasehold costs. On cross-examination, Massey seemed to agree that the IRC and Treasury Regs set out “required calculations” whereby Clearview could not take more than its contribution of leasehold interest, 62.5%, but he later stated that the parties could agree to any allocation, and he “assumed” they had complied with 26 U.S.C. § 743(b).

Clearview called one witness, Ware Shipman, its longtime CPA, who specialized in partnership taxation. He confirmed that at the outset, TPJVs capital account was $1.6 million but its leasehold costs were only $1.28 million, or 62.5% of total capital. He testified that under the IRC and Treasury Regs, the joint venture could not allocate a greater cost deduction | fithan a partner’s ownership interest, and so what Transpetco did in 1992 was illegal. With the proper allocation, Shipman calculated, Clearview wound up with a positive balance in 2009 of $276,430. On cross-examination, Shipman seemed to concede that the parties could agree to allocate 100% of leasehold costs to one partner. He also conceded that nobody objected to the allocation when it was done, it was too late to amend any tax returns, and that his biggest client was Pettigrew business entities.

The district court ruled from the bench that all witnesses were truthful and credible, the only issue being the application of the IRC and Treasury Regulations. The court found the “weight of the evidence” supported Massey’s interpretation that the allocation was legal, given that nobody ever questioned it — including the Internal Revenue itself — until the liquidation occurred. Further, Pettigrew was a sophisticated investor (“this was not his first rodeo”) who could negotiate and bargain for his 100% allocation of leasehold costs, given his superior financial position. Getting this disproportionate allocation was a prudent way for him to “hedge his bets” in case the deal “went south.” The court also noted that under COPAS, Pettigrew had 24 months to dispute any statement, and never did so. The court rendered judgment in favor of Transpetco for $248,900. It later awarded attorney fees and costs, as provided in the amended agreement, of $100,493.

Clearview has appealed, raising one assignment of error.

The Parties’ Positions

By its sole assignment of error, Clear-view urges the court erred when it held that 26 U.S.C. § 743 and Treasury Regulation § 1.743-1 are not 17mandatory and could be altered by agreement. It argues that because the only issue is the interpretation of a statute, review is de novo, not manifest error. Thibodeaux v. Donnell, 2008-2436 (La.5/5/09), 9 So.3d 120. It contends that § 743 is specialized and rarely litigated, but it is mandatory in stating that a partner’s proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership property “shall be determined in accordance with his interest in partnership capital[.]”

Clearview also concedes that whether Pettigrew actually requested a 100% allocation in 1992 was a disputed fact, and it accuses Transpetco of changing its argument — from the original claim that it merely carried over a 100% allocation from Cardox to TPJV, to the later claim that Pettigrew demanded it. However, Clear-view submits this is irrelevant, given the mandate of § 743. It also cites the Regulation as stating that the transferee’s basis “is without regard to any prior transferee’s special basis adjustment.” It reiterates the bulk of Shipman’s testimony, and cites a passage in which Transpetco’s expert, Massey, said the § 743 basis is mandatory and the 100% allocation is “not allowed.” It concludes that the trial court’s ruling is legally wrong and must be reversed.

Transpetco responds that the standard of review for factual findings is manifest error. Salvant v. State, 2005-2126 (La.7/6/06), 935 So.2d 646. It urges there was no evidence to contradict the showing that Pettigrew, TPJV’s principal, conditioned his involvement on a special allocation of 100% of leasehold costs, and not the 62.5% basis in that asset; in fact, the annual balance statements and audits confirm this, as does the evidence of the tax benefit accruing to Pettigrew from the allocation. Transpetco asserts | sthat the 1992 agreement is indeed material and the record supports the district court’s findings on every disputed issue. It further contends that because Clearview (1) failed to assign any factual errors, it has waived them on appeal, Lawson v. Lawson, 48,296 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/24/13), 121 So.3d 769, and (2) failed to object to evidence of the 1992 agreement, it has waived that issue on appeal, Hollenshead Oil & Gas LLC v. Gemini Explorations Inc., 45,389 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/21/10), 44 So.3d 809, writ denied, 2010-2046 (La.11/12/10), 49 So.3d 892. Finally, it cites passages in which both experts seemed to say the parties could agree to any allocation without violating 26 U.S.C. § 743, and urges that the court had the discretion to accept an expert’s interpretation of a tax code. Goudchaux/ Maison Blanche v. Broussard, 590 So.2d 1159 (La.1991). It concludes there was no manifest error and the judgment should be affirmed.

Discussion

Although Clearview frames the issue as one of statutory interpretation alone, we find that the court’s decision hinges largely on factual findings, which we will address first. In civil cases, the proper standard of appellate review is the manifest error-plainly wrong standard, which precludes the appellate court from setting aside a district court’s finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless that finding is clearly wrong. Snider v. Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 2013-0579 (La.12/10/13), 130 So.3d 922; Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 2003-1734 (La.4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90. To reverse a trial court’s factual findings, the appellate court must (1) find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and 1 fl(2) that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., supra; Stobart v. State, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). If the trial court’s factual findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as a trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Broussard v. State, 2012-1238 (La.4/5/13), 113 So.3d 175; Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., supra.

On close review, we discern no basis to disturb the district court’s findings. The record supports the essential finding that TPJV elected an allocation of 100% of leasehold costs; no witness or documents contradicted Stanberry’s recollection of the negotiations of 1992. The testimony of both parties’ CPAs, Massey and Ship-man, supports the finding that the allocation was a tax benefit to TPJV, even though it is not apparent that TPJV or Pettigrew claimed it during the period of amortization. The documents in evidence uniformly show that neither Pettigrew nor any of his business entities contested the initial election of the allocation or the periodic statements reflecting it, particularly the statements asserting the negative capital account balance from 1996 onward. In short, the record amply supports that finding that in 1992 Pettigrew demanded, negotiated for, and received the 100% allocation for Clearview’s predecessor, an allocation that Clearview now seeks to negate under the provisions of the IRC.

Clearview’s assigned error contests the interpretation of a statute. It is therefore a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Silver Dollar Liquor v. Red River Parish, 2010-2776 (La.9/7/11), 74 So.3d 641; Thibodeaux v. Donnell, supra. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application |indoes not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La. C.C. art. 9; Cacamo v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 99-3479 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 41. The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning. La. C.C. art. 11; First Nat’l Bank, USA v. DDS Const. LLC, 2011-1418 (La.1/24/12), 91 So.3d 944.

The statute in question, 26 U.S.C. § 743, provides (in pertinent part, with emphasis added and footnote supplied):

(a) General rule. — The basis of partnership property shall not be adjusted as the result of a transfer of an interest in a partnership by sale or exchange or on the death of a partner unless the election provided by section 754 (relating to optional adjustment to basis of partnership property) is in effect with respect to such partnership or unless the partnership has a substantial built-in loss immediately after such transfer.
(b) Adjustment to basis of partnership property. — In the case of a transfer of an interest in a partnership by sale or exchange or upon the death of a partner, a partnership with respect to which the election provided in section 751 is in effect or which has a substantial built-in loss immediately after such transfer shall—
(1) increase the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the basis to the transferee partner of his interest in the partnership over his proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property, or
(2) decrease the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the transferee partner’s proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property over the basis of his interest in the partnership.
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such increase or |^decrease shall constitute an adjustment to the basis of partnership property with respect to the transferee partner only. A partner’s proportionate share of the adjusted basis of partnership property shall be determined in accordance with his interest in partnership capital

The regulation cited, § 1.743-1, provides an example (with emphasis added):

(f) Subsequent transfers. Where there has been more than one transfer of a partnership interest, a transferee’s basis adjustment is determined without regard to any prior transferee’s basis adjustment. In the case of a gift of an interest in a partnership, the donor is treated as transferring, and the donee as receiving, that portion of the basis adjustment attributable to the gifted partnership interest. The provisions of this paragraph are illustrated by the following example:
Example, (i) A, B, and C form partnership PRS. A and B each contribute $1,000 cash, and C contributed land with a basis and fair market value of $1,000. When the land has appreciated in value to $1,300, A sells its interest to Tl for $1,100 (one-third of $3,800, the fair market value of the partnership property). An election under section 754 is in effect; therefore, Tl has a basis adjustment under section 743(b) of $100.
(ii) After the land has further appreciated in value to $1,600, Tl sells its interest to T2 for $1,200 (one-third of $3,600, the fair market value of the partnership property). T2 has a basis adjustment under section 743(b) of $200. This amount is determined without regard to any basis adjustment under section 743(b) that Tl may have had in the partnership assets.

While the emphasized passages lend some support to Clearview’s argument, we find on de novo review that nothing in § 743 nullifies an allocation that is inconsistent with the statute. A plain reading shows that § 743 limits allocations of partnership interests for federal tax purposes, but it does not purport to restrict the allocation of capital among the partners themselves.

Certain facts fortify the plain reading. Massey testified that with the § 754 election in place, the allocation was “volitional,” and Shipman stated, 112in response to questions by the court, “Could the parties independently agree to do some special allocations as part of the agreement, independent of the § 754 election? The answer is, yes.” Even though Massey considered the allocation “unusual,” it reflected Pettigrew’s superior bargaining power with Transpetco. Notably, nothing in the record shows that Internal Revenue ever challenged the allocation. More notably, in nearly 20 years of the existence of the joint venture, neither Clear-view, its predecessors, nor its principal, Pettigrew, ever challenged the allocation. These facts show that everyone involved considered the allocation valid, at least until the liquidating event.

In short, we detect no manifest error in the district court’s factual findings, and on de novo review we find that 26 U.S.C. § 743 did not nullify the allocation. Clear-view’s assignment of error lacks merit.

Answer to Appeal

By answer to appeal, Transpetco seeks additional attorney fees for handling the appeal. It suggests $7,500, the amount deemed reasonable in Hirsch v. Calm Elec. Co., 29,327 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/9/97), 694 So.2d 636, writ denied, 97-1561 (La.10/3/97), 701 So.2d 200.

The amended agreement expressly provided for reasonable attorney fees and costs in the event of default; the district court awarded Transpetco attorney fees and costs of $100,493. A plaintiff who is entitled to an attorney fee by statute or contract, and who actually receives one at trial, is ordinarily entitled to an additional attorney fee for handling the defendant’s unsuccessful appeal. Frith v. Riverwood Inc., 2004-1086 (La.1/19/05), 892 So.2d 7; Hollenshead v. Gemini Explorations Inc., supra. A reasonable attorney fee is determined by the factors set forth in the Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(a). Smith, v. State, 2004-1317 (La.3/11/05), 899 So.2d 516. Considering the length and complexity of the case, the obvious expertise of the attorneys on both sides, and the amount of the fee already awarded, we find an additional award of $5,000 is reasonable for handling the appeal.

Conclusion

For the reasons expressed, we affirm the judgment in its entirety. Judgment is further rendered in favor of Transpetco I Joint Venture, Wallace Stanberry and Stanberry Oil Co., and against Clearview Investments Ltd. for the additional attorney fee of $5,000. All costs are to be paid by Clearview Investments Ltd.

AFFIRMED AND ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY FEE AWARDED.

      . The nonoperators were Halliburton Co., Dorchester Gas Producing Co., Eagleton Engineering Co., Texas Energy Services Inc. and Baker & Baker Drilling Co.

      . Statements also showed that Stanberry had a negative capital account balance, which he restored timely.

      . 26 U.S.C. § 754 provides: “If a partnership files an election, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, the basis of partnership property shall be adjusted, * * * in the case of a transfer of partnership interest, in the manner provided in Section 743. Such an election shall apply to * * * all transfers of interests in the partnership during the taxable year with respect to which such election was filed and all subsequent taxable years. Such election may be revoked by the partnership, subject to such limitations as may be provided by regulations prescribed by the Secretary.”

      . Factors include (1) the time and labor required, the novelty or difficulty of the issues, and the skill required to properly perform the legal services; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the matter will preclude other employment; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.