text:
    Brenda BROWN v. AVOYELLES PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE & ABC Insurer.
    No. 2013-CC-0188.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Anderson, Sheriff Doug; Avoyelles Parish Sheriffs Office, et al.; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2011-6508; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-00980.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Shelia BOUDREAUX, et al. v. Alfred FRANKS, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0189.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Alfred Franks, Et Al.; L & B Transport, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 11-0554-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-647.

Denied.


text:
    Carla BROUSSARD-SCHER v. Brian Christopher LEGENDRE, et al. Tiffany Renee Thomas v. Brian Christopher Legendre.
    No. 2013-CC-0192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Scher, Carla Broussard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2009-0641 C/W 2011-5316; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01074.

Denied.


text:
    Leo BINDER, Individually and on Behalf of his Deceased Son, Vincent Binder v. Doug ANDERSON, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Avoyelles Parish Sheriff Doug Anderson; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2010-5909; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01019.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    BCM, L.L.C., et al. v. Roy Clifton CHEATWOOD, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re BCM L.L.C., et al.; Nawlins Ka-jun Foods, L.L.C.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2009-2807; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-411.

Denied.


text:
    Rosalind M. YOUNGBLOOD v. COVENANT SECURITY SVC, L.L.C. and Esis New Orleans.
    No. 2013-C-0200.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Youngblood, Rosalind M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 5, No. 07-00414; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 2382.

Denied.


text:
    Mark DAVIS, et al. v. Ashleigh MANUEL, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Mark Davis, et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2009-6074; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0577.

Denied.


text:
    H & E EQUIPMENT SERVICES, INC. v. Lloyd Wayne CARTER and Advanced Services, Inc.
    No. 2013-CC-0220.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Advanced Services, Inc.; Carter, Lloyd Wayne; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 611314; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1381.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Leonard BRACKENS v. GEORGIA PACIFIC, et al. Payne & Keller, Employer-Lambert & Nelson (Referring Attorney) and their Professional Insurer and Plaintiff Steering Committee.
    No. 2013-C-0221.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Brackens, Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 70,715; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0753.

Denied.


text:
    CONN-BARR, LLC v. Diana Istre FRANCIS.
    No. 2013-C-0227.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Conn-Barr, LLC; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2011-162; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-348.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Rashika DOTSON v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2013-CC-0235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Allstate Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C612658; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1689.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Paul LE, individually and d/b/a Bonsai Sushi Downtown Lafayette, LLC v. The BRADFORD GROUP, LLC et al.
    No. 2013-C-0237.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Brazell, Robert Gregory; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. C-2011-3070; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-439.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Leah R. RHODES v. Marsha SAUCIER, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0238.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Rhodes, Leah R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 10-7804; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-1563.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Faustino DUARTE-ORTEGA v. DISASTER RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC d/b/a DR Services and Dallas National Insurance Carrier.
    No. 2013-CC-0244.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Dallas National Insurance Carrier; Disaster Recovery Services, LLC d/b/a DR Services; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 7, No. 11-6677; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-C-883.

Denied.


text:
    Viel OLIVIER v. OLIVIER BUILDERS and LUBA Workers’ Compensation.
    No. 2013-C-0245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Olivier, Viel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 4, No. 06-03499; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-570.

Denied.


text:
    Kalani FINISTER v. Alan DURLACHER, GEICO General Insurance Company, Resurrection Life Family Ministries, Inc., Essex Insurance Company, Pollie B. Johnson, Samuel J. Johnson and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-CC-0248.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Essex Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 604723; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1760.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Vicki P. GUIN, Wife of/and Charles E. Guin v. Fritz J. MILLER; Allstate Insurance Company, as Liability Insurer of Fritz J. Miller; Dr. John Doe, as the Physician who Completed the Medical Examination form for Fritz J. Miller; ABC Insurance Company, as Liability Insurer of Dr. John Doe; Ace Group of Companies d/b/a Ace Use, d/b/a Ace American Insurance Company, as the Underinsured/Uninsured Motorist Carrier for the Vehicle Operated by Charles E. Guin; American International Group, d/b/a AIG, as the Underinsured/Uninsured Motorist Carrier for Charles E. Guin; and the State of Louisiana, Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections-Dept. of Motor Vehicles.
    No. 2013-CC-0250.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections — Department of Motor Vehicles; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2009-14171; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1591.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Paul LE, Individually and d/b/a Bonsai Sushi Downtown Lafayette, LLC v. The BRADFORD GROUP, LLC et al.
    No. 2013-C-0256.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Hargrave, Brandon; The Bradford Group, LLC, Et Al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. C-20113070; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-439.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Stephen J. WILLIAMS v. INTERNATIONAL OFFSHORE SERVICES, LLC.
    No. 2013-C-0259.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Williams, Stephen J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 116,856; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2011 CW 1240, 2011 CW 1318, 2011 CA 1369.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mark A. BURGE.
    No. 2013-OK-0437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Burge, Mark A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 53767; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0761.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dominique RIVERS.
    No. 2013-KD-0520.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 8, 2013.
   In re Rivers, Dominique; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 12-10-0474; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0359.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnnie MARK.
    No. 2013-KK-0556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 511-923; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0318.

Writ granted. We find no clear abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion in ruling on the motion for a continuance. La. C.Cr.P. art. 712; State v. Reeves, 06-2419, p. 73 (La.5/5/09), 11 So.3d 1031, 1078; State v. Ordonez, 395 So.2d 778, 782 (La.1981).

JOHNSON, C.J., would deny the writ.

HUGHES, J., concurs in the granting of the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnnie MARK.
    No. 2013-KK-556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2013.
   In re Johnnie Mark; — Defendant; Applying For Rehearing of this Court’s order dated March 13, 2013, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 511-923; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0318.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    Gerard Roger TASSIN v. AMTEK, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0529.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2013.
   In re Eagle, Inc.; McCarty Corporation; Wyeth Holdings Corporation; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2012-2959; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-C-0302.

Denied.


text:
    Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2012-ADMIN-1067.
    No. 2013-OB-0390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Williams, Patrick W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 2012-ADMIN-1067.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the matter to the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel for review by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(A).


text:
    Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2009-ADMIN-1351.
    No. 2013-OB-0418.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Bell, Mary Sue; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 2009-ADMIN-1351.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the matter to the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel for review by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(A).


text:
    Nina SKINNER, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, DOTD, et al.
    No. 2012-C-2713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-18418; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 12-119.

Granted.


text:
    Misty HERNANDEZ v. Brandon JENKINS.
    No. 2012-CJ-2756.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Hernandez, Misty; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 151,645; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CU 0097.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jammicka GREENE.
    No. 2012-OK-2027.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Greene, Jammicka; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 43457; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-649.

Granted. La.C.Cr.P. art. 914(A) provides in part that “[a] motion for an appeal may be made orally in open court or by filing a written motion with the clerk.” (Emphasis added). The article should be construed liberally to effectuate a defendant’s constitutional right of appeal in Louisiana. La. Const. Art. I, § 19; State v. Goodley, 423 So.2d 648, 651 (La.1982). Defendant’s oral “notice of intent to appeal” in open court at sentencing constituted an oral motion for appeal as authorized by La.C.Cr.P. art. 914(A) and adequately preserved her right to seek appellate review of her conviction and sentence despite the delays in preparing the appellate record for review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 915(A) (“When a motion for an appeal has been timely made, the appeal shall not be affected by any fault or omission on the part of the trial court.”). The court of appeal therefore erred in dismissing defendant’s appeal on grounds that she was attempting to appeal only from a judgment denying her post-conviction relief which the district court apparently never rendered. The decision below is reversed and the matter remanded to the court of appeal to address the merits of defendant’s appeal of her conviction and sentence.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Montie B. MONTGOMERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Montgomery, Montie B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 73,274; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,648-KW.

Writ granted in part. The state presented constitutionally insufficient evidence to sustain the conspiracy to distribute cocaine conviction because relator could not enter into an agreement with the state agent with whom he negotiated the illegal drug sale. R.S. 14:26; see, e.g., State v. Joles, 485 So.2d 212, 214 (La.App.1986) (criminal conspiracy charge correctly quashed when one party, as state agent, lacked requisite intent to commit crime). Because a timely claim asserting insufficient evidence is cognizable on collateral review, see e.g. State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987), relator’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribution are vacated. In all other respects, relator’s applications are denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Errol VICTOR, Sr. and Tonya O. Victor v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-OK-0408.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Victor Sr., Errol et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2012-CR-249.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal for its consideration.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry L. COLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0431.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Coleman, Terry L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 84,095; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No 47969-KH.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, for consideration of enforcement of its rule to show cause.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Will JILES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Jiles, Will; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. F-2011-22; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,366-KA.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the application for post-conviction relief to the district court for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dana MILES.
    No. 2012-KP-0832.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Dana Miles, — Defendant; Applying for Rehearing, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 04-97-0133; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2132.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    Shelley R. BRIGNAC v. TOWER CREDIT, INC. and Binning Bonding Company, L.L.C. and Stephen Binning, L.L.C.
    No. 2012-C-2636.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Shelley R. Brignac; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated January 25, 2013; Parish of W. Baton Rouge; 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 38610; to the Court of Appeal, A Second Circuit, No. 2011 CA 1894.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    Nolan BENSON, Sr. v. ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2012-C-2650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Nolan Benson, Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated February 8, 2013; Parish of Avoyelles; 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2011-6929-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-517 C/W 12-385.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX § 6.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond DARNELL.
    No. 2013-KP-0393.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 251,486; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-120-KW.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ulysses HILL.
    No. 2012-K-1492.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Hill, Ulysses; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 452-314; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1001.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Trivenskey ODOM.
    No. 2012-K-1994.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Odom, Trivenskey; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 298,449; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,379-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allen Ray ARKANSAS.
    No. 2012-KO-1996.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Arkansas, Allen Ray; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 290411; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-317-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Barry L. DAVIS.
    No. 2012-KO-2014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Davis, Barry L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 94-218; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 11-KA-137, 09-KH-991.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel Lee GIBBS.
    No. 2012-K-2054.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 279896; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,062-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Walter JACKSON.
    No. 2012-K-2057.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 491—481; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1280.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kaleigh SMITH.
    No. 2012-K-2069.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Smith, Kaleigh; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 475-055; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0091.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Walter JACKSON.
    No. 2012-K-2084.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Jackson, Walter; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 491—481; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1280.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nicholas YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2143.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Young, Nicholas; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 179,963; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. KH 12-47721.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Victor SANDERS.
    No. 2012-KO-2153.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Sanders, Victor; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 11-1885; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-114.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael SHANNON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2316.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Shannon, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 478-693; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0955.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bertie Randall HICKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2319.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Hicks, Bertie Randall; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 72,752; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,771-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Catrenia N. MAYNOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2320.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Maynor, Catrenia N.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Div. O, Nos. 80,975, 80,980; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,662-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David CONSTANCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Constance, David; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 19446; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1392.

Denied.


text:
    Johnson WASHINGTON v. The STATE of Louisiana; & La. Dept. of Corr. through the Attny. General of the State of La., et al.
    No. 2012-CI-2323.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Washington, Johnson; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 603,678; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0191.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Fred D. KIDD, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2328.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Kidd Sr., Fred D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06-F-1423; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,727-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard COLLINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Collins, Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 230-88 & 230-889.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randall Wayne ROCKETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2339.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Rockett, Randall Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 177,346; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,793-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard L. MUNSTER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No, 2012-KH-2340.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Munster Jr., Richard L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 492441; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1199.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jamal L. LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2349.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Lewis, Jamal L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 06-3458; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-651.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Williams, Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 477-886; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1260.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dale Robin MILLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Miller, Dale Robin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 92141; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-01468.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmy WILHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Wilhite, Jimmy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 03-F-0336; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,753-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Glenn A. BRUMFIELD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2353.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Brumfield, Glenn A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-5362; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-666.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles CLEMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Clemons, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 24,119.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth BELL, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2363.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Bell Sr., Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 303261; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-195.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur CARTER Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2372.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Carter, Jr., Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 328-180; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1364.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    George Raymond WILLIAMS, M.D., Orthopaedic Surgery, a Professional Medical L.L.C. v. SIF CONSULTANTS OF LOUISIANA, INC., Risk Management Services, L.L.C., Med-Comp USA, Inc., et al.
    No. 2012-C-2637.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Executive Risk Specialty Insurance Company; Homeland Insurance Company of New York; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 09-C-5244; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-419.

Denied.


text:
    Taryn G. GREMILLION v. ROLLINS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (LA), INC. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-CC-2744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Virginia Surety Company, Inc.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 377,568; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1509.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David BROWN.
    No. 2013-KK-0108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Brown, David; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. W-04-3-77; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012-KW-1866.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Lucille BICKHAM v. Terrance CONERLY.
    No. 2013-CC-0153.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Conerly, Terrance; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District 06, No. 12-02925; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1729.

Denied.


text:
    Clyde A. TUCKER, Ronald L. Johnston, JCWII, LLC, and Gloria Laubach v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, Murphy Oil USA, Inc., Murphy Exploration & Production Company, USA, Tennyson Oil Company, LLC, BP Products North America, Inc., Jeems Bayou Production Corporation, Ora Oil Company, New Ora Oil, Inc., Chanse Energy Corporation, Southern States Petroleum Corporation, Opal Oil, Inc., Roberts and Smith, Plunckett and Sklar, Guy Maybee Drilling Company, and Kerr & Findlayson.
    No. 2013-CC-0191.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re BP Products North America Inc.; Murphy Exploration & Production Company USA; Opal Oil Inc.; Tennyson Oil Company LLC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Union, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 42,934; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 48,029-CW, 48,043-CW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rory JOHNSON.
    No. 2013-KK-0197.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Johnson, Rory; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 507-038 C/W 508-203; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1448.

Denied.


text:
    Gary L. RING, Individually and on Behalf of all others similarly situated v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, and the Division of Weights and Standards.
    No. 2013-C-0199.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 481,767; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0204.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    Marcus BROUSSARD, Jr., et al. v. MARTIN OPERATING PARTNERSHIP, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0215.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re M-I LLC d/b/a M-I Drilling Fluids LLC; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 83,406 C/W 90032; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-1559.

Denied.


text:
    Marcus BROUSSARD, Jr., et al. v. MARTIN OPERATING PARTNERSHIP, L.P., et al.
    No. 2013-C-0249.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Broussard Jr., Marcus et al.; Broussard, Flo; Broussard, R. Brady; Vallee Land Co. LLC; Vallee, Joseph; Vallee, Suzanne; Whitestone Inc.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 83,406 C/W 90,032; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-1559.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF James Robert COLE, Sr.
    No. 2013-C-0257.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Cole, Cynthia Anne; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 59,854; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-802.

Denied.


text:
    Clyde Lee BRECHEEN, Jr. and Louisiana Sports Enterprises, Incorporated v. The NEWS GROUP, L.P.
    No. 2013-C-0263.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re News Group L.P.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 63,666; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-CA-1173.

Denied.


text:
    Faron CLAVIER and Annette Clavier v. OUR LADY OF THE LAKE HOSPITAL, INC., Dr. Richard Byrd, Pathology Group of Louisiana, APMC and Dr. Stephen Mason.
    No. 2013-C-0264.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Clavier, Annette; Clavier, Far-on; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 603,531; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 056.

Denied.


text:
    Charles MITCHELL, James Mitchell and Barbara Mitchell v. SOUTHERN SCRAP RECYCLING, L.L.C., Southern Scrap Material Co., L.L.C., Southern Scrap Recycling Morgan City, L.L.C. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-CC-0271.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Gemini Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 155,217; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1726.

Denied.


text:
    Logan C. FOURNERAT v. Glynis Ann Fuselier FOURNERAT.
    No. 2013-CC-0272.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Fournerat, Glynis Ann Fuselier;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 09-10670; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01309.

Denied.


text:
    ASAP COURT REPORTING SERVICES, INC. v. Daniel G. ABEL.
    No. 2013-C-0273.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Abel, Daniel G.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2011-12757; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0784.

Denied.

HUGHES, J„ recused.


text:
    Juanita Christine PAULSELL, as Curator of the Interdict Patricia Jolynn Paulsell-Lathrop v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Michael A. Laviolette, ABC Helmet Distributing Company, DEF Labeling Company, GHI Helmet Manufacturing Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-0274.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development; State of Louisiana, Office of Risk Management;— Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 544,152; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0396.

Denied.


text:
    Lisa S. KIRSCHMAN v. Arnold L. KIRSCHMAN.
    No. 2013-C-0275.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Prados, David M.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2006-6464; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0385.

Denied.


text:
    ARMOUR UNLIMITED, L.L.C., et al. v. Wendy DUBOSE, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0282.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Armour Unlimited, L.L.C., et al.; New Century Rentals, Inc.; — Plaintiffis); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2012-3447-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01043.

Denied.


text:
    James M. BIGLANE, et al. v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, FIFTH LOUISIANA LEVEE DISTRICT, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0284.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No 44,712-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW12-01057.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Eddie Lee MOORE a/k/a Phil Moore.
    No. 2013-CC-0288.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Moore, Brenda; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 4274; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,797-CW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rory JOHNSON and Clayton Burd.
    No. 2013-KK-0302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, Nos. 507-038, 508-203; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1450.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    In re Medical Review Panel for the Claim of Joseph BURNS and Letricia Burns.
    No. 2013-C-0314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Medical Review Panel for he Claim of Joseph Burns and Letricia Burns;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 572,026; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0333.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    INTEGRATED PRO SERVICES, L.L.C. v. CROSS GROUP, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0318.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Investment Group, Inc. f/k/a Cross Equipment, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2010-7121; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-1616.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Claude WASHINGTON.
    No. 2013-KK-0322.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 369-048; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1637.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of H.C.
    No. 2013-CJ-0394.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re C., A.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2012-0217; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-1119.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lester R. DYER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-0420.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re Dyer, Lester R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 513-048; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0132.

Denied.


text:
    C.M.H. v. D.M. and S.D.M.
    No. 2013-CJ-0470.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 15, 2013.
   In re D.M.; S.D.M.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 33819; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1961.

Denied.


author: MARION F. EDWARDS, Chief Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Demond TANNER a/k/a Julien Brice.
    No. 11-KA-62.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    June 28, 2012.
    Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, Terry M. Boudreaux, Gail D. Schlosser, Scott U. Schlegel, David Hufft, Assistant District Attorneys, Gretna, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
    Margaret S. Sollars, Attorney at Law, Louisiana Appellate Project, Thibodaux, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    Demond Tanner, St. Gabriel, LA, Defendant/In Proper Person.
    Panel composed of Judges MARION F. EDWARDS, CLARENCE E. McMANUS, and WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD.
   MARION F. EDWARDS, Chief Judge.

Defendant/appeIlant, Demond Tanner a/k/a Julien Brice (“Tanner”), appeals his conviction and sentence on the charge of the second degree murder of Kevin Chambers in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. We affirm both the conviction and sentence.

Tanner was charged with the murder by Grand Jury Indictment and entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment. In due course, Tanner was tried by a jury and found guilty as charged. A subsequent motion for new trial was filed and denied, after which Tanner was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Tanner filed a timely motion for appeal that was granted by the trial court.

Tanner filed a second motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence after the appeal was granted. Because the trial court did not rule on that motion, Tanner filed a motion to remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing on that motion. This Court granted that motion and took the matter off the docket of this Court.

The trial court heard and denied the second motion for new trial, and the matter is now back before this Court on original appeal.

FACTS

Sergeant Eddie Kline of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office testified that, in August of 2002, he conducted a criminal investigation regarding Tanner. . In the course of that investigation, Sergeant Kline interviewed Kevin Chambers (“Chambers”). That interview was taped by police officers and later led to Tanner’s arrest and guilty plea on a firearm violation in April of 2004. Tanner was sentenced to a term of seven years at hard labor. Due to a diminution of sentence, Tanner was released early on December 17, 2006 and placed on parole.

On November 29, 2007, Tanner went to the home of his long time neighbor, Randolph Johnson (“Johnson”). Tanner had three other men, including Chambers, with him at the time. The four men stayed at Johnson’s home for a while then left in Tanner’s tan Dodge Neon. Later that evening, Tanner returned with only Chambers. Tanner told Johnson that he (Tanner) was intoxicated and could not drive. Tanner asked Johnson to drive him and Chambers home. Johnson did not know who Chambers was or where he lived, so he drove according to Tanner’s directions. During the drive Johnson heard Tanner and Chambers talking about hiding drugs. Johnson became upset and confronted the two men, telling them that he resented being put in this situation and was going to drive back to his home. Tanner convinced Johnson to continue driving to bring Chambers home. Tanner indicated a home on Ocean Drive in Gretna, and Johnson pulled over to the curb. Tanner got out of the car, but then he came back, and Chambers got out of the car. Tanner and Chambers walked around to the back of the house. At that point, Johnson heard Tanner say, “[Y]ou ratted me out.” Then Johnson heard two gunshots. When Tanner came back to the car he was holding a revolver. Tanner asked Johnson if he saw anything. Johnson indicated that he did not and then drove back to his home. Johnson did not report the incident to police because he was afraid of Tanner’s retaliation.

Johnson admitted that he had originally been arrested for Chambers’ murder and obstruction of justice, but he was released after the investigation was complete. Johnson stated that he was actually relieved when he was arrested and also learned Tanner was arrested because now the true story could be told without fear. Johnson stated that he spoke to Tanner while the two were incarcerated, and Tanner told him that if he could find out who “ratted” on the two of them, he could take care of things.

The State presented evidence that Tanner signed a rental agreement for a gold Dodge Neon on November 28, 2007 from Nifty Rental Car Company. In conjunction with that testimony, the State introduced a document reflecting the transaction that is signed by Tanner.

Investigators from the Gretna Police Department investigated the crime after receiving calls reporting gunshots. Upon arrival at the location on Ocean Drive, officers found the victim in a ditch, with two bullet wounds to the head. There was drug paraphernalia, but no identification on the victim and no physical evidence collected at the scene. Officers subsequently learned the victim was Chambers and began investigating by talking to Chambers’ associates. In the course of that investigation, several possible suspects were identified, and a background search was done on each of these suspects. One of the subjects was Brandon Brown (“Brown”), who was murdered a few days after the Chambers’ murder.

When officers first approached Tanner’s wife, Bianca Hansen, she was uncooperative. Officers continued to investigate the case and collect evidence. On May 7, 2008, Ms. Hansen came to the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office and gave officers information that led to the arrests of Tanner and Johnson.

Omega Johnson, Johnson’s uncle, testified that he was invited to Tanner’s home on Christmas day in 2007. At that time, Tanner showed Omega Johnson a folder with some paperwork that contained statements made to police officers by Chambers in a prior criminal proceeding against Tanner. Tanner told Omega Johnson that he killed Chambers because of Chambers’ involvement in the prior case. Tanner disclosed the details of the murder to Omega Johnson and tried to justify the killing when Omega Johnson seemed shocked. Omega Johnson did not report the murder to police for fear that Tanner would kill him also.

After the State rested its case, Dustin Jordan (“Jordan”) testified for the defense that, on November 29, 2007, he met Kevin Chambers, the victim, that day about 6:00 p.m. in Harvey. Chambers told Jordan he had a “little hustle” to take care of and asked Jordan to drop him off. Jordan subsequently dropped off Chambers at the Casey Jones parking lot in Gretna. Jordan claimed Brandon Brown was there when he dropped off the victim. Afterward, Jordan left.

David Washington (“Washington”) testified for the defense that, on November 29, 2007, he was released from jail to house arrest. He indicated that he knew Brown well. Washington testified that he told police that Brown was the one who killed the victim. He claimed that Brown told him he killed the victim because the victim was trying to steal cocaine from him. Washington asserted that the victim more than likely owed money to Brown.

On cross-examination, Washington testified that he did not recall telling the police that Brown would not have killed the victim because Brown was a coward, and it made no sense for Brown to kill the victim for a small amount of money. Washington admitted that he had two or three convictions for drug possession.

The State and the defense stipulated that, if Cheston Isom (“Isom”) were called to testify, he would testify that Chambers “cooked” cocaine for Brown and Isom; that Brown told Isom that Chambers was trying to cheat him and that Brown was going to kill Chambers; that Isom told Washington about the murder; and that Isom and Washington were cousins.

The State called several witnesses in rebuttal, including Detective Russ and Terry Graffeo. Detective Russ testified that, in May of 2008, at Hunt Correctional Center, Jordan stated that he misled Detective Russ; that there was a person who informed Jordan that Brown’s name came up during the investigation; and that Jordan was instructed to provide Brown’s name if he ever spoke to the police. Detective Russ further testified that Jordan acknowledged that he dropped Chambers off an hour before his death, but Jordan never said he dropped Chambers off to Brown. When asked why he lied, Jordan said he “played them” and that Chambers was nothing but a “snitch” and a “rat.”

Terry Graffeo testified for the State in rebuttal that, when they interviewed Jordan in April, Jordan mentioned that he met with Washington while at the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center; that Washington told him the police questioned him about the homicide; and that Jordan was told to use the name “Brown” and to “use it up.” Graffeo further testified that Jordan said he dropped Chambers off at the parking lot; that the Chambers got out and walked across Stumpf Boulevard; and that Jordan then lost sight of the victim and drove off.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Both defense counsel and Tanner have filed briefs. The only issue on review in both is whether the evidence presented by the State is sufficient to convict Tanner of the crime.

Tanner argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction as the State failed to prove his identity as the perpetrator. He contends that the testimony of Johnson and Omega Johnson, the State’s witnesses, was not credible, and their statements and testimony contradicted one another. Tanner asserts that Brown Wiled Chambers and that the defense witnesses who testified as such were credible and should have been believed.

The State responds that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to negate all reasonable probability of misidentification. The State further responds the jury found the State’s witnesses to be more credible than the defense witnesses, and the credibility of the witnesses should not be reweighed on appeal.

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, an appellate court must determine that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the trial court must instruct the jury that, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” The reviewing court is not required to determine whether another possible hypothesis of innocence suggested by the defendant offers an exculpatory explanation of events. Rather, the reviewing court must determine whether the possible alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, Tanner was convicted of second degree murder which is defined as the Wiling of a human being when the offender: (1) has specific intent to Wll or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies, even though he has no intent to Wll or to inflict great bodily harm.

The State proceeded under the first theory of second degree murder. As such, in order to prove second degree murder, the State was required to prove: (1) the killing of a human being; and (2) that the defendant had specific intent to Wll or inflict great bodily harm. In addition to proving the statutory elements of the charged offense at trial, the State is required to prove defendant’s identity as the perpetrator.

Where the key issue is identification, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Here, Tanner does not claim that the State failed to prove the essential elements of the crime; rather, he contends that the State did not prove his identity as the perpetrator.

At trial, the State presented witnesses, Johnson and Omega Johnson, to prove that Tanner killed Chambers. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of witnesses to prove that Brown killed Chambers.

The arguments presented involve the credibility of witnesses. The credibility of witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact. Clearly, the jury found the State’s witnesses to be more credible. It is not the function of the appellate court to second-guess the credibility of witnesses as determined by the trier of fact or to reweigh the evidence absent impingement on the fundamental due process of law. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find the State sufficiently negated all reasonable probability of misidentifi-cation and sufficiently proved Tanner’s identity as the perpetrator of the offense. Accordingly, we find no merit in this assignment of error and we affirm the conviction and sentence of Tanner.

AFFIRMED

      . Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Neal, 00-0674 (La.6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002).

      . La. R.S. 15:438.

      . State v. Mitchell, 99-3342 (La.10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83; State v. Washington, 03-1135 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/27/04), 866 So.2d 973, 977.

      . See, La. R.S. 14:30.1; State v. Lewis, 05-170 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/29/05), 917 So.2d 583, 589-90, writ denied, 06-0757 (La.12/15/06), 944 So.2d 1277.

      . State v. Pagan, 04-1478 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 905 So.2d 435, 441, writ denied, 05-2003 (La.2/17/06), 924 So.2d 1013.

      . State v. Draughn, 05-1825 (La.1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 593, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007); State v. Ingram, 04-551 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 888 So.2d 923, 926.

      . Draughn, supra.

      . State v. Harris, 07-124 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/25/07), 968 So.2d 187, 193.

        . State v. Jones, 08-20 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/15/08), 985 So.2d 234, 240.

        . Id.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alton PLACIDE, Jr.
    No. 11-KA-1061.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    June 28, 2012.

      Jane L. Beebe, Attorney at Law, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    Panel composed of Judges MARION F. EDWARDS, CLARENCE E. McMANUS, and WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD.
   MARION F. EDWARDS, Chief Judge.

Defendant/appellant, Alton Placide, Jr. (“Placide”), was charged with one count of aggravated burglary in violation of La. R.S. 14:60, and two counts of possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. Pursuant to a motion to quash, the bill of information was later amended to charge him with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, along with the aggravated battery charge. Plac-ide pled not guilty, waived his right to a trial by jury, and proceeded with a bench trial. After taking the matter under advisement, on October 19, 2010, the trial court issued a written judgment, finding Placide not guilty of aggravated burglary (count one), but guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count two).

Placide’s motion for new trial was denied and, subsequently, the trial court sentenced him on count two to ten years of imprisonment, with credit for time served, and without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The court also imposed a fine of $1,000. Placide appeals.

Brenda Gueret (described by the trial court as mentally challenged) testified that, on October 1, 2007, she got up because her dog was barking. When she looked out, she saw a man who pulled her out of the door and threw her on a bag of pecans. He told her to sit and be quiet, then took her back to her mother. His mother told him to take whatever he wanted, and the man searched the house for money. Brenda Gueret saw that he had a black gun and that the man took both money and her father’s pistol. She identified State’s Exhibit 9 as the gun he had with him. She was familiar with her father’s guns, but she never touched them. By the time of trial, her mother was deceased.

Detective Christie Murden testified that she investigated the aggravated burglary of the Gueret home. Upon entering the home, she saw the breakfast area where papers, a checkbook, and other things were spread out all over the floor. She also found a purse and its contents on the floor in another area. The rest of the house appeared to have been rummaged through. Detective Murden spoke with Brenda Gueret who told her a black male had a long shotgun type weapon with him and had also taken a gun from the residence. The officer learned that a Ruger 9mm weapon had been taken from the mother’s purse.

In connection with information developed in the investigation, Detective Mur-den then testified that she was involved in the execution of a search warrant at 519 Homewood Street in Reserve later that evening. In searching the bedroom, she lifted the mattress and found two weapons, a Mossberg shotgun and a Ruger 9mm. There were also many documents, such as phone bills, with the name of Alton Placide on them. The detective stated that a rental agreement indicated Placide used that address.

Errol Falterman testified that he owns the property at 519 Homewood, and, at the time of the incident, it was rented to a Daphne and Alton Placide. Mr. Falter-man identified the lease in court, which was signed by both Mr. and Mrs. Placide. Mr. Falterman dealt mostly with Mrs. Placide, and while he went to the home once or twice, he did not see Placide inside. However, he did see Placide outside. The lease is still in effect.

Michael Davis, retired from the St. John Parish Sheriffs Office, testified that he assisted in carrying out the search warrant at the Homewood Street address. He photographed and collected evidence, including a handgun and a shotgun, cell phones, etc. After photographing the evidence, he brought it into the office, processed it, and turned it over to Captain Harry Troxlair. Both weapons were recovered underneath the mattress in the bedroom. Mr. Davis identified the photos he took of the weapons.

Sergeant Kurt Tregre of the St. John Parish Sheriffs Office testified that he participated in the execution of a search warrant on a 2006 Nissan Maxima. He took a photo, which he identified, of a Comcast receipt that showed the name of Alton Placide at 519 Homewood Place in Reserve, as well as photos of Placide’s driver’s license with the same address and Social Security card. The original documents were later introduced into evidence.

Captain Troxlair, evidence custodian, testified that he obtained documents taken by Detective Davis from the Homewood Place address. These included a pay stub from Turner Industries in the name of Alton Placide, Sprint phone bills to Plac-ide, and his Social Security card. He further testified that, from the time he obtained the documentation from Davis to the time of trial, the evidence remained in the evidence locker under his custody and control. Placide objected to this evidence (see below).

On appeal, Placide argues that he was denied his right to confront his accuser and cross examine the custodian of the records produced by the State and used to link him to the guns that he was convicted of constructively possessing from a particular bedroom. Specifically, he maintains that three Sprint phone bills and a Turner Industries pay stub bearing his name, and found in the master bedroom, were improperly admitted into evidence because they were not authenticated in violation of La. C.E. art. 901. Placide argues that, without producing a certified copy of the documents and/or the testimony of the custodian of the documents, the documents were unauthenticated inadmissible hearsay. He further asserts that he did not receive a fair trial because he was unable to confront the custodian of the records that the State used to connect him to the guns he was alleged to have constructively possessed. Finally, Placide maintains that a harmless error analysis reveals that the verdict was attributable to the error in admitting the unauthenticated documents because the only other evidence presented by the State linking him to the house in which the guns were found was the testimony of Falterman who “admitted that he usually dealt with the wife and never saw the defendant at the house.”

At trial, when the State attempted to introduce the documentation collected from Placide’s home and auto into evidence, defense counsel objected that the pay stub found in the home was not self-authenticating, nor was the social security card or the phone bills. Counsel argued these were hearsay evidence until authenticated by certified copies and/or the testimony of the custodian of the documents. Counsel also objected to the evidence found in the car, the Comcast bill and driver’s license, on similar grounds.

Despite overruling Placide’s objection, when the State moved to admit the subject documentation into evidence, the trial court declared that it was going to withhold its ruling on the admission of the evidence until the conclusion of trial.

Later, the court overruled the objections and ultimately found the documents admissible. Placide then raised a second objection as to the admission of the documents, arguing that, under Crawford v. Washington, the State failed to present a witness to authenticate the documents, thus, depriving defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine any such witnesses. Additionally, Placide argued that the State failed to show that the witnesses were unavailable to testify. He further argued that, even if the documents had been authenticated, they would still be inadmissible under Crawford because they are testimonial in nature. In response, the State again asserted that the exhibits were obtained pursuant to a validly issued search warrant and were not being offered to prove the accuracy of the information contained therein. Thus, the State maintained that it is left to the trier of fact to attribute the weight it deems appropriate to the documents admitted.

Because authentication of evidence is a condition precedent to admissibility, an exhibit that is not authenticated does not constitute competent evidence. Identification of an item of evidence establishes a proper foundation for its admission into evidence. Identification can be either visual, as by a witness who identified the evidence in court, or by a chain of custody. It suffices if the foundation laid establishes that it is more probable than not that the object is one connected with the case. Lack of positive identification or a defect in the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility.

Evidence must either be authenticated as provided in La. C.E. art. 901, or must be self-authenticating. See, La. C.E. art. 902. La. C.E. art. 901(B) includes a non-exclusive list of methods that may be utilized to authenticate evidence. Among the methods used to authenticate or identify a piece of evidence includes testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be, or through the use of distinctive characteristics such as the “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns” taken in conjunction with the circumstances surrounding its discovery. La. C.E. art. 901(b)(1) and (4).

Here, the State presented ample evidence of the chain of custody through the testimony of Davis and Captain Troxlair. Detective Murden also testified regarding the recovery of the evidence. It is clear that the State in this case was not trying to admit the Sprint bills and Turner Industries pay stub to establish that Placide did, in fact, have a service contract with Sprint or was employed by Turner Industries. Rather, the State identified the documents collected pursuant to the execution of the search warrant to establish that Placide had mail with his name on it at the 519 Homewood residence. Additionally, upon overruling Placide’s objection pertaining to the subject documents, the trial court stated “it is understood that the purported items are being offered for the mere purpose of showing that is was found at the residence at 519 Homewood Place.” Once admissible, it is left to the trier of fact to attribute the weight to the documents that it deems appropriate. We note that this was a bench trial; thus, the trial court’s understanding of the purpose of the offered evidence and the weight it may have attributed to the documents was less likely to be improperly applied than if presented to a jury. We find that La. C.E. art. 901 was fulfilled through the testimony of the officers verifying the chain of custody of the documentation collected pursuant to the search warrant executed at 519 Home-wood.

Placide also argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was unable to confront the custodian of records (i.e., a Sprint company representative) for the documents introduced by the State, citing Crawford v. Washington, supra. Traditionally, for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, all hearsay statements were admissible if (1) the declarant was unavailable to testify, and (2) the statement fell under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. But the United States Supreme Court has overruled Roberts insofar as it applies to out-of-court statements that are testimonial in nature, in Crawford v. Washington, supra. The Crawford court drew a distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay and noted that non-testimonial hearsay is admissible where both prongs of Roberts are satisfied, regardless of whether the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The Crawford Court held that testimonial hearsay statements may be admitted as evidence at a criminal trial only when the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declar-ant.

[T]he first issue is whether the statement at issue was “testimonial.” While the Supreme Court specifically declined to define “testimonial,” it recognized that, at a minimum testimonial statements include: “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and police interrogations.” State v. Leonard, 05-42, p. 19 (La.App.5 Cir. 7/26/05), 910 So.2d 977, 989, citing Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. The Cranford Court stated that “testimony” is “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” State v. Leonard, 05-42 at 19-20, 910 So.2d at 989, citing Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at 1364. According to the Supreme Court, an accuser making a formal statement to government officials bears testimony in a sense that a person making a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. Id. As examples of testimonial statements, the Crawford Court lists affidavits, custodial examinations, depositions, prior testimony, confessions, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used in a prosecution. The Supreme Court also refers to statements that were made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. State v. Leonard, 05-42 at 20, 910 So.2d at 989-90 citing Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at 1364.

In the present case, we find that the rule established in Crawford has no application here because the statements at issue were not testimonial in nature. Here, Placide’s name was found on pieces of mail inside his residence. Providing his name and contact information to Sprint and his employer were likely not made under “circumstances that would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the statements would be available for use at a later trial.” Moreover, as previously stated, the fact that Placide’s name was found on mail located inside the residence located at 519 Homewood Place does not constitute hearsay and, thus, the two-prong Robert test need not be addressed.

Even if admission of the evidence was erroneous, it was harmless error. The question raised by erroneous admission of evidence and confrontation errors is whether the trial court’s error in admitting it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To be harmless, the improperly admitted evidence must not have contributed to the verdict. Factors to be considered include the importance of the evidence to the State’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of additional corroboration of the evidence, the extent of cross-examination permitted, and the overall strength of the State’s case.

In this case, Placide was charged with violating La. R.S. 14:95.1, possessing a firearm by a convicted felon. To support a conviction under La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must prove that Placide possessed the firearm; that he has a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; that he possessed the firearm within ten years of the prior conviction; and that he had general intent to commit the crime. Constructive possession is sufficient to satisfy the element of possession. The determination of whether there is “possession” sufficient to convict depends on the particular facts of the case.

The record in this case indicates that Placide stipulated to the admission of the record establishing his prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana on October 28, 1998. Further, Errol Falterman, the landlord, testified that both Placide and his wife leased the residence located at 519 Homewood Place, and Fal-terman identified the lease signed by both parties, which lease was introduced into evidence. Although Falterman testified that he mostly dealt with Placide’s wife and only saw Placide outside the house on a few occasions, he also testified that he had only been inside the residence “once, twice, at the most” to make repairs. We note the trial court specifically found Mr. Falterman to be a credible witness who connected Placide to the residence where the weapons were found.

Additionally, the testimony of the officers at trial established that the guns were found underneath the mattress in the master bedroom of the house that Placide and his wife jointly leased. When a gun is found in an area that the defendant has customarily occupied, the courts have generally found this to be evidence of constructive possession. State v. Ware, supra (citing State v. Jackson), wherein this Court found the defendant had constructive possession of a gun that was found under the bed where defendant slept. “Because the gun was found under the defendant’s bed, this Court stated that the defendant had easy access to it, and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to show he possessed the gun.”

Finally, although he objected to the introduction of the items seized from his car at trial, Placide failed to assign error to their admissibility on appeal. Accordingly, the documentation seized from the car also helps to establish that Placide constructively possessed the contraband seized from the master bedroom at 519 Homewood Place. We find that the circumstances and evidence presented at trial support a determination that Placide was in constructive possession of the guns even without the documentation found in the master bedroom being admitted at trial.

This assignment of error is without merit.

Our error patent review reveals that neither the sentencing minutes nor the transcript reflects that Placide was advised of the time period for seeking post-conviction relief as provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8.

We correct the error by now informing Placide, via this opinion, that no application for post-conviction relief, including an application for an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 914 or 922.

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

      . Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), holding that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of an out-of-court “testimonial” statement against a criminal defendant unless the defendant is unavailable and had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

      . Price v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., 04-0227 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/27/05), 915 So.2d 816, 822.

      . State v. Collins, 535 So.2d 973, 976 (La.App. 2 Cir.1988).

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . State v. Landry, 388 So.2d 699 (La.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 968, 101 S.Ct. 1487, 67 L.Ed.2d 618 (1981).

      . Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980).

      . State v. Parks, 08-423 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/08), 2 So.3d 470, 478, writ denied, 09-0142 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 101.

      . Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Gibson, 391 So.2d 421, 427-28 (La.1980).

      . State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321, 1322 (La.1990), cert denied, 506 U.S. 880, 113 S.Ct. 231, 121 L.Ed.2d 167 (1992); State v. Banks, 439 So.2d 407, 409 (La.1983); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081-82, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); State v. Everidge, 96-2665, p. 8 (La. 12/2/97), 702 So.2d 680, 685; State v. Davis, 05-987, p. 15 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/9/06), 930 So.2d 1099, 1107.

      . Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); State v. Louviere, 00-2085, p. 28 (La.9/4/02), 833 So.2d 885, 905, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 828, 124 S.Ct. 56, 157 L.Ed.2d 52 (2003).

      . See, State v. Gordon, 00-1013, p. 14 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/27/01), 803 So.2d 131, 142, writs denied, 02-0362 (La.12/19/02), 833 So.2d 336, 02-0209 (La.2/14/03), 836 So.2d 134.

      . State v. Ware, 01-194 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/28/01), 795 So.2d 495, 499 (citing State v. Mose, 412 So.2d 584 (La.1982)).

      . State v. Ware, supra (citing State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La.1983)).

      . Id.

      . 97-1246 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/13/98), 712 So.2d 934, 937-38, writ denied, 98-1454 (La.10/16/98), 726 So.2d 37.

      . State v. Ware, supra.

      . State v. Thomas, 10-220 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/9/10), 54 So.3d 678, 688, writ denied, 10-2758 (La.4/25/11), 62 So.3d 89 and writ denied, 10-2752 (La.5/20/11), 63 So.3d 974.


author: EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge.

text:
    Sherry WATTERS, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. Sherry Watters, et al. v. Department of Social Services, et al.
    Nos. 2011-CA-1754, 2012-CA-0751.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Jan. 9, 2013.

      Mickey P. Landry, Frank Joseph Swarr, David Ryan Cannella, Philip C. Hoffman, Landry Swarr & Cannella, L.L.C., Thomas Patrick Owen, Jr., Richard Charles Stanley, Stanley Reuter Ross Thornton & Alford, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, Kelly Creely, Kelly Creely, Attorney at Law, LLC, Pass Christian, MS, for Plaintiffs/Appellees, Sherry Watters et al.
    James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, Attorney General, Baton Rouge, LA, James Jerome Bolner, Jr., Montgomery, Barnett, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for Defendants/Appellants, State of Louisiana, et al.
    (Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge DANIEL L. DYSART).
   EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge.

This is a consolidated appeal of a judgment awarding damages to 49 out of 50 class members involved in a toxic tort action concerning injuries suffered while working at the Plaza Tower office building between 1996 and 2002. The appellees are part of the second flight of class members comprised of State employees who allege that while working in the Plaza Tower office building they were exposed to mold. The class is made up of Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) and Department of Social Services (DSS) employees, who suffered a variety of health issues due to their exposure to mold and mold byproducts. Finding that the trial court did not err in awarding damages to the appel-lees, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

On October 25, 2001, the five class representatives in this case, Sherry Watters, Gina Recasner, Wendy Lemuix, Frances Breyne, and Gretchen Wiltz, filed a class action suit naming as defendants, the owners of the Plaza Tower office building, the management company for the building, the building’s insurers, and their own employer, the State of Louisiana. In their petition, the class representatives allege personal injuries through their exposure to toxic mold in the Plaza Tower, located at 1001 Howard Avenue in New Orleans. Particularly, they allege that they suffered inter alia, headaches, respiratory infections, sore throats, body aches, flu-like symptoms, itching, and increases in allergy reactions caused by their exposure to mold, mold spores, and mold by-products during their occupancy of the Plaza Tower as State employees from September 1996 to February 2002. After a class was certified and the certification was affirmed on appeal following a challenge by the State, the trial court conducted a seven-day bench trial in November 2007 to determine the common issues for the class and damages for the five class representatives.

By the end of 2009, it was established that on behalf of a class of State employees who worked in the Plaza Tower between 1996 and 2002 that: (1) the Plaza Tower was infested with harmful mold, particularly Stachybotrys, related to deplorable building conditions; (2) the State had breached its duty to its employees by requiring them to work in a building with such conditions; (3) that Stachybotrys mold can cause a variety of symptoms including respiratory symptoms, nasal irritation, sinus discomfort, watery eyes, throat discomfort, coughing, nasal symptoms, runny, blocked, or stuffy nose, headaches, itchy skin, weak voice, swallowing problems, and other related issues; and (4) the State is liable for 35% of the damages suffered by the appellees. See Watters v. Department of Social Services, 11-1174 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/14/12) 102 So.3d 118, writ denied, 12-1146 (La.9/14/12), 99 So.3d 42.

Following these rulings, the State insisted and repeatedly requested that each individual class member prove at trial that he or she suffered harm because of the exposure to mold. However, because of the logistical issues of trying over 600 individual claims, the parties decided to try the damage claims in flights.

At a status conference after the first flight of class members’ damage claims were presented at trial, the trial court stated that it intended to appoint an expert to assist it with the grouping of the damages. After the conference, each party was allowed to submit nominations and brief any relevant issues regarding the appointment of such an expert. On January 27, 2011, the trial court issued an order appointing Bryan Jefferson to “create a methodology that allows for the grouping of claims that includes a quantum for each group to ensure a timely resolution of this matter and to submit a report to this Court and all parties detailing such methodology” and required him to be subject to cross-examination at trial.

On March 21, 2011, the State filed a writ application -with this court challenging the trial court’s authority to, inter alia, order its appointed expert to attend depositions and to recommend a quantum while grouping the claims of class members. The State’s writ application was denied.

On June 21, 2011, the trial court heard the individual issues for the appellees, a second flight of fifty (50) class members. To assist the court in preparation for that trial, Mr. Jefferson reviewed the depositions of the fifty (50) class members, their medical records, and relevant decisions by the trial court and this court related to this case. Mr. Jefferson then issued an initial report in which he provided recommendations as to how to group the class members based on the trial court’s decisions concerning the previous fifty-five (55) class members. The parties then deposed Mr. Jefferson, after which he issued a supplemental report based on issues raised by the parties at the deposition.

At trial, the appellees introduced into evidence the depositions of the class members, the proof of loss forms, and the medical records that Mr. Jefferson had reviewed in preparing for his reports, as well as his reports. Further, Mr. Jefferson testified about his reports and recommendations, with each party permitted to cross-examine him. The court then took the case under advisement, and issued a judgment on September 18, 2011, awarding damages to 49 of the 50 class members whose claims had been tried.

The appellees then filed a motion for new trial as to five (5) of the fifty (50) class members. While a decision on that motion was pending, the State appealed the September 2011 Judgment as to the remaining forty-five (45) members. On February 8, 2012, the trial court denied the appellees’ motion for new trial. On February 22, 2012, the State appealed the decision as to the remaining five (5) class members. These two appeals were then consolidated, and the State timely filed its appellant brief on July 23, 2012.

Discussion

The State assigns as error: (1) the trial court improperly permitted Bryan Jefferson to offer opinion testimony, improperly admitted his report into evidence and improperly relied on Bryan Jefferson’s opinion testimony and report as the basis for its general awards to the plaintiffs; (2) the trial court improperly awarded damages to the plaintiffs based on Bryan Jefferson’s erroneous interpretations of the law; (3) the trial court improperly awarded damages to the plaintiffs based on Bryan Jefferson’s “totality of the circumstances” test; and (4) the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs met their burdens of proof without testimony from a medical expert to establish specific causation.

Factual determinations are subject to the manifestly erroneous standard of review. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Trans. And Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). “Louisiana’s three-tiered court system allocates the fact finding function to the trial courts. Because of that allocation of function (as well as the trial court’s normal procedure of evaluating live witnesses), great deference is accorded to the trial court’s factual findings, both express and implicit, and reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on appellate review of the trial court’s judgment.” Vir gil v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 825, 826 (La.1987).

As stated by this court in Ladner v. Government Employees’ Ins. Co., 08-0323, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/8/08), 992 So.2d 1098, 1101-02.:

The trier of fact may also choose to reject all of the testimony of any witness or may believe and accept any part or parts of a witness’ testimony and refuse to accept any other part or parts thereof. Temple v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, 95-2491, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/10/96), 677 So.2d 1103, 1105-1106. Further, the trial court is permitted to make credibility determinations from deposition testimony just as from live testimony, and an appellate court views those determinations using the manifest error standard. Virgil v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 825, 826 (La.1987); Maldonado v. Louisiana Superdome Com’n, 95-2490, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/22/97), 687 So.2d 1087, 1091

Further, the trial court, as the trier of fact, has great and vast discretion with respect to the determination of damage awards. La. Civ.Code art. 2324.1; Howard v. Union Carbide Corp., 09-2750 (La.10/19/10), 50 So.3d 1251. Thus, it is only after an articulated analysis of the facts discloses an abuse of discretion may an appellate court disturb a damages award. Miller v. LAMMICO, 07-1352, p. 28 (La.1/16/08), 973 So.2d 693, 711.

Since the first three assignments of error asserted by the State regard the appointment and reliance on expert Bryan Jefferson, we will address them together. The State argues that the trial court improperly permitted Bryan Jefferson to offer opinion testimony, improperly admitted his report into evidence, and improperly relied on Bryan Jefferson’s opinion testimony and report as the basis for its general damage awards to the plaintiffs based on Mr. Jefferson’s erroneous interpretations of the law and “totality of the circumstances” test. Specifically, the State avers that the trial court failed to recognize the limitations of La.Code Evid. art. 706 experts.

Pursuant to Louisiana Code of Evidence article 706, it was within the trial court’s discretion to appoint Mr. Jefferson as an expert to assist her with grouping claims and providing recommendations as to quantum, as stated in this court’s disposition denying the State’s writ application, which, in pertinent part, states:

The trial court’s judgment appointing an expert to assist it in managing the remaining class members’ claims falls within the discretion allowed by La. C.E. art. 706. The trial court appointed an expert to create a methodology to group claims, including quantum, and to submit a report to the Court and the parties detailing the methodology. This was done to ensure a timely resolution of the matter. The expert will be subject to cross-examination by the parties. We do not find that this confers on the expert judicial or fact-finding functions. Adams v. CSX Railroads, 2004-1965 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/4/05), 904 So.2d 13. Therefore, we deny the writ as to the appointment of the expert.

A review of the record reveals that Mr. Jefferson properly carried out his role as the trial court’s appointed expert in creating a methodology to group claims. The record indicates that Mr. Jefferson’s report and recommendations were made after the review of the record in the common-issues trial, the class members’ depositions and their relevant medical records as well as on the previous decisions made by the trial court and this court in this case. After being deposed, Mr. Jefferson submitted a supplemental and amending expert report and recommendations to address queries from both parties regarding findings memorialized in the original report. At trial, he was subject to cross-examination as to both his original and supplemental reports and recommendations.

At the June 21, 2011 hearing, the trial court recognized the limitations of court-appointed experts, which is evident when it stated:

The Fourth Circuit did approve the creation of methodology to determine the quantum. Now, at the end of the day, I’m going to determine these numbers. And, again, we all know that the Fourth Circuit said we could have an expert to assist us. I understand that and I’ve already done it, and I gave him the template. So, that’s going to be denied as well.”
* * *
And I want the record to be clear that the expert is court appointed to assist the Court in managing this trial.... I cannot hear 800 trials, and the Court did do originally I think roughly 50 of them to get an idea of what was going on so that the expert could do it. At the end of the day, I will make the decision .... So, I just want to make that clear that this is a court-appointed expert. He is here to assist the plaintiff as well as the defense. He has to answer to both, and however he can come up with the information to help this Court out, he has to work with you. [Emphasis added].

Thus, as the trial court clearly stated that the expert, Mr. Jefferson, would not engage in judicial functions nor be a trier of fact, we find that the trial court (1) did not manifestly err in appointing Mr. Jefferson to assist in the adjudication of the trial by creating a methodology to determine the quantum or in admitting his report into evidence; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in its awards of damages to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we find that the State’s argument has no merit.

In its appeal, the State also argues that the trial court manifestly erred in finding that any of the appellees suffered physical symptoms related to the Plaza Tower mold, claiming that the appellees failed to introduce medical evidence to establish specific causation.

In Watters v. Dept. of Social Services, 11-1174 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/14/12), 102 So.3d 118, the State asserted the same assignment of error stating that “[t]he Appellees failed to prove specific causation because they did not introduce medical evidence linking their particular injuries to mold exposure at the Plaza Tower.” This court rejected this argument, stating:

The State’s assertions that the Appellees failed to introduce medical evidence is erroneous. As stated by the district court, to request medical expert testimony and a medical report form each individual would void the purpose of class actions. The class representatives of this class action provided a medical expert’s testimony. This medical expert provided concrete findings and reasoning for her determination that the symptoms of the class representatives were related to the mold found in the Plaza Tower. This finding of specific causation by the class representatives is significant of the remaining class members. It is clear that Louisiana law does not require medical expert examination of each class member’s symptoms before the court can find that specific causation has been met. As in Howard v. Union Carbide Corp., 09-2750, pp. 3-4 (La.10/19/10), 50 So.3d 1251, 1254-1255, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s findings that the class members had met their burden of proving causation without any evidence that a medical expert examined each one of the class members. In fact, the record in Howard showed that not all the class members sought medical treatment for their symptoms. Id. Thus, the distribution of the damage awards in this matter was without error.

Id. at 125-26. (footnote omitted).

In the earlier case, Watters v. Dept. of Social Services, 08-0977 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/17/09), 15 So.3d 1128, we analyzed all the facts and evidence presented at trial and the findings of the district court, concluding that the class members had sufficiently proved general causation. Id., pp. 25-26, 15 So.3d at 1147-1148. Specifically, we found that symptoms such as wheezing, coughing, runny nose, headaches, itchy skin, weak voice, swallowing problems, etc., were consistent with the effects of mold exposure. In this case, the appellees’ production of their proof of loss forms is admissible under La.Code of Evid. art. 803(4) and 803(5) along with their testimony that they have experienced the same symptoms as presented by the other class members. Further, medical evidence as presented in the earlier case is sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellees suffered damages because of their exposure to mold. Thus, the State’s argument is without merit. After a review of the record, we do not find that the trial court manifestly erred in its findings.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

      . Anthony Bader, Mirtha Bell, Dawn Bently, Valerie Bergeron-Vedor, Mary Bonaparte, Nicole Bouie, Arnold Burks, Cornelia Cager-Bonds, Elaine Carter, Kim Marie Davis Che-neau, Brenda Clark, Joan Clayton, Donna Luise Cohen, Althea Davis, Lizzie Dempsey, Donna Downy, Yolanda Evans, Audrey Feru-son, Ursula Forstall, Katherine Franklin, Bob-bette Gaines, Cheryl Franklin, Robin Green, Joycelyn Haynes, Betty Johnson, Mary Jones, Julia Lewis, Carol Mackey, JoAnn Medice, Sigrid Petit, Tanya Soublet, Patricia Thompson, Barbara Tregre, Mary Young, Beatrice Dorsey, Curtis Fisher, Jr., Wanda Gaines, Sandra Cook, Bobby Gross, Cynthia Brown, Catherine Carter, Michelle Davis, Alfreda Fields, Mary Gaines, Chiquita Jones, JoAnn Roy-Busch, Angela Batiste-Bridges, Paulette E. Brown, and Brenda Griffin.

      . The trial court re-opened the claim of remaining class member — Brenda Griffin.

      . Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 706 provides, in pertinent part:
      A. Civil Cases. In a civil case, the court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called to testify by the court or any party.