source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PETTIGREW, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    GILCHRIST CONSTRUCTION CO., LLC v. EAST FELICIANA PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 2012 CA 1307.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    July 11, 2013.

      John M. Madison, III, Scott E. Frazier, Gerald J. Asay, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant, Gilchrist Construction Co., LLC.
    Michael Hughes, St. Franeisville, LA, for Defendant-Appellee, East Feliciana Parish Police Jury.
    E. Allen Graves, Jr., David C. Voss, David W. Carley, Cerise K. Potts, Baton Rouge, LA, for Intervenor, Coastal Bridge Company, LLC.
    Before KUHN, PETTIGREW, and McDonald, jj.
   PETTIGREW, J.

| ?,Tlüs is an appeal by Gilchrist Construction Co., LLC. (Gilchrist) of a judgment that dismissed its action for nullity, and maintained the defendants’ exceptions of no right of action and prescription, finding Gilchrist had no right to contest as null a public bid contract that had been allegedly awarded in violation of Louisiana’s Public Bid Law, La. R.S. 38:2211 et seq., because Gilchrist’s objections thereto were untimely. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 2012, the Parish of East Feliciana, through the East Feliciana Parish Police Jury (EFPPJ), published “Advertisement For Bids” in connection with a project, entitled East Feliciana Parish Unincorporated Road Repairs (the project), which involved the construction of an asphalt overlay for several roads within the parish. The engineer and the owner’s representative for the project was Shread-Kuyrkendall and Associates, Inc. (Shread). The advertisements instructed that all bids were to be delivered no later than 10 a.m. on March 15, 2012, and that they were to be filed in triplicate. The advertisements also noted that the owner reserves the right to reject any or all bids for just cause, in accordance with Title 38 of the Revised Statutes [Louisiana’s Public Bid Law].

After submission of and opening of all bids, it was tabulated that Gilchrist submitted the lowest bid; however, its bid was rejected as being non-responsive for failure to comply with the advertised requirement that it be submitted in triplicate. Accordingly, by letter to EFPPJ dated March 19, 2012, Shread recommended that the contract be awarded to the lowest responsive bidder, Coastal Bridge Company, L.L.C. (Coastal), noting in the letter that the lowest bidder, Gilchrist, was non-responsive for failing to submit its bid in triplicate as required by the advertisement.

l.gOn March 20, 2012, the matter of the award for the project was presented to the EFPPJ, which voted to award the contract to Coastal, in the amount of $1,959,489.00.

On March 28, 2012, Gilchrist filed an application for preliminary injunction, together with a separate pleading, entitled Petition for Permanent and Mandatory Injunction, Declaratory Judgment and for Damages. Primarily, Gilchrist sought to enjoin the EFPPJ from awarding, executing, or making payments under any contract to anyone other than Gilchrist, claiming to be the lowest responsive bidder for the project. In the alternative, Gilchrist sought an order that the EFPPJ reject all bids based on its own failure to comply with the Louisiana Public Bid Law. Specifically, Gilchrist contended that the EFPPJ failed to comply with La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(f), which it claims mandates the EFPPJ (and all public entities) to provide potential bidders with the option to submit bids electronically and that the public entity include all bid documents on the electronic website for accepting public bids.

On April 2, 2012, Coastal filed a petition of intervention, claiming to have been awarded the contract for the project as the lowest responsive bidder. Coastal also asserted that Gilchrist’s request for injunc-tive relief was untimely, and/or prescribed, and should be dismissed on that basis. Coastal also asserted that Gilchrist is not an interested party with the right to bring this action, because its bid had been rejected as non-responsive because it failed to file its bid in triplicate. Finally, Coastal asserted in the alternative that Gilchrist had waived its’ right to complain about the bid process being defective or violative of statutory mandate, because it waited to complain about the lack of the option to file electronically until after the submission of its own bid and the award of the contract to another bidder. On April 9, 2012, Coastal filed exceptions of no right of action, prescription, and laches. The EFPPJ filed its own exception of no right of action and adopted, by reference, all arguments presented by Coastal.

On April 10, 2012, Gilchrist filed an unopposed motion to amend and supplement its original petition, to seek a declaratory judgment that the EFPPJ violated provisions of the Public Bid Law, and seeking to annul the contract that was awarded to Coastal. Gilchrist additionally sought attorney fees and damages.

14A hearing on the foregoing was held on April 11, 2012. Prior to the hearing, the parties entered into written stipulations that were entered into evidence to the effect that Gilchrist no longer sought to enjoin the award of the contract to Coastal, but was only proceeding for a declaration that the award of the contract was null and void for failure of the EFPPJ to comply with the specific terms of the Public Bid Law; i.e., the requirement that bidders be given the option of electronic filing. The parties further stipulated that the remaining exceptions filed by EFPPJ and Coastal would be heard prior to but at the same hearing as the action for nullity.

The parties also stipulated the following pertinent facts: (1) that the EFPPJ published advertisements for and received bids pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2211 et seq.; (2) that EFPPJ did not provide bidders with the opportunity to submit bids electronically according to La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(f), although the provision was applicable to that parish; (3) that no bidder, person, or entity objected in any manner to the advertisement, the bid form, or the bidding procedure at any time prior to the submission of bids or the award of the project; and more specifically, (4) that no bidder, including Gilchrist, requested to submit electronically, or objected to the lack of the opportunity to file the bids electronically; (5) that Gilchrist’s submitted bid was the lowest numerical bid of $1,924,081.00, and Coastal’s submitted bid was the second lowest numerical bid of $1,959,489.00; (6) that the EFPPJ, upon the recommendation of its project engineer, determined Gilchrist’s bid was non-responsive for failure to file in triplicate as required, and that its bid was therefore rejected on that basis; (7) that the project was then awarded to Coastal, the second lowest bidder and the lowest responsive bidder; (8) that neither EFPPJ, Gilchrist nor Coastal were aware at the time of the bidding process that the threshold for requiring the option of electronic bidding to parishes with a population of at least 50,-000 (inapplicable to East Feliciana Parish) had been amended with an effective date of August 15, 2011, to reduce the threshold to parishes with populations of at least 20,000 (which did apply to East Feliciana Parish); (9) that Gilchrist was allowed to file an amending and supplemental petition asserting an action to annul the award of the contract to Coastal, which nullity would be the sole remaining issue arising out of IfiGilchrist’s objections to the bidding process (thus, Gilchrist was relinquishing the action to enjoin the award of the contract to Coastal); and finally, (10) that the only issue outstanding, as between the parties, as of the time of entering into these stipulations, was the issue of nullity of any contract entered into in connection with the Project.

At the hearing, all of the documents related to the foregoing stipulation of facts were entered into evidence, as was the affidavit of Chad Juneau, COO of Gilchrist, which detailed the bidding process and the failure of that process to offer an option for electronic filing of bids. He also attested that Gilchrist was unaware of the EFPPJ’s failure to comply with the Public Bid Law when it submitted its bid on March 15, 2012.

After the hearing, the trial court rendered reasons for judgment, specifically finding that the rejection of Gilchrist’s bid by the EFPPJ as non-responsive was valid — it found the advertisement required the bids to be submitted in triplicate and that clearly, Gilchrist had not met this requirement.

The trial court also noted that La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(f)(i), requiring a public entity to offer the option of electronic filing, did indeed, apply to the EFPPJ in this matter, and that the EFPPJ had failed to comply with this, requirement. However, it noted that Gilchrist was an aggrieved (unsuccessful) bidder, and as such, it failed to timely file suit for an injunction based on its claim that the bidding process violated the Public Bid Law, because Gilchrist knew (or should have known) of that deficiency in the bidding process at the time it was advertised, or at the very latest, by the time Gilchrist submitted its bid. The trial court noted that there was no evidence that Gilchrist could not have sought injunc-tive relief and asserted its allegation of violation of the Public Bid Law prior to the submission deadline, thus giving the EFPPJ an opportunity and time to correct its failure and offer the electronic submission of bids. Because Gilchrist did not timely file an injunction based on that allegation, its bid was validly rejected; therefore, it waived (or had no right) to proceed with a nullity action.

Based on those findings, the trial court sustained the exceptions of no right of action and the exception of prescription, and dismissed Gilchrist’s claims by judgment signed May 1, 2012. Gilchrist then filed a Motion for New Trial and/or for Reconsideration Rof Reasons for Judgment, which the trial court denied on May 14, 2012. Gilchrist now appeals those judgments.

Gilchrist asserts the trial court erred in ruling that an unsuccessful bidder must seek injunctive relief prior to seeking nullification of a public works contract; in allowing a public entity to proceed with an award of a public works contract where a violation of the public bid law in the solicitation of bids had occurred; in finding that Gilchrist had failed to timely seek injunc-tive relief; and, in denying its motion for new trial.

APPLICABLE LAW

The Louisiana Public Bid Law, La. R.S. 38:2211 et seq., is a prohibitory law founded on public policy. Hamp’s

Construction, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, 2005-0489, p. 4 (La.2/22/06), 924 So.2d 104, 107, La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(1)(a) mandates that all public construction contracts of major significance be let to the “lowest responsible bidder.” The Public Bid Law serves the dual purposes of (1) eliminating fraud and favoritism and (2) securing free and unrestricted competition among bidders, thereby avoiding undue or excessive costs. Apolinar v. Professional Construction Services, 95-0746, p. 4 (La.11/27/95), 663 So.2d 17, 18-19. A political entity has no authority to take any action which is inconsistent with the Public Bid Law. Hamp’s, 924 So.2d at 107. See also, La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(b)(i), which provides that the requirements and provisions of that section shall not be waived by any public entity.- In this sense, the law severely curtails the discretion of the public entity, thereby ensuring a level playing field for all bidders and a fair and equitable means by which competing bids might be evaluated to determine the lowest responsible and responsive bidder. One bidder cannot be provided an advantage over another bidder due to a waiver. Hamp’s, 924 So.2d at 110.

|7And specifically at issue herein, La. R.S, 38:2212(A)(l)(f) provides:

(i) Contractors shall be provided the option to submit bids for public contracts through a uniform and secure electronic interactive system. Political subdivisions shall follow the standards for the receipt of electronic bids adopted by the office of the governor, division of administration, and the office of information technology as provided for in LAC 4:XV.701, and shall make the appropriate provisions necessary for the acceptance of electronic bids for all purchases requiring competitive bidding as required by this Section. Any special condition or requirement for the submission shall be specified in the advertisement for bids required by this Section.
(ii) Public entities that are currently without available high speed Internet access will be exempt from this requirement until such time that high speed Internet access becomes available.
(iii) Any parish with a police jury form of government and a population of less than twenty thousand shall be exempt from the provisions of this Subpara-graph.
(iv) Any city or municipality with a population of less than ten thousand shall be exempt from the provisions of this Sub-paragraph.
(v) Any special service district created by a police jury form of government and which is unable to comply with R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(f)(i) without securing and expending additional funding shall be exempt from its requirements. The special service district shall be exempted from any expenditures for high speed Internet access, software, personnel costs, training, or other office equipment directly relating to the receipt of bids via high speed Internet access.
(vi) Public entities shall have the option to require that all bids be submitted electronically for any competitive bid let out for public bid.
(vii) Public entities must include all bid documents as defined in R.S. 38:2211(A)(1), on the electronic website accepting the electronic bids.

(Emphasis added.)

It is undisputed, and the trial court specifically found that the EFPPJ did not comply with subsection (l)(f) of the Public Bid Law in that it did not provide bidders with the opportunity to electronically file bids. Although an amendment to the statute, Acts 2011, No. 81 § 1, effective August 2011, reduced the population threshold from 50,000 to 20,000, thus now including East Feliciana Parish within the scope of the ^statute’s mandate, EFPPJ was unaware of the amendment (or that the electronic filing option was now applicable to that parish) at the time the bids were advertised, received, and the contract awarded.

Regarding the award of a contract contrary to the provisions of the Public Bid Law, La. R.S. 38:2220 provides, in pertinent part:

A. Any purchase of materials or supplies, or any contract entered into for the construction of public works, contrary to the provisions of this Part shall be null and void.
B. The district attorney in whose district a violation of this Part occurs, the attorney general, or any interested party may bring suit in the district court through summary proceeding to enjoin the award of a contract or to seek other appropriate injunctive relief to prevent the award of a contract which would be in violation of this Part, or through ordinary proceeding to seek appropriate remedy to nullify a contract entered into in violation of this Part.

(Emphasis added.)

An “interested party” for the purpose of the remedies set forth in 38:2220(B) and the jurisprudence is a party claiming to be the lowest responsible and responsive bidder and thus, the bidder entitled by virtue of the Public Bid Law to an award of the contract by the public entity. Carolina Biological Supply Co. v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 2011-0301 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/14/12), 2012 WL 895995 (unpublished), writ denied, 2012-0836 (La.5/25/12), 90 So.3d 418 (wherein this court held, by raising an exception of no right of action on its own motion, that an unsuccessful bidder who was not entitled to an award of the contract in the first place had no right of action to seek damages as a result of the School Board’s award of the contract to another bidder.)

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS

Gilchrist argues that there is no dispute that EFPPJ violated subsection La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(f)(i) by failing to provide bidders with the option of filing bids electronically, and that pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2220, it, as an interested party and taxpayer may file the instant suit through ordinary remedy to nullify the contract to Coastal that it contends was awarded in violation of the statute. Notably, Gilchrist does not dispute that it failed to file its bid in triplicate by the time of submission on March 15, 2012, as instructed by the | nadvertisement; however, it claims that it submitted two copies of the bid to EFPPJ on March 23, 2012, pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(b)(ii)(bb), such that at that time, its bid was “responsive.”

The trial court rejected, and we agree, that Gilchrist’s subsequent compliance with the statutory requirement of 38:2212(A)(l)(b)(ii)(bb) is not the equivalent of the requirement in EFPPJ’s advertisement for bids that they be submitted in triplicate. The trial court found, and we agree, that the requirement was not only valid, but very clearly and unambiguously required by the advertisements. Because Gilchrist was not the lowest responsible and responsive bidder, based on the foregoing, it can have no right of action to now contest the award of the contract to another entity.

This is especially so under the facts and circumstances of this case, where Gilchrist’s allegation about EFPPJ’s noncompliance with the Public Bid Law concerns a statutory requirement (allowing electronic filing of bids) that had nothing to do with the reason that Gilchrist’s bid was rejected. Moreover, the evidence reveals that no bidder, including Gilchrist, ever inquired or requested to file their bid electronically, nor did any bidder, including Gilchrist, raise a complaint about the lack of that option at any time during the bidding process. This Is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Airline Construction Company, Inc. v. Ascension Parish School Board, 892697 (La.10/22/90), 568 So.2d 1029, that an unsuccessful bidder on a public contract .who fails to resort to the relief granted by statute. (i.e., La. R.S. 38:2220(B)) by attempting to enjoin timely the execution or performance of the contract when the facts necessary for | 10injunctive relief are known or readily as.certainable by the bidder, is precluded from recovering damages against the public body.

After correctly setting forth the law, burden of proof, and analysis for an exception of no right of action, the trial court also very aptly noted as follows:

The evidence shows that the agent for the Police Jury notified all bidders by letter dated March 19, 2012 of the recommendation that the Police Jury reject the bid of Gilchrist and award the contract to Coastal. The Police Jury acted in accord with the recommendation at a meeting on March 20, 2012. That considered, there was simply no time between the notification and the award for any bidder to seek injunctive relief for a wrongful award. In fact, Gilchrist did not acquire knowledge of the award until after it had been finalized. However, Gilchrist is not seeking to rectify a wrongful award for some procedural or substantive defect in that specific award. Gilchrist is seeking to nullify the entire process for failure of the Police Jury to offer the bidders the option to submit bids electronically. As to that issue, Gilchrist knew or should have known of the deficiency in the bidding process when the Police Jury advertised. It was at that time that Gilchrist could have and should have sought injunctive relief giving the Police Jury time to correct its failure to offer electronic submission of bids to bring the process into compliance with the Public Bid Law. Gilchrist ... failed to timely assert its claim for injunctive relief and, as an unsuccessful bidder, has waived its right to proceed with this nullity action. To find otherwise, would allow any bidder on any project to forego seeking injunctive relief to correct any known shortcoming in the bidding process or failure to comply with the Public Bid Law when the shortcoming or failure could be corrected and wait to see if it was the successful bidder. If successful, no action would be taken. If unsuccessful, the unsuccessful bidder could proceed with the nullity action thereby requiring another round of bids but with knowledge of the amounts of the other bids. The purpose of the law — to insure a level playing Held for all bidders and a fair and equitable means by which competing bids might be evaluated to determine the lowest responsible and responsive bidder — would be defeated.

(Emphasis added.)

CONCLUSION

We find these reasons for judgment are consistent with the applicable statutory provisions, the jurisprudence, and also with the public policy underlying the Public Bid Law. We also find they are amply supported by the record, and the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, | ndismissing Gilchrist’s action for nullity, and sustaining the exceptions of no right of action and prescription. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Gilchrist.

AFFIRMED.

      . Gilchrist submitted a bid for $1,924,081.00.

      . Coastal’s bid was for $1,959,489.00.

      . La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(a) provides: "All public work exceeding the contract limit as defined in this Section, including labor and materials, to be done by a public entity shall be advertised and let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder who had bid according to the contract, plans, and specifications as advertised, and no such public work shall be done except as provided in this Part.”

      . That provision addresses additional filings that must be made by the lowest responsive bidder, providing as follows:
      Other documentation and information required including but not limited to the low bidder’s attestation pursuant to R.S. 38:2212.10 and 2227 shall be furnished by the low bidder within ten days after the bid opening. The ten-day period shall not be altered or waived by any public entity except the governing authority of any publicly owned commercial aviation airport, the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, and all agencies of the City of New Orleans, including but not limited to the Regional Transit Authority and the New Orleans Aviation Board, who shall require that the other documentation and information referred to in this Subitem be furnished by the two lowest bidders three days after the bid opening.


author: WELCH, J.

text:
    Thomas McKENZIE v. IMPERIAL FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, the Estate of Sharon R. Braud and Sharon Braud and State Farm Insurance Company.
    No. 2012 CA 1648.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    July 30, 2013.

      Thomas L. Smith, David A. Dalia, New Orleans, LA, for Appellant Plaintiff, Thomas McKenzie.
    James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, Attorney General, Thomas M. Brahney, Assistant Attorney General, New Orleans, LA, for Appellee Defendant, State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    Before PARRO, WELCH, and DRAKE, JJ.
   WELCH, J.

li>The plaintiff, Thomas McKenzie, appeals a trial court judgment sustaining the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription filed by defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”), and dismissing the plaintiffs claims against DOTD with prejudice. For reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 19, 2008, the plaintiff was traveling westbound on Interstate 10 in St. Tammany Parish when Sharon Braud, who was traveling eastbound on the interstate, crossed over the median and collided with the vehicle driven by the plaintiff. The collision caused the plaintiffs vehicle to leave the paved roadway and ultimately crash on the embankment. As a result of the incident, the plaintiff sustained various personal injuries.'

On November 24, 2008, the plaintiff filed a petition for damages in the Thirty-Fourth Judicial District Court (“34th JDC”) for the Parish of St. Bernard, naming as defendants Sharon Braud; her automobile liability insurer, Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (“Imperial”); and the plaintiffs uninsured/underinsured motorist insurer, State Farm Insurance Company (“State Farm”). Following a settlement of the plaintiffs claims against State Farm, on | ¡¡September 9, 2009, State Farm was dismissed with prejudice from the suit, reserving the rights of the plaintiff to proceed against the remaining defendants.

On October 13, 2010, the plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended petition for damages in the 34th JDC. The amended petition copied the original petition “in extenso ” and added an additional defendant, DOTD, which allegedly had responsibility for maintaining the median where the accident at issue took place. With regard to DOTD, the plaintiff alleged that DOTD was both negligent and strictly liable for the plaintiffs injuries, because it failed to provide an adequate barricade in the median of the interstate where the accident occurred.

Based on a settlement of claims with the plaintiff, on November 16, 2010, Imperial, Sharon Braud, and the Estate of Sharon Braud were dismissed with prejudice from the suit, with a reservation of rights against all remaining defendants. The DOTD then filed, in response to the plaintiffs petition, a declinatory exception raising the objection of improper venue. In the exception, DOTD sought a transfer of this suit to St. Tammany Parish, based on allegations that St. Bernard Parish was an improper venue pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5104(A) and because St. Tammany Parish was the most convenient forum.

On June 24, 2011, the trial court sustained the exception and ordered this case transferred to the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court (“22nd JDC”) for St. Tammany Parish. Once the case was transferred to the 22nd JDC, on January 18, 2012, DOTD filed an answer to the plaintiffs petition and supplemental and amended petition, essentially denying the factual allegations of the petitions. ^Additionally, on January 30, 2012, DOTD filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, claiming that the plaintiffs supplemental and amended petition naming it as a defendant was not filed and served on them until two years after the accident at issue and that the supplé-mental and amended petition did not relate back to the original petition under La. C.C.P. art. 1153, because it did not comply with the criteria established by the supreme court in Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So.2d 1083, 1086-87 (La.1983). After a hearing, the trial court sustained the objection of prescription and dismissed the plaintiffs claims against DOTD with prejudice. A judgment in accordance with the trial court’s ruling was. signed on May 2, 2012, and it is from this judgment that the plaintiff has appealed.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the exception, because the defendants named in the original petition ■ and the DOTD are joint tortfeasors. He argues that under La. C.C. arts. 2324(C) and 3462, his timely original suit against the defendants/joint tortfeasors named therein interrupted prescription as to all other joint tortfeasors, including DOTD. Accordingly, the plaintiff.claims that his suit against DOTD was not prescribed.

I ,LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Generally, the trial court’s factual findings on a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, such as the date on which prescription begins to run, are reviewed on appeal under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. Gilmore v. Whited, 2008-1808 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/31/09), 9 So.3d 296, 299. However, in this case, the issue of whether the plaintiffs action was prescribed involves the proper application and interpretation of La. C.C. arts. 2324(C) and 3462. The proper application and interpretation of a statute is a question of law. Gilmore, 9 So.3d at 299. Therefore, on review, this court must determine whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect in determining that the plaintiffs claims against DOTD were prescribed.

Prescription

A claim for personal injuries is a delictual action subject to a liberative prescriptive period of one year, which commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained. La. C.C. art. 8492. The objection of prescription may be raised by a peremptory exception. See La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(1). At the trial of a peremptory exception, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. La. C.C.P. art. 931. However, when no evidence has been introduced at a hearing on an exception of prescription, as in this case, all allegations of the petition are to |fibe accepted as true. Wheat v. Nievar, 2007-0680 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/8/08), 984 So.2d 773, 775.

Ordinarily, the party pleading the objection of prescription bears the burden of proving the claim has prescribed. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009-2632 (La.7/6/10), 45 So.3d 991, 998. However, if a petition has prescribed on its face, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the action has not prescribed. Wheat, 984 So.2d at 775. In this case, DOTD was named as a defendant in the plaintiffs lawsuit by an amended petition filed almost two years after the accident. Thus, the plaintiffs claims against DOTD are prescribed on the face of the petition, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his claim has not prescribed.

The plaintiff contends that DOTD is a joint tortfeasor with Sharon Braud, Imperial, and State Farm, that prescription was interrupted when he filed suit against Sharon Braud, Imperial, and State Farm in the 34th JDC, and thus, the interruption of prescription against Sharon Braud, Imperial, and State Farm interrupted prescription as to DOTD, citing La. C.C. art. 2324(C).

When the plaintiffs basis for claiming interruption of prescription is that the newly added defendant is a joint tortfeasor with a defendant who was timely sued, then the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that joint tortfeasor status. Wheat, 984 So.2d at 775. Additionally, the plaintiff will also bear the burden of establishing that prescription had been timely interrupted against a joint tortfeasor. Id. at 776.

Joint Tortfeasor

Louisiana Civil Code article 2323(A), which instituted comparative fault, provides that “[i]n any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death, or loss,” the fault of “all persons causing or contributing to the injury, death, or loss shall be determined.” In determining whether liability for damages is a solidary or a joint and divisible obligation, La. C.C. art. 2324(A) provides that “[h]e who |7conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act” is solidarity liable “with that person, for the damage caused by such act.” If liability is not solidary, then “liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and divisible obligation.” La. C.C. art. 2324(B).

According to the record, the plaintiff alleged in his original petition that Sharon Braud was negligent and that, as a direct and proximate result of her negligence, the plaintiff suffered injuries and damages for which the defendants were liable. In the supplemental and amended petition, the plaintiff alleged that DOTD was negligent and strictly liable to the plaintiff for his injuries. In both the original and supplemental petition, the plaintiff alleged specific acts (or failures to act) by Sharon Braud and DOTD, that, when taken as true, are sufficient to establish some fault on the part of both Sharon Braud and DOTD for the plaintiffs injuries, thereby making Sharon Braud and DOTD joint tortfeasors. For example, reading both petitions together, the plaintiff alleged that Sharon Braud’s negligence in driving her vehicle off of the eastbound lane of the interstate, across the median, and into the westbound lane of the interstate, combined with DOTD’s failure to provide an adequate barricade in the median strip of the interstate for the purpose of separating the oncoming lanes of traffic, were the cause of the plaintiffs damages. Thus, based on the allegations of the petitions, we must conclude that, for purposes of this exception, that plaintiff has established that Sharon Braud (and her liability insurer) and DOTD are joint tortfeasors.

According to La. C.C. art. 2324(C) “[i]n-terruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tort-feasors.” Thus, we must next determine whether the plaintiff established that prescription was timely interrupted against a joint tortfeasor, thereby interrupting prescription against DOTD.

| ^Interruption of Prescription

Generally, prescription statutes are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the claim sought to be extinguished by it. Bailey v. Khoury, 2004-0620 (La.1/20/05), 891 So.2d 1268, 1275. Prescription may be renounced, interrupted, or suspended. See La. C.C. arts. 3449 through 3472.

According to La. C.C. art. 3462, “[prescription is interrupted when ... the obli-gee commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue[;]” however, “[i]f action is commenced in an incompetent court, or in an improper venue, prescription is interrupted only as to a defendant served by process within the prescriptive period.” (Emphasis added.) An interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit in a competent court and in the proper venue or from service of process within the prescriptive period continues as long as the suit is pending. La. C.C. art. 3463.

DOTD argued in its exception that this suit was commenced against it in an improper venue, based on La. R.S. 13:5104(A), which provides:

All suits filed against the state of Louisiana or any state agency or against an officer or employee of the state or state agency for conduct arising out of the discharge of his official duties or within the course and scope of his employment shall be instituted before the district court of the judicial district in which the state capítol is located or in the district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the cause of action arises.

Given that venue was improper with respect to DOTD, DOTD contends that since it was not served within the first year of the accident, under La. C.C. art. 3462, interruption of prescription as to DOTD never occurred, that La. C.C. art. 2324(C) is inapplicable, and that the plaintiffs claims against it are prescribed.

However, the plaintiff contends that it timely commenced the action in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue, that the suit interrupted prescription as to the defendants named therein, and since one (or more) of those defendants are alleged joint tortfeasors with DOTD, La. C.C. art. 2324(C) mandates that | ¡interruption of prescription also occurred with respect to DOTD. The plaintiff further argues that under La. C.C. art. 3463, the interruption of prescription has remained in effect because the suit was still pending when it filed the amended petition, and thus, the amended petition was filed within the prescriptive period and his claims are not prescribed. We agree.

According to the plaintiffs petition, both the plaintiff and the defendant, Sharon Braud, were domiciled in St. Bernard Parish, and the accident occurred in St. Tammany Parish. Thus, this action, initially filed in the 34th JDC for the Parish of St. Bernard, satisfied proper jurisdictional and venue requirements when suit was commenced. See La. Const, art. V, § 16(A) and La. C.C.P. arts. 42(1), 73(A), and 76. With regard to the interruption of prescription, La. C.C. art. 3462 “looks to whether venue was proper at the time suit was commenced, not whether venue is currently proper.” Moore v. Kmart Corporation, 884 F.Supp. 217, 219 (E.D.La.1995); see also La. C.C. art. 3463, comment (f) (“[i]ssues of interruption of prescription are determined as of time of filing of the suit sought to be dismissed”). This comports with the standard of strict construction required of prescription statutes and the clear wording of La. C.C. art. 3462, and does not lead to absurd consequences. Accordingly, we find that when the plaintiff commenced suit on November 24, 2008, in the 34th JDC for the Parish of St. Bernard (approximately one month after the accident), prescription was interrupted. See La. C.C. art. 3462. Pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2324(C), this interruption of prescription was effective against all joint tortfeasors. And this interruption continues as long as this suit is pending. See La. C.C. art. 3463.

Although the plaintiffs petition was subsequently amended on October 13, 2010, to include DOTD (an alleged joint tortfeasor) as a defendant, and the action |10then became subject to the mandatory venue provisions set forth in La. R.S. 13:5104(A) and was transferred to the 22nd JDC for St. Tammany Parish (where the accident occurred), this does not change the fact that when the suit was commenced, jurisdiction and venue were proper, and thus, prescription had already been interrupted when the petition was amended.

In this case, we are not presented with the situation where suit was initially commenced in an improper venue. Rather, this suit, when commenced, was filed in a court of proper jurisdiction and venue; however, .venue subsequently became improper because of a mandatory venue provision for governmental claims, when DOTD (an alleged joint tortfeasor) was added as a defendant. This is a particularly unusual issue, because in most suits, proper venue as to one joint tortfeasor is usually considered proper venue as to all other joint tortfeasors. See La. C.C.P. art. 78. Thus, the jurisprudence on this issue is limited.

In Bell v. Kreider, 2003-0800 (La.App. 5th Cir.9/16/03), 858 So.2d 58, writ denied, 2003-2875 (La.1/9/04), 862 So.2d 986, the fifth circuit court of appeal addressed a similar issue. Therein, the plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident on the Greater New Orleans Expressway, commonly referred to as the “causeway bridge.” Id. at 59. Almost a year after the accident, the plaintiffs filed two identical suits against the alleged tortfeasor in two different venues — one suit was filed in the Civil District Court for Orleans Parish (“the CDC suit”) and the other was filed in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson (“the first 24th JDC suit”). Id. at 60. Apparently, all three-1T T defendants were served and subsequently filed answers in response to the CDC suit; however, no service was requested or any other action taken against the defendants in the first 24th JDC suit. Id.

Almost four years after the original petitions were filed, on May 14, 2002, the plaintiffs amended both the CDC suit and the first 24th JDC suit to add as defendants, the Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission (“GNOEC”), Timothy Fondren (GNOEC’s executive director), and John Brock (a GNOEC policeman). Id. In the CDC suit, these newly added defendants filed a declinatory exception raising the objection of improper venue, based on La. R.S. 13:5104, which the trial judge in the CDC suit sustained, and the case was then transferred to Jefferson Parish, where it remained pending. Id. In the first 24th JDC suit, the newly added defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the basis of abandonment, which the trial judge in the first 24th JDC suit granted; however, the plaintiffs moved to vacate that order of dismissal, and that issue was taken under advisement by the trial judge in that matter. Id.

Contemporaneous with the filing of the amended petitions, the plaintiffs also filed a separate new suit in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for Jefferson Parish (“the second 24th JDC suit”), involving the same accident and same defendants as the other suits. Id. In the second 24th JDC suit, GNOEC and Brock filed peremptory exceptions raising the objection of prescription, which the trial judge in the second 24th JDC suit sustained, and the plaintiffs appealed. Id. at 60-61.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that prescription had been interrupted by the timely filed CDC suit as to the original defendants, and pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2324(C), interruption of prescription also timely occurred with respect to joint tort-feasors GNOEC and Brock. Id. at 63-64. And since the interruption of | ^prescription remained in effect against all defendants throughout the pending litigation of the CDC suit, the second 24 JDC suit was timely filed. Id.

The fifth circuit court of appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial judge in the second 24th JDC suit. Relying on La. C.C. art. 3462, the court concluded that since the action was not originally filed in a court of proper venue as to GNOEC and Brock, prescription was not interrupted as to those defendants, who were not served within the one-year prescriptive period. Accordingly, interruption of prescription had never occurred as to those defendants, and the claims against them had prescribed. Id. at 64-65.

Although we respect the opinions expressed by our brethren in the fifth circuit court of appeal, we disagree with their opinion in Bell and decline to adopt their reasoning on this issue. First, we note that the sole issue before the court in Bell related to the trial judge’s ruling on the issue of prescription as to the second 24 JDC suit; the decision did not disclose the ultimate outcome of either the first 24th JDC suit or of the CDC suit after it was transferred to the 24th JDC, which is the situation more factually similar to the case before us.

Additionally, the fifth circuit, despite noting that “the CDC suit[,] which was brought against the original defendants^] satisfied proper jurisdictional and venue requirements,” Id. at 63, failed to recognize that once the suit was commenced in a proper jurisdiction and venue, prescription was interrupted. In concluding that interruption of prescription never occurred, the fifth circuit reasoned that the unique circumstances of this case exposed a conflict between La. C.C. arts. 2324(C) and 3462, and that La. C.C. art. 3462 ultimately controlled, because that article directly addressed the issue of prescription with respect to suits filed in the | l3wrong venue. While we agree with the underlying premise espoused by the court (that where two statutes deal with the same subject matter, they should be harmonized if possible; however, if there is a conflict, the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail, see Guitreau v. Kucharchuk, M.D., 99-2570 (La.5/16/00), 763 So.2d 575, 579), we do not find a conflict between La. C.C. arts. 2324(C) and 3462. Louisiana Civil Code article 3462 sets forth the rule that prescription is interrupted either (1) by filing a suit in a competent court and proper venue, or (2) by service of process within the prescriptive period. Once the interruption of prescription occurs as provided in La. C.C. art. 3462, as between joint tortfeasors, then interruption of prescription is effective against all joint tort-feasors under La. C.C. art. 2324(C). Furthermore, even if there were a conflict between the two articles, we find that La. C.C. art. 2324(C) is the statute directly addressed to the issue of interruption of prescription with regard to joint tortfea-sors, whereas La. C.C. art. 3462 simply addresses the interruption of prescription by the filing of suit in general. Thus, in the event of a conflict, La. C.C. art. 2324(C) would ultimately control.

In Nunnery v. Elmore, 2001-1766 (La. App. 1st Cir.10/2/02), 835 So.2d 645, this court was also faced with a similar, but distinguishable, situation. In Nunnery, the plaintiffs, who were guest passengers in an automobile owned by Bernard Carr and driven by Willie Nunnery, were involved in an automobile accident on March 7, 1998, in Hammond, Louisiana. The accident occurred as Nunnery was driving in a funeral procession and was struck by a vehicle driven by Elmore. Id. at 646. Approximately two months after the accident, on May 15, 1998, the plaintiffs filed suit in Hammond City Court against Carr, Nunnery, Elmore, and Elmore’s liability insurer, seeking damages for injuries sustained in the accident. Id. Approximately seven months after the accident, on December 16, 1998, Nunnery filed a separate lawsuit in the Twenty-First Judicial District Court 114(“2lst JDC”) for Tangipahoa Parish, alleging the defendants’ liability for injuries he sustained, based on the same operative facts. Id. Nunnery’s lawsuit named the City of Hammond as a defendant, in addition to Elmore and her liability insurer. Id.

On June 21, 1999, a joint motion to transfer the plaintiffs’ lawsuit from the Hammond City Court to the 21st JDC was filed in the city court. This was apparently done for the convenience of the parties, and the motion noted that the plaintiffs’ claims were not in excess of the jurisdictional amount of the Hammond City Court. Id. The motion was granted. Additionally, pursuant to a motion filed by Elmore and her liability insurer in the 21st JDC following the transfer, the plaintiffs’ lawsuit and Nunnery’s lawsuit were consolidated. The plaintiffs then filed an amending and supplemental petition on November 19, 1999, naming the City of Hammond as a defendant. Id. The City of Hammond responded by filing a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, which the trial court sustained, and the plaintiffs then appealed. Id. at 646-47.

On appeal, this court affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Hammond were prescribed. Id. at 648. In doing so, this court found that the plaintiffs had commenced their action against Carr, Nunnery, Elmore, and her liability insurer in the Hammond City Court — a court that had no jurisdiction over the City of Hammond (a political subdivision of the state), according to La. C.C.P. art. 4847(A)(6). Id. Since the Hammond City Court was not a court of competent jurisdiction, and because the plaintiffs could not establish that the City of Hammond was served within the prescriptive period, this court concluded that, under La. C.C. art. 3462, the plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Hammond were untimely. Id.

| xsWe find that Nunnery is factually distinguishable from the case before us, and therefore, is inapplicable to this case. Although this court recognized in Nunnery, 835 So.2d at 647, that the interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors, this court’s decision that the initial suit in Hammond City Court did not serve to interrupt prescription as to the City of Hammond was based solely on the fact that the Hammond City Court ultimately lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action, that this lack of jurisdiction could not be waived, and that “the parties could not by their consent confer jurisdiction upon the Hammond City Court.” Id. at 648; see also La. C.C.P. art. 3.

In this case, the suit was initially commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue; however, the action subsequently became subject to the mandatory venue provisions of La. R.S. 13:5104(A). Although the venue requirements of La. R.S. 13:5104 are mandatory, they are waivable. See Franques v. Evangeline Parish Police Jury, 625 So.2d 157 (La.1993). Thus, the question of commencing an action in a court of proper jurisdiction and commencing an action in a court of proper venue present two very different issues. “Venue provisions are significantly different from jurisdictional provisions.” Underwood v. Lane Memorial Hospital, 97-1997 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 715, 716.

Accordingly, we find that the plaintiff established that when he commenced suit on November 24, 2008 (approximately one month after the accident) in the 34th JDC for the Parish of St. Bernard against the defendants named therein, jurisdiction and venue were proper. Under the clear language of La. C.C. art. 3462, prescription was thus timely interrupted as to the defendants named therein, ie., Sharon Braud, Imperial (her liability insurer), and State Farm (the plaintiff’s uninsured/underinsured motorist insurer). Because the plaintiff also alleged that Sharon Braud (and her liability insurer) and DOTD are joint tortfeasors, this | ^interruption of prescription as to Sharon Braud (and her liability insurer) was effective against all joint tortfeasors, including DOTD. La. C.C. art. 2324(C). Furthermore, this interruption of prescription continues as long as this suit is pending. See La. C.C. art. 3463. Accordingly, when the plaintiff filed the amended petition to include DOTD, prescription had already been interrupted, and thus, the amended petition was timely.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the May 2, 2012 judgment of the trial court, sustaining the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription filed by the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development, and dismissing the plaintiffs claims against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development, is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

All costs of this appeal, in the amount of $1,099.78, are assessed to defendant/appel-lee, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . Apparently, Sharon Braud is now deceased, and on November 24, 2009, the trial court signed an ex parte motion and order to substitute Ms. Braud’s heirs, Rita Mae Tucker and Neils C. Sand, III, as defendants in this matter. See La. C.C.P. arts. 801 and 802.

      . The record before us contains two other petitions for damages filed in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany by the plaintiff based on the same operative facts. The first petition, bearing docket number 2008-15,979 was filed on November 12, 2008, and is identical to the petition filed in the 34th JDC for the Parish of St. Bernard. The second petition, bearing docket number 2009-16,228, was filed on October 19, 2009 and is almost identical to the other two petitions, except that it named two additional defendants — the Estate of Sharon Braud and Daimler Chrysler Corporation and/or Chrysler Motors Corporation and/or The Chrysler Group ("Chrysler”), which allegedly manufactured the vehicle the defendant was driving at the time of the accident— and also alleged that there were unreasonably dangerous defects in the design of the vehicle driven by the defendant, of which Chrysler failed to warn. These two petitions were attached to a memorandum in support of an exception filed by DOTD hereinafter discussed, but the record does not reveal anything further about the disposition of these two petitions.

      .Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5104(A) provides:
      All suits filed against the state of Louisiana or any state agency or against an officer or employee of the state or state agency for conduct arising out of the discharge of his official duties or within the course and scope of his employment shall be instituted ■ before the district court of the judicial district in which the state capítol is located or in the district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the cause of action arises.

      . Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153 provides: "When the action or defense asserted .in the amended petition or answer arises out of. the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of filing the original pleading.”

      . The criteria set forth by the supreme court in Ray, 434 So.2d at 1086-87, for determining whether La. C.C.P. art. 1153 allows an amendment that changes the identity of the party, or parties sued to- relate back to the date of filing of the original petition, are:
      (1) The amended claim must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading;
      (2) The purported substitute defendant must have received notice of the institution of the action such that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits;
      (3) The purported substitute defendant must know or should have known that but for.a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party defendant, the action would have been brought against him;
      (4) The purported substitute defendant must not be a wholly new or unrelated defendant, since this would be tantamount to assertion of a new cause of action which would have otherwise prescribed.

      . No evidence was offered by either party at • this hearing.

      . The trial court sustained the exception on the basis that DOTD was not solidarity liable with the original defendants, and this ruling appears to have been based on the argument of counsel. The record before us does not contain any allegation that the original defendants and the DOTD "conspire[d] with [each other] to commit an intentional or willful act" against the plaintiff. See La. C.C. art. 2324(A). Thus, solidary liability between DOTD and the original defendants is not an issue in this case, and the trial court may have erroneously required the plaintiff to establish solidary liability in order for there to have been an interruption of prescription. However, appeals are taken from judgments and not the reasons for judgment or the reasons why a trial court reached a particular result. See Huang v. Louisiana State Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, 99-2805 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/22/00), 781 So.2d 1, 6. Accordingly, the issue before this court is the propriety of the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiffs claims against DOTD were prescribed, not the reason that it reached that particular result.

      . By our decision herein, we make no determination as to whether DOTD will be ultimately liable to the plaintiff for his damages.

      . When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, and the application of the law does not lead to absurd consequences, the statute should be applied as written. La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1:4; Succession of Faget, 2010-0188 (La. 11/30/10), 53 So.3d 414, 420.

      . See, e.g., Rico v. Clarke, 2009-1360 (La. App. 1st Cir.3/26/10), 36 So.3d 309 311 writ denied, 2010-0958 (La.6/25/10), 38 So.3d 343, (where service of process was made on the defendant and his employer two months after the prescriptive period had run, prescription was not interrupted because "suit was com
        menced in a court of improper venue. ” (Emphasis added.)); and Barbarin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001-0669 (La.App. 5th Cir.11/27/01), 804 So.2d 116, 118 (where the plaintiff "initially filed suit in an improper venuefj” and the defendant “was not served with [that] suit until after the prescriptive period on the claim had run[J ... under La. C.C. [afrt. 3462 prescription was not interrupted on the [plaintiff’s] claim by the mere filing of the suit. ”)

      . See also Fuselier v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 2006-0118 (La.App. 5th Cir.8/29/06), 940 So.2d 26, writ denied, 2006-2355 (La. 12/8/06), 943 So.2d 1096, following Bell and holding that the timely filing of a suit in federal court against a railroad did not interrupt prescription as to the Parish of St. John (which was not a party to the federal suit) in a subsequent suit in state court against that parish.

      . It was alleged that the City of Hammond was negligent for creating an appearance of police protection and then failing to warn funeral procession motorists of disengagement from that protection. Nunnery, 835 So.2d at 646.

      . Once a plaintiff establishes that a joint tortfeasor has been timely sued, consideration of the concept of relating back under La. C.C.P. art. 1153 to interrupt prescription is not necessary. Wheat, 984 So.2d at 776; see also Perkins v. Willie, 2003-0126 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/2/04), 878 So.2d 574, 578. Accordingly, we need not address DOTD’s contention that the amended petition did not relate back to the original petition under La. C.C.P. art. 1153 because it did not comply with the criteria established by the supreme court in Ray, 434 So.2d 1083.
      Additionally, based on our conclusion that prescription was interrupted by commencement of suit in a court of proper jurisdiction and venue, we need not determine whether prescription was interrupted by service of process on a defendant within the prescriptive period. See La. C.C. arts. 1799, 2324(C), and 3503 and Wimberly v. Brown, 2007-0559 (La.App. 5th Cir. 11/27/07), 973 So.2d 75, 77-80 (the timely filing of a suit in a court of improper venue interrupts prescription as to the defendant or his solidary obligors served by process within the prescriptive period, thus, the timely filing and service of process on two solidary obligors interrupted prescription as to the service on the third solidary obligor, who was not served until almost two years after the accident; as such, prescription remained interrupted while suit was pending, and service on the third solidary obligor occurred within the prescriptive period.)


author: WALLER, Chief Justice, KING, Justice,

text:
    Anna M. ALFONSO, et al. v. DIAMONDHEAD FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Jack Cleveland, Edward Dabler, Patrick Destefano, Eloise Kinja, Pat Kinsella, Russell Love, Charles Reddien, Paul Snemyr, and Dick Weber.
    No. 2012-CA-00217-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Aug. 1, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 2013.
    David Neil McCarty, Oliver E. Diaz, Jr., Jackson, William M. Kulick, Ocean Springs, attorneys for appellant.
    Michael B. Dickinson, Edward C. Taylor, Gulfport, attorneys for appellees.
   WALLER, Chief Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. A group of property owners filed suit against the Diamondhead Fire Protection District (DFPD) board of commissioners and several current and former DFPD officers, seeking declaratory judgment that a fee charged for fire-protection services is an impermissible tax. Finding the DFPD had authority to charge fees for services rendered, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the DFPD. The property owners appeal, raising two issues: (1) whether the monthly fee is an illegal tax, and (2) whether the power to tax should be construed narrowly. We find that the trial court correctly decided that the DFPD provides a service to the community, and therefore, the challenged fees for such services are lawful. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 1974, the Hancock County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution creating the DFPD. When it initially was formed, the DFPD was funded through ad valorem taxes and contributions from the Diamondhead Property Owners Association (POA). However, in 1993, the POA stopped contributing to the DFPD. Since 1993, the DFPD has charged local property owners a monthly fee for fire-protection services. From 1993 to 2002, the monthly charge for individuals was $15; however, in 2002, the price increased to $20 per month.

¶ 3. Since 1974, the DFPD has grown tremendously. The DFPD now has two fire departments and fifteen full-time employees. At all times, the DFPD has four experienced firefighters on duty, including a captain and lieutenant. Half of the staff members are nationally registered emergency medical technicians. With full-time employees, the DFPD is responsible for payroll taxes, workers’ compensation, supplies, equipment, repairing and maintaining equipment, providing uniforms, training, oil and gas costs, administrative costs, and so on. According to Fire Chief Jerry Dubuisson, the DFPD responds to more than 700 calls for emergency assistance a year. The DFPD also conducts post-fire investigations, commercial fire and life safety inspections, pre-incident plans, fire-hydrant inspections, and public fire-and-life safety education training.

¶ 4. On March 3, 2009, several property owners sued the DFPD and several current and former members of the DFPD board of commissioners (collectively referred to as the DFPD). While conceding the DFPD could charge fees for services rendered, the property owners argued that they were not receiving a service from the DFPD and, thus, the fee was an impermissible tax. The property owners alleged claims of negligence and extortion against the DFPD. The property owners also filed a motion for declaratory judgment, requesting the trial court to determine the meaning of “services rendered” under Mississippi Code Section 19-5-177(e) and declare whether the DFPD should be enjoined from collecting its fire-protection fee. The DFPD filed a response, urging that it had authority to charge the fee for services rendered. The DFPD also filed three affidavits to support its position from Fire Chief Jerry Dubuisson, Ty Windham of the Mississippi State Rating Bureau, and State Farm Agent Teri Eaton.

¶ 5. Dubuisson stated that, without the fees, the DFPD would have to decrease staffing to two, full-time firefighters per shift and decrease salaries; it could not operate twenty-four hours a day; and it possibly would close one of the fire stations. Regardless of funding, Dubuisson opined that the DFPD would still respond to more than 700 emergency calls per year. Dubuisson stated that a reduced staff would result in response delay times, and reduced pay would result in a less experienced staff. Windham, superintendent of public protection with the Mississippi Rating Bureau, stated that the DFPD’s current fire rating is Class Six. If the DFPD reduced its staff, Windham stated the rating would fall to Class Ten, the lowest rating available. Eaton, a State Farm insurance agent, stated “[i]n the event the Diamondhead community[’s] fire rating were to decrease from a six to a ten, the homeowner insurance premium on a $245,000 residence in the Diamondhead community would increase by approximately $4,409 per year.”

¶ 6. The trial court determined that the DFPD had authority to assess fees for “services rendered” and did not find any restrictive language regarding the term. The trial court stated “a fire department provides services in a variety of ways other than simply putting out a fire or filling a fire extinguisher, services for which plaintiffs maintain property owners could be charged.” Accordingly, the trial court determined the DFPD’s charge for fire-protection services was a fee, not a tax, and thus permissible.

¶ 7. The property owners filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. Aggrieved, the property owners filed an appeal with this Court.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8. “This Court employs a de novo standard of review when reviewing questions of law, including motions for declaratory judgment.” Tunica County v. Hampton Co. Nat’l Sur., LLC, 27 So.3d 1128, 1131 (Miss.2009).

¶ 9. The issue before this Court is whether the DFPD’s fee for fire-protection services is based on services rendered or whether the charge amounts to an illegal tax.

¶ 10. Mississippi Code Section 19-5-151 provides for the incorporation of water, sewer, garbage and waste collection and disposal, and fire protection districts in unincorporated areas of the state. The Legislature has given such districts explicit authority to assess fees for services rendered as a funding mechanism. See Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-177(l)(e) (Rev.2012). However, the meaning of “services rendered” is an issue of first impression.

¶ 11. The property owners argue that they receive a service from the fire department only if the department responds to an emergency call and that the assessed fees are really for “anticipatory services.” However, the DFPD asserts that many day-to-day actions are required for it to have the ability to put out fires. To conduct its fire-protection service, the DFPD is required to maintain and repair equipment; to have certified and experienced firefighters available on a daily basis; to provide nationally registered emergency medical technicians; to maintain pre-incident plans, to inspect fire hydrants, and to conduct public fire-and-life safety education training to and for the Diamond-head community. The property owners also have received the benefit of a better fire rating from the Mississippi Ratings Bureau, which resulted in significantly lower homeowner/fire insurance premiums. Finally, better fire protection enhances property values and makes the community more attractive to prospective home buyers/residents.

¶ 12. Words contained in statutes are to be interpreted “according to their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning.” Miss.Code Ann. § 1-3-65 (Rev.2005). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “service” as “the act of doing something useful for a person or company for a fee; a person or company whose business is to do useful things for others; an intangible commodity in the form of human effort, such as labor, skill or advice; [or as a verb] to provide service for....” Black’s Law Dictionary 638 (2d pocket ed.2001). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines service as “... the performance of work commanded or paid for by another ...: an act done for the benefit or at the command of another ...: action or use that furthers some end or purpose: conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something ...: useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity ...,” or (as a verb) “to perform services for: meet the needs of ...: to provide information or other assistance to.... ” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2075 (2002).

¶ 13. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that similar service fees are permissible. The Supreme Court of Washington held that “benefit charges” levied by fire protection districts were not taxes or assessments, but rather fees for benefits received. King County Fire Prot. Dist. v. Housing Auth. of King County, 123 Wash.2d 819, 872 P.2d 516, 524 (1994). In King County, the fees at issue were “reasonably proportioned to the measurable benefits to property resulting from the services afforded by the district” and were assessed “based on fire insurance rates, distance to fire equipment, the level of services provided to the property, or the need of the property for specialized services,” and, therefore, were distinguishable from property taxes. Id. at 523 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin has rejected the assertion that a fee is appropriate only where a service actually is used to fight a fire — or that to be a fee, a charge must be assessed for commodities actually consumed. City of River Falls v. St. Bridget's Catholic Church of River Falls, 182 Wis.2d 436, 513 N.W.2d 673, 675-76 (Wis.Ct.App.1994). That court held that “the substance, and not the form, of the imposition is the test” of a charge’s “true character.” Id. (citing Milwaukee v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 6 Wis.2d 299, 94 N.W.2d 584, 588 (1959)). The court found that the primary purpose of the charge at issue was to cover the expense of making water available, storing the water and ensuring that water would be delivered as needed to fight fires at utility customers’ properties. Id. at 676. Therefore, the substance of the charge was consistent with a fee, not a tax. Id.

CONCLUSION

¶ 14. We find that the DFPD provides a valuable service by having fire and other emergency services available to respond to an emergency. Therefore, the fee assessed is permissible. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

¶ 15. AFFIRMED.

RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. KING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ. DICKINSON, P.J., AND COLEMAN, J„ NOT PARTICIPATING.

KING, Justice,

dissenting:-

¶ 16. I would find that Diamondhead Fire Protection District’s (DFPD) fee is an illegal tax. Accordingly, I would reverse and render the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 17. The Legislature has authorized the ad valorem tax as the primary funding source for fire-protection districts. Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-189(2) (Rev.2012). As a secondary funding source, it has authorized fire-protection districts to charge and collect fees for the services which they render. Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-177(l)(e) (Rev.2012).

A. Funding Mechanisms

1. Tax

¶ 18. The property owners argue that only the Legislature has the power to tax; a fire district has no such power. The property owners maintain that the Legislature has given municipalities limited authority to assess fees for services rendered.

¶ 19. The power to tax rests with the Legislature. See City of Jackson v. Pittman, 484 So.2d 998, 999 (Miss.1986). Through that power, the Legislature may confer upon political subdivisions the authority to levy taxes. Id.; see Miss.Code. Ann. § 21-33-45 (Rev.2007) (giving municipalities authority to levy ad valorem taxes). But Mississippi Constitution Article 4, Section 80 provides that:

Provision shall be made by general laws to prevent the abuse by cities, towns, and other municipal corporations of their powers of assessment, taxation, borrowing money, and contracting debts.

Miss. Const, art. 4, § 80. “Thus a municipality has no power concerning taxation beyond that authorized by the Legislature and entailed thereby.” Pittman, 484 So.2d at 999.

¶ 20. Mississippi Code Section 19-5-189 gives a county board of supervisors authority to levy a special tax for fire-protection services. Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-189 (Rev.2012). The tax collected “shall be paid over to the board of commissioners of the district to be used either for the operation, support and maintenance of the fire protection district or for the retirement of any bonds issued by the district for fire protection purposes, or for both.” Id. Where needed, the statute also provides a mechanism for the board of supervisors to increase the tax levy. See Miss.Code Ann. § 19 — 5—189(2)(c) (Rev.2012).

¶ 21. The DFPD currently benefits from the county board of supervisors’ authority to level a special tax for fire-protection services. It receives four mills of the ad valorem tax collected by the county.

2. Fees

¶ 22. In addition to receiving the ad valorem tax revenue, the fire-protection district can charge a fee for its service. The Legislature has granted counties authority to create utility and fire-protection districts. Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-151(1) (Rev.2012). Those districts have “the power enumerated in the resolution of the board of supervisors” and are “limited to the conducting and operating of ... a fire protection system.” Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-175 (Rev.2012). To accomplish the purpose of creating a fire-protection district, the district:

Shall be vested with all the powers necessary and requisite for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the district is created. No enumeration of powers herein shall be construed to impair or limit any general grant of power herein contained not to limit any such grant.... Such districts are empowered to do all acts necessary, proper, or convenient in the exercise of the powers granted under such sections.

Id. One power the district has is “to fix, maintain, collect and revise rates and charges for services rendered by or through the facilities of such district....” Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-177(l)(e) (Rev. 2012) (emphasis added).

3. Bonds

¶ 23. The Legislature also has allowed funding for fire-protection districts through bonds. “Any such district shall have the power to provide funds for the purpose of constructing, acquiring, reconstructing, improving, bettering or extending the facilities of such district ... by the issuance of revenue bonds.” Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-181 (Rev.2012). The district’s board of commissioners “may issue bonds of such district by resolution spread upon the minutes of such board.” Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-183(1) (Rev.2012).

¶ 24. Mississippi law allows revenue for a fire-protection district to be raised through taxes (levied by the county board of supervisors), fees for services rendered (charged by the fire-protection district), and bonds. Likewise, Arizona has concluded that a fire-protection district may raise revenue only through taxes, fees (which can be charged only for a specific service actually rendered), and bonds. Nw. Fire Dist. v. U.S. Home of Arizona Constr. Co., 215 Ariz. 492, 495 (¶ 13), 161 P.3d 535 (Ariz.2007).

B. Fees for Services Rendered

¶ 25. The property owners and the DFPD agree that fire-protection districts have the authority to charge fees for “services rendered.” Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-177(e) (Rev.2012). However, the parties disagree on what encompasses “services rendered.” The property owners argue that the statutes should be construed narrowly. I agree. The Court has stated:

[Wjhere a statute enumerates and specifies the subject or things upon which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned or under a general clause, those not of like kind or classification as those enumerated....

Lee v. Alexander, 607 So.2d 30, 36 (Miss.1992). The property owners claim that the district-wide fire-protection fee charged by the DFPD is for services that were not actually rendered but for “anticipatory services.” The property owners suggest that “services rendered” should be equivalent to using a toll road, stating that:

The archetypal example is a toll road providing access to only those who use the road and are therefore willing to pay for it. Unlike the road everybody uses through the middle of town, the whole community does not pay a tax to pave the road — only those who want to use it.

In other words, the property owners argue the DFPD should not charge them unless they receive a specific, direct service from the DFPD — have a fire extinguished, an inspection conducted, and so on.

¶26. The DFPD contends that the plain language of neither Section 19-5-175 nor Section 19-5-177 places a specific restriction on a district’s ability to charge a fee. While the DFPD has not responded to an emergency call for every property owner, the DFPD states that it has rendered many other services to the property owners. These services include: (a) responding to more than 700 emergency calls, including fires; (b) maintaining and repairing equipment; (c) responding quickly to emergency calls; (d) providing four, experienced firefighters on duty at all times — including a captain and lieutenant; (e) having nationally registered emergency medical technicians; (f) conducting pre-incident plans, fire-hydrant inspections, and public fire-and-life safety training sessions; and (g) providing Class Six fire-protection services which benefit the Dia-mondhead community with lower insurance premiums. Thus, the DFPD claims it is entitled to charge a fee for these services.

¶ 27. “Services rendered” is not defined by statute, and no caselaw exists which interprets the phrase. When statutory terms are not defined, the Court applies those terms “according to their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning.” Miss.Code Ann. § 1-3-65 (Rev.2005). Render means “[t]o transmit or deliver.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1410 (9th ed.2009). “Service” has several meanings. “Service,” in its verb form, means “[t]o provide service for; specifically]” Id. at 1491. As a noun, “service” refers to “[t]he act of doing something useful for a person or company ... for a fee,” and “service” also is defined as “[a]n intangible commodity in the form of human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.” Id.

¶ 28. Several Attorney General (AG) opinions have addressed whether a fire-protection district may charge a fee for its services. AG opinions are not binding on this Court but may be viewed as persuasive authority. Poppenheimer v. Estate of Coyle, 98 So.3d 1059, 1066 (¶22) (Miss.2012).

¶ 29. In 1990, the Board of Commissioners for the DFPD asked the AG whether it could charge a fee for fire-protection services. Sylvia Pross, Op. Att’y Gen., 1990 WL 548177, *1 (November 29, 1990). The letter read, in part:

Our tax millage revenues are decreasing as more property owners become eligible for the 65 or over exemption instead of increasing as more houses are built. Yet additional burdens for men and equipment are placed on the District for fire-protection service.
State Statute 19-5-177, Additional powers of districts, states in part ‘acting by and through the board of commissioners of such district as its governing authority, shall have the following among other powers:
(e) to fix, maintain, collect and revise rates and charges for services rendered by or through the facilities of such districts’ etc.
We respectfully solicit your opinion of acceptable methods of increasing revenues in accordance with the State Statutes. For example, is it permissible for a fire district to charge for services?

Id. The AG opined that the powers listed in Section 19-5-177(e) allow fire-protection districts “to so fix rates or charges for services rendered.” Id.

¶ 30. In 2000, a Benton County supervisor asked the AG the following: “Benton County owns a fire department building and land located in one of its towns. Can this [volunteer] fire department charge dues to its residents who are already paying fire protection millage as part of then-land taxes?” Randy Wilburn, Op. Att’y Gen., 2000 WL 1207464 (July 14, 2000). In response, the AG cited the home rule statute, which provides:

(1) The board of supervisors of any county shall have the power to adopt any orders, resolutions or ordinances with respect to county affairs, property and finances, for which no specific provision has been made by general law and which are not inconsistent with the Mississippi Constitution, the Mississippi Code of 1972, or any other statute or law of the State of Mississippi....
(3) This section shall not authorize the board of supervisors of a county to (a) levy taxes other than those authorized by statute or increase the levy of any authorized tax beyond statutorily established limits.

Id. (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 19-3-40) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the AG opined that the current millage rate could be increased if it were less than the statutory maximum. Id. In addition, the AG stated, “we are of the opinion that charging ‘dues’ for fire protection constitutes a tax that is not authorized by statute and is therefore prohibited.” Id.

¶ 31. In 2001, the North Tunica Fire Protection District asked whether it could charge for responding to emergency calls, specifically automobile accidents. Andrew Dulaney, Op. Att’y Gen., 2001 WL 1082630 (August 24, 2001). The AG opined that fire-protection services included emergency response and rescue services. Id. Citing Section 19-5-177, the AG opined that the fire-protection district “may set and collect rates and/or charges for the provision of emergency response services, or rescue services.” Id.

¶ 32. The North Forrest Fire Protection District initially had a voluntary fee and assessed property owners 1 mill for fire-protection services. Charles Marshall, Op. Att’y Gen., 2005 WL 3817032 (December 27, 2005). But in 2005, the district adopted and began enforcing a mandatory fee. Id. A district supervisor asked the AG whether the mandatory fee was legal. Id. Again, citing Section 19-5-177(e) and previous AG opinions, the AG opined that:

It is still the opinion of this office that the fire district may on a case by case basis fix rates and charges for services which have already been rendered. However, this does not authorize the fire district to levy rates and charges in anticipation of rendering services. To do so would amount to the levying of an unlawful tax.

Id.

¶ 33. I note the following points from the AG opinions: (1) The AG states that, generally, fire-protection districts are supported by millage collected from ad valo-rem taxes. If the millage assessed is insufficient, the county may increase the millage rate to the statutory maximum; (2) under Section 19-5-177(l)(e), the AG opines that a fire-protection district can charge fees for services rendered; (3) the AG opines the district may not levy and collect a fee “in anticipation of services rendered” because this would amount to an unlawful tax; (4) property owners may pay fire-protection fees voluntarily, but mandatory fire-protection fees charged “in anticipation of services rendered” amount to an unauthorized tax.

¶ 34. In this case, the DFPD already receives four (4) mills collected from ad valorem taxes. It once received donations from two groups. When those groups no longer donated to the DFPD, the DFPD charged property owners a mandatory, flat fee for fire-protection services to supplement its share of ad valorem taxes. The fee is charged regardless of whether the property owners receive a direct service from the DFPD, for instance, an emergency-call response.

¶ 35. When construed narrowly, the property owners maintain that “ ‘[sjerviees rendered’ assumes a particular, unique and specific service to a particular and specific person. It cannot be distorted to encompass all services possibly rendered-for this would have the characteristic of a tax.”

¶ 36. While it is true that AG opinions are not binding on this Court, in this case, I find the AG opinions to be persuasive. Based on the definitions of “service” and “render,” I would find that “services rendered” are those specific services delivered directly to a specific customer. Thus, the fire-protection district can fix various rates for its services (fire response, emergency response, inspections, and so on) and charge a fee to the specific customer who receives those specific services. However, things such as (a) having four experienced firefighters on duty at all times, (b) maintaining and repairing equipment, (c) having nationally registered emergency medical technicians, (d) conducting pre-incident plans, fire-hydrant inspections, and public and life safety training sessions, and (e) providing Class Six fire-protection services are anticipatory services, which are anticipated to be funded through the ad valorem tax levy.

C. Fee Versus Tax

¶ 37. Though not directly on point, the parties cite cases regarding impact fees to support their positions. The Court previously has explored this issue in Mayor and Board of Aldermen of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Association of Mississippi, Inc., 932 So.2d 44 (Miss.2006). Most importantly, Ocean Springs details the difference between a fee and a tax.

¶ 38. In Ocean Springs, the city adopted an impact-fee ordinance that authorized assessment of various impact fees for public improvements and services, which included a fire-facilities-development fee. Ocean Springs, 932 So.2d at 47 (¶ 1). The city planned to assess fees against new developments, which would impact the said service, and use the fees to improve and expand the designated services. Id. The homebuilders association filed a bill of exceptions, arguing that the impact fees amounted to an illegal tax. Id. at 47 (¶ 3). The circuit court agreed and held the impact fees were an unlawful taxing measure. Id. at 48 (¶ 4).

¶ 39. The Court noted the power to tax is granted solely to the Legislature, and the Legislature may grant a municipality authority to impose exactions. Id. at 52 (¶¶ 21-22). Citing the Mississippi Constitution, the Court cautioned that “provision shall be made by general laws to prevent the abuse of cities, towns, and other municipal computations of their powers of assessment, taxation, borrowing money, and contracting debts.” Id. at 52 (¶22) (quoting Miss. Const, art 4, § 80). Accordingly, the Court noted that the Legislature had not adopted any impact-fee statutes or other legislation which would authorize a city to establish an impact fee. Id. at 51, 53 (¶¶ 17, 27, 31).

¶ 40. Next, the Court explored whether the impact fee was a valid exercise of the city’s police power or an invalid tax. Id. at 53-58 (¶¶ 32-60). In essence, the Court held that the general levy of taxes is a mandatory payment, it provides revenue to the government, it is exacted for public purposes, and it provides a benefit to the community as a whole. Id. at 54 (¶¶ 32-34). On the other hand, the Court determined that a fee is charged by an agency to defray its cost of operation, and it confers a special benefit/service upon the payer. Id. at 54-55 (¶¶ 32-40). The Court found that the impact fees were “a revenue-raising measure” for public services which traditionally were funded by taxes, were not related to expenses, and did not confer a special benefit upon the payer. Id. at 55, 60 (¶¶40, 44, 71). The Court cautioned:

A municipality could classify any exaction as a “fee” for the provision of services or facilities and evade the Constitutional and Legislative limitations placed upon governing authorities in regard to taxation.

Id. at 56 (¶ 44). Thus, the Court held the impact fees constituted a tax. Id. at 60 (¶¶ 70-71).

¶ 41. In regard to impact fees, the Court reached the same conclusion in Sweet Home Water and Sewer Association v. Lexington Estates, Ltd., 613 So.2d 864 (Miss.1993). In Sweet Home, a public water and sewer utility attempted to charge an apartment-complex owner fees for water services and an impact fee, per unit installed, for any negative effects on its water system. Sweet Home, 613 So.2d at 866. Although it had authority to charge fees for services rendered, the Court held that Sweet Home could not charge an impact fee based on fear the apartment complex would negatively impact its system. Id. at 870.

¶ 42. Twenty dollars seems like a small price to pay for two fully-staffed fire departments, experienced firefighters, state-of-the-art equipment, and lower home-insurance premiums. Those who agree probably would pay the fee voluntarily, but the fee cannot be mandatory. I would find that the fire-protection fee possesses the basic characteristics of a tax. The fee is a mandatory charge, and it is imposed on all property owners within the district, regardless of whether or not the property owners receive a specific, direct service from the DFPD. The fee generates revenue to support the DFPD. Clearly, having a fully staffed and experienced fire department with the best equipment benefits the community as a whole, but that benefit is to be funded by the ad valorem tax. Thus, the DFPD’s fee is an impermissible tax.

¶ 43. The majority suggests that the fee is permissible because the property owners receive a benefit from the DFPD’s preparation to render services, “a better fire rating,” and because “fire protection enhances property values and makes the community more attractive to prospective home buyers/residents.” Maj. Op. 11. In support of its position, the majority cites two cases: King County Fire Protection District v. Housing Authority of King County, 123 Wash.2d 819, 872 P.2d 516 (1994), and City of River Falls v. St. Bridget’s Catholic Church of River Falls, 182 Wis.2d 436, 513 N.W.2d 673 (Wis.Ct.App.1994). Maj. Op. 13.

¶44. As previously mentioned in footnote five of this opinion, King County is inapplicable. In King County, the court determined that a housing authority was required to pay a “benefit charge” to the local fire-protection district. Unlike Mississippi, the state of Washington has a benefit-charge statute which specifically allows fire-protection districts to assess a charge based on the benefit property owners receive from their services, not services actually rendered. The statute provides:

The board of fire commissioners of a fire protection district may by resolution, for fire protection district purposes authorized by law, fix and impose a benefit charge on personal property and improvements to real property which are located within the fire protection district on the date specified and which have or will receive the benefits provided by the fire protection district, to be paid by the owners of the properties....

Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 52.18.010 (emphasis added). The benefit-charge statute provides further that “[t]he aggregate amount of such benefit charges in any one year shall not exceed an amount equal to sixty percent of the operating budget for the year in which the benefit charge is to be collected....” Id. The DFPD’s collected fees account for seventy-four percent of its budget. Nevertheless, because Mississippi does not have a similar benefit-charge statute, King County is inapplicable.

¶ 45. To support its belief that fees can be charged regardless of services rendered, the majority also relies on River Falls. Maj. Op. 13. River Falls held that the city could charge its water customers, including churches, for storing and providing water for fire protection. River Falls, 513 N.W.2d at 676. River Falls has nothing to do with fire-protection fees. Wisconsin’s statute specifically provides that a town may “charge property owners a fee for the cost of fire protection provided to their property ... according to a written schedule established by the town board.” Wis. Stat. § 60.55(2)(b). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has addressed whether a town may charge a county fire-protection fees based on (1) a valuation of county properties within the town, or (2) on or a per-call basis. Town of Janesville v. Rock County, 153 Wis.2d 538, 451 N.W.2d 436 (Wis.Ct.App.1989). The court determined that “[Section] 60.55(2)(b) allows the town to charge the county for fire protection on a per call basis.” Id. at 436. In distinguishing fees like the ones imposed in River Falls from fire-protection fees, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that:

We have approved levying charges on a district basis, even when a property is not specially benefitted by the service. Grace Episcopal Church v. City of Madison, 129 Wis.2d 331, 336-37, 385 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Ct.App.1986). Also, we have allowed special charges under sec. 66.60(16)(a) when other property owners pay their share of the costs of the service in a different manner. Rubin v. City of Wauwatosa, 116 Wis.2d 305, 316, 342 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Ct.App.1983). However, we distinguish the case before us, not on the basis of the type of service or the payment scheme, but because the statute allows a special charge only for services which are actually performed.

Town of Janesville, 451 N.W.2d. at 439 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court remanded the case “to the trial court for a determination of the amount the county owes the town, based on a reasonable per call calculation.” Id. at 440 (emphasis added).

¶ 46. Fire-protection districts were created to provide areas, not located within corporate boundaries, adequate fire-protection services. See Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-151 (Rev.2012). By charging fees to all property owners without rendering a specific service to each, the DFPD was able to accumulate funds, which represents seventy-four percent of its budget, to build a top-class fire department, rivaling municipal-level services. While beneficial and impressive, this simply is not the purpose of Section 19-5-177(l)(e). “A municipality could classify any exaction as a ‘fee’ for the provision of services or facilities and evade the Constitutional and Legislative limitations placed upon governing authorities in regard to taxation.” Ocean Springs, 932 So.2d at 56 (¶44). The Legislature has provided fire-protection districts with several ways to receive funding to support their growth-by tax revenue received from the county board of supervisors, through the issuance of bonds, and through fees charged for specific services rendered. Why would the Legislature specify that fire-protection districts could charge fees for “services rendered” if fire-protection districts could charge fees simply for existing?

CONCLUSION

¶ 47. Municipalities have limited taxing power, which can be used to fund fire-protection districts. However, fire-protection districts may charge fees only for “services rendered.” “Services rendered” are those specific services delivered directly to a specific customer. The DFPD’s fee is a mandatory payment charged to all property owners in the district. It is not a result of a specific service provided to the payer, and it benefits the community as a whole. A fire-protection district may not charge a fee in anticipation of rendering a service; this is an impermissible tax. Accordingly, I would reverse and render the trial court’s declaratory judgment.

KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . The property owners have presented two issues: (1) Whether the monthly fee is an illegal tax and (2) whether the power to tax must be narrowly construed. Because the issues are related, they will be discussed together.

      . Section 19-5-189 provides, in part:
      (1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section for levies for fire protection purposes and subsection (3) of this section for certain districts providing water service, the board of supervisors of the county in which any such district exists may, according to the terms of the resolution, levy a special tax, not to exceed four (4) mills annually, on all of the taxable real property in such district, the avails of which shall be paid over to the board of commissioners of the district to be used either for the operation, support and maintenance of the district or for the retirement of any bonds issued by the district, or for both.

      (2)(a) In respect to fire protection purposes, the board of supervisors of the county in which any such district exists on July 1, 1987, may levy a special tax annually, not to exceed the tax levied for such purposes for the 1987 fiscal year on all of the taxable real property in such district, the avails of which shall be paid over to the board of commissioners of the district to be used either for the operation, support and maintenance of the fire protection district or for the retirement of any bonds issued by the district for fire protection purposes, or for both. Any such district for which no taxes have been levied for the 1987 fiscal year may be treated as having been created after July 1, 1987, for the purposes of this subsection.
      (b) In respect to fire protection purposes, the board of supervisors of the county in which any such district is created after July 1, 1987, may, according to the terms of the resolution of intent to incorporate the district, levy a special tax not to exceed two (2) mills annually on all of the taxable real property in such district, the avails of which shall be paid over to the board of commissioners of the district to be used either for the operation, support and maintenance of the fire protection district or for the retirement of any bonds issued by the district for fire protection purposes, or for both; however, if the district is created pursuant to a mandatory election called by the board of supervisors, in lieu of a petitioned election under Section 19-5-157, the board of supervisors may levy a special tax annually not to exceed an amount to be determined by the board of supervisors and stated in the notice of such election. The mandatory election authorized herein shall be conducted in accordance with paragraph (c) of this subsection. The special tax may be increased if such increase is authorized by the electorate pursuant to an election conducted in accordance with paragraph (c) of this subsection.
      Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-189 (Rev.2012) (emphasis added).

      . The property owners raised the issue of bonds below but have not focused on that argument in this appeal. The DFPD argues that a bond is not required to charge a fee for fire-protection services.

      . In it is letter to the AG, the DFPD stated clearly its need to increase revenue for fire-protection services because “our tax millage revenues are decreasing as more property owners become eligible for the 65 or over exemption.” Pross, 1990 WL 548177, *1. It is important to note that the Legislature created a special homestead exemption for persons over sixty-five years of age. It is illogical to believe the Legislature created a special homestead exemption for persons over sixty-five years old and then allowed the DFPD to circumvent the Legislature’s intent by taxing all property owners for fire protection under the guise of a fire-protection fee.

      .The Washington Supreme Court held that a flat, monthly rate for ambulance service imposed on every household and business within the area was neither a valid tax nor a valid fee for services rendered. Arborwood Idaho, L.L.C. v. City of Kennewick, 151 Wash.2d 359, 89 P.3d 217 (2004). However, in 1994, the court held that a "benefit charge” upon a housing authority for fire-protection services was a permissible fee, not a tax. King County Fire Prot. Dist. v. Housing Auth. of King County, 123 Wash.2d 819, 872 P.2d 516 (1994). Washington has a "benefit charge” statute. Id. at 522.

        . In contrast, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment against a couple for services rendered by a local fire district. Brandsville Fire Prot. Dist. v. Phillips, 374 S.W.3d 373 (Mo.Ct.App.2012). The fire district had charged the couple "$100 for an 'initial call out' fee plus $562.50 for 2.25 hours at $250 per hour for time spent at the scene” of a single-car accident. Id. at 375.

      . The property owners also note that House Bill 356, which would have revised Section 19-5-177 to allow fire districts to collect fees from property owners, had died in committee. See H.B. 356, Reg. Sess. (Miss.2008).

      . Other impact-fee ordinances at issue charged fees for the development of municipal facilities, park and recreational facilities, police facilities, major roadways, and water facilities. Ocean Springs, 932 So.2d at 48 (¶8).

      . Nationally, many fire districts have voluntary fire-protection dues and bill nonsubscri-bers for any fire-protection services they receive.

      . In Florida, the district court of appeals found that a fire-line charge, which was imposed on properties exceeding a certain size, was a patently discriminatory tax. City of Miami Beach v. Jacobs, 315 So.2d 227 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975).