author: TUTER, JACK, Associate Judge.

text:
    Loyal R. CAYEA, Jr., a/k/a Loyal R. Cayea and Lori J. Cayea a/k/a Lori Cayea, Appellants, v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D13-1555.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 28, 2014.

      Gene D. Lipscher of Gene D. Lipscher, P.A., Jupiter, for appellants.
    Nancy M. Wallace and Michael J. Larson of Akerman Senterfitt, Tallahassee and William P. Heller of Akerman Senter-fitt, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   TUTER, JACK, Associate Judge.

Loyal and Lori Cayea appeal the trial court’s entry of a final judgment of foreclosure in CitiMortgage, Inc.’s (“Citi”) favor following a bench trial. The entirety of the Cayeas’ arguments center on the court’s admission of Citi’s payment records at trial. We find no error in the court’s admission of certain bank records which complied with the requirements of the business records exception and affirm.

At trial, Citi called Michael Windsor, an employee of its default research and litigation department, as a witness. Mr. Windsor testified the Cayeas had been in default on their loan since April of 2009. Citi then sought to admit a summary of the Cayeas’ payment history after Mr. Windsor confirmed that the entries in the payment history were made contemporaneous with payment. The Cayeas’ attorney objected and asked to voir dire the witness about the payment summary. The court granted the request, and the following transpired:

Q: Now the document that you have in front of you, this is a document that was created for purposes of this trial?
A: It’s just a general payment history and yes it was created for purposes of this trial on paper.
Q: It’s a summary?
A: Generally yes a summary of everything that’s been paid by the borrowers as well as by Citi on behalf of the borrowers.
Q: The summary of the transactions, right?
A: Right.
Q: CitiBank doesn’t keep this form, the records in this form?
A: There’s a few different systems that we have payment history available in this is one of the versions.
Q: Okay. But this is printed for purposes of this trial?
A: . Yes.

After their brief voir dire of the witness, the Cayeas reasserted their objection to the admission of the payment history on the grounds that it lacked foundation. Citi responded that the document was a printout from its system, and met all requirements of the business records exception. The court then asked the witness: “This was prepared for this trial, actually you pushed d button on the computer and it was spit out and you want to use that for this trial, is that correct?” The witness responded: “Yes, this is actually from our system Citi that comprises all this information.”

The witness went on to testify that it was the regular business practice of Citi to input payments into its system upon receipt and payments were entered into Citi’s system, “Citilink,” by employees of its payment processing department. He further testified that the payment processing department had two groups — one which monitored electronic payments and one which monitored payments by mail— each of which were responsible for posting their respective payments into the proper account in Citilink. Lastly, the witness testified that such entries were kept in the ordinary course of business activity at Citi and it was the ordinary business practice of Citi to keep individual records for each loan. After this testimony, the court overruled the objections and admitted the documents.

This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 938 So.2d 124, 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). However, a trial court’s discretion is limited by the rules of evidence. Id.

The Cayeas argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Citi to introduce their loan payment histoiy because: 1) the payment history was a “summary” and did not meet the standards for a business record; 2) therefore Mr. Windsor’s testimony regarding the payment history constituted hearsay; and 3) even if the payment record was a business record, the lender failed to lay the proper foundation for its admission. Citi counters that the court properly admitted the payment history into evidence under the business record exception.

Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” § 90.801 (l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within a recognized exception. See § 90.802, Fla. Stat. Florida’s business-records exception appears in section 90.803(6)(a) of the Florida Evidence code, which defines a “business record” as:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or as shown by a certification or declaration that complies with paragraph (c) and s. 90.902(11), unless the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes a business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.

§ 90.803(6)(a), Fla. Stat.

“Summaries” of such business records may be admitted so long as the summary is authenticated by the party who prepared it and the presenting party complies with the notice requirements set forth in section 90.956. McKown v. State, 46 So.3d 174, 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). See § 90.956, Fla. Stat. (2012) (“When it is not convenient to examine in court the contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs, a party may present them in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation by calling a qualified witness”).

Although the Cayeas claim that the printout was a “summary” within the meaning of section 90.956, we disagree. The totality of Mr. Windsor’s testimony establishes that he did not review a voluminous amount of documents and create a synopsis of the documents especially for purposes of the trial, rather he merely printed out data kept by the lender in its payment posting system. Printouts of data prepared for trial may be admitted under the business records exception even if the printouts themselves are not kept in the ordinary course of business so long as a qualified witness testifies as to the manner of preparation, reliability, and trustworthiness. Jackson v. State, 877 So.2d 816, 817-18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Indeed, loan payment history printouts, if properly authenticated, are routinely admitted as a business record in foreclosure cases. See, e.g., WAMCO XXVIII, Ltd. v. Integrated Elec. Env’ts., Inc., 903 So.2d 230, 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (affirming the admission of loan payment history as a business record). The printout was not admitted pursuant to section 90.956 and, therefore, the notice provisions of that section do not apply.

Instead, the court properly admitted the printout of the loan payment history as a business record. To secure admissibility of a business record the proponent must show that:

(1) the record was made at or near the time of the event; (2) was made by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (4) that it was a regular practice of that business to make such a record.

Yisrael v. State, 993 So.2d 952, 956 (Fla. 2008). This foundation may be established in one of three ways. Id. “First, the proponent may take the traditional route, which requires that a records custodian take the stand and testify under oath to the predicate requirements.” Id. (citing § 90.803(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004)). “Second, the parties may stipulate to the admissibility of a document as a business record.” Id. “Third and finally, since July 1, 2003, the proponent has been able to establish the business-records predicate through a certification or declaration that complies with sections 90.803(6)(c) and 90.902(11), Florida Statutes (2004).” Id. at 957. It is important to note that the authenticating witness need not be “the person who actually prepared the business records.” Cooper v. State, 45 So.3d 490, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Rather, the witness just need be well enough acquainted with the activity to provide testimony. Id. at 493 (quoting Alexander v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 So.2d 592, 593 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)).

This Court has dealt with similar business record custodian issues in Weisenberg v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 89 So.3d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), and Glarum v. LaSalle Bank National Association, 83 So.3d 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

Glarum dealt with affidavits which were used by the bank in support of a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 782. In that case, the custodian testified in a deposition that he did not know who entered the data into the computer and he could not verify that the entries were correct at the time they were made. Id. In reversing the summary judgment entered in favor of the bank, we explained that the specialist’s affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay because “[h]e relied on data supplied by [the loan servicer] with whose procedures he was even less familiar” and as such, the bank failed to present competent substantial evidence of the amount owed under the mortgage. Id. at 783.

In Weisenberg, we held that the trial court did not err in finding that a loan servicer’s affidavit regarding the borrower’s indebtedness met the requirements of the business records exception. 89 So.3d at 1112. In doing so, we recognized Gla-rum, but distinguished it on the grounds that there, “[t]he specialist had a total lack of knowledge as to how his company’s own data was produced.” Id. Conversely, in Weisenberg, the affiant’s deposition testimony illustrated that the affiant knew how the data was produced. Id. Specifically, the affiant “testified that the cashiering department was responsible for collecting and applying payments. Information relating to the servicing of the loans was kept in a program known as the mortgage servicing platform which she relied on to verify the specific figures in her affidavit.” Id. From this testimony, we held that the affiant “demonstrated that she was familiar with the bank’s record-keeping system and had knowledge of how the data was uploaded into the system.” Id. Thus, the affidavit qualified under the business record exception. Id. at 1113.

Here, unlike Glarum, Citi’s records custodian, Mr. Windsor, did not have a complete lack of understanding as to how the loan payment data was recorded. Rather, just like in Weisenberg, Mr. Windsor’s testimony demonstrated his familiarity with Citi’s record-keeping system and the process for uploading payment information.

Lastly, the case before us was a bench trial. The trial judge was charged with evaluating not only the quality and substance of the evidence but also the believability of the witnesses. Section 90.803(6)(a) establishes that once counsel has elicited an appropriate foundation from the records custodian and that the records are kept in the ordinary course of business, the trial court may then admit the records “unless the sources of information or other circumstances show a lack of trustworthiness.” § 90.803, Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Windsor’s testimony was untrustworthy.

Finding no error in the trial court’s admission of the bank records, the final judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

WARNER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: FORST, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    OASIS BUILDERS, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, and Rick P. Calpitano, individually, Appellants, v. Brenda McHUGH, individually, Signature Plumbing Co. of South Florida, Inc., and Thomas Watley, Appellees.
    No. 4D13-3390.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 28, 2014.

      Clark W. Smith and Thomas B. Miller of Paxton & Smith, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants.
    Beverly A. Pohl, P.A., of Broad and Cassel, Fort Lauderdale, Gary E. Lehman, P.A., and Francisco Armada of Broad and Cassel, Miami, for appellee Brenda McHugh.
   FORST, J.

Appellants, Oasis Builders, LLC and Rick Calpitano, appeal the non-final order of the trial court holding them in civil contempt for failure to produce documents to Appellee Brenda McHugh. Appellants raise three issues on appeal regarding the contempt order. However, because we find that the trial court fundamentally-erred in inappropriately basing its finding of contempt on Appellants’ noncompliance with something the prior court order did not say, we reverse on that ground as explained below.

The underlying case arose from a complaint filed by Appellee Brenda McHugh against Appellants for breach of contract and negligence concerning deficient remodeling projects in her home. During the course of the litigation, Appellee filed a third request for production of documents from Appellants, requesting, among other things, various tax return and compensation documents, as well as some telephone records. Appellants filed a motion for protective order as to the financial documents and telephone records requested. The motion for protective order challenged the production of those documents and records because of the private and sensitive financial information that would be included and argued that the information is not relevant to the issues in the case.

The trial court denied Appellants’ motion for protective order and ruled that certain information shall be redacted from the documents and records that is not needed or relevant. However, the court’s order did not expressly mandate that the documents were to be produced. Appellants never produced the documents, but they did file an amended response detailing objections to producing the documents on grounds of relevancy and invasion of privacy.

Appellee later filed a motion for contempt against Appellants for failure to produce the requested documents as allegedly ordered by the court. Appellee claimed that the failure to produce the documents was willful noncompliance of the court’s order and requested the court to hold Appellants in contempt, direct them to produce the documents forthwith, and sanction them by awarding Appellee her attorneys’ fees related to filing and arguing the motion. Appellants filed a response to the motion for contempt, again arguing that the requested documents and records requested were irrelevant to the issues in the case.

After a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the motion for contempt, finding Appellants in contempt for “willfully and deliberately disregarding an order of this court” (i.e., the order denying the motion for protective order). The contempt order stated that Appellants may purge themselves of the contempt by producing the requested documents within ten days. The trial court also awarded Appel-lee the fees and costs incurred by her in connection with the contempt litigation.

We review an order of contempt for abuse of discretion. See Parisi v. Broward County, 769 So.2d 359, 363 (Fla. 2000). However, where contempt is based on something an order does not say, “the standard of review is de novo, not abuse of discretion.” Wilcoxon v. Moller, 132 So.3d 281, 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). We have previously held that “a judge cannot base contempt upon noncompliance with something an order does not say.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). If an order is not clear and unambiguous regarding what a party may or may not do or what it must or must not do, then it cannot support the conclusion that the party willfully or deliberately violated that order. DeMello v. Buckman, 914 So.2d 1090,1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

In our present case, the underlying order that served as the basis for finding Appellants in contempt merely denied a motion for protective order and stated that certain information should be redacted from discovery. As mentioned above, the order did not mandate that Appellants must produce the documents at issue. Although the court’s ruling to redact certain information from the documents may be taken to inherently mean that the court intended for the documents to be produced, such “implied .or inherent provisions of [an order] cannot serve as a basis for an order of contempt.” Keitel v. Keitel, 716 So.2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Because the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants willfully and deliberately disregarded the court order was based on an order that does not expressly require them to produce the documents, the trial court fundamentally erred in finding Appellants in contempt. See Wilcoxon, 132 So.3d at 286 (noting that fundamental error occurs with contempt orders when the trial court substantially departs from the essential requirements of law). We therefore reverse the order finding Appellants in civil contempt and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and Remanded.

GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Pascal LARRIEUX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D12-2771, 4D12-2772.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 28, 2014.
    Carey Haughwou't, Public Defender, and Tom Wm. Odom, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

These two cases have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. Larrieux appeals his sentence of forty years in prison after the trial court found him in violation of his probation. Larrieux contends that the trial court erred by denying him the opportunity to be heard before sentencing. We agree. We reverse the sentence and remand the case back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

Prior to the commencement of the violation of probation hearing, Larrieux requested that, if the court should find him in violation of his probation, the trial court continue the sentencing portion of the hearing. Larrieux stated that he was not prepared to proceed to a sentencing hearing, and he wanted “the court to hear absolutely everything” before pronouncing a sentence. Immediately after the trial court found Larrieux in violation of his probation, it sentenced Larrieux to forty years in prison, the maximum penalty he faced based on the charges for which he was on probation, without giving Larrieux or his counsel an opportunity to present any evidence or argument in mitigation prior to imposing the sentences.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(b) states that, at a sentencing hearing, “[t]he court shall entertain submissions and evidence by the parties that are relevant to the sentence.” Because we find that the trial court departed from the essential requirements set forth in rule 3.720(b), we reverse the sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

Reversed and remanded.

WARNER, GROSS and CONNER, JJ„ concur.

      . Larrieux only appeals the sentence, not the judgment finding him in violation of probation.

      . Although the State argues the error was not preserved, we disagree.


text:
    Diana Santa MARIA, P.A., Appellant, v. STATE FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 4D12-3425.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 28, 2014.
    Stephen A. Marino, Jr., and Rochelle N. Wimbush of Ver Ploeg & Lumpkin, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Elizabeth K. Russo of Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., Miami and Methe & Rocken-bach, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Federated Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Esposito, 937 So.2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

GROSS, GERBER and FORST, JJ„ concur.


text:
    Hania Thomas MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D13-3783.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 28, 2014.
    Hania Thomas Moore, Bristol, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s sworn Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801 motion which sought additional jail credit. The trial court denied the motion as time barred under rule 3.801, but the motion was filed on September 27, 2013 — within the grace period recently added to the rule. In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Proce dure, 132 So.3d 734 (Fla.2013). Under the rule as amended, defendants sentenced before July 1, 2013, have until July 1, 2014 to file a rule 3.801 motion seeking jail credit. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(b).

In response to our order to show cause, the State argues that the jail credit claim is barred as successive because appellant allegedly sought the same jail credit in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(d) (“No successive motions for jail credit will be considered.”). The record in this proceeding does not support affirmance on this basis as appellant states that the prior motion was based upon incorrect information. Appellant has not previously filed a motion for jail credit under rule 3.801.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the State may raise its argument that appellant’s claim for jail credit is barred by collateral estoppel.

Reversed and Remanded.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., STEVENSON and CONNER, JJ., concur.


author: LOGUE, J.

text:
    ROCKETRIDER PICTURES, LLC, Appellant, v. BANKUNITED, et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D13-1470.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    May 28, 2014.
    Arnaldo Velez, P.A., and Arnaldo Velez, for appellant.
    John L. Penson, P.A., and John L. Pen-son, for appellees.
    Before WELLS, LAGOA, and LOGUE, JJ.
   ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

LOGUE, J.

Rocketrider Pictures, LLC appeals a trial court order that confirmed a foreclosure sale and denied the foreclosure defendant’s objection to the sale, to which objection Rocketrider had joined as a third party. Rocketrider asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the judicial sale where the property subject to the sale was owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties, and the foreclosure was entered against the wife but not against the husband. On appellee’s commendable confession of error, we agree.

The trial court erred in denying Rocket-rider’s objection to the judicial sale. Because only the wife’s interest in the property was foreclosed, nothing passed by the judicial sale to Rocketrider. Balding v. Fleisher, 279 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (“[A]n estate by the entireties ... [is] not capable of being the object of satisfaction for the debt of one of the tenants alone. Thus, the interest of the judgment debtor could not pass by the sale.”). Moreover, the notice of judicial sale inaccurately indicated the entire property was for sale.

Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of foreclosure and reverse the trial court’s May 20, 2013 order denying the objections to the judicial sale and confirming sale. We remand with directions to the trial court to cancel the certificate of title issued to Rocketrider, and direct the clerk of court to return Rocketrider’s bid monies.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions.


text:
    Osvaldo CACERES, Appellant, v. SEDANO’S SUPERMARKETS and Johns Eastern Co., Inc., Appellees.
    No. 1D13-5653.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 3, 2014.
    William F. Souza of the Law Offices of William F. Souza, P.A., North Miami Beach, for Appellant.
    Luis F. Estrada of Angones, McClure & Garcia, P.A., Miami, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying com-pensability of his injuries claimed under a theory of repetitive trauma with an alleged date of accident of September 22, 2003. Claimant argues that the JCC erred when he found that the report of injury was late, forever barring the prosecution of any claims. Claimant also argues that the JCC erred by ruling on reserved claims for attorney’s fees and costs related to previously provided benefits. We agree and reverse the order on appeal, and remand the case for additional findings.

Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2002) requires that a claimant advise his employer of an injury within 30 days of either the date of the injury or the date of the initial manifestation. Under the plain language of the statute, there are two separate dates from which a report of injury may be timely made and the use of either date is sufficient for timely compliance. This court has noted that the date of injury in a case of repetitive trauma is generally deemed to be the last date of exposure to the trauma. See Rose v. Geico, 90 So.3d 886, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing Troche v. Geico, 966 So.2d 460, 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)). Here, the JCC appears to have assumed that any report of injury more than thirty days after Claimant first had knowledge of his symptoms — i.e., the date of the initial manifestation — was too late. Nothing in the final order indicates that the JCC considered the date of injury as the alternate date for timely reporting of this claim based on alleged repetitive trauma (nor did the JCC make any findings as to whether Claimant suffered an injury of any sort). Instead, the JCC appears to have interpreted the reporting requirements of section 440.185 in a manner that would require this court to add the phrase “whichever occurs first” following the two alternate dates after which an employee can timely report an injury. This interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute which provides two separate dates as alternatives for timely compliance. Furthermore, courts are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature. See Germ v. St Luke’s Hosp. Assn., 993 So.2d 576, 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“If a statute’s plain language is clear and unambiguous, courts should rely on the words used in the statute without involving rules of construction or speculating as to the legislature’s intent. Courts should give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and may not add words that were not included by the legislature.” (citations omitted)).

Because the JCC assumed that the report of injury here would have been too late under any interpretation of the evidence, he failed to make the necessary findings for this repetitive trauma claim— including a determination of the date of injury based on the last injurious exposure, or whether Claimant suffered an injury of any sort. Conflicts in the lay testimony and expert medical opinion concerning other elements of the claim, such as causation, remain unresolved and this Court cannot perform a meaningful review on the issue of whether Claimant’s report of injury was timely under section 440.185. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further findings regarding this repetitive trauma claim to include findings as to whether Claimant suffered injury, and the date of the injury. Because we reverse the order on appeal, including the denial of attorney’s fees and costs, this renders moot Claimant’s second issue relating to the denial of attorney’s fees. Based on the foregoing, the appealed order is reversed, and the case remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WOLF, PADOVANO, and RAY, JJ„ concur.


author: BENTON, J.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Harold Ricardo ROBINSON, Appellee.
    Nos. 1D12-2566, 1D12-2567, 1D12-2605.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 3, 2014.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   BENTON, J.

The state appeals sentences imposed on Harold Ricardo Robinson in three separate cases. The Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet — the accuracy of which has never been challenged — put the lowest permissible sentence at 50.85 months’ and the maximum sentence at 45 years’ imprisonment. But the trial court imposed concurrent Sentences of 50.85 months’ imprisonment, “suspended” after 36 months, on no stated condition, and with no post-incarceration probationary term. We reverse and remand for resentencing.

By suspending Mr. Robinson’s sentences after 36 months on no stated condition (and without any probationary term), the trial court imposed sentences less severe than the lowest permissible sentence of 50.85 months’ imprisonment, and so “departed downward” without explanation. Section 921.0026(1), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that a sentence less severe than the lowest permissible sentence allowed under the scoresheet “is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure.” See also §§ 921.0024(2); 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (2011).

The sentences imposed were not, moreover, true suspended sentences authorized by statute, because the trial court failed to impose probation during the period of suspension. See § 921.187(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (providing the court may, as a sentencing alternative, impose “a split sentence whereby the offender is to be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence”); § 948.01(5), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“The imposition of sentence may not be suspended and the defendant thereupon placed on probation or into community control unless the defendant is placed under the custody of the department or another public or private entity.”).

“Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is to be placed on probation or, with respect to any such felony, into community control upon completion of any specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years or less. In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation or into community control after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.” § 948.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). See also Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79, 80 (Fla.1958) (holding that “the power to suspend the imposition of sentence upon a. convicted criminal can be exercised by a trial judge only as an incident to probation under the provisions of Ch. 948”); State v. Galazz, 2 So.3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA2009).

In any event, ordering a probationary period would not have cured the lack of any explanation for the downward departure. . “Suspended sentences are downward departure sentences, the reasons for which must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.” State v. Ryckman, 86 So.3d 535, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (citations omitted). .

Reversed and remanded.

PADOVANO and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ted E. DUNLAP, Appellant, v. Michael D. CREWS, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-5601.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 3, 2014.
    Ted E. Dunlap, pro se, Appellant.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Joy A. Stubbs and David William Grimes, Assistant Attorneys General, and Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The issue on appeal is whether funds transferred from Ted E. Dunlap’s personal banking account to his inmate trust fund by a third party with power of attorney are exempt from the lien provision in section 945.6037, Florida Statutes, because those funds were allegedly disability benefits payments from The Department of Veteran Affairs, which are exempt under Rule 38-203.201, Florida Administrative Code. The Second District addressed a very similar issue in Myers v. Steube, 61 So.3d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) and we find its reasoning persuasive. By adopting Myers, we hold that the funds transferred by the third party into Mr. Dunlap’s inmate trust fund were not identifiable as VA benefit payments because the VA benefits checks were not mailed directly to the Bureau of Finance and Accounting, as required by Rule 33-203.201 in order to obtain exempt status. A corollary to this holding is that Secretary Michael D. Crews has no legal duty to protect unidentifiable funds in Mr. Dunlap’s inmate trust fund.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, C.J., WOLF, and MAKAR, JJ„ concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Blake JONES, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4261.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 3, 2014.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Lauren Brudnicki and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

On direct appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s order on a motion to suppress to the extent that the order granted Blake Jones’ request to suppress his statements. On cross-appeal, Jones challenges the trial court’s order on the motion to suppress to the extent that the order denied his request to suppress all physical evidence recovered. We hold that the trial court erred in partially denying Jones’ motion to suppress because the statements were made and the physical evidence was gathered after an illegal detention that occurred at the beginning of the stop. See Neeley v. State, 112 So.3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Johnson v. State, 995 So.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Leroy v. State, 982 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that he was free to leave). We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order to the extent that it denied the motion to suppress the physical evidence; we affirm the portion of the order that granted the motion to suppress the statements; and we remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.CJ1

ROWE, MARSTILLER, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    U.S. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION as Trustee, Successor in Interest to Bank of America, National Association as Trustee as Successor by Merger to La-Salle Bank, National Association as Trustee for Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR15-Trust, Appellant, v. Josef QUIROZ; et al, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-138.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 3, 2014.
    Anthony R. Smith and Kathryn I. Kas-per of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Pensacola, for Appellant.
    Kenneth B. Bell and Robert J. Powell of Clark; Partington, Hart, Larry, Bond & Stackhouse, Pensacola, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Consistent with appellees’ confession of error, the final order on appeal is reversed and the matter remanded to the lower tribunal for further proceedings.

LEWIS, C. J., THOMAS and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Corey BRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-1340.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 3, 2014.
    W. Charles Fletcher, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. This dismissal is without prejudice to appellant’s right to file a petition for belated appeal. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c).

WOLF, PADOVANO, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Almetric DEBROW.
    No. 2013-KP-1814.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

| (Writ granted. In regard to relator’s application for DNA testing, following attempted armed robbery convictions in which the state’s case rested on identification testimony and in which relator presented a defense of misidentification at trial, the lower courts erred when they denied the application for post-conviction DNA testing. La.C.Cr.P. art. 926.1(B) and (C). The district court is therefore directed to investigate the availability and integrity of the physical evidence and to order DNA testing in the event that it determines the results could tend to make relator’s guilt more or less probable. La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.1(C) and (D). See e.g., State ex rel. Tran v. State, 12-1275 (La.10/8/12), 99 So.3d 1005; State ex rel. Jackson v. State, 11-0394 (La.5/25/12), 90 So.3d 384; State v. Stokes, 10-1387 (La.2/11/11), 56 So.3d 1008. In all other aspects, relator’s application for post-conviction relief is denied.

VICTORY, J., would deny.

KNOLL, J., would deny.


text:
    In re J. Renee MARTIN.
    No. 2014-B-0895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

11 Respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which respondent admitted that she failed to return a client file upon request. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that J. Renee Martin, Louisiana Bar Roll number 30161, be publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Michael A. FENASCI.
    No. 2014-OB-0826.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ON APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT

PER CURIAM.

| jThis proceeding arises out of an application for reinstatement to the practice of law filed by petitioner, Michael A. Fenasci, an attorney currently suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2009, petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for three years for serious attorney misconduct, including improperly obtaining a loan from his client, improperly advancing living expenses to his client, and commingling and converting client funds. In re: Fenasci, 09-1665 (La.l 1/20/09), 21 So.3d 984. In June 2013, petitioner filed an application for reinstatement with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) took no position regarding the application for reinstatement. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

Following the hearing, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law. Neither petitioner nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

After considering the record in its entirety, we will adopt the committee’s recommendation and reinstate petitioner to the practice of law. As found by the committee, the record provides clear and convincing evidence of petitioner’s 1 ¡¡compliance with the reinstatement criteria. Under these circumstances, petitioner has shown that he possesses the requisite competence, honesty, and integrity to be reinstated to the practice of law. Accordingly, we will reinstate petitioner to the practice of law.

DECREE

Upon review of the recommendation of the hearing committee, and considering the record, it is ordered that Michael A. Fenasci, Louisiana Bar Roll number 5508, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.


author: /s/ Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana

text:
    In re David J. MOTTER.
    No. 2O14-OB-1076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ORDER

|,Considering the Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that David J. Motter, Louisiana Bar Roll number 21366, be and he hereby is transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 22(B). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    Robert W. PECUE, Marie Adele Pecue Lambert, and William B. Pecue, Individually and on Behalf of their Deceased Mother, Juanita Pecue. v. PLANTATION MANAGEMENT CO., L.L.C., d/b/a the Guest House.
    No. 2014-C-0586.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re Lambert, Marie Adele; Pecue, William B.; Robert W. Pecue, et al.;— Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, Nos. 509298, 509298; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0977.

Denied.


text:
    Henry MOORE, Jr. v. MURPHY OIL USA, INC., and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CC-0598.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company; Murphy Oil USA, Inc, et al.;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipa-hoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2012-0003321; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 2051.

Denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Sue SPILSBURY and Lynn Divincent v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, its Department of Safety and Permits and Board of Zoning Adjustments.
    No. 2014-C-0601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re City of New Orleans; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2013-01417; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1258.

Denied.


text:
    June A. PERCELL v. FIRST LAFAYETTE CORPORATION, INC. d/b/a Races and Aces.
    No. 2014-CC-0612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re Percell, June A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 1040783; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW1772.

Denied.


text:
    Kerry FOSTER v. Ravish V. PATWARDHAN, M.D. and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-0614.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re Patwardhan M.D., Ravish; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 556219; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, .Nos. 48,575-CA, 48,712-CA.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Joseph Emmett BELLANDE, Jr.
    No. 2014-C-0615.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re Ciuzio, Nancy Bellande; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2011-0030277; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0578.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John MALBROUGH, Jr.
    No. 2014-KK-0616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re Malbrough, Jr., John; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 137929; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 14-00214.

Denied.


text:
    Shelly E. GOUTIERREZ v. ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY, Kenner Police Department, William D. Campbell, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Julia Goutierrez v. St. Paul Insurance Company, Kenner Police Department, William D. Campbell, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-C-0649.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2014.
   In re Campbell, Officer William; City of Kenner; St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 672-301 CfW 672-787; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-614 C/W 13-CA-615.

Denied.


text:
    Tessie M. MOUTON Bob Kolby Keith Johnson, et al. v. LOUISIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
    No. 2014-CC-0920.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2014.
   In re Mouton, Tessie M. et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 630,120; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2014 CW 0620, 2014 CW 0627.

Denied.

VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.

HUGHES, J„ recused.


text:
    John OLESZKOWICZ v. EXXON MOBILE CORPORATION, Exxon Mobile Oil Corporation, Humble Incorporated and Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-0256.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Exxon Mobile Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 695-645; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-623.

Granted.


text:
    Cynthia HOLLIDAY v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LSU AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE, etc.
    No. 2014-CC-0585.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Board of Supervisors of LSU Agricultural and Mechanical College et al.; State of Louisiana; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2010-3208; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0034.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Booker Earl LOYDEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1970.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Loyden, Booker Earl; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 256385; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00664.

Writ granted in part. The court of appeal is ordered to allow relator a reasonable amount of time to supplement his application with the appropriate supporting documentation and to (re)consider his pro se filing on the merits. See State v. Melon, 95-2209 (La 9/22/95), 660 So.2d 466 (“[Meaningful access to courts guaranteed by La. Const, art. I, §§ 2, 19 and 22 requires courts to accept and consider post-verdict pro se filings from represented defendants.”). In all other respects, the application is denied.

CLARK, J., would deny.


text:
    Christie LeCompte THOMAS v. Kellsey THOMAS.
    No. 2014-CC-0668.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Thomas, Kellsey; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 160666; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1554.

Not considered; not timely filed. See State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La.3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; Morris v. Stueben,, 01-0137 (La.1/26/01), 781 So.2d 1220.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tyrone GIPSON.
    No. 2013-KK-2176.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Gipson, Tyrone; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated September 26, 2013, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 504-973; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1028.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.


text:
    Thomas McMASTERS v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2013-C-2634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re' McMasters, Thomas; — Petitioner; Applying for Rehearing of this court’s action dated February 28, 2014.

Rehearing denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Susan CLEVELAND v. IMPERIAL FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2013-C-2795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Cleveland, Susan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Rehearing of this court’s action dated March 14, 2014, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 129,314; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0165.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    Nikia ADAMS v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2014-C-0140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Adams, Nikia; — Plaintiff; Applying For Applying for Rehearing of this court’s action dated March 21, 2014 City Civil Sendee Commission, No. 7796; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0200.

Rehearing denied.

GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jermaine LOEB.
    No. 2013-KP-1754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Loeb, Jermaine; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 08-613; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-471.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J„ recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darryl RUFFIN.
    No. 2013-K-1916.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Ruffin, Darryl; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2010-182134; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1793.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darryl RUFFIN.
    No. 2013-KO-1925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Ruffin, Darryl; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2010-182134; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1793.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kimethia COLEMAN.
    No. 2013-K-1990.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Coleman, Kimethia; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 283,950; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-168-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Glen Dale KING.
    No. 2013-KO-2017.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re King, Glen Dale; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2006-740; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,335-KA

Denied.

CLARK, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Torrey HACKETT.
    No. 2013-KO-2122.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Hackett, Torrey; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 465-898; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0178.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry L. SYLVE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-OK-2208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Sylve, Jerry L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 278195; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW1044.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kim R. HOGAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2214.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Hogan, Kim R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 387357; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1005.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bernard JOSEPH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2240.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Joseph, Bernard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 324-246; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1156.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ketron TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2250.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Taylor, Ketron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 248,146; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-704-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth Wayne MONTGOMERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Montgomery, Kenneth Wayne;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 26952-12; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00678.

Denied. Appeal pending. La.C.Cr.P. art. 924.1.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Don C. FLEMINGS.
    No. 2013-K-2274.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Flemings, Don C.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 501-934; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-1345.

Denied


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ernest LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2286.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Lewis, Ernest; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 304-693; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1178.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Solomon WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2291.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Washington, Solomon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 302559; to .the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW1038.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Matt BANKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2292.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Banks, Matt; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div F, No. 09-F-1627; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,640-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Louis MITCHELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2304.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Mitchell, Louis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 195-491 C/W 195-533.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rory GULLETTE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2312.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Gullette, Rory; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 245,159; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-802-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Todd P. THIBODEAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2313.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Thibodeaux, Todd P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No.-08-118139-1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00925.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ashleigh E. THORNTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Thornton, Ashleigh E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 505-319; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1182.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stacy WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Williams, Stacy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 87,459; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-700-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 98-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raymond WEBB v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2333.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Webb, Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 42,706; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-771-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Thomas, 08-2912, (La.10/16/09), 19 So.3d 466.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin Duane GOODLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Goodley, Kevin Duane; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 98-K-4086-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00585.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daniel RONQUILLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Ronquille, Daniel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-164; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-637.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie Carl JONES, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Jones Jr., Willie Carl; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 171,940, 171,-940-A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,725-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin SUTTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2345.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Sutton, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 284027.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2349.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Brown, Eric; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 94-5632; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-623.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Patrick GUILLORY, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2386.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Guillory, Jr., Patrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 78173; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00634.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth Demario McCLAIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2387.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re McClain, Kenneth Demario;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-CR3-97401; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1061.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brandon LAVERGNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Lavergne, Brandon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 585314FA, 58,521-F; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. KH 13-00502, KH 13-00573.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Phillip KNIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Knight, Phillip; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-6148; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-681.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; see also La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of M.W.B., JR.
    No. 2013-CK-2415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge Juvenile Court, No. 99810; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KJ 0322.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tremika D. LANG.
    No. 2013-KO-2614.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Lang, Tremika D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 09-6198; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth- Circuit, No. 13-KA-21.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky Lavelle WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-K-2678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 309,149; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-156.

Denied.

GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Albert L. ARNOLD.
    No. 2013-KO-2723.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Arnold, Albert L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 95771; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-218.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carol H. BANKS.
    No. 2013-K-2731.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Banks, Carol H.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 10-783; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-41.

Denied.


text:
    John OLESZKOWICZ v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Exxon Mobil Oil Corporation, Humble Incorporated and Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc.
    No. 2014-C-0261.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Oleszkowicz, John; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 695-645; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-623.

Denied.


text:
    Karl PALMER v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS FAIR PLAN.
    No. 2014-CC-0399.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2010-1475; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0053.

Denied.


text:
    Leslie FRANCES v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2014-CC-0400.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2010-01493; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0052.

Denied.


text:
    Matthew MASON & Paula Mason v. BANKERS INSURANCE GROUP.
    No. 2014-C-0433.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Mason, Matthew et al.; Mason, Paula; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 690-989; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-704.

Denied.


text:
    Irene LEEDY v. LEONARD J. CHABERT MEDICAL CENTER.
    No. 2014-C-0652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Leedy, Irene; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 148895; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1099.

Denied.


text:
    Laryy PAUL, et ux. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0656.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Fisher, Cathy M.; State Farm & Casualty Company; Uncle Albert’s, L.L.C.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 246,639-G; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-01254.

Denied.

CLARK and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    TBE DeSOTO LOUISIANA PROPERTIES, L.P. and SFC Louisiana Real Estate, Ltd. v. CHESAPEAKE LOUISIANA, LP PXP Louisiana, L.L.C.
    No. 2014-CC-0657.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re SFC Louisiana Real Estate, LTD.; TBE DeSoto Louisiana Properties, L.P.;— Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, Ño. 73,609; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,133-CW.

Denied.

KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ., would grant and docket.


text:
    Dakota WYANT, et al. v. Cody Michael FREEMAN, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0658.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Safeway Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Concor-dia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 46773; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-01137.

Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA WORKFORCE COMMISSION v. CANTU SERVICES, INC. and Miles Orell Kimball.
    No. 2014-CC-0659.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Workforce Commission; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 615,827; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1856.

Denied.


text:
    BLACK WATER MARSH, LLC v. ROGER C. FERRIS PROPERTIES, INC., Timothy J. Litel, and Janice C. Ferris.
    No. 2014-C-0660.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Black Water Marsh, LLC; Gary Lavoi d/b/a Black Water Marshes, Inc.;— Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2011-4641; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-477.

Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CORPORATION v. FIRST CHOICE MEDICAL STAFFING, INC. OF LA.
    No. 2014-CC-0661.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re First Choice Medical Staffing Inc. of LA; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. C575398-D; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1696.

Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CORPORATION v. FIRST CHOICE MEDICAL STAFFING, INC. OF LA.
    No. 2014-CC-0662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re First Choice Medical Staffing Inc. of La.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 575,398; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1753. Denied.


text:
    HUMANE SOCIETY OF NEW ORLEANS v. Mitchell J. LANDRIEU, in his Capacity as the Mayor of the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2014-C-0663.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Humane Society of New Orleans; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2013-02784; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1059.

Denied.


text:
    Tiffany WILLIAMS, as the Natural Tutrix of Gavin Williams, Minor Son of Henry L. White, III v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM, aka the Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities.
    No. 2014-C-0666.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System a/k/a Louisiana Board of Trustees for the State Colleges and Universities; Grambling State University; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 539,174; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,763-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Alvin BONDS and Betty Bonds v. SAPA EXTRUSIONS, LLC.
    No. 2014-C-0667.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Sapa Extrusions, LLC; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 42,267-B; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,760-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Jean JONES And George E. Bull, IV v. AMERICAN EXPRESS PREPAID CARD MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2014-CC-0670.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Bull IV, George E.; Jones, Jean et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2013-05124; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0015.

Denied.


text:
    Catherine M. STEIN, Individually, and as Natural Tutrix of her Children, Moira E. Matherne, Anne M. Matherne, Jessie L. Matherne, and Josie E. Matherne v. PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Sean Melancon, Melancon Gauging, ABC Insurance Company, and XYZ Insurance Company, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0689.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Stein, Catherine M. et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 109698; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0151.

Denied.


text:
    Matthew MASON & Paula Mason v. BANKERS INSURANCE GROUP.
    No. 2014-C-0448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2014.
   In re Bankers Insurance Group; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 690-989; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-704.

Denied.


author: McDonald, j.

text:
    John H. BROWN, Stephanie Brown and Douglas Brown v. LA RIVIERA RESTAURANT, et al.
    No. 2013 CA 0737.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
    Jim Holt, Baton Rouge, LA, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants John H. Brown, Stephanie Brown and Douglas Brown.
    Douglas J. Cochran, Baton Rouge, LA, Attorney for Defendants/Appellees La Riviera Restaurant and Louisiana Restaurant Association Self Insurer’s Fund.
    Before PETTIGREW, McDONALD, and McClendon, jj.
   McDonald, j.

|aThis is an appeal from a judgment of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court that sustained an objection raising the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction over judgments rendered by the Office of Workers’ Compensation and ordered the matter transferred to this court. The plaintiffs appealed that judgment. The plaintiffs also filed a motion with this court asking to file a June 6, 2005 notice of judgment from OWC case 03-01147 as an attachment to their brief. We affirm the district court’s judgment sustaining the objection raising the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, vacate the order transferring the matter to this court, and deny the plaintiffs’ motion to file an attachment to their brief.

On October 16, 2008, John H. Brown, and his children Stephanie Brown and Douglas Brown, filed a lawsuit styled as a “Petition For Judicial Review” in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Mr. Brown named as defendants the Louisiana Restaurant Association Self Insurers Fund and La Riviera Restaurant, and requested a review of his OWC cases: 08-02015, 07-01854, 03-01147, 03-02046 and 98-01247. He asserted that his workers’ compensation benefits were taken from him without due process. The defendants filed objections raising the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, res judicata, no right of action, insufficiency of citation, and insufficiency of service of process, as well as a motion for contempt of court.

After a hearing on February 25, 2013, the district court sustained the defendants’ objection raising the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and ordered the matter transferred to this court pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 932B, which provides that if an action has been brought in a court of improper jurisdiction or venue, the court may transfer the action to a proper court in the interest of justice. The plaintiffs appealed that judgment. The defendants re-urged the same exceptions on appeal.

| .¡Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of action or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C.C.P. art. 2. A judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void. La. C.C.P. art. 3.

. [1] Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1310.5B provides that “The decision of the workers’ compensation judge shall be final unless an appeal is made to the appropriate circuit court of appeal.” This court previously found, ex proprio motu, on a rule to show cause why appeal should not be dismissed, that the OWC’s May 10, 2005 judgment dismissing Mr. Brown’s claims for workers’- compensation benefits was a final, appealable judgment. The OWC’s May 10, 2005 judgment finding that Mr. Brown committed fraud was also a final appealable judgment. The delays in the case expired before Mr. Brown filed his motion for appeal on March 2, 2006, thus, he failed to obtain timely an order of appeal as to the judgment signed on May 10, 2005, and his appeals of that judgment were therefore dismissed. John H. Brown v. La Riviera Restaurant, 2007 CA 0117 c/w 2007 CA 0118 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/26/07). Mr. Brown applied for a writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was denied. John H. Brown v. La Riviera Restaurant, 2007-1728 (La.11/2/07), 966 So.2d 608.

After the district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it should have dismissed the matter. The trial court erred in transferring the matter to this' court. See La. R.S. 23:1310.5B. Mr. Brown has attempted to file what amounts to an untimely appeal of his workers’ compensation case by styling it as a “request for judicial review” under the Administrative Procedure Act and filing it in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court.

We affirm the district court’s judgment sustaining the objection raising the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and we vacate the order transferring |4the matter to this court. The plaintiffs’ motion to file an attachment to their brief is denied. Costs are assessed against the plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; MOTION DENIED.


author: GARRETT, J.

text:
    James Laeonard WOOTTON, III, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Melissamarie Joy Newell WOOTTON, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 49,001-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    May 14, 2014.
    Knight Law Firm LLC, by Robert T. Knight, Metairie, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Law Office of Paul Kidd, Jr., by Paul Henry Kidd, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before DREW, MOORE and GARRETT, JJ.
   GARRETT, J.

|,In this child custody matter, the father appeals from a district court judgment sustaining an exception of no jurisdiction in Ouachita Parish, which was filed by the mother, who has lived in Mississippi with the children since 2008. We affirm the district court judgment.

FACTS

James Leonard Wootton, III, and Melis-samarie Joy Newell married in East Baton Rouge Parish in 2001. Of this marriage, four children were born. The family was living in Caddo Parish when the parents separated in early November 2008, at which time the mother and the children moved to Mississippi. In fact, in the petition for divorce and determination of incidental matters filed by the father in Caddo Parish on November 24, 2008, he alleged that the mother was a Mississippi resident.

Pursuant to a consent judgment and joint custody implementation plan signed on November 20, 2009, the parties were awarded joint custody of the four children. The mother was designated as the domiciliary parent. The documents provided that the legal domicile of the children was the residence of the mother. The consent judgment provided that Louisiana “shall retain custody jurisdiction over all future custody litigation involving these parties and their children and child support issues.” The implementation plan had a similar provision. The parents divorced in May 2010.

In February 2012, the father filed a motion in Caddo Parish entitled “Motion for Transfer and Change of Venue,” requesting that the court transfer the case from Caddo to Ouachita Parish, where he now resides. The father relied upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens under La. C.C.P. art. 123. The father had the mother served under the Louisiana long-arm | ¡.statute as she was still residing in Mississippi. By a letter filed into the suit record on June 12, 2012, the mother — who was unrepresented — proposed that, instead of Ouachita Parish, the case be moved to the children’s home state of Mississippi. By judgment signed October 1, 2012, the father’s motion to transfer venue was granted. The Clerk of Court for Cad-do Parish was ordered to effectuate the transfer. Copies of documents contained in the Caddo Parish proceedings were filed with the Ouachita Parish Clerk of Court.

In January 2013, the father sought to modify the custody plan to designate him as the domiciliary parent. These pleadings were filed in Ouachita Parish. He alleged that he was now ■ a resident of Ouachita Parish and employed as a physician. He asserted that he had remarried and his current wife, who did not work, could provide care for the children. He also alleged that the living conditions provided by the mother for the children in Mississippi were unsuitable and that she was failing to communicate with him about the children’s well-being or report cards. He also contended that at least two of the children wanted to live with him. In addition to seeking a modification of the prior custody plan, he requested that the mother be held in contempt of court, sentenced to jail time and placed on probation.

The mother, now represented by counsel, answered and filed exceptions of prematurity, no jurisdiction, no cause of action and forum non conveniens. She denied all of the allegations made by the father and maintained in the exceptions that Mississippi, as the home state of the children, had jurisdiction and was the proper forum pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UC-CJEA”), La. R.S. |s13:1801 et seq. She also asserted that under La. R.S. 13:1819, Louisiana is an inconvenient forum. She further alleged that the father’s rule to modify custody was filed only after she initiated “SES support proceedings” in Mississippi.

A Hearing Officer Conference (HOC) was held on June 3, 2018. In her report, the hearing officer made the following recommendations:

(1) The exception of prematurity should be sustained due to the father’s failure to make the Caddo judgment executory in Ouachita;
(2) As to the exception of no cause of action, the father stated a cause of action; however, this is irrelevant if jurisdiction and venue are not proper in Oua-chita;
(3) The exception of no jurisdiction has merit. By the time the father filed his petition for divorce in November 2008, the mother and the children had already moved to Mississippi and the father made no objection to the move at that time. The children have lived in Mississippi for more than four years and it is now their home state under the UC-CJEA.
As to exclusive continuing jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:1814, Ouachita Parish did not make the initial custody determination. Also, the children have only visited and never lived in Ouachita Parish. The signing of the transfer order indicated that Caddo Parish agreed that it was no longer the proper parish since none of the parties live there.
(4) The exception of forum non conve-niens has merit. The mother has always been the primary caretaker. She and the children have resided in Mississippi since before the first pleadings were ever filed, apparently with the father’s knowledge and consent. All pertinent evidence pertaining to the children and their current situation is in Mississippi. The only evidence in Oua-chita Parish pertains to visitation periods since the father moved there in July 2011. There is no compelling reason to make the mother and children come to Louisiana for a custody proceeding.

The father filed an objection to the HOC report. He argued that the mother moved to Mississippi without court consent. He also asserted that a |4prior request to transfer to Mississippi was denied in 2012 in Caddo Parish. He further cited the parties’ agreement in the 2009 consent decree that Louisiana would retain jurisdiction over all future custody matters and child support issues.

By judgment signed June 10, 2013, the district court in Ouachita Parish adopted the HOC report as its temporary order. The matter was set for hearing on July 30, 2013. At that time, the district court denied the exception of no cause of action but sustained the exceptions of prematurity and no jurisdiction. The exception of venue was deemed moot. In its oral reasons for judgment, the district court found that under the UCCJEA, Ouachita Parish could not assert jurisdiction over custody of these children who had never resided there. Also, since it did not make the initial custody determination, the court held that Ouachita Parish did not have continuing jurisdiction.

On August 13, 2013, the district court signed a judgment ruling on the exceptions and dismissing the matter at the father’s cost. In open court, it also clarified its reasons for judgment. In particular, it addressed La. C.C.P. art. 74.2 pertaining to venue in a proceeding for a change of custody. The article provides that, if the person awarded custody is no longer domiciled in the state, Venue may be appropriate where the custody decree was rendered or where the person seeking custody is domiciled. However, the court took note of the 1983 comment (c) to the article, which states that in such a case, jurisdiction would be based on the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), the predecessor to the UCCJEA. The court observed that, under the provisions of the current UCCJEA, only Caddo Parish could have | ¡¡exercised continuing jurisdiction and it declined. The court then cited the hearing officer’s conclusion that Oua-chita Parish did not have jurisdiction because Mississippi was the home state of the children under the UCCJEA.

The father appeals.

LAW

The UCCJA, La. R.S. 13:1700, et seq., which was adopted in Louisiana in 1978, served two paramount purposes: (1) avoiding jurisdictional competition among the states and (2) promoting resolution of custody disputes by the forum deemed most likely to- have the maximum amount of relevant information about the case. Lopez v. Lopez, 27,330 (La.App.2d Cir.9/27/95), 661 So.2d 665.

Broadly speaking, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure allows jurisdiction in Louisiana over a minor’s status in a “proceeding to obtain the legal custody of a minor if he is domiciled in, or is in, this state.” La. C.C.P. art. 10(A)(5); Martin-Creech v. Armstrong, 42,649 (La.App.2d Cir.9/12/07), 965 So.2d 624, writ denied, 2007-2120 (La.11/21/07), 967 So.2d 1160. The UC-CJA previously functioned to graft a second tier of inquiry onto the question of jurisdiction over the custody of minor children. Diamand v. Davis, 47,332 (La. App.2d Cir.6/27/12), 94 So.3d 1027, writ denied, 2012-1922 (La.9/12/12), 97 So.3d 1005. It imposed jurisdictional limits that required a court with general subject matter jurisdiction to decline to exercise it. Diamand v. Davis, supra; State ex rel. J.W., 43,163 (La.App.2d Cir.2/13/08), 975 So.2d 841. Jurisdiction over the custody of minor children is now governed by the UCCJEA, which was enacted — and the UCCJA repealed-effective August 15, 2007. Diamand v. Davis, supra.

| fíLa. R.S. 13:1813, which addresses an initial custody determination under the UCCJEA, provides:

A. Except as otherwise provided in R.S. 13:1816, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state,....
(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under R.S. 13:1819 or 1820; and
(a) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence.
(b) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
(3) All courts having jurisdiction have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under R.S. 13:1819 or 1820; or
(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this Subsection.
B. Subsection A of this Section is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.
C. Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.

Under the UCCJEA, “home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. La. R.S. 13:1802(7)(a).

|7La. R.S. 13:1814, which concerns exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, provides:

A. Except as otherwise provided in R.S. 13:1816, a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with R.S. 13:1813 or 1815 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(1) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(2) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.
B. A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this Section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under R.S. 13:1813.

The jurisprudence has held that the UCCJA’s jurisdictional requirements had to be met at the time the petition was filed in order for the court to have jurisdiction over the child. Diamand v. Davis, supra; State ex rel. J.W., supra. This includes a petition for custody modification. Diamand v. Davis, supra; Tabuchi v. Lingo, 588 So.2d 795 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991). We find that the same is equally true with the UCCJEA.

La. R.S. 13:1819 addresses the concept of inconvenient forum under the UCCJEA and provides:

A. A court of this state which has jurisdiction under this Act to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion, or request of another court.
B. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another Instate to exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child.
(2) The length of time the child has resided outside this state.
(3) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction.
(4) The relative financial circumstances of the parties.
(5) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction.
(6) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child.
(7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence.
(8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.
C. If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.
D. A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.

DISCUSSION

The father contests the district court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the prior custody judgment. He contends that Louisiana has never lost jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because he remains in the state. He also attempts to characterize the jurisdiction conflict here as [ ¡{intrastate, between the parishes of Caddo and Ouachita, and not interstate, between Louisiana and Mississippi.

On the other hand, the mother argues that the district court correctly determined that, under the provisions of the UCCJEA, Mississippi is the home state of the parties’ children, who have lived there since November 2008. According to the terms of La. R.S. 18:1818 and 13:1814, she maintains that Mississippi has replaced Louisiana as the children’s home state and that the vast majority of pertinent evidence is in Mississippi.

There is no doubt that Mississippi is the home state of the Wootton children, as defined in La. R.S. 13:1802(7)(a), and that it has been for several years. Therefore, jurisdiction in a court of Louisiana in general — and Ouachita Parish in particular— for the father’s instant motion to modify custody would be permissible under the UCCJEA only if allowed by La. R.S. 13:1813 and 13:1814. Our review reveals that it is not.

Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:1814 is available only to a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with La. R.S. 13:1813. A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:1814 may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination under La. R.S. 13:1813. Neither of these provisions vests exclusive, continuing jurisdiction in the court in Oua-chita because it neither made nor could have made the initial child custody determination. Further, in order for a court to exercise 11flcontinuing jurisdiction to modify its earlier custody decree, it must meet the jurisdictional requirements of the UC-CJEA at the time the modification is sought.

Arguably, the court in Caddo might have maintained jurisdiction in the instant matter. However, that contention is of no moment now. The Caddo court divested itself of jurisdiction over the matter when it transferred the matter to Ouachita on the father’s own motion after the parents and children all moved from Caddo Parish.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Louisiana had jurisdiction in either Caddo or Ouachita, the record indicates that Louisiana would be an inconvenient forum under La. R.S. 18:1819 due to the length of time the children have resided outside the state and the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, i.e., testimony pertaining to the children’s education, health and social activities.

Both sides cite Hartman v. Lambert, 2008-1055 (La.App.3d Cir.2/4/09), 7 So.3d 758, as supporting their respective positions. In that case, a custody decree was originally rendered when both parents lived in Orleans Parish. Subsequent proceedings to modify custody were brought by the father in Orleans Parish where he maintained a residence while the mother lived in St. Landry Parish. Thereafter, the father moved to Nassau, Bahamas, and the mother registered the Orleans judgment in St. Landry. She then sought to modify child custody and support in St. Landry. The father objected to jurisdiction, and the St. Landry Parish court agreed because an Orleans judgment said Orleans retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the proceedings. The third circuit vacated the lower court | n judgment, finding that St. Landry had jurisdiction, and remanded. Because the parties were seeking to litigate in Louisiana, albeit in different parishes, the third circuit concluded that the continuing and exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the UCCJEA did not apply. The court also found La. R.S. 9:355.17 was inapplicable because there was no relocation of a child as defined by La. R.S. 9:355.1.

We find that the Hartman case offers no support for the father’s position because — unlike the instant case — no other state was involved. Contrary to the father’s assertions, the instant case is an interstate matter between Mississippi and Louisiana.

There are numerous cases in which Louisiana courts have lost jurisdiction in custody cases after the children went to live in other states which, over time, became the “home state” under the UCCJA’s definition and the place where the most relevant evidence concerning the child was available. Examples include Broadway v. Broadway, 623 So.2d 185 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1993), in which the child had lived in Mississippi for eight years; Counts v. Bracken, 494 So.2d 1275 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986), in which the child had been living in Arkansas for seven years; and Martin v. Martin, 545 So.2d 666 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1989), in which the child had not | ^lived in Louisiana for at least 16 months at the time the mother filed for permanent custody.

In particular, we note that the case of Tabuchi v. Lingo, swpra, is remarkably similar to the matter before us. Although it was decided under the UCCJA, the rationale in that case is the same. There the mother moved to Missouri in 1984 with her son and daughter after she was awarded sole custody by a Louisiana court. (The judgment was modified by agreement in 1986 to award joint custody with the mother as primary custodian.) In 1990, the father sought to obtain custody of the son after the child came to Louisiana for summer vacation. The trial court denied the mother’s exceptions of lack of jurisdiction and inconvenient forum and awarded primary custody of the boy to the father. This court reversed, finding that since the children had continuously lived with their mother in Missouri for six years, home state jurisdiction clearly vested in the Missouri court system long before the modification action was brought. Missouri was also the state with the most significant connection to the child and the maximum evidence concerning his present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships.

The father’s additional argument that Louisiana should have permanent jurisdiction over all future child custody disputes because the November 2009 consent judgment contained a provision to that effect is without merit. Subject matter jurisdiction, such as that exercised in resolving child custody disputes, cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. La. C.C.P. art. 3; Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, 621 So.2d 71 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993).

11sWe find that the district court properly sustained the mother’s exception asserting a lack of jurisdiction under the UC-CJEA in the instant custody matter.

CONCLUSION

The district court judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the father, James Leonard Wootton, III.

AFFIRMED.

      . Our research' suggests that this pertains to child support enforcement services available through the Mississippi Division of Child Support Enforcement.

      . When the divorce proceedings were instituted on November 24, 2008, Louisiana would have been considered the home state at that time because the children had been in Mississippi for less than a month and Caddo Parish was the last matrimonial domicile.

      . At the time the Hartman case was rendered, La. R.S. 9:355.17 stated:
      If the court grants authorization to relocate, the court may retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the case after relocation of the child as long as the non-relocating parent remains in the state.
      However, this statute on continuing jurisdiction was repealed as written in 2012. See Acts 2012, No. 627. Furthermore, this provision was part of the child relocation statutes, La. R.S. 9:355.1, et seq. Given Dr. Wootton’s failure ever to object to the children’s domicile being in Mississippi beginning in 2008 and his apparent acquiescence thereafter, relocation is not an issue in this case. Further, more than five years have passed since the initial move. The Louisiana relocation provisions are simply inapplicable here.