author: DONALDSON, Judge.

text:
    Ann WELCH and Gary Welch v. NUNNALLY’S GLASS AND FRAMING COMPANY, INC.
    2111225.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    May 17, 2013.
    Charles C. Turner, Anniston, for appellants.
    Submitted on appellants’ brief only.
   DONALDSON, Judge.

Ann Welch and Gary Welch appeal from a judgment of the Calhoun Circuit Court in favor of Nunnally’s Glass and Framing, Inc. We dismiss this appeal because the trial court’s judgment is not final.

Facts

This case involves claims of trademark or tradename infringement between two businesses operating in Anniston. From 1983 until their divorce in 1990, Linda Nunnally and Ken Nunnally jointly operated Nunnally’s Glass and Framing Company, Inc., a business specializing in picture and poster framing. The Nunnallys’ 1990 divorce, judgment awarded Linda Nunnally the framing portion of the business and related inventory. The divorce judgment awarded Ken Nunnally the glasswork portion of the business. Linda Nunnally operated the framing business as “Nunnally’s Frame Shop” until 1995, at which time she sold it to the Welches. Following the divorce, Ken Nunnally operated a separate business called “Nunnally Glass Company,” and his work focused on installing or repairing storefront and automobile windows. Ken Nunnally eventually sold the glass business and all of the outstanding stock in Nunnally’s Glass and Framing Company, Inc., to Guy Sparks. Sparks continued to operate the business as “Nun-nally Glass Company,” and he performed only storefront and automobile glasswork. At some point before to the filing of the complaint, the Welches alleged, Sparks began to operate his business under the name “Nunnally Glass and Framing, Inc.”

On July 28, 2008, the Welches instituted this action in the Calhoun Circuit Court naming as defendants Nunnally’s Glass and Framing Company, Inc., and Sparks and requesting that the defendants be enjoined from using or operating under the name “Nunnally Glass and Framing, Inc.” The complaint also included a request for damages, because, the Welches contended, the defendants’ use of the name “Nunnally’s Glass and Framing, Inc.,” resulted in injury to the Welches’ business, “Nunnally’s Frame Shop.” Sparks, individually and as owner of “Nunnally’s Glass and Framing Company, Inc.,” filed an answer and a counterclaim in which he sought damages from the Welches for infringing upon his corporate tradename.

On March 25, 2009, the Welches filed an application for a preliminary injunction. On April 13, 2009, the trial court entered an order setting a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction for April 22, 2009. On April 21, 2009, the trial court continued the hearing to July 22, 2009, but, apparently, no hearing was held on that date. The trial court subsequently entered an order on October 21, 2009, setting the hearing on the application for November 17, 2009. The aforementioned orders indicate that the trial court was setting only the application for a preliminary injunction for a hearing. The hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction was ultimately heard on November 17, 2009, with both parties present and represented by counsel.

On May 2, 2012, the trial court entered a judgment in which it stated that the ease had been “called for trial.” In the judgment, the trial court declined to enter the injunction and otherwise purported to “find[ ] in favor of the Defendant.” The Welches filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment on May 7, 2012; the record indicates that the trial court never ruled on the motion. The Welches ultimately appealed to this court. On appeal, the Welches contend that they did not receive notice of a trial setting pursuant to Rule 40(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., regarding setting cases for trial, and that they were denied a trial on the merits.

Discussion

In its May 2, 2012, judgment, the trial court denied the Welches’ request for a preliminary injunction. The judgment does not, however, dispose of the defendants’ counterclaim for damages arising from the Welches’ alleged infringement of the defendants’ corporate tradename nor does the judgment specifically address the Welches’ claim for damages. Therefore, the judgment is not final and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal:

“Generally, this court’s appellate jurisdiction extends only to final judgments. § 12-22-2, Ala.Code 1975.
“‘A judgment is generally not final unless all claims, or the rights or liabilities of all parties, have been decided. Ex parte Harris, 506 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). The only exception to this rule of finality is when the trial court directs the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.’
“Laney v. Garmon, 25 So.3d [478] at 480 [ (Ala.Civ.App.2009) ].”

Austin v. Austin, 102 So.3d 403, 406 (Ala. Civ.App.2012). Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in part:

“When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.”

There is no indication that the trial court intended to certify its judgment as final under Rule 54(b). This court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a nonfinal judgment that has not been appropriately certified pursuant to Rule 54(b). See, e.g., Finova Capital Corp. v. College City Drugs, 885 So.2d 811, 813 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (dismissing an appeal because a counterclaim remained pending and the trial court did not certify the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b)); see also Hall v. Reynolds, 27 So.3d 479 (Ala.2009) (dismissing an appeal when an order establishing a boundary line did not address claims for damages and for injunctive relief); and Day v. Davis, 989 So.2d 1118 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (dismissing an appeal when a judgment establishing a boundary line did not address remaining tort claims).

Finally, although Rule 65(a)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., authorizes the trial court, “[b]efore or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction [to] order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application,” there is no indication in the record that that procedure was followed in this cases. In fact, the Welches specifically argue on appeal that no trial on the merits was held.

For the reasons stated above, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal because all claims of all parties have not been adjudicated; accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur.

      . The complaint also listed fictitiously named defendants; however, the Welches have not substituted parties for these fictitiously named defendants.

      . Nunnally's Glass and Framing Company, Inc., has not filed a brief on appeal.

      . Although Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R.App. P., requires an appeal from an interlocutory order denying a request for an injunction to be filed within 14 days of the date of entry of the order or judgment, the Welches have not appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction as an interlocutory order. The Welches, instead, assert that they did not receive notice of a trial setting in this case as required by Rule 40, Ala. R. Civ. P.; and that judgment on the matter should not have been made final since the November 17, 2009, hearing was not a trial on the merits. Thus, we do not dismiss based upon untimely filing of an appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1)(A).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PITTMAN, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Wendell W. EDGIL and Theresa L. Edgil v. Billy Mack SPANN et al.
    2111232.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    May 24, 2013.
    Clatus Junkin and Charles E. Harrison of Junkin, Pearson, Harrison, Junkin & Pate, LLC, Tuscaloosa, for appellants.
    Allen Grocholski of W. Allen Grocholski, P.C., Fayette, for appellees.
   PITTMAN, Judge.

Wendell W. Edgil and Theresa L. Edgil appeal from an adverse judgment entered in an action involving a dispute regarding the ownership of a strip of land (“the disputed strip”) located in the south half of the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of Section 22, Township 13 South, Range 12 West, in Fayette County (“the half-quarter-quarter section”). We affirm.

In 1980, W.R. Spann (“W.R.”), who was the father of Billy Mack Spann (“Billy Mack”) and Benny Spann (“Benny”) and the then owner of record title to the half-quarter-quarter section, deeded a parcel (“the 350-foot-wide parcel”) of the half-quarter-quarter section to Benny and Barbara Spann (“Barbara”). The 350-foot-wide parcel was bounded on the west by the western boundary line of the half-quarter-quarter section and was bounded on the east (“the eastern boundary line of the 350-foot>-wide parcel”) by a line that was approximately 350 feet east of, and parallel to, the western boundary line of the half-quarter-quarter section. The disputed strip, which is located within the 350-foot-wide parcel, is bounded on the east by the eastern boundary line of the 350-foot-wide parcel and bounded on the west (“the western boundary line of the disputed strip”) by a line that is approximately 30 feet west of, and parallel to, the eastern boundary line of the 350-foot-wide parcel.

In 1985, W.R. deeded a parcel consisting of all the half-quarter-quarter section except the 350-foot-wide parcel to Billy Mack. In 1992, Benny and Barbara deeded to David Neal Smith a parcel of land located north of the 350-foot-wide parcel (“Smith’s parcel”) and a 30-foob-wide easement (“the easement”) across the 350-foot-wide parcel for ingress to, and egress from, Smith’s parcel. The eastern and western boundary lines of the easement coincide with the eastern and western boundary lines of the disputed strip. Later in 1992, Barbara executed a quitclaim deed conveying any interest she might own in the portion of the 350-foot-wide parcel located west of the disputed strip to Benny. On May 3, 1999, Benny deeded the portion of the 350-foot-wide parcel located west of the disputed strip to the Edgils. In 2005, Smith deeded his parcel and the easement to Joseph H. Watkins and Paula Watkins.

Sometime in 2007, a dispute arose between the Edgils and Billy Mack regarding who owned the disputed strip. The evidence at trial was in conflict regarding who had been in possession of the disputed strip after the Edgils had acquired record title to the portion of the 350-foob-wide parcel located west of the disputed strip on May 3,1999.

On August 7, 2007, Billy Mack sued the Edgils, alleging that he owned the disputed strip, stating claims of ejectment and trespass, and seeking possession of the disputed strip and damages. The Edgils answered the complaint with a qualified general denial but did not assert a counterclaim. On January 8, 2009, Billy Mack filed an amendment to his complaint that added a claim asserting that he had adversely possessed the disputed strip. The Edgils answered the amendment to Billy Mack’s complaint with a qualified general denial but, again, did not assert a counterclaim. On January 27, 2009, Benny executed a quitclaim deed conveying any interest he might own in the disputed strip to Billy Mack; however, that quitclaim deed was not recorded at that time. In December 2009, with the leave of the trial court, Billy Mack filed an amendment to his complaint adding the Watkinses as defendants in the action.

On June 28, 2010, the Edgils filed a third-party complaint against Benny, which stated a claim seeking reformation of their deed from Benny to add the legal description of the disputed strip to the legal description of the land conveyed by that deed and a claim seeking a determination that they had adversely possessed the disputed strip. Benny answered the third-party complaint with a general denial. In August 2010, the Edgils filed a third-party complaint against Barbara, asserting the same claims the Edgils had asserted in their third-party complaint against Benny. Barbara answered the third-party complaint with a general denial.

In January 2011, Barbara executed a quitclaim deed conveying any interest she might own in the disputed strip to Billy Mack, and both that quitclaim deed and the January 2009 quitclaim deed executed by Benny were recorded. Also in January 2011, Billy Mack filed an amendment to his complaint adding a claim seeking a determination that he owned the disputed strip by virtue of his owning .record title to it.

Following a bench trial at which it received evidence ore tenus, the trial court entered a judgment finding in favor of Billy Mack with respect to his claims against the Edgils, granting Billy Mack possession of the disputed strip but denying him any damages, finding in favor of Benny and Barbara with respect to the Edgils’ third-party claims, determining that the boundary line separating Billy Mack’s land from the Edgils’ land was the western boundary line of the disputed strip, and determining that the disputed strip was subject to the Watkinses’ easement. As its rationale for ruling against the Edgils with respect to their adverse-possession claim, the trial court stated:

“The fact that the deed from Benny to the Edgils was executed and delivered in 1999 and Billy Mack filed this action against the Edgils [on] August 7, 2007, is dispositive. The Edgils cannot acquire title to the disputed area by adverse possession because they had been in possession for less than 10 years before suit was filed. Whiddon v. White, [285 Ala. 109,] 22[9] So.2d 498 (Ala. 1969). The Edgils did not and could not offer evidence of ‘tacking’ as their predecessor, Benny, was an adverse party. In the case of [Center Line ] Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington, 465 So.2d 1129 (Ala.l985)[,] the Court found that the claim of adverse possession failed because the claimants, as the Edgils in this case, had been in possession for only 8 years, not the required 10, before suit was filed.”

The Edgils timely filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion asserting that the trial court had erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that they could not prevail on their adverse-possession claim because less than 10 years had elapsed between the date when they allegedly began adversely possessing the disputed strip in May 1999 and August 7, 2007, the date Billy Mack filed this action. According to the Edgils, the period to be considered in determining whether they had adversely possessed the disputed strip continued to run until they filed their third-party complaint stating an adverse-possession claim against Benny on June 28, 2010, and, they contended, the period of their alleged adverse possession of the disputed strip therefore exceeded the requisite 10-year period. The Edgils’ Rule 59(e) motion was denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., and the Edgils then timely appealed to the supreme court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

On appeal, the sole issue presented by the Edgils for our review is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the period to be considered in determining whether the Edgils adversely possessed the disputed strip stopped running when Benny Mack filed this action on August 7, 2007. Because the ruling of the trial court challenged by the Edgils is a ruling regarding a question of law, we review that ruling de novo. See Ex parte City of Brundidge, 897 So.2d 1129, 1131 (Ala.2004) (“A ruling on a question of law carries no presumption of correctness, and appellate review is de novo.”).

As they did in their Rule 59(e) motion, the Edgils argue to this court that the period to be considered in determining whether they had adversely possessed the disputed strip continued to run until they filed their third-party complaint stating an adverse-possession claim against Benny rather than stopping when Billy Mack filed this action on August 7, 2007. The Edgils have not cited any Alabama law squarely supporting their argument. Moreover, although they have challenged the trial court’s reliance on Whiddon v. White, 285 Ala. 109, 229 So.2d 498 (1969), they have not challenged the trial court’s reliance on Center Line Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington, 465 So.2d 1129 (Ala.1985).

In Center Line, Aroe Washington (“Aroe”) had mortgaged his undivided 2/9 interest in a parcel of real property (“the property”) on which he and his wife lived. Thereafter, in 1971, Aroe died intestate, and, in June 1972, his widow moved from the property and never again possessed it or made any claim to it. In 1973, the mortgagee foreclosed the mortgage and apparently purchased Aroe’s undivided 2/9 interest in the property at the foreclosure sale. Apparently, the mortgagee then assigned its interest in the property to an assignee sometime before January 24, 1974, the date the assignee contracted to sell its interest in the property to Curtis G. Lockett. In 1976 or 1977, Lockett took possession of the property, which had been abandoned since June 1972. In 1980, the assignee of the mortgagee deeded its interest in the property to Lockett, and, later that same year, Lockett deeded his interest in the property to Center Line Enterprises, Inc. (“Center Line”). However, Lockett remained in possession of the property. On April 20, 1982, the owners of the other undivided 7/9 interest in the property (“the plaintiffs”) brought a sale-for-division action against Lockett. Center Line later became a defendant as well. Center Line contended, among other things, that it had acquired the plaintiffs’ interests in the property through Lockett’s adverse possession of the property. After the trial court ordered the property sold at public auction and the proceeds divided among the plaintiffs and Center Line, Center Line appealed to the supreme court. On appeal, Center Line again contended, among other things, that it had acquired the plaintiffs’ interests in the property through Lockett’s adverse possession of the property. Rejecting that contention, the supreme court stated:

“[Center Line] also claimed title by adverse possession through the alleged adverse possession of its predecessor, Curtis G. Lockett. [Center Line], however, introduced no evidence of adverse possession from the time of the original possession of Aroe Washington. Moreover, the evidence shows that [Lockett] did not contract to purchase the property until January 24, 1974. This action was filed by the plaintiffs on April 20, 1982, which established as less than 10 years the period for which [Lockett] claimed to have been in adverse possession. Cf. Reed v. Ray, 409 So.2d 814 (Ala.1982) (adverse actual possession requires occupancy that is clear, definite, positive, notorious, continuous, and exclusive for the requisite period).”

Center Line, 465 So.2d at 1130 (emphasis added).

Beard v. Ryan, 78 Ala. 37 (1884), also supports the ruling of the trial court in the present case. In Beard, the plaintiff, who claimed to be the owner of record title to a parcel of land, brought an ejectment action against the defendant, who was in possession of the parcel. As a defense, the defendant asserted that he had adversely possessed the parcel for 10 years and that, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to possession of the parcel. The action was tried before a jury. At the request of the plaintiff and over the objection of the defendant, the trial court gave the following charges, among others:

“ ‘1. The ten years possession which will give title under the statute of limitations, means ten years before suit [is] brought; the time lapsing after suit [is] brought, counts nothing.
“ ‘2. This suit being brought on the 27th January, 1879, the ten years adverse possession of [the defendant], or of those from whom he claims must be ten years before that day; the time elapsing since that date, does not count in considering the statute of limitations.’

78 Ala. at 41 (emphasis added). After the jury’s verdict resulted in the entry of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealed to the supreme court. Among other things, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court had erred in giving the two jury charges quoted above. Rejecting that argument, the supreme court stated:

“The court did not err in charging the jury, that the ten years of adverse possession, which, under the operation of our statute of limitations, will mature into a good title, means ten years before the commencement of the suit, and that, in this estimate, the time which elapses after suit [zs ] brought is not counted or included.”

78 Ala. at 44 (emphasis added).

Based on the holdings in Center Line, supra, and Beard, supra, we conclude that the trial court in the present case did not err in concluding that Billy Mack’s filing of this action on August 7, 2007, stopped the running of the period to be considered in determining whether the Edgils had adversely possessed the disputed strip. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and THOMAS, MOORE, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.

      . The parcel W.R. deeded to Billy Mack abutted the eastern boundary line of the 350-foot-wide parcel.

      . The distance between the eastern and western boundary lines of the portion of the 350-foot-wide parcel located west of the disputed strip is approximately 320 feet.

      .At trial, all the parties conceded that the disputed strip was subject to the easement, which the Watkinses had acquired from Smith in 2005.

      . The Edgils had pleaded an adverse-possession claim against Benny and Barbara in the Edgils' third-party complaints. However, they had not pleaded a counterclaim asserting an adverse-possession claim against Billy Mack. Nonetheless, the record indicates that such a claim was tried by the implied consent of the parties pursuant to Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

      . Footnote 1 of the opinion in Center Line implies that Lockett had some kind of relationship with Center Line.


author: KELLUM, Judge.

text:
    Thomas Willie BUCHANNON v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-11-0164.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    March 23, 2012.

      Thomas Willie Buchannon, pro se.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and William D. Little, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   KELLUM, Judge.

The appellant, Thomas Willie Buchan-non, appeals from the denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence, made pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.Code 1975. In 1997, Buchannon pleaded guilty to theft of property in the first degree. The circuit court sentenced Buchannon under the Habitual Felony Offender Act (“HFOA”) as a habitual felony offender to life imprisonment.

On September 14, 2011, Buchannon filed a motion for sentence reconsideration pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1. See Kirby v. State, 899 So.2d 968 (Ala.2004). In his motion, Buchannon contended that he was eligible for sentence reconsideration because he had been sentenced as a habitual felony offender to life imprisonment following his guilty-plea conviction for a Class B felony. Without requiring a response from the State, the circuit court entered an order on September 21, 2011, finding that it did not have authority to modify Buchannoris sentence under Kirby. Specifically, the circuit court found that Buchannon received a “ ‘life in prison’ sentence” and that the “Kirby decision only applies to persons who receive a [sentence of] ‘life without’ the possibility of parole.” (C. 9.) Buchan-non timely filed a postjudgment motion which the circuit court denied. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Buchannon contends that the circuit court abused its discretion when it ruled that he was not eligible for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 because, he argues, he was sentenced to life in prison as opposed to life in prison without the possibility of parole and, therefore, is eligible for sentence reconsideration pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1 and Kirby. The State concedes that the circuit court erred in determining that Buchannon was not eligible for sentence reconsideration.

In Kirby, the Supreme Court discussed which inmates were eligible to seek resen-tencing under § 13A-5-9.1, stating:

“Reading § 13A-5-9.1 in conjunction with § 13A-5-9, it is clear that a sentencing judge or a presiding judge can resentence only two narrowly defined classes of habitual offenders: those who had been sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under the mandatory provisions of the HFOA upon-conviction of a Class A felony with no prior Class A felony convictions; and those who had been sentenced to life imprisonment under the mandatory provisions of the HFOA upon conviction of a Class B felony. Moreover, of those habitual offenders, the judge can resentence only those who are nonviolent offenders.
‘We conclude that the state’s trial judges have the authority under the statute to determine whether a defendant is a nonviolent offender and that those judges are competent to make that determination based upon the nature of the defendant’s underlying conviction, other factors brought before the judge in the record of the case, and information submitted to the judge by the [Department of Corrections] and the Parole Board concerning the inmate’s behavior while incarcerated.”

899 So.2d at 974 (emphasis added).

In Holt v. State, 960 So.2d 726 (Ala. Crim.App.2006), this Court recognized that there are three requirements for eligibility to have a sentence reconsidered under § 13A-5-9.1:

“(1) the inmate was sentenced before May 25, 2000, the date the 2000 amendment to the HFOA became effective; (2) the inmate was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(3) and had no prior Class A felony convictions or was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(2), see Prestwood [v. State, 915 So.2d 580, 584-85 (Ala. Crim.App.2005) ]; and (3) the inmate is a ‘nonviolent convicted offender.’ ”

960 So.2d at 734-35 (emphasis added).

Our examination of the record indicates that the conviction as to which Buchannon is seeking sentence reconsideration was for one count of theft of property in the first degree, a Class B felony. See § 13A-8 — 3(d), Ala.Code 1975. Pursuant to § 13A-5-9, as it existed at the time of this conviction, the circuit court was required to sentence Buchannon to life imprisonment, if it found that Buchannon had three or more prior felony convictions. After December 1, 2001, Buchannon fell within the category of inmates eligible to file a motion for sentence reconsideration, requesting that the trial court resentence him under the amended provisions of § 13A-5-9, Ala.Code 1975. See Kirby, supra, 899 So.2d at 974; Mack v. State, 925 So.2d 999, 1001 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). Accordingly, the circuit court mistakenly concluded that Buchannon was not eligible to file a motion for reconsideration of his 1997 sentence for life imprisonment.

Based on the foregoing, this case is remanded for the circuit court to enter a new order addressing the merits of Buchan-non’s request that he be resentenced for the aforementioned Class B felony pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(2), as amended, effective May 25, 2000. The circuit court shall take all necessary action to see that the circuit clerk makes due return to this Court at the earliest possible time and within 42 days of the release of this opinion.

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

WINDOM, P.J., and WELCH, BURKE, and JOINER, JJ., concur.

       Note from the reporter of decisions: On October 19, 2012, on return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion.


author: WINDOM, Judge.

text:
    Roderick Earl JACKSON v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-09-1580.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    Dec. 17, 2010.

      Glennon F. Threatt, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Troy King and Luther Strange, attys. gen., and Audrey K. Jordan, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   WINDOM, Judge.

Roderick Earl Jackson appeals his convictions for one count of trafficking in cocaine while possessing a firearm, a violation of § 13A-12-23K2) and (13), Ala.Code 1975, one count of trafficking in marijuana while possessing a firearm, a violation of § 13A-12-23K1) and (13), Ala.Code 1975, one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a violation of § 13A-12-212, Ala.Code 1975, three counts of failure to affix a tax stamp, violations of § 40-17A-4, Ala.Code 1975, and one count of carrying a pistol without a permit, a violation of § 13A-11-73, Ala.Code 1975. Jackson was sentenced as a habitual felony offender with 2 prior felony convictions as follows: 1) life in prison plus 5 years and a $50,000 fine for the trafficking-in-cocaine conviction; 2) life in prison plus 5 years and a $25,000 fine for the trafficking-in-marijuana conviction; 3) 10 years in prison and a $2,000 fee imposed pursuant to the Demand Reduction Assessment Act for the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction; 4) 10 years in prison for each failure-to-affix-a-tax-stamp conviction; and 5) 12 months in prison for the carrying-a-pistol-without-a-permit conviction. The circuit court ordered that these sentences run concurrently. Lastly, the circuit court ordered Jackson to pay court costs and $100 to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund for each felony conviction. (C. 14-18, R. 288-90.)

I.

On appeal, Jackson first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person and from his car. Specifically, Jackson argues that Officer Derrick Bouyer did not have a warrant to search his person or his car and that the State failed to establish that the searches fall within a recognized exception to the Fourth Amend-merit’s warrant requirement. This Court disagrees.

“This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence when the facts are not in dispute.” State v. White, 28 So.3d 827, 829 (AIa.Crim.App.2009) (quoting State v. Skaggs, 903 So.2d 180, 181 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004) (internal citations omitted)). In the instant case, the facts are uncontested; therefore, the only issue before this Court is the circuit court’s application of the law to those facts. Consequently, this Court affords no presumption in favor of the circuit court’s ruling and reviews the circuit court’s decision de novo.

It is well settled that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the State establishes that the search or seizure falls within a recognized exception. Ex parte Hilley, 484 So.2d 485, 488 (Ala. 1985). Exceptions to the warrant requirement include: 1) objects in plain view; 2) consensual searches; 3) a search incident to a lawful arrest; 4) hot pursuit or emergency situations; 5) probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances; and 6) an investigatory detention and frisk pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Ex parte Tucker, 667 So.2d 1339, 1343 (Ala.1995). Another recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the “automobile exception,” which allows law enforcement to search an automobile based on probable cause alone. State v. Black, 987 So.2d 1177, 1180 (Ala. Crim.App.2006) (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)).

At the suppression hearing, Officer Bouyer was the only witness to testify. According to Officer Bouyer, he stopped Jackson at Arkadelphia Road and 8th Avenue West because Jackson was playing his radio too loudly. Officer Bouyer walked up to the passenger side of Jackson’s car and asked for Jackson’s driver’s license. As Jackson was handing Officer Bouyer his driver’s license, Officer Bouyer “smelled a strong odor of marijuana and also observed [an opened] beer inside the vehicle.” (R. 10, 123.) Officer Bouyer then walked around to the driver’s side of the car and asked Jackson if there was anything in the car that the officer should know about. Jackson denied that there was anything in, the car. At that point, Officer Bouyer asked Jackson to get out of the car so he could conduct a patdown search.

During the patdown, Officer Bouyer asked for consent to search Jackson’s pockets, and Jackson consented. In one of Jackson’s pockets, Officer Bouyer found money, marijuana, powder cocaine, and crack cocaine. At that point, Officer Bouyer arrested Jackson and placed Jackson in his patrol car. Officer Bouyer then conducted a search of Jackson’s car. During the search of the interior of the car, Officer Bouyer found a handgun underneath the driver’s seat. While searching the trunk, Officer Bouyer found a large bag containing several bags of marijuana, another bag containing marijuana and pills, a footlocker containing a “bag full of money” (R. 13), and more cocaine.

Based on these uncontested facts, the circuit court correctly denied Jackson’s motion to suppress. Officer Bouyer initially stopped Jackson for playing his radio too loudly in violation of a city ordinance. While Officer Bouyer was next to Jackson’s car, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana and saw an open beer can. At that point, Officer Bouyer had probable cause to arrest Jackson and search Jackson’s car. See Blake v. State, 772 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (“[I]t is well settled ... that the odor of burned marijuana emanating from an automobile is enough to provide probable cause to search the vehicle.”); State v. Gargus, 855 So.2d 587, 592 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (holding that an officer’s detection of “the odor of ‘burnt marijuana smoke’ emanating from [a] vehicle ... established probable cause” to search the vehicle); Key v. State, 566 So.2d 251, 254 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (same); Adams v. State, 815 So.2d 578, 582 n. 4 (Ala.2001) (holding that “where police officers smell the odor of burned or burning marijuana coming from a legally stopped automobile, police officers have probable cause to arrest all of the automobile’s occupants”). Further, after properly ordering Jackson out of the car, Officer Bouyer obtained Jackson’s consent to search Jackson’s pockets, where Officer Bouyer found drugs and money. See Mills v. State, 62 So.3d 553, 561 (Ala.Crim. App.2008) (holding that consent to search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement). After smelling the strong odor of marijuana coming from the car and after Officer Bouyer found, pursuant to Jackson’s consent, drugs in Jackson’s pocket, he had probable cause to search the ear. See Blake, 772 So.2d at 1202; Adams, 815 So.2d at 582 n. 4.

Because Officer Bouyer had probable cause to search Jackson’s car and because Jackson consented to the search of his pockets, the circuit court correctly denied Jackson’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of those searches. Therefore, this issue does not entitle Jackson to any relief.

II.

Jackson next argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the State to impeach him with his prior felony convictions for first-degree unlawful possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, Jackson argues that the circuit court erroneously determined that the probative value of the prior convictions outweighed the prejudice as required under Rule 609(a)(1)(B), Ala. R. Evid. Jackson also argues that the circuit court erred in failing to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding its consideration of his prior convictions. Neither of these issues entitles Jackson to any relief.

To the extent Jackson argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the State to impeach him, pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1)(B), Ala. R. Evid., with his prior felony convictions for first-degree unlawful possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, this issue is not properly before this Court. In ruling on his motion in limine, the circuit court stated:

“Under [Rule] 609, [Ala. R. Evid.,] I’m going to find that the probative value of admitting these outweighs the prejudicial value. I think it could also come in as WJp(b) [, Ala. R. Evid.,] to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the drugs, since there’s been testimony from the police officer there was an odor of marijuana in the car, and that according to these prior convictions there was a prior possession of marijuana, and the other was a possession of a controlled substance. So I’m going to deny your motion.”

(R. 218 (emphasis added).)

In his initial brief, however, Jackson does not challenge the circuit court’s alternative holding that the prior convictions were admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid. Because Jackson has failed to challenge one of the circuit court’s holdings, he has waived review of this issue. See Kellis v. Estate of Schnatz, 983 So.2d 408, 413 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (holding that an appellant’s failure to challenge the circuit court’s alternative holding constitutes a waiver and requires that we affirm the circuit court’s decision); Andersen v. Professional Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005) (“Because the Andersens have failed to challenge on appeal the district court’s alternative grounds for granting summary judgment against them, the dismissal of their case must be affirmed.”); Biales v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1993) (holding that the failure to challenge an alternative ground for a holding constitutes abandonment of the issue and precludes further review of that holding on appeal); Johnson v. Com., 45 Va.App. 113, 609 S.E.2d 58, 60 (2005) (holding that in situations in which there is one or more alternative holdings on an issue, the appellant’s failure to address one of the holdings results in a waiver of any claim of error with respect to the court’s decision on that issue); Maher v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir.2008) (“ ‘[I]n situations in which there is one or more alternative holdings on an issue, we have stated that failure to address one of the holdings results in a waiver of any claim of error with respect to the court’s decision on that issue.’”) (quoting United States v. Hatchett, 245 F.3d 625, 644-45 (7th Cir.2001)); Coronado v. Valleyview Pub. Sch. Dist., 537 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that the appellant’s claim failed due to his “failure to confront the district court’s alternative holding”); Utah v. United States, 528 F.3d 712, 724 (10th Cir.2008) (holding that the failure to challenge alternative holding of district court constitutes waiver); cf. Smith v. State, 745 So.2d 922, 932 n. 2 (Ala.Crim. App.1999) (noting that this Court will not address issues not raised by the appellant).

Moreover, even if this issue was properly before this Court, it does not entitle Jackson to any relief. This Court notes that ‘[t]he admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” Hinkle v. State, 67 So.3d 161, 164 (Ala.Crim.App. 2010) (quoting Taylor v. State, 808 So.2d 1148, 1191 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), aff'd, 808 So.2d 1215 (Ala.2001)). “The question of admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.... ” Ex parte Loggins, 771 So.2d 1093, 1103 (Ala. 2000). This Court has thoroughly reviewed the record and cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence of the prior convictions outweighed any prejudice. See Rule 609(a)(1)(B), Ala. R. Evid. (“[EJvidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.”). Therefore, Jackson has not met his burden of establishing that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of his prior convictions to be admitted.

Finally, to the extent Jackson argues that the circuit court erroneously failed to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for the admission of his prior convictions, this issue is not properly before this Court. At trial, Jackson neither requested a limiting instruction nor objected, to the circuit court’s instructions. Rule 21.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o party may assign as error the court’s ... giving of an ... incomplete or otherwise improper oral charge, unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating the matter to which he or she objects and the grounds of the objection.” See also Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d 1275, 1282 (Ala. Crim.App.2006) (holding that the appellant’s challenge to the circuit court’s jury instruction was not preserved and thus was not properly before this Court). Because Jackson failed to request a limiting instruction and failed to object to the circuit court’s instruction, he did not preserve this issue for this Court’s review. Therefore, this issue does not entitle him to any relief.

Based on the foregoing, this Court affirms Jackson’s convictions. This Court must, however, remand this cause. It does not appear from the record that the circuit court imposed the additional mandatory $25,000 fine for Jackson’s conviction of trafficking in cocaine while possessing a firearm or for his conviction for trafficking in marijuana while possessing a firearm. § 13A-12-2S1(13), Ala.Code 1975 (“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any person who has possession of a firearm during the commission of any act proscribed by this section shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of five calendar years which shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, the punishment otherwise provided, and a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000); the court shall not suspend the five-year additional sentence of the person or give the person a probationary sentence.”). See Carter v. State, 812 So.2d 391, 395 n. 3 (Ala.Crim. App.2001) (holding that “the $25,000 fine provided for in § 13A-12-231(13) is mandatory”). Because the circuit court did not impose the mandatory fine contained in § 13A-12-231Q3), Ala.Code 1975, Jackson’s sentences are illegal. Brown v. State, 939 So.2d 957, 961 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005) (holding that the circuit court’s failure to apply the mandatory enhancements contained in § 13A-12-231(13) renders the appellant’s sentence illegal). Accordingly, this Court remands this cause to the, circuit court and directs that court to impose the mandatory $25,000 enhancement to Jackson’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine while possessing a firearm and to his conviction for trafficking in marijuana while possessing a firearm. Due return shall be filed with the Court within 28 days of the date of this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

WISE, P.J., and WELCH, KELLUM, and MAIN, JJ., concur.

      . Jackson does not contest the legality of the initial stop; therefore, this Court will not address that issue.

       Note from the reporter of decisions: On February 18, 2011, on return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion. On April 22, 2011, that Court denied rehearing, without opinion.