author: KITCHENS, Justice, DICKINSON, Presiding Justice,

text:
    Timothy Gene PRYER a/k/a Tim a/k/a Timothy Pryer a/k/a Timothy G. Pryer v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2012-CT-00427-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    June 5, 2014.
    Timothy Gene Pryer, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry, Jr., attorney for appellee.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KITCHENS, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Timothy Pryer repeatedly requested documents from the Circuit Clerk of Itawamba County pursuant to the Mississippi Public Records Act. The circuit judge twice denied the request, finding that the documents did not exist within the clerk’s file. Pryer appealed the latter order and the Court of Appeals affirmed, whereupon we granted a writ of certiorari. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Pryer sought from the circuit court: “the Order givin[g] Carol Gates the Office of Judge de facto or pro tempore and the order givin[g] Carol Gates authority to appoint indigent counsel for Decern-ber 2, 2004 [hearing] and the names of the 40 plus souls and their addresses according to the record.” The Itawamba County Circuit Court issued an order on June 6, 2011, “denying Pryer records and construing a request for records as a petition for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR).” (Emphasis in original.) This order does not appear in the record but is mentioned in the “Motion to Show Cause” filed by Pryer on June 20, 2011. In that motion, Pryer alleged:

that on December 2, 2004 A.D., Carol Gates presided over an Indictment Arraignment as Judge de facto or pro tempore in the absence of Paul Fun-derburk. That forty (40) plus souls were arraigned and that Carol Gates appointed indigent counsel by the name of Hon. Carolyn Benson to represent some or all of the forty (40) plus souls. Because Carol Gates is not licensed to practice law, Carolyn Benson received State funds under false pretenses, Fun-derburk and Gates facilitated the crime and are accessories before the fact. Because Gates and Judge Garner [sic] have obviously conspired to circumvent the law and procedure, they are accessories after the fact.

(Emphases in original.) Asserting that “[t]he truth will come out,” Pryer requested the above documents from the circuit judge.

¶ 3. On December 19, 2011, Pryer filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court, requesting that we direct the circuit judge to enter an order on the “Motion to Show Cause.” This Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus on January 18, 2011, and the circuit court proceeded to enter an order on February 1, 2012. That order denied Pryer’s motion, explaining that the documents requested were “not contained with the Circuit Clerk’s file” and that “[t]his motion contains the exact same requests as the previously filed motions.” The court continued, “the Motion to Show Cause contains completely unfounded and slanderous allegations against several court officials.”

¶ 4. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Itawamba County Circuit Court, holding that “we have no reason to believe that any such documents do exist. It further appears that Pryer is merely on a ‘fishing expedition’ for grounds upon which to attack his conviction and sentence.” Pryer v. State, 139 So.3d 719, 721, 2013 WL 2399645, at *2 (Miss.Ct.App. June 4, 2013). In his petition for writ of certiorari, Pryer argues that the Court of Appeals erred in two ways. First, Pryer argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to treat his request as a petition for post-conviction relief, since he explicitly requested the documents pursuant to the Public Records Act. Second, Pryer contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously excepted prisoners from the Public Records Act. He reasserts that “the Circuit Court Judges of Itawamba County ... [are] signing generic orders and allowing clerks to officiate arraignments.... The practice is unlawful and Pryer needs public records to prove it.” He concludes that “[t]his is the main reason the legislature enacted the Public Records Act” and that he “prays this Honorable] Court will settle this question so as to keep the right to access public records to all humans as persons.”

ANALYSIS

¶ 5. The Mississippi Constitution vests the circuit courts and the chancery courts of this State with their jurisdiction. “The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court....” Miss. Const, art. 6, § 156 (emphasis added). The Constitution further provides that: “[t]he Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals and shall exercise no jurisdiction on matters other than those specifically provided by this Constitution or by general law.” Miss. Const, art. 6, § 146 (emphasis added). The legislature has spoken to the meaning of “appellate jurisdiction”: “An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from any final judgment of a circuit or chancery court....” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-3 (Rev.2012) (emphasis added). Further,

[t]he essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings of a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. In reference to judicial tribunals, an appellate jurisdiction, therefore, necessarily implies that the subject-matter has been already instituted in and acted upon by some other court, whose judgment or proceedings are to be revised.

Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Dodd, 105 Miss. 23, 43, 61 So. 743, 743-44 (1913).

¶ 6. The circuit court denied both Pryer’s first request for documents and Pryer’s subsequent and successive “Motion to Show Cause.” The circuit court’s order on the “Motion to Show Cause” states that “[t]his motion contains the exact same requests as the previously filed motions,” that the documents “are not contained with the Circuit Clerk’s file,” and that Pryer’s allegations against court officials are “unfounded and slanderous.” The Court of Appeals termed Pryer’s request a “fishing expedition.” Pryer v. State, 139 So.3d 719, 721, 2013 WL 2399645, at *2 (Miss.Ct.App. June 4, 2013). The Itawam-ba County Circuit Court’s ruling on Pryer’s “Motion to Show Cause” was a final judgment. Pryer’s appeal from that final judgment was appealable to this Court under its constitutional appellate jurisdiction and assignable by this Court to the Court of Appeals.

¶ 7. The Mississippi Public Records Act states: “[a]ny person denied the right granted by Section 25-61-5 to inspect or copy public records may institute a suit in the chancery court of the county in which the public body is located, and the court shall determine whether such public record is exempt from the provisions of this chapter....” Miss.Code Ann. §25-61-13(1)(a) (Rev.2010). The statute provides parties aggrieved by the denial of public records the option of filing suit in the chancery court as a means of seeking relief. The Court of Appeals never stated or suggested that prisoners are outside the scope of the Public Records Act. If Pryer so desires, he may, pursuant to the statute, institute a suit in the Chancery Court of Itawamba County-. Nothing in the Court of Appeals decision or in the order of the circuit court prevents his doing so, and this Court’s ruling today does not impede Pryer’s statutory right to file such an action, should he choose to do so.

¶ 8. Instead of utilizing the statutory procedure for denial of public records requests, Pryer filed his Motion to Show Cause in circuit court. Upon denial of that motion, he filed a notice of appeal in this Court, and his case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. Pryer now complains of a jurisdictional defect. He states that “the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a Public Records request as a Post Conviction Relief petition.” We cannot say whether the circuit court treated Pryer’s initial request as a motion for post-conviction relief, since that order neither appears in the appellate record nor was it appealed. But in its order on the Motion to Show Cause, the circuit court did not make reference to the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1 to -29 (Rev. 2007). The circuit court simply denied the motion and held that the documents were “not contained with the Circuit Clerk’s file.” Thus, the record provides no indication that the circuit court treated Pryer’s Motion to Show Cause as a petition for post-conviction relief.

¶ 9. The Court of Appeals, however, applied the standard from Fleming v. State requiring prisoners seeking post-conviction relief to “show[ ] a specific need, or that the documents sought are necessary to decide a specific issue.” Pryer, 139 So.3d at 721, 2013 WL 2399645, at *2 (citing Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505, 507 (Miss.1989)). While we find that the Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that Pryer’s Motion to Show Cause was treated by the circuit court as a petition for post-conviction relief, we do not find that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to rule upon the motion. The Court of Appeals stated that “we have no reason to believe that any such documents do exist,” and we agree. Pryer, 139 So.3d at 721, 2013 WL 2399645, at *2.

¶ 10. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Circuit Court of Itawamba County.

¶ 11. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR, PIERCE, AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. DICKINSON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER AND COLEMAN, JJ.

DICKINSON, Presiding Justice,

dissenting:

¶ 12. If a news organization filed a public-records request exactly like the one Timothy Pryer filed, I firmly believe the majority would be taking a different view. But the simple truth is that, because he does happen to be an inmate, the Court of Appeals — and now the majority of this Court — deny him the statutory right to file a public-records request. Because nothing in the public-records statutes denies an inmate the same access to public records as a news organization (or anyone else, for that matter), I respectfully dissent.

¶ 13. Mississippi’s Public Access to Public Records Act of 1983 (“Public Records Act”) states: “It is the policy of the Legislature that public records must be available for inspection by any person unless otherwise provided by this Act.” And because the majority neither cites nor points to any exemption or exclusion for inmates, it is fair to conclude that the Legislature intended the Public Records Act to apply to inmates.

¶ 14. So, let us assume for a moment that, instead of Pryer, a news organization suspected that — in the absence of any circuit judge — the circuit clerk of Itawamba County illegally presided over forty circuit-court arraignments, taking pleas, setting trial dates, and assigning counsel to indigent defendants. If that newspaper wished to engage in a “fishing expedition” to see if there were documents in the circuit court files to support the suspicion, no one would think anything about it. But, because Pryer is an inmate, rather than a news organization or ordinary citizen, the majority denies him the right to make a request under the Public Records Act. I cannot agree with this unsupported judicial prohibition.

¶ 15. There can be no doubt that Pryer filed a request for public documents under the Public Records Act. In his request, he clearly set forth that he was not attempting to file a petition for post-conviction relief, but rather that the Mississippi Public Records Act entitled him to access to the documents. When the circuit court responded that the requested documents did not exist within the Clerk’s files, Pryer filed an appeal, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals held that he was on a “fishing expedition.” Again, my view is that the Public Records Act allows “any person” to request public records, and it has no exemption for “fishing expeditions.” In fact, most public-records requests probably are fishing expeditions. But because of Pryer’s status as an inmate, the majority thinks he is not entitled to make the request.

¶ 16. At issue here is the nature of Pryer’s request and the appropriate forum for review of the circuit court’s failure to produce the requested documents. Pryer requested access pursuant to the Mississippi Public Records Act, but the Court of Appeals ignored the mandate within the Public Records Act and affirmed based on the statutory post-eonviction-relief discovery provisions.

Requests for Documents under the Public Records Act

¶ 17. Stated again for clarity, the purpose of the Mississippi Public Records Act is to provide every person — there is no exception within the statutes for inmates— with broad access to public records. Any person may make a request to a public body for access to documents in its possession. Here, Pryer made his request to the circuit court.

¶ 18. The statutes provide that, where the public body — again, here, the circuit court — denies access to the requested documents, that person may challenge the denial by “instituting] a suit in the chancery court of the county in which the public body is located” to compel access. The chancellor must then determine whether the public body improperly denied access to the document in question. An individual aggrieved by the chancellor’s decision may then appeal and is subject to “all the rights and rules of appeal for other suits arising in the chancery court.”

¶ 19. Pryer believed that the Circuit Court of Itawamba County — clearly a public body — possessed public documents that he wished to see, so he requested access to those documents. The circuit court denied access, triggering Pryer’s right to file an action in the chancery court, Instead, Pryer commenced an original action in the appellate courts of this State to enforce his rights under the Public Records Act.

¶ 20. When a public body — whether the circuit court, the Mississippi Tax Commission, or any other public body — denies a request made pursuant to the Public Records Act, the aggrieved individual’s only remedy is to initiate an anginal action in the chancery court. Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals may constitutionally hear original civil actions. We do not sit as a trial court, and we do not make fact-finding decisions. Instead, as provided in the Public Records Act, an aggrieved person must bring suit in the chancery court.

¶ 21. Section 25-61-13 states that “[a]ny person denied the right granted by Section 25-61-5 to inspect or copy public records may institute a suit in the chancery court of the county in which the public body is located, and the court shall determine whether such public record is exempt from the provisions of this chapter....” The majority suggests the permissive word “may” leaves open other avenues, and that the chancery court is only one of other possible unnamed avenues to seek relief. I find the better interpretation of “may” — as used in the statute — is that an aggrieved party “may” (has permission, but is not required to) file a lawsuit when such a denial has occurred. The unambiguous language of Section 25-61-13 provides only a single avenue to challenge denials under the Public Records Act — “institute a suit in the chancery court....”

¶ 22. The majority also points out that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over final, appealable orders, but it fails to recognize that the circuit court’s denial of Pryer’s request was simply that: a denial of a public-records request. Pryer’s request to the circuit clerk for documents was denied by the circuit judge, who stated that the records did not exist. Having been denied the requested documents, Pryer’s only remedy was to file a case in the chancery court.

¶ 23. The trial judge’s response to Pryer’s request to the circuit clerk for documents was not an order. While it is true that the judge styled the denial as an “order,” he ordered nothing. He merely denied a records request. I would not hold that denials of requests for public records are final, appealable orders, capable of being appealed to the Supreme Court. Surely my friends in the majority do not mean to conclude that, for instance, where a justice court judge denies a request for public documents, the justice court judge’s order is a “final, appealable order” to the Supreme Court. The fact that a judge, rather than the circuit clerk, responded to Pryer’s request does not transform the denial into a “final, appeal-able order.”

¶24. Pryer made a public-records request for public documents pursuant to the Public Records Act. He made his request to the public body he believed was in possession of the public records. Regardless of the public body’s reason for denying the request, the sole remedy for the denial is to institute an original civil action in chancery court, and neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has the authority or jurisdiction to designate the request a “fishing expedition,” though the request very well may be one.

Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an original civil action challenging denial of a request for public records.

¶ 25. While we are indeed the Supreme Court, our jurisdiction is limited to that granted to us by the Mississippi Constitution and the Legislature, and neither has granted us the jurisdiction to hear original civil actions challenging a denial of public records under the Public Records Act. In fact, Section 25-61-5 — which sets forth the procedure for all denials under the Public Records Act — specifically grants the chan-eery court — and only the chancery court— jurisdiction to hear suits to compel access under the Public Records Act.

¶ 26. So, when the circuit court denied Pryer’s request for public records, his only remedy was to initiate an original action in the Chancery Court of Itawamba County. Instead, Pryer attempted to appeal the circuit court’s denial of the public records, and instead of dismissing the improper appeal, we improperly referred it to the Court of Appeals. But, because I would find that we were without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, so was the Court of Appeals. I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismiss this appeal.

CHANDLER AND COLEMAN, JJ„ JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . Though it is unclear precisely what Pryer was seeking, he requested "Court Orders” and "names that were docketed December 2, 2004.” Seemingly, he wants a copy of the circuit court’s criminal docket, along with the names and addresses of defendants arraigned on the same day as he.

      . Carol Gates is, and was in 2004, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Itawamba County. Secretary of State, 2004 — 2008 Official and Statistical Register, Mississippi (Blue Book) 289 (2005).

      . Honorable Paul S. Funderburk is, and was in 2004, one of the circuit court judges serving Itawamba County. Secretary of State, 2004-2008 Official and Statistical Register, Mississippi (Blue Book) 194 (2005).

      . This may be a reference to Honorable Thomas J. Gardner, III, Senior Circuit Court Judge for Itawamba County. Secretary of State, 2004-2008 Official and Statistical Register, Mississippi {Blue Book) 194 (2005).

      . If, instead of seeking circuit court records, Pryer had sought records from the Itawamba County Chancery Court, we would have been left to ponder the statute’s functionality. According to the statute, had Pryer been denied records by the Itawamba County Chancery Court, one option for Pryer would have been institution of a suit in that very same chancery court.

      . The circuit court controls its own records. See URCCC 1.12 ("No record, or any part of a file of court papers, shall be taken from the clerk’s custody without a written order from the judge to the clerk."); Miss.Code Ann. § 9-1-29 (Rev.2002) ("Each court shall have control over all proceedings in the clerk’s office....”). Numerous statutes set forth the duties of the circuit clerk with regard to record-keeping. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 9-7-127 to-181 (Rev.2002).

      . Miss Code Ann. § 25-61-1 (Rev.2010) (emphasis added).

      . Pryer v. State, 139 So.3d 719, 2013 WL 2399645 (Miss.Ct.App. June 4, 2013) (citing Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505, 507 (Miss.1989)).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-5 (Rev.2010),

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-15 (Rev.2007).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-2 (Rev.2010).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-5.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-13 (Rev.2010).

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-13 (Rev.2010).

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . /¿.(emphasis added).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-3 (Rev.2002).

      . Id.

        . Miss. Const. art. 6, § 146; Miss.Code Ann. § 9-4-3 (Rev.2002).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-13 (Rev.2010).

      . Id.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JAMES, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Timothy Gene PRYER a/k/a Tim a/k/a Timothy Pryer a/k/a Timothy G. Pryer, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CP-00427-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 4, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 2013.

      Timothy Gene Pryer, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry Jr., attorney for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES and JAMES, JJ.
   JAMES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Timothy Pryer appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion requesting certain documents. In the only issue he raises on appeal, he challenges this decision. Upon review, we find that this appeal is without merit. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On October 6, 2005, Pryer was convicted of sexual battery and was sentenced to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with fifteen years to serve and five years suspended pending successful completion of five years of post-release supervision. Pryer was also required to register as a sex offender. On March 6, 2007, this Court affirmed Pryer’s conviction. See Pryer v. State, 958 So.2d 818, 820 (¶ 2) (Miss.Ct.App.2007).

¶ 3. On June 20, 2011, Pryer filed a motion seeking documents from the circuit clerk. Specifically, Pryer requested “the [ojrder giving Carol Gates[ ] the [ojffice of [jjudge de facto ... and the [ojrder giving Carol Gates authority to appoint indigent counsel for [the] December 2, 2004 [hearing] and the names of the 40 plus souls and their addresses[.j” In his brief, Pryer alleged that he requested “a judgefs] order, and the dockets of those [arraigned] on December 2, 2004.” On February 1, 2012, the circuit court entered an order denying Pryer’s motion as follows:

This cause comes before this [c]ourt on [Pryer’s] pro se [m]otion to [s]how [e]ause. [Pryer] requests this [c]ourt to order the Itawamba County Circuit Clerk to forward [Pryer] a free copy of the documents not contained within the [c]ircuit [c]lerk’s file. This motion contains the exact same requests as the previously filed motions.[] In addition, the [m]otion to [s]how [c]ause contains completely unfounded and slanderous allegations against several court offices. The Motion to [s]how [c]ause has no legal merit and shall be DENIED.

On March 5, 2012, Pryer filed his notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶ 4. The State argues that Pryer’s appeal was untimely because the order denying relief was filed on February 1, 2012, and the notice of appeal was not filed until March 5, 2012. Therefore, according to the State, the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days as required by Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The State further argues that the prison-mailbox rule announced in Sykes v. State, 757 So.2d 997, 1000-01 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000), does not apply to this case because this action is not brought under the Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Act (UPCCRA). In Sykes, our supreme court held that “a pro se prisoner’s motion for post-conviction relief is delivered for filing under the UPCCRA and the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure when the prisoner delivers the papers to prison authorities for mailing.” Id. Thus, the prison-mailbox rule announced in Sykes applies only to cases filed under the UPCCRA, and the rule has no application to pro se prisoners seeking judicial review for civil appeals not brought under the UPCCRA. See Gaston v. State, 817 So.2d 618, 616 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (holding that “the prison[-]mailbox rule extends to all actions under the UPCCRA, and appeals in those actions”). However, in Maze v. MDOC, 854 So.2d 1090, 1092 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2003), this Court announced that it saw “no reason why the [prison-mailbox] rule should not apply in the context of ... a civil filing by a pro se prisoner seeking judicial review.” In Easley v. Roach, 879 So.2d 1041, 1042-43 (¶¶ 4-5) (Miss.2004), our supreme court approved the rule announced by this Court extending the modified rule to civil filings by pro se prisoners. In the case before us, Pryer is seeking judicial review of a civil matter. Therefore, we find that the State’s argument is without merit.

¶5. Pryer argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion requesting “the [o]rder giving Carol Gates the [ojffice of [j]udge de facto ... and the [o]rder giving Carol Gates authority to appoint indigent counsel for [the] December 2, 2004 [hearing] and the names of the 40 plus souls and their addressesf.]” However, the circuit court found that no such documents exist. Upon review of the record on appeal, we have no reason to believe that any such documents do exist. It further appears that Pryer is merely on a “fishing expedition” for grounds upon which to attack his conviction and sentence. Pryer “has not shown a specific need, or that the documents sought are necessary to decide a specific issue.” See Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505, 507 (Miss.1989). Therefore, we affirm.

¶ 6. THE JUDGMENT OF THE ITA-WAMBA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO ITA-WAMBA COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

      . Gates is the Itawamba County Circuit Court Clerk.

      . We note that it is unclear exactly what information Pryer was seeking, but it is clear that the circuit court determined that no such orders existed.

      . Any previously filed motions are not in the record on appeal.


author: ISHEE, J.,

text:
    BRADDOCK LAW FIRM, PLLC, Appellant v. Daniel E. BECNEL Jr., Appellee.
    No. 2012-CA-00345-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Aug. 6, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 2014.

      C. Eric Malouf, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    Daniel E. Becnel Jr., appellee, pro se.
    ISHEE, SPECIAL P.J., ROBERTS and FAIR, JJ.
   ISHEE, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. In the late 1990’s, a group of approximately 224 clients were gathered to pursue a class-action lawsuit against a pharmaceutical company for damages suffered from a dangerous product produced and marketed by the pharmaceutical company. Daniel E. Becnel Jr. and the Braddock Law Firm PLLC (Braddock Law), run by Tal Braddock (Braddock), were both associated with the lawsuit. After a successful trial on the merits, P.C. agreed to settle a limited number of the remaining future cases. Attorneys’ fees were distributed to the associated plaintiffs’ attorneys pursuant to a fee-splitting agreement. A dispute arose as to the distribution of fees, among other issues. Braddock filed suit in the Hinds County Chancery Court on behalf of Braddock Law against Becnel and other attorneys associated with the lawsuit for breach of the fee-splitting agreement. After the first trial on the merits was reversed and remanded on appeal, Braddock proceeded with a second trial in 2011. During the trial, Braddock agreed to a settlement with all attorneys other than Becnel. At the close of the trial, the chancery court determined that no contract existed between Braddock and Becnel with regard to attorneys’ fees, and that all other claims against Becnel were without merit. Aggrieved, Braddock appeals. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Becnel, who practiced law in Louisiana, was the originating attorney in this products-liability lawsuit. He associated Michael T. Gallagher and his law firm, which included lawyers in Texas and Mississippi, to bring more claimants into the class-action lawsuit and to try the lawsuit. After a successful trial resulted in a substantial judgment for the plaintiffs, Becnel and Gallagher began settlement talks with P.C. regarding future cases. The negotiations centered on P.C.’s flat-rate settlement offer on a per-case basis.

¶ 3. Gallagher soon approached Braddock about associating with them in the settlement talks and referring more Mississippi claims that would fall within the purview of the settlement. This would, theoretically, increase P.C.’s settlement offer since the total settlement offer would depend on the number of claims procured. Braddock claims that Gallagher entered into an agreement with him to split the fees, with forty percent going to Gallagher and sixty percent to Braddock. Gallagher admits that an oral agreement on attorneys’ fees was discussed with Braddock, but disputes the percentages.

¶ 4. Based on the sixty-percent-fee promise, Braddock associated Bobby Gill and Richard Martin to assist him in finding claimants they could represent and include in Gallagher’s settlement negotiations. The three attorneys agreed to split Braddock’s sixty-percent fee between themselves, with Gill and Martin receiving fifty-seven percent and Braddock receiving three percent.

¶ 5. After independently researching the specifics of the lawsuit, Gill and Martin became aware of Becnel’s involvement and contacted him to inform him of their fee agreement with Gallagher. By virtue of this conversation, Becnel became aware that P.C.’s offer to Gallagher was more than three times what P.C. had offered to Becnel for his clients. Furthermore, the record reflects that at the time Becnel was not aware of Braddock’s existence or participation in the lawsuit. As such, Becnel entered into a fee-splitting agreement with Gill and Martin to include their Mississippi clients with his clients to present to P.C. for settlement. In turn, Gill and Martin executed an agreement with Braddock to split the attorneys’ fees within thirty days of Becnel’s settlement.

¶ 6. However, Becnel soon breached his agreement with Gill and Martin, and personally met with P.C.’s counsel in an attempt to settle his clients on his own in order to procure the entire attorney fee for himself. P.C.’s counsel informed Bec-nel that Gallagher was the only attorney with whom P.C. was settling clients at that time. P.C.’s counsel also informed Becnel that a close review of the attorney-client documents proved that Gill and Martin had no authority to settle the clients they had referred to Becnel.

¶ 7. Becnel then met with Gallagher and another associating attorney, Tim Goss, regarding the fees. After a few weeks of negotiations, they entered into a written agreement entitling Becnel to sixty percent of the fees and Gallagher to forty percent of the fees. However, the contract only named Goss and Becnel as contracting parties, not Gallagher. P.C. soon settled all claims, including claims from the clients referred by Braddock, Gill, and Martin. When the settlement was finalized a short time later, Goss received the attorneys’ fees and forwarded forty percent to Gallagher and the other sixty percent to Becnel. Gallagher later paid six percent of his forty percent to Goss.

¶ 8. Shortly thereafter, Gill and Martin filed suit in the Hinds County Chancery Court against Becnel for intentional breach of contract in failing to pay them the agreed-upon referral fees. Braddock intervened in the suit and joined Gallagher and his associates as defendants. The chancellor granted partial summary judgment to Gill and Martin for the fees Becnel had promised to them. The chancellor then granted summary judgment to Becnel regarding Braddock’s claim of a three-percent attorneys’ fee. The chancellor held that Braddock could not prove a direct relationship regarding a fee agreement with Becnel. Furthermore, at the close of Braddock’s case, the chancery court granted Gallagher’s motion for an involuntary dismissal.

¶ 9. All parties, even Becnel, agreed that Becnel was liable to someone for the three-percent fee. However, the chancellor determined that Braddock’s only cause of action could be against Gallagher and his associates. Nonetheless, Gallagher was dismissed from the action, leaving Braddock no recourse.

¶ 10. Becnel soon appealed the chancery court’s judgment. This Court reversed the chancery court’s dismissal of Gallagher and his associates, as well as the chancery court’s denial of Braddock’s motion to amend his complaint to include a count of civil conspiracy. Braddock, 949 So.2d at 45 (¶ 23), (¶ 22). We remanded the case for further proceedings on Braddock’s civil-conspiracy claim and gave Gallagher and his associates the opportunity to present their defense. Id.

¶ 11. On remand, the chancery court ordered the parties to submit memorandums, and later held a hearing on all evidence and the memorandums. The chancery court then entered a final judgment determining that Gallagher and Braddock had a binding settlement agreement, but that no civil conspiracy existed between Becnel and Gallagher. Hence, the chancery court dismissed all of Braddock’s claims against Becnel.

¶ 12. Braddock again appeals the chancery court’s judgment, claiming the court erred in the following ways: (1) dismissing Braddock’s joint-venture claim; (2) dismissing Braddock’s civil-conspiracy claim; and (3) failing to award attorneys’ fees and punitive damages. Finding no error, we affirm the chancery court’s judgment.

DISCUSSION

¶ 18. We review a chancellor’s findings under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Vincent v. Creel, 80 So.3d 859, 862 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citation omitted). Findings of fact are not disturbed unless they are “clearly erroneous [or] manifestly wrong, or the chancellor applied an incorrect legal standard.” Id. Nonetheless, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

I. Joint Venture

¶ 14. Braddock claims the chancery court erred in dismissing his claim regarding a joint-venture between his law firm and Becnel. In its memorandum of law, the chancery court stated the following:

With regard to Braddock’s claims against Becnel, the Mississippi Court of Appeals remanded solely on the issue of the amendment of a civil[-]conspiraey claim.... However, out of an abundance of caution, this [c]ourt has reviewed [the joint-venture claim] posed by Braddock. ... Although the Mississippi Court of Appeals did find a joint venture between Braddock, Gallagher, [and other associated attorneys], there is no mention of Becnel as a part of the venture. According to common law, the three main factors of partnership, and by extension joint venture, are (1) intent, (2) control, and (3) profit sharing. Smith v. Redd, 593 So.2d 989, 993 (Miss.1991). In this matter, it is undisputed that Becnel had no intention of joining a venture with Braddock. In fact, Becnel did not even know of Braddock’s existence. Becnel had a limited contract with Gill and Martin. However, his fiduciary responsibilities did not extend to those with whom Gill and Martin had a contract. Therefore, there was no joint venture including both Becnel and Braddock. Further, this Court would note that the Mississippi Court of Appeals specifically affirmed the previous chancellor’s summary judgment in favor of .Becnel as to [the] declaratory action, accounting!,] and breach of contract. Therefore, this [c]ourt cannot readdress those issue which have been specifically-decided and affirmed by the appellate courts.

¶ 15. Indeed, in Braddock, we affirmed the chancery court’s grant of Bec-nel’s summary-judgment motion on the basis that Braddock could not prove a direct relationship with Becnel. Braddock, 949 So.2d at 47 (¶¶ 34-38). We discussed joint-venture relationships in Braddock with regard to Braddock and Gallagher. Id. at 50-52 (¶¶ 45-53). As stated therein, a joint venture is a single-purpose partnership evidenced by intent, control, and profit sharing. Id. at 49 (¶ 46) (citations omitted).

¶ 16. In order to show intent, a movant must establish by the proof that the parties intended to be legally bound to one another for the purpose of reaching a singular goal. See Smith v. Redd, 593 So.2d 989, 994 (Miss.1991). The chancery court found that Becnel was not aware of Braddock’s existence at the time he entered into fee-splitting agreements with Gill, Martin, and Gallagher. The extensive nature of this class-action lawsuit made it feasible for Braddock to operate as a minimally involved referral attorney through his law firm without Becnel’s knowledge. This alone shows that Becnel could not have possibly intended to enter into a binding agreement with Braddock regarding the settlement or the fee-splitting agreement. As stated in Braddock, the evidence .reflected that Gallagher was bound by the agreement with Braddock and the other Mississippi attorneys. However, we see no evidence in the record to tie Braddock to Becnel by virtue of a joint venture or any other contract.

¶ 17. Likewise, as stated by the chancery court, we affirmed the court’s prior dismissal of Becnel “as to [the] declaratory action, accounting!,] and breach of contract.” Braddock, 949 So.2d at 48 (¶ 35). Having determined that Braddock failed to meet the first element of intent, required to establish the existence of a joint venture between himself and Becnel, in addition to our prior ruling affirming the dismissal of Becnel from all breach-of-contract claims, we find this issue to be without merit.

II. Civil Conspiracy

¶ 18. Braddock next argues that a civil conspiracy existed between Becnel and Gallagher to exclude all Mississippi attorneys from the settlement. “Conspiracy requires a finding of[:] (1) two or more persons or corporations; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result.” Gallegos v. Mid-South Mortgage & Inv., Inc., 956 So.2d 1055, 1060 (¶ 22) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citation omitted).

¶ 19. The only pertinent agreement in the record involving Braddock was the agreement executed between Braddock, Gill, and Martin providing a fee distribution between the three attorneys within thirty days of Becnel’s settlement. However, while this agreement was contingent on Becnel’s agreement with Gill and Martin, Becnel was only tangentially linked to Braddock by virtue of the two separate contracts. Becnel never agreed to pay Braddock or Braddock Law anything. Rather, he agreed to pay Gill and Martin, who agreed to pay Braddock.

¶ 20. The evidence shows that Becnel became increasingly dissatisfied with Gill and Martin’s performance as the negotiations ensued. Later, Becnel discovered through P.C.’s counsel that Gill and Martin had no legal authority to settle the claims they had referred to him. Because Gill and Martin had failed to fulfill their obligation in the agreement with Becnel, Bec-nel had cause to terminate the agreement. See Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 255 (Miss.1985). The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that “[t]here is no actionable conspiracy ... where all that is shown is the exercise[,] in a lawful manner[,] of a right to terminate a contract.” Id.

¶ 21. Becnel lawfully terminated his agreement with Gill and Martin, which negates an element of conspiracy, which consists of two persons who enter into unlawful activity. Accordingly, whether or not Becnel and Gallagher devised to exclude Braddock and others from the settlement is of no consequence to a conspiracy claim since there was not an unlawful act committed to accomplish their goal. This issue is also without merit.

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Punitive Damages

¶22. Finally, Braddock contests the chancery court’s failure to award attorneys’ fees and punitive damages. However, Braddock’s claim rests upon his assertion that he “has clearly and convincingly proven intentional, tortious, and bad faith breach of contracts as well as civil conspiracy. ...” This argument is completely unsupported by the record. Likewise, Braddock cites no authority for his assertions. We have previously held that “failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues.” Braddock, 949 So.2d at 47 (¶ 35) (citing Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452, 487 (¶ 90) (Miss.2001)). As such, this issue is meritless.

¶ 23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT. LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., AND JAMES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . For confidentiality purposes, we will decline to name the pharmaceutical company, and instead will refer to it as ‘'P.C.”

      . See Braddock Law Firm, PLLC, v. Becnel, 949 So.2d 38 (Miss.Ct.App.2006).


author: CARLTON, J.,

text:
    Rubin WEEKS a/k/a Rubin R. Weeks a/k/a Rubin Rurie Weeks, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2012-CP-00574-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Sept. 24, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 11, 2014.

      Rubin Weeks, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, C.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.
   CARLTON, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Rubin Weeks appeals the Hinds County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). Weeks argues that Mississippi wrongfully extradited him to Missouri, and because of this error, he has served his Mississippi sentence while serving time in Missouri for his Missouri offenses. After reviewing the record, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS

¶ 2. Weeks was convicted of burglary and sentenced by the Scott County Circuit Court to four years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). On June 7, 1990, the Mississippi Parole Board granted Weeks conditional parole.

¶ 3. Then, in September 1991, the MDOC issued a warrant for Weeks’s arrest due to violations of his parole agreement. However, Weeks was then extradited to Missouri as a result of charges faced by Weeks in Missouri. Weeks subsequently pled guilty in Missouri to charges of kidnapping and rape, and he received a sentence in Missouri of concurrent terms of thirty years and life imprisonment. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342, 1344 (8th Cir.1997). After his conviction and sentencing in Missouri, by letter dated March 2, 1994, the MDOC requested that a detainer be placed in Weeks’s file with the Missouri Department of Corrections.

¶ 4. Then, on November 21, 2011, Weeks filed a PCR motion in Mississippi, complaining about the MDOC’s request to place a detainer in his file in Missouri. Weeks filed his PCR in Hinds County, Mississippi, but he received his conviction and sentence in Scott County, Mississippi. The trial court dismissed the PCR motion, and Weeks now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. “An appellate court will not reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of a PCR motion absent a finding that the decision was clearly erroneous.” Whetstone v. State, 109 So.3d 616, 618 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2013). However, we review questions of law, such as jurisdiction, utilizing a de novo standard of review. Id.; see also Cosby v. State, 66 So.3d 161, 165 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2010).

DISCUSSION

¶ 6. Weeks argues that Mississippi wrongfully extradited him to Missouri, and because of this error, he asserts that he already served the revoked portion of his Mississippi sentence while serving time in the Missouri Department of Corrections. Weeks, however, provides no record showing that Mississippi ever revoked his parole prior to extradition to Missouri. While Weeks claims that he was arrested and detained in Mississippi for a parole violation, he provides no evidence showing that a revocation hearing occurred or, as previously stated, that the Mississippi Parole Board ever revoked his parole. See Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-27 (Supp.2012). The appellant possesses a duty to ensure that the record supports his assignments of error. Woods v. State, 71 So.3d 1241, 1245 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2011). Therefore, a review of this record fails to reflect a basis for jurisdiction.

¶ 7. Moreover, we note that a PCR motion must be filed in the trial court wherein sentencing was initially imposed. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Supp. 2012). Therefore, Hinds County also lacked jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

¶ 8. THIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . The record shows that Weeks has received several convictions and sentences from the State of Mississippi. It is difficult to determine which of Weeks's convictions and sentences are the subject of this appeal. However, Weeks's argument on appeal centers around a detainer and a warrant that are included in the record and involve Weeks's burglary conviction and four-year sentence in the custody of the MDOC. Therefore, we will proceed under the assumption that Weeks intended to challenge this conviction only. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-9(2) (Supp.2012) ("A motion [for PCR] shall be limited to the assertion of a claim for relief against one (1) judgment only.”); see also Cook v. State, 990 So.2d 788, 790-91 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2008).

      . According to Weeks, he is currently incarcerated with the Missouri Department of Corrections.

      . "This Court always has jurisdiction to determine whether it properly has jurisdiction. If the Court determines that it has jurisdiction, then it may proceed to address the substantive appeal.” Seal v. State, 38 So.3d 635, 637 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2010).


author: IRVING, P.J.,

text:
    Darius Cornelius FORD a/k/a Darius Ford a/k/a Darius C. Ford a/k/a Cornelius Ford a/k/a Popcorn, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2012-KP-00843-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Dec. 3, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied March 11, 2014.

      Darius Cornelius Ford, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., ROBERTS and JAMES, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On February 8, 2012, a jury convicted Darius Cornelius Ford of aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Scott County Circuit Court sentenced Ford, as a habitual offender, to twenty years for the aggravated-assault conviction and to ten years for the possession-of-a-firearm conviction, with the sentence in Count II to run consecutively to the sentence in Count I, all in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without eligibility for parole or probation.

¶ 2. Feeling aggrieved, Ford appeals and presents several issues for review. For the sake of discussion and clarity, Ford’s issues have been restated and reordered below:

I. Whether the indictment properly charged Ford as a habitual offender.
II. Whether Ford was denied his right to a speedy trial.
III. Whether the State was required to produce the witness that certified the documents used to demonstrate Ford’s prior convictions.
IV. Whether the circuit court erred in its reading of the Sharplin instruction.
V. Whether the circuit court properly denied Ford’s motions for a directed verdict and a new trial.
VI. Whether the circuit court committed cumulative error mandating reversal of Ford’s conviction and sentence.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. On January 11, 2010, Sanford Lackey, a real estate appraiser, was in rural Scott County, Mississippi, photographing several parcels of land along Highway 21. After taking photos of a vacant property, Lackey realized that he had photographed the wrong property. Lackey testified that he drove along the road looking for a place to turn around. He decided to turn around at an old convenience store on Highway 21. As he was turning around, he heard three gunshots. When he looked in the direction where he thought the shots were coming from, he saw a man exit a nearby mobile home and walk toward a gold sport-utility vehicle (SUV). Lackey noted that the man looked in his direction as he descended the steps of the mobile home. The man was wearing a blue sweatshirt and a rolled-up toboggan. Lackey continued along the road, searching for the correct property to photograph.

¶ 4. Lackey testified that after taking the correct photos, he pulled to the side of the road to input another address into his GPS. After setting the GPS, Lackey pulled back onto the road. At that time, he noticed the gold SUV from the mobile home approach his vehicle from behind at a high rate of speed. Lackey sped up. When the vehicle was approximately a car length away, the driver leaned out of the driver’s side window, aimed a handgun, and shot through the rear windshield of Lackey’s vehicle. Then, the gold SUV turned around and sped away from Lackey. He stated that he immediately called the Scott County Sheriffs Department and subsequently went to the sheriffs office. While at the sheriffs office, Lackey saw Ford as the law enforcement officers brought him into the station. Lackey later told the officers that Ford was the individual that shot at his vehicle.

¶ 5. Kevin Polk, an investigator with the Scott County Sheriffs Department, testified that he and several other officers responded to the call from dispatch regarding Lackey’s incident. He and the other officers went to the vicinity of where the incident had occurred. At the first mobile home that the officers approached, they spoke with Jessica Adams, Ford’s girlfriend. Adams told Investigator Polk that Ford had gone to pick up his children from school. Upon hearing this, Investigator Polk and an additional Scott County deputy left the mobile home to intercept Ford on his way back from the school. When Investigator Polk saw Ford’s vehicle, he stopped Ford and told him that he needed him to come into the station for questioning. Investigator Polk also had Ford’s vehicle towed to the sheriffs department.

¶ 6. Deputy Marcus Lingle, with the Scott County Sheriffs Department, testified that he participated in the search of Ford’s mobile home once Adams gave the officers written consent to search. During the search, Deputy Lingle found a .40-caliber pistol on the bed and a box of ammunition. The officers also recovered “male clothing [that was] hanging [in] the closet.” Deputy Lingle testified to finding “either a dark gray or blue sweatshirt” that “match[ed] a description of the upper garment worn by ... the suspect ... that day.” Deputy Lingle stated that “[f]rom [the] time of [the] incident to the time [they] arrived at the property was an estimation of at least thirty minutes.”

¶ 7. Adams testified that although the mobile home was in Ford’s mother’s name, Ford did not live there. She admitted that Ford was at the home on the day of the incident. According to Adams, she and Ford slept from approximately 9:00 a.m. until 2:40 p.m. on the day of the incident. Adams noted that the male clothing hanging in the closet did not belong to Ford. Also, Adams testified that the gun that Deputy Lingle found on the bed belonged to her, and that Ford did not know that she owned the gun.

¶ 8. Ford testified that he was just one of several men that Adams was seeing at that time. He insisted that he did not live with Adams in the mobile home; that he did not own a firearm because he knew that, as a convicted felon, he could not; and that he did not own a dark blue pullover or sweatshirt. Ford admitted that he was a convicted felon. He also stated that he did not know Lackey and had never seen him prior to the morning of trial.

¶ 9. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

I. Indictment

¶ 10. “Whether an indictment is defective is an issue of law, which this Court reviews de novo.” Johnson v. State, 50 So.3d 335, 338 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2010). Rule 11.03 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court applies in cases involving enhanced punishment for habitual offenders. Rule 11.03(1) states, in pertinent part: “The indictment must allege with particularity the nature or description of the offense[s] constituting the previous convictions, the state or federal jurisdiction of any previous conviction, and the date of judgment.”

¶ 11. The habitual-offender portion of Ford’s indictment reads as follows:

And he, the said Darius Cornelius Ford, then and there having been convicted twice previously of felony crimes upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and having been sentenced to and served separate terms of one year or more for each of said felony convictions in the Mississippi Department of Corrections to wit:
(1) he, the said Darius Cornelius Ford, was convicted on the 16th day of February, 1995, in Cause No. 4582 in the Circuit Court of Scott County, Mississippi, of the felony crime of Sale of Cocaine, and was sentenced to serve a term of six (6) years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections; and
(2) he, the said Darius Cornelius Ford, was convicted on the 21st day of May, 2007, in Cause No. 06-CR-074-SC-G in the Circuit Court of Scott County, Mississippi, of the felony crime of Count I-Possession of Cocaine and Count II-Possession of Less than 30 Grams of Marijuana, and was sentenced in Count I to serve a term of five (5) years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and was sentenced in Count II to pay a fine of $250;
he, the said Cornelius Darius Ford, therefore being a habitual criminal pursuant to [Mississippi Code Annotated] [sjection 99-19-81 [ (Supp.2013) ].

Ford contends that his indictment did not properly charge him as a habitual offender because it did not contain the judgment dates of his previous convictions. Ford’s contention is without merit. The record reveals that Ford entered guilty pleas in each of the cases used to charge him as a habitual offender. Therefore, the judgment date and the conviction date for the sale-of-cocaine offense was February 16, 1995. Likewise, the judgment date and the conviction date for the possession-of-cocaine offense and the possession-of-marijuana offense was May 21, 2007.

¶ 12. This Court has previously held that an indictment that contains “sufficient information to inform [the defendant] of the specific prior convictions upon which the State reliefs] for enhanced punishment” complies with due process and is not fatally defective. See Thomas v. State, 99 So.3d 1169, 1173 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2012). Here, the indictment listed the previous convictions; the court that adjudicated each conviction; the date of each conviction, which is the date that Ford pleaded guilty to those crimes; the imposed sentences for each conviction; and the cause numbers for each conviction. Therefore, even though the indictment does not refer to the “date of judgment” for either conviction, the habitual-offender portion of the indictment was sufficient to put Ford on notice of the prior convictions used to charge him as a habitual offender. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

II. Speedy Trial

¶ 13. Ford argues that the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial because approximately two years passed between the date of his arrest and the first day of his trial. “[T]he United States Supreme Court has stated that a formal indictment or information or an arrest-7-whieh ever occurs first—triggers the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Havard v. State, 94 So.3d 229, 237 (¶ 21) (Miss.2012) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). “In Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ], the Supreme Court set forth four factors to consider whenever a defendant alleges that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Ben v. State, 95 So.3d 1236, 1242 (¶ 7) (Miss.2012) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182). The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that the Barker factors “are related and must be considered alongside other relevant circumstances.” Id. (citing McBride v. State, 61 So.3d 138, 142 (¶ 5) (Miss.2011)).

A.Length of Delay

¶ 14. A review of the remaining Barker factors is triggered only by a finding that the State’s delay in bringing a defendant to trial is presumptively prejudicial. Ben, 95 So.3d at 1242 (¶ 9). “In Mississippi, a delay of more than eight months is considered presumptively prejudicial.” Id. (citing McBride, 61 So.3d at 142 (¶ 7)). Here, Ford was arrested on January 11, 2010, the day of the incident. His trial began on February 7, 2012. The just-over-two-year delay is presumptively prejudicial.

B.Reason for the Delay

¶ 15. Ford was released on bond the day after his arrest. Ten months later, the grand jury indicted Ford. The record reveals that, after the indictment, most of the delay in bringing Ford to trial was caused by Ford himself. Approximately one month after the indictment, Ford began requesting continuances. He requested three continuances — January 24, 2011; June 3, 2011; and October 12, 2011. Ford’s trial began at the next term of court. Ford’s requests for continuances created a thirteen-month delay — a delay that should not be attributable to the State. “[W]ell-taken motions for continuance may justify a delay in criminal cases.” Ben, 95 So.3d at 1243 (¶ 15) (quoting Flora v. State, 925 So.2d 797, 815 (¶ 63) (Miss.2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 16. Our supreme court has stated that in a pre-indictment analysis of due[-]process violations[,] ... the burden of persuasion is on the defendant. In order to prevail[,] ... [the defendant] must show that 1) the pre[-]indictment delay caused actual prejudice to him, and 2) such delay was an intentional device used by the government to obtain a tactical advantage over the accused.

Stack v. State, 860 So.2d 687, 700 (¶ 30) (Miss.2003) (internal citations omitted) (quoting De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547, 569 (¶ 77) (Miss.1997)). Although the State has not offered a reason for the ten-month pre-indictment delay, Ford, who carries the burden in this analysis, has failed to show that the delay caused actual prejudice to him or that the State used the delay to gain a tactical advantage over him. Therefore, this factor weighs against Ford.

C.Assertion of Right to a Speedy Trial

¶ 17. “Ordinarily, a defendant’s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial weighs heavily against him.” Ben, 95 So.3d at 1244 (¶ 18) (citing Spencer v. State, 592 So.2d 1382, 1394 (Miss.1991)). Our supreme court “has determined that defendants have the responsibility to demand a speedy trial between their arrest and their indictment.” Id. at 1245 (¶ 19) (citing Young v. State, 891 So.2d 813, 818 (¶ 13) (Miss.2005)). “[A] defendant’s failure to do so in such instances is critical to an analysis of the speedy-trial issue.” Id. (quoting Young, 891 So.2d at 818 (¶ 13)). Ford never requested a speedy trial. As such, this factor weighs against Ford.

D.Prejudice to Ford

¶ 18. Ford contends that he has suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in bringing him to trial. As evidence of this prejudice, Ford states that witnesses were lost and that his defenses to the charges were diminished by the delay. He additionally alleges that the State, the circuit court, and his defense counsel conspired against him, as he never personally requested any of the continuances. Despite his allegations, Ford does not identify any witness that he cannot locate or any defense that he could not present at trial as a result of the delay. Therefore, it cannot be said that Ford suffered any actual prejudice as a result of the delay between his arrest and his indictment. This factor weighs in favor of the State.

¶ 19. The record does not support a finding that the State violated Ford’s constitutional speedy-trial rights. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

III. Certification of Prior-Convictions Documents

1120. Ford asserts that the State’s use of the certified pen-packs to prove his status as a habitual offender violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. The- Confrontation Clause prevents the admission into evidence “of out-of-court testimonial statements by an unavailable witness offered in a criminal trial to prove the truth of a matter asserted ... unless the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the statement.” Frazier v. State, 907 So.2d 985, 996 (¶ 36) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). This Court has previously determined that pen-packs are not testimonial statements, which would trigger an analysis pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Frazier, 907 So.2d at 997 (¶ 42).

¶ 21. Here, the State did not call as a witness the individual who certified the pen-packs for the State’s use during trial. However, that individual was not required to testify before the pen-packs could be admitted as evidence of Ford’s prior convictions. As this Court stated in Frazier, “[i]f anything, the certificate on the pen[-]packs indicates that the custodian of records swore that the documents were true and correct copies, not that [the defendant] actually committed any act,” and the custodian would not have been qualified to testify to anything else. Id. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

TV. Sharplin Instruction

¶ 22. Ford argues that his conviction and sentence as to the aggravated-assault charge should -be reversed because the circuit court failed to read to the jury the complete Sharplin instruction. Our supreme court has held that the circuit court, upon learning that a jury has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict, may give one of the following instructions:

[P]lease continue [your] deliberations[.] or

I know that it is possible for-honest men and women to have honest different opinions about the facts of a case, but, if it is possible to reconcile your differences of opinion and decide this ease, then you should do so. Accordingly, I remind you that the court originally instructed you that the verdict of the jury must represent the considered judgment of each juror. It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate in view of reaching agreement if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if you are convinced it is erroneous, but do not surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Please continue your deliberations.

Lafayette v. State, 90 So.3d 1215, 1218 (¶ 8) (Miss.2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Sharplin, 330 So.2d at 596). Here, after deliberating for two hours, the jury indicated to the circuit court that it could not reach a verdict on Count I — the aggravated-assault charge. The court recessed for the evening. The following morning, the circuit court read the lengthier version of the Sharplin instruction to the jury. When reading the instruction to the jury, the court failed to read the last sentence of the instruction.

¶ 23. First, Ford’s counsel did not object to the court’s failure to read the last line of the instruction. Ford’s counsel also failed to request a mistrial as a result of the court’s failure to read the last line of the instruction. Therefore, Ford is procedurally barred from arguing this issue on appeal. See Hughes v. State, 90 So.3d 613, 623 (¶ 24) (Miss.2012).

¶ 24. Procedural bar aside, Ford’s argument is without merit. Ford relies on our supreme court’s decision in Bolton v. State, 643 So.2d 942 (Miss.1994), to argue that his conviction should be reversed. However, the facts of Bolton and the facts before this Court are significantly distinguishable. In Bolton, when reading the Sharplin instruction to the jury, the circuit court inserted language regarding the costs of trial and the possibility of impaneling another jury. Bolton, 643 So.2d at 943-44. The supreme court reversed Bolton’s conviction because it could not be sure that the improper instruction did not “taint the jury.” Id. at 945.

¶ 25. Here, prior to reading the instruction, the circuit court informed the jury that, in spite of its inability to reach a verdict, the court would not release the jury. After reading the instruction to the jury, the court let the jury return to deliberations. While the circuit court did err in not reading the complete Sharplin instruction, the error is harmless. The record is clear that the jury continued its deliberations until it reached a unanimous verdict, and there is no evidence that any statement from the circuit court coerced the jury to return with a guilty verdict. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

V. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

¶ 26. Ford requested a directed verdict twice during the trial — at the close of the State’s case and at the close of all of the evidence. By renewing his motion, Ford properly preserved this issue for appellate review. See Foster v. State, 928 So.2d 873, 879 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). A motion for a directed verdict challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (¶ 16) (Miss.2005). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Patton v. State, 109 So.3d 66, 82 (¶ 47) (Miss.2012). Thus, reversal is appropriate “only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty.” Id. (quoting McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993)).

¶ 27. Conversely, a motion for a new trial challenges the weight of the evidence. Williams v. State, 89 So.3d 676, 683 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.2012). Our supreme court has stated:

A motion for a new trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and such motion should be considered with caution. The power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. [Appellate courts] must weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and must therefore look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State’s theory of the case. [Appellate courts] will disturb the verdict only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.

Weeks v. State, 123 So.3d 373, 380 (¶ 14) (Miss.2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

¶28. Ford challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence presented against him at trial by attacking Lackey’s pretrial and in-court identifications of him. According to Ford, Lackey’s in-court identification of him was tainted because the pretrial identification was impermissi-bly suggestive and unreliable. We note that Ford did not participate in a lineup. Lackey saw Ford as he arrived at the sheriffs office with law enforcement officers. Later, after Ford’s interrogation, Lackey told officers that Ford was the individual who shot at his vehicle. Also, Ford did not object at trial to Lackey’s identification of him as the individual who shot at his vehicle; therefore, his argument on appeal attacking the identification is procedurally barred. See Parks v. State, 103 So.3d 772, 775 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2012).

¶ 29. Nevertheless, Ford argues that because this initial procedure was tainted, Lackey’s in-court identification was tainted as well. It is settled that show-ups, which involve “showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification,” have been condemned as being impermissibly suggestive. Whitlock v. State, 47 So.3d 668, 672 (¶ 9) (Miss.2010) (quoting Roche v. State, 913 So.2d 306, 310-11 (¶ 12) (Miss.2005)). However, Lackey’s opportunity to see Ford at the sheriffs office was not arranged by law enforcement officers. In fact, officers were not aware that Lackey saw Ford until later. During trial, Investigator Polk testified:

Yes, as we were going into the jail, Mr. Lackey was able to see him, and after questioning [Ford], a few minutes later, after going into booking, I came back out to the Sheriffs Department!,] which is in conjunction with the jail. I came out and Mr. Lackey had stated, ‘Yes, sir, that’s who done the shooting.”

Therefore, Lackey’s positive identification of Ford was not suggested or coerced by law enforcement officers.

¶ 30. Even if Lackey’s view of Ford at the sheriffs office could be characterized as a show-up for identification purposes, the inquiry does not end with the presence of an impermissibly suggestive identification. Roche, 913 So.2d at 311 (¶ 14). “Such identification is admissible if, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification procedure, the identification did not give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misiden-tification.” Id. (citing York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1383 (Miss.1982)). In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), the United States Supreme Court laid out the factors to consider in determining “whether under the totality of the circumstances the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive”:

As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witnesses] degree of attention, the accuracy of the witnesses] prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

Whitlock, 47 So.3d at 672 (¶ 10) (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375).

¶ 31. When analyzing this case according to the Biggers factors, it cannot be said that the law enforcement officers’ conduct, if impermissibly suggestive, gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Lackey testified that he saw Ford, from approximately twenty yards away, exiting his mobile home and walking towards a gold SUV. Lackey saw that same gold SUV speeding towards him and being driven by the same individual that he saw exit the mobile home. Lackey was certain that it was the same individual because he saw the individual’s head and shoulders “hanging out the window [of the gold SUV] with a gun on the mirror[.]” Additionally, Lackey identified Ford shortly after this incident. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in allowing Lackey’s in-court identification of Ford. Also, Deputy Lingle testified that he and other officers recovered a .40-caliber weapon and male clothing from the mobile home, matching the description of the clothing worn by the shooter. In light of these facts, it cannot be said that the evidence supporting Ford’s convictions is insufficient or that allowing the verdict to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. This issue is without merit.

VI. Cumulative Error

¶ 32. Ford contends that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case requires reversal of his conviction and sentence. Under the cumulative-error doctrine, “individual errors, which are not reversible in themselves, may combine with other errors to make up reversible error, where the cumulative effect of all errors deprives the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.” Ross v. State, 954 So.2d 968, 1018 (¶ 138) (Miss.2007). As the circuit court committed no errors at trial, there can be no reversal based on cumulative errors. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

¶ 33. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF COUNT I, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND SENTENCE, AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER, OF TWENTY YEARS; AND COUNT II, POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON, AND SENTENCE, AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER, OF TEN YEARS, WITH THE SENTENCE IN COUNT II TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO SCOTT COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., CONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591 (Miss. 1976).