text:
    R & G, LLC, et al. v. RCH IV-WB, LLC.
    1111433.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 22, 2013.

      Marcus E. McCrory, Mobile, for appellant, R&G, LLC.
    T. Michael Brown and Jeffrey M. Anderson of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, for appellee.
   STUART, Justice.

R&G, LLC, George D. Copelan, Sr., Gilman Hackel, and Robert Yarbrough (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the appellants”) appeal the $1,350,296 judgment entered against them and in favor of RCH IV-WB, LLC (“RCH”), by the Baldwin Circuit Court. We affirm.

I.

In July 2005, Wolf Bay Partners, L.L.C., executed a promissory note with Wachovia Bank in the original principal amount of $2,550,000. That note was secured by a mortgage on two parcels of property in Baldwin County and guaranteed by each of the appellants, as well as by GDG Properties, LLC, David W. Mobley, and George D. Gordon (hereinafter referred to collectively with the appellants as “the defendants”)- By written agreement of the parties, the amount of the indebtedness was subsequently increased to $2,938,718. Wa-chovia Bank thereafter assigned its interest in the note and mortgage to RCH Mortgage Fund IV, LLC.

Wolf Bay Partners subsequently defaulted on its payment obligations under the terms of the promissory note, and RCH Mortgage Fund IV accordingly commenced foreclosure proceedings on the property secured by the mortgage. On April 14, 2009, RCH, a newly created affiliate of RCH Mortgage Fund IV, purchased the property at a foreclosure sale for $2,000,000, and RCH Mortgage Fund IV thereafter assigned RCH all of its rights under the loan. In June 2009, RCH sued the defendants, seeking to recover $1,046,572 allegedly still due on the promissory note, plus interest accruing at a rate of $305.25 per day, after the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were applied to the debt.

A bench trial was held, at which the defendants challenged ■ the evidence put forth by RCH indicating that the foreclosed-upon mortgage had been properly assigned to RCH Mortgage Fund IV by Wachovia Bank. The defendants also argued that it was improper for RCH Mortgage Fund IV to sell the foreclosed property as a single unit instead of as two separate parcels and that RCH Mortgage Fund IV accepted an allegedly unconscionably low purchase price at the foreclosure sale. The trial court ultimately excluded the evidence put forth by RCH indicating that the mortgage had been assigned to RCH Mortgage Fund IV and set aside.the foreclosure and sale because, for all that appeared, the wrong party — RCH Mortgage Fund IV as opposed to Wachovia Bank — had conducted the foreclosure and sale. The- trial court made no ruling on the defendants’ other arguments because its finding that RCH Mortgage Fund IV was the wrong party to conduct the foreclosure and sale made doing so unnecessary. RCH appealed the trial court’s judgment to this Court, and, on August 12, 2011, in RCH IV-WB, LLC v. Wolf Bay Partners, L.L.C., 78 So.3d 395, 399 (Ala.2011), we held that RCH’s evidence of mortgage assignment should have been considered by the trial court. Accordingly, we “reverse[d] the trial court’s judgment and remand[ed] the case for proceedings consistent with [our] opinion.” Id.

It appears that, following our remand, a status conference'was held on December 19, 2011; however, the record contains no transcription of that hearing. On January 6, 2012, RCH filed a post-remand brief with the trial court, arguing that, in light of this Court’s decision in RCH LV-WB, there was nothing for the trial court to do but confirm the amount of the final judgment to be entered in favor of RCH. RCH further argued that the arguments made by the defendants in their pleadings and at the bench trial that RCH Mortgage Fund IV had acted improperly 1) by selling the foreclosed property as a single unit instead of as separate parcels and 2) by accepting an allegedly unconscionably low purchase price were unsupported by Alabama law.

RCH’s January 6 brief was served on all the defendants; however, none of them filed a response. Two months later, on March 5, 2012, the trial court entered its final judgment in favor of RCH, stating:

“This case is on remand from the Alabama Supreme Court.
“On the evidence presented, the court finds that the sale of the 2 distinct properties en masse impaired the ability of the debtor(s) to redeem the property because debtor was unable to redeem one property without redeeming both properties.
“However, both properties were encumbered under one mortgage. That mortgage included an independent clause that provided the mortgagee with the sole discretion to sell all encumbered property either as an entirety or in separate parcels. The mortgagee chose to sell in one parcel.
“Judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount of $1,046,572.31, plus interest of $303,723.75.”

On April 4, 2012, Hackel and Yarbrough moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., and also asked the trial court for leave to submit a response to RCH’s January 6 brief and to stay execution of the judgment. On June 12, 2012, the trial court denied that motion, and, on July 24, 2012, the appellants filed their notice of appeal to this Court.

II.

The trial court originally entered a judgment following a bench trial; that judgment was reversed on appeal, and, on remand, the trial court entered a new judgment. The ore tenus standard of review generally applies to judgments entered following a bench trial. See, e.g., Board of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile Cnty. v. Weaver, 99 So.3d 1210, 1216 (Ala.2012) (“Because the trial court heard ore tenus evidence during the bench trial, the ore tenus standard of review applies.”). However, in this appeal, the relevant facts are undisputed, and the appellants’ argument raises only a question of law. We review questions of law de novo. Ruttenberg v. Friedman, 97 So.3d 114, 134 (Ala.2012) (“Although the ore tenus standard of review is applicable here, because this issue presents a question of law and does not concern a disputed issue of fact, our review is de novo.”).

III.

Before we consider the merits of the appellants’ arguments, we first consider RCH’s argument that this appeal is untimely and should therefore be dismissed. When RCH initiated this action by filing a complaint in June 2009, the case was docketed as case number CV-2009-900753.00 (emphasis added). Following this Court’s opinion reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings, the trial court apparently assigned the case a new suffix, CV-2009-900753.50 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, when RCH filed its post-remand brief on January 6, 2012, it was stamped as being filed in case number CV-2009-900753.00.

On April 4, 2012 — 30 days after the entry of the trial court’s March 5, 2012, judgment in favor of RCH — Hackel and Yarbrough filed a motion asking the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). That motion, however, was filed in ease number CV-2009-900753.00. The next day, April 5, 2012, Hackel and Yarbrough refiled their Rule 59(e) motion in case number CV-2009-900753.80. RCH now argues that that April 5 motion was untimely because a motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment must be filed “not later than thirty (30) days after entry of the judgment,” and Hackel and Yarbrough’s April 5 motion was filed in case number CV-2009-900753.80 on the 31st day after the judgment was entered. Rule 59(e). Accordingly, RCH argues, that untimely Rule 59(e) motion did not toll the 42-day period for filing a notice of appeal, and the notice of appeal filed by the appellants on July 24, 2012 — 141 days after the trial court’s March 5 judgment — was untimely, thus making it necessary for this Court to dismiss the appeal. See Miller Props., LLC v. Green, 958 So.2d 850, 851-52 (Ala.2006) (holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this Court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal).

We agree with RCH that the motion filed on April 5, had it been the only Rule 59(e) motion filed, was untimely and insufficient to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. However, we recognize and give effect to the motion filed on April 4. Following remand, this case proceeded under a new docket number, CV-2009-900753.80 as opposed to CV-2009-900758.00. However, the record reveals that, post-remand, parties on both sides nevertheless continued to make filings under the original docket number — CV-2009-900753.00. For all that appears, those filings were considered by the trial court, which has also granted the appellants’ motion to supplement the record in CV-2009-900753.80 to include the April 4 motion filed in CV-2009-900753.00. On the basis of all these facts, we consider the appellants’ appeal to be timely filed because the April 4 motion tolled the time for filing the notice of appeal.

The timeliness of the appeal having been established, we must next consider the merits of the appeal. The appellants’ only argument on appeal is that the trial court violated established rules of procedure and fundamental notions of due process by entering a judgment following this Court’s remand without holding a new trial. We begin by noting Ex parte Edwards, 727 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala.1998), in which we stated:

“ ‘ “It is the duty of the trial court, on remand, to comply strictly with the mandate of the appellate court according to its true intent and meaning, as determined by the directions given by the reviewing court. No judgment other than that directed or permitted by the reviewing court may be entered.... The appellate court’s decision is final as to all matters before it, becomes the law of the case, and must be executed according to the mandate, without granting a new trial or taking additional evidence

(Quoting Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 431 So.2d 151, 155 (Ala.1983), quoting in turn 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error § 991 (1962).) In RCH IV-WB, we closed by stating: “[W]e reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.” 78 So.3d at 399. We did not state, as did the Court of Civil Appeals in Matthews Bros. Construction Co. v. Stonebrook Development, L.L.C., 854 So.2d 573, 583 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), when it reversed a judgment entered following a bench trial, that “the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.” Thus, the trial court did not ignore any specific instructions from this Court to conduct a new trial, and, upon further review, its actions following remand were consistent with both our opinion in RCH IV-WB and principles of due process.

“The hallmarks of procedural due process are notice and ‘the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ’ ” Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So.2d 337, 344 (Ala.2004) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), quoting in turn Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). There is no allegation in this case that the appellants were not given proper notice of the first bench trial and/or an opportunity to fully argue their case at that trial. Although the trial court deemed it unnecessary to rule on any arguments made by the defendants at the bench trial other than the mortgage-assignment issue, it is evident from the record in RCH IV-WB that other arguments were fully presented and argued, including the arguments that it was improper for RCH Mortgage Fund IV to sell the foreclosed property as a single unit instead of as separate parcels and that RCH Mortgage Fund IV accepted an allegedly unconscionably low purchase price at the foreclosure sale. See Henderson v. Henderson, 73 So.3d 1282, 1284 n. 3 (Ala.Civ.App.2011) (stating that the Court of Civil Appeals “would take judicial notice of the records in the previous proceedings involving these parties to the extent that they pertained to the issues involved in this appeal”). In fact, in the brief Copelan, Hackel, and Yarbrough filed in RCH IV-WB, they expressly adopted the statement of facts set forth by Gordon and GDG Properties in their brief, in which they acknowledged ' that evidence was offered at the bench trial “as to the insufficiency of the sales price at the foreclosure sale and that the property should have been sold in parcels, instead of en masse.” Brief of Gordon and GDG Properties in RCH IV-WB, p. 14.

Moreover, not only were the appellants given a full opportunity to argue their case at the bench trial, they also had ample opportunity to argue their case post-remand. Notably, this is not a case where the trial court entered a judgment immediately following our remand; rather, approximately three and one-half months went by after this Court issued its certifí-cate of judgment in RCH IV-WB before the trial court held a status conference. Some three weeks later, RCH filed and served upon the appellants its post-remand brief. However, for all that appears, the appellants did nothing during this time, a course of action they maintained for another two months until the trial court entered its judgment. After one more month elapsed, the appellants finally submitted their first post-remand filing, a Rule 59(e) motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment the trial court entered on remand. Under this set of facts, we cannot agree that the trial court in any way denied the appellants due process by entering its post-remand judgment and thereafter denying the appellants’ Rule 59 motion. The appellants had over six months to file a post-remand brief or motion; however, they took no action in that regal'd. “The fact that [the appellants] did not avail [themselves] of this opportunity [to argue their case] does not show that [they were] not given the opportunity.” Dillard v. Southern States Ford, Inc., 541 So.2d 483, 485 (Ala.1989).

We further note that the caselaw submitted by the appellants in support of them argument is inapplicable. In both Ex parte Plumbline Construction, Inc., 992 So.2d 746 (Ala.Civ.App.2008), and Coker v. Farmers Mutual Exchange, 425 So.2d 489 (Ala.Civ.App.1983), the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgments of the trial courts after trials were conducted without providing the notice required by Rule 40, Ala. R. Civ. P. In this case, however, there is no allegation that the bench trial was conducted in violation of Rule 40; rather, the appellants desire a new trial on remand. As explained supra, however, a new trial was not required by either our opinion reversing the judgment and remanding the case or by principles of due process.

IV.

RCH sued the appellants seeking a deficiency balance owed after a foreclosure sale. Following a full bench trial on the issues, the trial- court entered a judgment in favor of the appellants; however, this Court subsequently reversed that judgment in RCH IV-WB and remanded the case. Approximately six months after the case was remanded to it, the trial court entered a new judgment in favor of RCH. For the reasons set forth herein, that judgment is hereby affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

MOORE, C.J., and PARKER, MURDOCK, and WISE, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Michael L. KEATING v. Jodi K. KEATING.
    2110816.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    March 8, 2013.

      Thomas P. Ollinger, Jr., Mobile, for appellant.
    Submitted on appellant’s brief only.
   On Application for Rehearing

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

This court’s opinion of December 14, 2012, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

Michael L. Keating (“the husband”) appeals from a judgment divorcing him from Jodi K. Keating (“the wife”). In the judgment, the trial court, among other things, divided the marital property and ordered the husband to pay the wife $1,000 each month in periodic alimony.

This court’s review of the record indicates the following. The parties married in March 1998. One child was born of the marriage. The child was 11 years old at the time of the trial. When the parties married, the wife said, she was a regional manager for a finance company. The wife testified that no money was owed on the house she lived in at the time she married the husband. The husband worked for a restaurant chain in Mobile. He did not own any real property at the time of the marriage, so the parties lived in the wife’s house. Eventually, the wife said, they sold her house and built a new house. Later, they sold that house and moved into the house in which they were living when the wife filed for a divorce in April 2010. The wife also testified that, when the parties married, she paid off the husband’s credit-card debt of between $8,000 and $9,000 and his student loans, which were a “few thousand dollars.”

The wife testified that she sought a divorce on the ground of adultery. She said that, in 2007, she discovered that the husband was having an affair with someone with whom he was attending graduate school. The wife said that the husband told her that their marriage was over, that he was in love' with the woman with whom he was having an affair, and that he and that woman planned to marry. However, the wife testified, the woman decided to return to her own husband. The husband, in turn, returned to the wife and, according to the wife, “pretty much acted perfect” for a time, but, the wife said, the affair had had a “catastrophic, heartbreaking” effect on the marriage.

In April 2010, the wife said, she learned that the husband was having another affair, this time with someone with whom he had worked. She said that the husband told her at that time that their marriage was over and that she asked him for his wedding band and his key to the marital residence. The wife testified that she asked the husband to leave the residence but that he refused, telling her his attorney had told him not to move. The wife said that she filed for a divorce the day after she learned of the husband’s 2010 affair, but she stayed in the marital residence about two more weeks. During that two-week period, the wife said, the husband would talk openly on the telephone with the woman with whom he was having the affair, and he continued to refuse the wife’s request that he leave the house. After about two weeks, the wife said, she and the parties’ child moved out of the marital residence and into a smaller house, and the wife began having to pay rent.

At the time of the trial, the parties owed $292,574 on the first mortgage on the marital residence. They also had a home-equity line of credit with a balance of approximately $54,000. Documentary evidence was introduced indicating that the husband had purchased a house in Daphne (“the Daphne house”) in February 2010, about two months before the wife filed for the divorce. The wife testified that the husband did not tell her about the Daphne house, and her name did not appear on any of the paperwork regarding the house. The wife testified that, after she learned about the Daphne house, the husband told her that he had cashed in a retirement account for the down payment. There was approximately $19,000 in the retirement account. The settlement statement prepared for the purchase of the Daphne house indicated that the husband had made a down payment of $22,391.98. The mortgage balance for the Daphne house was approximately $72,000 at the time of the trial. At the time of the trial, the husband was earning rental income from the Daphne house, and he had offered the renters an option to purchase the house for $117,900.

At the time of the trial, the wife worked at a bank earning an annual income of approximately $59,640. The husband worked for the United States Army Corps of Engineers and had an annual income of approximately $84,575. In addition to their respective jobs, the parties at one time had owned an engraving and personalization shop called Personally Yours Gifts & Accessories, LLC (“PY”). The wife owned 51% of PY; the husband owned 49%. The wife testified that PY never turned a “significant profit” and that it had “a lot of debt.” The wife said that she had filed a claim with BP, an oil company, for revenue PY had lost as a result of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. She said she had received $15,065 from BP and $72,900 from the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in connection with the oil spill. The wife testified that she had used the money she received as a result of the oil spill to pay PY’s expenses, including paying off debt, paying outstanding invoices to vendors, and making payroll. The wife said that after she and the husband separated, the husband told her he wanted nothing more to do with PY. She said that she had closed PY and had sold the furniture, fixtures, and existing inventory for $65,000. The wife testified that, after using the oil-spill money and the money from the sale of the assets of PY, the business was still approximately $20,000 in debt. The evidence was undisputed that, despite being a 49% partner in PY, the husband had not paid anything toward its debt.

In addition to his share of PY, the husband had a second business, Keating & Associates. Through Keating & Associates, the husband wrote grants for government projects, engaged in “project management,” and did “stuff’ for an architectural firm and firms he had had contact with in previous jobs. Keating & Associates had no employees other than the husband. The wife testified that Keating & Associates also earned income from assisting BP after the oil spill in the Gulf. The parties’ “proposed” tax return for 2010 indicated that Keating & Associates had income of $109,791 that year. The husband said that, because of his full-time job with the Army Corps of Engineers, he did not have the time to devote to the projects he had been working on through Keating & Associates. At the time of the trial, he said, he was not earning an income from Keating & Associates. However, the husband also testified that, a month before the trial, he had become a one-third partner in a venture called Global Infrastructures Systems and Services, which was established. to do “energy management work.” He said that he expected to earn a third of any profit derived from that business. The husband has also taught engineering courses at Faulkner University and the University of South Alabama, earning approximately $12,000 annually.

The wife had a retirement account through her employer of approximately $20,409. She testified that, at one time, she had an additional retirement account of more than $60,000, but the parties closed that account and used the proceeds toward the purchase of the marital residence. The husband had numerous retirement accounts at the time of the trial. Those accounts totaled approximately $57,386.

The wife testified that she had been using credit cards to meet her monthly expenses after she and the husband separated. Both parties were questioned extensively regarding their finances, including their debt, the necessity for certain expenditures, the necessity for certain deductions from their respective paychecks, loans, and business profits and losses. Both parties contended that the other had access to money that was unaccounted for in the documents exchanged during discovery.

After the wife filed for a divorce in April 2010, the parties entered into a “Temporary Agreement Pending Final Hearing.” Pursuant to that agreement, which the trial court adopted on June 4, 2010-, the husband was to retain possession of the marital residence. He also was to continue to make the payments on the first mortgage on that residence and to pay for all utilities for the marital residence. The husband and the wife were to be equally responsible for the payments on the home-equity line of credit.

The husband and the wife also agreed to “share joint custody of the minor child,” with the wife having primary physical custody subject to the husband’s visitation. However, the parties also agreed to evenly divide “all expenses related to the minor child,” with the caveat that

“[a]ny cost greater that $50.0Q must be mutually agreed upon. Including but not limited to:
“1. Educational tuition, fees and meals/snacks.
“2. Extracurricular activities.
“3. Summer camps and daycare.
“4. Cell phone bill.
“5. Clothing.
“6. Doctor/co-pay expenses and prescriptions.”

As to those expenses, the husband agreed to reimburse the wife for payments she made on his behalf within 14 days of notification.

After the trial, the trial court entered a judgment divorcing the parties on the ground of adultery. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of the child, and the wife was awarded primary physical custody. The husband was ordered to pay $1,123 per month in child support. In addition, the husband was ordered to pay the wife a total of $17,259.82 in past-due pendente lite child support. However, after a hearing on the husband’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, the trial court amended the judgment and awarded the wife $8,629.91 in pendente lite child support. That figure represents half of the original award, to reflect the parties’ agreement.

The trial court ordered that the marital home be sold and that any equity remaining after the payment of the mortgage, the home-equity line of credit, and fees related to the sale of the home was to be paid to the wife. The husband was allowed to remain in the marital residence until it sold, and he was ordered to be responsible for making the payments on both the first mortgage and the home-equity line of credit. The husband also was awarded the house he had purchased in Daphne.

The wife was awarded all the business interest in PY. The husband was awarded all the business interest in Keating & Associates. The parties were each awarded their respective vehicles. In addition, the trial court ordered that the wife was to be responsible for paying the debt on one of the parties’ credit cards, which had a balance of approximately $72 five months before the judgment was entered. The trial court ordered that three of the parties’ savings or “ETrade” accounts be liquidated to pay the debt incurred on two other credit cards, which had a combined outstanding balance of approximately $31,210.84 five months before the judgment was entered. The husband was ordered to pay any remaining marital debt, excluding debt “attached” to the marital residence. Finally, the husband was ordered to pay the wife $1,000 a month in periodic alimony.

The husband timely appealed. The wife, who has proceeded pro se at times during this litigation, did not submit a brief on appeal.

Our standard of review of a judgment determining an award of alimony and dividing marital property is well settled.

“When the trial court fashions a property division following the presentation of ore tenus evidence, its judgment as to that evidence is presumed correct on appeal and will not be reversed absent a showing that the trial court exceeded its discretion or that its decision is plainly and palpably wrong. Roberts v. Roberts, 802 So.2d 230, 235 (Ala.Civ.App.2001); Parrish v. Parrish, 617 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); and Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So.2d 408, 410 (Ala.1986). A property division is required to be equitable, not equal, and a determination of what is equitable rests within the broad discretion of the trial court. Parrish, 617 So.2d at 1038. In fashioning a property division and an award of alimony, the trial court must consider factors such as the earning capacities of the parties; their future prospects; their ages, health, and station in life; the length of the parties’ marriage; and the source, value, and type of marital property. Robinson v. Robinson, 795 So.2d 729, 734 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). ‘[W]e note that there is no rigid standard or mathematical formula on which a trial court must base its determination of alimony and the division of marital assets.’ Yohey v. Yohey, 890 So.2d 160, 164 (Ala.Civ.App.2004).”

Stone v. Stone, 26 So.3d 1232, 1236 (Ala.Civ.App.2009).

The husband contends that the amount of past-due pendente lite child support the trial court awarded to the wife in the final judgment was mathematically incorrect or, alternatively, that the trial court exceeded its discretion in making that award because, the husband says, the award violated the temporary agreement the parties had reached during the pen-dency of the litigation.

The trial court awarded the wife $20,731 for expenses she had incurred on behalf of the child. The trial court then offset that amount by $3,471.18 for expenses the husband had incurred on behalf of the child, and it determined that the husband owed the wife $17,259.82 in pendente lite support. The trial court then divided that amount in half, to reflect the parties’ agreement, so that the wife was awarded $8,629.91. However, this court is unable to discern from the record how the trial court arrived at the initial figure of $20,731 in expenses, on which the other calculations were based.

The wife testified that she had kept up with the expenses she had incurred on behalf of the child during the 19 months between the time the trial court entered an order adopting the temporary agreement and the entry of the final judgment. The total amount of those expenses was $18,542.66. The wife agreed that the husband’s share of those expenses would have been $9,271.33. In addition, the wife acknowledged that she did not make all of her share of the payments toward the home-equity line of credit as called for in the temporary agreement. When the husband was given a credit for those missed payments, the wife said, he would owe her a total of $5,196.33. The wife also acknowledged that she did not discuss with the husband each expenditure of more than $50 spent on behalf of the child; however, she said, the husband had refused to discuss anything with her and, throughout the pendency of the litigation, had refused to reimburse her for those expenditures.

In his original brief to this court, the husband asserted that he owes the wife only $371.25 in pendente lite support for the 19 months the temporary agreement was in effect. On rehearing, the husband contends that, “upon further analysis,” he does not owe any pendente lite support. Given that the parties had agreed to divide the expenses incurred on behalf of the child, including expenses for items such as tuition, fees, meals and snacks, clothes, medical expenses, and the child’s extracurricular activities, the husband’s claim that he should pay less than $400 toward support of the child for a 19-month period is implausible.

From the evidence contained in the record, the trial court could have determined that the husband was uncooperative in sharing expenses incurred on behalf of the child and that the wife ■ wás entitled to reimbursement for the expenses for which she had documentation. Nonetheless, because we cannot determine how the trial court arrived at the award of $8,629.91 in pendente lite child support to the wife, we must reverse the judgment as to this issue and remand the cause for' the trial court to recalculate the amount of pendente lite support owed to the wife or to demonstrate how it reached the $20,731 amount of expenses on which its award is based.

The husband also argues that the final judgment requiring him to make the monthly payments on both the first mortgage on the marital residence and the home-equity line of credit was inequitable because, he says, approximately half of the balance on the home-equity line of credit was attributable to the purchase of the wife’s vehicle. He states that, “[f]or that reason alone, arguably, she should be obligated to pay one-half of the [home-equity line of credit] installments.... ” The husband’s argument as to this issue is one paragraph in length, and he fails to cite any authority in’ support of his position.

“Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R.App. P.,] requires that arguments in briefs contain discussions of facts and relevant legal authorities that support the party’s position. If they do not, the arguments are waived. Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 849 So.2d 914, 928 (Ala.2002); Arrington v. Mathis, 929 So.2d 468, 470 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App.2005); Hamm v. State, 913 So.2d 460, 486 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). ‘This is so, because “ ‘it is not the function of this Court to do a party’s legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or. argument.’ ” ’ Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So.2d 1, 9 (Ala.2007) (quoting. Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 20 (Ala.2003), quoting in turn Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala.1994)).”

White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So.2d 1042, 1058 (Ala.2008).

Moreover, we note that, in the final judgment, the trial court permitted the husband to remain in the marital residence until it is sold. Also, the parties had used the money from the wife’s retirement account to make the down payment on the marital residence. The record indicates that when the wife discovered the husband was involved in a second extramarital affair, the husband acknowledged the affair and told the wife that their marriage was “over.” When the wife asked the husband to leave the marital residence, the husband refused, so the wife and the child moved to a separate residence for which the wife has had to pay rent. The wife said the house she and the child were renting had approximately half the square footage of the marital residence. She also said that the marital residence had a pool; the rental house did not. Throughout the pendency of the litigation, the husband remained in the marital residence. At the same time, he failed to reimburse the wife for his share of the expenses incurred on behalf of the child. The husband has had the benefit of remaining in the marital residence, and, as he told the trial court, his lifestyle has not changed since the wife and the child left the marital residence. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the husband to make both the monthly mortgage payments on the marital residence and the monthly payments on the balance owed on the home-equity line of credit.

The husband also argues that the award of $1,000 each month in periodic alimony to the wife is not justified and is inequitable. The wife worked as a branch manager of a bank and said her take-home pay was $3,156.52 each month. In his brief on appeal, the husband attempts to demonstrate that the wife’s “true” monthly income was actually $3,667.65, and not $3,156.52 as the wife had claimed. The husband attempts to discount the amount the wife contributed to her retirement account and to the payment of her health-insurance premium. He also challenges a number of the expenses on her budget as being too high or unnecessary. The husband ultimately determines that, by his calculation, when child support is considered, the wife would have a surplus of $518.81 each month without receiving alimony.

■ On the other hand, the husband claimed that he had a monthly “disposable income” of $5,112.14. It appears that that income was only what he earned from his job with the Army Corps of Engineers. It did not include his teaching jobs, from which he earned approximately $12,000 annually, income he earned from the rental property he had purchased in Daphne, or his income from Keating & Associates, which was more than $100,000 before the divorce, or from his consulting work with Global Infrastructures Systems and Services. The husband claimed that, based on his monthly take-home pay of $5,112.14, he would have a shortfall of $201.04 each month if he were required to pay $1,000 a month in alimony. Based on the evidence, the trial court could have believed the wife’s calculations as to her income and expenses over the husband’s calculations. Additionally, the trial court could have determined that the husband’s total income was sufficient to pay the wife $1,000 a month in alimony without “crippling” him, as the husband argues. Also, we note that the payments toward the mortgage and the balance of the home-equity line of credit constitute $3,190.18 of the husband’s monthly expenditures. When the marital residence sells, the husband will be relieved of that burden and will be able to lower his monthly mortgage or rental payments if he chooses.

Furthermore, in determining whether to award alimony and divide marital property, the trial court may consider the relative fault of the parties for the breakdown of the marriage. Lackey v. Lackey, 18 So.3d 393, 401 (Ala.Civ.App.2009); and Davis v. Davis, 108 So.3d 1057, 1059 (Ala.Civ.App.2012). “ “Where one spouse is guilty of misconduct toward the other spouse, the trial court’s award may be as liberal as the estate of the offending spouse will permit under the circumstances.’ ” McDowell v. McDowell, 644 So.2d 27, 28 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) (quoting Shirley v. Shirley, 600 So.2d 284, 287 (Ala.Civ.App.1992)).

In his brief, the husband appears to argue that the trial court should not have considered evidence of his adultery in awarding the wife alimony because, he says, the parties reconciled after his affair in 2007 came to light and he and the wife were intimate after the wife learned of the 2010 affair. The husband did not provide any authority for his contention that, because the parties were intimate after they separated, the trial court could not consider the husband’s adultery when determining whether to award alimony.

The wife acknowledged that the two had been intimate after she discovered the husband’s second affair. She testified that after she had moved to the rental house, the husband had occasionally come over and “acted like he missed” her. She said that they would watch television and have a glass, of wine and that, oh “probably three” occasions, they had “wound up having relations.” , The wife said their intimacy had occurred because she was lonely and missed the husband and because he had told her that he missed her and “not to give up.” The wife also testified that, after they had been intimate, the husband told her that he was still seeing the woman with whom he had been having an affair but that the wife could no longer pursue a divorce on the ground of adultery because they had had sex since they had separated. However, the wife said, she never moved back in with the husband and they never reconciled after the second affair. The husband, on the other hand, testified that the wife had been the instigator of their intimacy after they separated. He did not contend that they had ever reconciled after the second affair. The husband also cites no authority to support his contention that the parties’ intimacy after separating necessarily requires a determination that the wife condoned the affair. In fact, our review of the record indicates that the wife never forgave or condoned the husband’s conduct.

Based on the evidence of the husband’s adultery, his various sources of income, the amount of his income and the wife’s income, the changes in the wife and child’s lifestyle, and the husband’s comment that his lifestyle had not changed at all since he and the wife had separated, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the husband to pay the wife $1,000 a month in periodic alimony.

The husband asserts that the trial court exceeded its discretion in divesting him of his interest in the parties’ engraving business, PY. The wife testified that the business had not been profitable and that she had sold the business. She said that she had used the proceeds from the sale, as well as money received as a result of the oil spill, to pay PYs debts, but that PY still had debt of about $20,000. The husband acknowledged that he had not paid any money toward PY’s debt, even though he was a 49% shareholder in the business. Furthermore, in arguing that divesting him of his share of PY was inequitable, the husband never mentions that the trial court awarded him Keating & Associates and divested the wife of any interest she may have had in that business. The husband conceded that, although he did not have the time he once had to put into Keating & Associates, it was still an ongoing concern. Evidence also indicated that the husband had just become a partner in another consulting business from which he expected to earn income. The husband’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in divesting him of his interest in PY is not well taken.

The husband also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring him to liquidate financial accounts to pay certain marital debt. The liquidation of the accounts, which were accumulated during the course of the marriage, to pay marital debt necessarily meant that neither the husband nor the wife received proceeds from those accounts. As mentioned, the trial court heard the evidence regarding the parties’ respective incomes and debt, their employment opportunities, and the causes of the breakdown of the marriage. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that the proceeds of certain financial accounts be used to pay the parties’ debt.

The husband also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in mandating more expensive health-insurance coverage through the wife’s employer rather than the insurance available through his employer in calculating child support. The husband cites no authority for this contention. Accordingly, this argument is waived. White Sands Group, 998 So.2d at 1058.

The husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife $12,000 to be paid toward her attorney fee. In support of his contention, the husband states that the wife failed to demonstrate that she had a financial need for an award of an attorney fee and that there was no evidentiary basis for an award of $12,000.

“ ‘Whether to award an attorney fee in a domestic relations case is within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent an abuse of that discretion, its ruling on that question will not be reversed. Thompson v. Thompson, 650 So.2d 928 (Ala.Civ. App.1994). “Factors to be considered by the trial court when awarding such fees include the financial circumstances of the parties, the parties’ conduct, the results of the litigation, and, where appropriate, the trial court’s knowledge and experience as to the value of the services performed by the attorney.” Figures v. Figures, 624 So.2d 188, 191 (Ala.Civ.App.1998).’
“Glover v. Glover, 678 So.2d 174, 176 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).”

E.A.B. v. D.G.W., [Ms. 2100718, Sept. 7, 2012] — So.3d -, - (Ala.Civ.App. 2012).

In this case, as mentioned, the trial court could have determined that the husband’s financial circumstances were more favorable than the wife’s. The evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that the husband’s conduct was the primary cause of the breakdown of the marriage. The trial court’s judgment indicated that it rejected many of the husband’s arguments during the litigation. Moreover, contrary to the husband’s assertion that there was no evidentiary basis for the value of the services of the wife’s attorneys, the wife testified that she had paid $5,000 to the attorney who first represented her in this case and who filed the complaint on her behalf. In addition, by the time of the trial, the wife said, she had paid her current attorney $10,000 and was aware that she still owed her attorney for outstanding expenses. We note that the record in this case is 1,010 pages long, excluding the 8 boxes of exhibits, which hold about 500 pages of documents each. The wife’s testimony regarding the amount she had paid to her attorneys provided the trial court with an evidentiary basis for its award of an attorney fee; therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the husband to pay the wife an attorney fee of $12,000. See T.K.T. v. F.P.T., 716 So.2d 1235, 1240 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife an attorney fee of $15,000 when wife’s attorney’s fees totaled $20,250 and she had already paid attorney $7,100 and costs of $3,418.15).

Finally, the husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to enforce a purported “settlement agreement” the parties had reached before the trial of this matter. The husband cites a motion to withdraw that the wife’s-first attorney filed with the court. As grounds for his request to withdraw from the case, the wife’s first attorney stated:

“1. The [wife] and [the husband] have apparently reached a settlement agreement in said case.
“2. The [wife] has informed the undersigned counsel that she wishes to allow [the husband’s] attorney, Mr. Thomas P. Ollinger, to draft said settlement agreement and represent herself pro se from this point forward.”

The trial court granted the motion on February 4, 2011. Less than two weeks later, the wife retained a second attorney, who filed a notice of appearance on February 16, 2011. It appears that the husband’s attorney drafted a settlement agreement, and the husband signed it on February 9, 2011. The wife, however, never signed the document, and the husband filed a motion seeking enforcement of the purported settlement agreement. A hearing was held on the motion on April 8, 2011. On May 11, 2011, the trial court entered an order stating that, after hearing testimony and arguments on the husband’s motion, it was denying what it called an “interim order.”

A transcript of the April 8, 2011, proceedings does not appear in the record. Because we do not have a transcript of the April 8, 2011, hearing, we must assume that the evidence presented at that hearing supports the trial court’s decision not to enforce the purported settlement agreement. See Leeth v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 789 So.2d 243, 247 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (“ ‘[W]hen a trial court’s order is based on evidence that is not before the appellate court, we conclusively presume that the court’s judgment is supported by the evidence.’ ” (quoting Newman v. State, 623 So.2d 1171, 1172 (Ala.Civ.App.1993))).

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse that portion of the judgment awarding the wife pendente lite child support in the amount of $8,629.91, and we remand the cause for the trial court to reconsider the award or to provide this court with guidance as to how the amount of the award was determined and to enter a judgment accordingly. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED; OPINION OF DECEMBER 14, 2012, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

PITTMAN, THOMAS, MOORE, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.


author: THOMPSON, Presiding Judge. MOORE, Judge,

text:
    Derek Anthony SANTIAGO v. Jenny Kim SANTIAGO. Jenny Kim Santiago v. Derek Anthony Santiago.
    2110654.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    March 8, 2013.

      Christina L. Dixon, Huntsville, for appellant/cross-appellee Derek Anthony Santiago.

      Page A. Banks, Huntsville, for appel-lee/cross-appellant Jenny Kim Santiago.
   THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

Derek Anthony Santiago (“the husband”) appeals, and Jenny Kim Santiago (“the wife”) cross-appeals, from the judgment of the Madison Circuit Court (“the trial court”) modifying the parties’ June 29, 2010, divorce judgment.

The parties’ divorce was uncontested. The divorce judgment incorporated the terms of a settlement agreement reached by the parties on May 19, 2010. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the divorce judgment divided the marital property and awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Among other things, the divorce judgment awarded the wife a portion (30% or $919.40, whichever is greater) per month of the husband’s military-retirement income; it also awarded her one-half the balance of the husband’s Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”) and one-half of the balance of his 401 (k) retirement account. The divorce judgment, subject to certain conditions, ordered the wife to convey to the husband her one-half interest in the marital home and for the husband to pay the wife her one-half equity in the home; the divorce judgment also permitted the wife to remain in the marital home for 90 days following the entry of the divorce judgment, with the husband being responsible for the mortgage payments and certain utility and other household expenses.

Regarding child support and alimony, the divorce judgment ordered the husband to pay the wife child support in the amount of $808 per month and alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month for five years. The divorce judgment also ordered the husband to maintain the children on his health-insurance policy and to pay for their “medicine” and co-pays not covered by insurance. The divorce judgment further ordered the husband to pay for the children’s reasonable college expenses. The divorce judgment noted that the child-support guidelines under Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., had not been followed because the parties had agreed to a true joint-custody arrangement. Neither party appealed the divorce judgment.

On October 1, 2010, only three months and a few days after the entry of the parties’ divorce judgment, the husband filed in the trial court a petition to modify his child-support obligation under the divorce judgment. In his petition, the husband alleged that the wife had become gainfully employed and that her employment constituted a material change of circumstances warranting a recalculation of child support. The husband specifically requested that the trial court “re-calculate child support based on the parties’ current income and modify the amount of child support to be paid by the [husband] to the [wife] making it retro-active from the time of filing this Petition.” The husband also sought an attorney fee.

On October 21, 2010, the wife, proceeding pro se, filed an “Answer/Counter Petition,” and on October 29, 2010, the wife, represented by counsel, filed an amended answer and counterclaimed to modify the husband’s child-support obligation under the divorce judgment. Although in her answer the wife denied that her employment constituted a material change of circumstances warranting modification of the husband’s child-support obligation, the wife alleged in her counterclaim that the husband was paying 20% less than required under Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., and that that fact constituted a material change of circumstances warranting a recalculation of his child-support obligation. The wife requested that the trial court recalculate the amount of child support to be paid by the husband pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.J. Admin., and to make it retroactive from the time of the filing of his petition. The wife also sought an attorney fee.

On March 9, 2011, the husband filed an amended petition to modify the divorce judgment. In his amended petition, the husband alleged that the wife’s employment, as well as her receipt of a portion of his monthly military-retirement income pursuant to the divorce judgment, constituted a material change of circumstance warranting a recalculation of child support based on the parties’ current income. In addition, the husband requested that the trial court order the wife to pay one-half of the uncovered medical expenses and co-pays for the children and to further order the wife to pay a pro rata share of college expenses for the children. The husband requested, in the alternative, that the trial court order a lesser amount of periodic alimony or terminate his periodic-alimony obligation.

On April 7, 2011, the wife filed an amended petition to modify the divorce judgment. In her amended petition, the wife alleged that there had been a material change in circumstances such that she required an increase in periodic alimony and an increase in the duration of periodic alimony because, among other reasons, she wanted to pursue additional training and education to help her obtain employment that would sufficiently cover her monthly living expenses and allow her to support herself in the future. The wife also sought an attorney fee.

The trial court held an ore tenus hearing on November 28, 2011. Shortly thereafter, on December 12, 2011, the trial court entered a modification judgment that, among other things, increased the husband’s child-support obligation from $808 per month to $1,496.70 per month and terminated his periodic-alimony obligation. The modification judgment ordered, in part:

“1. The court GRANTS the request of [the husband] to re-calculate child support based on the parties’ current income. The Court determines the support the [husband] shall pay to the [wife] towards the support and maintenance of the parties’ minor children [is] the sum of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIX AND 70/100 ($1,496.70) DOLLARS, per month. This modification is made retroactive from the filing of this petition. The child support guidelines set forth in Rule 32, [Ala. R. Jud. Admin.,] have been followed and applied.
“2. The Court concludes the [wife’s] earnings constitute a material change of circumstances. The alimony award is hereby TERMINATED, effective January, 2012. The [husband’s] request for retroactive termination of alimony is hereby DENIED.
“3. All remaining claims of the parties not ruled on herein are hereby DENIED.
“4. All other provisions of the Divorce Judgment shall remain in effect.”

(Capitalization in original.)

Thereafter, both parties filed timely postjudgment motions that were denied by the trial court on February 29, 2012. The husband timely appealed, and the wife timely cross-appealed.

Appeal

The husband contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing his child-support obligation because, he maintains, the wife failed to present sufficient evidence of a material change of circumstances to warrant the increase. We find the husband’s contention to be without merit. The husband bases this contention on the faulty premise that the trial court granted the wife’s request to modify child support when, in fact, the trial court, in the modification judgment, specifically “GRANTfED] the request of [the husband] to re-calculate child support based on the parties’ current income.” (Capitalization in original.) We note that the proceedings below were initiated by the husband by filing a petition to modify his child-support obligation under the divorce judgment; as previously stated, in his petition the husband alleged that the wife had become gainfully employed and that her employment constituted a material change of circumstances warranting a recalculation of child support based on the parties’ current income. In his amended petition, the husband alleged that the wife’s employment, as well as her receipt of a portion of his monthly military-retirement income pursuant to the divorce judgment, constituted a material change of circumstances warranting a recalculation of child support based on the parties’ current income. We recognize that the wife counterpetitioned for an increase in child support, but the trial court specifically granted the husband’s petition to modify his child-support obligation based on the parties’ current income. Although the husband’s petition resulted in an increase in his child-support obligation, rather than the decrease he apparently had hoped for, he is not now in a position to complain. Therefore, as to the husband’s appeal, we affirm the judgment insofar as it modified the husband’s child-support obligation.

Cross-appeal

In her cross-appeal, the wife first contends that the trial court failed to grant her a “sum certain” amount of retroactive child support that, she maintains, was required pursuant to § 30-3-114, Ala.Code 1975. We find the wife’s reliance on § 30-3-114 to be misplaced. See Calloway v. Mitchell, 718 So.2d 65, 68 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (Section 30-3-114 does not apply in proceedings in which child support previously has been ordered pursuant to a divorce judgment, per § 30-3-110, Ala.Code 1975).

Sections 30-3-110 and 30-3-114 were enacted as part of the same act, Act No. 94-213, Ala. Acts 1994, and must be read together. See Locke v. Wheat, 350 So.2d 451, 453 (Ala.1977) (noting the general proposition that statutory sections dealing with the same subject matter are to be read in pari materia). Section 30-3-110, the first section of that act, provides, in part:

“There is hereby created a civil action to establish an order of retroactive [child] support which may be brought against a non-supporting parent who has a duty to support as the legal parent of a child or children but has failed to provide support.An action under this section can be brought only if support has' not previously been ordered pursuant to a divorce or other action in this or any other jurisdiction.”

Section 80-3-114, cited by the wife, provides in part that “[t]he order of retroactive [child] support shall be a sura certain judgment and may cover all periods in which the non-supporting parent failed to provide support.”

In Calloway, supra, this court concluded that the father in that case was precluded from bringing an action for retroactive child support under § 30-3-110 when the issue of child support previously had been addressed in the parties’ divorce judgment. In so doing, this court reasoned:

“By Act No. 94-213, § 1, Ala. Acts 1994, codified at § 30-3-110, the legislature created ‘a civil action to establish an order of retroactive support which may be brought against a non-supporting parent who has a duty to support as the legal parent of a child or children but has failed to provide support.’ The last sentence of § 30-3-110 states: ‘An action under this section can be brought only if support has not previously been ordered pursuant to a divorce or other action in this or any other jurisdiction.’
“Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says.’ IMED Corp. v. Systems Engineering Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992).”

Calloway, 718 So.2d at 68.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the issue of child support previously has been addressed in the parties’ divorce judgment; thus, neither § 30-3-110 nor § 30-3-114 apply to the facts of this case. See Calloway, supra.

Next, the wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating the husband’s periodic-alimony obligation. We agree. At the outset, we note that the ore tenus rule applies to our review of the facts of this case. See Raidt v. Crane, 342 So.2d 358, 360 (Ala.1977) (“It is axiomatic that where the evidence has been taken ore tenus, a presumption of correctness attends the trial court’s conclusion on issues of fact, and [an appellate court] will not disturb the trial court’s conclusion unless it is clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence, but will affirm the judgment if, under any reasonable aspect, it is supported by credible evidence.”).

At the time of their divorce in June 2010, the parties had been married more than 16 years. At that time, the wife was 43 years old and the husband was 47 years old. Two children were born of the marriage — a daughter and a son. At the time of the divorce, the daughter was 16 years old and the son was 13 years old. The wife is a native of Korea; she left Korea in 1989. The husband has a military background, having formerly served in the United States Army.

At the time of the parties’ divorce and at the time of the modification hearing, the husband worked for a research and technology corporation. The husband has a master’s degree in acquisition accounting and contracting and a professional certification in contracting. At the time of the parties’ divorce, the wife had just begun working at a clothing store as a trainee; she was not working when the parties signed the settlement agreement in May 2010. At the time of the modification hearing, the wife was working as a part-time manager at the clothing store.

During most of the parties’ marriage, the husband was the sole wage earner and source of income for the parties. The wife worked at least part time during 2003 through 2006, starting out as a cosmetic sales associate and ending as an assistant manager at a “PX,” or “post exchange,” store on a military base. The husband testified that the wife also had done “things on her own,” such as “cleaning houses [and] making stuff for people” and “house sitting.” According to the husband, the wife’s money had not gone to pay household bills, explaining that “her money was her money and my money was our money.”

During spring 2010, the parties discussed divorce, and, at the same time, they also discussed the wife’s seeking employment. During those conversations, they discussed the possibility of the wife’s starting her own cleaning business, and the husband printed the wife business cards and brochures regarding that possible business venture. At the time the parties signed the settlement agreement in which the husband agreed to pay the wife monthly periodic alimony in the amount of $1,000 for five years, the wife was not employed but the husband was aware that she was looking for employment. The settlement agreement that was incorporated into the divorce judgment does not mention the wife’s efforts to find employment and does not state that periodic alimony will terminate if the wife becomes employed.

Regarding the husband’s income, at the time of the parties’ divorce in June 2010, the husband’s gross pay from his employment totaled $3,993.11 every two weeks, based on an hourly rate of $47.51 plus $192.31 in “[b]enefits.” Beginning in January 2011, the husband’s gross pay from his employment totaled $4,069.11 every two weeks, based on an hourly rate of $48.60 plus $192.31 in “[b]enefits.” In addition to his regular pay, the husband also received bonus income; during November 2010 the husband received a $12,000 bonus, during May 2011 the husband received a $500 bonus, and during September 2011 the husband received a $750 bonus. The husband testified that his 2010 bonus income totaled $13,750. Although bonus income was not guaranteed, the husband expected to receive similar bonus income during 2011. The husband’s 2010 federal income-tax return reflects that his gross taxable income from his employment totaled $106,208; his accompanying W-2 form reflects total gross pay in the amount of $117,496.48. The difference in his gross pay and his gross taxable income is attributable to pre-tax income that was deposited into his 401(k) retirement account ($7,779.17), into a “Medical FSA” account ($2,499.90), and into an account designated as “Other Cafe 125” ($1,009.12). During 2010, the husband received $635 for officiating football games, and he expected to receive $800-$900 for officiating football games during 2011. At the time of the modification hearing, the husband was paid $2,315.60 per month in military-retirement income, and the wife was paid $992.40 per month in the husband’s military-retirement income, per the parties’ divorce judgment. At the time of the parties’ divorce and at the time of the modification hearing, the husband also received $857 per month in Veterans Administration disability benefits.

Regarding the wife’s income, shortly after the parties signed the settlement agreement but before the divorce judgment was entered, the wife became employed at a clothing store on June 10, 2010; she began at a rate of $9.50 per hour, and during fall 2010 that rate was increased to $12 per hour. At the time of the modification hearing, she worked approximately 30 hours per week earning $12 per hour for a total of approximately $1,560 per month. Following the parties’ divorce and per the parties’ divorce judgment, the wife remained in the parties’ marital home for approximately three months after the divorce and then moved out; around the time that she moved out, the husband paid the wife $20,000, representing her share of the equity in the marital home.

The wife has the equivalent of a high-school education and attended a community college in Korea. Following her move to the United States, the wife took some classes relating to cosmetics. According to the wife, she has language barriers; she describes her oral communication skills as average, stating: “I think I understand English better that I talk”; she describes her writing skills as poor. The wife testified that she believed that her inability to speak English well had impacted her ability to find employment.

The wife testified that she receives no benefits from her employment and that she has not been offered full-time employment. She also testified that she is not offered overtime. She testified that she does not receive bonuses and does not anticipate a raise. She testified that she has been trying to look for other employment. The wife testified that she would like to return to school to complete her education but that she did not have the money to pay for it. The wife testified that, although her income was sufficient to meet her present monthly expenses, she lived “paycheck to paycheck” and had no income to invest in retirement. The wife has $10,000 in a savings account that she wants to reserve for emergencies for the children. She also testified that she has approximately $30,000-$31,000 in a retirement account derived from the husband’s 401(k) account. The wife testified that the expenses she incurs for the children had increased, as had her household expenses. The wife described her postdivorce standard of living as being lower than when she was married to the husband, pointing out, for instance, that during the parties’ marriage she had purchased higher quality meat for the family and had shopped for her clothes at a nice department store but that, since the divorce, she shopped at discount department stores, such as TJMaxx. The wife testified that she had not been able to pay her attorney fee at the time she filed her answer and counterclaim, so she had charged that expense on a credit card. The wife had two different attorneys represent her at the trial-court level, and her attorney fees at the time of the modification hearing totaled approximately $5,967.50. The wife testified that she was not able to pay her attorney fees “comfortably.”

The record contains statements regarding both parties’’ monthly living expenses; all of those statements include expenses for and/or allocated to the children. In her October 2010 pro se answer and coun-terpetition, the wife alleged that her monthly expenses totaled approximately $2,795; that initial pro se answer and counterpetition was discussed during the wife’s testimony at the modification hearing, but it was not admitted into evidence. In her February 2011 answer to the husband’s interrogatory question regarding her average monthly expenses, the wife responded that her average monthly expenses totaled $2,710.44; that response was admitted into evidence.

The wife also compiled a monthly budget during fall 2011 after saving a years’ worth of receipts and looking at expenses for a year; that budget statement also was admitted into evidence and reflects that the wife’s monthly expenses totaled $4,092.

The husband also prepared a monthly expenditures statement; that statement also was admitted into evidence and reflects that, in addition to his existing child-support and periodic-alimony obligations, the husband’s monthly expenses totaled $6,539. In addition to typical monthly living expenses, the husband included, among other things, $485.05 for hair restoration and $510.75 for legal fees.

Periodic alimony and its subsequent modification are matters resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s judgment as to those issues will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Tiongson v. Tiongson, 765 So.2d 643, 645 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).

In Bray v. Bray, 979 So.2d 798 (Ala.Civ.App.2007), this court set forth the applicable standard of review as follows:

“ ‘Our standard of review when reviewing an appeal from a judgment granting or denying a requested modification of alimony is well settled.
“ ‘ “An obligation to pay alimony may be modified only upon a showing of a material change in circumstances that has occurred since the trial court’s previous judgment, and the burden is on the party seeking a modification to make this showing. ...”
‘Glover v. Glover, 730 So.2d 218, 220 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (citation omitted).’
“Ederer v. Ederer, 900 So.2d 427, 428 (Ala.Civ.App.2004).
“ ‘Where a trial court receives ore tenus evidence, its judgment based on that evidence is entitled to a presumption of correctness on appeal and will not be reversed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion or that the judgment is so unsupported by the evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong.’
“Sellers v. Sellers, 893 So.2d 456, 457-58 (Ala.Civ.App.2004).”

979 So.2d at 800.

Even if a material change of circumstances is shown, a trial court is not required to modify alimony. Kiefer v. Kiefer, 671 So.2d 710, 711 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (citing Mullins v. Mullins, 475 So.2d 578 (Ala.Civ.App.1985)). Factors the trial court should consider in determining whether to modify an alimony award include, among other things, the earning capacity of each spouse, the payee spouse’s need for alimony, the payor spouse’s ability to pay alimony, and each spouse’s estate. Kiefer, 671 So.2d at 711 (citing Posey v. Posey, 634 So.2d 571 (Ala.Civ.App.1994)). When, as in this case, a provision awarding periodic alimony is based upon the agreement of the parties, that provision should not be modified without close scrutiny, see, e.g., Trammell v. Trammell, 589 So.2d 743 (Ala.Civ.App.1991), especially when a short time, in this case only approximately 17 months, separates the modification hearing from the previous entry of the divorce judgment. See Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat, 423 So.2d 888 (Ala.Civ.App.1982), Roberts v. Roberts, 395 So.2d 1035 (Ala.Civ.App.1981), and Taylor v. Taylor, 369 So.2d 1240 (Ala.Civ.App.1979) (cases involving a relatively short period separating the entry of the divorce judgment from the modification hearing; in each case, the period was less than two years).

In the present case, the divorce judgment was entered only a little more than three months before the husband filed his petition to modify. The divorce judgment, as agreed between the parties, awarded the wife monthly periodic alimony in the amount of $1,000 for five years. We construe this limited periodic-alimony award to be in the nature of rehabilitative alimony. See, e.g., Treusdell v. Treusdell, 671 So.2d 699, 704 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (three-year award of periodic alimony construed as being in the nature of rehabilitative alimony). The purpose of rehabilitative alimony, which has been described by this court as being a subclass of periodic alimony, is to allow a spouse to begin or resume supporting himself or herself. See, e.g., Alfred v. Alfred, 89 So.3d 786, 790 (Ala.Civ.App.2012); Enzor v. Enzor, 98 So.3d 15, 21 (Ala.Civ.App.2011). See also Benson v. Benson, 876 So.2d 1157, 1164 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (“‘This court has defined rehabilitative alimony as “a sub-class of periodic alimony” that allows a spouse “time to reestablish a self-supporting status.” ’ ” (quoting Fowler v. Fowler, 773 So.2d 491, 495 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (overruled on other grounds, Enzor, supra), quoting in turn Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat, 628 So.2d 741, 743 (Ala.Civ.App.1993) (overruled on other grounds, Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 816 So.2d 1046 (Ala.Civ.App.2001)))). “ ‘[Rjehabilitative alimony[ ]’ ... generally connotes an attempt to encourage a dependent spouse to become self-supporting by providing alimony for a limited period of time during which gainful employment can be obtained.” Molnar v. Molnar, 173 W.Va. 200, 202, 314 S.E.2d 73, 76 (1984). Rehabilitative alimony is intended to provide support for a dependent spouse for a limited period of reeducation or retraining following a divorce so that the dependent spouse may gain skills to become self-sufficient. See Enzor, 98 So.3d at 23. Regarding alimony in general, this court in Korn v. Korn, 867 So.2d 338, 345-46 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), stated:

“Under Alabama law, periodic alimony ‘is to support the former dependent spouse and enable that spouse, to the extent possible, to maintain the status that the parties had enjoyed during the marriage, until that spouse is self-supporting or maintaining a lifestyle or status similar to the one enjoyed during the marriage.’ O’Neal v. O’Neal, 678 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).”

Our review of the facts in the present case convinces us that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating the husband’s periodic-alimony obligation. Given the fact that the husband knew that the wife was looking for employment at the time he agreed to pay her periodic alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month for five years, we are not convinced that the wife’s part-time employment that pays only $12 per hour amounts to a material change of circumstances warranting a termination of the husband’s periodic-alimony obligation. Even if the wife’s part-time employment amounts to a material change of circumstances, that fact alone does not justify the termination of the husband’s five-year periodic-alimony obligation based on the unique and particular facts of this case.

In so holding, we note that the parties’ divorce and modification proceedings all occurred within a relatively short period. The parties divorced in June 2010; the husband filed his petition to modify child support in October 2010; he then filed his amended petition to modify both child support and alimony in March 2011; and the modification hearing was held in November 2011.

In this instance, the husband is highly educated and has a much higher earning capacity than the wife, who has the equivalent of a high-school education. The wife also has language barriers. During 2010, the year in which the parties divorced, the husband’s gross pay from his employment totaled $117,496.48; although his gross taxable income for federal income-tax purposes from that employment totaled $106,208, the difference in gross pay and gross taxable income resulted in large part from his deferring otherwise taxable income in the amount of $7,779.17 by contributing that amount to his 401 (k) account. Beginning in January 2011, the husband received an small raise in his regular pay. In addition, although bonuses are not guaranteed, the husband expected to receive over $10,000 annually in bonus income. The husband also was paid $2,315.60 per month in military-retirement income and $857 per month in disability benefits.

The wife, on the other hand, was not working at the time the parties signed the settlement agreement. Although the wife was not working at that time, the husband knew that she was looking for employment. The wife began working part time at the clothing store shortly before the divorce judgment was entered. At the time of the modification hearing, the wife earned $12 an hour working approximately 30 hours per week; that amount totaled approximately $1,560 per month. She did not anticipate receiving a raise or bonus or additional work hours. The wife also was paid $992.40 per month in the husband’s military-retirement income.

The parties were married for over 16 years, and the wife worked for a relatively small amount of time during the parties’ marriage. At the time of the parties’ divorce, their younger child was 13 years old and the end of the husband’s 5-year periodic-alimony-obligation period essentially coincides with the time that that child would be expected to graduate from high school. The wife, who was either prevented because of the marriage from pursuing, or chose not to pursue an education or self-supporting employment, should now be allowed an opportunity to become self-supporting. The wife testified that she would like to return to school to complete her education but that she did not have the money to pay for it.

The wife, consistent with the purpose of rehabilitative alimony, should be permitted a reasonable amount of time to transition from financial dependence on the husband to financial independence. In this instance, the wife desires to pursue additional education in order to obtain better employment than a part-time job paying $12 per hour. Although the wife may be able to meet most of her current monthly expenses with her current part-time employment income, her portion of the husband’s military-retirement income, and the increase in child support ordered by the trial court in this case, we cannot hold that the wife is financially independent without the husband’s alimony payment based on the facts of this particular case and given the nature and purpose of rehabilitative alimony.

Finally, the wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her an attorney fee. We agree.

“This court reviews an award of an attorney fee on an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 806 So.2d 1286, 1292 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). In determining whether to award an attorney fee and the amount of the fee, the trial court must consider factors such as the earning capacities of the parties, the results of the litigation, the parties’ financial circumstances, and the conduct of the parties. Korn v. Korn, 867 So.2d at 347; Glover v. Glover, 678 So.2d 174, 176 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).

In the present case, the husband has a much higher earning capacity than the wife. The husband’s financial circumstances are much better than the wife’s financial circumstances. The husband, within a relatively short period following the divorce judgment, initiated the modification proceedings below by first seeking to modify his child-support obligation and then later by also seeking, among other things, to terminate his periodic-alimony obligation. The results of the litigation have been favorable for the wife. Based on the facts of this particular case, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the wife’s request for an attorney fee in the amount of $5,967.50.

Accordingly, with respect to the wife’s cross-appeal, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this cause is remanded for an order consistent with the opinion.

The husband’s request for an attorney fee on appeal is denied. The wife’s request for an attorney fee on appeal is granted in the amount of $8,500.

APPEAL — AFFIRMED.

CROSS-APPEAL — AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

PITTMAN, THOMAS, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.

MOORE, J., concurs in the result, with writing.

MOORE, Judge,

concurring in the result.

I concur in the result as to those parts of the main opinion reversing the judgment entered by the Madison Circuit Court (“the trial court”) to the extent it terminated the alimony obligation of Derek Anthony Santiago (“the father”) and failed to award Jenny Kim Santiago (“the mother”) attorney’s fees; further, I concur in the result insofar as the main opinion affirms the trial court’s judgment failing to award the mother a “sum certain” amount of retroactive child support. As to that part of the main opinion affirming that part of the trial court’s judgment modifying the father’s child-support obligation, I also concur in the result, but I do so for the reasons set out below.

The father and the mother were divorced by a judgment of entered by the trial court on June 29, 2010. That judgment incorporated a settlement agreement entered between the parties, pursuant to which the parties agreed that the parties would share joint legal and physical custody of their two minor children, that the father would pay the mother $808 per month in child support for five years and $404 per month thereafter until December 1, 2018, and would cover the health expenses of the children, and that the father would pay the children’s reasonable college expenses. The settlement agreement expressly declared that the child-support provisions of the agreement were a deviation from Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., because of the parties’ joint-custody arrangement. The father also agreed to pay $1,000 per month to the mother as periodic alimony for 60 months.

. On October 1, 2010, the father filed a petition to modify the child-support provisions of the divorce judgment on the ground that the mother, who had had no job and no income at the time the parties entered into the settlement agreement, had obtained gainful employment. The father contended that, due to a material change in the employment status of the mother, his child-support obligation should be decreased. On October 29, 2010, the mother filed an amended answer and a counterclaim requesting an increase in child support to comply with Rule 32. On March 9, 2011, the father amended his petition to request that his child-support obligation be recalculated based on the parties’ current incomes. The father also requested a modification of the terms of the divorce judgment to make both parties equally responsible for the health expenses and college expenses of the children. Additionally, the father asked that his obligation to pay periodic alimony be eliminated altogether. The mother responded by amending her counterclaim to seek an increase in periodic alimony.

After a trial, the trial court modified the child-support provisions of the divorce judgment by awarding the mother $1,496.70 per month, retroactive to the date of the filing of the father’s petition in accordance with Rule 32. The trial court also terminated the periodic alimony payable to the mother. Both the father and the mother moved the trial court to alter, amend, vacate, or clarify its judgment, which motions the trial court denied. The father appealed, and the mother cross-appealed.

In his appeal, the father argues that the trial court erred in increasing his child-support obligation. The main opinion does not address that contention on the ground that the trial court granted the father’s petition. 122 So.3d at 1272-74. Although a party cannot appeal when no adverse ruling is made against him or her, Holloway v. Robertson, 500 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.1986), a party aggrieved or prejudiced by a judgment can appeal. Robino v. Kilgore, 838 So.2d 366, 369 (Ala.2002).

“Black’s Law Dictionary 65 (6th ed. 1990) defines ‘aggrieved party’ as follows:
“ ‘One whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree or judgment.... The word “aggrieved” refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right,- or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation.’ ”

Birmingham Racing Comm’n v. Alabama Thoroughbred Ass’n, 775 So.2d 207, 210 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (construing meaning of “aggrieved person” under § 22-22A-7, Ala.Code 1975).

Before the trial court entered the modification judgment in this case, the father was required to pay the mother, based on the parties’ settlement agreement, monthly child support in the amount of $808 per month through June 2015, with that amount decreasing to $404 per month at that point and terminating altogether in December 2018. Pursuant to the modification judgment, the father’s monthly child-support obligation is now $1,496.70. Thus, the modification judgment resulted in an immediate increase of $688.70 per month in the father’s child-support obligation. The judgment invaded the legal rights of the father that had been established by the settlement agreement and incorporated into the divorce judgment and adversely affected the pecuniary interests of the father by imposing upon him an additional financial obligation. Consequently, the father has a right to appeal the judgment as an aggrieved party.

Moreover, although the trial court specifically stated in its modification judgment that it was granting the father’s. child-support-modification petition, it is clear that, in substance, the trial court granted the mother’s motion to increase the father’s child-support obligation by applying Rule 32. The father specifically requested a downward modification in his child-support obligation to account for a change in the employment status of the mother with the corresponding increase in her income. On the other hand, the mother asked the trial court to modify the child-support provisions of the divorce judgment by applying the Rule 32 child-support guidelines because the amount of child support to which she agreed was not sufficient for her to meet the needs of the children while in her care. The trial court modified child support solely by applying Rule 32 in order to increase the amount payable to the mother. A judgment should be construed according to its effect and substance and not merely according to its form. DuBoise v. DuBoise, 275 Ala. 220, 228, 153 So.2d 778, 785 (1963). In substance and effect, the trial court did not grant the modification petition of the father.

Nevertheless, the trial court did not err by modifying the child-support provisions of the divorce judgment. In incorporating the parties’ settlement agreement into the divorce judgment, the trial court found that the child-support guidelines established in Rule 32 should not apply because the parties would be sharing joint custody of the children, thereby rebutting the presumption that the amount established by the guidelines would be the correct amount of child support to be awarded. See Rule 32(A)© & Rule 32(A)(1)(a).

“There shall be a-rebuttable presumption that child support should be modified when the difference between the existing child-support award and the amount determined by application of these guidelines varies more than ten percent (10%), unless the variation is due to the fact that the existing child-support award resulted from a rebuttal of the guidelines and there has been no change in the circumstances that resulted in the rebuttal of the guidelines.”

Rule 32(A)(3)(c) .(emphasis added).

Because the trial court deviated from the Rule 32 child-support guidelines in fashioning its original award in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement, and because the parties continued to exercise the same joint-custody arrangement as existed at the time of the entry of the original divorce judgment, the mother was not entitled to a rebuttable presumption that child support should be modified as set out in Rule 32(A)(3)(c). However,

“even when there is no rebuttable presumption that a party’s child-support obligation should be modified, we have held that
“ ‘a trial court may [still] modify a child-support award “upon proof of a material change of circumstances that is substantial and continuing.” E.g., Romano v. Romano, 703 So.2d 374, 375 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). See also Williams v. Braddy, 689 So.2d 154 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (explaining that the “material change in circumstances” standard applies even if the presumption in favor of modification under [former] Rule 32(A)(3)(b)[, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., now Rule 32(A)(3)(c), Ala. R. Jud. Admin.,] is not applicable). See generally Thomas v. Vanhorn, 876 So.2d 488, 491 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (“Child-support judgments are never absolutely ‘final’ in the strictest sense, because such judgments are always subject to modification in the future upon a showing of a material change in circumstances.”).’
“Reeves v. Reeves, 894 So.2d 712, 714 (Ala.Civ.App.2004).”

Jones v. Jones, 101 So.3d 798, 803 (Ala.Civ.App.2012).

The mother discharged her burden of proof by presenting an exhibit showing the current financial needs of the children and testifying that, “[e]very month, every year it’s costing more money. Everything went up, and I have to spend more money on the kids.” This court has repeatedly held that an increase in the age of children, along with a correlative increase in their financial needs, when coupled with an increase in the cost of living due to inflation, constitutes a material change of circumstances warranting an increase in child support. See, e.g., Campbell v. Tolbert, 656 So.2d 828, 829-30 (Ala.Civ.App.1994). Although the evidence is very scant as to the precise amount of the increase in the children’s financial needs from the time of the entry of the original divorce judgment to the time of the modification hearing, which was a relatively short period, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to justify an increase in child support, and we cannot reverse its judgment based on our very limited standard of review. See Bray v. Bray, 979 So.2d 798 (Ala.Civ.App.2007).

The mother’s proving a material change of circumstances did not automatically justify the trial court’s increasing the amount of child support to comply with the Rule 32 guidelines. The trial court still should have considered the parties’ joint-custody arrangement and the evidence indicating that the father had been satisfying most of the financial needs of the children through the previous arrangement. Nevertheless, the father does not specifically argue that the evidence fails to support the amount of the increase. Therefore, I concur that the trial court did not err in establishing child support at a rate of $1,496.70 per month.

      . Regarding the parties’ divorce, we note that the parties signed a divorce agreement on May 11, 2010, approximately one week before they signed the settlement agreement on May 19, 2010. At the time the parties signed the divorce agreement, they were not represented by legal counsel. Apparently, an attorney helped them with the divorce “paperwork” by finalizing the settlement agreement (incorporating the divorce agreement) and also by assisting them with the completion of the “CS” child-support forms required pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.

      . The wife initially was represented by the attorney who helped the parties with their divorce. See note 1, supra. That attorney later withdrew, and the wife thereafter was represented by different legal counsel.

      . We note that the evidence contained in the record regarding the correct amount of the husband’s income for purposes of determining his child-support and periodic-alimony obligations is somewhat confusing because the husband appears to base such obligations primarily on what he considers to be his "net income” rather than his income/benefits that are actually available for such considerations. For example, the husband’s amount of "gross income” on his Form 41, Child-Support-Obligation Income Statement/Affidavit, both at the time of the divorce and at the time of the modification hearing, does not appear to correspond to other more credible evidence in the record as to the amount that should have been reported. We note that the husband's earnings statements for pay period ending June 19, 2010, through the pay period ending September 9, 2011, and his 2010 federal and state income-tax returns reveal that the husband possibly sought to have his child-support and periodic-alimony obligations established on lesser amounts of income than required for those purposes.

      . In his monthly expenditures statement, the husband also sought to establish the amount of his monthly income. We have carefully reviewed that statement and note that the amount of the husband's self-determined monthly income appears to be less than the amount that actually should be considered for alimony purposes. See note 3, supra.

      We also note that the husband prepared, and introduced into evidence, a statement relating to certain expenses that he and the wife had spent on the children; that statement reflects that such expenses totaled $1,968.18, of which he paid $1,324.73 and the wife paid $643.45.

      . Two children were born of the parties’ marriage, one on April 4, 1994, and one on December 3, 1996. The children were 16 years old and 14 years old, respectively, on the date of the divorce. The child-support provisions of the settlement agreement called for the father to make payments past the age of majority for both children. The father testified that he had agreed to pay postminority child support because he was ignorant of the law and because the divorce was uncontested.

      . Black's Law Dictionary 77 (9th ed.2009) defines "aggrieved” as "having legal rights that are adversely affected; having been harmed by an infringement of legal rights.”

      . The father testified that the parties sometimes vary that schedule when he travels.

      . The trial court did not specify when the father’s child-support obligation would terminate, but it appears that, by modifying the previous child-support provisions to comply with Rule 32, the trial court intended that the father could petition to modify his child-support obligation as each child reaches the age of majority. However, that modification would not impact the father’s voluntary obligation to pay college expenses for the children.