author: ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge. TOBIAS, J., BONIN, J., LANDRIEU, J., LOBRANO, J.,

text:
    Jane L. JOHNSON v. Taetrece HARRISON and Arthur Morrell, In his Capacity as Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Clerk.
    No. 2014-CA-0932.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Sept. 3, 2014.

      E. John Litchfield, Berrigan Litchfield Schonekas Mann Traína & Bolner, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Edward R. Washington, III, The Washington Law Group, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr., Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge PAUL A. BONIN, Judge DANIEL L. DYSART, Judge MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge JOY COSSICH LOBRANO, Judge ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge SANDRA CAB RIÑA JENKINS).
   ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge.

| T This is an election contest suit in which the plaintiff, Jane Johnson, seeks review of the trial court’s judgment denying her motion to disqualify the defendant, Taetrece Harrison, as a candidate for judge in Domestic Section 1 of Civil District Court. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana on October 13, 2006. On August 22, 2014, she qualified as a candidate for district judge in Orleans Parish (Domestic Section 1 of Civil District Court), before she had been practicing law for eight years. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Johnson filed a petition to disqualify the defendant alleging that she did not meet the requirements regarding the admission to practice law. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiffs petition, and this appeal followed. The defendant answered the plaintiffs appeal requesting damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in denying her petition to disqualify the defendant from the upcoming election. Therefore, the |2issue before this Court is whether the defendant meets the qualification requirements as a candidate for district judge in Orleans Parish.

The interests of the state and its citizens are best served when election laws are interpreted so as to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates. Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 7 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869. In an election contest, the person opposing candidacy bears the burden of proving the candidate is disqualified. Id. The laws governing elections must be liberally construed so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy. Id. Any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run for office. Id.

La. R.S. 18:451, which provides general qualification guidelines, states, in pertinent part, as follows:

A person who meets the qualifications for the office he seeks may become a candidate and be voted on in a primary or general election if he qualifies as a candidate in the election. Except as otherwise provided by law, a candidate shall possess the qualifications for the office he seeks at the time he qualifies for that office. In the event that the qualifications for an office include a residency or domicile requirement, a candidate shall meet the established length of residency or domicile as of the date of qualifying, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary [emphasis supplied].

However, La. Const. Art. V, Sec. 24 sets forth explicit domicile and bar admission qualifications for district court judges. La. Const. Art. V, Sec. 24, which was amended pursuant to 2006 La. Acts 860 (Act 860), provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:
1¾(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals — ten years.
(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction — eight years.

As the language in La. R.S. 18:451 defers to more specific election laws, the constitutional article prevails. Moreover, when a statute conflicts with a constitutional provision, the statute must fall. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm’n v. Office of Motor Vehicles Through Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. of State, 97-2238 (La.4/14/98), 710 So.2d 776, 780 (citation omitted). Thus, we conclude that the constitutional provisions predominate.

Particularly, at issue here is when the eight-year admission requirement must be met and whether the defendant meets the requirement. It is uncontested that she was admitted to practice law on October 13, 2006; she qualified for candidacy on August 22, 2014. The date of the primary election is November 4, 2014. Thus, she will have been admitted to practice law for eight years on October 13, 2014, between the date of qualifying and the primary election.

The plaintiff contends that since the language of the constitutional article does not provide for a deadline, the admission requirement must be met upon qualifying, as provided by the default language in La. R.S. 18:451. Thus, she concludes that the defendant does not meet the requirement. Conversely, the defendant contends that the language of the constitutional article is ambiguous, thus necessitating interpretation of the constitutional article. She argues that the legislature’s will was to provide that the admission requirement was to be met before the election, not qualification; thus, she is a qualified candidate.

| /‘The function of statutory interpretation and the construction given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government.” Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895, p. 3 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186 (citation omitted). The rules of statutory construction are designed to establish and implement the intent of the legislature. Succession ofBoyter, 99-761, p. 9 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128 (citation omitted). Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court has often noted the paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the legislature to enact the law. State v. Johnson, 03-2993, p. 12 (La.10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 575 (citations omitted); Theriot, 95-2895 at p. 3, 694 So.2d at 186.

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Id. “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the ■ intent of the legislature.” La. C.C. art. 9; Johnson, 03-2993 at p. 12, 884 So.2d at 575. However, “when the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” La. C.C. art. 10; Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water Dist., 02-439, 02-442, 02-478, p. 7 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 20. Moreover, “when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.” La. C.C. art. 12.

Primarily agreeing with the defendant’s interpretation of the constitutional article, the trial court .denied the plaintiffs petition. We find no error. As written, | ¿the constitutional article is ambiguous. Specifically, the language is susceptible to two meanings: 1) both the domicile and the admission requirements must be met “preceding election,” or 2) only the domicile requirement must be met “preceding election.”

An additional provision in Act 860 provided that the proposed amendment to the constitutional article would be submitted to Louisiana voters during a statewide election. See 2006 La. Acts 860, Section 2. It further set forth the language on the official ballot, in relevant part, as follows:

To provide that a person shall have been admitted to the practice of law for ten years preceding election to the supreme court or a court of appeals and for eight years preceding election to a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction ...

2006 La. Acts 860, Section 3 (emphasis supplied). After reviewing Act 860 in its entirety, it is clear that the legislature intended that both the domicile and the admission requirements be met before the election. Further, where there are two viable interpretations of the constitutional article, we must lean towards the interpretation that favors candidacy.

Since the defendant will have been admitted to practice law in this State for more than eight years prior to both the date of the primary and the general election established for the office of district judge, she meets the qualifications established by the Constitution for the office she seeks. Therefore, the petition objecting to her candidacy was properly denied.

\ ^¡ANSWER TO APPEAL

In an answer to the appeal, the defendant argues that the judgment appealed from should be modified to award costs of court, plus a reasonable attorney fee, plus damages of $5,000.00. See La. C.C.P. arts. 2133 and 2164. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, stating that the plaintiffs argument raised a legitimate issue; therefore, the appeal was not frivolous. We agree. Accordingly, the request for a modification is denied.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed; and the defendant’s motion for a modification of judgment is denied.

AFFIRMED; REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT DENIED.

TOBIAS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

BONIN, J., concurs with reasons.

LANDRIEU, J., concurs with reasons.

LÓBRANO, J., dissents in part and concurs in part.

TOBIAS, J.,

concurs and assigns reasons.

hi agree that Taetrece Harrison is eligible to run for the judgeship for which she has qualified as a candidate for the following reasons:

La. Const, art. V, § 24, as originally enacted in 1974, read:

A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been admitted to the practice of law in this state for at least five years prior to his election and shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for the two years preceding election. He shall not practice law. [Emphasis supplied.]

La. Acts, No. 860 (2006) proposed a constitutional amendment, which the electors accepted. La. Const, art. V, § 24 now reads:

(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:
(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals — ten years.
(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction — eight years.
(B) He shall not practice law. [Emphasis supplied.]

li>The amendment removed the specific language “preceding election,” with regard to the years admitted to the practice of law. I find, however, that the legislature did not intend to change the law in this respect.

I start with the jurisprudential rule that candidacies for public office are favored and the courts should uphold a candidacy if an interpretation of the laws would promote the candidacy. Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, p. 7 (La.3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541; Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 7 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869; Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595, p. 4 (La.9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1051; Ogden v. Gray, 12-1314, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/11/12), 99 So.3d 1088, 1091, writ denied, 12-2041 (La.9/17/12), 98 So.3d 315; Scaglione v. Juneau, 10-1109, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/4/10), 45 So.3d 191, 199, unit denied, 10-1831 (La.8/9/10), 42 So.3d 380; Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 08-0961, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99, 104, writ denied, 08-1680 (La.7/30/08), 986 So.2d 671, cert, denied, 555 U.S. 1045, 129 S.Ct. 627, 172 L.Ed.2d 609 (2008).

Ms. Harrison was admitted and licensed to the practice of law in Louisiana on 13 October 2006. On both the date of the primary and general election, Ms. Harrison will have been licensed to practice law in Louisiana for more than eight years. It is undisputed that she has been domiciled in Orleans Parish for more than one year at the time she qualified for the office of judge at issue herein.

Our sister courts interpreted § 24, as originally enacted, finding that if a candidate had the requisite number of years of admission to the practice of law on the date of the general election, then the candidate was qualified to stand for that election. Cook v. Campbell, 360 So.2d 1193, 1196 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ den., 362 So.2d 573 (La.1978), citing Knobloch v. 17th Judicial Dish Democratic Exec. Com., 73 So .2d 433 (La.App. 1st Cir.1954); Aiple v. Naccari, 454 So.2d 894 (La.App. 5th Cir.), writ den., 456 So.2d 151 (La. 1984). Moreover, regardless of the type or quantity of practice the lawyer has previously handled or specialized in, the latest for determining qualification is the period of time that the lawyer has . been licensed to practice law in Louisiana. Elie v. Karst, 594 So.2d 929, 930 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992); Gamble v. White, 566 So.2d 171, 172 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ den. 565 So.2d 923 (La.1990).

The 2006 regular session of the Louisiana Legislature enacted by joint resolution “Act 860,” which reads in its entirety as follows:

A JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing to amend Article V, Section 24 of the Constitution of Louisiana, to provide for the qualifications of office for judges; to provide for submission of the proposed amendment to the electors; to provide for an effective date; to provide for applicability; and to provide for related matters.
Section 1. Be it resolved by the Legislature of Louisiana, two-thirds of the members elected to each house concurring, that there shall be submitted to the electors of the state of Louisiana, for their approval or rejection in the manner provided by law, a proposal to amend Article V, Section 24 of the Constitution of Louisiana, to read as follows:
§ 24. Judges; Qualifications
Section 24.(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:
(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals — ten years.
(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction-eight years.
(B) He shall not practice law.
Section 2. Be it further resolved that this proposed amendment shall be submitted to the electors of the state of Louisiana at the statewide election to be held on September 30, 2006.
Section 3. Be it further resolved that on the official ballot to be used at said election there shall be |4printed a proposition, upon which the electors of the state shall be permitted to vote FOR or AGAINST, to amend the'Constitution of Louisiana, which proposition shall read as follows:
To provide that a person shall have been admitted to the practice of law for ten years preceding election to the supreme court or a court of appeals and for eight years preceding election to a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction; and
to decrease the requirement that a person be domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish from two years to one year preceding election. Effective January 1, 2008, and applicable to any person who is elected to the office of judge on and after January 1, 2008. (Amends Article V, Section 24)
Section 4. Be it further resolved that the provisions of this Amendment shall become effective on January 1, 2008, and shall be applicable to any person who is elected to the office of judge on and after January 1, 2008. [Emphasis supplied.]

When 2006 La. Acts, No. 860 (“the Act”) was adopted by the legislature by joint resolution of the house and senate, the legislature, as evidenced by Section 3, did not intend to change the law. The Act contains a title and is confined to one object as required by La. Const. Art. XIII, § 1(B). Section 3 of the Act, which | ¡jStates how the proposed amendment shall appear on the ballot submitted to the electors, while not required by the constitution, see Rotará v. City of New Orleans, 213 La. 843, 854-856, 35 So.2d 752, 755-756 (1948); Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 04-2477, 04-2523 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 715, evidences the legislature’s intent to change only the required years to be admitted to the bar to run for a particular judgeship and not to the deadline by which the requirement was to be met.

Section 3 is meaningful because the object of the amendment, i.e., the actual language of the amendment, is ambiguous. I thus respectfully concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s decision holding that Ms. Harrison may run in the 4 November 2014 primary election.

Ms. Harrison is not currently a judge. If elected, she would be a judge as of 1 January 2015. Under § 24 is it now reads, she can serve. If she can serve because she will have been admitted to practice law for more than eight years at the time her service begins, it stands to reason that she can run for the office.
What makes this analysis undesirable is that a literal reading would mean that a person admitted to practice law for several years less than the constitutional eight years could run for a judgeship even though that individual would not be eligible to serve as a judge, if elected, on the first day of the term of office because the person has not been admitted to practice law for eight years.
I don't think the legislature intended that result when it adopted by joint resolution the Act.

I also respectfully concur with the majority’s holding that Ms. Harrison is not entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees. I note that although Ms. Harrison answered the appeal requesting the relief, she did not brief the issue to this court. Under Rule 2-12.4 B(4) of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, the issue of costs and attorney’s fees is deemed abandoned and should not be considered by this court.

BONIN, J.,

concurs with reasons. Ill concur in the results.

On August '22, 2014, Ms. Harrison filed her qualifying papers as a candidate for the office of district judge of Domestic Relations Division 1 of the Civil District Court. See La. R.S. 13:1138 B(3). The term of such office commences January 1, 2015. See Acts 2011, No. 340 § 4. Her candidacy is objected to on the basis that — as of the date of her filing — she did not possess the eight-year law-practice requirement. Ms. Harrison was admitted on October 13, 2006.

The qualification for office in question is set out in the constitution: “A judge of the ... district court ... shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least ... eight years.” La. Const, art. 5, § 24(A)(2). The plain and unambiguous meaning of these words is that at the time a person assumes the office of judge she shall have been admitted to the practice of law for eight years. Because the provision is unambiguous, we must give it effect, and there is no need for us to resort to the “intent of the voters” or to a statutory “clarification.”

|2On January 1, 2015, Ms. Harrison will have been admitted to the practice of law for eight years. Accordingly, there is no impediment to her qualifying as a candidate for district judge in the upcoming election, and the objection to her candidacy was correctly dismissed.

LANDRIEU, J.,

concurs with reasons.

|, The law providing the qualifications for running for judicial office is not the picture of clarity. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the 2006 constitutional amendment to Article V, Section 24 was designed to do two things: (1) reduce the domicile requirement of a candidate for judicial office from two years to one year; and (2) increase the number of years a candidate is required to have been admitted to the practice of law from five years to eight years. Nothing more. The joint resolution placing this issue before the voters is clear on these points. The law requires us to resolve any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate in favor of permitting the candidate to run for public office. Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 679 (La.1991). Therefore, I concur with the majority’s affirmation of the judgment.

LOBRANO, J.,

dissents in part and concurs in part. '

|,1 respectfully dissent. The plaintiff, Jane L. Johnson, seeks the disqualification of the defendant, Taetrece Harrison, a candidate for the office of Judge, Civil District Court, Orleans Parish, Domestic Section 1, asserting that she has not been admitted to practice of law for the required minimum number of years as required by the Louisiana Constitution.

As originally enacted in 1974, La. Const, art. V, § 24 stated as follows:

Section 24. A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been admitted to the practice of law in this state for at least five years prior to his election and shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for the two years preceding election. He shall not practice law. [Emphasis added.]

However, this was changed by the electors in 2006, effective January 1, 2008, to read:

§ 24. Judges; Qualifications
Section 24.(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court hav-

ing solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:

(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals — ten years.

| ¾(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction — eight years.

(B) He shall not practice law. [Emphasis added.]

The language of § 24 is clear and unambiguous and consistent with La. R.S. 18:451. The law has been changed to require that a candidate for judicial office must have been admitted to the practice of law for the requisite number of years at the time of qualifying for the office, not at the time of the “election” as was formerly the case. Because the provision is unambiguous, “the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” La. C.C. art 9. Thus, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s decision holding that Ms. Harrison may run in the November 4, 2014 primary election.

I respectfully concur with the majority’s holding that Ms. Harrison is not entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees.

A person who meets the qualifications for the office he seeks may become a candidate and be voted on in a primary or general election if he qualifies as a candidate in the election. Except as otherwise provided by law, a candidate shall possess the qualifications for the office he seeks at the time he qualifies for that office. In the event that the qualifications for an office include a
residency or domicile requirement, a candidate shall meet the established length of residency or domicile as of the date of qualifying, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary. No person, whether or not currently registered as a voter with the registrar of voters, shall become a candidate if he is under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony.

      . Arthur Morrell was also named as a defendant in his capacity as Clerk of Criminal District Court.

      . The language "except as otherwise provided by law” designates La. R.S. 18:451 to be the default rule for qualification.

      . We need not reach the issue regarding whether the phrase “preceding election” refers to the primary or the general election.

      .Technically, the Act is not per se an act. It is a joint resolution of the legislature which requires no signature of the governor. A constitutional amendment is proposed to electors of the state by the legislature. La. Const, art. XIII, § 13 states in pertinent part:
      (A)(1) Procedure. An amendment to this constitution may be proposed by joint resolution at any regular session of the legislature, .... If two-thirds of the elected members of each house concur in the resolution, pursuant to all of the procedures and formalities required for passage of a bill except submission to the governor, the secretary of state shall have the proposed amendment published once in the official journal of each parish within not less than thirty nor more than sixty days preceding the election at which the proposed amendment is to be submitted to the electors. Each joint resolution shall specify the statewide election at which the proposed amendment shall be submitted....

      (B) Form of Proposal. A proposed amendment shall have a title containing a brief summary of the changes proposed; shall be confined to one object; and shall set forth the entire article, or the sections or other subdivisions thereof, as proposed to be revised or only the article, sections, or other subdivisions proposed to be added.... [Emphasis supplied.]

      . I acknowledge that one may read § 24 literally and reach the same result.

      . I recognize that this interpretation creates a possible conflict between § 24 and La. R.S. 18:451, which mandates that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a candidate shall possess the qualifications for the office he seeks at the time he qualifies for that office.” However, because (a) § 24 specifically relates to candidates for judgeship and (b) constitutional provisions prevail over statutory provisions, the constitutional provision has primacy. Stated another way, when a statute conflicts with a provision of the constitution, the statute must fail. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, p. 22 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 32.

      . "The starting point in the interpretation of constitutional provisions is the language of the constitution itself.” Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 04-0066, pp. 6-7 (La.7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1, 7 (citing East Baton Rouge Sch. Bd. v. Foster, 02-2799, p. 15 (La.6/6/03), 851 So.2d 985, 996). "When a constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect.” Id., 04-0066, p. 7, 880 So.2d at 7. "Unequivocal constitutional provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their generally understood meaning." Id. (citing Cajun Elec. Power Co-op. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com'n, 544 So.2d 362, 363 (La. 1989) (on rehearing)).

      . La. R.S. 18:451 states:


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LOMBARD, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mazen S. HAMDAN.
    No. 2013-KA-1404.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Sept. 3, 2014.
    Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Donald G. Cassels, III, Donna An-drieu, Assistant District Attorneys, New Orleans, LA, for Appellee/State of Louisiana.
    Powell W. Miller, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD).
   LOMBARD, Judge.

hThe defendant, Mazen Hamdan, appeals his conviction as a multiple offender. After review of the record in light of the applicable law and arguments of the parties, we find his appeal without merit.

Relevant Procedural History and Facts

The defendant, a convicted felon, was found guilty of possession of a firearm on March 22, 2012. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a multiple offender bill of information and the defendant responded with a motion to quash. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to quash and the State sought supervisory review. This court denied writ but was subsequently reversed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. State v. Hamdan, 2012-1986 (La.3/19/13), 112 So.3d 812, 821. Upon remand, the trial court found the defendant to be a second offender based on his federal conviction for transporting stolen property, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Accordingly, the defendant’s previous sentence was vacated and he was sentenced as a second felony offender to ten years at hard labor.

|?On appeal, the defendant argues that in light of dicta in Justice Alito’s dissent in Descamps v. U.S., — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), the finding by the Louisiana Supreme Court is invalid.

Discussion

The Louisiana Supreme Court held that in evaluating a criminal defendant’s previous conviction during an habitual offender adjudication under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1(A), courts are required to consider all the information in the record to determine whether the crime for which the defendant was convicted in a “foreign jurisdiction” (in this case, federal court), would, if committed in this state, be a felony. Hamdan, 2012-1986, p. 16,112 So.3d at 821. The federal statute at issue in this case provides in pertinent part that it is illegal to transport, transmit, or transfer in interstate commerce “goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value” worth more than $5000 “knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.” 18 U.S.C. § 2314. In turn, the state statute at issue provides that possession of stolen goods is illegal, stating in pertinent part: “Illegal possession of stolen things is the intentional possessing, procuring, receiving, or concealing anything of value which has been subject of any robbery or theft....” La.Rev.Stat. 14:69. Upon review of the evidence in the record, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that, for purposes of whether the defendant’s prior federal conviction served as a predicate offense under the state habitual offender law, 18 U.S.C. § 2814 was analogous to La.Rev.Stat. 14:69.

|sThe defendant’s argument, based on Descamps, that this court should find that the Louisiana Supreme Court erred in allowing the trial court to look at anything beyond the elements of the statutes in its determination of whether the defendant’s prior federal conviction qualified as a predicated offense for purposes of the state habitual offender law is meritless. In Des-camps, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a federal trial court should not look at documents in the record to determine whether a state offense qualified as a predicate “violent felony” for sentence enhancement purposes under the federal-Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) “when the crime of which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements.” The U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis is based on the specific language of the ACCA and its own jurisprudence and, therefore, not applicable to the state statute. Justice Alito taking issue in his dissent with the analysis of the majority in that case clearly has no bearing on the validity of the analysis of Louisiana Supreme Court in this case.

Conclusion

We find no error in the trial court judgment of June 14, 2013, adjudicating the defendant a second felony offender.

AFFIRMED.


author: MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge. APPEAL CONVERTED TO WRIT; WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald OLIVIER.
    No. 2014-KA-0355.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Sept. 3, 2014.

      Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Scott G. Vincent, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
    Kenneth J. Beck, Gretna, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU).
   MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge.

| ¶ Ronald Olivier appeals the trial court’s ruling denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. Because this ruling is not an appealable judgment, we convert this appeal to a writ. We grant the writ and affirm the judgment.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Mr. Olivier was indicted on February 20, 1992, for the first degree murder of Gerard Lee, Jr. On February 10, 1993, a jury convicted Mr. Olivier of second degree murder, and the court subsequently sentenced Mr. Olivier to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Mr. Olivier was sixteen years old. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Olivier, unpub. 93-2303 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/17/94), 646 So.2d 1262.

On February 27, 2013, Mr. Olivier filed a motion to correct illegal sentence based upon the United State Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), where the Court found that the automatic imposition of a life sentence without benefit of parole eligibility on a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. On April 17, the trial court ruled that it would hold a Miller hearing in this case. The State objected requested a stay of the hearing, arguing 12that Miller does not apply retroactively to state cases on collateral review. The trial court denied the stay. This Court denied writs, State v. Olivier, unpub. 2013-0630 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/15/13), but the Supreme Court stayed all proceedings two days later.

On November 25, 2013, in response to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Tate, 2012-2763 (La.11/15A3), 130 So.3d 829, that Miller is not to be applied retroactively, the trial court denied Mr. Olivier’s motion to correct illegal sentence. Mr. Olivier objected, noting that Tate was not final, and moved for an appeal of the trial court’s ruling.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Olivier now argues that the court erred in denying his motion to correct illegal sentence because the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Tate is not final. We note that the ruling from which Mr. Olivier seeks review is not an appealable judgment. Accordingly, we convert this appeal to a writ application. State v. Williams, 2012-1092 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/24/13), 115 So.3d 702, unit den., 2013-1195 (La.11/22/13), 126 So.3d 478; State v. Hill, 2011-0683 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/4/12), 89 So.3d 396.

Mr. Olivier’s claim has no merit. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s writ in the present case and reversed the trial court’s April 17, 2013 ruling that granted Mr. Olivier a hearing on his motion to correct illegal sentence, citing its ruling in Tate that Miller is not be applied retroactively on collateral review. State v. Olivier, 2013-1110 (La.6/20/14), 141 So.3d 266. This is law of the case and dispositive of this issue. Moreover, at the time that Mr. Olivier moved for an appeal and filed his brief in the present appeal, writs were pending in the United States Supreme Court in Tate. Howevér, on May 27, 2014, the United States Supreme Court denied Tate’s writ of certiorari. Tate v. Louisiana, — U.S.—, 134 S.Ct. 2663, 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014).

^CONCLUSION

We convert Mr. Olivier’s appeal to a writ, grant the writ, and affirm the judgment of the trial court, which denied his motion to correct illegal sentence.

APPEAL CONVERTED TO WRIT; WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.


author:
DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge. TOBIAS, J., BELSOME, J.,
      BONIN, J., McKAY, C.J.,

text:
    Cedric L. RICHMOND v. Gary C. LANDRIEU and Tom Schedler, in his Capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State.
    No. 2014-CA-0957.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Sept. 9, 2014.

      Ernest L. Jones, Elie Jones & Associates, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appel-lee.
    Henry L. Klein, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge PAUL A. BONIN, Judge DANIEL L. DYSART, Judge JOY COSSICH LOBRANO, Judge ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS).

      . Judge Terri F. Love and Judge Madeleine M. Landrieu are recused.

   DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge.

[ iAppellant, Gary C. Landrieu (“Lan-drieu”), appeals a September 2, 2014 judgment, which ordered his disqualification as a candidate for the United States House of Representatives for the Second Congressional District. For the following reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

On August 20, 2014, Landrieu filed a “Notice of Candidacy” seeking to qualify for the office of United States Representative for Louisiana’s Second Congressional District in an election to be held on Tuesday, November 4, 2014. Thereafter, on August 29, 2014, Cedric L. Richmond (“Richmond”) filed an Objection to Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Landrieu alleging that Landrieu’s Notice of Candidacy provided grounds for objection under Louisiana Revised Statute 18:492. Also made defendant in this lawsuit is Tom Schedler, solely in his official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State.

Richmond argues in his petition that Landrieu should be disqualified because he signed a certification that he did not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties when Landrieu did in fact owe approximately $700.00 in fines and fees to the Louisiana Board of Ethics. Attached to the petition were: (1) a copy of 12Landrieu’s notice of candidacy, where he certified that he owed no outstanding fines, fee or penalties; and (2) copies of late fee assessment orders against Landrieu from the Louisiana Board of Ethics from April 14, 2014.

Although service was made on the Clerk of Court as agent for Landrieu, Landrieu was not personally served by the Civil Sheriff until after the hearing, on September 2, 2014 at 10:55 a.m. In light of Lan-drieu’s absence at the hearing, the trial court appointed attorney Dennis W. Moore as curator ad hoc to represent Landrieu’s interests.

Following a hearing on Richmond’s objection to candidacy, the trial court rendered judgment granting the petition to disqualify Landrieu as a candidate for the United States House of Representatives for the Second Congressional District. Landrieu now appeals this final judgment.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Landrieu essentially argues that he was not provided with proper notice of the suit and hearing, and that the trial court erred in disqualifying him from the congressional candidacy without proof that the alleged fee, fine or penalty was in fact due on August 20, 2014.

With regard to the sufficiency of service and notice of the petition objecting to the candidacy, La. R.S.18:1406 provides, in part:

Petition; answer; notification
A. An action objecting to the calling of a special election, objecting to candidacy, or contesting any election shall be instituted by filing a petition in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue and posting a copy of the petition in a conspicuous place at the entrance of the office of the clerk of court where the petition is filed.
|SB. The petition shall set forth in specific detail the facts upon the objection or contest is based....
C. The defendant shall be served with citation directing him to appear in court no later than 10:00 a.m. on the fourth day after suit was filed, subject, however, to the provisions of R.S. 18:1408(D). The defendant is not required to answer the petition, but if he answers, he shall do so prior to trial.

La. R.S. 18:1407 provides:

Appointment of agent for service of process
By filing notice of candidacy a candidate appoints the clerk of court for each parish in which he is to be voted on as his agent for service of process in any action objecting to his candidacy, contesting his qualification as a candidate in a second party primary election or in a general election, or contesting his election to office.

La. R.S. 18:1408 provides:

Service of process; sending notice and copies; documents to be filed
A. If service of process is to be made on the appointed agent, as authorized by R.S. 18:1407, such service shall be made by serving citation on this agent, but at the same time that service is made on the appointed agent, a diligent effort shall be made to make personal service on the defendant at his domiciliary address as shown by his qualifying papers.
B. When service is made on the appointed agent, he shall immediately send notice thereof, together with a copy of the citation, by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by commercial courier as defined in R.S. 1S:3204(D), when the person to be served is located outside of this state, to addressee only, to the defendant at his domiciliary address as listed in his notice of candidacy. If the appointed agent has reason to believe that the candidate is temporarily absent from his domiciliary address as listed in his notice of candidacy, he shall give additional notice to the candidate in the manner required by this Subsection by mailing a copy of the citation to any place where the candidate temporarily resides.
|4C. Proof of mailing, certified by the official mark of the United States Postal Service, or by commercial courier as defined in R.S. 13:3204'(D), when the person to be served is located outside of this state, along with the return receipt if received by the agent, shall be filed in the proceedings.
D. Service of process on and citation of the appointed agent, together with the posting of the petition as provided in R.S. 18:1406, shall be sufficient service
to give the trial court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

La. R.S. 18:1409 provides, in part:

Trial; decision; appeal
A. (1) Actions objecting to the calling of a special election, objecting to candidacy, or contesting an election shall be tried summarily, without a jury, and in open court. The trial shall begin no later than 10:00 a.m. on the fourth day after suit was filed.
(2) If the trial defendant does not appear on the date set for the trial, either in person or through counsel, the court shall appoint an attorney at law to represent him by instanter appointment made prior to the commencement of the trial. In a case where a court appointment of an attorney to represent the defendant is made, the proceedings shall be conducted contradictorily against the court-appointed attorney.

In this case, we find that the record reflects compliance with these provisions of law as (1) service was made on the Clerk of Court through Arthur Morrell, (2) a copy of the petition was posted on the fourth floor leading to the Clerk of Court’s office as well as the first floor of the courthouse, and (3) the Sheriff made an attempt to serve Landrieu on August 29, 2014 at the address listed on his notice of candidacy, and eventually served Landrieu on September 2, 2014. Thus, we find that Landrieu was provided proper notice as required for due process.

The second issue for this Court to address is whether Richmond carried his burden of proof to establish a prima facie case that Landrieu owed, on the date he [sexecuted his qualifying form, any late fees under the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act.

The person objecting to the candidacy of a person bears the burden of proof. Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, p. 6 (La.3/24/05), 899 So.2d 585, 541. “Because election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to candidacy bears the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified.” Id. However, once the party bearing the burden of proof has established a 'prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the opposing party. As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Landiak:

Generally, the legal term “burden of proof’ “denotes the duty of establishing - by a fair preponderance of the evidence the truth of the operative facts upon which the issue at hand is made to turn by substantive law.” Black’s Laxo Dictionary (8th ed). Under Louisiana’s civil law, the “burden of proof’ may shift back and forth between the parties as the trial progresses. Therefore, when the burden of proof has been specifically assigned to a particular party, that party must present sufficient evidence to establish the facts necessary to convince the trier of fact of the existence of the contested fact. Stated another way, the party on which the burden of proof rests must establish a prima facie case. If that party fails to carry his burden of proof, the opposing party is not required to present any countervailing evidence. On the other hand, once the party bearing the burden of proof has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present sufficient evidence to overcome the other party’s prima facie case.

Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, p. 8, 899 So.2d 535, 542.

Although Richmond attaches copies of late fee assessment orders against Lan-drieu from the Louisiana Board of Ethics from April of 2014, he fails to establish a prima facie case that Landrieu had late fees pending on August 20, 2014. In fact, when asked by the trial court whether the State knew if the fines had been paid, the State responded that it did not know. Thus, we find that Richmond Rfailed to establish a prima facie case that Landrieu should be disqualified. Further, the parties do not dispute that Landrieu possesses the necessary qualifications required under Article 1, Section 2; Clause 2 of the United States Constitution in that he is over twenty-five years of age and has been a United States citizen for more than seven years. Accordingly, after reviewing this record, we find that Richmond failed to carry his burden of proof to establish a prima facie case that Landrieu owed, on the date he executed his qualifying form, any late fees under the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act. Because our decision regarding this issue is dispositive of this case, we need not address Landrieu’s motion to strike and thus, deny the motion as moot.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed. Landrieu’s candidacy for the office of United States Representative of Louisiana’s Second Congressional District is hereby reinstated.

REVERSED; MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED.

TOBIAS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty
five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

BELSOME, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.

BONIN, J., concurs with additional reasons.

LOBRANO, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Judge TOBIAS.

JENKINS, J., concurs in the result.

McKAY, C.J., dissents with reasons.

LOMBARD, J., dissents.

TOBIAS, J.,

concurs and assigns reasons.

hA review of the record reveals that defendant/appellant, Gary C. Landrieu, timely submitted all documents and fees required to qualify as candidate for the United States House of Representatives, Second Congressional District. Pursuant to instructions from the Louisiana Secretary of State, Mr. Landrieu executed a form entitled “Notice of Candidacy-(Qualifying Form),” which contained the following language:

9. I acknowledge that I am subject to the provisions of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act if I am a candidate for any office other than United States senator, representative in congress, or member of a committee of a political party and that I do not owe any outstanding fines, fees or penalties pursuant to the Campaign finance [sic] Disclosure Act.

The record fails to reflect whether Mr. Landrieu has outstanding fines payable to the Campaign Finance Oversight Board. However, believing that Campaign Finance Disclosure Act (“CFDA”) does not apply to candidates for the United States Congress, Mr. Landrieu signed the certification.

Plaintiff/Appellee, Cedric L. Richmond, filed the instant lawsuit against Mr. Lan-drieu and Tom Schedler, in his official capacity as Secretary of State and Commissioner of Elections for the State of Louisiana, to disqualify Mr. Landrieu lafrom running for federal office on the ground that his notice of candidacy certification regarding outstanding state campaign finance fines was “false.”

The trial court rendered judgment on 2 September 2014, disqualifying Mr. Lan-drieu as a candidate for the Second Congressional District for the United States House of Representatives. Mr. Landrieu has filed the instant appeal, arguing, inter alia, that state election finance laws are preempted by federal law. I agree with Mr. Landrieu.

Article I, § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution states:

No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

In recognition of federal law, Louisiana has adopted the requirements to run for federal office in La. R.S. 18:1275:

A. No person shall be a United States senator who has not attained the age of thirty years and who has not been a citizen of the United States for nine years and who is not, when elected, an inhabitant of this state.
B. No person shall be a representative in Congress who has not attained the age of twenty-five years and who has not been a citizen of the United States for seven years and who is not, when elected, an inhabitant of this state.
C. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the qualifications for United States senators and members of the United States House of Representatives as provided in this Section shall be exclusive. [Emphasis added.]

Against this backdrop, I examine La. R.S. 18:463, which sets forth the requirements for filing a notice of candidacy. One of the requirements states that the notice of candidacy include a certificate signed by the candidate certifying that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the CFDA and that all statements contained in the notice are true and correct. La. R.S. 18:492 provides the grounds for objecting to a candidacy, stating in pertinent part:

| aA. An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds:
(5) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2).

Reviewing again the notice of candidacy, I find this part of the form to be ambiguous. On the one hand, the first part of numbered paragraph 9 of the form indicates that one is not subject to the CFDA when one is a candidate for congressional office and then continues to talk about not owing fines, fees, and penalties. One can read the clauses conjunctively. Given that a candidate running for a Representative in Congress is not subject to the CFDA, the conjunctive language of the form creates ambiguity. Based on the jurisprudence, such ambiguity must be construed in favor of allowing the candidate to run for office. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he laws governing the conduct of elections must be liberally interpreted so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy. Any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of permitting the candidate to run for public office.” Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595, p. 4 (La.9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1051, citing Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 679 (La.1991).

It is undisputed that candidates for federal office are subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 et seq., whereby all federal campaign funds must be timely and accurately reported to the Federal Election Commission. It is further undisputed that candidates for federal office are not subject to Louisiana’s Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, La. R.S. 18:1481 et seq.

|4In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the United States Supreme Court reviewed the history and text of the Qualifications Clauses in a case involving an attempted exclusion of a duly elected Member of Congress. The principal issue was whether the power granted to each House in Art. I, § 5, cl.l, to judge the “Qualifications of its own Members” included the power to impose qualifications other than those set forth in the text of the Constitution. In the majority opinion, the Court held that it did not. Id. at 522, 89 S.Ct. 1944.

It stands to reason that if Congress is without the power to impose any additional qualifications on its own members, then the Louisiana Legislature is likewise powerless to do so. However, if Mr. Landrieu wins the election, the Congress would be the appropriate entity to judge his qualifications in light of the alleged false certification in his Notice of Candidacy filed with the Louisiana Secretary of State.

In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842,131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995), the Court struck down an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution that prohibited the name of an otherwise eligible candidate for Congress from appearing on the general ballot if that candidate had already served a specified number of terms. The Court framed the issue in terms of “whether the Constitution forbids States from adding to or altering the qualifications specifically enumerated in the Constitution.” The Court explicitly referred to term limits as “qualifications.” Id. at 837, 115 S.Ct. 1842 (“[t]erm limits, like any other qualification for office, unquestionably restrict the ability of voters to vote for whom they wish.”). Similarly, the Court repeatedly used the term “qualifications” to refer to the age and residency requirements for membership in the United States Congress. The Court ultimately |fiheld that the challenged term limits amendment imposed an additional and unconstitutional “qualification” upon Congressional candidates that would effect a fundamental change in the Federal constitutional framework. Id.

To the extent that one might argue that the Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 08-0961 (La.App.4 Cir.7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99, writ denied 08-1680 (La.7/30/08), 986 So.2d 671, cert, denied Fahrenholtz v. Williams, 555 U.S. 1045, 129 S.Ct. 627, 172 L.Ed.2d 609 (2008), is precedent or support for the position that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed, I note that this court’s decision is not precedent for anything, the court having split evenly on a five-to-five vote, and the denial of a writ application is likewise not precedent for anything. State v. Williams, 00-1725, p. 4 n. 3 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 795; St. Tammany Manor, Inc. v. Spartan Building Corp., 509 So.2d 424, 428 (La.1987). Further, the notice of candidacy form now before us reads differently from that in Williams v. Fahrenholtz.

Because I find the certification in the Notice of Candidacy ambiguous and in violation of both state and federal law by imposing an additional qualification on the ability of one to run for federal office, I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court and permit Mr. Landrieu to run for United States House of Representatives, Second Congressional District.

BELSOME, J.,

concurs in the result and assigns reasons.

_JjI respectfully concur in the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling. However, I would reverse on the grounds that La. R.S. 18:463 attempts to impose greater qualifications on a candidate. A candidate for the United States House of Representatives must be twenty-five years of age, a United States Citizen for seven years, and an inhabitant of the State when elected. That list is exclusive and cannot be added to by a state constitution or state law. See Strong v. Breaux, 612 So.2d 111, 112 (La. App. 1st Cir.1992), See also, Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 08-961 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99, 106 (Murray, J., dissenting).

BONIN, J.,

concurs with additional reasons.

1,1 concur fully in the views expressed in the majority opinion and at the same time associate myself with the views expressed in the concurring opinions of JUDGES Tobias and Belsome amplifying that aspect of the majority opinion concerning the exclusivity of the constitutional qualifications for the office of a member of Congress.

I write separately to answer the arguments of the dissenting judges that Mr. Richmond made a sufficient prima facie showing that Mr. Landrieu owed an outstanding late fee imposed under authority of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act at the time he filed his qualifying form for U.S. Representative from Louisiana’s second congressional district.

“The elements of a prima facie case are established with competent evidence, as fully as though each of the allegations in the petition were denied by the defendant.” Goldfinch v. United Cabs, Inc., 08-1447, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/13/09); 13 So.3d 1173, 1178 (emphasis added) (citing Sessions & Fishman v. Liquid Air Corp., 616 So.2d 1254, 1258 (La.1993)). Thus, it is Mr. Richmond who must prove that Mr. Landrieu owed any outstanding late fee. But here, even assuming that Mr. Lan-drieu was obliged by La. R.S. 18:463 A(2)(v) to certify “that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign | ¡¿Finance Disclosure Act,” the evidence offered by Mr. Richmond that Late Fee Assessment Orders were previously issued to Mr. Lan-drieu only support a finding that at some time before Mr. Landrieu qualified he owed a late fee. The accompanying assessment letters, which were also introduced into evidence, noted that Mr. Landrieu under La. R.S. 18:1511.4.1 B and C(l) had three options: (1) pay the assessed late fee, (2) seek a waiver from the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure (the Board of Ethics), or (3) appeal to the Ethics Adjudicatory Board. Thus, clearly, the documentary evidence did not establish that Mr. Landrieu had not taken any one of those three courses of action.

If Mr. Landrieu paid the' late fee in full before he qualified, there is by definition no “outstanding” fee to trigger a violation under § 463 A(2)(v). See La. R.S. 18:463 A(2)(c)(iii) (“ ‘Outstanding fine, fee, or penalty shall not mean any fine, fee, or penalty that has been paid in full as of the time of the filing of the notice of candidacy.”)

If Mr. Landrieu received a waiver of payment from the Supervisory Committee, then again there would be no outstanding fee triggering a violation. See La. R.S.18:1511.4.1 B (noting that the Supervisory Committee may waive all or part of any fee assessed by the staff).

If Mr. Landrieu timely appealed the assessment order, and an adverse disposition of his appeal was not yet final, again by definition there is no outstanding fee due. See La. R.S. 18:463 A(2)(c)(i) (referencing determination of finality due to exhaustion of appeals or court proceedings).

Because Mr. Richmond bore the burden of disqualifying Mr. Landrieu, he was required to establish that there was an “outstanding late fee” due at the time of qualification; Mr. Landrieu was not required to prove the absence of an ^outstanding late fee. Oddly, Mr. Richmond offered some evidence that the late fee had once been assessed, but no evidence that it was “outstanding.” For example, the letters ac-eompanying the Late Fee Assessment Orders warned that unpaid late fees “will be posted on the Board’s website.” And, notably, the letter advised that “[i]f you timely submit a waiver request or appeal, your name will not be posted on the website pending the result of your appeal.” No evidence was offered by Mr. Richmond that Mr. Landrieu’s name and late fee ever appeared on the Board’s website.

The burden of establishing an outstanding late fee as of the time of qualifying is hardly burdensome because the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure itself “shall bring or join in an action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election for an office on the grounds provided in R.S. 18:492(A)(6).” La. R.S. 18:491 C(l) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Louisiana State Bd. of Ethics v. Murray, 07-1219, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/21/07), 968 So.2d 1076, 1078; Louisiana State Bd. of Ethics v. Garrett, 06-0263, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/21/06), 929 So.2d 176, 178. Here, the Supervisory Committee did not join in the action and was not represented at the trial, suggesting that Mr. Richmond could not bear his burden of proving that there was an outstanding late fee.

McKAY, C.J.,

dissents with reasons.

_JjFor the following reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In an election contest, the person opposing candidacy bears the burden of proving the candidate is disqualified. Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 7 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864 (citing La. R.S. 18:492). Once the burden of proof is carried, the burden shifts to the person opposing disqualification to rebut the showing. See Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758 (La.3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535; see also Louisiana State Board of Ethics v. Garrett, 06-0263 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/21/06), 929 So.2d 176. If that party is unable to successfully rebut the evidence establishing the prima facie case for disqualification, the objection to candidacy is to be sustained. See Id. According to La. R.S. 18:494(A), the effect of sustaining an objection to candidacy is disqualification.

On August 20, 2014, Gary C. Landrieu filed a notice of candidacy seeking to qualify for the office of United States Representative from Louisiana’s Second Congressional District in an election to be held on Tuesday, November 4, 2014. Cedric L. Richmond, a person of the full age of majority and a qualified elector for the Second Congressional District, filed an objection to candidacy and petition to ^disqualify the candidacy of Gary C. Lan-drieu on August 29, 2014. Also made defendant in this lawsuit was Tom Sche-dler, solely in his official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State. In his petition, Mr. Richmond argues that Mr. Landrieu should be disqualified because Mr. Lan-drieu signed a certification that he did not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties when Mr. Landrieu did in fact owe approximately $700.00 in fines and fees to •the Louisiana Board of Ethics. Attached as exhibits to Mr. Richmond’s petition were: 1) a copy of Mr. Landrieu’s notice of candidacy, where he certified that he owed no outstanding fines, fees or penalties; and 2) documentation from the Louisiana Board of Ethics, which established that Mr. Landrieu had a fee assessed against him for the late filing of a campaign finance report from a previous election and as of April 14, 2014, those fees had never been paid. At trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff made a prima facie case and disqualified the defendant.

For a prima facie case, a party must present sufficient evidence to establish facts necessary to convince the trier of fact of the existence of the contested fact. Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758 (La.3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535. The exhibits attached to Mr. Richmond’s petition make a prima facie case that Mr. Landrieu signed a certification that he owed no outstanding fines, fees or penalties under the act when he did owe approximately $700.00. The exhibits clearly show that Mr. Landrieu was assessed with a late fee by the Louisiana Board of Ethics on April 14, 2014. This fee remains assessed until it is either paid or waived. As far as we know, the fine was still due at the time Mr. Landrieu qualified on August 20, 2014. If the fee was no longer due it was incumbent upon the defendant to rebut the pri-ma facie case made by the plaintiff. I also take issue with the majority opinion’s statement that the attorney for the State could not tell whether the fees 1 swere still due at the time of qualification; that attorney represented the Louisiana Secretary of State, not the Louisiana State Board of Ethics. These are two distinct entities.

Although it is not addressed by the majority, I believe it is necessary that I address the underlying issue in this case, i.e., what qualifications apply to candidates for congress. Regarding the qualifications for members of the United States House of Representatives, the Qualifications Clause of the United States Constitution provides:

Section 2, Clause 2. Qualifications of Members

No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant - of that State in which he shall be chosen.

U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2.

The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, cl.l) further provides that state legislatures shall prescribe the times, places and manner of congressional elections; however, Congress is expressly given authority to make or alter such state regulations. Under this constitutional authority, the states have the right to create those laws and regulations necessary to ensure the integrity and reliability of the election process. Therefore, “[sjtates are entitled to adopt ‘generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.’ ” U.S. Term, Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995), quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). “These justifications are substantial, and reflect a legitimate and compelling state interest in orderly, consistent, and honest government.” Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1533 (9th Cir.1983).

|4In Louisiana, the manner in which a candidate qualifies for election to public office and the requirements for such qualification are provided for in the Louisiana Election Code. See La. R.S. 18:1 et seq. Any person desiring to become a candidate in a primary election for United States senator or representative in Congress shall file notification of his candidacy and decía-ration of his qualifications as provided for state candidates in Chapter 5 of this Title. La. R.S. 18:1274. La. R.S. 18:461(A)(1) provides that “a person who desires to become a candidate in a primary election shall qualify as a candidate by timely filing notice of his candidacy.” In pertinent part, La R.S. 18:463 states:

A. (l)(a) A notice of candidacy shall be in writing and shall state the candidate’s name, the office he seeks, the address of his domicile, and the parish, ward, and precinct where he is registered to vote. The candidate shall list on the notice of candidacy the name of the political party if he is registered as being affiliated with a recognized political party, “other” if he is registered as being affiliated with a political party that is not a recognized political party, or “no party” or an abbreviation thereof if he is registered with no political party affiliation. No candidate shall change or add his political party designation, for purposes of printing on the election ballot as required by R.S. 18:551(D), after he qualified for the election.
(2)(a) The notice of candidacy shall include a certificate, signed by the candidate, certifying all of the following:
(v) That he acknowledges that he is subject to the provisions of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act if he is. a candidate for any office other than United States senator, representative in congress, or member of a committee of a political party and that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act,,
(vii) That he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of Governmental Ethics.

| sLa. R.S. 18:492(A) provides the grounds for an objection to candidacy. That statute states:

A. An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one of the following grounds:
(1) The defendant failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law.
(2) The defendant failed to qualify for the primary election within the time prescribed by law.
(3) The defendant does not meet the qualifications for the office he seeks in the primary election.
(4) The defendant is prohibited by law from becoming a candidate for one or more of the offices for which he has qualified.
(5) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not know any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2).
(6) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of Governmental Ethics as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2).
(7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed both his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both.

In the instant case, the trial court disqualified Mr. Landrieu’s candidacy for United States Representative for Congress from the Second District of Louisiana because Mr. Landrieu owed outstanding fines, fees or penalties pursuant to the Louisiana Board of Ethics pursuant to the Louisiana Code of Governmental Ethics and/or the Louisiana Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, and Mr. Landrieu signed a certification that he did not owe such fines. This Court has addressed this same issue before in Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 08-0961 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99. In that case, an equally divided Court could not render a majority decree and the trial court’s judgment, disqualifying the congressional candidate who signed a similar declaration as the one in the instant case and also owed outstanding fines, fees or penalties, was affirmed. Id.

The reasoning used by Judge Love in Williams v. Fahrenholtz found the notice of candidacy form signed by Mr. Fahren-holtz and the provisions of La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(v) contained two distinct requirements: 1) the candidate is to | (¡acknowledge that the terms of the Louisiana Campaign Finance Disclosure Act applies to him unless he is a candidate for United States Senator or United States Representative to Congress; and 2) he owes no outstanding fines, fees or penalties under the Louisiana Campaign Finance Disclosure Act. The same rationale applies in the instant case; Mr. Landrieu is not being asked to admit that the act applies .to him as a congressional candidate, but rather he is being asked only to certify that he owes no outstanding fines, fees or penalties for any other reason. The exhibits attached to Mr. Richmond’s petition make a prima facie case that Mr. Landrieu signed a certification that he owed no outstanding fines, fees or penalties under the act when he did owe approximately $700.00.

Surely, the State of Louisiana has a compelling interest to adopt procedures, requirements and even restrictions to protect the integrity of the electoral process. This is a very legitimate interest on the part of the State. The dissenting opinions in Williams v. Fahrenholtz stress that there are only three qualifications for the office of United States Representative for Congress and they are provided for solely in the United States Constitution Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 and La. R.S. 18:1275. This viewpoint, however, ignores the fact that there are a number of other requirements or qualifications that an individual must meet before he is actually allowed to run for (and ultimately assume a seat in) Congress. First of all, at the time of qualification for that office in Louisiana, an individual is required to pay $900.00 or attach a nominating petition with a requisite number of signatures or be a member of the U.S. armed forces stationed/deployed outside the U.S. Even the United States Constitution provides for additional qualifications. Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 authorizes the disqualification of any person convicted in an impeachment proceeding from “any Office of Honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” Also, Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 provides that “no person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House 17during his continuance in Office.” Further, Section 3 of the 14th Amendment disqualifies any person “who having previously taken an oath ... to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have, engaged in an insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.” Therefore, there are clearly more than the three qualifications enumerated in Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2 and La. 18:1275. The aforementioned qualifications or requirements are no different than what Mr. Lan-drieu was disqualified for in the instant case. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in disqualifying the candidacy of Mr. Landrieu.

      . The record contains copies of the sheriff returns for August 29th, 2014, as well as September 2, 2014.

      . The United States Constitution, Article I, § 2, sets forth the qualifications for members of the United States House of Representatives as follows:

      . 52 U.S.C.A. § 30143(a) states:
      Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this Act, and of rules prescribed under this Act, supersede and preempt any provision of State law with
      respect to election to Federal office. [Emphasis added.]

      . See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2.

      . Under Parfait v. Transocean Offshore, Inc., 07-1915, 07-1998 (La.3/14/80), 980 So.2d 634, an even split of the judges in the court of appeal operates only to leave the trial court’s decision undisturbed.

      . U.S. Const, art. 1, § 2, cl. 2.

      . There are two orders, dated March 6, 2014 and April 14, 2014, which appear to cover the same late-filing transgression, involving the filing of a 2013 Supplemental campaign finance disclosure report on February 25, 2014, which was seven days late.

        . The "state” lawyer who appeared at the trial represented the Secretary of State and not tire Supervisory Committee.

      . Mr. Richmond is the incumbent United States Representative from the Second Congressional District of Louisiana and is running for re-election to that office.

      . These fines and fees were assessed because Mr. Landrieu's 2013 supplemental report for the March 24, 2012 election for New Orleans City Council-at-Large was filed seven days late.