author: DAVIS, Chief Judge.

text:
    PRESLEY LAW AND ASSOCIATES, P.A., Petitioner, v. Roberta Sue CASSELBERRY f/k/a Sue C. Berlinger; Bruce D. Berlinger; Suntrust Bank, as Garnishee; and Richard K. Inglis, as Garnishee, Respondents.
    No. 2D13-5507.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 1, 2014.

      Steven M. Presley, Michael R. Presley, and Robert M. Presley of Presley Law and Associates, P.A., Wellington, for Petitioner.
    Michael A. Hymowitz of Braverman & Hymowitz, Fort Lauderdale, for Respondent Roberta Sue Casselberry f/k/a Sue C. Berlinger.
    No appearance for remaining Respondents.
   DAVIS, Chief Judge.

Presley Law and Associates, P.A., is a law firm representing the interests of certain third parties associated in various capacities with funds in which Bruce Berlinger, the Former Husband, has an interest as a trust beneficiary. In this proceeding, Presley seeks certiorari review of the denial of a motion for protective order seeking to prevent the production of its records. Because the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in ordering production from a third party with no adequate remedy on appeal, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

The records at issue were subpoenaed by Roberta Casselberry, the Former Wife, when she sought garnishment from the holders of certain trust accounts following her receipt of a judgment against the Former Husband during the dissolution of their marriage. As part of her collection efforts, the Former Wife initiated a garnishment action related to funds in certain trusts in which the Former Husband had an interest. She also sought to recover from the Former Husband her attorney’s fees generated from these collection efforts, and she requested records from Presley as related to the time spent in representation of the various actions.

As relevant to the instant action, the Former Wife subpoenaed trust records from Presley solely in its representative capacity of two third-party garnishees— SunTrust Bank and an individually named special trustee. Presley sought a protective order — claiming work product, attorney-client privilege, lack of relevancy, and privacy — in an attempt to protect the firm from having to turn over its billing and related records stemming from its representation of the parties to the trust during the earlier dissolution proceeding. This motion was denied after a hearing.

Presley argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by requesting the production of billing records from third parties for the sole purpose of the Former Wife’s attempting to establish the reasonableness of the fees and hours expended by her own attorneys in the earlier proceeding against the Former Husband. Presley further argues that the trial court failed to find that the requested items were relevant. The Former Wife, however, maintains that the documents became relevant when the Former Husband argued against the amount of fees she sought in her action to collect unpaid alimony.

We conclude that the trial court here departed from the essential requirements of law because no evidence of relevancy was presented to establish how the firm’s billing records for representation that is clearly related to the interests of third parties are related to the Former Wife’s purpose in seeking to establish the reasonableness of the amount of the fees she incurred in the action against her Former Husband. See Rowe v. Rodriguez-Schmidt, 89 So.3d 1101,1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“[T]he trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law because it ordered production of a nonparty’s financial information without considering any evidence regarding its relevance.”). Additionally, certiorari relief is appropriate for this departure because there is no adequate remedy on appeal available for Presley or the nonparties it represents. Id. Whether these records are actually relevant is a matter to be determined by the trial court. We merely find that it was a departure from the essential requirements of law to order the records’ production without first requiring evidence establishing their relevancy. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

Granted.

VILLANTI and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

      . In the various proceedings that have been filed in the circuit court or this court, Presley has represented the Former Husband, a special trustee, and SunTrust as the holder of certain trusts for which the Former Husband is a beneficiary. Presley also appears to have represented the Former Husband’s adult children in a related action in federal court.

      . We note that based on the entry of a stay of the ordered disclosure of the records at issue by the circuit court, the records do not appear to have been disclosed while the underlying case has proceeded.

      . The Former Husband argued that the Former Wife’s attorney’s fees were not proportional to those incurred by his attorneys in the same action, but she maintained that her requested attorney’s fees were proportional because she was required to represent her position as to the interests represented by Presley as well as the Former Husband’s direct interests.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Robert E. DUBOW, as Successor Trustee of the American Land and Mortgage Trust Number 1119, dated December 9, 2005; and Stephen D. Vaughan, Appellants, v. Danita ACREE, individually and as Trustee of the American Land and Mortgage Trust Number 1119, dated December 9, 2005; William Jerry Brock; and Wachovia Bank, a national association, Appellees.
    No. 2D13-4188.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 1, 2014.

      Benjamin W. Hardin, Jr. and Jeffery E. Pratt of Hardin & Associates, P.A., Lake-land; and Joseph E. Seagle of Joseph E. Seagle, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.
    Michael K. Winston, Dean A. Morande, and Michael D. Sloan of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellee Wachovia Bank.
    No appearance for remaining Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Robert E. Dubow, as Successor Trustee of the American Land and Mortgage Trust Number 1119, dated December 9, 2005; and Stephen D. Vaughan challenge the circuit court’s order dismissing their action for lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e) and a subsequent order denying their motion to vacate the prior order and for rehearing. We find no error in the dismissal of the case for lack of prosecution or the later order denying the motion to vacate and for rehearing. Nevertheless, the circuit court should not have dismissed the action -with prejudice.

A dismissal for failure to prosecute under rule 1.420(e) is to be without prejudice. Se. Mortg. Co. v. Sinclair, 632 So.2d 677, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Nektaredes v. Sagonias, 432 So.2d 769, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); McDaniel v. Onkey, 422 So.2d 70, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). As we did in McDaniel, we strike the words “with prejudice” from the order dismissing the case. As so amended, we affirm the order of dismissal and the order denying the motion to vacate and for rehearing. See McDaniel, 422 So.2d at 70-71.

Affirmed as modified.

CASANUEVA, VILLANTI, and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.


author: MORRIS, Judge.

text:
    Davone Lamar ROYSTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D13-905.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 1, 2014.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.
   MORRIS, Judge.

Davone Lamar Royster appeals his judgments for first-degree murder, attempted armed robbery with a firearm or deadly weapon, and attempted first-degree murder. He also appeals his life sentence with the possibility of parole on the first-degree murder conviction. He first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to require the State to provide immunity to a State witness or to suffer a judgment of acquittal. We affirm that issue without further comment. We also affirm on the second issue, regarding the legality of his life sentence with the possibility of parole, which is controlled by our recent opinion in Rodriguez-Giudicelli v. State, 143 So.3d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

Affirmed.

DAVIS, C.J., and KHOUZAM, J., Concur.


author: WALLACE, Judge.

text:
    Alyssa CONRAD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D14-1015.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 1, 2014.
   WALLACE, Judge.

Alyssa Conrad appeals the order dismissing her motion to reduce or modify sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) as untimely. Because such an order is not appealable, we treat the appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, and we grant the petition. See Bailey v. State, 136 So.3d 615, 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

The law is well settled that a circuit court departs from the essential requirements of law when it dismisses a timely rule 3.800(c) motion without considering the merits of the motion. See, e.g., id. at 616; Kwapil v. State, 44 So.3d 229, 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); McPherson v. State, 139 So.3d 478, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). As the sixtieth day following the imposition of her sentence was Saturday, August 24, 2013, Conrad’s motion was timely filed when she placed it in the hands of prison officials on Monday, August 26, 2013. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)(1)(C) (providing that when the last day of a computational period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday); Bailey, 136 So.3d at 616 (“The mailbox rule applies to motions filed in accordance with rule 3.800(c). Thus, a rule 3.800(c) motion is considered filed when entrusted to prison officials for further delivery or processing.” (citations omitted)).

Therefore, we grant the petition, quash the circuit court order dismissing her motion as untimely, and remand for the court to consider Conrad’s motion on its merits.

Petition granted; order quashed; remanded.

MORRIS and SLEET, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Reynaldo PRIETO, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-1180.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 1, 2014.
    Reynaldo Prieto, pro se, Petitioner.
    Sarah J. Rumph, General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The Florida Commission on Offender Review correctly concedes that its records improperly reflect a conviction which had been vacated in 2006 for use of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense. The February 18, 2014, order of the circuit court is hereby quashed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

WOLF, BENTON, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    German GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D14-3076.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
    Paula C. Coffman, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the trial court’s July 17, 2013 order on postconviction motion, filed in Case No. 2007-CF-00199-A, in the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

ORFINGER, COHEN and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Donald BRUSH, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-547.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
    Donald Brush, III, Live Oak, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s January 16, 2014, motion for post-conviction relief. We also affirm the trial court’s March 13, 2014, order denying appointment of counsel. However, we reverse that portion of the March 13, 2014, order that considered, on the merits, Appellant’s request to file a successive motion for postconviction relief to raise additional claims. The trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the additional claims as this appeal was still pending.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

TORPY, C.J., SAWAYA and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.

      . We acknowledge that our order relinquishing jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel, and for permission to file a successive motion for postconviction relief, was vague regarding the scope of our remand.


text:
    Travis LUCAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-822.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
    Travis Lucas, Wewahitchka, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Pamela J. Roller and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney Generals, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Travis Lucas appeals the trial court’s order summarily denying his rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief as improperly successive. After considering the unique procedural history of this case, we conclude that good cause existed to allow the successive filing. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(2). Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for consideration on the merits.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ORFINGER, COHEN and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    J.A.B., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-312.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 3, 2014.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and John M. Selden, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, J.A.B., a child, appeals the $460 restitution award against him. As the award was not supported by competent, substantial evidence, we reverse and remand for a new hearing.

After a disagreement, Appellant attacked the victim and kicked a large dent in the victim’s vehicle door panel. Appellant pled no contest to criminal mischief and battery and received probation with restitution to be set. At the restitution hearing, the victim stated that he believed it would cost between $460 and $490 to repair the damage to his vehicle. He gave no basis for his opinion. The victim’s stepfather testified that the victim had obtained a repair estimate, which the victim’s mother had sent to an office within the court system. The estimate did not reach the court. The court awarded $460 in restitution, and this appeal followed.

Quite clearly, as the State agrees, the award was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. See State v. Childers, 979 So.2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (reiterating that restitution must be proved by competent, substantial evidence); Bennett v. State, 944 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“A victim’s testimony, without documentation, is not enough to support an award of restitution.”). Accordingly, we reverse the award and remand for a new hearing. Horahan v. State, 134 So.3d 535, 535 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (reversing and remanding award for restitution that lacked support of competent, substantial evidence); Johnson v. State, 856 So.2d 1085, 1087 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (reversing and remanding restitution awarded based solely on hearsay).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

PALMER, LAWSON, JJ., and HARRIS, C.M., Senior Judge, concur.

      . There was no testimony that the victim had any special knowledge concerning the costs of repairs.


author: PER CURIAM. THOMAS, J.,

text:
    Hattie BONNER, Appellant, v. MIAMI DADE PUBLIC SCHOOLS/Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Appellee.
    No. 1D14-1200.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 7, 2014.

      Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
    Michael J. Ring of the Law Office of Michael J. Ring, LLC, Pompano Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in denying her request for a $2,000 advance. We agree that the JCC erred in denying the advance.

Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (2011), permits advances of up to $2,000 on the following proof:

(c) In the event the claimant has not returned to the same or equivalent employment with no substantial reduction in wages or has suffered a substantial loss of earning capacity or a physical impairment, actual or apparent:
2. An advance payment of compensation not in excess of $2,000 may be ordered by any [JCC] ... after giving due consideration to the interests of the person entitled thereto.

The advance must, of course, “have some plausible nexus to” “medical and related financial needs arising from workplace injuries.” ESIS/ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 104 So.3d 1111, 1114-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Here, the JCC concluded that “the nexus between the accident and the circumstances suggesting the need for an advance is missing” because Claimant’s “difficulty in managing those [financial] circumstances is unrelated to her workplace injury.” Thus, the JCC has found that Claimant has both a financial need and difficulty in managing her financial circumstances. But from whence does that difficulty spring? Solely from Claimant’s reduction in earnings, which — it is undisputed — is due to her workplace injury.

Claimant’s uncontroverted testimony was that she was off work for “more than 18 months on sick leave,” that she returned to work at a reduction in total pay, and that an advance “would put me up to date ... so that I could put food in my refrigerator, for one thing, gas in my car, and to pay my bills.” By this testimony, which the JCC did not reject, Claimant has met her burden of proof.

The JCC’s conclusion that Claimant’s difficulty in managing her finances is unrelated to her injury is seemingly based on his categorization of some of Claimant’s monthly bills as “luxury expenses.” But whether an item is classified as a “luxury” is not a proper factor for consideration under section 440.20(12)(c)2. These small advances are merely a stopgap to help a claimant avoid defaulting with creditors while awaiting the potential distribution of workers’ compensation benefits, when the reduction in income is caused by the injury. A claimant is not required to live a pauper’s life to be eligible for an advance of up to $2,000 under section 440.20(12)(c)2.

Advances in excess of $2,000 are permitted under subsections 440.20(12)(c)3. and (12)(d), and those subsections mandate that a JCC inquire into the reasonableness of those larger advances. In contradistinction to advances over $2,000, advances in a smaller amount do not permit this inquiry, but involve only a consideration of the claimant’s interests; the burden of proof on the claimant is lighter precisely because the financial burden on the employer or carrier is lighter.

As we made clear in Lopez v. Allied Aerofoam, 48 So.3d 888, 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), “[sjection 440.20(12)(c)2. requires the JCC to consider the ‘interests of the person entitled [to the advance].”’ We distinguish Worthy v. Jimmie Crowder Excavating, 100 So.3d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), on the ground that there the JCC “was unable to adequately consider Claimant’s interests” without additional evidence, which was Worthy’s burden to produce and prove, whereas here the JCC found he had sufficient evidence to give Claimant’s interests due consideration.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the order denying the advance and REMAND this matter for entry of an order awarding the requested $2,000 advance.

PADOVANO and CLARK, JJ., concur; THOMAS, J., dissents with opinion.

THOMAS, J.,

dissents.

I dissent. This case presents nothing more than a failure of proof on Claimant’s part, who bore the burden of persuasion. See Fitzgerald v. Osceola Cnty. Sch. Bd., 974 So.2d 1161, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Claimant bore the burden over the course of the proceedings below to prove her entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.”); Mitchell v. XO Commc’ns, 966 So.2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“Claimant has the burden to prove entitlement to ... benefits.... Accordingly, Claimant must present evidence the JCC finds persuasive.”). The JCC found that Claimant’s “income and expenses roughly equate,” the record supports that finding, and in the absence of any evidence of specific indebtedness connected to the workers’ compensation case, the JCC properly denied the advance. See Worthy v. Jimmie Crowder Excavating, 100 So.3d 727, 728-29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (noting claimant did not “provide any evidence to show that $2,000, as opposed to something less than that, was appropriate in his situation”). Thus, I respectfully dissent.


text:
    Cecila ROSARIO, Nelson Melendez, et al., Appellants, v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, et al., Appellees.
    No. 5D13-1563.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 7, 2014.
    Monique M. Sadarangani, of Advocate Law Groups of Florida, P.A., Miami Lakes, for Appellants.
    Kimberly N. Hopkins, of Shapiro, Fish-man, & Gaché, LLP, Tampa, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Roman v. Wells Fargo Bank, 143 So.3d 489 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

TORPY, C.J., LAWSON and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.


text:
    FLORIDA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. Shelly SAULNIER, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-416.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 7, 2014.
    Dorothy Venable DiFiore, of Haas Lewis DiFiore, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Matthew R. Danahy and Kimberly L. Armistead, of Danahy and Murray, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Branco, — So.3d — (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

ORFINGER, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.


text:
    William SMITH, Appellant, v. GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-467.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 7, 2014.
    William Smith, DeLand, pro se.
    K. Denise Haire and Nicole R. Topper, of Blank Rome LLP, Boca Raton, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a).

ORFINGER, EVANDER, and BERGER, J.J., concur.


author: FERNANDEZ, J.

text:
    ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Appellant, v. Jeanette CLARKE, Appellee.
    No. 3D14-871.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 8, 2014.

      Mase Lara, P.A., Curtis J. Mase and Valentina M. Tejera and Cameron W. Eu-banks, Miami, for appellant.
    Goldstein and Goldstein, and Phillip J. Goldstein, Miami, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
   FERNANDEZ, J.

Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD. appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion to dismiss for improper venue. We reverse because Royal Caribbean reasonably communicated to appellee Jeanette Clarke the forum selection clause of the ticket contract before she boarded the vessel, and Royal Caribbean had no obligation to remove the case to federal court.

On October 9, 2013, Clarke, a passenger aboard a Royal Caribbean vessel, filed a negligence claim against Royal Caribbean in state court, a few days before the expiration of the contractual one-year limitation period. .Royal Caribbean moved to dismiss Clarke’s complaint on improper venue grounds. In support of its motion, Royal Caribbean submitted an affidavit which established that Clarke needed to check in and accept all of the terms and conditions of the ticket contract before she boarded the vessel. The trial court denied Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss, finding that there was no evidence Clarke received and read the ticket contract before she boarded the vessel.

The first paragraph of the ticket contract indicated in bold and capital letters that it “[c]ontains important limitations on the rights of passengers, it is important that you carefully read all terms of this contract, paying particular attention to section 3 and sections 9 through 11,” which pertained to the forum selection clause and the one-year limitation period to file suit provision. The forum selection clause in section 9 stated, “[a]ll disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this agreement ... shall be litigated, if at all, in and before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida located in Miami-Dade County, Florida....”

The record reflects that Royal Caribbean reasonably communicated to Clarke the existence of important terms and conditions of the ticket contract before she boarded the vessel. The appropriate inquiry is whether a cruise ship operator “reasonably communicates to passengers the existence within the ticket of important terms and conditions which affect legal rights,” not whether the passenger actually received and read the ticket contract. Leslie v. Carnival Corp., 22 So.3d 567, 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

The record sufficiently established that Clarke entered into the ticket contract and the first paragraph of the ticket contract reasonably communicated to Clarke, in bold and capital letters, important limitations such as the forum selection clause and the one-year limitation to file suit. The record also reflects Clarke timely filed her negligence suit and, as such, she acknowledged the ticket contract’s provision relative to the application of the one-year limitation period to file suit. The ticket contract’s forum selection clause, like the one-year limitation period provision, was contained in the ticket contract.

Clarke also failed to satisfy her burden of establishing the non-enforcement of the forum selection clause. The United States Supreme Court has held forum selection clauses are “prima facie valid” and enforceable. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991). The party contesting the application of a forum selection clause bears the burden of establishing its non-enforcement. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Texas, — U.S. — , 134 S.Ct. 568, 574-75, 187 L.Ed.2d 487 (2013). It is undisputed that Clarke offered no evidence to avoid enforcement of the forum selection clause.

Finally, Royal Caribbean had no obligation to remove the case to federal court in Miami after Clarke filed the negligence claim in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County. This Court has enforced similar forum selection clauses and has recognized dismissal as a proper mechanism to enforce a forum selection clause of a cruise ticket. Weisenberg v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., 35 So.3d 910, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Assiff v. Carnival Corp., 930 So.2d 776, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

We thus conclude that Clarke is bound by the forum selection clause contained in the ticket contract because Royal Caribbean reasonably communicated to her the terms and conditions of the ticket contract, and we further conclude that Royal Caribbean had no obligation to remove the case to federal court. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.

Reversed.


author: SHEPHERD, Chief Judge.

text:
    The WILLIAM W. ZEIGLER TRUST, et al., Appellants, v. COFRAN SUNDAY SUNSHINE CANNON, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D12-2605.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 8, 2014.
    Horan, Wallace & Higgins and David Paul Horan (Key West), for appellants.
    Stones & Cardenas and Adele V. Stones (Key West), for appellees.
    Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and WELLS and LAGOA, JJ.
   SHEPHERD, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment construing a Deed Granting Easement over property in Monroe County. The parties stipulated that their cross-motions for summary judgment “involve exclusively questions of law, [that] no genuine issue of material fact is involved, and that the issue before the court is the construction of the ... Deed Granting Easement.” The trial court ruled in favor of appellees. However, the parties overlooked the dispositive question: Did a valid easement exist in the first place? See Winthrop v. Wadsworth, 42 So.2d 541, 543-44 (Fla.1949); One Harbor Fin. Ltd. Co. v. Hymes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039, 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Hensel v. Aurilio, 417 So.2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see also 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *46-47; 20 Fla. Jur.2d Easements § 1 (2014).

Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings as may be required to determine the issue.


text:
    Terry Lee MARSHALL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-3137.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 9, 2014.
    Octavius Holliday, Jr. of The Holliday Law Firm, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kristen Bonjour, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the December 5, 2013, judgment and sentence, in Duval County Circuit Court case number 16-2013-CF-005302-AXXX-MA. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

ROWE, MARSTILLER, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


author: SWANSON, J.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Khalid MUHAMMAD, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4147.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 13, 2014.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Justin D. Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   SWANSON, J.

The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s order dismissing Count I of an amended information charging appellee, Khalid Muhammad, with sexual battery following a trial, at the conclusion of which, the jury announced it could not reach a verdict on either Count I or Count II (the latter count charging appellee with kidnapping to facilitate a felony). The jury, instead, rendered a verdict only on Count III, finding appellee guilty of lewd or lascivious battery, as charged. For the following reasons, we reverse the order of dismissal.

In Count I of the amended information, appellee was charged with having committed sexual battery “by penetrating [the victim’s] vagina with his penis or any other object, without the victim’s consent” on February 1, 2012, contrary to sections 794.023 and 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (2011). In Count III of the same amended information, appellee was also charged with having committed lewd or lascivious battery on February 1, 2012, by “unlawfully engage[ing] in sexual activity with [the victim] ... by penetrating her vagina with his penis or any other object,” contrary to section 800.04(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). The victim was twelve years of age or older, but less than sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged offenses. Following submission of the jury’s verdict, the trial court adjudicated appellee guilty of lewd or lascivious battery and sentenced him on June 20, 2013, to eight years’ incarceration to be followed by seven years of probation. The state scheduled a re-trial on Counts I and II for July 22, 2013. In the interim, appellee filed a proper motion to dismiss Count I under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b), asserting that under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 9, of the Florida Constitution, the state was prohibited on double jeopardy grounds from subjecting him “to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal offense.” Valdes v. State, 3 So.3d 1067, 1069 (Fla.2009). See also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (observing the double jeopardy guarantee restrains both courts and prosecutors). Jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn. Turner v. State, 37 So.3d 132 (Fla.2010).

In ruling on the motion, the trial court acknowledged it was “clear that Courts have found sexual battery and lewd a lascivious [battery] cannot stand when based on the same act.” It went on to “confess some fault” that the “issue” had not occurred to it when it proceeded to sentence appellee under Count III, and that it was indeed a conviction “for double jeopardy purposes.” The court then candidly admitted had the count been left “open” and appellee been retried and convicted on Count I, “it would have been the State’s option to choose between the two offenses.” That not being the case, however, the trial court announced it could not “undo” what had already been done. Consequently, it granted appellee’s motion to dismiss.

Due to the procedural posture of the present case, we need not address, as did the trial court, the issue of whether convictions for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious battery can stand when based on the same act. Cf. Smith v. State, 41 So.3d 1041, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding the testimony at trial showed proof of touching to support the lewd or lascivious charge was the same touching which occurred in the act of sexual battery by digital penetration and, therefore, “the trial court fundamentally erred by entering judgment against Mr. Smith for both sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation”). The United States Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the rule that a retrial following a hung jury does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). Accord Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003). As the Supreme Court emphasized in Richardson, “the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy,” but “the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy.” 468 U.S. at 325, 104 S.Ct. 3081. In such an event, the Court stressed “[t]he Government, like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to agree.” Id. at 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081. Accord Rose v. Dugger, 508 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla.1987) (holding “article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution does not prohibit a defendant’s retrial when a prior trial has been concluded by mistrial because of a hung jury”). In Harris v. State, 449 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), we emphasized “[t]he double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Florida constitutions protect ‘against multiple punishments for a single criminal offense,’ not against prosecution for multiple offenses arising out of a single criminal episode.” Id. at 895 n. 1 (quoting Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla.1979)) (emphasis added). We continued: “Moreover, the declaration of a mistrial based upon the jury’s inability to agree on a verdict does not constitute former jeopardy, and a defendant may be retried for the same offense.” Id. (citations omitted).

More recently, in Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009), the Supreme Court carefully explained why a jury’s inability to reach a verdict on one count does not affect another count upon which the jury was able to reach a verdict:

Because a jury speaks only through its verdict, its failure to reach a verdict cannot — by negative implication — yield a piece of information that helps put together the trial puzzle.... Unlike the pleadings, the jury charge, or the evidence introduced by the parties, there is no way to decipher what a hung count represents. Even in the usual sense of “relevance,” a hung count hardly “make[s] the existence of any fact ... more probable or less probable.” A host of reasons — sharp disagreement, confusion about the issues, exhaustion after a long trial, to name but a few— could work alone or in tandem to cause a jury to hang. To ascribe meaning to a hung count would presume an ability to identify which factor was at play in the jury room. But that is not reasoned analysis; it is guesswork. Such conjecture about possible reasons for a jury’s failure to reach a decision should play no part in assessing the legal consequences of a unanimous verdict that the jurors did return.

Id. at 121-22, 129 S.Ct. 2360 (citations and footnotes omitted). In Avila v. State, 86 So.3d 511 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), the Second District Court of Appeal interpreted the Supreme Court’s language in Yeager to mean that a jury’s inability to reach a verdict on a lesser charge does not equate to an acquittal of the greater charge. Id. at 516. But see Vitagliano v. State, 680 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding double jeopardy prohibits retrial on a sexual battery charge on which the jury was deadlocked, when the jury acquitted the defendant of the lewd and lascivious conduct charge resting on the same facts as the sexual battery charge).

In the present case, appellee was not acquitted of an offense arising from the same facts as the charge on which the jury was hung, as occurred in Vitagliano. Applying the Yeager analysis here, we conclude the jury’s guilty verdict on Count III and appellee’s conviction on that count said absolutely nothing concerning the sexual battery offense charged in Count I. Thus, because jeopardy was never terminated as to Count I, the trial court erred in dismissing that count. Consequently, the order of dismissal is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ROBERTS and MARSTILLER, JJ„ concur.

      . The state may appeal an order dismissing an indictment or information, or any count thereof, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A).

      . We have per curiam affirmed appellee's conviction for this offense in case number ID 13-3114, which appeal was consolidated with the instant case for purposes of the record.

      . Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b) provides in relevant part: "Motions to Dismiss; Grounds. All defenses available to a defendant by plea, other than not guilty, shall be made only by motion to dismiss the indictment or information, whether the same shall relate to matters of ... former jeopardy....”


text:
    James BANKS, Appellant, v. Kim D. McFARLAND, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-5825.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 13, 2014.
    Russell K. Ramey, of Ramey Law Offices, Panama City, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

James Banks appeals the issuance of a temporary injunction for repeat violence against him based upon the complaint of Kim McFarland. We reverse.

Appellant and his spouse lived across the street from and had an acrimonious relationship with appellee and her spouse. The trial court entered the injunction against repeat violence pursuant to section 748.046, Florida Statutes (2013), based upon testimony from appellee and another neighbor that appellant yelled at appellee, “I will shoot and kill all of you” and “I’ll F you up,” in addition to making other ugly remarks and taunts and engaging in intrusive behavior.

The “repeat violence” necessary to obtain an injunction under the statute includes “assault,” which, in turn, requires proof of an intentional and unlawful threat to do violence, the apparent ability to do so, “and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.” § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). The case law is replete with instances of persons making nearly identical threatening remarks as appellant’s, which did not warrant an injunction because they were not accompanied by overt acts that would have created a well-founded fear in the victim that violence was imminent. See Titsch v. Buzin, 59 So.3d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Gagnard v. Sticht, 886 So.2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Perez v. Siegel, 857 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Cirillo v. Jones, 84 So.3d 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). See also Sorin v. Cole, 929 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Johnson v. Brooks, 567 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Power v. Boyle, 60 So.3d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Russell v. Doughty, 28 So.3d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Santiago v. Towle, 917 So.2d 909 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

There was no showing of an overt act below. We find nothing to distinguish the case at bar from those cited above.

REVERSED.

PADOVANO, THOMAS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.


author: OSTERHAUS, J.

text:
    Tammy Lee ANTICO, Personal Representative of the Estate of Tabitha Frances Guyton Antico, Deceased, Petitioner, v. SINDT TRUCKING, INC., and James Paul Williams, Respondents.
    No. 1D14-277.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 13, 2014.

      Andrew J. Decker, IV, of The Decker Law Firm, P.A., Live Oak, and Bruce Robinson of Robinson, Kennon, Kendron, P.A., Stephen A. Smith, and Thomas T. Demás, Lake City, for Petitioner.
    Albert J. Wollermann and Trudy Innes Richardson, Guilday, Schwartz, Simpson, West, Hatch & Lowe, P.A., Tallahassee, for Respondents.
   OSTERHAUS, J.

The petition in this matter seeks to quash a discovery order in a wrongful death action. Citing the privacy provision, article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution, and the rules of civil procedure, the personal representative of Tabitha Antico’s estate (Petitioner) objects to an order entered by the trial court allowing Respondents’ expert to conduct a limited inspection of the cell phone that Ms. Antico allegedly was using when an automobile accident caused her death. We conclude, however, that the order does not depart from the essential requirements of law and deny the petition.

I.

On September 5, 2012, a truck operated by the Respondents collided with a vehicle driven by Ms. Antico and she was killed. Six months later, the decedent’s estate filed a wrongful death action, but Respondents denied liability. Respondents asserted that the decedent was either comparatively negligent or was the sole cause of the accident because she was distracted by her iPhone. Numerous times Respondents requested data from the decedent’s cellphone, which has been kept unused by the Petitioner since shortly after the accident. And while Respondents received some calling and texting records from the decedent’s wireless provider, other cellphone data was not disclosed, such as use and location information, internet website access history, email messages, and social and photo media posted and reviewed on the day of the accident.

Respondents moved for an order from the trial court permitting an expert to inspect the cellphone’s data from the day of the accident. Petitioner objected to the cellphone inspection citing the decedent’s privacy rights under the Florida Constitution. After a hearing, the trial court granted Respondents’ motion.

The order allowing the inspection recognized both Respondents’ discovery rights and the privacy interest asserted by the Petitioner. It stressed the relevance of the requested information, citing cell phone records showing that the decedent had been texting in the minutes preceding the accident; testimony from two witnesses indicating that the decedent may have been utilizing her cell phone at the time of the accident; and testimony from the responding troopers supporting the assertion that the decedent was using her cell phone when the accident occurred.

The order also recognized the decedent’s privacy interests and set strict parameters for the expert’s confidential inspection. It provided that the expert could examine the cellphone, at Respondents’ expense, in the presence of Petitioner’s counsel at an agreed date, place, and time. Petitioner’s counsel could also video the inspection. The order enumerated the following steps to be followed by the expert:

(1) Install write-protect software to ensure no alteration of the phone’s hard drive would be made during the inspection;
(2) Download a copy of the cell phone’s hard drive, making a master copy, a review copy, a copy for Petitioner’s counsel;
(3) Return the cell phone to Petitioner’s counsel immediately after copying the hard drive;
(4) Review only the data on the hard drive for the nine-hour period permitted by the Court (including call records, text messages, web searches, emails sent and received, uploads, downloads, data changes and GPS data);
(5) Prepare a summary of the data reviewed, including type of data, use of data, date/time of data, and any other information s/he deems relevant.
(6) Provide the summary to Petitioner’s counsel prior to the dissemination of any more specific findings. Petitioner’s counsel shall have ten (10) days from service to file a Motion for Protective Order or other form of objection to the release of all or a portion of the data, citing grounds for each objection.
(7)If no objection is interposed by the Petitioner, then Respondents’ expert may release his or her findings to Respondents’ counsel.

The order suggested that the hard drive copying process would take between ten minutes and two hours. And only if Petitioner’s counsel did not object could the expert make findings available to Respondents’ counsel.

After the court granted Respondents’ motion, Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari.

II.

A.

As a threshold matter, a petition for writ of certiorari is the correct vehicle for reviewing Petitioner’s privacy-related objections to the trial court’s discovery order. We have noted previously that cer-tiorari relief involving an order compelling discovery is available “when the order departs from the essential requirements of law, causing irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on plenary appeal.” Poston v. Wiggins, 112 So.3d 783, 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Heekin v. Del Col, 60 So.3d 437, 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)). The irreparable harm part of this analysis is jurisdictional. Id. It is satisfied in this case because irreparable harm can be presumed where a discovery order compels production of matters implicating privacy rights. Rasmussen v. S. Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So.2d 533, 536-37 (Fla. 1987); see also Holland v. Barfield, 35 So.3d 953, 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (having to disclose a computer hard drive and a cellphone SIM card demonstrates irreparable harm). And so, Petitioner will be entitled to relief if the order below departs from the essential requirements of law.

B.

Petitioner argues that the cellphone inspection order violates the decedent’s privacy rights and doesn’t comport with the rules of civil procedure because it permits inspection of “all data” on the decedent’s cellphone. Petitioner considers the inspection “an improper fishing expedition in a digital ocean.”

Generally speaking, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280 allows for the discovery of matters that are relevant and admissible, or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, including electronically stored information. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1), (b)(3), 1.350 (2013); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(d) (addressing limitations on the discovery of electronically stored information). But where personal information is involved as in this case, the trial courts’ discretion to permit discovery “must be balanced against the individual’s competing privacy interests to prevent an undue invasion of privacy.” McEnany v. Ryan, 44 So.3d 245, 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Courts have reversed rulings for not adequately accounting for privacy interests in the inspection of electronic storage devices. See, e.g., Holland, 35 So.3d at 955 (reversing an order allowing the inspection of a computer hard drive and cellphone SIM card); Menke v. Broward Cnty. Sch. Bd., 916 So.2d 8, 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (reversing an order allowing the inspection of all computers in a household).

But, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, privacy rights do not completely foreclose the prospect of discovery of data stored on electronic devices. Rather, limited and strictly controlled inspections of information stored on electronic devices may be permitted. See Menke, 916 So.2d at 11 (“[Rule 1.350 is] broad enough to encompass requests to examine [electronic information storage devices] but only in limited and strictly controlled circumstances”); cf. Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So.2d 189, 194 (Fla.2003) (finding that privacy rights limit compelled disclosure to that which is necessary to determine contested issues). Both Holland and Menke, for instance, would have allowed for inspections of the devices involved (computers and cellphones) if: (1) there was evidence of destruction of evidence or thwarting of discovery; (2) the device likely contained the requested information; and (3) no less intrusive means existed to obtain the requested information. Holland 35 So.3d at 955; Menke, 916 So.2d at 12.

C.

Which brings us to this case. The record here indicates that the trial court closely considered how to balance Respondents’ discovery rights and the decedent’s privacy rights. The order highlighted the relevance of the cellphone’s data to the Respondents’ defense and it set forth strict procedures controlling how the inspection process would proceed.

The context of Respondents’ discovery request is quite important. The trial court didn’t allow the inspection simply because Respondents made assertions that decedent was on her cellphone, or because the decedent happened to possess a cellphone in her car. This case does not involve an unanchored fishing expedition as Petitioner alleges. Rather, Respondents supported their motion to inspect the cellphone with specific evidence. Respondents cited cell phone records showing that the decedent was texting just before the accident; two witnesses indieat-ed that the decedent may have used her cell phone at the time of the accident; and troopers responding to the accident lent support to the conclusion that the decedent was using her cell phone when the accident occurred. Additionally, no one has disputed that the decedent’s smart-phone may contain very relevant information. As Respondents put it below:

With GPS enabled phones, such as [the decedent’s] iPhone, there is a very high probability that if the GPS feature were enabled, we can look at the data and figure out conclusively what happened in the moments leading up to the accident, i.e. whether she stopped at the stop sign or not and whether she was texting, Facebooking, Tweeting, or nothing at the time of the accident.

It’s long been true that “[t]he more relevant and necessary the desired information is to a resolution of the case, the greater the state’s interest in allowing discovery of the information.” S. Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), approved, 500 So.2d 533 (Fla.1987). And here, we agree with the trial court that Respondents’ discovery request comports with the rules allowing for discovery of relevant information, including information from devices like cellphones, see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1), and that their interest in the discovery of this particular data is quite substantial.

The other side of the equation — the countervailing privacy interest involved with the discovery of data on a cellphone— is also very important. See S. Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 467 So.2d at 803 (recognizing the court’s obligation to minimize the impact on competing interests). But we are satisfied that the order adequately safeguards privacy interests under the circumstances here where Petitioner was given the opportunity, but advanced no alternative plan. As detailed above, the trial court’s order strictly controls how the confidential inspection must proceed: it limits the data that the expert may review to the nine-hour period immediately surrounding the accident; it gives Petitioner’s counsel a front-row seat to monitor the inspection process; and it allows Petitioner the opportunity to interpose objections before Respondents can obtain any of the data. This certainly isn’t a case like Holland, for example, where the trial court’s order allowed a respondent “to review, without limit or time frame, all of the information on [a] mobile phone SIM card without regard to [privacy rights and privileges].” Holland, 35 So.3d at 956. See also Root v. Balfour Beatty Constr., 132 So.3d 867, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (warning against “carte blanche discovery”).

We don’t agree with Petitioner that the trial court erred by allowing Respondents’ expert to first inspect the cellphone. See, e.g., Merike, 916 So.2d at 12. Petitioner did not offer or argue to the trial court below to use its own expert. In fact, Petitioner remained silent at the hearing when the trial court openly stated its uncertainty about “who looks at [the cellphone], what they do with the information, who they report it to, [and] how we protect the privacy interest of the person [and provide] a chance to object to the dissemination, ... I haven’t got this all formed in my head yet.” Though the trial court expressly invited Petitioner “to submit ... language that you think would work that protects the privacy and interest,” the order notes that Petitioner didn’t propose “any less intrusive manner to obtain the requested data.” The trial court was left ultimately to accept the representation of Petitioner’s counsel that he was “unable to obtain some of the requested information ... from Plaintiff.” Under these circumstances, where Petitioner offered nothing in response to the court’s privacy concerns and open invitation to propose a different process, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by allowing Respondents’ expert retrieve the cellphone’s data under limited and controlled conditions.

Finally, we find no error with the order having allowed the expert to review “all data” on the cellphone for the nine-hour period surrounding the time of the accident. While Petitioner has apparently possessed the cellphone since the accident, the trial court’s order noted that she didn’t “indicate the quantity, nature or type of any information on plaintiffs decedent’s cell phone, or if any such information was, in fact, privileged.” Nor did the Petitioner proffer “any less intrusive manner to obtain the requested data.” It would appear that the only way to discover whether the decedent used her cellphone’s integrated software at the time of the accident, or drafted a text, dialed a number, searched for contact information, reviewed an old message, or used any other of the smart-phone’s many features, is by broadly inspecting data associated with all of the cellphone’s applications. Or, at least, if an effective and superior privacy-respecting plan for segregating inspection-permissible from -impermissible data exists, it hasn’t been presented to the court. And so, we cannot conclude that the trial court violated the essential requirements of law by permitting a thorough inspection of the cellphone for the nine-hour period on the day of the accident.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the PETITION IS DENIED.

LEWIS, C.J., and THOMAS, J., concur.

      . See also Riley v. California, - U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2489-91, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 do 14) (recognizing privacy interests in electronic information stored on a cellphone).

      . We needn’t resolve Respondents’ additional contention that Petitioner lacks standing in this case to assert the decedent’s constitutional privacy rights. The trial court didn’t pass on this question. And, as discussed above, relief isn’t warranted even if we assume (as this opinion does) that Petitioner can assert the decedent’s privacy rights.


text:
    R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant, v. Robert THIBAULT, Personal Representative of the Estate of Evelyn Thibault, Individually as Surviving Spouse, and on behalf of the Estate, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-4312.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 13, 2014.
    Gregory G. Katsas of Jones Day, Washington, D.C., and Charles F. Beall, Jr., of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
    John G. Crabtree and George R. Baise, Jr., of Crabtree & Associates, P.A., Key Biscayne, and Richard J. Diaz, of Richard J. Diaz, P.A., Coral Gables, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm all points raised on appeal. We write only to confirm our position that appellant’s proposed jury instruction on the statute of repose was properly denied. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Buchanan, — So.3d — (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hiott, 129 So.3d 473, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). In so hold-mg, as we did in Buchanan, we certify conflict with Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Hess, 95 So.3d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), rev. granted, 137 So.3d 1020 (Fla.2013) (table).

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, MARSTILLER, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Corey R. CAPEHART, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-5246.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 13, 2014.
    John Edward Eagen of The Law Office of John Eagen, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Samuel Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this direct appeal from a criminal judgment and sentence, Appellant raises two issues. The first issue, which relates to an alleged error in the sentencing process, is without merit, and we do not discuss it further. In the second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court committed a sentencing error by imposing an illegal sentence that included a “no early termination” provision as a condition of his probation. Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e), we are not permitted to consider this claim because it was not preserved for appellate review by a contemporaneous objection or motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to rule 3.800(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562, 568-69 (Fla.2008).

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment and sentence. However, we do so without prejudice to Appellant’s raising the unpreserved claim in a proper motion for postconviction relief. See Hope v. State, 134 So.3d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, C.J., BENTON and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    MAD DOG MARKETING GROUP, INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-1091.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 13, 2014.
    Bennett M. Miller, Law Offices of Bennett M. Miller, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

      Trevor S. Suter, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Financial Services, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Mad Dog Marketing Group, Inc., appeals a final order of the Department of Financial Services imposing penalties for failure to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. We affirm without comment Issues I, II, and III, but reverse Issue IV. The department erred as a matter of law by fining appellant $2,000.00 for continuing to operate its business in violation of the stop-work order, because the department had not charged appellant with such violation as required by Florida Rule of Administrative Procedure 28-106.2015(1). See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Health, 120 So.3d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Trevisani v. Dep’t of Health, 908 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Cottrill v. Dep’t of Ins., 685 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

PADOVANO, THOMAS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lisa SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, A Foreign Corporation, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-2158.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 13, 2014.
    Kelly B. Hampton, of Fenderson & Hampton, LLC, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Thomas Corley Smith, of Lynn Leonard & Associates, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Because no final judgment has yet been rendered by the lower tribunal, this appeal is premature. Accordingly, appellee’s motion, filed on July 11, 2014, is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.

THOMAS, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


text:
    SOUTHERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF FLORIDA, INC. d/b/a Baptist Medical Center-South, Petitioner, v. Jean CHARLES, Jr., as Next Friend and Duly Appointed Guardian of his Sister, Marie Charles, and her Minor Children, Angel Alston, Jazmin Houston and Ervin Alston, Minors, Kristin Fernandez, D.O., Yuval Z. Noat, M.D., Safeer A. Ashraf, M.D., Integrated Community Oncology Network, LLC, A Florida Limited Liability Corporation, Andrew Namen, M.D., Gregory J. Sengstock, M.D., John D. Pennington, M.D., and Eugene R. Bebeau, M.D., Respondents.
    No. 1D14-3985.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 13, 2014.
    George N. Meros, Jr. and James Timothy Moore, Jr., of GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee; William E. Kuntz, Michael H. Harmon and Earl E. Googe, Jr., of Smith Hulsey & Busey, Jacksonville; Jack E. Holt, III, of Grower, Ketcham, Rutherford, Bronson, Eide & Telan, P.A., Orlando, for Petitioner.
    Bryan S. Gowdy, of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, for Respondents Jean Charles, Jr., Marie Charles, Angel Alston, Jazmín Houston and Ervin Alston.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks certiorari review of an order granting a motion to compel discovery that contemplates a future order to determine the scope and breadth of the discovery and other related issues. However, as the order does not compel discovery, petitioner has not demonstrated that the order will result in irreparable harm. See Poston v. Wiggins, 112 So.3d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied. AVCO Corp. v. Neff, 30 So. 597, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Respondents’ motion, filed September 10, 2014, seeking dismissal of the petition is hereby denied.

THOMAS, ROBERTS, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jimmie GOODINE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-3563.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 14, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charles R. McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND CERTIFICATION

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing and Certification. We grant the motion to the extent that it requested the inclusion of a citation to controlling authority. However, we deny Appellant’s request to certify questions of great public importance. Accordingly, we withdraw our former opinion filed on August 22, 2014, and substitute this opinion in its place.

AFFIRMED. See Williams v. State, 143 So.3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

WOLF, ROWE, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lamar TIMMONS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D13-5435.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 14, 2014.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Glen P. Gifford, and Randall Richardson, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee; Elizabeth Desloge, Assistant State Attorney, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED as untimely. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.0200).

LEWIS, C.J., WOLF, and MAKAR, JJ„ concur.


text:
    WALTON COUNTY, Walton County Board of County Commissioners, Wayne Dyess, and Billy Bearden, Appellants, v. SANDESTIN INVESTMENTS, LLC, A Florida Limited Liability Company, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-2533.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 14, 2014.
    Mark D. Davis and Sidney N. Noyes, Office of the County Attorney, DeFuniak Springs, for Appellants.
    Dana C. Matthews, Scott M. Work, and Dana C. Matthews II of Matthews & Jones, LLP, Destín, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of a non-final order granting Appellee’s request for a temporary injunction. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

As this Court has previously held, the issuance of a temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which must be based on a showing of the following criteria: “(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law;. (3) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) considerations of public interest.” Tom v. Russ, 752 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citing Spradley v. Old Harmony Baptist Church, 721 So.2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)). Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610, a trial court’s order granting injunctive relief must “specify the reasons for the entry” of the injunction. This Court has emphasized that “[cjlear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings must support each of the four conclusions necessary to justify entry of a preliminary injunction.” Spradley, 721 So.2d at 737 (quoting City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co., 634 So.2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).

The order on appeal failed to address any of the four criteria necessary for the issuance of an injunction and failed to set forth any factual findings in support of the required criteria. Accordingly, we remand with instructions to the trial court to either enter an order that satisfies all the requirements for entry of a temporary injunction or, if appropriate, an order denying the injunction.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

THOMAS, ROBERTS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher NELSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D14-2789.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 14, 2014.
    Christopher Nelson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kristen Bonjour, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801 seeking additional jail credit. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand.

The appellant alleged an entitlement to 52 additional days of credit for time spent in the “ART Program” as a condition of his probation. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court orally pronounced that he was to be given credit for all time he spent in the ART program. The trial court ruled that the appellant was actually awarded more credit that he was entitled to receive, and that he was not entitled to credit for the 52 days he spent in the ART program because that was a condition of his probation. See § 948.06(3), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“No part of the time that the defendant is on probation or in community control shall be considered as any part of the time that he or she shall be sentenced to serve.”); State v. Cregan, 908 So.2d 387, 390-91 (Fla.2005) (holding that “a defendant who violates the conditions of his community control cannot receive credit against a subsequent prison sentence for the time he spent in a drug rehabilitation facility”).

The appellant attached a transcript of his sentencing hearing, which includes the following exchanges:

Court: Do you have any questions to ask either myself or your attorney prior to me accepting your plea?
Appellant: I just — do I get credit for time served that I’ve been on community control and the ART?
Court: You definitely get it for the ART.
Appellant: I had been there for almost three months. And that’s the month I waited twice.
Court: Yeah, you will get credit for all that.
Appellant: I can get credit for the time served and the month that I was on community control?
Court: I don’t believe there’s anything that allows me to give you that. And you do admit that you were away from home?
Appellant: Yes, ma’am.
Court: Okay. Then at this time I will find that the plea is freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis as stipulated to. [Defense Counsel], anything further?
Counsel: No, ma’am. You are just indicating you will give him credit for the time he was in ART and the time waiting to go to ART?
Court: That is correct. I will give him time for that because he was, in fact, for all intents and purposes, confined.
Appellant: Yes, ma’am.
Court: Then I will at this time revoke his community control and his probation, adjudicate him guilty on the underlying offenses, sentence him to 45.6 months with credit for the time he served on the case as well as the time he was in ART.

(emphasis added).

Regardless of whether the appellant is entitled to the credit under pursuant to the Florida Statutes, he is alleging that the trial court orally awarded credit for time spent in ART when it stated that he was to receive all jail credit, including credit for the “time he was in ART.” The oral pronouncement of sentence controls over the written sentence. See Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265 (Fla.2003) (holding that oral pronouncement of sentence controls over written documents); Johnson v. State, 627 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (written sentence must comport with oral pronouncement of jail credit). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to attach documents refuting the appellant’s claim that the trial court orally pronounced that he was to be given credit for time spent in ART, or to grant relief.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.

PADOVANO, WETHERELL, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


author: KNOLL, Justice,

text:
    CHESAPEAKE OPERATING, INC. v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT & CADDO PARISH COMMISSION Chesapeake Operating, Inc. v. City of Shreveport and Caddo Parish Commission.
    Nos. 2014-C-440, 2014-C-442.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 20, 2014.
   KNOLL, Justice,

concurring in the result.

‘RBecause there is nothing in the record before us evidencing a transfer of ownership to Caddo Parish from the private owners through their acts of dedication for public use, this Court cannot properly resolve the issue presented herein regarding the transfer of ownership to the underlying mineral rights through the subsequent annexation by the City of Shreveport. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the denial of this writ.


author: PER CURIAM. VICTORY, J.

text:
    In re Kearney Soniat du Fossat LOUGHLIN.
    No. 2014-B-0923.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| Respondent, Kearney Soniat du Fossat Loughlin, seeks review of a decision of the disciplinary board imposing a public reprimand. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the formal charges against respondent.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2007, respondent created a website to promote his law firm. Both the “home page” and the “firm profile” page of the website contained the following statement: “Loughlin & Loughlin is a plaintiff-oriented pure litigation firm specializing in maritime personal injury and death cases.” [Emphasis added.] In 2009, respondent requested that the website be taken down for revisions because his wife, ■with whom he had been practicing, left the private practice of law.

In October 2011, in connection with its investigation in an unrelated matter, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) accessed a copy of the “firm profile” page of respondent’s former website through a Google search. After investigation, the ODC filed one count of formal charges, alleging respondent violated Rules 7.2(c)(1)(B) and 7.2(c)(5) as well as former Rule 7.4 (as it existed prior to 2009) by his claim on his former website that he “specialized” in maritime personal injury and death cases.

12Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct. He contended that his former website did not claim a particular expertise or legal specialization, but rather used the term “specializing” in its ordinary meaning to convey that the focus of his law practice was maritime personal injury and death claims. Respondent later filed an amended answer asserting that the rules represented a content-based restriction on speech and are overly broad and vague, all in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitutions and Article I, Sections 2 and 7 of the Louisiana Constitution.

The matter proceeded to a formal hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing committee determined that the language on respondent’s website stated or implied that his firm was a “specialist” in maritime personal injury and death cases, although such a specialization has not been recognized or approved in accordance with the rules and procedures established by the Louisiana Board of Legal Specialization. Accordingly, the committee found respondent violated former Rule 7.4 during the 2007-2009 time period described above.

The committee determined respondent acted negligently in failing to make himself aware of and comply with Rule 7.4. However, it found there was no evidence of actual injury caused by respondent’s violation, and little potential for injury was shown. Considering these factors, it recommended respondent be publicly reprimanded, and recommended that he be required to attend a continuing legal education program on lawyer advertising.

The disciplinary board affirmed the factual findings of the committee. Like the committee, it found no actual harm was caused by respondent’s actions and it concluded respondent’s actions were based “upon inexperience with the advertising rules rather than a dishonest or selfish motive.” Accordingly, the board ^ordered that respondent be publicly reprimanded. The board also directed respondent to attend a continuing legal education program on lawyer advertising.

Respondent appealed the board’s ruling to this court. We issued an order directing the parties to file written briefs for our consideration.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

The record establishes respondent’s actions were not taken with a culpable mental state. It is also undisputed his actions caused no harm to the public. Considering these factors, we do not find respondent’s actions rise to the level of sanctionable misconduct. Therefore, we will dismiss the formal charges against respondent.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record and the briefs filed by the 14parties, it is ordered that the formal charges against respondent be and hereby are dismissed.

VICTORY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

VICTORY, J.

dissents.

|TI would follow the recommendation of the disciplinary board and publicly reprimand Respondent and order Respondent to attend continuing legal education on attorney advertising.

      . Rules 7.2(c)(1)(B) and 7.2(c)(5) became effective on October 1, 2009. In response to respondent’s claim that his website predated the adoption of these rules, the ODC amended the charges to also allege a violation of Rule 7.4, as it existed prior to 2009.

      . The board declined to reach respondent's constitutional arguments, finding insufficient evidence in the record to reach a conclusion on this issue.

      . The ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions recognize three mental states. The most culpable mental state is that of intent, when the lawyer acts with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. The next most culpable mental state is that of knowledge, when the lawyer acts with conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. The least culpable mental state is negligence, when a lawyer fails to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. In the instant case, we do not find respondent’s mental state rises to even the lowest level of culpability.

      .Because we dismiss the formal charges, we do not reach respondent’s constitutional arguments.


text:
    In re Jennifer MATTE.
    No. 2014-OB-1904.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 2014.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; — Other; Applying For Petition to Transfer to Disability Inactive Status.

ORDER

11 Considering the Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the response thereto filed by respondent, captioned as a “Motion to Stay Proceedings,” and the supplemental filing by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that Jennifer Matte, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19036, be and she hereby is transferred to disability inactive status. All disciplinary proceedings against respondent shall be deferred until such time as she resumes active status. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the “Motion to Stay Proceedings” filed by respondent be and hereby is denied.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    MOORING TAX ASSET GROUP, L.L.C. v. Roderick A. JAMES and the United States Department of Treasury-Internal Revenue Service.
    No. 2014-C-0109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   In re Mooring Tax Asset Group V L.L.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2010-5616; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0607.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alfredo MATEO.
    No. 2014-KK-0768.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 04-13-0503; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 KW 0215.

Writ granted. The trial court’s ruling which set aside the judgment of bond forfeiture is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 349.8(A)(1).

WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Chad Roy LOUVIERE v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 2014-KP-1223.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re Louviere, Chad Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 282-510.

Writ granted. The scheduling and discovery order of the district court signed on June 9, 2014 is amended in part. With respect to the petitioner’s expert witnesses for the August, 2014 hearing, the defense is ordered to provide the state with: (1) the address, phone number, fax number, and email address; and (2) a copy of all reports prepared. The stay of discovery proceedings previously imposed is lifted and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of D.J.
    No. 2014-KD-1255.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2014-050-03-DQ-E; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0625.

Writ granted. The trial court’s ruling granting the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed and the matter is remanded for prompt delinquency adjudication.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ., would deny.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jacob M. BELL, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 20I4-KH-1317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re Bell Sr., Jacob M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 03-07-0332; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2221.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion for production of documents filed on or about December 16, 2013. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of it’s judgment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank Ford COSEY.
    No. 2013-OK-1671.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07-90-0596.

Denied.

VICTORY, KNOLL and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Amy Leighanne THOMAS.
    No. 2013-KP-1944.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re Thomas, Amy Leighanne; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 08-CR-398197; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0866.

Denied.


text:
    Rev. Norwood THOMPSON, Jr. and his Wife Wynnette Thompson v. BANK ONE OF LOUISIANA, NA; First Zion Baptist Church of New Orleans, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0793.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re First Zion Baptist Church of New Orleans et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari, and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 99-17279; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1058.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frank Ford COSEY v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 2014-KP-0804.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re Burl Cain, Warden; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari, and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07-09-0596.

Denied.

VICTORY, KNOLL and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    KERRY T. THIBODEAUX, M.D. (a Professional Medical Corporation) v. AMERICAN LIFECARE, INC.
    No. 2014-CC-1112.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re American Lifecare Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 13-C-3212; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW14-00184.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of T.W.
    No. 2014-CK-1215.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re T.W.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Juvenile Court Orleans Parish, No. 2013-134-02DQ-C; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-1564.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth WILLIAMS.
    No. 2014-KK-1217.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 518,976; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0602.

Denied. Stay lifted.


text:
    Kathryn Schrader TANNER v. Brett WALLACE.
    No. 2014-CJ-1235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re Wallace, Brett; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2014-10498; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0825.

Writ denied. Stay denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of J.L.
    No. 2014-CK-1253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re L., J.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2013-189-01-DQ-C; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-0293.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Angelle Leonard HINKLE v. Shannon HINKLE.
    No. 2014-CJ-1270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re Hinkle, Angelle Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 45,756; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0863.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Paul MASSEY v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-C-2789.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re Massey, Paul; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 606,221; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0241.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of L.D.
    No. 2014-CK-1080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re D., L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. JC-2013875; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-01.

Granted.


text:
    Christopher Michael JONES v. Lisa Marie Chatelain, Wife of Christopher Michael JONES.
    No. 2014-CJ-1119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2014.
   In re Jones, Christopher Michael;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 2011-13039; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CU 1270.

Granted.

HUGHES, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alphonso NAVIA.
    No. 2014-KD-1807.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 25, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 516-806.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Jentrell GLOVER v. Terry BROWN, Cintas Corporation, and Discover Property & Casualty Insurance Company.
    No. 2014-CC-1792.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 26, 2014.
   In re Brown, Terry et al.; Cintas Corporation; Discover Property & Casualty Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 610,580; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW1138.

Granted. Under the unique facts presented, we find defendants have shown good cause for an independent medical examination. See La.Code Civ.P.art. 1464. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and defendants’ motion is granted. Case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., dissent.