author: WARNER, J.

text:
    Michael MATTE, Appellant, v. Stacey CAPLAN, Quepasa Corporation, and Meetme, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 4D13-1903.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    June 11, 2014.

      Bryan J. Yarnell and Irwin R. Gilbert of Gilbert Yarnell, Palm Beach Gardens, for appellant.
    Cathleen Scott and Lindsey Wagner of Cathleen Scott & Associates, P.A., Jupiter, for appellee Stacey Caplan.
   WARNER, J.

Believing that the complaint filed against him was improper, the appellant sought attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2013). In accordance with the procedure set forth in section 57.105(4), appellant served a motion to dismiss on appellee/plaintiffs counsel twenty-one days prior to filing his motion to dismiss the complaint and motion for attorney’s fees. Appellee did not dismiss the complaint until after that time. Nevertheless, at the hearing on the attorney’s fees motion, appellee objected to the section 57.105 sanction, because appellant had failed to serve the motion in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516. The trial court denied the motion for fees. We agree that strict compliance with the rules is required and affirm.

Appellee filed a complaint against Que-pasa Corporation, MeetMe, Inc., and appellant, in which she alleged appellant had tortiously interfered with an advantageous business relationship. Shortly after service of the complaint on appellant, on February 22, 2013, appellant’s counsel emailed appellee’s counsel a copy of a motion for sanctions under section 57.105, Florida Statutes. The subject line of the e-mail stated: “6277 Caplan, Stacey vs. Quepasa Corporation, Inc.: Defendants’ Motion for 57.105 Sanctions.doc.” The body of the e-mail stated: “See attached motion.” Attached was a Word document entitled “Defendants’ Motion for 57.105 Sanctions.doc.”

Over twenty-one days later, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint’s claims against him. Two days later, he filed a motion for sanctions under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, against appellee and her counsel. The motion’s certificate of service stated it had been served on appellee’s counsel via e-mail on February 22, 2013. Appellee filed an amended complaint that removed appellant as a defendant. The court thereafter denied appellant’s motion to dismiss as moot, but reserved jurisdiction to hear appellant’s motion for sanctions. Appellee responded to the sanctions motion, arguing that the motion was never properly served on her.

At the hearing, appellee argued that the motion for sanctions was not enforceable because appellant’s February 22nd e-mail did not comply with the requirements for service by e-mail in Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516. Specifically, the e-mail did not: (1) provide a PDF of the motion or a link to the motion on a website maintained by the clerk; (2) contain, in the subject line in all capital letters, the words “SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT,” followed by the case number; (3) contain, in the body of the e-mail, the case number, name of the initial party of each side, title of each document served with that e-mail, and the sender’s name and telephone number. Appellee argued these defects were fatal, because section 57.105 is strictly construed as in derogation of the common law.

Appellant responded that only substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, with Rule 2.516 was required. He argued that the strict interpretation of section 57.105 did not extend to Rule 2.516. At the hearing, appellee’s counsel testified that she had received the e-mail and read the attached Word document. Because the service had resulted in actual notice, appellant argued it was sufficient under the rule.

The trial court restricted its consideration to this procedural issue and not the merits of the motion. It denied the motion, thus agreeing with appellee’s argument that the failure to strictly observe the service rules precluded consideration of the motion. This appeal ensued.

Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2013), allows an assessment of attorney’s fees against an opposing party and opposing counsel who file frivolous claims. The statute contains a “safe harbor” provision to avoid sanctions: “A motion by a party seeking sanctions under this section must be served but may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” § 57.105(4), Fla. Stat. (2013); see, e.g., Lago v. Kame By Design, LLC, 120 So.3d 73, 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (referring to this subsection as the “safe harbor” provision).

With the advent of electronic filing and the use of e-mail for service, the Rules of Civil Procedure and Judicial Administration have been amended to provide the requirements for e-mail service, which is mandatory between attorneys. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(a) provides, “Every pleading subsequent to the initial pleading ... and every other document filed in the action must be served in conformity with the requirements of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516.” (Emphasis added). Rule 2.516(b)(1) provides, “All documents required or permitted to be served on another party must be served by e-mail, unless the parties otherwise stipulate or this rule otherwise provides.” (Emphasis added.) Rule 2.516(b)(1)(E) specifies the format for email service:

(E) Format of E-mail for Service. Service of a document by e-mail is made by an e-mail sent to all addresses designated by the attorney or party with either (a) a copy of the document in PDF format attached or (b) a link to the document on a website maintained by a clerk.
(i) All documents served by e-mail must be sent by an e-mail message containing a subject line beginning with the words “SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT” in all capital letters, followed by the case number of the proceeding in which the documents are being served.
(ii) The body of the e-mail must identify the court in which the proceeding is pending, the case number, the name of the initial party on each side, the title of each document served with that e-mail, and the name and telephone number of the person required to serve the document.
(iii) Any document served by e-mail may be signed by any of the 7s/”, 7s”, or “s/” formats.
(iv) Any e-mail which, together with its attached documents, exceeds five megabytes (5MB) in size, must be divided and sent as separate e-mails, no one of which may exceed 5MB in size and each of which must be sequentially numbered in the subject line.

(Emphasis added).

In the present case, it is undisputed that e-mail service of appellant’s motion under section 57.105 did not strictly comply with Rule 2.516. Specifically: (1) the e-mail attached the motion in Word format instead of a PDF or link; (2) the subject line failed to state “SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT” and contained a number that does not correlate with the circuit court case number; and (3) the body of the e-mail failed to contain any of the required information listed in subsection (ii), but simply said, “See attached motion.” Appellant nevertheless argues that service was sufficient under the safe harbor provision of section 57.105(4) because he “substantially complied” with the rule and this resulted in actual notice to appellee, based on testimony of appellee’s counsel that she read the document.

As section 57.105 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees in derogation of common law, it must be strictly construed. See Montgomery v. Larmoyeux, 14 So.3d 1067, 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Thus, even where a letter contained all of the information required by section 57.105(4), including a demand for attorney’s fees if the offending complaint was not withdrawn, the Third District held that this actual notice through a letter did not comport with the statutory requirement that a motion be served twenty-one days prior to it being filed with the court, reversing a section 57.105 award. See Anchor Towing, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 10 So.3d 670, 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). In finding section 57.105 should be strictly construed as in derogation of the common law, Montgomery cited cases construing proposals for settlement under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, allowing for attorney’s fees, which is also strictly construed and requires strict compliance with the provisions of the rule. See Montgomery, at 1072-73 (citing Cano v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 8 So.3d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that “[sjection 768.79 and rule 1.442 are strictly construed because they are ‘in derogation of the common law rule that each party pay their own fees’ ”) (quoting Brower-Eger v. Noon, 994 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).

Here, section 57.105 requires service of the motion on the plaintiff twenty-one days prior to filing with the court. “Service” is defined and regulated in Rule 2.516. The e-mail service requirements, which were implemented in 2012, use mandatory language stating that service “must” be made in the manner described. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.516(b)(1)(E)(i)-(iv); In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Jud. Admin. et al., 102 So.3d 505, 515-17 (Fla.2012). The rule requires that the e-mail subject line contain the words SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT, all in capitals and followed by the case number. This is important, because anyone with an e-mail account knows that users frequently receive many e-mails about many different topics. The capitalized notification advising that the email relates to a court document is critical to assure that the recipient opens the email and reviews the document promptly. Further, while it may seem insubstantial that a Word version of the motion was attached rather than the PDF, a Word version is modifiable whereas the PDF is not. Sending a PDF avoids controversy regarding the content of the document. The PDF version of a document is what is required to be filed with the court.

Appellant argues that because the appel-lee had actual notice of the motion and its contents, he substantially complied with the statute. In Anchor, however, the letter received by the plaintiff put the plaintiff on actual notice of the issues and the fact that a motion would be filed seeking section 57.105 attorney’s fees, yet the Third District still held that strict compliance with the statute was necessary. We conclude that actual notice does not allow a party to evade strict compliance with the rule.

Litigants should not be left guessing at what a court will deem is “substantial compliance” with the rules and statutes for the imposition of attorney’s fees as a sanction. Just as is the case with Rule 1.442 regarding proposals for settlement, a bright line rule requiring service in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the rule provides certainty to both parties as to whether attorney’s fees may be assessed if the court finds that the action or defense is frivolous. We hold that strict compliance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 regarding e-mail service of pleadings is required before a court may assess attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes.

Affirmed.

LEVINE, J„ and TUTER, JACK, Associate Judge, concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Cash Wallace PAWLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D14-1080.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Cash Wallace Pawley, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before LAGOA, SALTER and EMAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Spielvogel v. Crown Realty Assocs., 465 So.2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130®, which provides that “the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending” review of a non-final order, does not apply where review is sought by way of a petition for writ of certiorari).


text:
    Dana Carl DOUGLAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-0450.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Dana Carl Douglas, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the appellant’s convictions and sentences in this Anders appeal, but remand for correction of the written judgment and the probationary order, which reflect that the trial court sentenced the appellant to 15 years’ imprisonment to be followed by 10 years’ probation for the second-degree felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon/actual possession. The sentencing hearing transcript indicates that the trial court orally imposed a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for this offense, but no probation. It is a longstanding principle that a court’s oral pronouncement controls over any written sentencing document. State v. Williams, 870 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (citing Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla.2003)). The appellant does not need to be present for the correction of this clerical error. See Knight v. State, 114 So.3d 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

AFFIRMED but REMANDED to correct the written sentence in the judgment and probationary order to reflect a 15-year prison sentence as to Count I.

BENTON, WETHERELL, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.

      . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).


text:
    Scott William GEIL, II, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-5094.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Scott William Geil, II, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Donna A. Gerace, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant appeals an order denying his motion seeking jail credit. Because the appellant’s motion was filed after July 1, 2013, it should be treated as though filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801. The appellant’s motion is facially insufficient pursuant to that rule as he fails to allege any of the required information. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(c). Pursuant to the new rule the appellant is entitled to an opportunity to amend to state a facially sufficient claim. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(e) (incorporating Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(f)); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(f)(2) (if motion is facially insufficient, trial court must give defendant 60 days to amend). Here, the trial court denied the motion on the merits, but failed to attach any records supporting its conclusions. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.801(e) (incorporating Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(f)); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(f)(5) (trial court must attach portions of the record refuting appellant’s claims). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to comply with the requirements of rule 3.801.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

THOMAS, ROWE, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jason LULL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-5943.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Jason Lull, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Angela R. Hensel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant filed a rule 3.850 motion raising three claims. We affirm the first and third claims without comment. We find merit as to Appellant’s second claim that trial counsel acted ineffectively because he failed to inform Appellant of the correct statutory maximum sentences he faced for the three offenses charged against him before he entered his plea. See Lane v. State, 839 So.2d 854, 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (stating “a plea is involuntary if a defendant pleads to a crime when he is unaware of the maximum penalty of such crime.”). The record attached by the lower court does not conclusively refute the claim, and the State has conceded that if this court determines that the claim is not conclusively refuted by the record, the claim should be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. We, therefore, reverse claim two for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

LEWIS, C.J., THOMAS and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael Scott TIMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-1921.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 11, 2014.

      Michael Tims, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking belated appeal is denied on the merits. This disposition is without prejudice to petitioner presenting his claims regarding the legality of his sentences to the sentencing court in a proper motion pursuant to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

BENTON and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.

WETHERELL, J., concurs in result only.


author: FERNANDEZ, J.

text:
    NOBE BAY HOLDINGS, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lazaro Miguel GARCIA, M.D., Respondent.
    No. 3D13-3160.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 11, 2014.

      Murai Wald Biondo Moreno & Pegg, P.A., and Lynette Ebeoglu McGuinness, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
    Lazaro Miguel Garcia, M.D., in proper person.
    Before ROTHENBERG, FERNANDEZ and SCALES.
   FERNANDEZ, J.

Nobe Bay Holdings, LLC petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the trial court’s order denying Nobe Bay’s “Amended Motion to Dissolve Improper Lis Pendens.” We grant Nobe Bay’s petition for writ of certiorari and quash the trial court’s order. We direct the trial court to discharge the lis pendens, as well as the bond that the court ordered Nobe Bay to post.

Garcia contracted with Merco Group for the purchase of two condominium units. Pursuant to the contract, Garcia deposited $257,600 into an escrow account. Later that year, the escrow agent transferred $128,800 to Merco for the construction of the condominiums.

Garcia subsequently formed two new contracts. One of the contracts was a Conditional Cancellation Agreement. In that agreement, Garcia and Merco agreed to cancel the purchase agreements for the original two condominium units. Garcia and Merco also agreed to transfer the remaining $128,800 in the escrow account to a new contract with a related developer, Indian Creek Holdings, Inc.

The other contract was a Purchase Agreement with Indian Creek for Unit 1402 of the Nobe Bay Condominium, which the parties never recorded. The Purchase Agreement required an additional deposit of $56,200 on top of the transferred $128,800. Garcia never paid the additional $56,200. Regions Bank thereafter initiated foreclosure proceedings against Indian Creek and obtained a final judgment in 2010. Nobe Bay obtained Unit 1402.

Garcia filed an amended complaint against Nobe Bay seeking counts of, inter alia, specific performance, breach of contract and an equitable lien. Garcia later agreed to limit his complaint to a claim for money damages and dropped his claim for specific performance. He obtained a lis pendens on Unit 1402.

Nobe Bay, by motion, asked the court to dissolve the lien. The court denied Nobe Bay’s motion, and allowed the removal of the lis pendens upon Nobe Bay posting a bond in the amount of Garcia’s security deposit.

Nobe Bay timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(A); Ness Racquet Club, LLC v. Renzi Holdings, Inc., 959 So.2d 758, 759 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (stating that “an order denying a motion to discharge a lis pendens is renewable by certiorari.”).

The proponent of the lis pendens has the burden of showing that the claim affects the real property in question. Medical Facilities Dev., Inc. v. Little Arch Creek Properties, Inc., 675 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla.1996); Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 614 So.2d 491, 492 n. 2 (Fla.1993). The proponent must establish a fair nexus between the apparent legal or equitable ownership of the property and the dispute embodied in the lawsuit. Medical Facilities, 675 So.2d at 917; Chiusolo, 614 So.2d at 492. If the proponent can establish a fair nexus between the apparent legal or equitable ownership of the property and the dispute embodied in the lawsuit, a lis pendens cannot be dissolved. Chiusolo, 614 So.2d at 492. If the proponent of the lis pendens does establish a fair nexus, the trial court, within its discretion, can require the lis pendens proponent to post a bond to protect the property owner. Medical Facilities, 675 So.2d at 917.

The lis pendens should have been dissolved because Garcia failed to establish a fair nexus between title to the property and the lawsuit. The only existing document is the Purchase Agreement between Garcia and Indian Creek for Unit 1402 of the Node Bay Condominium. The Purchase Agreement is not a duly recorded instrument and was properly terminated when Indian Creek refunded Garcia his initial deposit of $128,800 and Garcia failed to make the second deposit. Garcia thus does not have a claim to Unit 1402.

Furthermore, Garcia agreed to limit his complaint to a claim for money damages and dropped his claim for specific performance. Without the claim for specific performance, Nobe Bay correctly argues that Garcia destroyed any possible nexus between ownership of the property and the amended complaint.

In addition, the Purchase Agreement confirms that Garcia has no direct claim against the subject property. Paragraph 31 of the Purchase Agreement states: “[n]either this Agreement, Nor Purchaser’s payment of deposits, will give Purchaser any lien or claim against the Unit of the Condominium.”

We further conclude that the trial court should not have required Nobe Bay to post a bond. As the Florida Supreme Court held in Medical Facilities, “in situations governed by section 48.23(3), [Fla. Stat.], it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether to require the lis-pendens proponent to post a bond ...” Medical Facilities, 675 So.2d at 916 (emphasis added). Nobe Bay presented evidence that the lis pendens prevents a closing on Unit 1402 pursuant to a sales contract with a third-party. Accordingly, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it required Nobe Bay to post bond.

Therefore, we quash the trial court’s order, and direct the trial court to discharge the lis pendens and the bond that the court ordered Nobe Bay to post.

Petition granted; order quashed.

      . Garcia had until February 14, 2014 to file a response to Nobe Bay’s petition. He has not responded.


text:
    A.M., the mother, Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 3D14-300.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 11, 2014.
    Eugene Zenobi, Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Third Region, and Kevin Colbert, Special Assistant Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, for appellant.
    Karla Perkins, for appellee, Department of Children and Families.
    Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

A.M., the mother of A.J., a minor, seeks review of the trial court’s Revised Adjudication Order as to the Mother. We affirm the trial court’s adjudication of dependency as orally pronounced at the September 30, 2013, hearing, finding the child dependent as to A.M. pursuant to section 39.01(15)(g), Florida Statutes (2013).

As noted by the parties, however, the order does not comport with the oral pronouncement. The pertinent written finding is limited to a determination that the Mother has “emotional or mental health problems.” We remand the case so that the order can be amended to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement that A.J. does not have a parent that can control the further continued sexual exploitation of A.J.

Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

      . See E.K. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 2 So.3d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).


text:
    Christopher K. SWEENEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D14-1544.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 12, 2014.
    Christopher K. Sweeney, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2004).

ROWE, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


author: WALLIS, J.

text:
    Thomas D. CARNICELLA, Appellant, v. Sheri D. CARNICELLA, Appellee.
    No. 5D13-1414.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    June 13, 2014.
    Marcia K. Lippincott of Marcia K. Lip-pincott, P.A., Lake Mary, for Appellant.
    Susan W. Savard of West, Green & Associates, P.L., Orlando, for Appellee.
   WALLIS, J.

Thomas Carnicella (“Appellant”) appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial after a final judgment of dissolution of marriage and equitable distribution, which resulted in equalizing payments to Sheri Carnicella (“Appellee”). Appellant argues that because the trial court abdicated its judicial responsibility, a new trial is warranted for the equitable distribution. We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial regarding only the equitable distribution. Although the trial court committed many errors, we highlight three as worthy of ordering a new trial.

Before the parties’ marriage, Appellant worked as a professionally licensed, general, residential contractor. One year before their marriage, Appellant purchased a vacant lot by obtaining a construction loan for $155,800 and built almost the entire home, which was titled in Appellant’s name only. Appellant testified he used $12,000 from savings and $31,200 from his salary to pay for costs associated with the home’s construction. In contrast, Appellee could not quantify the financial contribution either party made to purchase or construct the house.

The parties married on April 28, 2000. Appellee filed for dissolution on March 24, 2011. On the date of filing for dissolution, Appellee had credit card debt of $129.75. Appellee testified that after filing for dissolution, she borrowed $30,000 from her parents to pay her attorney’s fees. Appellant testified that he borrowed $5,000 on a home equity line of credit to pay his attorney’s fees. Testimony established that Appellee lived in the marital home until three weeks before trial, with Appellant paying the mortgage.

On July 25, 2012, at trial, the trial court announced that neither party was entitled to attorney’s fees. After three months of inactivity, both parties submitted, via email, proposed time-sharing plans, amortization tables, equitable distribution charts, and final judgments. Almost six months elapsed between the end of the trial and the court’s entry of the final judgment. The trial court adopted, almost verbatim, Appellee’s twenty-five-page proposed final judgment. The trial court in-eluded verbatim the four-page equitable distribution chart and five-page repayment amortization table.

The final judgment included the $30,000 Appellee borrowed for attorney’s fees as a marital liability subject to equitable distribution, but excluded Appellant’s $5,000 draw on the home equity line of credit. The final judgment found that the equity value of the home at the time of marriage was 100% marital. The trial court then set a valuation date closer to the date of trial instead of the date of filing for dissolution. In the equitable distribution, Appellant did not receive credit for the mortgage payments he made between the date of filing and trial. Finally, the final judgment valued Appellee’s credit card debt at the time of filing as $1,000, despite Appel-lee’s admission at trial that her credit card debt at the time of filing for dissolution was $129.75.

The equitable distribution resulted in an equalizing payment from Appellant to Ap-pellee of $197,655, amortized by Appellee’s proposed table to monthly payments of $1,537.42. The trial court’s equitable distribution left the $2,280 monthly mortgage payment and home equity line of credit payments as solely Appellant’s responsibility. Appellant also owes $133.35 in child support per month. Based on the trial court’s equitable distribution, Appellant owes $3,950.77 per month, despite his imputed monthly income of $3,440.17.

On appeal, Appellant argues for a new trial because the trial court: (1) delayed entering the final judgment for six months; (2) adopted verbatim Appellee’s proposed equitable distribution; (3) entered a final judgment, which conflicted with its oral ruling; and (4) made many errors in valuation and timing of assets. We agree.

“An excessive delay between a trial and entry of final judgment may require reversal.” Walker v. Walker, 719 So.2d 977, 978 (Fla.5th DCA 1998) (citing Caswell v. Caswell, 674 So.2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). In Walker, this court indicated that whether the delay was “reasonable” is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and that there is no bright-line test to determine whether the delay was reasonable. Id. at 979 (reversing on all issues except for the dissolution of marriage and remanding for a new trial after a nine and a half month delay). The delay can span fifteen months without requiring reversal. See Florida Air Acad., Inc. v. McKinley, 688 So.2d 359, 361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Or, a case can be reversed with just over a three-month delay. Polizzi v. Polizzi, 600 So.2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

In previous eases, this court has acknowledged that “the delayed ruling does not, standing alone, justify setting aside the final judgment.” Edel v. Walker, 927 So.2d 989, 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citations omitted). “Rather, there must be ‘delay plus an indication that something is seriously amiss on the merits,’ such as conflicts or inconsistencies between the trial court’s findings at the time of trial and the ultimate judgment, or significant findings not supported by the record.” Id. at 990-91 (quoting Ascontec Consulting, Inc. v. Young, 714 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); accord, Fla. Air Acad., Inc., 688 So.2d at 360 (considering whether “there is a factual finding in the final judgment unsupported by the trial evidence”); Poliz-zi, 600 So.2d at 491 (noting that oral pronouncements at trial that differ with holdings in the judgment can support a new trial when there is an unreasonable delay). Other factors include those that show whether the delay in the trial court’s ruling caused it “to have forgotten or confused any material issue.” Edel, 927 So.2d at 992. For example, this court has viewed a trial judge’s execution of a proposed order just before retirement as suspicious. Polizzi, 600 So.2d at 491-92 (Harris, J., concurring specially) (“The record here reflects that the trial judge, because of a heavy caseload, the passage of time and his impending, immediate retirement, may have deferred to trial counsel in deciding this case.”). Similarly, a trial court’s adoption of a proposed order verbatim is suspicious. Henin v. Henin, 767 So.2d 1284, 1285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (noting that where “the trial court made no oral findings at the close of evidence, requested a proposed judgment from each party and then signed with only one change to the verbatim proposed judgment of husband ... is not in and of itself error,” but “does heighten our concern about the errors and omissions contained in the final judgment”).

Here, the court waited almost six months, which, without more, would not require reversal. However, based on the content and effect of the final judgment, we are convinced the trial court either forgot or confused the central issues at trial. The trial court adopted verbatim Appellee’s equitable distribution table. The trial court’s oral ruling expressly denying both parties’ attorney’s fees and the written final judgment classifying Appel-lee’s $30,000 loan as a marital liability are clearly inconsistent. See Schmitz v. Schmitz, 950 So.2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (reversing and remanding because the husband’s post-filing debts were included as marital liabilities, which resulted in the "wife incurring one-half of the husband’s debts for his attorney’s and accountant’s fees).

Furthermore, the trial court’s failure to attribute any pre-marital equity was error where undisputed and express testimony showed that Appellant provided $12,000 from savings and $31,200 from his salary before marriage for costs associated with the house. The trial court also failed to credit Appellant for mortgage payments he made before trial, resulting in Appel-lee’s benefit of the appreciation of the value of the marital home from the date of filing for dissolution to the date of trial.

Finally, although Appellee concedes error in this appeal that her credit card debt should have been $129.75 instead of $1000, the error was included in the proposed final judgment and adopted into the trial court’s final judgment.

For these reasons, the circumstances of this case demonstrate that there was a “delay plus an indication that something is seriously amiss on the merits.” Edel, 927 So.2d at 990 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we reverse this case and remand for a new trial on issues relating only to the equitable distribution.

REVERSED and REMANDED for New Trial with Instructions.

SAWAYA and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

      . The trial court made changes to the proposed final judgment’s equitable distribution findings only by renumbering four paragraphs and renaming "bonus room” to “bonus/game room” and “a glorified attic” to "a very nice attic.” The trial court changed nothing in the four-page equitable distribution chart. The trial court made substantial changes to the parenting plan that are not relevant to this appeal.

      . The net effect resulted in Appellant paying all of his own attorney’s fees and half of Appellee's attorney's fees, despite the express ruling at trial that neither party was entitled to fees.

      . We find no need to detail the proposed final judgment’s mathematical error and a naming error for one of Appellant's bank accounts that were both adopted by the trial court.

      . The dissolution of marriage, parenting plan, and timesharing plan may not be revisited on remand.


author: COHEN, J.

text:
    Allihondra MOODY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D13-2879.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    June 13, 2014.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Allison A. Havens, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   COHEN, J.

Allihondra Moody appeals from the judgment and sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of attempted first-degree murder -with a firearm, attempted second-degree murder, retaliating against a witness causing bodily harm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, Moody argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow any read-back requests by the jury. We agree and reverse.

In both its opening statement and closing argument at trial, the State informed the jury that it would not be allowed any read-back of testimony. In overruling Moody’s objections, the trial judge stated that read-backs were not permitted in her courtroom. Moody correctly argues that this ruling constituted per se reversible error.

The case law on this issue is clear. In Johnson v. State, 53 So.3d 1003 (Fla.2010), the Florida Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, held that the trial court committed per se reversible error by instructing the jury, over the defense’s objection, that it could not have testimony read back during deliberations. The dissenting justices did not dispute that such a ruling was error; rather, they believed that the error should not automatically result in a new trial and instead should be analyzed under the harmless error test.

On appeal, the State argues that Johnson is inapplicable because it addressed the trial judge’s instructions to the jury, not misstatements of the law by counsel. This argument is unavailing. The assistant state attorney, who no doubt practiced before this trial judge on a regular basis, was well aware of the judge’s policy. On three separate occasions, the prosecutor made sure that the jury understood that it would not be allowed to have trial testimony read back during deliberations. When the defense properly objected, the trial judge reiterated her policy and overruled the objection. In doing so, the judge placed her imprimatur upon the State’s informing the jury that no read-backs would be permitted. We view the trial court’s overruling of the defense’s objection as the functional equivalent of the jury instruction disapproved in Johnson. In our view, the. same harm addressed in Johnson was present in Moody’s trial.

The jury plays an especially important role in a trial: Whether in the civil or criminal context, jurors make difficult decisions that have a profound impact on the parties’ lives. To that end, and not without some controversy, we have provided juries some tools to make that task easier. We allow them to take notes and, within reason, to ask questions of witnesses. We do so, understanding that such accommodations can lengthen a trial with potential consequences to a trial court’s docket. Read-back of testimony can have the same impact, but it is a price that we are willing to pay to give jurors all the help we can in making such important decisions. While trial courts have some discretion in deciding whether to allow the read-back of testimony, it cannot be said that the trial judge in the instant case exercised her discretion. Rather, the judge imposed a blanket policy that prohibited any read-back of testimony. Such a policy runs afoul of the supreme court’s holding in Johnson. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.

SAWAYA and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.

      . We note that we have issued an opinion addressing a somewhat similar issue in a case involving the same trial judge who presided over the trial in the instant case. See Johnson v. State, 97 So.3d 319 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). To be fair, however, Moody’s trial occurred before the release of that opinion.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Ricardo Hermon GLASCO, Appellee.
    No. 5D11-851.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    June 13, 2014.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Dee Ball, Assistant Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for Appellee.
   ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

PER CURIAM.

Based on the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision in Glasco v. State, No. SC12-1292, 2014 WL 1622186 (Fla.2014), which quashed this court’s decision in State v. Glasco, 90 So.3d 905 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), we withdraw the mandate issued July 9, 2012, and our previously-entered opinion and hereby affirm the decision of the circuit court granting the motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, ORFINGER, and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ryan M. RAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D12-4525.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    June 13, 2014.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Kevin R. Holtz, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Ryan Ray (defendant) appeals his life sentence without the possibility of parole, which was imposed by the trial court after a jury found him guilty of committing the crimes of felony murder and robbery. The defendant was a juvenile (age 16) at the time the crimes were committed, but he was tried as an adult. At the time of sentencing, the trial court did not have the benefit of our decision in Horsley v. State, 121 So.3d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that the only sentencing option in juvenile murder cases is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years). Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction, but reverse his life sentence and remand for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years as required by Horsley.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA, PALMER and BERGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Todd BARFIELD, Appellant, v. Ranee KAY, Appellee.
    No. 5D14-716.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    June 13, 2014.
    Todd Barfield, Ocala, pro se.
    Mark D. Shelnutt and Rebecca A. Guthrie, of Mark D. Shelnutt, P.A., Ocala, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Todd Barfield appeals the summary denial of his motion to vacate or modify an injunction for protection against repeat violence entered in favor of Ranee Kay. We reverse.

Section 784.046(10), Florida Statutes (2013), allows a court to modify or dissolve an injunction at any time on the motion of an interested party. Likewise, Florida Rule of Family Procedure 12.610(6) allows an injunction to be modified or vacated under specified circumstances. In either event, due process requires that Barfield is entitled to a hearing. See McFarr v. McKee, 83 So.3d 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

SAWAYA, ORFINGER and COHEN, JJ., concur.


author: OSTERHAUS, J.

text:
    CITIMORTGAGE, INC. Successor by Merger to Abn Amro Mortgage Group, Appellant, v. Brian HILL, et al., Appellees.
    No. 1D13-3585.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 18, 2014.

      Heather L. Griffiths, William S. Isen-berg, Ali Gilson, and Allyson Sartoian of Phelan Hallinan, PLC, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
    Steven Copus of Copus & Copus, Esq., Shalimar, for Appellees.
   OSTERHAUS, J.

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court properly dismissed a foreclosure action filed by the appellant. The trial court dismissed the case because appellant failed to “schedule the matter for non-jury trial,” despite the fact that appellant had actively prosecuted the case and filed a notice of trial readiness three weeks before the dismissal order. Because the rules of civil procedure and Florida Supreme Court precedent require courts, not parties, to fix trial dates, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to reinstate the cause of action and to set a trial date.

I.

At a hearing on May 22, 2013, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for summary judgment and ordered appellant “to schedule a non-jury trial within 30 days.” On June 5, 2013, appellant filed a “Notice for Non Jury Trial” providing the court notice of its readiness for trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(b). Nothing else occurred until appellee Brian Hill filed a motion to dismiss on June 27, 2013. The next day, the trial court granted his motion without awaiting appellant’s response and dismissed the case without prejudice. Appellant promptly sought to vacate the order of dismissal in a motion explaining that it had taken all action necessary to hasten a trial by serving a notice of readiness pursuant to Rule 1.440(b). Appellant’s motion stated that it had awaited a trial date to be provided by the court pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c). But appellant’s motion was summarily denied.

Appellant filed a timely appeal in which it renews its argument that dismissal of its case was inappropriate. Appellees have not responded.

II.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440 addresses how cases are to be set for trial. This court views “strict compliance with rule 1.440 [to be] mandatory.” Bennett v. Cont’l Chemicals, Inc., 492 So.2d 724, 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The rule contemplates that a party will first serve notice that an action is at issue and ready for trial, then the trial court will fix a date for trial, as follows:

(b) Notice for Trial. Thereafter any party may file and serve a notice that the action is at issue and ready to be set for trial. The notice shall include an estimate of the time required, whether the trial is to be by a jury or not, and whether the trial is on the original action or a subsequent proceeding. The clerk shall then submit the notice and the case file to the court.
(c) Setting for Trial. If the court finds the action ready to be set for trial, it shall enter an order fixing a date for trial. Trial shall be set not less than 30 days from the service of the notice for trial. By giving the same notice the court may set an action for trial. In actions in which the damages are not liquidated, the order setting an action for trial shall be served on parties who are in default in accordance with rule 1.080.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.440(b), (c).

The facts of this case resemble those considered by the Florida Supreme Court in Mikos v. Sarasota Cattle Co., 453 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla.1984). In Mikos, the Florida Supreme Court reversed an order of a trial court dismissing a case for failure to prosecute, holding that it was the trial court’s responsibility to set the trial date after a notice of readiness for trial was filed. Id. In a later case, the Court limited Mikos ’ application in ways not relevant here, but underscored Mikos ’ clear rule in cases like this one: “Once a notice of readiness for trial has been filed, absent any other happening, the next step is for the court to take[.]” Fishe & Kleeman, Inc. v. Aquarius Condo. Ass’n, 524 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Fla.1988). See also Cabrera v. Pazos, Larrinaga & Taylor, P.A., 922 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“Failure of the trial court to set the case for trial precludes dismissal for failure to prosecute.”).

Because, here, the appellant continuously prosecuted its case and timely filed a notice of readiness for trial, dismissal was improper. The next move was for the trial court itself, not appellant, to schedule the case for trial.

III.

For these reasons, we reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate the dismissal order, reinstate the proceedings, and fix a date for trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LEWIS, C.J., and THOMAS, J., concur.

      . Appellant filed a motion opposing dismissal on July 8, 2013, which was moot because the trial court had ruled so quickly on the motion.


author: SCALES, J.

text:
    The COLLECTION, LLC, etc., Petitioner, v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, et al., Respondents.
    No. 3D14-338.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 18, 2014.
    Crabtree & Associates, and John G. Crabtree and George R. Baise, Jr.; Char-app & Weiss, LLP, and Barrett R. Char-app; Bass Sox Mercier, and Richard N. Sox (Tallahassee), for petitioner.

      Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP, and Stephanie L. Carman and Catherine S. Dorvil; Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP, and John J. Sullivan (New York), Pro Hac Vice for respondent Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC.
    Before WELLS, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
   SCALES, J.

The Collection LLC, etc., petitions this court for a writ of certiorari, seeking to quash two orders from the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) pertaining to The Collection’s discovery requests. Because Petitioner has failed to meet the threshold requirement of showing DOAH’s orders create irreparable harm, see Flores v. Sanchez, 137 So.3d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade (My., 117 So.3d 400, 404 (Fla.2013)), we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. See Adorno & Yoss, LLP v. Soltero, 133 So.3d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 896 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.


author: LAGOA, J.

text:
    Anthony DORSETT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D14-435.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 18, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied July 9, 2014.
    Anthony Dorsett, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, LAGOA, and LOGUE, JJ.
   LAGOA, J.

The Appellant, Anthony Dorsett (“Dor-sett”), appeals from an order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the wrong court, we affirm without prejudice in order for Dorsett to refile the petition in the appropriate circuit court.

Dorsett was convicted and sentenced in Broward County on two counts of first degree murder, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of armed burglary, and two counts of armed kidnapping. He is currently serving a life sentence at a facility located in Miami-Dade County. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Dorsett challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to support his conviction. When a petitioner attacks the legality of a conviction by raising issues relating to the trial, jurisdiction for habeas proceedings rests with the trial court that rendered the judgment of conviction and imposed sentence. See Young v. McNeil, 23 So.3d 1263, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“[A] circuit court has no jurisdiction to review the legality of a conviction in another circuit....”); Calloway v. State, 699 So.2d 849, 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); see also Nails v. State, 78 So.3d 13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

Because the trial court in Miami-Dade County did not render the judgment of conviction and did not impose the sentence, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal on the basis that the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the wrong court. Our ruling is without prejudice to Dorsett to refile in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court of Broward County.

AFFIRMED.


author: SHEPHERD, C.J.

text:
    Charles J. EATO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D14-666.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 18, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied June 23, 2014.
    Charles J. Eato, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and LAGOA and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
   SHEPHERD, C.J.

Appellant, Charles Eato, seeks to consolidate appeals his appeals in case numbers 3D14-666 and 3D14-721. We deny the motion to consolidate since 1) we have already ruled on 3D14-666 and 2) the panel for 3D14-721 has already denied a motion to consolidate. Charles Eato cannot circumvent the decision of this panel in 3D14-666 by attempting to consolidate the appeal into another ongoing appeal. Charles Eato is hereby ordered to show cause, within thirty days from the date of this opinion, why he should not be prohibited from filing any further pro se appeals, pleadings, motions, or petitions relating to his convictions, judgments, and sentences in case numbers 03-2288, 03-2288A, 03-2289, and 03-2289A. Absent a showing of good cause, we intend to direct the Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeal to refuse to accept any further filings relating to case numbers 03-2288, 03-2288A, 03-2289, and 03-2289A unless they have been reviewed and signed by an attorney who is a licensed member of the Florida Bar in good standing.

Additionally, absent a showing of good cause, any such further and unauthorized pro se filings by Eato will subject him to sanctions, including the issuance of written findings forwarded to the Florida department of Corrections for consideration by it of disciplinary action, including the forfeiture of gain time. See 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2013).

Order to consolidate denied; show cause order issued.

      . This case marks Eato's sixteenth pro se appeal or original proceeding with this court related to case numbers 03-2288, 03-2288A, 03-2289, and 03-2289A.


text:
    Anthony BUSH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-4375.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 24, 2014.

      Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Angela R. Hensel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Anthony Bush appeals his convictions and sentences for armed robbery, grand theft, and the use of a firearm while committing felony grand theft. We affirm the convictions and sentences for armed robbery and grand theft without further comment, but reverse and vacate the conviction for use of a firearm while committing grand theft based on the State’s proper concession of error.

Bush’s conviction for the three offenses stemmed from the same incident, a robbery of a jewelry store. In finding him guilty of armed robbery, the jury determined Bush was in actual possession of a firearm during the offense. As such, the additional conviction for use of a firearm while- committing felony grand theft resulted in a double jeopardy violation. See Cleveland v. State, 587 So.2d 1145, 1146 (Fla.1991) (“[W]hen a robbery conviction is enhanced because of the use of a firearm in committing the robbery, the single act involving the use of the same firearm in the commission of the same robbery cannot form the basis of a separate conviction and sentence for the use of a firearm while committing a felony under section 790.07(2).”). The State concedes the conviction was in error and must be vacated.

Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences for armed robbery and grand theft but vacate the conviction and sentence for use of a firearm while committing grand theft.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED

THOMAS, MARSTILLER, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Trent Abasi STEVENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 1D13-144, 1D13-2280.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 24, 2014.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated cases, we affirm appellant’s judgments of conviction and sentences imposed in Duval County circuit court case numbers 16-201 l-CF-7890 (1D13-144) and 16-2011-CF-8214 (1D13-2280). We write only to hold that while this is one of those rare instances on direct appeal when the appellate record is sufficient on its face to facilitate our consideration of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellant’s trial counsel based on her failure to file a motion to suppress evidence in circuit case number 16-2011-CF-7890, the record is also sufficient to demonstrate that failure did not prejudice appellant’s defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (holding that for a convicted defendant to prevail on a claim.of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must establish both deficient performance and prejudice caused by the deficient performance).

AFFIRMED.

ROWE, SWANSON, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellant, v. Scott M. KING, et al., Appellee.
    No. 1D13-1670.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 24, 2014.
    Jeremy W. Harris, Khari E. Taustin, Masimba M. Mutamba and Angela Barbo-sa Wilborn of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, Chartered, West Palm Beach, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Gombert, 135 So.3d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

THOMAS, ROWE, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellant, v. Alex F. BRIGHTWELL, et al., Appellee.
    No. 1D13-1678.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 24, 2014.
    Wm. David Newman, Jr. and Karene Tygenhof of Choice Legal Group, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Gombert, 135 So.3d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

THOMAS, ROWE, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mary and Edgar ORTEGON, Appellants, v. LEVIEV BOYMELGREEN MARQUIS DEVELOPERS, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 3D13-710.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 25, 2014.
    David Philips, for appellants.
    Akerman and Dana A. Clayton and Nancy A. Copperthwaite and Stacy J. Rodriguez, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and WELLS and SALTER, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. N. Carillon, LLC v. GRC 603, LLC, 135 So.3d 274 (2014).


text:
    In re Hon. Yolanda J. KING.
    No. 2014-O-0924.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 15, 2014.
   ORDER

hOn recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, and considering the response thereto filed by Judge King,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judge Yolanda King, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, be and she hereby is disqualified from exercising any judicial function during the pendency of further proceedings in this matter, pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 25(C) and Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 27.

This order shall be effective immediately-

JOHNSON, C.J., recused.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jefferson D. Hughes Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Darrell K. HICKMAN.
    No. 2014-B-0817.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 16, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

liThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent misled his client concerning the status of her legal matter. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Darrell K. Hickman, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22797, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. It is further ordered that this suspension shall be deferred in its entirety.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    Peggy EDWARDS v. PLANT WORKS, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0484.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   ORDER

1jWrit granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is vacated. The case is remanded to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of Church Mutual Co. v. Dardar, 13-2351 (La.5/7/14), — So.3d -, 2014 WL 1800067, and Cook v. Family Care Services, Inc., 13-2326 (La.5/7/14), — So.3d -, 2014 WL 1800038.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Clyde LAIN, Jr.
    No. 2014-OB-1021.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   ORDER

b The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) is conducting an investigation into allegations that respondent converted client funds to his own use. Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Clyde Lain, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 7922, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Clyde Lain, Jr. for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Clyde Lain, Jr. shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Greg Gerard Guidry Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frankie BASKIN.
    No. 2013-KO-2747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

h Granted in part. The trial court erred in adjudicating and sentencing defendant as a fourth offender for purposes of La. R.S. 15:529.1 in part on the basis of his 2005 federal conviction for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. To qualify for use in habitual offender proceedings, a conviction in another state or under federal law must involve a crime “which, if committed in this state would be a felony.” La.R.S. 15:529.1(A). The federal crime defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324 addresses the bringing into the United States, and the harboring of certain aliens in an illegal manner (as specified), or the knowing transportation of illegal aliens within the United States, and invokes the plenary federal authority over immigration. There is no comparable provision in Louisiana law, felony or misdemeanor. Defendant’s adjudication and sentence as a fourth offender are therefore vacated and this case is remanded to the district court for the resentencing of defendant as a third felony offender. In all other respects, the application is denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    In re Geraldine Broussard BALONEY.
    No. 2014-B-1012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2014.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent engaged in a conflict of interest between two current clients that led to one client being overcharged for costs and accepted an aggregate settlement on behalf of the clients without their informed consent. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Geraldine Broussard Baloney, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24012, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law for six months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a one-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    Paul THOMPSON and David Simmons v. WILLIAMS COMPANIES, INC., Williams Olefins, LLC, Williams Partners, LP, Williams Partners GP, LLC, Discovery Producer Services, LLC, Black Marlin Pipeline, LLC, Williams Ohio Valley Midstream, LLC, and Turner Industries Group, LLC.
    No. 2014-CC-1035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 21, 2014.
   In re Williams Olefins, L.L.C.;&emdash;Defen-dant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 72,701; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0440.

Stay denied; writ denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michelle NICKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-979.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Nicks, Michelle;&emdash;Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated January 10, 2014; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 396-381; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0422.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrell SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1340.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Smith, Darrell;&emdash;Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated January 10, 2014; Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd District Court Div. B, No. 297865; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0660.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Preston RUSSELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Preston Russell; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated action January 10, 2014, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 405-773; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0557.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy DICKERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1765.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Dickerson, Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated March 14, 2014; Parish of Jefferson, 24th District Court Div. M, No. 99-3181; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-493.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stanley VEAL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-1910.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Veal, Stanley; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated March 14, 2014; Parish of Jefferson, 24th District Court Div. D, No. 99-6697; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-569.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Garland MILLER v. DESOTO REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0294.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Miller, Garland; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 11, 2014, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 64,651; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-639.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    David GUILLIOT v. DOLGENCORP, L.L.C.
    No. 2013-C-2953
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Guilliot, David; — Petitioner; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated March 21, 2014, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A. No. 2011-6810-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-587.

Rehearing denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Donald DAVIS, Individually and on Behalf of his Deceased Mother, Cynthia Tuckson v. CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY, City of Kenner, State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development, Denver F. Dickens, and Chad Bishop.
    No. 2013-C-2959.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Davis, Donald, individually and on behalf of his deceased mother, Cynthia Tuckson; — Petitioner; Applying for Rehearing of this court’s action dated April 17, 2014, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 690-322; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-198.

Rehearing denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Glen R. LAMPKIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2303.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Lampkin, Glen R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 10-63; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-391.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Spencer HENRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Henry, Spencer; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 7367; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1060.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marlon Percy BRAMWELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2330.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Bramwell, Marlon Percy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 48,831; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,694-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. James DONALDSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Donaldson, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 481-786; to the Court of Appeal-, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0967.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alvin CATCHINGS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Catchings, Alvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 353-177; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1214.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael Wayne NEWSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Newson, Michael Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 211,932; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-784-KH.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stephen BRADLEY III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Bradley III, Stephen; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 172,931; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-812-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vernon CALLIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2357.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Callier, Vernon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 101,379, 102,137; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,722-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert Lee POOLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2372.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Pooler, Robert Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 10524; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1039.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy Edwards ATES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2400.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Ates, Roy Edwards; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 39,950-2.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael COMERY.
    No. 2013-KO-2401.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Comery, Michael; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 27624; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0999.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lorenzo JEFFERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2419.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Jefferson, Lorenzo; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 279,282; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-721-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2420.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 483,407; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1006.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; see also State ex rel. Hall v. State, 99-0326 (La.9/24/99), 871 So.2d 1071.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Damon Lee HARMON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2436.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Harmon, Damon Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 5001-06; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 13-00656.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Deshaun TORREGANO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Torregano, Deshaun; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 487-799; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1278.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alfred MALVEO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2470.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Malveo, Alfred; — 'Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 10-09-0822; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013-KW-1128.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tim Price v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Price, Tim; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06-5531; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-522.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Danny HARGROVE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2474.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Hargrove, Danny; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 02-F-0432; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-743-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Perry BANKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Banks, Perry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. F-2006-99; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,814-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Luis Starlyn RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2476.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Rodriguez-Hernandez, Luis Star-lyn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 465867-3; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 1040.

Denied.


text:
    Mark GIBBS v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2013-CI-2495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Gibbs, Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 600,190; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 2376.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie DILLON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2519.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Dillon, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 404-736; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0815.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert DIGGINS.
    No. 2013-KO-2742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Diggins, Robert; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 479-135; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-KA-0015.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeffery DAVIS.
    No. 2013-K-2751.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Davis, Jeffery; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 10-2258; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KA-237.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Franklin MEREDITH, Jr.
    No. 2013-KO-2811.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Meredith Jr., Franklin; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 07-10-0442; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0566.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. TAM Q. LE.
    No. 2013-K-2828.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Le, Tam Q.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 506845; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 0611.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis ANGELLE.
    No. 2013-K-2845.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Angelle, Jarvis; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. CR-119602.1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-508.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gus Jerrod MELBERT.
    No. 2013-KO-2855.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Melbert, Gus Jerrod; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2012-1294; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-564.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Monique Renee HOUSTON.
    No. 2013-KO-2872.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Houston, Monique Renee; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 6895-07; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA13-493.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Curtis WILLIAMS.
    No. 2013-K-2889.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Williams, Curtis; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 494-001; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No.. 2013-KA-0271.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allen Jamel ROBINSON.
    No. 2013-KO-2939.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Robinson, Allen Jamel; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 10F2546; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,476-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Willie CLARK, et ux. v. JENNINGS POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0721.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Clark, Melinda; Clark, Willie; Willie Clark, Et Ux.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. O, No. C-781-11; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1022 C/W 13-1023.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Harry P. CARMOUCHE.
    No. 2014-KK-0713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Carmouche, Harry P.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 173708; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 13-01404.

Denied.


text:
    Margaret McCLAIN v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re City of New Orleans Planning Commission; City of New Orleans Planning Commission Director; City of New Orleans, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2013-02400; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-4291.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William Christopher BEARY.
    No. 2014-KK-0725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Beary, William Christopher; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 513-374; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0667.

Denied.


text:
    Jacqueline DANIELS v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS FAIR PLAN.
    No. 2014-CC-0726.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 681-663; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-C-45.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Byronisha BRIGHT.
    No. 2014-KK-0728.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 504-177; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0067.

Denied.


text:
    Donald BUXTON, Sr., v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2014-C-0731.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   ' In re Buxton . Sr., Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District # 3, No. 11-09254; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1203.

Denied.

JOHNSON, C.J., and KNOLL and HUGHES, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Cleo ALEXANDER v. PEERLESS CLEANERS.
    No. 2014-C-0733.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Alexander, Cleo; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Louisiana Office of Worker’s Compensation, No. 12-07926, DISTRICT 2; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1104.

Denied.


text:
    Welkin SMITH, Indiv., et al. v. RAPIDES HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2014-C-0734.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Smith, Welkin et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 243,027; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-1172.

Denied.


text:
    FARMERS-MERCHANTS BANK & TRUST COMPANY et al. v. SOUTHERN STRUCTURES, LLC, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0736.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Nucor Building Systems Sales Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 76722; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-926.

Denied.


text:
    Succession of Oleava K. KNIGHTON (Kevin Knighton) v. Intervenor Weldon KNIGHTON, et al.
    No. 2014-C-0737.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Knighton, Weldon; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 50559; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-56.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kendall HARRIS.
    No. 2014-KK-0738.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Harris, Kendall; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 513-315; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0179.

Denied.


text:
    Jeffrey WINN v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2014-C-0753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Winn, Jeffrey; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, New Orleans Civil Service Commission, No. 7873; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-CA-0199.

Denied.


text:
    Tisha GRADY v. CHOICES OF LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 2014-C-0756.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Grady, Tisha; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div A, No. 62,450; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-437.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Natalie NEWTON.
    No. 2014-KK-0757.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Newton, Natalie; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 1-202736; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2034.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rochelle GREGORY.
    No. 2014-KK-0716.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 477-025; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-1593.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Hebert C. WELLMAN, Jr. and Graig E. Collier v. Mohammad TUFAIL.
    No. 2014-C-0758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Tufail, Mohammad; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div, M, No. 2007-02110; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1173.

Denied.


text:
    JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 1 d/b/a West Jefferson Medical Center v. K & B LOUISIANA CORPORATION and Rite Aid Headquarters Corporation.
    No. 2014-C-0759.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Jefferson Parish Hospital District NO. 1 D/B/A West Jefferson Medical Center; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 712-557; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-508 C/W 13-CA-730.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Glynn HAWKINS.
    No. 2014-KK-0761.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 516-468; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0180.

Denied.


text:
    Jared DUNAHOE, et ux. v. Nancy Lynn ROGERS.
    No. 2014-C-0883.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 2014.
   In re Rogers, Nancy Lynn; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-85704A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 13-01301.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian Douglas HORN.
    No. 2014-OK-1075.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 27, 2014.
   In re Horn, Brian Douglas; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-20372A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,409-KW.

Denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-148.
    No. 2014-OB-0710.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Johnson, Doris Ann; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-143.
    No. 2014-OB-0754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Badran, Tonia; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-143.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-038.
    No. 2014-OB-0765.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Dillion, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-038.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-130.
    No. 2014-OB-0803.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Giles, Brandon Dwayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-130.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 13-PDB-091.
    No. 2014-OB-0811.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Coté, Lisa D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 13-PDB-091.

Leave to appeal denied


text:
    E.P. SERVICES v. WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES and Ford Motor Company, Inc. et al.
    No. 2014-C-271.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Ford Motor Company and Berry-land Motors, LLC.; — Defendant; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated April 17, 2014, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2006-1424; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 1678.

Rehearing denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.

GÜIDRY, J., would grant to correct interest on attorney fee award only.

CLARK, J., would grant to correct attorney fees; and would otherwise deny.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Chazmon JAMES.
    No. 2014-KK-0976.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re James, Chazmon; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 502-12-CR7-118530; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 KW 0088.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Amy T. HEBERT.
    No. 2013-KP-2065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Hebert, Amy T.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 448360; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0768.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeremy LANDRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2228.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Landry, Jeremy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 22,441; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013-KW 0900.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tobie GILLESPIE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2268.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Gillespie, Tobie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 364872; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0916.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marvin L. LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Lewis, Marvin L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 500164; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1047.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Oscar MADRID v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2356.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Madrid, Oscar; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 10-2889; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-741.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Louis WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2358.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re White, Louis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 121,481; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,696-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael MACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Mack, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 44,716, 47,099; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,706-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeanie HANO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Hano, Jeanie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 369912; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 0640.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tracy HOBBS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Hobbs, Tracy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 58,725; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-750-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Craig PARENT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2469.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Parent, Craig; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 96-520; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-KH-677.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy Leon TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2013-KH-2472.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 30, 2014.
   In re Taylor, Roy Leon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 71,536; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-851-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.