author: WINDOM, Presiding Judge. JOINER, Judge, WELCH, Judge,

text:
    Jackie MCLEOD v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-11-0860.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    Nov. 2, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 2013.

      Jackie McLeod, pro se.
    Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Jean A. Therkelsen, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

Jackie McLeod appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., in which he attacked his May 1989 convictions for four counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, see § 13A-12-211, Ala. Code 1975, and his resulting consecutive sentences of life in prison for each conviction. On August 3, 1990, this Court affirmed McLeod’s convictions and sentences. See McLeod v. State, 581 So.2d 1144 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). On October 30, 1990, this Court issued a certifícate of judgment.

On February 3, 2012, McLeod filed a pleading styled “Motion to Vacate Judgment Rendered on May 16, 1989 Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure; and Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing on Motion.” In his motion, McLeod alleged that he was denied a fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because: 1) Juror N.M. was influenced by her son, a narcotics agent, to find McLeod guilty; 2) the State failed to disclose to the trial court and to McLeod that it was aware Jurors J.H. and N.M. had failed to disclose information during voir dire; and 3) the empaneled jurors intentionally failed to disclose information during voir dire, and that the State failed to disclose to the trial court and to McLeod that it was aware that the jurors had failed to disclose information during voir dire. On February 23, 2012, the circuit court, without affording the State an opportunity to respond, treated McLeod’s pleading as a Rule 32 petition and dismissed it. The circuit court did not state any reasons for its dismissal.

On appeal, McLeod reasserts claims (1) and (2). He, however, has not reasserted claim (3) and thus has abandoned that claim. Brownlee v. State, 666 So.2d 91, 93 (Ala.CrimApp.1995). Further, he has improperly raised a number of issues for the first time on appeal, and those issues are not properly before this Court. Chambers v. State, 884 So.2d 15, 19 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). Thus, whether the circuit court correctly dismissed claims (1) and (2) is the only issue properly before this Court.

In its brief on appeal, the State asserts, for the first time, that the circuit court properly dismissed claims (1) and (2) because those claims were procedurally barred under Rules 32.2(b) and 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P. The State did not have the opportunity to, and thus did not, assert these procedural bars in the circuit court. Therefore, this Court must determine whether the application of those bars has been waived.

The Alabama Supreme Court has held that the procedural bars contained in Rules 32.2(a) and 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., do not implicate the circuit court’s jurisdiction to reach the merits of a petitioner’s claim; instead, they are affirmative defenses that will be waived if not raised in the circuit court. See Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d 348, 354 (Ala.2007); Ex parte Ward, 46 So.3d 888, 896 (Ala.2007). See also Fox v. State, 50 So.3d 494, 496 n. 1 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (implicitly holding that Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., is not a jurisdictional bar to relief). However, a “ ‘[w]aiver is ... the voluntary surrender or relinquishment of some known right, benefit, or advantage,’” Stewart v. Bradley, 15 So.3d 533, 543 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (quoting Waters v. Taylor, 527 So.2d 139, 141 (Ala.Civ.App.1988), citing in turn City of Montgomery v. Weldon, 280 Ala. 468, 195 So.2d 110 (1967)), and “ ‘ “will not be implied from slight circumstances.... ” 29 Am. & Enq. Law, p. 1105.’ ” Ex parte Textron, Inc., 67 So.3d 61, 66 (Ala.2011) (quoting Isom v. Johnson, 205 Ala. 157, 159-60, 87 So. 543, 545 (1920)). Instead, a waiver “ ‘ “must be evidenced by an unequivocal [statement or a] decisive act.Id. Thus, this Court holds that in circumstances when the State is not given an opportunity to respond to a Rule 32 petition before the petition is summarily dismissed, the State has not “evidenced [its intent to waive its affirmative defenses] by an unequivocal [statement or a] decisive act,” and it has not waived the application of the procedural bars. Id.; cf. AG. v. State, 989 So.2d 1167, 1180, n. 6 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (recognizing that the State will not be deemed to have waived the application of a procedural bar contained in Rule 32.2, Ala. R.Crim. P., if the State did not have the opportunity to raise that bar in the trial court); Davenport v. State, 987 So.2d 652, 655, n. 4 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (same).

This Court’s conclusion is buttressed by the Alabama Supreme Court’s holdings in Ex parte Collins, 84 So.3d 48 (Ala.2010), and Ex parte Collier, 64 So.3d 1045 (Ala.2010). In Ex parte Collins, 84 So.3d at 53, the Alabama Supreme Court held that an inmate’s failure to verify his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was a nonjurisdic-tional, pleading defect that will be waived by the State if not raised in the circuit court. In Ex parte Collier, the Alabama Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that the “failure to verify a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a defect [in an inmate’s pleading] that clearly can be waived” if not raised in the circuit court. 64 So.3d at 1050. It, however, explained that the State will not be deemed to have waived that defense if the State did not have the opportunity to raise that defense in the circuit court. Id. To support its conclusion, the Alabama Supreme Court recognized that the “State cannot waive an issue [or defense] ... it never had a chance to [raise] in the trial court.” Id. Thus, when the State does not have the opportunity to respond to an inmate’s pleading in the circuit court, it will not be deemed to have waived any defenses if those defenses are asserted at the State’s first opportunity, i.e., in its brief on appeal. Id. at 1051.

Here, the circuit court dismissed McLeod’s Rule 32 petition before the State had an opportunity to respond; therefore, the “State ... never had a chance to [raise the procedural bars] in the trial court.” Id. Because the “State cannot waive an issue [or defense] ... it never had a chance to [raise] in the trial court,” id., it has not waived and may assert the procedural bars for the first time on appeal. Cf. A.G., 989 So.2d at 1180, n. 6; Davenport, 987 So.2d at 655, n. 4. The State has asserted that McLeod’s claims are procedurally barred under Rules 32.2(b) and 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P.; therefore, the circuit court’s dismissal will be affirmed if either of those procedural bars applies.

In claims (1) and (2), McLeod raised claims relating to juror misconduct and prosecutorial misconduct. Those claims are not jurisdictional and are therefore subject to the procedural bars contained in Rule 32.2, Ala. R.Crim. P. See Jenkins v. State, 105 So.3d 1234, 1239 (Ala.Crim.App.2011); Green v. State, 591 So.2d 576, 578 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). Further, McLeod filed his Rule 32 petition well after the time limitation contained in Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., had expired. Therefore, McLeod’s claims are procedurally barred, and the circuit court’s judgment is due to be affirmed.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

BURKE, J., concurs. JOINER, J., concurs specially, with opinion; WELCH, J., concurs in the result, with opinion; KELLUM, J., concurs in the result.

JOINER, Judge,

concurring specially.

I fully concur with the main opinion. I write specially to explain my basis for doing so and to note that, although I think the extraordinary-circumstances analysis Judge Welch proposes in his separate opinion is an excellent approach, I do not think it is necessary in this case.

In A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d 1167 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), this Court discussed the holding in Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d 348 (Ala.2007), that absent “extraordinary circumstances” this Court could not sua sponte apply a ground of preclusion to a petitioner’s claim. 989 So.2d at 1179. This Court stated in A.G.:

“The opinion in Ex parte Clemons appears to be grounded in due-process principles. The Court noted in Ex parte Clemons that Rule 32.3 places the burden on the State to plead any ground of preclusion but then places the burden on the petitioner to disprove the existence of any preclusion ground asserted by the State. Thus, for a petitioner to satisfy his burden of disproving a preclusion ground asserted by the State, due process requires that a petitioner be given notice of that preclusion ground.”

989 So.2d at 1179.

As the main opinion concludes, the State cannot be said to have waived the grounds of preclusion because it did not have the opportunity to assert them in the circuit court. The first opportunity the State had to assert those grounds was in its brief to this Court, and the State took that opportunity to do so. McLeod was given notice of the preclusion grounds asserted by the State in its brief on appeal. See Rule 31(b), Ala. R.App. P. (requiring a party to serve a copy of its brief on each party). Further, Rule 28(c), Ala. R.App. P., afforded McLeod the opportunity to file a reply in response to the State’s assertion of the preclusionary grounds, but McLeod did not avail himself of that opportunity. In fact, McLeod sent two documents to this Court after the State filed its brief, but neither was a timely reply and neither addressed the State’s assertion that McLeod’s claims are procedurally barred.

If McLeod had responded to the State’s assertion of the grounds of preclusion and if that response had warranted additional fact-finding, the matter could have been remanded to the circuit court for fact-finding as to that issue, including, if necessary, an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 32.9, Ala. R.Crim. P. See also Ex parte Coleman, 71 So.3d 627, 633 (Ala.2010). Cf. Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d at 356 (stating that under the particular circumstances there the Court “need not reach the question of the ease with which the issue [of whether to apply a procedural bar sua sponte] could be resolved at the appellate level without the necessity for further fact-finding”).

Because the State asserted the grounds of preclusion at its first opportunity to do so and because McLeod had notice and an opportunity to respond to the State’s assertion of the preclusion grounds but did not do so, I do not think it is necessary to perform the extraordinary-circumstances analysis proposed by Judge Welch. Under these particular circumstances, this Court’s resolution of the instant case is consistent with the due-process principles identified in Ex parte Clemons, supra, and AG., supra.

WELCH, Judge,

concurring in the result.

I concur in the result reached in the majority’s opinion.

I.

The State’s legitimate lack of opportunity to plead procedural bars, and recognition that the State did not waive the bar, does not relieve this Court of the obligation to conduct the extraordinary circumstance analysis mandated by Ex parte Clemons before sua sponte applying procedural bars.

I believe that the majority has failed to follow the plain mandate of Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d 348 (Ala.2007). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that because the State had no opportunity to respond in the trial court, it did not waive the applicable affirmative defenses, which are procedural bars in this case, and can assert those defenses for the first time on appeal and that, for that reason, this Court may sua sponte apply them to affirm the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 32 petition.

The majority’s analysis directly contradicts the explicit holding in Ex parte Clemons that the sua sponte application of procedural bars by an appellate court is allowed only in eases in which the appellate court finds the existence of “extraordinary circumstances.” Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d at 354-55. I also conclude that in Davenport v. State, 987 So.2d 652 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), relied upon by the majority, this Court misapplied the holding of Ex parte Clemons and that Davenport should be overruled. Therefore, for the reasons that follow, I respectfully must disagree with the rationale of the majority.

A. Procedural posture of the case

On February 6, 2012, McLeod filed his petition, challenging four May 16, 1989, convictions and sentences. The majority characterizes the claims McLeod pursues on appeal as follows:

“In his motion, McLeod alleged that he was denied a fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because: 1) Juror N.M. was influenced by her son, a narcotics agent, to find McLeod guilty; [and] 2) the State failed to disclose to the trial court and to McLeod that it was aware Jurors J.H. and N.M. had failed to disclose information during voir dire....”

McLeod v. State, 121 So.3d 1020, 1022 (Ala.Crim.App.2012).

Without allowing a response from the State, the circuit court summarily denied relief on these claims by the notation “motion denied” on the case-action summary of each case. McLeod appealed. Both claims are, as the majority determined, nonjurisdictional claims that are untimely under Rule 32. See Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P. (holding that newly discovered evidence claims must be raised within six months of discovery and McLeod’s other claims must be raised within two years of the issuance of the certificate of judgment).

In its brief on appeal, the State argues that McLeod’s claims were procedurally barred under Rules 32.2(b), as a successive petition, and under 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., as untimely filed. Because the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition before the State responded, the majority characterizes the threshold question as whether the State has waived the applicable procedural bars and whether the State may raise the bars at its first opportunity. This question was not raised by the State in its brief.

Citing Ex parte Collier, 64 So.3d 1045 (Ala.2010), and Ex parte Collins, 84 So.3d 48 (Ala.2010), the majority holds that the State will not be charged with having waived any procedural bar so long as the State does raise them at the first opportunity. In this case, the first opportunity was on appeal.

I agree with the majority when it cites Ex parte Collier, 64 So.3d 1045 (Ala.2010), and Ex parte Collins, 84 So.3d 48 (Ala.2010), to establish that the State did not waive the relevant affirmative defenses in this case. However, for the reasons that follow, I do not believe that even the State’s legitimate lack of opportunity to plead an affirmative defense pretermits the application of an Ex parte Clemons extraordinary-circumstance analysis.

The rationale of the majority opinion fails to explain why the express requirement of Ex parte Clemons, reinforced in Ex parte James, 61 So.3d 352 (Ala.2009)—that before an appellate court may sua sponte apply a procedural bar to affirm the judgment of a trial court, it must find that extraordinary circumstances exist that justify that action — should be ignored when this Court finds that the State, through no fault of its own, has failed to assert an affirmative defense in the circuit court. The majority’s analysis also relies in part on obiter dicta, in particular A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d 1167, 1180, n. 6 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), and Davenport, a case that itself is based on obiter dicta and that ignores the plain mandate of Ex parte Clemons.

I will explain in this writing that the consideration of whether a waiver occurred and the cause of the State’s failure to plead an affirmative defense should be assessed in an extraordinary-circumstances analysis when considering the blameworthiness of the State for failing to raise an affirmative defense in the circuit court. Whether a waiver has or has not occurred is not the only factor this Court should consider when deciding whether to apply a preclusionary bar sua sponte on appeal where the State had no opportunity to assert an affirmative defense, as the majority holds.

B. The holding in Ex parte Clemons

In Ex parte Clemons, supra, the State expressly waived procedural bars in its response to the Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition in the circuit court and during the direct appeal to this Court. This Court applied the procedural bars on appeal. During oral arguments before the Alabama Supreme Court, without prior notice to the petitioner, the State asserted:

“[T]he procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a) are jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Accordingly, the State contended, the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly applied those bars sua sponte to Clemons’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, despite the State’s failure to assert the procedural bars in the trial court.”

Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d at 352.

The Alabama Supreme Court determined that procedural bars were not jurisdictional and could be waived by the State, and, in an ordinary case, an appellate court cannot apply sua sponte a procedural bar that had been expressly waived by the State in the circuit court.

“The question before us in this proceeding is whether the State may waive the affirmative defense of the procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a) and thereby enable the trial court to entertain the proceeding on its merits.
“If we were to read Rule 32.2(a) as a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the circuit court to grant relief in instances where preclusion is available as a defense, thereby enabling an appellate court to invoke the defense sua sponte, we will have construed a rule of procedure in a manner contrary to the authority conferred upon this Court by the Alabama Constitution. This we simply cannot do.”

Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d at 353-54.

Finally, the Supreme Court also held that where extraordinary circumstances exist, an appellate court may apply sua sponte an affirmative defense that had been waived by the State in the circuit court:

“However, our holding that the procedural bars in Rule 32.2(a) are not jurisdictional does not lead to the conclusion that an appellate court can never assert them sua sponte. Federal courts of appeals have, sua sponte, overcome waiver of the defense of preclusion in postcon-viction proceedings under extraordinary circumstances.”

Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d at 354.

Ex parte Clemons dealt with an express waiver of procedural bars by the State in the circuit court. The Alabama Supreme Court later clarified that the omission of an affirmative defense in a response filed by the State amounted to a waiver. In Ex parte James, 61 So.3d 352 (Ala.2009), the State did not plead in the circuit court an affirmative defense to each ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim pleaded by James. The Alabama Supreme Court reaffirmed that an appellate court is prohibited from sua sponte applying a procedural bar unless the Court finds that extraordinary circumstances exist.

“[I]t is undisputed that the State did not plead the affirmative defense of the pre-clusionary grounds of Rule 32 concerning the majority of James’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, thus waiving that affirmative defense, and that no ‘extraordinary circumstances’ exist that would justify the Court of Criminal Appeals’ sua sponte application of the procedural grounds to those of James’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims as to which the State did not plead the affirmative defense. The State concedes that the Court of Criminal Appeals’ sua sponte application of the preclusionary grounds of Rule 32 to James’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims conflicts with Clemons and that its judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for that court to consider the merits of James’s remaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. We agree. As Clemons establishes, the preclusion-ary grounds of Rule 32 are affirmative defenses that must be pleaded or they are waived; the preclusionary grounds do not affect the courts’ jurisdiction. The State concedes that it waived the preclusionary grounds by not pleading them as an affirmative defense in the circuit court. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment and remand the case for that court to consider the merits of James’s remaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.”

61 So.3d at 356.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held in Ex parte James that the State’s omission of an affirmative defense in its response to a petitioner’s claim is a waiver of that affirmative defense and that Ex parte Clemons prohibits an appellate court from sua sponte applying that affirmative defense to affirm a trial court’s dismissal of a claim in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.

The majority apparently attempts to distinguish its opinion in this case from the holding in Ex parte Clemons by stating in footnote 3 that it is not sua sponte applying procedural bars.

“This Court is not applying procedural bars sua sponte. Black’s Law Dictionary 1560 (8th ed.2009) (defining ‘sua sponte’ as acting ‘[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own motion.’)”

121 So.3d at 1022, n.3.

The State did argue in its appellate brief that “the claims contained herein are barred under Rule 32.2(b) and (c), Ala. R.Crim. P., as the petition is successive and barred by the statute of limitation.” (State’s brief, p. 5.) However, the question before this Court is whether an appellate court may apply for the first time on appeal a procedural bar not raised or expressly applied below, without engaging in an extraordinary circumstances analysis.

A perspicacious examination of the opinion in Ex parte Clemons demonstrates that the Alabama Supreme Court did not use the term sua sponte exactly as it is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary.

In Ex parte Clemons, the Court equated the action of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Guess, 203 F.3d 1143, 1145-46 (9th Cir.2000), in that the government raised and argued a procedural bar for the first time on appeal, as the sua sponte application of a procedural bar.

“However, our holding that the procedural bars in Rule 32.2(a) are not jurisdictional does not lead to the conclusion that an appellate court can never assert them sua sponte. Federal courts of appeals have, sua sponte, overcome waiver of the defense of preclusion in postcon-viction proceedings under extraordinary circumstances. In United States v. Guess, 203 F.3d 1143, 1145-46 (9th Cir.2000), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:
“ ‘However, the government failed initially to argue the default issue. It first raised Appellant’s potential default in its response brief to this court. In United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc), we declared, “[This court] ... will usually not allow the government to raise a petitioner’s default for the first time on appeal, when it did not take the opportunity to do so before the district court.” 172 F.3d at 1156. When the government raises a petitioner’s default for the first time on appeal, this court usually finds that the government has “waived” its default defense. Id. Barron thus requires that the government show “extraordinary circumstances” which suggest that “justice would be served by overlooking the government’s omission [at the district court]” in order for the government to avoid waiver. Id,.’ (Emphasis added.)”

55 So.3d at 354 (emphasis added).

Ex parte Clemons deemed the appellate court’s application of procedural bars in Guess to be “sua sponte” action by the appellate court, even though the bar had been raised in the government’s brief.

Even more telling is how the Alabama Supreme Court dealt with the extraordinary circumstances present in Ex parte Clemons. After the State had orally argued that procedural bars should be applied to affirm the judgment of the circuit court, the Alabama Supreme Court performed an extraordinary-circumstances analysis and determined that the circumstances in Ex parte Clemons did not justify sua sponte application of procedural bars:

“We agree that an appellate court ‘should not lightly raise the issue of a defendant’s procedural default sua sponte.’ Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d at 733. Suffice it to say that the State has not shown extraordinary circumstances that suggest that justice would be served by overlooking its failure to assert in the trial court the affirmative defense of preclusion. We are not here dealing with a proceeding in which the defendant pleaded guilty, which militates against concerns with the finality of criminal judgments that would be otherwise implicated in a collateral proceeding. The State’s ‘blameworthiness’ is not in serious question here, as it is clear that the State intentionally waived the defense. Because of the foregoing circumstances we need not reach the question of the ease with which the issue could be resolved at the appellate level without the necessity for further fact-finding.
“In summary, the preclusive provisions of Rule 32.2(a) cannot be read as jurisdictional. Because those procedural bars are nonjurisdictional, they may, as they were here, be waived. Only in extraordinary circumstances may such waiver be overcome by an appellate court acting sua sponte. Those circumstances do not exist here. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case for consideration of Clemons’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”

55 So.3d at 355-56.

Had the Court in Ex parte Clemons deemed sua sponte to be defined only by the definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary, it would not have applied that term to describe the actions the Court itself could have taken after the State had argued, i.e., suggested, that procedural bars could be applied by the Alabama Supreme Court to affirm the denial of relief. After making an extraordinary-circumstance analysis it determined that it should not sua sponte apply the procedural bars argued by the State.

Therefore, even if, as the majority asserts, technically the term “sua sponte” does not apply to action by an appellate court after the application of a procedural bar is first suggested, as the State did in the instant case, i.e., raised during oral argument, or argued in a brief on appeal, the Court in Ex parte Clemons was using a connotation of sua sponte which does not match the denotation of that term in Black’s Law Dictionary.

C. Analysis of cases relied upon by the majority

Six months after Ex parte Clemons was decided, this Court released A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d 1167 (Ala.Crim.App.2007). I believe that the majority opinion relies on obiter dicta in A.G. to buttress its assertion that “the State will not be deemed to have waived the application of a procedural bar contained in Rule 32.2, Ala. R.Crim. P., if the State did not have the opportunity to raise that bar in the trial court.” 121 So.3d at 1023.

A.G. claimed in his Rule 32 petition that the indictment underlying his conviction was void. In the circuit court, the State correctly pleaded in response that the claim “was precluded by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala. R.Crim. P., because it could have been, but was not, raised and addressed at trial and on appeal.” AG. v. State, 989 So.2d at 1178. However, the circuit court did not utilize Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (5) as grounds for denying the claim.

This Court noted in A.G. that Ex parte Clemons appeared to be grounded in due-process principles:

“The opinion in Ex parte Clemons appears to be grounded in due-process principles. The Court noted in Ex parte Clemons that Rule 32.3[, Ala. R.Crim. P.,] places the burden on the State to plead any ground of preclusion but then places the burden on the petitioner to disprove the existence of any preclusion ground asserted by the State. Thus, for a petitioner to satisfy his burden of disproving a preclusion ground asserted by the State, due process requires that a petitioner be given notice of that preclusion ground.”

A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d at 1179-80.

The Court in A.G. held that because the State did plead that the claim was due to be dismissed based on the procedural bars set forth in Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (5) and because this did afford AG. an opportunity to rebut the use of those procedural bars to preclude review of his claim, the circuit court’s failure to utilize the bars pleaded by the State did not present a due-process impediment to this Court’s utilizing those bars on appellate review. In other words, due process is satisfied when the State pleads an applicable procedural bar in its response. The circuit court’s failure to dispose of the petition on the State’s pleaded grounds did not prevent this Court from affirming the denial of a petition on those grounds. This Court concluded:

“Thus, the due-process concerns that were present in Ex parte Clemons are not present in this case, and Ex parte Clemons is not controlling here.
“Because due process is not implicated and Ex parte Clemons is not applicable in this case, this Court may apply the well-settled rule that an appellate court may affirm a circuit court’s judgment if that judgment is correct for any reason.
“Because A.G.’s indictment claim is not jurisdictional and because no due-process concerns are implicated in this case, we conclude that we may affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim on the ground that it is precluded by Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), even though that was not the reason stated by the circuit court.”

AG. v. State, 989 So.2d at 1180-81.

In that part of its analysis, A.G. was correct. However, this Court included note 6 in A.G., which is cited by the majority, stating that a petitioner is entitled to the notice required by due process “only when the State files a response to a petition.” A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d at 1180 n. 6. After having acknowledged that Ex parte Clemons required that a petitioner be given notice of the assertion of a procedural bar and the due process right to rebut such a pleading, AG. stated in note 6 that:

“We note that the Supreme Court expressly recognized in Ex parte Clemons, [55 So.3d 348 (Ala.2007)], that Rule 32.7(d) specifically ‘authorizes sua sponte action by’ the circuit court in applying a preclusion ground and that, subsequently, in Ex parte Ward, [46 So.3d 888 (Ala.2007) ], the Court reaffirmed the long-standing rule that a circuit court ‘may properly summarily dismiss such a petition without waiting for a response to the petition from the State.’ Thus, this notice requirement is triggered only when the State files a response to the petition.”

A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d at 1180 n. 6 (emphasis added). Because the State did file a response in AG., the emphasized portion of note 6 is unnecessary to the Court’s holding in AG. and is obiter dictum. That is especially true because the Ex parte Clemons Court specifically stated that it did not decide that issue. See Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d at 353 (“Whether the trial court’s authority continues after service of an answer omitting a defense is a question not before us.”). The opinion in A.G. provided no analysis, nor any support for the emphasized portion of the footnote. This part of the footnote, as applied to an affirmative defense, is also directly called into question by AG.’s later quotation from Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C., 881 So.2d 1013 (Ala.2003), explained below in more detail, which holds that a totally omitted affirmative defense will not suffice as a basis on which to affirm a trial court judgment denying relief.

The note also cites Rule 32.7(d), which states:

“(d) Summary disposition. If the court determines that [1] the petition is not sufficiently specific, or [2] is precluded, or [3] fails to state a claim, or [4] that no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief under this rule and that no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, the court may either dismiss the petition or grant leave to file an amended petition, Leave to amend shall be freely granted. Otherwise, the court shall direct that the proceedings continue and set a date for hearing.”

It should be noted that of the four reasons for summary dismissal listed above, only reason number 2 — preclusion—is an affirmative defense. Reasons 1, 3, and 4 are not affirmative defenses. Therefore, stating that a circuit court may summarily dismiss a petition without awaiting a response by the State is not the same as saying that a petitioner is not entitled to notice of the application of a procedural bar in the circuit court. Summary dismissal may occur after the State has filed a response including an affirmative defense or has filed a response not including an affirmative defense, as well as when it has not responded at all.

The logical conclusion of the principle expressed in the emphasized portion of note 6 of AG., which itself was mere obiter dictum, is that a petitioner is deprived of the due-process right to notice by the sua sponte application of a procedural bar by the appellate court when the State files a response in the circuit court failing to raise any procedural bars, but a petitioner is not deprived of notice and due process by the sua sponte application of a procedural bar by the appellate court when the State files no response at all in the circuit court. This makes no sense. It directly contravenes the express prohibition in Ex parte Clemons, reenforced in Ex parte James, preventing an appellate court from applying an affirmative defense sua sponte except when extraordinary circumstances are present. I do understand that the Court was attempting to clarify the parameters of Ex parte Clemons, but nonetheless, for the reason explained herein, these comments should not be cited as precedent.

Seven months after Ex parte Clemons was released, this Court released Daven port v. State, 987 So.2d 652 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) — a case cited as authority by the majority here. Davenport filed a Rule 32 petition raising nonjurisdictional claims after the limitations period in Rule 32.2(c) had expired. Without having received a response from the State, the circuit court denied the petition stating only that the petition was “[d]enied.” This Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling by citing Ex parte Ward, 46 So.3d 888 (Ala.2007). In Ward, the Alabama Supreme Court established that equitable tolling could be applied by the circuit court to excuse the application of the procedural bar of Rule 32.3(c) in a case where the petitioner alleged in his petition that: there existed extraordinary circumstances beyond his control; the circumstances were unavoidable even with the exercise of diligence; and the circumstances prevented him from filing his petition within the limitations period. Davenport rationalized that because the petition was time-barred on its face, and because Davenport did not plead that she was entitled to equitable tolling, this Court could affirm the trial court’s judgment if it was correct for any reason.

“Based on the plain language of [Ex parte ] Ward, the petitioner must establish entitlement to the remedy of equitable tolling in her petition. In this case, the petition was time-barred on its face, and the appellant did not assert equitable tolling in the petition. Therefore, the circuit court could have properly summarily denied the petition pursuant to Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., because it was time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. See Sumlin v. State, 710 So.2d 941 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (holding that we will affirm a circuit court’s denial of a Rule 32 petition if it is correct for any reason).

Davenport, 987 So.2d at 655.

The DavenpoH Court did not acknowledge that it was doing so, but by affirming the circuit court’s denial of the petition because the petition was untimely and because the petition did not include an allegation that equitable tolling should be applied, Davenport sua sponte applied the procedural bar in Rule 32.2(c). In its holding, Davenport explained in note 4 that the presumption that the circuit court could have summarily applied a procedural bar did not offend due-process principles because, in accord with A.G., the petitioner was not, in any event, entitled to due-process protections because the State did not respond to the petition.

Note 4 in Davenport appears to refer to note 6 in AG., but Davenport does not explain how a footnote in A.G., containing obiter dictum, can support the Davenport Court’s holding. The Court in A.G. specifically noted that the State did file a response and asserted procedural bars. Moreover, the language and rationale of AG. do not support the holding in Davenport. In A.G., the following language described the effect of an omitted affirmative defense:

“As the Alabama Supreme Court explained in Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C., 881 So.2d 1013 (Ala.2003):
“ ‘Nonetheless, this Court will affirm the trial court on any valid legal ground presented by the record, regardless of whether that ground was considered, or even if it was rejected, by the trial court. Ex parte Ryals, 773 So.2d 1011 (Ala.2000), citing Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So.2d 1071 (Ala.1999), and Smith v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So.2d 463 (Ala.1988). This rule fails in application only where due-process constraints require some notice at the trial level, which was omitted, of the basis that would otherwise support an affirmance, such as when a totally omitted affirmative defense might, if available for consideration, suffice to affirm a judgment, Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Bentley, 851 So.2d 458 (Ala.2002),
881 So.2d at 1020.”

A.G., 989 So.2d at 1180-1181 (emphasis added). Therefore, A.G. reaffirmed the principles that an unpleaded affirmative defense may not be applied by an appellate court sua sponte to affirm a trial court’s dismissal of an ordinary civil case. Ex parte Clemons modified that rule in Rule 32 cases, allowing an appellate court to affirm a circuit court’s judgment on the basis of an omitted affirmative defense when the appellate court finds that extraordinary circumstances exist.

Davenport applied a questionable rationale to circumvent the limitation in Ex parte Clemons on this Court’s authority to sua sponte apply procedural bars without conducting the required extraordinary-circumstances analysis. However, the rationale employed in Davenport allows precisely what Ex parte Clemons prohibits, as does the majority’s analysis of the effect of a lack of waiver by the State in this case. Under Davenport, a petitioner may be denied relief on a procedural ground that is applied for the first time by this Court during appellate review without consideration of the extraordinary circumstances, delineated in Ex parte Clemons, which allow an appellate court to sua sponte apply a procedural bar. Thus, the petitioner is denied notice and an opportunity to rebut the procedural ground in the circuit court. The rationale set forth in Davenport circumvents the Alabama Supreme Court’s prohibition against this Court’s sua sponte application of procedural bars and denies a petitioner due process.

Although I believe that Davenport should be overruled, this does not mean that this Court cannot sua sponte apply procedural bars. However, to do so this Court must act in compliance with the method set out in Ex parte Clemons, by examining the circumstances in the record of the case, and by determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist that justify sua sponte application of a procedural bar. In the next section of this special writing I conduct that analysis.

II.

Extraordinary-Circumstances Analysis required by Ex parte Clemons

Had the majority conducted an extraordinary-circumstances analysis, it could have examined this case in light of the factors listed in Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d 729 (2d Cir.1998), set out in Ex parte Clemons:

“In Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d 729, 732-33 (2d Cir.1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with this issue in considerable detail:
“‘We may, nevertheless, raise these issues [not asserted below by the government] sua sponte. See, e.g., United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir.1998); See also Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1448 (2d Cir.1993) (raising defendant’s procedural default sua sponte on state prisoner’s § 2254 petition). We believe that consideration of these issues is appropriate here for three reasons.
“‘First, it is necessary to protect the finality of federal criminal judgments. See United States v. Allen, 16 F.3d 377, 379 n. 2 (10th Cir.1994) (“the important interests served by the principle of finality [of criminal judgments] cannot always be foreclosed by waiver”); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). Raising the issue of defendants’ procedural default is particularly appropriate where, as here, the movants pled guilty. We recognize that “the concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.” United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979); see Bousley [v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621], 118 S.Ct. [1604] at 1610[, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) ]. “The impact of inroads on finality is greatest in the context of guilty pleas because the vast majority of criminal convictions result from such pleas and because the concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant is only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea.” Lucas v. United States, 963 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir.1992) (internal quotation omitted).
“ ‘In addition, the unique circumstances of this case compel the conclusion that the government was not blameworthy in failing to raise this issue. Because dictum in Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 369 n. 8 (2d Cir.1997), indicated that a § 2255 movant’s Bailey [v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995),] claim could easily hurdle a procedural bar challenge, the government may well have concluded that it would be subject to criticism for raising a frivolous argument. It was only in May 1998 — one month after the government submitted its brief in this appeal — that the Supreme Court suggested in Bousley that the Triestman dictum might be incorrect. See De Jesus v. United States, 161 F.3d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir.1998).
“ ‘Finally, the procedural default is manifest from the record and, hence, resolution of this defense does not require further fact-finding. Thus, additional scarce judicial resources need not be expended by remanding this case to the district court. See Washington, 996 F.2d at 1449.
“ ‘Granted, appellate courts should not lightly raise the issue of a defendant’s procedural default sua sponte. We are aware that prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief lack the resources available to the government. We should hesitate to lend the weight of the judiciary to this already uneven fight, lest we be cast in the role of a second line of defense, protecting government prosecutors from their errors. We are satisfied, however, that this appeal warrants the exercise of our inherent power to raise the previously unaddressed issue. We now turn to it.’
164 F.3d at 732-33.”

55 So.3d at 354-55.

When determining whether to apply procedural bars sua sponte, appellate courts seek to protect the finality of criminal judgments by balancing the need for finality against a concomitant concern that deserving petitioners should be given relief in appropriate cases where justice may not have been done. These extraordinary circumstances are: The first circumstance to consider is whether the conviction was obtained by a guilty plea. A “concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant is only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea.” 164 F.3d at 732-33. Second, the degree of blameworthiness of the State in failing to raise the omitted procedural bar should be considered. Id. And, third, an appellate court should consider whether the procedural default is manifest from the record, which would mean that resolution of the affirmative defense does not require further fact-finding. Id.

An analysis of the procedural history of this case and the claims made leads to the conclusion that this Court may properly affirm the trial court’s denial of relief by sua sponte applying the procedural bars raised by the State for the first time on appeal.

Evaluating the first factor — whether the petitioner’s conviction was obtained by a plea of guilty — an examination of the record shows that McLeod’s convictions were a result of a jury trial. The importance of preserving the finality of criminal judgments allows sua sponte application of an unpleaded procedural bar more readily in cases in which the petitioner pleaded guilty and there is no indication that “unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant.” See Lucas v. United States, 963 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir.1992). This circumstance does not favor preserving the finality of the criminal judgment in this case, and militates against the sua sponte application of the procedural bars raised by the State on appeal.

Concerning the second factor — the blameworthiness of the State in failing to raise the procedural bar in the circuit court — an examination of the record reveals that the State was blameless in failing to raise procedural bars in the circuit court. Rule 32.7(a) allows the State to file its response “[wjithin thirty (30) days after the service of the petition, or within the time otherwise specified by the court.” The circuit court did not afford the State 30 days nor specify a shorter time for the State’s response to be filed before it summarily denied McLeod’s pleading. The State had no opportunity to respond before the denial. This circumstance does favor preserving the finality of the criminal judgments in this case and indicates that the sua sponte application of the procedural bars raised by the State on appeal should be allowed.

Regarding the third factor — whether the procedural default is manifest from the record and whether resolution of the procedural bar as an affirmative defense requires further fact-finding — the pleadings in the record show that the claims made by McLeod are not jurisdictional claims and that they were untimely. It is also worthy of note that McLeod has filed at least five previous postconviction petitions and could have presented his claims before the limitations period of Rule 32.2(c) expired. The claim that the prosecutor knowingly failed to reveal the criminal history of some veniremembers was a successive claim and was also precluded by Rule 32.2(b). This Court need not remand this case to the circuit court because an examination of the claims, together with the text of Rule 32 and relevant caselaw, shows that they are precluded. No additional facts could be proven in the circuit court that would prevent the application of the procedural bars raised by the State on appeal. This circumstance does favor preserving the finality of the criminal judgments in this case and indicates that the sua sponte application of the procedural bars raised by the State on appeal should be allowed.

After balancing the factors discussed above, I am of the opinion that those extraordinary circumstances in favor of sua sponte applying the procedural bars of Rules 32.2(b) and 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., by this Court outweigh the one circumstance indicating that such an application should not be made. I would find that the extraordinary circumstances set forth in Ex parte Clemons do exist and that it is proper for this Court to sua sponte apply the procedural bars raised by the State for the first time on appeal. However, to affirm the circuit court’s judgment solely on the basis that no waiver by the State in the circuit court had occurred ignores the other Ex parte Clemons extraordinary circumstances and the plain mandate of that case.

Conclusion

The holding in Ex parte Clemons put in force due-process principles to prohibit this Court from sua sponte applying procedural bars that were not pleaded by the State in the circuit court, unless this Court finds that extraordinary circumstances exist that, on balance, allow sua sponte application of a procedural bar. The majority opinion establishes a completely new principle that if the State did not waive an affirmative defense because it had no opportunity to assert one, but does present the affirmative defense in its appellate brief, then this Court may, by solely considering that one circumstance, sua sponte apply that affirmative defense to affirm the judgment of the circuit court. This holding runs afoul of the prohibitions in Ex parte Clemons.

Additionally, because the holding in Davenport erroneously deprives a petitioner of the due process afforded by Ex parte Clemons, I believe that Davenport should be overruled. Finally, only by using an extraordinary-circumstances analysis can the denial of relief by the circuit court be affirmed on preclusionary grounds in a case where preclusionary grounds were not asserted or applied in the circuit court. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the result reached by the majority.

      . Claims (1) and (2) relate to specific jurors, whereas claim (3) relates to all the jurors.

      . The circuit court properly treated McLeod’s filing as a Rule 32 petition. State v. Murphy, 1 So.3d 1084, 1087 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (holding that a court must treat a filing according to its substance and not its style). This Rule 32 petition is at least McLeod’s fifth postconviction petition challenging his May 1989 convictions for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. See McLeod v. State (Ms. CR-09-0884), 84 So.3d 1021 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (table).

      .This Court is not applying procedural bars sua sponte. Black’s Law Dictionary 1560 (9th ed.2009) (defining "sua sponte” as acting "[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own motion”).

      . Sua sponte is a term of art. As I will discuss later in this opinion, in Ex parte Clemons, the term sua sponte was used to mean that an appellate court cannot, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, apply a procedural bar that was not raised by the State in the circuit court.

      . I concurred in Davenport but have now determined that the rationale used in that case was erroneous. See Walker v. State, 62 So.3d 601, 603 (Ala.Crim.App.2009)(Welch, J., dissenting).

      . McLeod appealed his convictions. McLeod’s convictions occurred before Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., was amended to change the limitations period from two years to one year. His first claim untimely alleged that he had newly discovered juror misconduct.

      . Davenport has not been followed by this Court in any subsequent case. It has been cited as authority in only one case, and then only for the unquestioned proposition that a

      “4Because the circuit court did not require a response from the State, the due process considerations discussed in Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d 348 (Ala.2007), are not implicated in this case. See A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d 1167 (Ala.Crim.App.2007).” circuit court may summarily dismiss a petition absent a response by the State. Beckworth v. State, [Ms. CR-07-0051, May 1, 2009] - So.3d - (Ala.Crim.App.2009).

      . In this case the circuit court did not specify any reason for denying relief. Whether a circuit court may expressly apply a preclu-sionary bar to deny relief after the State has responded, and failed to assert that bar, or in the absence of a response by the State is not before us.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. BENTON, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Clare CALDWELL, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ELDER AFFAIRS, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-163.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 22, 2013.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 2013.
    Marie A. Mattox of Marie A. Mattox, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Donald L. Bell, General Counsel, and Scott W. Foltz, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Clare Caldwell appeals the dismissal of her complaint by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) based on its conclusion that it lacked statutory authority under the Whistle-blower’s Act to investigate the complaint. Caldwell asserts that the Commission was not authorized to dismiss her complaint, but rather was obligated conduct the investigatory and fact-finding functions set forth in the Whistle-blower’s Act, sections 112.3187-31895, Florida Statutes. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Commission’s dismissal of Caldwell’s complaint.

Facts

Caldwell was employed by the Florida Department of Elder Affairs (Department). Her employment was terminated on September 2, 2011. On October 18, 2011, Caldwell filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that her termination violated the Whistle-blower’s Act. Caldwell asserted that during an investigation of the Department by the Federal Administration on Aging, she “contact[ed] by telephone the Federal Investigator to alert him to the condition of the Ombudsman program and the gross misfeasance and malfeasance that were occurring within.”

On December 2, 2011, by letter issued to Caldwell in care of her attorney, the Commission notified Caldwell that it had determined that it lacked jurisdiction to investigate her complaint because she failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted under the Whistle-blower’s Act:

The Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) has reviewed your charge form, alleging the Florida Department of Elder Affairs retaliated against you in violation of the Florida Public “Whistle-blower’s Act (Act), §§ 112.3187-112.31895, Florida Statutes (2011). A Commission representative also contacted you by telephone and obtained clarification of your allegations. Having taken all the information you provided into account, the Commission has determined your allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Wdiistle-blower’s Act. Specifically, you did not engage in a protected activity as defined by the Act.
Accordingly, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to investigate this claim. §§ 112.3187-112.31895, Florida Statutes (2011).

The Commission informed Caldwell that she had the right to seek judicial review of this decision. Caldwell timely filed a notice of appeal.

Analysis

Our review of the Commission’s action begins “with the usual recognition of deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged to administer.” Big Bend Hospice, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 904 So.2d 610, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (quoting Cone v. State, Dep’t of Health, 886 So.2d 1007, 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)).

The Commission’s authority to investigate whistle-blower complaints is set forth in section 112.31895, Florida Statutes. This section provides that the Commission shall receive any allegation of “personnel action prohibited by s. 112.3187 ... and conduct informal fact finding regarding any allegation under this section .... ” § 112.31895(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011)(emphasis added). Section 112.3187, Florida Statutes, in turn, prohibits an employer from taking retaliatory action against an employee who discloses information of a specified nature and discloses that information in a specified manner. The Act protects information disclosed about “[a]ny act or suspected act of gross mismanagement, malfeasance, gross waste of public funds, suspected or actual Medicaid fraud or abuse, or gross neglect of duty committed by an employee or agent of an agency or independent contractor.” § 112.3187(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Moreover, a whistle-blower complaint is considered sufficient only if it “is sufficiently precise to identify the parties and to describe generally the action or practice complained of.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y-5.001(6)(b).

Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, Caldwell’s complaint failed to meet the pleading requirements to trigger an investigation. In her complaint, Caldwell alleged that she contacted a federal investigator “to alert him to the condition of the Ombudsman program and the gross misfeasance and malfeasance that were occurring within.” These conclusory allegations fail to describe any act or suspected act of misfeasance or malfeasance; thus, Caldwell failed to plead the prima facie elements necessary to initiate the operation of the Act. Stanton v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, — So.3d -, -, 2013 WL 466280, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D325, D326 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 8, 2013) (holding that conclusory allegations of retaliation were insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements the Act).

In her Initial Brief, Caldwell twice states that she was never allowed to amend her claim to cure any deficiency. These two isolated references constitute Caldwell’s entire argument that she should have been allowed an opportunity to amend her complaint before dismissal. These perfunctory statements are insufficient to present an argument for appellate review. See Shere v. State, 742 So.2d 215, 217 n. 6 (Fla.1999) (recognizing that an issue raised in a brief without argument is insufficiently presented for review); Coolen v. State, 696 So.2d 738, 742 n. 2 (Fla.1997) (finding that raising an argument in a footnote without fully briefing the issue constituted waiver of that argument); Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1990) (“The purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal. Merely making reference to arguments below without further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues, and these claims are deemed to have been waived.”); Stanton, — So.3d at -, 38 Fla. L. Weekly at D325 (finding that a perfunctory argument without any supporting argument or authority will not be addressed on appeal); Hammond v. State, 34 So.3d 58, 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Claims for which an appellant has not presented an argument, or for which he provides only conclusory argument, are insufficiently presented for review and are waived.”); Henderson v. State, 569 So.2d 925, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“In view of the perfunctory argument made by appellant and the state’s justifiable lack of response, we decline to consider the constitutional validity of this new provision in the statute for the reason that it has not been properly preserved and presented for review on this appeal.”). There mere fact that Caldwell further explained this argument in her Reply Brief does not revive this argument.

We, therefore, conclude that the Commission properly exercised its inherent authority to dismiss Caldwell’s complaint. See Robinson v. Dep’t of Health, 89 So.3d 1079, 1082-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that the Commission had the inherent authority to dismiss an untimely whistle-blower’s complaint because such authority was “necessarily incident to the power to review timely complaints”).

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS and ROWE, JJ., concur; BENTON, C.J., dissents with opinion.

BENTON, C.J.,

dissenting.

Under governing statutes and rules, the Commission’s role is to investigate public sector whistleblowers’ complaints and to advocate for public employee whistleblow-ers who have been subjected to retaliation. In the present case, the Commission failed to fulfill its roles as investigator and advocate, and acted instead as judge, jury and executioner. The express “intent of the Legislature [is] to prevent agencies ... from taking retaliatory action against any person who discloses information to an appropriate agency alleging improper use of governmental office, gross waste of funds, or any other abuse or gross neglect of duty on the part of an agency, public official, or employee.” § 112.3187(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). Because the court today puts its imprimatur on the Commission’s arbitrary halt to the process the Legislature put in place to accomplish its intent, I respectfully dissent.

The Legislature has authorized whistle-blowers to sue in circuit court or to seek administrative relief in proceedings at the Public Employer Relations Commission (PERC), and has not given the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission or FCHR) the power to stop them from doing so:

The Whistle-blower’s Act provides a statutory cause of action for employees of state agencies, among others, who face adverse personnel action as a result of certain protected activities. §§ 112.3187(8)(a); 112.31895(4)(a). Employees of state agencies may seek the relief provided under the Act through either circuit court or the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC). §§ 112.3187(8)(a); 112.31895(4)(a). However, the Act provides certain prerequisites to the filing of an action in either circuit court or with PERC. §§ 112.3187; 112.31895.

Robinson v. Dep’t of Health, 89 So.3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), review denied, No. SC12-1447, 2012 WL 6757547 (Fla. Dec. 28, 2012). Before a public employee may seek relief in either forum, the Legislature has directed that the FCHR investigate the matter and take appropriate action, including attempting to “conciliate a complaint.” § 112.31895(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011). The complainant may then elect to pursue judicial remedies or file for relief with PERC.

The Commission’s investigation is meant to be but the first step in the process. Only if the complaint is filed out of time or falls outside the Commission’s investigatory jurisdiction is dismissal by the Commission appropriate. Otherwise, the Legislature has provided that the Commission shall conduct an investigation. “Upon termination of any investigation, the Florida Commission on Human Relations shall notify the complainant and the agency head of the termination of the investigation, providing a summary of relevant facts found during the investigation and the reasons for terminating the investigation.” § 112.31895(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011).

Our supreme court has been very clear that the public Whistle-blower’s Act should be construed broadly so “protections of the Whistle-Blower’s Act” are given full effect:

For example, the Act provides that an employee may bring an action when the whistle-blowing concerns “[a]ny ... suspected violation of any ... law, rule, or regulation committed by an employee or agent of an agency,” or with respect to “[a]ny ... suspected act of ... misfeasance ... or gross neglect of duty committed by an employee or agent of an agency.” § 112.8187(5), Fla. Stat. (1993). If the plain meaning of this section leaves any doubt as to the inclusiveness of this right of action and the broad protections afforded, the Legislature also provided that it is “the intent of the Legislature to prevent agencies ... from taking retaliatory action against any person who discloses information to an appropriate agency alleging improper use of governmental office ... or any other abuse ... on the part of an agency, public officer, or employee.” § 112.3187(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). The statute could not have been more broadly worded.

Irven v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 790 So.2d 403, 406 (Fla.2001) (emphasis supplied). Today’s decision construes the Act narrowly, and significantly diminishes its protections.

In the present case, Clare Caldwell filed with the FCHR a form Whistle-Blower Retaliation Charge of Discrimination in which she alleged that she was fired as an employee of the Florida Department of Elder Affairs (FDEA) for, among other things, cooperating with a federal investigation looking into (and ultimately critical of) FDEA by informing the federal investigator of gross misfeasance and malfeasance in the FDEA’s ombudsman program. In a letter somebody named Wilson signed for an FCHR co-executive director, the Commission announced it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to investigate” on grounds Ms. Caldwell “did not engage in a protected activity as defined by the Act.” Unable to pursue relief either in circuit court or at PERC under our recent precedent, see Robinson, 89 So.3d at 1081 (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, including judicial review), Ms. Caldwell brought the present appeal.

In her initial brief, Ms. Caldwell paints a picture of wholesale dereliction in alleging that FCHR mishandled her complaint, arguing, among other things:

FCHR failed to properly notify the other party of receipt of the charge within three working days as required under § 112.31895(l)(b). FCHR failed to conduct the fact finding investigation required under § 112.31895(2). FCHR failed to attempt to conciliate within 60 days as required under § 112.31895(3)(d). FCHR faded to notify Caldwell of her option to file a civil suit or an administrative appeal as required under § 112.3187(8). Instead, it improperly and illegally dismissed her complaint less than two months after it was filed....
Public supervisory officials misapplying the law and interfering with the State Ombudsman is illegal and would also constitute “gross mismanagement” and/or “gross neglect of duty” under § 112.3187(5)(b), Florida Statutes. In a broader sense, what Caldwell complained about was the illegal interference with the State Ombudsman in the performance of his job duties which was a violation of both state and federal law.
Caldwell never got the chance to amend her claim if it was deficient. She never got the chance to offer proof of her claims. She never got the chance to show that the actions of which she complained were illegal. This is in contrast to the holding[s in cited cases].

Initial Brief, 6, 15 (footnote omitted). She argues that FCHR’s dismissal should be reversed, with directions to issue a notice of termination of investigation instead.

The public sector Whistle-blower Act is remedial in nature, a “ ‘remedial statute designed to encourage the elimination of public corruption by protecting public employees who “blow the whistle.” As a remedial act, the statute should be construed liberally in favor of granting access to the remedy.’ ” Irven, 790 So.2d at 405 (quoting Martin Cnty. v. Edenfield, 609 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla.1992)). FCHR’s cryptic letter is an unauthorized impediment to Ms. Caldwell’s pursuing her Whistle-blower claims, whether in circuit court or at PERC, at her election. In either of these forums, of course, she may plead (and the presiding officer may require her to plead) with more specificity. See, e.g., Bohannon v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 983 So.2d 717, 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (affirming judgment dismissing amended complaint in circuit court at the instance of Florida Department of Elder Affairs). But she should not be prevented from filing in circuit court or at PERC.

The present case can be distinguished from Tillery v. Fla. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 104 So.3d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), where the complaint failed “to allege when or to whom [Tillery] made [alleged] whistle-blower disclosures,” claimed as the bases for retaliation. Because “his complaint d[id] not meet the prima facie elements necessary to initiate operation of the Act,” the court ruled “the Commission, which can only investigate claims covered by the Act, had no statutory authority to proceed.” Id. Perhaps less readily the present case can also be distinguished from Stanton v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, — So.3d -, -, 2013 WL 466280, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D325, D325 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 8, 2013), where the court affirmed FCHR’s dismissal of a whistleblower’s complaint because it contained “only conclusory allegations of retaliation.” Id.

In the present case, Ms. Caldwell alleged she informed a federal investigator “[o]n approximately April 15, 2011,” after the Federal Administration on Aging initiated an investigation of her employer FDEA, of “the condition of the [FDEA] Ombudsman program and the gross misfeasance and malfeasance that were occurring within,” and was terminated as “a direct result.” The majority opinion complains that “gross misfeasance and malfeasance” could have been identified with more specificity. But there is absolutely no reason on this record to conclude that the gross misfeasance and malfeasance that Ms. Caldwell alleged lie outside FCHR’s investigatory jurisdiction. Interfering with the duties of the State Ombudsman is, moreover, a violation of criminal law. § 400.0083, Fla. Stat. (2011).

FCHR’s summary denial of Ms. Caldwell’s rights to pursue her whistleblower claim took place despite the fact she had no opportunity to amend her complaint, even though Rule 60Y-5.001, Florida Administrative Code, provides:

(7) Amendments.
(a) A complaint may be reasonably and fairly amended within 60 days after filing and, thereafter, for good cause with the consent of the Executive Director.
(b) A complaint may be amended to cure technical defects, or omissions, including verification, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments which describe an additional unlawful employment practice related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original complaint will relate back to the date the complaint was first received.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y-5.001(7)(a)-(b). FCHR’s summary denial violated its own rules and the governing statute, and arbitrarily brought to an end Ms. Caldwell’s efforts to obtain redress for the discharge she alleged was in retaliation for her cooperation with an official investigation into a state agency’s gross misfeasance and malfeasance.

The majority opinion fails to address the fact that Ms. Caldwell was denied any opportunity to amend her complaint partly on grounds “it was not raised until the reply brief.” Ante p. 1064 n. 2. The record in the present case belies this assertion. In her initial brief she argued, “Caldwell never got the chance to amend her claim if it has defects.” More importantly, the majority opinion turns a blind eye to appellant’s larger point altogether. Under the statutory scheme, a public employee is entitled to litigate a claim that she was fired because she made protected disclosures. If the public employee elects circuit court, whether her disclosures were protected may be a question of fact for the jury. See Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 853 So.2d 1125, 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Except possibly for our problematic recent precedent, see Stanton; Tillery, the FCHR has no basis in a case like the present one to keep the question not only from the jury, but from the judge, as well.

Where public employees file timely, col-orable claims that they were fired in violation of the Whistle-blower’s Act, FCHR’s function is to investigate these claims, take action on behalf of affected public employees where appropriate, “conciliate” cases where possible, and then terminate the investigation, after preparing reports containing findings of fact. Thereafter, whether the FCHR decides there is reasonable cause to suspect a violation or not, the public employee has the right under the statute to seek an adjudication of her claim, either at PERC or in circuit court, at her election. FCHR’s summary truncation of the process, and today’s decision upholding FCHR’s still essentially unexplained action, have deprived Clare Caldwell of her right to proceed under the statute.

Even when authorized by statute or rule, dismissal is an extreme sanction “appropriate ... only in the most exceptional cases.” See A Professional Nurse, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 519 So.2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (deeming prohibition against presenting evidence (because of discovery violation) “as severe as dismissal”). PERC’s denial of Mr. Mathis’s petition had the effect of dismissal because, if permitted to stand, the order would end the case, without any consideration of the merits of the claim.

Mathis v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 726 So.2d 389, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). No rule or statute authorizes FCHR’s dismissal in the present case. At this point in the proceedings, we should “remand and reverse this matter to the Florida Human Relations Commission (Commission) to make ... factual and legal determinations” and issue a notice of termination of investigation. Mena v. Lifemark Hospitals of Florida, Inc., 50 So.3d 759, 760-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (reversing FCHR investigatory determination where it was “not clear how the Commission reached this result”).

We should at the very least certify a question of great public importance along the following lines:

WHETHER THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS AUTHORIZED TO DISMISS SUMMARILY A TIMELY WHISTLEBLOWER’S COMPLAINT FILED BY A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE WHERE IT DEEMS THE COMPLAINT “CONCLUSORY” OR LACKING IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL OR SPECIFICITY, ALTHOUGH THE WHISTLEBLOWER’S COMPLAINT ALLEGES THAT A STATE AGENCY DISMISSED HER AS THE DIRECT RESULT OF HER HAVING DISCLOSED A STATE AGENCY’S GROSS MISFEASANCE AND MALFEASANCE TO FEDERAL INVESTIGATORS?

      . The dissent argues that Tillery and Stanton do not control the outcome of this case because they are distinguishable. In Tillery, the complaint was insufficiently pled because there was no allegation as to when or to whom the complainant made the whistler-blower disclosures. In Stanton, the complaint was insufficiently pled because the alie-gations of retaliation were conclusory and it was unclear that the disclosure was made to a proper party. In this case, the complaint was insufficiently pled because the allegations of misfeasance and malfeasance were concluso-ry. All three complaints suffered from different pleading deficiencies; however, the result is the same in that they failed to plead the prima facie elements necessary to trigger the operation of the Act. Thus, contrary to the assertions set forth in the dissent, this case is controlled by the general principles set out in Tillery and Stanton.

      . As we have previously held, an argument may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Tillery, 104 So.3d at 1255, Hall v. State, 823 So.2d 757, 763 (Fla.2002); Coolen v. State, 696 So.2d 738, 742 n. 2 (Fla.1997); Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1990); Goings v. State, 76 So.3d 975, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Mathis v. Dep’t of Corrections, 726 So.2d 389, 392 n. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

      . The Commission's investigatory jurisdiction is broader than the range of claims for which a court or PERC may order relief for a complainant. The FCHR has jurisdiction to “[c]onduct an investigation, [even] in the absence of an allegation, to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that a prohibited action or a pattern of prohibited action has occurred, is occurring, or is to be taken.” § 112.31895(3)(a)(10), Fla. Stat. (2011).

      . Describing herself as “Plaintiff,” she alleged:
      Plaintiff was originally hired by Defendant on March 17, 2003 and held the position of South Regional Ombudsman at the time of her termination. In early February, 2011, the State Ombudsman, Brian Lee, was terminated/forced to resign by the Defendant for which Mr. Lee has an ongoing lawsuit against the Defendant. Plaintiff was a supporter of Mr. Lee’s and feels that her working relationship with him, was not looked upon favorably by the Defendant. In February, 2011 the Defendant appointed Aubrey Posey, the Programs Legal Advocate, to interim State Ombudsman. A Federal Investigation was initiated by the Federal Administration on Aging. In late March or early April, 2011, Plaintiff sent an email to her staff with a copy to her Supervisor, preparing them for this Federal Investigation. Plaintiff’s supervisor immediately contacted Plaintiff about this email and Plaintiff retracted it. On approximately April 15, 2011, Plaintiff contact [sic] by telephone the Federal Investigator to alert him to the condition of the Ombudsman program and the gross misfeasance and malfeasance that were occurring within. During a May 6, 2011 State Council meeting, Plaintiff spoke up about the needed independence of the Ombudsman Program for the benefit to the people it served. Around the end of August, 2011, the Federal Report from the Administration on Aging was issued to the Defendant which was critical of the Defendant. On September 2, 2011, Plaintiff received a hand delivered termination letter with an immediate effective date of termination of September 2, 2011, and no reason given for her termination. Plaintiff’s termination is a direct result of her prior Whistle Blower reporting. Plaintiff demands the full relief to which she is entitled under the laws applicable to this action.

      . The body of the letter reads in its entirety:
      The Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) has reviewed your charge form, alleging the Florida Department of Elder Affairs retaliated against you in violation of the Florida Public Whistleblower’s Act (Act), §§ 112.3187-112.31895, Florida Statutes (2011). A Commission representative also contacted you by telephone and obtained clarification of your allegations. Having taken all the information you provided into account, the Commission has determined your allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Whistle-blower’s Act. Specifically, you did not engage in a protected activity as defined by the Act.
      Accordingly, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to investigate this claim. §§ 112.3187-112.31895, Florida Statutes (2011).

      . The Robinson Court said “[ojnce a complainant receives a notice of termination of investigation, he or she may elect either to file a complaint with PERC within sixty days or to file a civil action within 180 days. §§ 112.3187, 112.31895(4)(a). If FCHR issues a final order, rather than a notice of termination of investigation, the final order is subject to judicial review under section 120.68, Florida Statutes, as provided in section 112.31895(4)(b).” Robinson v. Dep’t of Health, 89 So.3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), review denied, No. SC12-1447, 2012 WL 6757547 (Fla. Dec. 28, 2012).
      Although FCHR can be said to have investigated (by making a single phone call to Ms. Caldwell), it never gave notice of termination of investigation, dismissing the complaint instead. Ms. Caldwell was obliged to appeal under Robinson and, by the time her appeal concludes, the 60- and 180-day time periods will have run. Only if the court reversed with directions that FCHR investigate and/or, having investigated, give notice of termination of investigation would the clock be restarted. It is too late to start over. An affected public employee "may file a complaint alleging a prohibited personnel action ... [with FCHR] no later than 60 days after the prohibited personnel action.” § 112.31895(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011).

      . Our approach in Tillery v. Florida Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 104 So.3d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) differs from federal employment law which contains analogous requirements for filing charges with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). For example, because the EEOC has primary responsibility for enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the ADEA requires that prospective plaintiff employees notify the EEOC before proceeding to litigation on their own. "The purpose of the notice requirement is to provide the EEOC with sufficient information so that it may notify prospective defendants and to provide the EEOC with an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practice through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.” Kristine C. Karnezis, Annotation, Sufficiency of Contents of Notice to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Charging Violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 27 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 367 (2008).
      A complainant alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII is required to file a "charge of discrimination” with the EEOC which triggers the investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the EEOC. See Davis v. Sodexho, Cumberland Coll. Cafeteria, 157 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1998). The purpose of the notice requirement is to "initiate an investigation into the allegations and allow the EEOC to attempt informal means of resolving the dispute.” Karnezis, supra. The Supreme Court has held that what constitutes such a charge must be liberally construed "to protect the employee’s rights and statutory remedies.” Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 406, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008). The Court laid down this commonsense functional standard for determining whether a filing qualifies as a "charge”:
      In addition to the information required by the regulations, i.e., an allegation and the name of the charged parly, if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee.

        Id. at 402. The Court explained that "the filing must be examined from the standpoint of an objective observer to determine whether, by a reasonable construction of its terms, the filer requests the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes[J” Id. The Court subsequently held that complainant's "Intake Questionnaire,” together with an affidavit, constituted a "charge of discrimination” sufficient to trigger EEOC's investigative jurisdiction. Complainant’s failure to fill out and submit "Form 5,” labeled "Charge of Discrimination” was not fatal to her case. Id. at 405. In the present case, of course, Ms. Caldwell did fill out and submit a form charging discrimination.
      In Butler v. Cleburne County Comm'n, No. 1:10-cv-25 61-PWG, 2012 WL 2357740 (N.D.Ala. Jan. 17, 2012), approved, 2012 WL 2357741 (N.D.Ala. June 14, 2012), the court held that even where the Plaintiff did not file EEOC’s official Form 5, "Charge of Discrimination,” her letter to the EEOC sufficed as a charge. This letter stated in relevant part, "I wish to file a charge of discrimination against my former employers, the Cleburne County Water Authority and the Cleburne County Commission,” and was accompanied by a letter from her counsel. Id. at *9. The court held
      The documents Plaintiff faxed to the EEOC in December 2008 unambiguously requested the agency to act on them as a charge of discrimination, and her later charge filed on January 28, 2008 does not alter that fact. The ADEA claims are not due to be dismissed on the ground that Plaintiff failed to file a timely EEOC charge.

        Id. at *12. In the present case, Ms. Caldwell filed a form entitled WHISTLE-BLOWER RETALIATION CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION and thereby "request[ed] to be afforded full relief to which I am entitled.”
      In Holender v. Mut. Indus. N. Inc., 527 F.3d 352, 353 (3d Cir.2008), complainant filed a "charge” form but failed to check the box on the form next to the statement "I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency, if any.” Nor was the form notarized. The Third Circuit held this to be sufficient. Id. Nor was the Third Circuit troubled by the fact that complainant refused to respond to EEOC’s requests for further information after the submission of his charge form. Id. at 354; 357. Similarly, in Crevier-Gerukos v. Eisai, Inc., CIV.A. H-11-0434, 2012 WL 681723 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 29, 2012), the court held that when complainant checked the box on an “intake questionnaire” that stated "I want to file a charge of discrimination, and I authorize the EEOC to look into the discrimination I described above,” an objective observer would interpret this as a request to file a charge, which therefore qualified as a "charge.” The court noted that the intake questionnaire was unverified and unsigned. Id. at *7-9. See also Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., Inc., 643 F.3d 502, 509 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that complainant’s initial charge could be amended); Fava-Crockett v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 08CV0196, 2008 WL 1925099, at *1-3 (W.D.Pa. Apr. 29, 2008).

      . Under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), which differs from Florida’s law in important respects but which also has administrative exhaustion requirements that must be met before a public employee is entitled to an adjudication, a public employee need only allege reprisal as the result of disclosures within the purview of the WPA:
      At the jurisdictional threshold, however, the employee’s burden is significantly lower: for individual right of action appeals “the Board's jurisdiction is established by non-frivolous allegations that the [employee] made a protected disclosure that was a contributing factor to the personnel action taken or proposed.” Stoyanov v. Dep’t of the Navy, 474 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citing Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2006) (en banc)). Thus, Johnston could establish a jurisdictional predicate for her claims by making non-frivolous allegations that: (1) her disclosures were within the purview of the WPA, and (2) she suffered reprisal in the wake of these disclosures.

        Johnston v. Merit Sys. Prat. Bd., 518 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed.Cir.2008). See generally Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, Div. of Real Estate v. Toledo Realty, Inc., 549 So.2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (holding that a state statute modeled after a federal statute "will take the same construction in the Florida courts as its prototype has been given in the federal courts, insofar as such construction is harmonious with the spirit and policy of Florida legislation on the subject”).

      . Even in an adjudicatory context, Ms. Caldwell's complaint would suffice to invoke a tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Johnston, 518 F.3d at 909 ("There is a fundamental distinction between the requirements necessary to prevail on the merits of a WPA claim and those sufficient to establish board jurisdiction.”). Failure to state a claim does not divest a court (or an adjudicatory agency like PERC) of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Health & Welfare Fund of Ne. Pa., 285 F.Supp.2d 573, 578 (M.D.Pa.2003) ("The fundamental misapprehension of defendant’s argument is a failure to appreciate that, while subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to finding a valid cause of action, a valid cause of action is not a prerequisite to finding subject matter jurisdiction.”). See also Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 116-17 (2d Cir.2003) (a lack of RICO standing does not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the action, because RICO standing, unlike other standing doctrines, is sufficiently intertwined with the merits); Asco-Falcon II Shipping Co. v. United States, 32 Fed.Cl. 595, 605 (Fed.Cl.1994) ("The fact that the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, therefore, does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the counterclaim at bar.”); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 542, 544 n. 2 (Cl.Ct.1991) ("Dismissal of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to RUSCC 12(b)(4) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted does not divest the court of jurisdiction to hear defendant's counterclaim.”); Mayer v. Mayer, 11-CV-6385 (ENV)(SMG), 2012 WL 441182, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2012) (same); Rhodes v. U.S. I.R.S., 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-7438 (D.Ariz.2010) (holding that a pleading or factual deficiency “would at most be grounds to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, and would not divest the Court of jurisdiction to decide the merits”); Freeman v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 115 Idaho 78, 764 P.2d 445, 446 (Idaho Ct.App.1988) ("[A]n error in pleading does not divest the court of jurisdiction to examine the merits of the underlying claim.”).

      . She expanded on the argument she raised in her initial brief by arguing in her reply brief as follows:
      But more importantly, Appellee ignores Rule 60Y-11.005, entitled "Relationship of Other Rules.” This rule, in its entirety, states:
      “Other rules adopted by the Commission, namely Chapters 60Y-3, 60Y-4 and 60Y-5, F.A.C., shall be the rules governing a proceeding under this chapter to the extent that such other rules do not contradict a specific provision herein.”
      This rule was promulgated under §§ 112.3187-.31895, Florida Statutes which means that Rule 60Y-5 was adopted as a rule for charges processed by FCHR under the Public Whistle-blower’s Act. Adherence to this Rule is mandated by Rule 60Y-11.005. Rule 60Y-5.001, Florida Administrative Code, states:
      "7) Amendments.
      (a) A complaint may be reasonably and fairly amended within 60 days after filing and, thereafter, for good cause with the consent of the Executive Director.
      (b) A complaint may be amended to cure technical defects, or omissions, including verification, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments which describe an additional unlawful employment practice related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original complaint will relate back to the date the complaint was first received.
      (c) An amendment adding or changing a respondent will relate back to the date the complaint was first received if, within the period provided by subsection (2), the new respondent (i) has received such notice of the filing of the complaint as is sufficient to avoid prejudice in a defense on the merits, and (ii) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity of the proper respondent, the complaint would have been filed against the new respondent.”
      Appellant filed her charge with FCHR on October 19, 2011. Fewer than 60 days later, on December 2, 2011, FCHR dismissed Appellant's charge without even giving her the full time allotted to amend her charge. Thus, Appellant was denied her right to amend under Rule 60Y-5.001 when FCHR dismissed her charge 44 days after it was filed.
      Appellee misunderstands Appellant’s argument. She is not challenging the validity of FCHR’s rules as Appellee argues. [See Answer Brief, pg. 12]. Instead, she is challenging FCHR’s authority under its rules to dismiss a valid charge without investigation or allowing her the opportunity to amend to correct any deficiency.
      The problem is that FCHR, an administrative agency, is simply rejecting valid whistle blower charges, without giving the opportunity to amend, and instructing whistle blowers to just appeal its decisions to this Court. There is no opportunity to amend like under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure in which litigants get multiple opportunities to correct deficient pleadings before they are knocked out of court. There is no record created by FCHR to even determine what could have been alleged if the claimant had been given the opportunity to amend.
      Reply Brief, 3-5 (citations omitted).