text:
    In re Darien LESTER.
    No. 2013-B-2825.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
    See also, 26 So.3d 735.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Darien Lester, a disbarred attorney.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1997. In 2010, this court disbarred respondent for failing to provide competent representation to a client, neglecting legal matters, failing to communicate with clients, failing to refund unearned fees, failing to return a client’s file, issuing checks on accounts containing insufficient funds, failing to timely pay third-party medical providers, converting client and third-party funds to his own use, practicing law while ineligible to do so, attempting to settle a malpractice claim without advising his client to seek independent counsel, engaging in frivolous and vexatious litigation, being found in contempt of court and sanctioned in both state and federal court, engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and failing to cooperate with the ODC in several investigations. In re: Lester, 09-2052 (La.1/29/10), 26 So.3d 735 (“Lester I”).

Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at issue in the present proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES

Count I — The Roque Matter

In January 2007, Stanley Roque retained respondent to handle the succession of his father, paying him $500. Respondent was to draft succession papers and have Mr. Roque sign them and then forward them to Mr. Roque’s niece for her signature. Despite repeated efforts, Mr. Roque was unable to speak with respondent about the case. On April 12, 2007, Mr. Roque sent a letter to respondent discharging him from the representation and requesting a refund.

In June 2007, Mr. Roque filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena for his sworn statement. He failed to appear for the sworn statement as scheduled on September 11, 2007, but did finally respond to the complaint.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee) and 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Count II — The Criminal Matter

On November 9, 2006, respondent was stopped by the Caddo Parish Sheriffs Office for a traffic violation. The deputy suspected that marijuana may be in the vehicle as a hollowed out cigar was in plain sight in the passenger seat. Respondent admitted marijuana was in a box in the vehicle’s console. Furthermore, a canister in the vehicle contained six tablets of hy-drocodone, for which respondent did not have a prescription. Respondent was charged in the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo with possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. To date, respondent has not answered the disciplinary complaint opened by the ODC after his arrest.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.1(c) and 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer).

Count III — The Morris Matter

In May 2008, Bobby Morris retained respondent to handle a parole violation, for which he paid respondent a $2,000 fixed fee. Thereafter, respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Morris about the status of the matter or complete the representation. To date, respondent has not returned any money to Mr. Morris.

In December 2008, Mr. Morris filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena for his sworn statement. Despite being personally served with the subpoena, respondent failed to appear for the sworn statement as scheduled on February 17, 2009.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f)(5), and 8.1(c).

Count IV — The Burns Matter

In April 2009, Vanessa Burns hired respondent to represent her husband in Cad-do Parish on a felony charge of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance. Pursuant to the representation, Mrs. Burns paid respondent’s quoted fee of $1,500. Respondent filed a motion to suppress in the matter, but failed to appear in court for the hearing. Despite repeated efforts, Mrs. Burns was unable to contact respondent. When he finally appeared in court in 2009, respondent admitted that a drug possession charge was pending against him which could pose a conflict of interest if he continued the representation of Mr. Burns.

Thereafter, Mrs. Burns and her husband filed complaints against respondent. Despite being served with a copy of each complaint via certified mail, respondent failed to answer the complaints.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f)(5), 1.8 (conflict of interest), and 8.1(c).

Count V — The Washington Matter

In January 2010, Marie Washington hired respondent to represent her daughter in a criminal matter. Pursuant to the representation, she paid respondent’s quoted fee of $450. Thereafter, respondent failed to perform any work in the matter and failed to return Ms. Washington’s phone calls. Respondent also failed to disclose that he was not licensed to practice law, having been disbarred as of February 12, 2010. Respondent has not refunded any portion of the fee paid by Ms. Washington.

In March 2010, Ms. Washington filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. Despite being served with a copy of Ms. Washington’s complaint via certified mail, respondent failed to answer the complaint.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4,1.5(f)(5), and 8.1(c).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In August 2012, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee adopted the deemed admitted factual allegations of the formal charges as its factual findings. Based on those facts, the committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.

After reviewing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1997), and indifference to making restitution. The committee did not find any mitigating factors present.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee initially considered whether the approach established by this court in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So.2d 470 (La.1991), is applicable in this case. Noting that the misconduct at issue in these proceedings occurred prior to the court’s entry of the order of discipline in Lester I, but did not occur prior to or contemporaneously with the misconduct for which the respondent was previously disbarred, the committee found that, “strictly speaking,” Chatelain does not apply. Therefore, the committee determined that it is appropriate to impose additional sanctions in the form of an extension of the five-year minimum period which must elapse before respondent may seek readmission from his disbarment.

Based on this reasoning, the committee recommended that the time period in which respondent can apply for readmission should be extended by two years. The committee also recommended respondent make restitution of any unearned fees, and that he be assessed with the costs and expenses of this matter.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee’s factual findings in this deemed admitted matter are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges and/or by the evidence submitted in support of those allegations, with one exception relating to the Morris matter (see note 2, supra). The board also agreed with the committee’s determination of rule violations, except that the board did not find a violation of Rule 1.8 in the Burns matter because there are no facts in the record to support the allegation that respondent entered into a business transaction with Mr. Burns or that he acquired a pecuniary interest adverse to Mr. Burns. The board added that while the facts may support a violation of Rule 1.7 (a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest), the ODC failed to allege this violation in the formal charges.

The board determined respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to his clients. He caused actual injury to four clients by failing to complete the work in their legal matters and by failing to return unearned fees. By failing to respond to or cooperate with the ODC, he caused the ODC to expend additional time and expense in investigating these matters. After reviewing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

The board agreed with the aggravating factors found by the committee. The board also recognized as an aggravating factor respondent’s dishonest or selfish motive. The board did not find any mitigating factors present.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board determined that contrary to the committee’s findings, respondent’s misconduct in the Roque matter occurred during the same time period as the misconduct subject of Lester I; therefore, the Chatelain approach applies to the misconduct at issue in that matter. Finding it unlikely that a harsher sanction would have been imposed in Lester I had the court been presented with the additional misconduct, the board recommended the misconduct in the Roque matter be considered in the event respondent applies for readmission to the bar.

As to the remaining misconduct, the board noted that lengthy suspensions have been ordered by the court in cases involving attorneys who, like respondent, have failed numerous clients by failing to return unearned fees after neglecting their cases. Accordingly, the board adopted the committee’s recommendation to extend the time period in which respondent can apply for readmission by two years. The board also recommended respondent pay restitution to his clients, and that he be assessed with the costs and expenses of this matter.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and co.nvinc-ing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to refund unearned fees, failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigations, and was charged with possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. Based on these facts, respondent has violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f)(5), 8.1(c), and 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987).

Respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to his clients and the legal profession, causing actual harm. The applicable baseline sanction in this matter is suspension. The aggravating factors found by the disciplinary board are supported by the record. In addition, we find the aggravating factor of illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances, is present. There are no mitigating factors present.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we agree that the Chatelain approach applies to some of the misconduct in this case. Respondent’s arrest in the criminal matter occurred in November 2006 and the substantive misconduct in the Roque matter occurred between January 2007 and April 2007. The misconduct in Lester I occurred between May 1998 and March 2007. Due to the overlap between the time periods, we find the misconduct in the Roque and criminal matters should be considered along with the misconduct in Lester I if and when respondent applies for readmission from his disbarment after becoming eligible to do so.

The remaining misconduct at issue began in 2008, after the misconduct in Lester I. For this misconduct, we agree that the time period in which respondent can apply for readmission should be extended.

Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and extend the time period in which respondent can apply for readmission by two years. We will also order respondent to pay restitution to his clients.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Darien Lester, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24831, be and he hereby is adjudged guilty of additional violations warranting discipline, which shall be considered in the event he seeks readmission after becoming eligible to do so. It is further ordered that for the misconduct which occurred outside of the time frame of In re: Lester, 09-2052 (La.1/29/10), 26 So.3d 735, the minimum period for seeking readmission from respondent’s disbarment shall be extended for a period of two years. It is further ordered that respondent shall make restitution of any unearned fees. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . At the time the formal charges were filed against respondent in August 2012, the criminal case had not been concluded; however, respondent subsequently pleaded nolo conten-dere to an amended charge of possession of a Schedule III controlled dangerous substance.

      . In his complaint, Mr. Morris stated: "Mr. Darien Lester’s whole intention was to get the $1,000 from my family without providing any form of service that he contracted to do. Mr. Lester went further to even try to obtain the remaining $1,000 from my family, again with no services provided.” Based on these statements, and without any additional evidence in the record to indicate otherwise, it appears that respondent actually received $1,000 in the Morris matter.

      . In Chatelain, the court held that when the underlying misconduct occurs within the same time period as the misconduct forming the basis of a previously imposed sanction, the discipline imposed in the subsequent proceeding should be determined as if both proceedings were before the court simultaneously.

      . See, e.g., In re: Turissini, 03-0549 (La.6/6/03), 849 So.2d 491 (three-year suspension); In re: Powers, 99-2069 (La.9/24/99), 744 So.2d 1275 (three-year suspension).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Joan S. BENGE.
    No. 2014-OB-0060.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 2014.
   ON APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT

PER CURIAM.

This proceeding arises out of an application for reinstatement filed by petitioner, Joan S. Benge, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently suspended.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While serving as a judge for the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, petitioner engaged in judicial misconduct. On November 6, 2009, we removed petitioner from judicial office for her misconduct. In re: Benge, 09-1617 (La.11/6/09), 24 So.3d 822. On February 10, 2010, we placed petitioner on interim suspension. In re: Benge, 10-0262 (La.2/10/10), 27 So.3d 272. On October 16, 2012, we suspended petitioner from the practice of law for three years, retroactive to the date of her interim suspension, for her judicial misconduct. In re: Benge, 12-0619 (La.10/16/12), 100 So.3d 818.

On April 23, 2013, petitioner filed an application for reinstatement with the disciplinary board, alleging she has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) took no position regarding the application for reinstatement. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

Following the hearing, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law. Neither petitioner nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

After considering the record in its entirety, we agree with the committee that there is clear and convincing evidence of petitioner’s compliance with the reinstatement criteria. Accordingly, we will reinstate petitioner to the practice of law.

DECREE

Upon review of the recommendation of the hearing committee, and considering the record, it is ordered that Joan S. Benge, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20490, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey W. OLIPHANT.
    No. 2013-K-2973.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   PER CURIAM.

We granted the state’s application to consider the Third Circuit’s decision reversing defendant’s conviction and sentence for armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. State v. Oliphant, 13-473 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/20/13), 127 So.3d 91 (unpub’d). For the reasons that follow, the court of appeal’s decision is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

On appeal, the Third Circuit first addressed defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Testimony at trial gave the following account of circumstances leading to defendant’s arrest and prosecution. On April 23, 2005, around 2:00 p.m., a man armed with a pistol entered the Tobacco Warehouse in Natchitoches and took approximately $700 from the cashier at gunpoint. A store employee, Jared Bennett, described the perpetrator as a black man, wearing black pants and a dark hooded sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head and a piece of cloth over his face. Another employee, Julie Beard, described the man as a black male in his early twenties with brown eyes, short hair, wearing a hooded sweatshirt with “some pantyhose thing” over his face.

Immediately following the robbery, Riley Stanfield, who lived on the street behind the convenience store, observed a man dressed in a dark hooded sweatshirt run through his yard, jump over the fence, and climb into the passenger side of a white Lincoln. He testified that the car was approximately 150 to 200 yards away and he could see another black male in the driver’s seat. Stanfield could not provide a description of either man; however, he did note that the molding below the car door was missing.

At approximately 4:00 p.m., Natchitoch-es Police Officer Joel Mitchell observed a white Lincoln Town Car run a stop sign. Mitchell, who was aware of the description of the vehicle associated with the robbery, attempted to initiate a traffic stop. The driver initially made an attempt to escape, but ultimately stopped the car. The car was missing the molding below the door and was being driven by Nicholas Oli-phant, defendant’s brother. Oliphant admitted that he had a gun in the car and Mitchell recovered the .22 caliber revolver.

Officer Damien Spillman interrogated Oliphant at the police station. According to Spillman, Oliphant stated that he had been home all day and that defendant could verify that fact. Spillman then went to defendant’s house where defendant agreed to go to the police station. Defendant initially told Spillman that had worked the night shift and then slept most of the day. However, he later changed his story and stated that he was out late the night before, got up around 10:30 a.m. and went to a friend’s house to cut hair. He remained there, except for a brief trip to retrieve a set of clippers, until he learned that his brother had been arrested.

Detective Jeff Franks testified that he observed Spillman’s interrogation of Nicholas Oliphant. He testified that Oliphant stated he and defendant went to buy cigarettes for their mother on the morning of the robbery from Wardworths Grocery Store in Natchitoches. Franks later asked defendant about the trip. Defendant acknowledged the trip; however, he stated he and Oliphant went to McFarland Convenience Store. On cross-examination, Franks acknowledged that in his written statement he indicated the brothers stated the trip took place the night before the robbery.

While interrogating defendant, Spillman called for a set of tracking dogs to assist in the investigation. He asked for one of defendant’s socks and defendant complied with the request. Spillman took the sock to the Tobacco Warehouse where he met Officer Roy Gallien, one of the dog handlers. Gallien testified that there are six tracking dogs on the team, including the two used in this case, Bo and Trusty. The dogs are not certified in any way and all of their experience comes from work at the Natchitoches Parish Detention Center. Gallien testified that the trustees at the detention center were responsible for training the dogs; however, he did not explain if the trustees had any training or expertise. He further acknowledged that there were no records concerning the dogs’ use.

Gallien testified that he let the two dogs sniff the sock Officer Spillman obtained from defendant at approximately 7:15 p.m. on the day of the robbery. The dogs then began to track from the store. The dogs, working separately, tracked similar routes to the route described by Riley Stanfield.

Defendant was thereafter arrested for the armed robbery. A search of the car driven by Nicholas Oliphant uncovered two

items made of stocking-type material in addition to the .22 caliber revolver. A search of defendant’s home did not result in the seizure of any evidence. Witnesses Stanfield, Bennett, and Beard were all shown photographic lineups that included pictures of defendant and his brother. The pictures were twice the size of the other photos. Even then, none of the witnesses identified defendant or his brother from the lineup. Bennett and Beard chose someone other than defendant and Stanfield did not identify anyone.

Bennett and Beard testified that the gun found in the car driven by defendant’s brother was similar to the one used in the robbery; however, they could not positively identify it because the gun used by the perpetrator was concealed in his sleeve. Bennett also acknowledged that he previously told Officer Spillman that the seized gun was not the one used in the robbery.

Pat Wojtkiewicz from the North Louisiana Crime Lab testified that he conducted DNA analysis on the pistol and the stocking material found in Oliphant’s car. DNA found on the grip and hammer of the gun was a mixture of at least two individuals and defendant’s brother could not be excluded as one of the donors. DNA on the stocking material was also a mixture of at least two individuals and neither defendant nor his brother could be excluded as donors.

On the basis of this testimony, the court of appeal found that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. It first noted that no witnesses were able to identify defendant from a photographic lineup and the two Tobacco Warehouse employees chose suspects other than defendant. It acknowledged that the brothers’ inconsistent statements and the bloodhound evidence, even assuming the latter was properly admitted, suggested guilt; however, it emphasized that this evidence was inconsistent with the fact that defendant’s DNA was not found on the gun allegedly used in the robbery. Finally, it noted that while defendant’s DNA was found on a stocking in his brother’s car, the DNA transfer likely occurred because the two brothers lived together. Thus, it concluded that the state failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Oliphant, 13-473 at 15, 127 So.3d 91.

The court also found that the district court erred by admitting evidence that the bloodhounds tracked defendant’s scent from the scene of the crime. Relying on jurisprudence from this Court as well as other jurisdictions, the court found that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the qualifications of the bloodhounds. Specifically, it noted that the dogs were not certified in any capacity and their reliability could not be confirmed because no records were kept. Oliphant, 13-473 at 10, 127 So.3d 91.

We disagree with the court’s conclusion as to sufficiency. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984). Additionally, when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove ... must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” R.S. 15:438; see State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817, 820 (La.1987) (all direct and circumstantial evidence must meet the Jackson test); State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142, 1146 (La.1985) (R.S. 15:438 serves as an evidentiary guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence). Finally, review under Jackson’s due process standard encompasses all of the evidence, inadmissible as well as admissible, introduced at trial. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 781, 734 (La.1992) (“[W]hen the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the assignments of trial error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial.”).

To support the instant conviction the state relied on inconsistent and conflicting statements from defendant and his brother concerning their whereabouts on the day of the robbery, DNA analysis on a stocking found in the Lincoln that concluded defendant could not be excluded as the donor, and evidence that two bloodhounds trailed defendant’s scent from the convenience store to the area where the perpetrator got into the car.

Generally speaking, inconsistent or conflicting statements can be considered indicative of a guilty mind. Captville, 448 So.2d at 680, n. 4 (“ ‘Lying’ has been recognized as indicative of an awareness of wrongdoing.”) (citing State v. Rault, 445 So.2d 1203, 1213 (La.1984) (“The jury could have reasonably concluded that Rault concocted this version of the crime to hide his own guilt.”)). Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to consider defendant’s conflicting accounts of his whereabouts and activities around the time of the robbery as evidence pointing to his guilt.

Moreover, evidence that two bloodhounds, after smelling defendant’s sock, tracked his scent from the convenience store to the location where the perpetrator got into the getaway car also points to his guilt. The dogs, working separately, tracked similar paths from the store, and ended their searches in similar locations.

As to the DNA evidence, analysis showed that DNA found on a stocking found in the car of defendant’s brother came from at least two people and defendant could not be excluded as one of the donors. Both witnesses from the store stated that the perpetrator was wearing something over his face. One of the witnesses, Julie Beard, described the covering as “some pantyhose thing.”

The totality of the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness; thus, a reviewing court may impinge on the “fact finder’s discretion ... only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law.” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). Clearly, the jury in the instant case accepted the testimony of Officer Gallien concerning the bloodhound tracking and believed that the dogs accurately tracked defendant’s scent from the scene of the crime to the area where the perpetrator got into the getaway car. This evidence taken in conjunction with the facts that defendant’s brother was found driving a car similar to the getaway vehicle, a stocking and .22 caliber revolver similar to the ones used during the robbery were found in the car, defendant could not be excluded as a donor of DNA found on that stocking, and defendant and his brother presented inconsistent and conflicting accounts of their whereabouts at the time of the robbery, allowed the jury to rationally conclude that defendant was guilty of the robbery despite the fact that none of the witnesses could identify him as the perpetrator.

We affirm, however, the Third Circuit’s finding that the district court erred by admitting the bloodhound evidence at trial. There is little jurisprudence, in Louisiana concerning the admissibility of bloodhound tracking evidence. This Court had found that the evidence may be admissible if the state lays a foundation including “some proof of the reliability of the dogs, their acuteness of scent and power or sense of discrimination, and, in that respect, their reputation for trailing criminals, their pedigree, training, etc.” State v. Green, 210 La. 157, 26 So.2d 487, 488 (1946) (quoting State v. Harrison, 149 La. 83, 88 So. 696, 697 (1921)). However, the Court noted that even if the state lays the proper foundation the evidence should only “go to the jury ‘for what it is worth’ as ‘one of the circumstances’ which may tend to connect the defendant with the crime.” Id., 26 So.2d at 489.

In the present case, the state failed to lay the proper foundation for admission. First, the state concedes the dogs used in the instant case are not pure breed bloodhounds. Officer Gallien testified that be believed their mother was a dog living at Angola and that dog mated with dogs living at other correctional institutions around the state. The state did not introduce any documentation concerning the dogs’ lineage. Moreover, the state presented little information concerning the training of the dogs. Gallien testified the dogs are not certified in any capacity, “but they are very good in my book.” He explained that trustees at the detention center train the dogs and that the dogs “are real good with their noses.” As to their history of reliability, Gallien stated that one of the dogs recently located a missing person who had fallen off a dock and drowned. He further stated the dogs have “been used a good bit” to find people in the area. On cross-examination, Gallien admitted that he could not remember which dogs were used for different missions; therefore, he could not be more specific about the experience of the dogs used in the instant case. He further admitted that there are no records as to the dogs’ experience or rate of success. Accordingly, Gallien’s anecdotal evidence of the dogs’ experience cannot be verified. It is undisputed that the dogs began their search where the perpetrator was known to have been; however, they began their search five-and-one-half hours after the robbery, thus, giving any scent time to dissipate. Given the complete lack of verifiable information relating the dogs training, experience, or abilities, the court erred by admitting the evidence.

When evidence is improperly admitted it is subject to harmless-error analysis. State v. Johnson, 94-1379, pp. 17-18 (La.11/27/95), 664 So.2d 94, 102 (errors leading to improper admission of evidence subject to harmless-error analysis; error harmless if verdict “surely unattributable” to error) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)). Here, as the court of appeal determined, the error was not harmless. The bloodhound evidence introduced by the state was the only evidence that directly connected defendant to the scene. None of the witnesses identified him as the perpetrator, he was not found in the car resembling the getaway vehicle, and no evidence connecting him to the crime was found in his home. Without the bloodhound evidence, the state had only DNA analysis stating that defendant could not be excluded as a donor of DNA found on a stocking in his brother’s car that resembled the stocking worn by the perpetrator in addition to the conflicting statements given by the brothers. Thus, it cannot be said that the verdict in this case was “surely unattributable” to the bloodhound evidence.

As opposed to a finding of insufficient evidence which may provide grounds for an acquittal or entry of a verdict on a lesser and included offense, the remedy for trial error is retrial of the case. Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734 (“If the reviewing court determines there has been trial error (which was not harmless) in cases in which the entirety of the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, then the accused must receive a new trial, but is not entitled to an acquittal even though the admissible evidence, considered alone, was insufficient.”) (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988)). Accordingly, the Third Circuit’s ruling as to sufficiency is reversed and its ruling as to the admission of the bloodhound evidence is affirmed. This ease is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the view express herein.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART; CASE REMANDED.

      . Compare, for example, the evidence presented in Florida v. Harris, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1058, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013), supporting the reliability of a drug detection dog providing the sniff that the Supreme Court found “up to snuff” in establishing probable cause for a search:
      The State showed that two years before alerting to Harris’s truck, Aldo [the dog] had successfully completed a 120-hour program in narcotics detection, and separately obtained a certification from an independent company. And although the certification expired after a year, the Sheriff’s Office required continuing training for Aldo and [K-9 officer] Wheetley. The two satisfied the requirements of another, 40-hour training program one year prior to the search at issue. And Wheetley worked with Aldo for four hours each week on exercises designed to keep their skills sharp. Wheedey testified, and written records confirmed, that in those settings Aldo always performed at the highest level.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Theron EDWARDS.
    No. 2013-KK-2497.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 21, 2014.
   In re Edwards, Theron; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 04-07-0121, Anthony J. Marabella, J.; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1104.

WRIT GRANTED. Petitioner presented a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the imposition of an illegal sentence following his guilty plea for Indecent Behavior with Juveniles, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81. The claim was dismissed on procedural grounds as time barred. We grant the writ application and remand the case to the district court to be considered as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which, if meritorious, is an exception to the time limitations for post-conviction applications. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 882.

      . See La. R.S. 14:81H(1) which provides for a maximum sentence of seven years if the victim is over the age of 13.


author: SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS, Judge.

text:
    BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY and Agricultural and Mechanical College v. BOUDREAUX’S TIRE & AUTO REPAIR, L.L.C.
    No. 2013-CA-0444.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    March 5, 2014.
    Rehearing Denied April 3, 2014.

      Luke F. Piontek, J. Kenton Parsons, Thomas J. Capella, Christian J. Rhodes, Shelley Ann McGlathery, Roedel Parsons Koch Blache, Balhoff & MeCollister, ALC, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Randall A. Smith, L. Tiffany Davis, Mary Nell Bennett, Smith & Fawer, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge DANIEL L. DYSART, Judge SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS).
   SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS, Judge.

Appellant, the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (the Board), appeals from two separate judgments of the Orleans Parish Civil District Court. Both appeals relate to the same expropriation action. The first appeal concerns the $293,242.00 judgment of the trial court, effectively awarding Appellee/Respondent, Boudreaux’s Tire & Auto Repair, L.L.C., (Boudreaux’s) $978,600.00 in just compensation for expropriated property (“the subject property”). In connection with that appeal, the Board argues that the trial court erred by excluding all evidence of the subject property’s 2004 purchase price. Boudreaux’s filed an answer praying for attorney fees in connection with that appeal.

The Board separately appeals the trial court judgment awarding attorney fees, costs, and expenses to Boudreaux’s.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the exclusion of evidence of the purchase price. We remand for the limited purpose of fixing costs on appeal and insuring that only work performed on issues tried below were compensated by the trial court.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE

This case involves the expropriation of the subject property, located at 2301-2309 Tulane Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana. Testimony at trial indicated Boudreaux’s owners acquired the property in 2004 and began to operate their 20,400 square foot automotive repair service and tire shop from that location. Boudreaux’s substantially renovated the property’s preexisting structure, replacing the building’s roof, adding 15 bay doors, and expanding the building’s office and reception space.

On August 26, 2010, the Board filed its Petition for Expropriation of the land (and improvements) at 2301-2309 Tulane Avenue, stating that the property was necessary for the construction of a new United States Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center. Along with its petition, the Board deposited $685,358.00 in just compensation into the court registry and identified Boudreaux’s as the owner of the subject property. Boudreaux’s filed an Answer and Reconventional Demand alleging that the Board had not furnished just compensation.

Following extensive stipulations and pre-trial motions, the parties began a three-day jury trial on November 13, 2012. The trial focused exclusively on the issue of just compensation due to Boudreaux’s under La. Const. art. I, § 4(B)(5). Testimony consisted of the opinions of three expert appraisers and one expert architect, as well as lay testimony of Allen Boudreaux, one of the business’s owners.

On November 15, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of $978,600.00 in just compensation due to Boudreaux’s. Noting that the Board has already deposited $685,358.00 into the court registry, the trial court entered judgment awarding Bou-dreaux’s the balance of the jury’s award ($292,242.00) plus 5 percent annual interest. The Board timely appealed this judgment and Boudreaux’s answered the appeal, seeking reasonable attorney fees in connection with this appeal.

Following judgment on the question of just compensation, Boudreaux’s moved for the trial court to award attorney fees and costs (including expert fees) consistent with La. R.S. 19:8(A)(3). After lengthy briefing and an evidentiary hearing, on January 16, 2013, the trial court rendered judgment on fees and costs, awarding Boudreaux’s $109,021.73 in attorney fees, $31,275.00 in expert witness fees, and costs of $11,758.77. The Board filed a second timely devolutive appeal from this judgment.

DISCUSSION

As mentioned above, the Board has appealed from both the judgment on compensation and the judgment on fees. We address each of those appeals — and the relevant assignments of error — in turn.

I: The Judgment on Compensation

“Property owners in expropriation cases are entitled to receive compensation for the full extent of their loss as provided under the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.” Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. State, Div. of Admin., 12-1312, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/27/13) — So.Sd -, 2013 WL 772520, writ denied, 13-0683 (La.5/3/13), 113 So.3d 216. Article I § 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that the full extent of an owner’s loss “shall include, but not be limited to, the appraised value of the property and all costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages actually incurred because of the expropriation.” Such loss is generally assessed in terms of a property’s fair market value. See Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 12-1312, p. 4, — So.3d -.

A property’s fair market value is determined in light of its highest and best use and is calculated by one of three methods: the market/sales approach; the cost approach; and/or the income approach. Id. at p. 5, — So.3d at - (citing Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Hill, 00-2535, p. 8 (La.5/15/01), 788 So.2d 1154, 1160). The market/sales approach establishes a property’s value in reference to “the prices paid in actual market transactions, i.e., comparable sales.” Exxon Pipeline Co., 00-2535, p. 13 (La.5/15/01), 788 So.2d at 1162. The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that “in most cases,” the market/sales approach is “likely to produce more accurate results” than its competing approaches. Id., 00-2535, p. 13, 788 So.2d at 1163. The parties’ expert appraisers exclusively relied on this approach when valuing the property in this case.

A: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the subject property’s 2004 purchase price.

The Board contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Boudreaux’s Motion in Limine to exclude evidence regarding the 2004 purchase price Boudreaux’s paid for the subject property (shown by an Act of Cash Sale). The Board’s contention lacks merit.

A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Brooks v. Reimonenq, 10-0296, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/21/10), 44 So.3d 824, 827 (citing Stewart v. Ice, 07-0871, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/9/08), 982 So.2d 928, 933). Of course, “[a] district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” State v. Lee, 11-0398, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/12), 83 So.3d 1191, 1196 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)).

Boudreaux’s purchased the subject property in 2004 for $275,000.00. In support of its argument that the 2004 purchase price was relevant evidence and should have been admitted into evidence, the Board cites State, Department of Highways v. Addison, 136 So.2d 545 (La.Ct.App.1961). Addison involves the State’s appeal from a putatively excessive compensation award on grounds that trial court erroneously permitted the expropriate to introduce evidence of the purchase price paid for the expropriated property. Id. at 546-47. Rejecting the State’s argument that the purchase price was not relevant of the property’s value at expropriation, the First Circuit observed that the State’s own expert had taken the subject property’s $30,000.00 purchase price into account when furnishing his own estimate. Id. at 547. The court of appeal then explained that

[t]hough the purchase price paid by the expropriate is not evidence per se of the market value, certainly, in the absence of showing that the sale was fictitious, it is relevant evidence to be considered with other evidence in ascertaining the true market value, and in connection with the testimony of Defendants’ experts it does not detract from the valuations placed on the property by them in ascertaining the value of the property, for the true criterion of value is the market value of the property at the date of the institution of the expropriation suit.

Id. at 547 (citing Louisiana Highway Comm’n v. Boudreaux, 19 La.App. 98, 139 So. 521 (1932)); Murff v. Louisiana Highway Comm’n, 146 So. 328 (La.App.Ct.1933); Central La. Electric Co., Inc. v. Leonards, 65 So.2d 631 (La.App.Ct.1953). The court then affirmed the judgment of $34,800.00 in just compensation — nearly twice the $18,639.00 that the State had deposited in the court’s registry — but only marginally more than that which the expropriate had previously paid for the property. Addison, 136 So.2d at 547-50.

Addison is persuasive, but we do not believe that it furthers the Board’s position. First, Addison does not stand for the proposition that the purchase price is invariably relevant in determining fair market value. See id. at 547. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion as a matter of law in excluding the purchase price in the instant case.

Second, and more importantly, the uncontested evidence in the record suggests that Boudreaux’s acquisition of the subject property was made below fair market value, was made between friends, and was not fully accounted for in the money that exchanged hands (the seller took a management position with Boudreaux’s after the sale). The district court could correctly have concluded that the price paid for the subject property was as poor an indicator of the property’s true value as if the deal had been a sham. Cf id. at 547. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the 2004 purchase from the trial to determine the fair market value of the expropriation at issue.

Moreover, the evidentiary error of which the Board complains—and which we do not find—would be harmless. See Richardson v. Richardson, 07-0430 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/28/07), 974 So.2d 761, 771-72. Under La. C.E. art. 103, the effect of an erroneous evidentiary ruling is that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected.” Put differently, if the ruling’s effect on the outcome is insubstantial, reversal is not warranted. Gibson v. La. Rice Mill, L.L.C., 13-265, p. 1 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), 2013 WL 5539299, reh’g denied 126 So.3d 876 (La.11/13/13) (quoting Wright v. Bennett, 04 CA 1944, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/05), 924 So.2d 178, 182) (internal citations omitted).

Here, the 2004 sale very well may have no probative value in terms of the jury’s charge, namely a contemporary determination of the subject property’s fair market value. For example, none of the Board’s experts identified the 2004 purchase as relevant to their estimates of the subject property’s contemporary fair market value. They appear to have disregarded the purchase price entirely.

The Board’s challenge lacks merit.

B: Boudreaux’s request for additional fees and costs associated with this appeal is better determined by the trial court

In its answer to the instant appeal, Boudreaux’s requested an additional $25,000.00 for the work associated with preserving the trial court’s compensation judgment. Boudreaux’s supplied no breakdown of the time spent on this appeal. We find the record contains insufficient information for this Court to determine the appropriate award of costs. We therefore remand this matter to the trial court for a hearing to determine the costs to be awarded in connection with Bou-dreaux’s successful defense on appeal.

II: Judgment on Fees, Costs, & Expenses

In the subordinate sections, we address the Board’s specific arguments that attorney fees and expert witness fees were excessive.

“As a general rule, attorney fees are not allowed in Louisiana unless they are authorized by statute or provided for by contract.” Langley v. Petro Star Corp. of La., 01-0198, p. 3 (La.6/29/01), 792 So.2d 721, 723 (citing Sharbono v. Steve Lang & Son Loggers, 97-0110, p. 7 (La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 1382, 1386). In the expropriation context, however, La. R.S. 19:8 expressly permits a trial court to “award reasonable attorney fees to the defendant” where the amount of compensation awarded at trial exceeds the highest offer made for the property. La. R.S. 19:8(A)(3).

Our review of the trial court’s award of fees is conducted under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Miss Chub, L.L.C., 47,054, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/11/12), 92 So.3d 422, 425 (citations omitted); see also City of New Orleans v. Condon, 600 So.2d 78, 81 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1130 (La.1992) (citations omitted). On appeal, the Board challenges the award of attorney fees one three separate bases elaborated upon below.

A: The Trial Court Correctly Analyzed the Attorneys Fees in this Case in Light of the Factors on Which Such an Award may be Based.

The Board contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Boudreaux’s attorney fees without explicitly balancing all of the judicially created factors enumerated in State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Williamson, 597 So.2d 439 (La.1992). The Board’s contention lacks merit.

Williamson is an expropriation case arising under La. R.S. 48:441, et seq., and in which the sole issue on appeal was the reasonableness of the attorney fees awarded by the trial court. Id. at 440. The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the factors to be considered when deciding upon a reasonable fee award include

(1) the ultimate result obtained; (2) the responsibility incurred; (3) the importance of the litigation; (4) amount of money involved; (5) extent and character of the work performed; (6) legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the attorneys; (7) number of appearances made; (8) intricacies of the facts involved; (9) diligence and skill of counsel; and (10) the court’s own knowledge.

Id. at 442. Evaluating the award based on these factors, the Supreme Court observed that while the trial court had discussed most of the factors, it had abused its discretion by overemphasizing the intricacies of the litigation. Id. at 442-43. Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that the court of appeal, which had reduced the award, had focused too much on the time the attorneys devoted to the case. Id. at 443.

Here, the parties extensively briefed the issues regarding reasonable fees, including application of the Williamson factors to the instant case. At an evidentiary hearing held on these issues, testimony from Boudreaux’s attorney |n centered largely on the Williamson factors. Further, in addition to its judgment, the trial court issued reasons for judgment identifying the factors and stating that it had “reviewed the record and all of the [Williamson] factors and f[ound] that an award of $109,021.73 in attorney’s fees reasonable.” The court then specifically applied several of the factors to the case at hand, noting the excellent character of the work performed, the knowledge and skill of the attorneys, and their diligence. From the basis of the record, this Court can see that numerous appearances were made, that compensation awarded to Boudreaux’s was quite favorable (roughly 43 percent more than the Board had offered), that the sums involved were not insubstantial, and that the parties hotly contested the issues involved.

B: Consistency Between the Bou-dreaux’s Contingency Arrangement and the Trial Court’s Award Does Not Render the Award Unreasonable.

The Board claims that by awarding Boudreaux’s attorney fees consistent with the terms of their contingency fee agreement, the trial court impermissibly adopted a rule “holding that whatever a landowner’s contingency fee contract states regarding attorney’s fees is reasonable as, long as his attorneys request an award in that amount.” The Board’s claim is meritless.

While trial courts are not bound to award fees consistent with a contingency agreement, courts may certainly consider contingency agreements when awarding fees. See Williamson, 597 So.2d at 443 n. 10 (observing that district courts may consider an attorney-client contract among other factors in awarding fees); Pillow v. Bd. of Comm’rs for Fifth Louisiana Levee Dist., 425 So.2d 1267, 1284 (La.CtjApp. 1982)12 (“there is nothing in our law which precludes the awarding of attorneys’ fees based on a contingent fee contract”), writ granted, 427 So.2d 1200 (La.1983), writ recalled, 445 So.2d 1225 (La.1984); Nor-fleet v. Lifeguard Transp. Serv., Inc., 05-0501, p. 18 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/17/06), 934 So.2d 846, 859 (“A court may consider a contingency fee contract when awarding attorney’s fees, but the court is not bound by the contract’s terms”) (citing Rivet v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 01-0961, p. 6 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 777, 782.) In fact, this Court has affirmed fee awards consistent with contingent fee agreements. See, e.g., Vela v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 00-2221, pp. 26-28 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/13/02), 811 So.2d 1263,1280-81.

Here, the trial court never indicated a belief that it was bound by the contingency fee agreement provided by Boudreaux’s counsel. In addition, the parties thoroughly briefed the issue of fees, and the court both took evidence and held argument on the matter. That the trial court’s award is consistent with the fee agreement between Boudreaux’s and its counsel is not, by itself, an abuse of discretion. We find no merit to this assignment of error.

C: The Trial Court is Best Positioned to Evaluate Whether any Fees Were Awarded For Work on Untried Claims.

The Board further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reduce the attorney fees awarded to Boudreaux’s counsel for work on Bou-dreaux’s claims for relocation and re-establishment costs, which were abandoned on the eve of trial. We remand on this issue, but for reasons other than those raised by the Board.

The Board argues that because Bou-dreaux’s did not ultimately prevail on the relocation and re-establishment issues, Boudreaux’s counsel is per se not entitled to attorney fees for the work it performed on those issues. To support this position, the Board relies on LHO New Orleans LM, L.P. v. MHI Leasco New Orleans, Inc., 06-0489 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/16/08), 983 So.2d 217 and City of Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp., 34, 959, (La.App.2d Cir.8/22/01), 794 So.2d 962, for the proposition that a party is not due attorney fees for litigating issues on which it does not prevail. The Board’s reliance is misplaced, however.

The ruling in LHO New Orleans LM was explicitly based on an attorney fee provision in a lease agreement between the parties. See LHO New Orleans LM, L.P., 06-0489, p. 19, 983 So.2d at 230 (“In accordance with the terms of the lease, [the defendant’s] entitlement to fees, costs and expenses is limited to items on which it prevailed in enforcing the terms or determining its rights under the lease”)(emphasis added); see also Master Credit Corp. v. Campbell & Assoc., Inc., 98-0349 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/25/98), 724 So.2d 266, 268 (holding statutory fee authority inapplicable where “a contract, rather than the statute, controls”). Moreover, in Chanse Gas Corp., the Second Circuit refused to award attorney fees in connection with an ultimately unsuccessful appeal. See id., 34,958, 34,959, p. 26, 794 So.2d at 980. This is not same as failing to award a prevailing party attorney fees on litigated issues on which it did not prevail. In fact, in Chanse Gas Corp., the court affirmed an award of attorney fees for the defendant’s unsuccessful challenge to the legitimacy of the expropriation. See id., 34, 958, 34,959, p. 22, 794 So.2d at 977 (affirming an award of attorney fees even where defendant had lost a takings trial, La. R.S. 19:8 entitled the defendants both to challenge the expropriation of their land and to have their day in court regarding the issue of compensation). In other words, neither of the cases relied on by the Board support their position that a prevailing party is not entitled to attorney fees for its unsuccessful claims.

In support of the trial court’s award, Boudreaux’s cites several expropriation cases in which attorney fees under La. R.S. 19:8 were awarded in connection with defendants’ unsuccessful challenges to the legitimacy of a given taking. See, e.g., Chanse Gas Corp., 34,958, 34,959, p. 22 (La.App.2d Cir.8/22/01), 794 So.2d at 977; Louisiana Resources Co. v. Greene, 406 So.2d 1360, 1371 (La.App. 3d Cir.1981) (affirming as reasonable an award of attorney fees covering work fighting an unsuccessful battle against an expropriation). Given their broadest construal, these cases permit for the award of “attorney fees as an element of compensation for ‘the fundamental right of landowners to test an expropriation on all points or issues which may arise.’” Chanse Gas Corp., 34,958, 34,959, pp. 22-23, 794 So.2d at 977-78 (quoting Green, 406 So.2d at 1371); but see Rivet v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 01-0961 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 777, 782 (opining that “[ajttorney’s fees have traditionally been regarded as being distinct from the compensation due to the landowner”) (citing La. R.S. 19:8; La. R.S. 13:5111; 48:453(A)). Even under the broadest interpretation of Chanse Gas Corp. and Greene, however, those cases do not support an award of reasonable attorney fees in connection with Boudreaux’s abandoned claim for compensation related to relocation and reestablishment costs.

While attorney fees awarded to landowners in expropriation cases are reasonable as awarded on all points “tested,” Boudreaux’s relocation and re-establishment claims were not tested. These claims were not tried before the jury, nor were they subject to trial on a motion. Boudreaux’s, for whatever reason, chose not to contest these issues. Because Bou-dreaux’s did not exercise its fundamental right to test its expropriation on this point, it is not entitled to reasonable attorney fees tied to the exercise of that right. Cf. Chanse Gas Corp., 34,958, 34,959, pp. 22-23, 794 So.2d at 977-78 (quoting Green, 406 So.2d at 1371). As such, any attorney fees awarded to Boudreaux’s for work performed exclusively in furtherance of the untested relocation and re-establishment claims would constitute an abuse of discretion.

The record on appeal does not contain sufficient information for this Court to determine whether the trial court’s award of attorney fees compensated Boudreaux’s for the time spent on its relocation and reestablishment claims. As such, we lack the requisite information to modify (if necessary) the amount of attorney fees due to Boudreaux’s. As we have done in the past, we remand this matter for further proceedings to determine reasonable attorney fees. See Condon, 600 So.2d at 81. We note that in Boudreaux’s prior motion for fees offered the fitrial court the opportunity to review Boudreaux’s billings in camera. The trial court should review these billings to determine whether its pri- or award erroneously compensated Bou-dreaux’s counsel for work on the relocation and reestablishment issues. If so, the trial court should downwardly modify its award as consistent with this opinion.

D: Expert Witness Fees Were Not Unreasonable

The Board contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Bou-dreaux’s expert Dr. Wade Ragas $31,275.00 for his of work on this case. Specifically, the Board contends that Dr. Ragas was erroneously awarded fees for his attendance of and preparation for a deposition not offered at trial and that his award should be coordinately reduced. The Board also contends that Ragas’ award was generally unreasonable and should be reduced in proportion to the amount of his fair market value estimate that the jury did not accept. The Board’s contention lacks merit on both counts.

The trial court is charged with fixing expert witness fees under La. R.S. 13:3666(A). The expert fees to be awarded are largely within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Winn, 463 So.2d 648, 652 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984) (citing State, Dep’t of Highways v. Salles, 387 So.2d 1278 (La.App. 1st Cir.1980)). This award may include fees for preparatory, non-testifying expenses. Vela v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 00-2221, p. 30 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/13/02), 811 So.2d 1263, 1282, writ denied 02-1350 (La.6/21/02), 819 So.2d 337 and 02-1224 (La.6/21/02), 819 So.2d 343 (citing McGee v. Miears, 516 So.2d 1241, 1245 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987)).

As concerns the award of expert fees associated with an expert’s participation in a disposition, however, most courts have only permitted such an award where the deposition was “used at trial and introduced and accepted into evidence.” See, e.g., Yates v. Elmer, 06-267, p. 25 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/28/06), 948 So.2d 1092, 1106 (“if a deposition is not used at trial, the cost of the deposition, including deponent’s fee for giving the deposition, may not be taxed as costs”), writ denied, 06-3031 (La.2/16/07), 949 So.2d 415 and writ denied, 06-3033 (La.2/16/07), 949 So.2d 417 (citations omitted).

Here, it does not appear that Bou-dreaux’s was awarded expert fees in connection with Dr. Ragas’ participation in a deposition. Rather, the Board means to challenge the compensation that Dr. Ragas was awarded in connection with his preparation for the deposition. As previously noted by this Court, taxable expert fees may include fees for preparation. See Vela, 00-2221, p. 30, 811 So.2d at 1282 (citations omitted). We do not believe that this aspect of the expert fees awarded by the trial court constitutes an abuse of discretion.

The Board further contends that Dr. Ragas’ fees are generally unreasonable. The Board’s contention is mer-itless.

The Board stresses that Dr. Ragas charged Boudreaux’s nearly twice as much to prepare for and to testify at trial ($20,-700.00) as he charged to draft the 222-page report on which his testimony was based ($10,575.00). We note that the Board does not challenge the amount of time reported by Dr. Ragas, just the compensation awarded. Ragas’ time, of course, was spent reviewing the reports and depositions of the Board’s three experts. For this work, as well his actual trial testimony, the trial court allotted Dr. Ragas’ fees coming to $225.58 per hour. This fee does not constitute a clear abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

This Court has reviewed the matter thoroughly and finds no reversible error. Because we cannot determine whether the trial court’s allocation of fees erroneously compensated Boudreaux’s counsel for work on abandoned, noncompensable issues, we remand that issue to the trial court for review and reconsideration. The trial court is also to take evidence and award attorney fees to Boudreaux’s in connection with this appeal and not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN PART.

LOVE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

      . The old medical center was irreparably damaged by Hurricane Katrina.

      . Louisiana Article I, section 4(B)(5) states that
      [i]n every expropriation or action to take property pursuant to the provisions of this Section, a party has the right to trial by jury to determine whether the compensation is just, and the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the full extent of loss shall include, but not be limited to, the appraised value of the property and all costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages actually incurred by the owner because of the expropriation.
      La. Const, art. I, § 4(B)(5).

      . In presenting testimony of two expert appraisers, the Board satisfied its duties under La. R.S. art. 19:143.

      .La. R.S. 19:8(A)(3) provides for reasonable attorney fees associated with expropriation litigation, stating in full:
      Immediately after compensation has been determined, the plaintiff shall, upon motion of the defendant, present evidence as to the highest amount it offered the defendant for the property and severance damages, if any, prior to the trial on the merits. After hearing evidence on the issue, the court shall determine the highest amount offered. If the highest amount offered is less than the compensation awarded for the property and severance damages, if any, the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the defendant. The expropriating authority shall not be entitled to possession or ownership of the property until a final judgment has been rendered and payment has been made to the owner or paid into the registry of the court, except as may otherwise be stipulated by the parties.
      La. R.S. 19:8(A)(3)(emphasis added).

      . In a separate assignment of error, the Board argues that the trial court created an impermissible double standard by admitting Boudreaux’s evidence of comparable sales from the same time period. The Board does not contend the trial court erred in allowing evidence of these comparable sales. In fact, the Board believes this admission was correct. Rather, the Board complains that by allowing testimony on these other sales, the trial court "compounded” its error in excluding all evidence on the subject property’s 2004 purchase price.
      The Board's double standard argument collapses into the Board’s assignment of error concerning the exclusion of the 2004 purchase price. Further, we note that this double standard was not contemporaneously pointed out to the trial court and is waived as an independent assignment of error.

      . On September 12, 2012, Boudreaux’s filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude all evidence relating to the 2004 purchase price of the subject property. The record on appeal does not contain the Board’s opposition to the motion in limine, but instead contains only the Board's Motion to Strike Boudreaux's motion in limine as untimely filed. Nor does the docket contain any entry establishing that the Board actually filed opposition. Nevertheless, Boudreaux’s reply to the Board’s opposition is within the record as is Boudreaux's reference to the Board's opposition it its briefing to this Court. Boudreaux’s conduct and statements leads us to conclude that the motion in limine was opposed. Moreover, the similarity between Boudreaux’s arguments below and its arguments on appeal lead us to conclude that the content of the Board’s arguments in the trial court in fact preserved the issue for appeal.

      . The Court observed that in this statutory scheme, attorney fees were capped at 25% of the judgment. Id. at 443 n. 10.

      . In that motion, Boudreaux’s counsel noted that in camera review was necessary to limit the Board's ability to glean counsel’s strategy in other cases counsel is currently litigating in relation to the new Veterans Affairs Medical Center. This request appears reasonable and warranted.

      . La. R.S. 13:3666(A) provides that
      Witnesses called to testify in court only to an opinion founded on special study or experience in any branch of science, or to make scientific or professional examinations, and to state the results thereof, shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed by the court, with reference to the value of time employed and the degree of learning or skill required.
      La. R.S. 13:3666(A).

      . Since we do not find the fee unreasonable, we do not address the Board’s suggestion that Dr. Ragas' fee should be reduced by 29 percent, to reflect the portion of his appraisal rejected by the jury.

      . Because we do not order a reduction in costs, we pretermit any discussion of whether such a reduction impinges upon Boudreaux’s right to compensation for the full extent of its losses.


author: COOKS, Judge.

text:
    Brady GOTTE v. BARNES PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, INC.
    No. 13-420.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 12, 2014.

      Michael B. Miller, Jacqueline B. Ma-necke, Crowley, LA, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner, Brady Gotte.
    Stephen C. Resor, Amy D. Hotard, Sal-ley, Hite, Mercer & Resor, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, Barnes Personnel Management, Inc.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge and Judges SYLVIA R. COOKS and JOHN D. SAUNDERS.
   COOKS, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brady Gotte (Gotte) filed a claim for workers’ compensation against Barnes Personnel Management, Inc. (Barnes) for an on-the-job injury in 2010. Gotte and Barnes entered into a Consent Judgment in which Barnes “stipulated that Mr. Gotte was injured in the course and scope of his employment, that he is entitled to weekly indemnity benefits, reasonable and necessary medical treatment as well as penalties, attorney’s fees and cost.” Shortly thereafter, Barnes filed a disputed claim for compensation against Gotte alleging a bona-fide dispute on the following basis:

Employer has identified jobs the claimant through Voc Rehab. Dr. Henderson refuses to release claimant to return to work until he gets his dental work from Dr. Jerome Smith done. Claimant claims that Employer will not approve the dental work. This dental work was approved and treatment was scheduled. Claimant refuses to show up or schedule an appointment for examination or dental work. Employer believes this is an attempt to provide benefits[.]
1208 fraud. Claimant has lied about employer’s refusal to approval[sic] medical treatment.

Gotte filed an Answer and Reconven-tional Demand, and sent Interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents to Barnes. In his interrogatories, Gotte requested as follows:

1. As to each false statement or misrepresentation alleged to have been made by BRADY GOTTE, please state the following:
(a) Quote as best as possible each exact statement or representation made by BRADY GOTTE which you are claiming is false.
(b) As to each of the foregoing statements or representations, please state the date the statement or representation was made.
(c) As to each and every foregoing statement or representation, state the name, address, and employer of each and every person who has knowledge as to each specific statement or representation, identifying the person with the statement or representation alleged to be | ^untrue.

In response, Barnes answered Gotte’s Interrogatory number 1 as follows:

Objection, premature. Discovery is ongoing and we are currently in the process of obtaining additional information and documentation. Without waiving the objection:
a)An exact statement need not be quoted, the misrepresentations can be reflected in the documentation in this case. The Claimant is aware of the misrepresentations made by him concerning his treatment, approval of treatment, and benefits paid to him. Please see the medical records of Dr. Henderson, the deposition of Dawn Hebert, emailed medical approval of the Defendant dated September 26, 2011, Vocational Rehabilitation reports and other medicals of the Claimant concerning the approval of treatment, availability of transportation, payment of compensation benefits. See also the Southern Farm Bureau Records and Payment Ledgers regarding payment of compensation benefits. See also any and all depositions taken related to this work accident concerning the approval of treatment, availability of transportation, and payment of compensation benefits.
b) Also see the attached.
c) Persons with knowledge of these statements include Brady Gotte, Dr. Daryl Henderson, Scot Landry, Matthew Wiebersch, Jerome Smith, DDS, and Dawn Hebert.

Unsatisfied with Barnes’ answer to his interrogatory, Gotte filed a Motion to Compel Discovery. After a hearing on the motion, the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) issued a written ruling which states, in pertinent part:

[T]he Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 are GRANTED in part, requiring Barnes Personnel Management, Inc. to point plaintiff in the right direction and provide the names, addresses, and employers of each and every person who has knowledge as requested in Interrogatory No. 1(c) and Interrogatory No.2(a) & (b) and Plaintiffs Motion To Compel as to interrogatory No. 1(a) & (b) are DENIED.

Thus, the WCJ denied Gotte’s motion insofar as it requested Barnes “quote as best as possible each exact statement or representation” claimed to be false and the dates of the allegedly false statements. Subsequent to the WCJ’s ruling, Barnes filed a Supplemental and Amended Answer to Interrogatories in which it stated in response to Interrogatory No. 1:

Subject to, and without waiving its September 27, 2012 objections:
a) See the attached documents, including the deposition of Dr. Henderson, the deposition of Brady Gotte, an April 20, 2012 vocational rehab report, Southern Farm Bureau records, Dr. Henderson’s medical records, and a signed statement from Brady Gotte to Harriet Roy, provided in response to claimant’s Request for Production of Documents.
b) Specifically, claimant made misrepresentations to his health care providers and others regarding his ability to obtain transportation to scheduled appointments, as well as the status of the approval of his claims.
Defendant reserves the right to supplement the answer to this interrogatory as additional information is obtained.

Gotte thereafter filed this application for supervisory writs asserting the WCJ erred in failing to require Barnes to provide information to Gotte sufficiently specific as to its allegations of fraud so as to enable Gotte to adequately prepare a defense.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Gotte maintains that the WCJ’s denial of a portion of his Motion to Compel Discovery will result in a trial by ambush causing him irreparable harm. Indeed, if Barnes prevails in its allegations of fraud Gotte will suffer grave harm. Barnes seeks to dismiss Gotte’s workers’ compensation case and to terminate all of his medical treatment and benefits. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1208 provides in pertinent part:

A. It shall be unlawful for any person, for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment under the provisions of this Chapter, either for himself or for any other person, to willfully make a false statement or representation.
B. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether present or absent, directly or indirectly, to aid and abet an employer or claimant, or directly or indirectly, counsel an employer or claimant to willfully make a false statement or representation.
C. (1) Whoever violates any provision of this Section, when benefits claimed or payments obtained have a value of ten thousand dollars or more, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.
(2) Whoever violates any provision of this Section, when the benefits claimed or payments obtained have a value of two thousand five hundred dollars or more, but less than a value of ten thousand dollars shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both.
D. In addition to the criminal penalties provided for in Subsection C of this Section, any person violating the provisions of this Section may be assessed civil penalties by the workers’ compensation judge of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars payable to the Kids Chance Scholarship Fund, Louisiana Bar Foundation, and may be ordered to make restitution. Restitution may only be ordered for benefits claimed or payments obtained through fraud and only up to the time the employer became aware of the fraudulent conduct.
E. Any employee violating this Section shall, upon determination by workers’ compensation judge, forfeit any right to compensation benefits under this Chapter.

Gotte is entitled to information detailed enough to allow him to mount a defense against these serious accusations of fraud which, if proved, will have dire consequences to him. We agree with Gotte’s assertion that he is entitled to more specific information regarding Barnes’ allegations of fraud than that which has been provided thus far. Barnes’ response to discovery instructing Gotte to “see the attached documents” provides Gotte with no more understanding of the specific alleged incidents of fraud than he had before propounding discovery.

We have held that allegations of fraud in a workers’ compensation case is an affirmative defense (La.C.C.P. art. 1005) which must be specially pled. See Messina v. Isle of Capri Casino, 04-1061 (La.App.3 Cir.12/22/04), 891 So.2d 780, writ denied, 05-535 (La.4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1071. Once alleged, respondent is entitled to know who, what, when, where and how such alleged fraudulent statements occurred. Pointing respondent to “attached documents” and telling him to figure out the basis of the allegations made against him is disingenuous to say the least. It certainly does not serve the purpose of the discovery tools in our code of civil procedure and does not allow Gotte to prepare a defense. Gotte is simply left to joust at windmills while his employer prepares its case against him. Neither is it a sufficient reply to Gotte’s discovery requests to recite “specifically, claimant made misrepresentations to his healthcare providers and others regarding his ability to obtain transportation to scheduled appointments, as well as the status of the approval of his claims.” There is nothing “specific” about this response to Gotte’s interrogatory, and merely prefacing the response with the word “specifically” does not make it so. In Desadier v. West Frasier, Inc., 48,303, p. 3 (La.App.1 Cir.8/7/13), 122 So.3d 584, 587 (emphasis added) our sister circuit addressing allegations of a violation of La. R.S. 23:1208 succinctly stated:

The only requirements for a forfeiture of benefits under this statute are: (1) a false statement or representation; (2) willfully made; and (3) made for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment. Resweber v. Haroil Const., Co., 94-2078 [94-2708] (La.09/05/95), 660 So.2d 7. All three requirements must be present before a penalty will be imposed. Gilcrease v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 36,523 (La.App.2d Cir. 12/11/02), 843 So.2d 415. There is no requirement of prejudice to the employer; when the statute is satisfied, benefits will be forfeited for the sole reason that the claimant has willfully and deliberately attempted to defraud the workers’ compensation system, and no further requirement are to be imposed. Freeman v. Chase, 42,716 (La.App.2d Cir.12/05/07), 974 So.2d 25.
Forfeiture is a harsh remedy and must be strictly construed. An inadvertent and inconsequential false statement will not result in forfeiture of benefits. Louisiana R.S. 23:11208 does not penalize any false statement, but only those willfully made for the purpose of obtaining benefits. The relationship between the false statement and the pending claim will be probative in determining whether the statement was made willfully for the purpose of obtaining benefits. Slater v. Mid-South Extrusion, 43,343 (La.App.2d Cir.08/13/08), 989 So.2d 252.

In Arnaud v. Shaw Construction, 09-128, p. 6-7 (La.App.3 Cir.5/6/09), 12 So.3d 402 407, writ denied, 09-1249 (La.9/18/09), 17 So.3d 979 (emphasis added), we likewise held:

This court discussed La.R.S. 23:1208 in Abbeville General Hospital v. Manor, 07-1226, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/12/08), 980 So.2d 163, 165 stating:
This statute is penal in nature and must be strictly construed in favor of the one receiving benefits. Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water District, 02-439 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14. Under this provision, the employer must prove: (1) there is a false statement or representation; (2) it is willfully made; and, (3) it is made for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment. Resweber v. Haroil Constr. Co., 94-2708 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 7.
Nevertheless, this court has held that “[b]enefits are not terminated under the section for false statements that are inadvertent or inconsequential, but only false statements] which are determined by the workers’ compensation judge, as authorized by La. R.S. 23: 1208, to be willfully made for the purpose of obtaining or defeating benefits, (citations omitted).

In order to mount his defense and establish whether any alleged false statements amount to no more .than “inadvertent and inconsequential false statements,” or whether the alleged statements are even false, Gotte must be informed with far more specificity than Barnes has provided. “As a general rule, parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” Moss v. State of Louisiana through D.O.T.D., 05-1963, p. 6 (La.4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1191. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1422 provides the scope of discovery:

Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this Chapter, the scope of discovery is as set forth in this Article and in Articles 1423 through 1425.
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

In Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 433 So.2d 125, 129 (La.1983) the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the objectives of the discovery provisions in Louisiana which are based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

The basic objectives of the Louisiana discovery process are (1) to afford all parties a fair opportunity to obtain facts pertinent to the litigation, (2) to discover the true facts and compel disclosure of these facts wherever they may be found, (3) to assist litigants in preparing their cases for trial, (4) to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (5) to facilitate and expedíate (sic) the legal process by encouraging settlement or abandonment of less than meritorious claims. State v. Spruell, 243 La. 202, 142 So.2d 396 (9162); Bennett v. General Motors Corp., 420 So.2d 531 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1982); Comment, Louisiana’s Discovery Articles: A Modern Appraisal, 22 Loy.La.Rev. 130 (1976). The discovery statutes are to be liberally and broadly construed to achieve its intended objectives. See generally, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); Burns v. Thiokal [Thiokol] Chemical Corporation, 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.1973); 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2001, p. 17 (1970 ed.).
Articles 1422-1425 of the Code of Civil Procedure define the scope of permissible discovery and are applicable to all discovery devices. See Marist, p. 162. Generally, the articles permit discovery regarding any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter of the action. C.C.P. art. 1422. Consequently, the initial inquiry in most discovery problems is whether the matter sought to be discovered is relevant.

Based on the record before us, having reviewed Gotte’s discovery requests and Barnes’ responses, we find the WCJ abused its discretion in its partial denial of Gotte’s motion to compel discovery.

It is well settled under Louisiana law that the discovery statutes are to be liberally and broadly construed to achieve their intended objectives. Bridges v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp., 08-0400, p. 3 (La.6/20/08), 983 So.2d 1256, 1258. A party generally may obtain discovery of any information which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, (citation omitted)

La. Workers’ Compensation Corp., v. Quality Exterior Services, L.L.C., 2011 CW 1197, p. 3-1 (La.App.1 Cir.5/2/12), 92 So.3d 1034, 1036.

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the WCJ’s denial of Gotte’s Motion To Compel Discovery as to Interrogatory No. 1(a) & (b). Barnes is ordered to provide Gotte sufficiently specific information regarding any alleged false statements that form the basis of Barnes’ allegations of fraud including what the alleged false statements are, the date on which any alleged false statement was made, the circumstances under which any alleged false statement was made, and to whom were any such alleged false statements made. In all other respects the ruling of the WCJ is affirmed.

Writ Granted.