author: CLARK, Justice.

text:
    Jane DOE v. SOUTHERN GYMS, LLC, et al.
    Nos. 2012-C-1566, 2012-C-1572, 2012-C-1580.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 19, 2013.

      Gieger, Laborde & Laperouse, LLC, Robert Irwin Siegel, Esq., A. Simone Manuel, Esq., New Orleans, LA, for Applicant (No. 2012-C-1566).
    Powers, Sellers & Chapoton, LLP, Douglas Michael Chapoton, Esq., Baton Rouge, LA, for Applicant (No. 2012-C-1572).
    Juneau David, APLC, Robert Jefferson David, Jr., Esq., Lafayette, LA, for Applicant (No. 2012-C-1580).
    Timmy James Fontenot, Esq., Mamou, LA, Fayard & Honeycutt, D. Blayne Ho-neycutt, Esq., The Law Office of Calvin C. Fayard Jr., APLC, Calvin Clifford Fayard, Jr., Esq., Denham Springs, LA, for Respondent (Nos. 2012-C-1566, 2012-C-1572, 2012-C-1580).
   CLARK, Justice.

hWe granted certiorari in these three consolidated writ applications to determine whether the lower courts correctly applied the standards for analyzing class action certification set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591, et seq. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find the lower courts erred in concluding the plaintiff satisfied the threshold requirement of numer-osity, necessary for class certification. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court which granted plaintiffs motion for class certification.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sometime in April of 2010, the plaintiff in this matter, Jane Doe, was contacted by detectives in the Baton Rouge Police Department and asked to identify whether she was the subject of a photograph, obtained from a video, captured by a pen camera which had been surreptitiously placed in the women’s 12shower/changing room of a fitness center in downtown Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The plaintiff was a member of a gym called “Anytime Fitness,” a fitness center owned by Southern Gyms, LLC (“Southern Gyms”). Southern Gyms purchased a franchise for the fitness center from an out-of-state corporation known as Anytime Fitness, Inc. The plaintiff identified herself for police as the woman in the photograph.

Further investigation by police revealed that an assistant manager and trainer at the fitness center, Terry Telschow (“Tel-schow”), secretly videotaped the plaintiff and other women in the women’s shower/changing room of the gym. The police told the plaintiff her image was one of four women discovered on the pen camera when the pen camera was turned over to police on April 5, 2010. Telschow was arrested on April 23, 2010, and was prosecuted for video voyeurism. He ultimately pleaded guilty to four counts of video voyeurism — one count for each of the four women whose images were found on the pen camera — and was sentenced to a nine month term of imprisonment.

On June 25, 2010, plaintiff filed a pleading entitled “Class Action Petition for Damages” in Evangeline Parish on behalf of herself and others similarly situated. Made defendants in the action were Tel-schow; Southern Gyms; Anytime | ¡jFitness; and Southern Gyms’ insurer, later identified as Lexington Insurance Company. The plaintiff alleged causes of action in negligence against Southern Gyms, Anytime Fitness, and its employees for failing to properly supervise its employees and in failing or neglecting to protect its patrons from the criminal acts of others. In addition, the plaintiff directed allegations of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress toward Telschow, individually.

A hearing on the motion for class certification was held on August 5, 2011. Tel-schow’s deposition was admitted into evidence without objection. In his deposition, Telschow stated he placed the pen camera in the women’s shower/changing room at the gym on 10-15 days between mid-November of 2009 until the pen camera was discovered on April 5, 2010. On each of these days, the pen camera would record from 1-2 hours. There were many days he would fail to obtain any images, since the camera angle would be wrong. However, in addition to the images of the four women found on the pen camera by police on April 5, 2010, Telschow admitted he had videotaped at least five other women in various stages of undress, and about 20 women doing non-intimate things like washing their hands or face, or combing their hair. Telschow stated he erased the video images after he viewed them; thus, the only videotapes which remained on the pen camera were of the four women found by police, which Telschow never saw. Tel-schow denied ever downloading the images of women videotaped to his computer or sending them to others.

The plaintiff testified in person at the hearing, describing how she found out from the police that she had been surreptitiously videotaped. The plaintiff explained her willingness to be class representative in the proceeding and her general knowledge about the suit. She introduced into evidence a “Club Usage Report,” which showed all of the members (men and women) who used the gym ^between November 2, 2009 and February 8, 2010, based on the key swipe system for entrance into the fitness center.

The parties’ memoranda, including exhibits, were also admitted in evidence. One of the exhibits to a defense memorandum was a copy of the bill of information charging Telschow with four counts of video voyeurism. The defendants also introduced copies of two separate lawsuits filed in East Baton Rouge Parish against them by two other women who were videotaped by Telschow on April 5, 2010. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge took the question of class certification under advisement and requested post-hearing briefs.

The hearing on the motion for class certification was again heard on August 24, 2011, in connection with the defendants’ motion to transfer for forum non conve-niens. Although the district judge expressed doubt as to the correctness of proceeding with the case as a class action due to the speculative nature of the plaintiffs evidence of other aggrieved parties, he decided to err on the side of caution and certify the class. In a judgment on the motion for class certification signed on September 21, 2011, the district judge defined the class as:

All females who physically entered the women’s restroom/locker room/changing room at Anytime Fitness, 200 Government Street, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802, from November 1, 2009, through and including April 5, 2010.

Defendants appealed the ruling to the court of appeal, arguing the plaintiff failed to bear her burden of proving that class certification, under La. C.C.P. art. 591 et seq., was the proper procedural vehicle for maintaining this action. The main focus of the defendants’ argument was their assertion the plaintiff failed to prove the threshold requirement of showing the class was so numerous as to make joinder impractical.

IsThe court of appeal disagreed with the defendants’ assertions and affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court noted Anytime Fitness, the franchisor, was “a nationwide business entity which allows its members to use any location, nationwide;” therefore, the appellate court believed “there is potential for aggrieved parties to be located not only in Louisiana, but other states as well and, certainly, from areas outside of Baton Rouge, Louisiana.” As to the threshold requirement of numerosity, the court of appeal stated:

The number of women provided by Doe and the various potential locations of aggrieved parties provide a basis for the trial court to find that the lack of a class action could unduly burden the courts and joinder of all interested parties is impractical. Given the above and our directive of erring on the side of maintaining the class action because the judge may always modify or amend the class at any time prior to a decision on the merits, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in ruling that Doe has met the numerosity requirement.

Likewise, the court of appeal found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its conclusions as to any of the other threshold requirements of class certification. Concluding there was no error by the trial court in certifying the class, the appellate court found no merit to the defendants’ arguments and affirmed.

We consolidated and granted the defendants’ separate writ applications to review the judgments of the lower courts and, in particular, to examine whether those courts engaged in the rigorous analysis required to determine whether this action meets the requirements imposed by law for class action certification.

JüLAW

General Class Actions Law

In Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 1996-2913, p. 4 (La.9/9/97); 703 So.2d 542, 544, we said:

[t]he class action is a nontraditional litigation procedure permitting a representative with typical claims to sue or defend on behalf of, and stand in judgment for, a class of similarly situated persons when the question is one of common or general interest to persons so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court. See Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, 1 Newberg on Class Actions, § 1.10, p. 1-2, 1-3 (3d ed.1992). The purpose and intent of class action procedure is to adjudicate and obtain res judicata effect on all common issues applicable not only to the representatives who bring the action, but to all others who are “similarly situated,” provided they are given adequate notice of the pending class action and do not timely exercise the option of exclusion from the class action.

Introduced into Louisiana civil procedure in 1961 and modeled after original Federal Rule 23, the Louisiana class action procedure has since been extensively revised. See Ford, 1996-2913, p. 5; 703 So.2d at 545; Dupree v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2009-2602, p. 5 (La.11/30/10); 51 So.3d 673, 679. The code of civil procedure articles governing class actions which control the present action, found in La. C.C.P. art. 591 et seq., essentially adopt current federal law regulating class actions under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 and codify this court’s prior class certification jurisprudence. Price v. Martin, 2011-0853, p. 6 (La.12/6/11); 79 So.3d 960, 966; Dupree, 2009-2602, p. 5; 51 So.3d at 679. To the extent La. C.C.P. art. 591 parallels Federal Rule 23 regarding class actions, the analysis of Louisiana’s class certification is appropriately informed by federal jurisprudence interpreting Federal Rule 23. See Price, 2011-0853, p. 7 n. 6; 79 So.3d at 967 n. 6; Dupree, 2009-2602, p. 14 n. 8; 51 So.3d at 684 n. 8.

The threshold requirements for class certification are found in La. C.C.P. art. 591(A), which provides:

A. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all, only if:
|7(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class.
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.
(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(5) The class is or may be defined objectively in terms of ascertainable criteria, such that the court may determine the constituency of the class for purposes of the conclusiveness of any judgment that may be rendered in the case.

Each of these requirements must be met for an action to be maintained as a class action; failure to meet one of these threshold requirements precludes class certification. La. C.C.P. art. 591(B).

|rA rigorous analysis must be used to determine whether a class action meets the requirements imposed by law, since this procedural device is an exception to the rule that litigation be conducted by and on behalf of the individually named parties only. Brooks v. Union Pacific R. Co., 2008-2035, p. 10 (La.5/22/09); 13 So.3d 546, 554; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011); Price, 2011-0853, p. 6; 79 So.3d at 966. Such an analysis requires the district court to

evaluate, quantify and weigh [the relevant factors] to determine to what extent the class action would in each instance promote or detract from the goals of effectuating substantive law, judicial efficiency, and individual fairness. Upon arriving at an estimate of the class action’s overall effectiveness in furthering the intertwined goals, the court must compare this with its assessment of the effectiveness of other adjudicatory methods and decide whether the class action is the superior procedural device.

McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc., 456 So.2d 612, 618 (La.1984). In doing so, “the trial court must actively inquire into every aspect of the case and should not hesitate to require showings beyond the pleadings.” Id.

“Class action rules do not set forth a mere pleading standard; rather, a party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the [class action requirements] — that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Price, 2011-0853, p. 7; 79 So.3d at 967, citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (emphasis in original, internal quotations omitted). Frequently, the “rigorous analysis” required to make the class certification determination “will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claim.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S.Ct. at 2551; see Price, 2011-0853, p. 6; 79 So.3d at 967. This overlap into the merits is not unusual or unexpected. “Going beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.” Dupree, 2009-2602, p. 7; 51 So.3d at 680, citing Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir.1996).

In reviewing a class certification, the trial court’s factual findings are subject to the manifest error standard; however, the ultimate decision of whether or not to certify the class is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Price, 2011-0853, p. 7-8; 79 So.3d at 967; Dupree, 2009-2602, p. 7; 51 So.3d at 680; Brooks, 2008-2035, p. 10; 13 So.3d at 554. “Implicit in this deferential standard is recognition of the essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and of the district court’s inherent power to manage and control pending litigation.” Dupree, 2009-2602, p. 7; 51 So.3d at 681; Brooks, 2008-2035, p. 11; 13 So.3d at 554 (internal citations omitted). Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in determining whether to certify the class is reviewed de novo. Price, 2011-0853, p. 8; 79 So.3d at 967; Brooks, 2008-2035, p. 11; 13 So.3d at 554.

The party seeking to maintain the class action has the burden of proving that all of the statutory class certification criteria have been satisfied. Price, 2011-0853, p. 9; 79 So.3d at 968; Dupree, 2009-2602, p. 10; 51 So.3d at 682. In this case, the plaintiff was first required to prove all five threshold prerequisites of La. C.C.P. art. 591(A) were met. Those prerequisites are generally referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy of representative parties, and objectively definable class. Price, 2011-0853, p. 9; 79 So.3d at 968; Dupree, 2009-2602, p. 10; 51 So.3d at 682. For reasons explained more fully below, we find the district court erred in ruling the plaintiff met her burden of proving the class was so numerous that joinder of all members was impracticable. Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the class.

In Price, we granted certiorari to examine whether the rigorous analysis required in the determination of class certification was performed by the district court, especially with regard to the requirement of commonality. Here, we examine whether the same rigorous analysis was applied to the determination of numerosity, another of the threshold requirements for class certification.

Numerosity

Representative class members may sue if “[t]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” La. C.C.P. art. 591(A)(1). Although referred to as the “numerosity” requirement, it is important to note that this prerequisite is not based on the number of class members alone. The requirement of nu-merosity is followed by, and must be considered with, the core condition of this requirement — that joinder be impracticable. See 1 William B. Rubenstein, Alba Conte, Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 3:11, p. 186 (5th ed.2011).

Although this court has not had the opportunity recently to explain the parameters of the numerosity requirement, the law is well-developed in the courts of appeal. This element is determined based upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Galjour v. Bank One Equity Investors-Bidco, Inc., 2005-1360, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/21/06); 935 So.2d 716, 724; Chiarella v. Sprint Spectrum LP; 2004-1433, p. 18 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/17/05); 921 So.2d 106, 119, writ denied, 2005-2539 (La.3/31/06); 925 So.2d 1263; Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C., 2003-0005, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/14/04); 864 So.2d 880, 887, writ denied, 2004-0572 (La.4/23/04); 870 So.2d 304; Davis v. American Home Products Corp., 2002-0942, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/26/03); 844 So.2d 242, 257, writ denied, 2003-1180 (La.6/27/03); 847 So.2d 1279; Singleton v. Northfield Ins. Co., 2001-0447, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/15/02); 826 So.2d 55, 62, writ denied, 2002-1660 (La.9/30/02); 825 So.2d 1200; West v. G & H Seed Co., 2001-1453, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/28/02); 832 So.2d 274, 282; Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 98-1232, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99); 729 So.2d 146, 154; Pulver v. 1st Lake Properties, Inc., 96-248, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/18/96); 681 So.2d 965, 968; Olavarriette v. Tonti Properties, Inc., 95-0151, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/28/95); 658 So.2d 25, 26; Lewis v. Roemer, 94-0317, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/29/94); 643 So.2d 819, 822.

In keeping with the fact this is an impracticability of joinder rule, and not merely a numbers requirement, there is no strict numerosity threshold. In other words, there is no set number above which a class is considered to have satisfied this requirement. Davis, 2003-0005, p. 7; 864 So.2d at 888; Davis, 2002-0942, p. 19; 844 So.2d at 257; Singleton, 2001-0447, p. 10; 826 So.2d at 62; West, 2001-1453, p. 10; 832 So.2d at 282; Billieson, 98-1232, p. 11; 729 So.2d at 154; Olavarriette, 1995-151, p. 3; 658 So.2d at 27; Farlough v. Smallwood, 524 So.2d 201, 203 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied 526 So.2d 810 (1988).

This condition is not met by simply alleging that a large number of potential claimants exist. West, 2001-1453, p. 10; 832 So.2d at 282; Singleton, 2001-0447, p. 10; 826 So.2d at 63; Johnson v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 2000-0825, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/27/01); 790 So.2d 734, 741, writ denied, 2001-2216, 2001-2225 (La.11/9/01); 801 So.2d 378 and 2001-2215 (La.11/9/01); 801 So.2d 379; Hampton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 98-0430, p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/1/99); 730 So.2d 1091, 1094-1095; Johnson v. E.I. Dupont deNemours & Co., Inc., 98-0229, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/14/98); 721 So.2d 41, 44; Carr v. GAF, Inc., 97-0838, p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/98); 711 So.2d 802, 806, writ denied, 98-1244 (La.6/19/98); 721 So.2d 472; Pulver, 96-0248, p. 5; 681 So.2d at 968. Rather, a party must show that joinder is impractical and there is a definable group of aggrieved persons. Davis, 2002-0942, p. 19; 844 So.2d at 257; West, 2001-1453, p. 10; 832 So.2d at 282; Hampton, 98-0430, p. 8; 730 So.2d at 1095; Johnson, 98-0229, p. 6; 721 So.2d at 44; Pulver, 96-0248, p. 5; 681 So.2d at 968; Olavarriette, 1995-0151, p. 3; 658 So.2d at 26; Farlough, 524 So.2d at 203.

While there must be proof of a definable group of aggrieved persons, a plaintiff is not required to identify every member of the potential class prior to certification. McCastle, 456 So.2d at 620; Galjour, 2005-1360, p. 9; 935 So.2d at 723-724; Chiarella, 2004-1433, p. 19; 921 So.2d at 119; Davis, 2003-0005, p. 7; 864 So.2d at 888; Davis, 2002-0942, p. 19; 844 So.2d at 257; West, 2001-1453, p. 10; 832 So.2d at 282; Singleton, 2001-0447, p. 10; 826 So.2d at 62; Billieson, 98-1232, p. 11; 729 So.2d at 154; Lewis, 94-0317, p. 5; 643 So.2d at 822.

Although not as well-developed or relied on as the preceding guidelines, various other factors have developed in the jurisprudence for determining the practicality of joinder of a large number of potential class members, including: (1) the geographic dispersion of the class; (2) the ease with which class members may be identified; (3) the nature of the action; (4) the size of the individual claims; (5) judicial economy in avoiding a multiplicity of lawsuits; and (6) financial resources of class members. See Galjour, 2005-1360, p. 10; 935 So.2d at 724; Davis, 2003-0005, p. 7; 864 So.2d at 888. We find these factors may also inform a district court’s determination whether the proposed class has a sufficient number of members so that joinder is impracticable.

DISCUSSION

At the first hearing on the motion for class certification, the district judge expressed concern the plaintiff failed to present sufficient proof of the threshold requirement of numerosity. The district judge continued to have those concerns 1 isafter the matter was argued a second time before him. In ruling, the district judge noted he was aware he could decer-tify the class in the future, and stated:

That’s the issue whether we have enough people to make it worthwhile. And I guess the best thing to protect these people is I’m gonna err on the side of caution. I’ll certify this, but I’m going to leave the door open because I am very aware of the fact that I can decertify it.... [Judge tells plaintiffs counsel he must find some way to show there are more than four aggrieved parties] ... Cause if they come back and say there’s no people and they’ve got something to back that up and you don’t have anything to show that there are [sic; is] no one other than those that are aggrieved other than the four, I’m gonna decertify this. I’m telling you I’m leaning. This is a very weak certification in my opinion. And if written reasons are required, I am ruling and finding as a finding of fa[c]t that because of the claim ... this particular type of claim where we’ve got this person filming, we don’t know how long he filmed, how many people he filmed. The potential emotional distress cause[d] by that will satisfy the numerosity if those people are shown to have damages. But I’m gonna classify it at this point to protect their rights. And all of the factors enumerated in the Code of Civil Procedure Article 591 have been met in my opinion.

The court of appeal also noted its “directive of erring on the side of maintaining the class action because the judge may always modify or amend the class at any time prior to a decision on the merits....”

We initially find the court of appeal failed to appreciate the district court’s determination as to numerosity was a factual one. The court of appeal should have reviewed that factual determination for manifest error, rather than an abuse of discretion. Moreover, all of the district court’s determinations regarding the threshold requirements to class certification were factual ones, which should have been reviewed for manifest error.

Further, in failing to subject plaintiffs evidence to the rigorous analysis required by law, and in certifying a class when the evidence failed to show there were, in fact, a sufficient number of other aggrieved parties to make joinder impracticable, the lower courts failed to heed our directive, often-repeated, in Brooks, Dupree, and Price. We reiterate that instruction here:

To the extent that language in McCastle, particularly the statement that “[i]f there is to be an error made, it should be in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action” McCastle, 456 So.2d at 620, has been interpreted by courts as relaxing the plaintiffs’ burden in establishing the appropriateness of the class action for a particular case or the court’s role in evaluating whether the required statutory showing has been met, it has been misinterpreted. This general rule does not obviate the requirement that courts employ a “rigorous analysis” and take a “close look” at a case to determine if, in fact, the statutory requirements have been satisfied before accepting it as a class action.

With this directive in mind, we will review the evidence introduced by plaintiff at the class certification hearing and review the arguments presented in favor of that procedure. Plaintiff argued she did not need a videotape to maintain an action for invasion of privacy. In other words, the fact that Telschow deleted or erased the videotapes he had taken of women in the shower/changing room did not prohibit proceeding as a class action. The plaintiff claimed she presented evidence that approximately 250-S00 women were affected by the common event of Telschow’s illegal videotaping.

Louisiana recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy, which “is directed at redressing the damage which an individual suffers when legally recognized elements of his right to privacy have been violated.” Tate v. Woman’s Hosp. Foundation, 2010-0425, p. 3-4 (La.1/19/11); 56 So.3d 194, 197. One of the four ways in which the tort of invasion of privacy may occur is when a person “unreasonably intrudes on [someone’s] physical solitude or seclusion.” Tate, 2010-0435, p. 4; 56 So.3d at 197.

In her argument, the plaintiff distinguishes two cases with somewhat similar facts. In the first case, Meche v. Wal-Mart Stores, 96-0981 (La.App. 3 Cir.3/5/97); 692 So.2d 544, writ denied, 97-0888 (La.5/9/97); 693 So.2d 760, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1002, 118 S.Ct. 574, 139 L.Ed.2d 413 (1997), an overly zealous | lsWal-Mart security employee placed a closed circuit television camera in the ceiling of a unisex employee restroom. Testimony established the receiver had never been connected to either a monitor or a recording device and no one had viewed or taped anyone in the restroom. The camera, in place for three days only, was immediately removed upon discovery. Id., 96-0981, p. 3-4; 692 So.2d at 546. The jury .rejected the employees’ claims of invasion of privacy. Id., 1996-0981, p. 2; 692 So.2d at 545. On appeal, the employees objected to the jury instruction which required a viewing or recording of one of the plaintiffs in the restroom to prove that claim. The court of appeal affirmed the jury’s decision, finding no clear error in the court’s instruction, as Louisiana law does not recognize an attempted invasion of privacy. Id.

Here, plaintiff contends the proposed class is not presenting a claim for attempted invasion of privacy. Telschow testified in his deposition that he actually obtained and viewed videotapes of women in the shower/changing room of the fitness center. The plaintiff argues, in this case, actual invasions of privacy occurred.

The plaintiff also distinguishes the case of Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2003-1582 (La.4/7/04); 870 So.2d 531, writ denied, 2004-1146 (La.6/25/04); 876 So.2d 845. In Smith, a class was certified, consisting of female customers who could prove they used a restroom where a surveillance camera had been placed. Unlike Smith, where the proposed class members will know whether they entered the customer’s restroom between certain days, the plaintiff argues the potential class members here will never know whether they are on videotape. Insofar as this position seeks to lessen the plaintiffs burden of proof on class certification, it is unavailing.

| ifiTelschow’s deposition testimony shows he started placing the pen camera in the women’s shower/changing room at the fitness center in mid-to-late November of 2009. He would place the camera in the room when he entered to clean. He testified he placed the camera on 10-15 days, for 1 to 2 hours of videotaping on each attempt. He claimed there was much trial and error involved in the placement of the camera, and that he rarely obtained a viewable image. There are no records of which particular days Telschow worked at the fitness center; he was paid based on the total hours he worked. Telschow only operated the pen camera when he was physically on the premises.

Telschow claimed there were a total of five different women he captured on videotape in some stage of undress which he observed. Added to this number are the images of the four women retrieved from the hard drive of the pen camera by the police when the device was turned over to them. Approximately 20 women were videotaped performing routine tasks such as washing their face or hands, or brushing their hair. Except for the videotape with the four women discovered on the camera by police, all of the other videotapes were deleted by Telschow. He claimed he never shared the images with anyone, never posted the images on the internet, and did not keep those images on any other device. Telschow stated the police seized his home computer and checked it for any illegally-obtained images. He assumes none were found because he was not prosecuted for any other incidences. Telschow only knew one of the women he videotaped, who was a client whom he trained. Otherwise, Telschow does not know any of the women he videotaped, does not remember any of them, and would not be able to identify |17or recognize any of them.

Although the plaintiff testified that she probably entered the women’s shower/changing room each time she went to the fitness center, she did not know whether every other woman who entered the gym did so. She had no knowledge about any other women who were captured on videotape by Telschow. She did not know how many other women were videotaped. She did not know how many days, or on which days, Telschow operated the pen camera in the women’s shower/changing room. She had no information or knowledge about any damages or injuries suffered by any other woman who went to the gym between November of 2009 and April 5, 2010. The plaintiff never saw any videotape evidence of any other woman, although she was told by police that three other women were videotaped the same day she was. She understood the police recovered all the deleted files from the pen camera. She understood Telschow was prosecuted for what was found on the camera, and that the formal charges were four counts of video voyeurism. She never spoke to anyone at the gym about being videotaped and does not know any of the other women who were videotaped. The plaintiff was not aware that two other women filed suit in East Baton Rouge Parish against the defendants.

At the class certification hearing, the plaintiff bore the burden of proving that there were a sufficient number of aggrieved parties, in fact, such that join-der was impracticable. The plaintiff failed to present evidence that would support this threshold requirement.

Although the party seeking class certification does not have to identify each class member at the certification hearing, an aspect of presenting evidence of a defined group of aggrieved persons includes the fact that those persons are identifiable in some way. See e.g. Singleton, 2001-0447, p. 11; 826 So.2d at 68 (documents established there were several hundred known individuals who were 118potentially damaged by an oil well blowout); Davis, 2002-0942, p. 20; 844 So.2d at 257-258 (the class was definable and could be easily identified because the class had been surgically implanted with a contraceptive device, the subject of the class action lawsuit); Billieson, 98-1232, p. 11-12; 729 So.2d at 154-155 (potential class members identifiable by extensive documentation of the number of children in public housing and inspections of housing units for presence of lead every time a child tested positive for lead in routine screening).

The evidence adduced at the class certification casts doubt on the fact that any women, other than the four whose images were found by police, will ever be aware they were videotaped by Telschow. Tel-schow could not identify any of the women he videotaped, other than the one whom he trained. He claims the other videotapes are deleted. Although the plaintiff speculates otherwise, there was no evidence to show that any of the deleted videotapes exist. See Meche, 96-0981, p. 6; 692 So.2d at 547 (plaintiffs’ allegations were rejected where defendants presented testimony no videotapes were ever made and plaintiffs disputed that contention).

On the one hand, the plaintiff wants Telschow’s testimony credited when he states he obtained videotapes of several women; however, the plaintiff does not believe his testimony that those videotapes were never shared and were deleted (other than the four which were discovered on the pen camera on the day of its discovery). Only in this way can the plaintiff contend, in the absence of proof, that there may be other videotapes which may surface at some later time. Such speculation has no place where proof is required.

While we agree with the plaintiff there is no requirement of the existence of a videotape to prove an invasion of privacy under these circumstances, and we find the actions of Telschow to be reprehensible and criminal, those facts do not change the requirement of proof at a class certification hearing or convince us that a class 119action is a superior method of maintaining this suit. The plaintiff in this case testified she had no evidence of any damage or injuries suffered by others and no evidence of a causal link between Tel-schow’s actions and any purported damages. Failing to present evidence of a definable group of aggrieved persons, the plaintiff fails to prove a sufficient number of persons exist which make joinder impracticable. In fact, the evidence adduced showed joinder would be an efficient manner to proceed with this lawsuit. Of the nine women for whom there is some evidence that they were videotaped by Tel-schow, three of them, including the plaintiff, have filed their own lawsuits.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the district court manifestly erred in finding the threshold requirement of La. C.C.P. art. 591(A)(1) — the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable — was proved. As a consequence, we find the district court abused its discretion in accepting this matter as a class action and in certifying the class. We therefore reverse the appellate court’s judgment affirming the district court’s class action certification, reverse the district court’s ruling granting the motion for class certification and certifying the class, and remand the case for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Justice JEFFERSON D. HUGHES III was assigned as Justice pro tempore sitting for KIMBALL, C.J. for oral argument, and sits as an elected Justice at the time this opinion is being rendered.

      . Justice Jefferson D. Hughes III was assigned as Justice pro tempore sitting for Kim-ball, C.J. for oral argument, and sits as an elected Justice at the time this opinion is being rendered.

      . Due to the nature of the allegations of the petition, which make reference to the plaintiff as a victim of a sex offense, the plaintiff has been referred to throughout this case by the pseudonym “Jane Doe,’’ pursuant to La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

      . The fitness center is located in East Baton Rouge Parish, which is in the 19 th Judicial District.

      . The name of the fitness center in Baton Rouge is the same as the name of the foreign corporation which sold the fitness center franchise to Southern Gyms. In this opinion, “Anytime Fitness” will henceforth refer to the foreign corporation. To avoid confusion, the fitness center will not again be referred to by its name.

      . Exceptions of improper venue were denied by the district court. Lower court judgments denying the defendants’ motion to transfer for fomm non conveniens were reversed by this court and the matter was transferred to the 19th Judicial District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish. See Doe v. Southern Gyms, L.L.C., 2012-0448 (La.5/4/12); 88 So.3d 447. The court of appeal opinion we review here originates as the appeal from the original district court’s granting of the motion for class certification. This appellate judgment was rendered after our decision to transfer the matter to a different district court (with a different appellate court), but before that decision became final. Recognizing this court would have supervisory jurisdiction over the question of class certification whether the appeal arose out of the transferee appellate court or the transferor appellate court, we decide the issue presented for the sake of judicial efficiency, rather than remand to have the question of class certification tried anew in the transferee district court. Consequently, we do not reach the defendants' assignment of error regarding the court of appeal's authority to render the decision we are reviewing.

      . Although counsel stated the report covered from November 2, 2009 through April 5, 2010 (the date the pen camera was discovered), the report shows the computer printout of sequential days ends with February 8, 2010.

      . The four women were identified on the bill of information by their initials.

      . Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC, 2012-0140 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12); 92 So.3d 654.

      . Doe, 2012-0140, p. 5-6; 92 So.3d at 659. We note the Club Usage Report indicates when members from other franchises in other geographic areas took advantage of reciprocal membership. The areas where these members originate are noted on the computer printout. Our review shows the gym in Baton Rouge was used by persons with memberships in other gyms from around the state, and by a few people from outside the state.

      . Id.

      . Id., 2012-0140, p. 7-8; 92 So.3d at 660.

      . Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC, 2012-1566 (La.11/21/12); 102 So.3d 47 c/w 2012-1572 (La.11/21/12); 102 So.3d 48 c/w 2012-1580 (La.11/21/12); 102 So.3d 48.

      . Once the threshold requirements of Section (A) are met, the party requesting class certification must satisfy additional requirements found in La. C.C.P. art. 591(B). Section (B) of the article provides:
      B. An action may be maintained as a class action only if all of the prerequisites of Paragraph A of this Article are satisfied, and in addition:
      (1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of:
      (a) Inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
      (b) Adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
      (2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
      (3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
      (a) The interest of the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
      (b) The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
      (c) The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum;
      (d) The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action;
      (e) The practical ability of individual class members to pursue their claims without class certification;
      (f) The extent to which the relief plausibly demanded on behalf of or against the class, including the vindication of such public policies or legal rights as may be implicated, justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation; or
      (4)The parties to a settlement request certification under Subparagraph B(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of Subparagraph B(3) might not otherwise be met.

      . R. Vol. 3, p. 524-525.

      . Doe, 2012-0140, p. 6; 92 So.3d at 659.

      . Price, 2011-0853, p. 7 n. 8; 79 So.3d at 967 n. 8.

      . This assertion would seem to eliminate potential claimants who could allege only a fear that an invasion of privacy might have occurred.

      . Thus, the plaintiff presented evidence that only a total of nine women were videotaped in various stages of undress.

      . Even if these women could be identified to present their claims, we do not find under these circumstances that 29 proposed class members would make joinder impracticable.

      .The record shows this woman is one who has filed a separate suit against the defendants in the 19th Judicial District.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Okyeame WOODARD.
    No. 2012-KO-2371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Woodard, Okyeame; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 256,273; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-286-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles L. BERGERON.
    No. 2012-K-2388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Bergeron, Charles; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 15984-08; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-71.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald A. SCHEXNAYDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2482.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Schexnayder, Ronald A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 77-95; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1311.

Denied.

WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ„ would remand to trial court for a hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David HENRY, Jr.
    No. 2012-KO-2520.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Henry Jr., David; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 491-987; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1137.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert LETELL.
    No. 2012-KO-2533.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Letell, Robert; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 482,950; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0180.

„ . , Denied.

WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carl N. NOVEL.
    No. 2012-KO-2543.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Novel, Carl N.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 488-157; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1569.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael V. OWENS.
    No. 2012-OK-2548.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Owens, Michael V.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 111838; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1258.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tashon D. SANCHELL.
    No. 2012-K-2554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Sanchell, Tashon D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 502-371; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1672.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory RANSOM.
    No. 2012-KO-2560.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Ransom, Gregory; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 01-10-0078; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0657.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Benjamin H. BRUCE.
    No. 2012-KO-2568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Bruce, Benjamin H.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 10-4584; to the Court of 'Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-991.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cherie PEREZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Perez, Cherie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2004-407164; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1543.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clevern GRANGER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2587.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Granger, Clevern; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 09-1789; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-193.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Noel A. DEAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Dean, Noel A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 403-447; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1566.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthew Juan DUDLEY.
    No. 2012-KO-2593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Dudley, Matthew Juan; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 02-09-0670; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA 0640.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert LaTroy WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re White, Robert LaTroy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 434333; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1427.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard LAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Lay, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 11-CR5-112033; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2012 KW 1231, 2012 KW 1522.

Denied.

WEIMER and HUGHES, JJ, recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard Delbert BAZILE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Bazile, Richard Delbert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 499577; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1596.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edmond D. SPENCER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re’ Spencer, Edmond D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 12WCR312; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1171.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terrell James SUGGS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2638.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Suggs, Terrell James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 08-6038; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 12-KH-778, 12-KH-778.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James Lee WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2661.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Washington, James Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 8-92-1100; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1458.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Percy M. TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Taylor, Percy M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 88^4180; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-813.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Elbert WHITE, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2663.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re White Jr., Elbert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 165,915; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-878-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Priscilla Rogers REINOWSKI.
    No. 2013-OC-0375.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Reinowski, Robert Edward; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st. Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 537,370; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-513-CA.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley TUCKER.
    No. 2013-KK-0412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 513-436; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1769.

Denied.


text:
    Lynn B. DEAN and Elevating Boats, Inc. v. DELACROIX CORPORATION and the Parish of Plaquemines.
    No. 2013-C-0485.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Dean, Lynn B.; Elevating Boats, Inc.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 49-619; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0917.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    ARABIE BROTHERS TRUCKING CO. & American Interstate Insurance Co. v. Mary GAUTREAUX (Substituted Party) o/b/o Patrick GAUTREAUX (Deceased) & Graham Neill, individually & as Owner of A & G Tree & Stump Removal and A & G Tree & Stump Removal.
    No. 2013-C-0536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Gautreaux, Mary; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 9, No. 00-07938; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0849.

Denied.


text:
    Doretha Z. WALKER, et al. v. AMID/METRO PARTNERSHIP, LLC, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re City of New Orleans; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2007-14794; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0285.

Denied.


text:
    Doretha Z. WALKER, et al. v. AMID/METRO PARTNERSHIP, LLC, et al.
    No. 2013-C-0602.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re AMID/ Metro Partnership L.L.C. et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2007-14794; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-0285.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard PERKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Perkins, Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 91-1188; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-631.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. 2002 CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER (In re Nathaniel White).
    No. 2013-C-0639.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re White, Nathaniel; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, No. 488-63; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-1088.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    PHILLIP FAMILY L.L.C. and Beverly Construction Company, LLC v. BAYOU FLEET PARTNERSHIP.
    No. 2013-C-0641.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Bayou Fleet Partnership; Bayou Fleet, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 63,608; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-565.

Denied.


text:
    Thomas CLARK v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2013-C-0642.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re City of New Orleans; Department of Police; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil Service Commission City of New Orleans, No. 7890; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1274.

Denied.


text:
    Tammy Dykes CAUSEY, Individually, and on Behalf of Her Minor Children, Casey Dykes and Jackson Dykes v. WILLIS-KNIGHTON HEALTH SYSTEMS d/b/a Willis-Knighton North Medical Center.
    No. 2013-CC-0645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Willis-Knighton Health Systems d/b/a Willis-Knighton North Medical Center; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cad-do, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 558,607; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48113-CW.

Denied.


text:
    John ROBERTS, et ux. v. Don MARX, M.D., et al.
    No. 2013-C-0649.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Roberts et ux., John; Roberts, Kim; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Oua-chita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 10-4032; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,658-CA.

Denied.

HUGHES, J., would grant.


text:
    Patricia Ewing HENDRICK, Individually and as Trustee of the Robert Ewing Trust Under Will v. Benton PATTERSON, Jr., AIA, and Neff Construction, Inc.
    No. 2013-C-0650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Neff Construction Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 494;150; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,668-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony KEMPER.
    No. 2013-KK-0651.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Kemper, Anthony; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 300,565; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,-232-KW.

Denied.


text:
    Brett GABRIEL v. LAFOURCHE PARISH WATER DISTRICT.
    No. 2013-C-0653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Gabriel, Brett; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 9, No. 11-06892; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 12 CA 0797.

Denied.

HUGHES, J„ recused.


text:
    LOMARK, INC., Jasco, Inc., Northshore Shell Carwash, Inc., CSV Enterprises, Inc., Riverbend Shell, Inc., Victory Fuel Enterprises, L.L.C. and Laguardia and McAdams Enterprises, Inc. v. LAVIGNEBAKER PETROLEUM, L.L.C.
    No. 2013-C-0654.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Lavignebaker Petroleum L.L.C.;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 701-968; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-389.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL SPECIALTY, L.L.C. v. RAINBOW USA, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0655.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Qmedtrix Systems, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 07-04069; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 12-01219.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL SPECIALTY HOSPITAL, L.L.C. v. RAINBOW USA, INC., et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0667.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Pennsylvania Manufacturers Indemnity Company; Rainbow USA, Inc.;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 07-04069; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 12-01194.

Denied.


text:
    Patricia Ewing HENDRICK, et al. v. Benton PATTERSON, Jr., et al.
    No. 2013-C-0670.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re deBerardinis, David; deBerardi-nis, Nicholas; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 494,150; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,668-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Adam G. MORIN v. Shannon FOSTER and Donald W. Foster.
    No. 2013-CC-0671.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Morin, Adam G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 686-238; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-C-911.

Denied.


text:
    Nicole Y. COSSE v. Ivan A. ORIHUELA.
    No. 2013-C-0680.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Orihuela, Ivan A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, Jefferson Parish First City Court, No. 150-872; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-456.

Denied.


text:
    Jonathan Heath CARPENTER v. Erin Maxine McDONALD.
    No. 2013-CJ-0747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re McDonald, Erin Maxine; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 41308; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CU 1460.

Denied.


text:
    PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. John L. MORRISON, and First American Title Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-CD-0938.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 26, 2013.
   In re Mack, Sherman Q.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 140577.

Writ granted. Motion to continue granted.


text:
    Eber J. BEADLE, v. Kemp Joseph DAVID, et al. Davina Broussard v. Kemp Joseph David. Lauren Norris LeBlanc, et al. v. Kemp Joseph David, et al. State Farm Fire and Casualty v. Kemp Joseph David, et al. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. Geico General Ins. Co., et al. Kimberly F. Menard v. Kemp Joseph David, et al.
    No. 2013-CC-0392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re David, Kemp Joseph; Geico General Ins. Co.; Defendants (s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 1, 2013; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2010-6511, 2010-7498, 2010-8045, 2011-2417, 2011-3086, AND 2011-3146; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-01022.

Reconsideration granted; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bonifacio RAMIREZ.
    No. 2013-K-0276.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Ramirez, Bonifacio; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. CR-137924; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 12-01245.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rosa Lugo MARQUEZ.
    No. 2013-KK-0315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Marquez, Rosa Lugo; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. CR 137121; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW12-01316.

Granted.


text:
    Barbara SHAW v. ACADIAN BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, LLC.
    No. 2013-C-0397.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Shaw, Barbara; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 92,993; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 2164.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antywane WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Williams, Antywane; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 192617,192618; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,892-KH.

Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, is directed to supply relator with a copy of the appellate record and to afford him sufficient time to prepare a pro se supplemental brief for his pending appeal. State v. Stewart, 99-0113 (La.1/29/99), 736 So.2d 820; State v. Gibbs, 98-2403 (La.9/16/98), 724 So.2d 743; State v. Melon, 95-2209 (La.9/22/95), 660 So.2d 466.

KNOLL, WEIMER and CLARK, JJ., would deny.


text:
    Rusty Dean BISHOP v. CLICKS BATON ROUGE, INC., d/b/a Click’s Billards Inc., First Mercury Insurance Co., Casey Sharkey, William Warbington and Terry Pitre.
    No. 2013-CC-0502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Clicks Baton Rouge, Inc., D/B/A Click’s Billards Inc.; Pitre, Terry; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 597789; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 2096.

Granted. Plaintiff presented no evidence establishing relators’ actions or inac-tions caused his injuries. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and relators’ motion for summary judgment is granted. See Thrasher v. Leggett, 373 So.2d 494 (La.1979).


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-ADMIN-1067.
    No. 2013-OB-0764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Williams, Patrick W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(A).


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 10-DB-006.
    No. 2013-OB-0696.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re O’Dwyer, Ashton R.; — Other; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 10-DB-006.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry J. McKITHERN.
    No. 2012-KO-1653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re McKithern, Larry J.; — Defendant; Applying For Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated March 1, 2013, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 3678-11, 25391-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 11-1402,11-1111.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Montie B. MONTGOMERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Montgomery, Montie B.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated March 15, 2013. and from Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 73,274; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-648-KW.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mozine JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-2505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Johnson, Mozine; Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 5, 2013; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 05-2244; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-647.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    REGIONS BANK d/b/a Regions Mortgage v. Bertha Dakin RAUCH a/k/a Bertha Dakin, Bertha D. Rauch, Berta Rauch.
    No. 2013-C-0201.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Bertha Dakin Rauch a/k/a Bertha Dakin, Bertha D. Rauch, Berta Rauch;— Defendant; Applying For Reconsideration of this court’s order dated April 1, 2013, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 10-13504; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0232.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Renea FANGUY v. LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY and Michael Graham, M.D.
    No. 2013-C-0114.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Fanguy, Renea; — Plaintiff; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated April 1, 2013, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 700027; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-136 C/W ll-C-1102.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    Matilda Christina ROBICHEAUX v. Darryle TATE, Deron Carey and State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-0176.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Robicheaux, Matilda Christina;— Plaintiff; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s order dated April 1, 2013, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 37,207; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0241.

Rehearing denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Matilda Christina ROBICHEAUX v. Darryle TATE, Deron Carey and State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 2013-C-176.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2013.
   In re Subcontracting Concepts, Inc.;— Defendant; Applying For Rehearing, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 37,207; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CA 0241.

Rehearing denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


author: GUIDRY, J.

text:
    Juanita Christine PAULSELL, as curator of the Interdict Patricia Jolynn Paulsell-Lathrop v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Michael A. Laviolette, ABC Helmet Distributing Company, DEF Labeling Company, GHI Helmet Manufacturing Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2012 CA 0396.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Dec. 28, 2012.

      Nelson W. Wagar, III, Sarah Ney, Me-tairie, LA, Michael C. Palmintier, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant, Juanita Christine Paulsell, as curator for Patricia Jolynn Paulsell-Lathrop.
    James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, Attorney General, J. Elliott Baker, Irving Koch, Covington, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    Before CARTER, C.J., GUIDRY, and GAIDRY, JJ.
   GUIDRY, J.

|2The disabled victim of a motorcycle accident, through her curator, appeals a judgment denying claims for reimbursement of certain expenses from a fund established to pay medically-necessary expenses related to her injury.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While riding as a passenger on a motorcycle on June 13, 2005, Patricia Lathrop-Paulsell was involved in an accident, which caused her to sustain traumatic brain injuries that left her in a minimally-responsive, vegetative state. As a result of the injuries she sustained, a judgment of interdiction was entered against Patricia on February 14, 2006, whereby her mother, Juanita Christine Paulsell, was appointed her curator. Following her appointment as Patricia’s curator, Ms. Paulsell filed a petition for damages against various defendants, including the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”), but the matter proceeded to trial solely against the DOTD. During the trial, Ms. Paulsell and the DOTD reached a settlement by which Ms. Paulsell “agreed to accept the sum of one million seven hundred fifty thousand ($1,750,-000.00) Dollars, in cash and one million two hundred fifty thousand ($1,250,000.00) Dollars, to be paid as incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund, in full and final settlement of all claims [Patricia] has against the defendant, [the DOTD].” The trial court signed a consent judgment incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement on April 6, 2009.

Less than two years later, on November 29, 2010, Ms. Paulsell filed a “Petition to Enforce Judgment,” contending that the State of Louisiana, through the Office of Risk Management (ORM), had rejected certain expenses that she had submitted in accordance with the April 6, 2009 consent judgment. Therefore, Ms. |sPaulsell sought an order directing the ORM to disburse funds in accordance with the April 6, 2009 consent judgment. In response, the DOTD and the ORM filed an answer and exceptions pleading no cause of action, improper cumulation of actions, and prematurity. Thereafter, Ms. Paulsell filed a “Motion to Enforce Consent Judgment, for Declaratory Judgment and in Opposition to [Defendants’] Exceptions of Prematurity, Improper Cumulation and/or No Cause of Action and for Attorneys Fees.” By her motion, Ms. Paulsell again sought “enforcement” of the April 6, 2009 consent judgment. She also sought a declaratory ruling defining the term “related benefits” and declaring that she had the sole and exclusive right to determine what costs and expenses are to be submitted and paid for by the Future Medical Care Fund.

A hearing on the various exceptions filed by the DOTD and the ORM and the motion filed by Ms. Paulsell was held on October 24, 2011. The trial court rendered judgment sustaining the objections of no cause of action, improper cumulation of actions, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction raised in the exceptions filed by the DOTD and the ORM. The trial court denied Ms. Paulsell’s motion to enforce consent judgment and for declaratory relief as moot. It is from this judgment that Ms. Paulsell now appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in sustaining the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no cause of action, and improper cu-mulation of actions to dismiss her petition to enforce judgment.

DISCUSSION

The April 6, 2009 consent decree rendered judgment against the DOTD “in the full sum of one million seven hundred fifty thousand ($1,750,000.00) Dollars, in cash and one million two hundred fifty thousand ($1,250,000.00) Dollars, to be paid as incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund with no legal and/or judicial |interest to accrue....” In conjunction with this award, the consent judgment further orders that “the amount paid for future medical expenses ... in the amount of one million two hundred fifty thousand ($1,250,000.00) Dollars, are to be paid as incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund, as authorized by LSA-R.S. 39:1533.2, and that said funds will be paid directly to the medical provider as said expenses are incurred pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(e).”

The Future Medical Care Fund, as established in La. R.S. 39:1533.2, consists of “such monies transferred or appropriated to the fund, for the purposes of funding medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment rendered against the state or a state agency as provided by R.S. 13:5106 and as more specifically provided in R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c).” As for administration of the fund relative to personal injury claims against the state, La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) provides:

In any suit for personal injury against the state or a state agency wherein the court pursuant to judgment determines that the claimant is entitled to medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment, the court shall order that all medical care and related benefits incurred subsequent to judgment be paid from the Future Medical Care Fund as provided in R.S. 39:1533.2. Medical care and related benefits shall be paid directly to the provider as they are incurred. Nothing in this Subparagraph shall be construed to prevent the parties from entering into a settlement or compromise at any time whereby medical care and related benefits shall be provided but with the requirement that they shall be paid in accordance with this Subparagraph. [Emphasis added.]

The consent judgment rendered in this case complies with the provisions of La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c); therefore, Ms. Paul-sell is entitled to payment for all “medical care and related benefits” incurred on behalf of Patricia. Such “medical care and related benefits” are defined under La. R.S. 13:5106(D) to mean “all reasonable medical, surgical, hospitalization, physical rehabilitation, and custodial services, and includes drugs, prosthetic devices, and other similar materials reasonably necessary in the provision of such services.” It is Ms. Paulsell’s |,^contention that she has submitted several claims for such “medical care and related benefits” for Patricia, yet payment from the Future Medical Care Fund has not been authorized. In seeking redress for this failure, Ms. Paulsell revealed the additional issue of how and to whom should redress be sought.

In sustaining the various objections raised by the DOTD and the ORM, the trial court essentially found that Ms. Paul-sell’s complaints were administrative in nature, and as such, she first had to pursue administrative review prior to seeking judicial relief. Based on the record before us and the governing statutes, we disagree.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based on the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C.C.P. art. 2. Except as otherwise provided by the Louisiana Constitution, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters. La. Const. art. V, § 16. The term “original jurisdiction” designates the adjudicative tribunal in which the initial adjudication is made. When the original jurisdiction allocated to the various courts is circumscribed by the Louisiana Constitution, the Legislature may not alter such jurisdiction by statute. Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75, 79 (La.1990).

Objections of failure to exhaust administrative remedies are usually premised on one of two grounds: (1) that exclusive original jurisdiction over [ 6certain subject matter is granted to an administrative agency; or (2) that the legislature, by statutory enactment, has granted primary jurisdiction over certain subject matter to an administrative agency. The grant of exclusive jurisdiction of certain subject matters to an agency results in the subtraction of those matters from the district court’s jurisdiction. Jones v. Board of Ethics for Elected Officials, 96-2005, p. 3 (La.5/9/97), 694 So.2d 171, 172. The grant of original exclusive jurisdiction of designated subject matters to an agency can be contrasted with concurrent jurisdiction where the district court maintains original jurisdiction in certain matters at the same time that an agency or other court has been granted the same original jurisdiction. Louisiana Retailers Mutual Insurance Company v. DeRamus, 06-1427, p. 7 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/4/07), 960 So.2d 1048, 1052, writ denied, 07-1189 (La.9/21/07), 964 So.2d 336. The doctrine of “primary jurisdiction” is applicable when a court and state/governmental agency have concurrent jurisdiction over a claim or a dispute leading to potential conflicts on how such disputes are resolved. In such cases, a court, at its discretion, may dismiss the claims before it and defer the matter to the agency that has been granted primary jurisdiction over the claims. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 07-2371, p. 5 n. 6 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 22 n. 6.

The distinction between primary jurisdiction and the exhaustion rule (exclusive jurisdiction) is that primary jurisdiction applies when concurrent jurisdiction exists between the courts and the administrative agency; and the exhaustion rule applies when exclusive jurisdiction exists in the administrative agency, and the courts have only appellate, as opposed to original, jurisdiction to review the agency’s decisions. Daily Advertiser v. Trans-La, a Division of Atmos Energy Corporation, 612 So.2d 7, 27 (La.1993). Stated another way, primary ^jurisdiction applies when a claim is originally cognizable in a court. The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies when a claim is cognizable in the first instance only in an administrative agency. In exhaustion cases, judicial proceedings are premature until the administrative process has been completed, while in primary jurisdiction cases the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative agency of issues, which under a regulatory scheme, are within the agency’s special competence. Daily Advertiser, 612 So.2d at 27 n. 31.

We have not discovered nor has the DOTD or the ORM identified any constitutional provision wherein exclusive original jurisdiction has been granted to an administrative agency over claims involving the Future Medical Care Fund. In the absence of constitutional authority expressly granting exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative agency or other tribunal, the district court cannot be held to lack' subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Paulsell’s claims. See La. Const. art. V, § 16.

Still, the Legislature, of course, is free to enact procedures for initial submission of claims to an administrative agency for review, as long as the action of the administrative agency does not constitute the exercise of exclusive, original jurisdiction. See Pope v. State, 99-2559, p. 12 (La.6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713, 720. And in such cases where the regulatory scheme demonstrates that the subject matter has been legislatively determined to be within the special competence and expertise of an administrative agency, then a court should defer to the administrative agency and suspend the judicial process pending the deferral. See Daily Advertiser, 612 So.2d at 27 n. 31; Steeg v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 329 So.2d 719, 722 (La.1976).

In Kelty v. Brumfield, 93-1142 (La.2/25/94), 633 So.2d 1210, 1215 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that “the determination of whether an administrative | ^agency has exclusive statutory jurisdiction of an issue requires detailed analysis of the statutory provisions.” In that case, the Court -found that the initial adjudication of the plaintiffs’ dispute regarding their child’s entitlement to future medical care and related benefits under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, La. R.S. 40:1299.41-1299.48, was vested in “the state agency or agencies having exclusive authority to pay, reject, settle, or monitor all claims and to administer the fund from which they must be paid.” Kelty, 633 So.2d at 1215. Looking at the applicable legislative scheme as presented in La. R.S. 40:1299.43(0 and La. R.S. 40:1299.44, the Court concluded that “the legislature clearly intended to eliminate all judicial power in initial decision making or supervision over medical and related care claims and to vest such exclusive jurisdiction in the agency legislatively assigned to administer the [Patients’ Compensation Fund], subject only to court review of the agency’s actions pursuant to well established principles of judicial review.” Kelty, 633 So.2d at 1218-19; see also Bijou v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 95-3074 (La.9/5/96), 679 So.2d 893, 898; and Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board v. Edwards, 39,149, pp. 6-7 (La.App.2d Cir.12/15/04), 891 So.2d 85, 89

Specifically, La. R.S. 40:1299.43 provides in pertinent part:

C. Once a judgment is entered in favor of a patient who is found to be in need of future medical care and related benefits that will be incurred after the date of the response to the special interrogatory by the jury or the court’s finding or a settlement is reached between a patient and the patient’s compensation fund in which the provision of medical care and related benefits that will be incurred after the date of settlement is agreed upon and continuing as long as medical or surgical attention is reasonably necessary, the patient may make a claim to the patient’s compensation fund through the board for all future medical care and related benefits directly or indirectly made necessary by the health care provider’s malpractice unless the patient refuses to allow them to be furnished.
D. Payments for medical care and related benefits shall be paid by the patient’s compensation fund without regard to the five hundred thousand dollar limitation imposed in R.S. 40:1299.42.
RE. (1) The district court from which final judgment issues shall have continuing jurisdiction in cases where medical care and related benefits are determined to be needed by the patient.
(2) The court shall award reasonable attorney fees to the claimant’s attorney if the court finds that the patient’s compensation fund unreasonably fails to pay for medical care within thirty days after submission of a claim for payment of such benefits.

Further, La. R.S. 40:1299.44(D)(2)(a) and (3) respectively provide:

(2)(a) The board shall be responsible, and have full authority under law, for the management, administration, operation and defense of the fund in accordance with the provisions of this Part.
(3) The board shall have authority, in accordance with applicable provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, to adopt and promulgate such rules, regulations and standards as it may deem necessary or advisable to implement the authority and discharge the responsibilities conferred and imposed on the board by this Part.

A review of La. R.S. 39:1533.2 and La. 13:5106 does not reveal a similar regulatory scheme as outlined under the medical malpractice act. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106(B)(8)(c) simply provides that “the court shall order that all medical care and related benefits incurred subsequent to judgment be paid from the Future Medical Care Fund as provided in R.S. 39:1533.2. Medical care and related benefits shall be paid directly to the provider as they are incurred.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 39:1533.2(B) states that “[t]he fund shall be administered by the treasurer on behalf of the office of risk management for the benefit of claimants suing for personal injury who are entitled to medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment. Except for costs or expenses of administration, this fund shall be used only for payment of losses associated with such claims.”

According to La. R.S. 39:1535, the ORM has the following, non-exclusive duties and responsibilities:

A. It is the responsibility of the commissioner of administration through the office of risk management to manage all state insurance | ^covering property and liability exposure, through commercial underwriters or by self-insuring. Personnel benefits and group health and life coverage are excepted. It is also the responsibility of the commissioner of administration through the office of risk management to manage all tort claims made against the state or any state agency whether or not covered by the Self-Insurance Fund.
B. The duties and responsibilities of the office of risk management shall include but not be limited to the following:
(1) Administration of the state’s risk management program.
(2) Recommendation to the legislature of the amounts of premium charges assessable to the various state agencies.
(3) Provision of claim adjustment services through either employees or contractual services.
(4) Assist its counsel in the defense of claims against the state.
(5) Investigation of claims falling within the scope of this Chapter.
(6) Negotiation, compromise, and settlement of all claims against the state or state agencies covered by the Self-Insurance Fund, and all tort claims against the state or state agencies whether or not covered by the Self-Insurance Fund; however, all such compromises and settlements shall be made in return for a complete release and waiver of all further liability of the state, state agencies, and of the officers, officials, and employees covered by R.S. 13:5108.2. No settlement over twenty-five thousand dollars per claimant shall be made without the approval of the attorney general’s office.

As observed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hampton v. Greenfield, 618 So.2d 859, 863-64 (La.1993), missing from the statutory scheme outlined in La. R.S. 39:1527-1547 “is clear authority requiring the Office of Risk Management to pay final judgments against the state.” As we find there is no established administrative remedy in place that applies to the claim for future medical care benefits asserted by Ms. Paulsell, we conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Ms. Paulsell must pursue unavailable administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief. See Cheron v. LCS Corrections Services, Inc., 04-0703, p. 15 (La.1/19/05), 891 So.2d 1250, 1259-60; compare Steeg, 329 So.2d at 722; Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board, 39,149 at pp. 6-7, 891 So.2d at 89. We therefore reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment sustaining the | n declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, as we have found that no available administrative remedies exist for Ms. Paulsell to pursue, we likewise reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment sustaining the dilatory exception raising the objection of improper cumulation of actions.

Finally, we must consider the correctness of that portion of the trial court’s judgment sustaining the peremptory exception asserting no cause of action as to the DOTD. The DOTD contends that the trial court correctly found that Ms. Paul-sell had no cause of action against it, because the ORM is the administrative agency that receives, evaluates and rules upon claims for payment from the Future Medical Care Fund.

A cause of action, when used in the context of the peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiffs right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. State, Division of Administration, Office of Facility Planning and Control v. Infinity Surety Agency, L.L.C., 10-2264, p. 8 (La.5/10/11), 63 So.3d 940, 945. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. The exception is triable solely on the face of the petition and any attached documents. Baton Rouge Computer Sales, Inc. v. Miller-Conrad, 99-1200, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir 5/23/00), 767 So.2d 763, 765. The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiffs behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. State, Division of Administration, Office of Facility Planning and Control, 10-2264 at p. 9, 63 So.3d at 946.

In the petition to enforce judgment, Ms. Paulsell alleged:

112-L
During the trial on the merits of the claim of Patricia Paulsell-Lathrop on December 8, 2008, the [DOTD] and the Plaintiff agreed upon a settlement to compromise and settle the claim, thereby terminating the trial and bringing an end to the litigation.
2.
As part of the terms of the settlement, the [DOTD] agreed to and did enter into a Consent Judgment ... attached to this Petition as Exhibit A.
3.
The terms of the settlement included payment of $1,250,000.00 ‘as incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund’ and this Court duly ordered the [DOTD] to make payment of these funds ‘as incurred’ from the Future Medical Care Fund.

The consent judgment at issue in this matter specifically recites “that there be judgment herein ... against the defendant, [the DOTD]-” While the judgment further recites that the obligation for future medical expenses in the amount of $1,250,000.00 is “to be paid as incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund,” we do not construe this language as releasing the DOTD from liability for this award under the judgment. Instead, the language clearly conveys an obligation by the DOTD to see that the terms of the judgment are fulfilled. Thus, we find that the trial court also erred in sustaining the peremptory exception asserting no cause of action as to the DOTD.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court erred in sustaining the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper cumulation, and no cause of action to dismiss Ms. Paulsell’s petition to enforce judgment. We reverse the judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for | ^further proceedings. All costs of this appeal, in the amount of $2,297.01, are assessed to the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development and the Division of Administration, Office of Risk Management.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . In the petition, Ms. Paulsell alleged that the June 13, 2005 accident was caused in part by defective road conditions.

      . The DOTD and the ORM filed a separate pleading again excepting to Ms. Paulsell's petition on the grounds previously raised, but also added the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

      .In the petition to enforce judgment, Ms. Paulsell generally alleged that "certain expenses” presented to ORM were rejected and specifically alleged that "certain future expenses necessitated by the care and treatment of Patricia Paulsell-Lathrop, such as the purchase of a handicap accessible van and living accommodations in lieu of nursing home or skill nursing care were discussed and also rejected for payment or reimbursement.

      . See e.g. La. Const. art. IV, § 21; art. V, §§ 15, 16, 18 & 20; and art. X, § 12; see also Pope v. State, 99-2559, pp. 7-8 n. 11 (La.6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713, 717 n. 11.

      . See e.g. La. R.S. 15:1171-1179; La. R.S. 22:2191-2208; La. R.S. 30:12;

      . Objections of no cause of action and prematurity raised by the ORM were "denied as moot” in the judgment.

      . And while in the answer to the petition to enforce judgment, the ORM “admits that it has an obligation under the Consent Judgment to pay from the Future Medical Care Fund the future medical expenses of [Patricia] ... up to $1,250,000.00, pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5106 and 39:1533.2,” this assumption of liability by the ORM does not operate to relieve the DOTD of liability. See La. C.C. arts. 1821 and 1823.